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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 6 March 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. YU Pei-Wen

(China)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina: Mr. A. DUMONT  
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. A. BEHI  
Mr. P. NOLAN  
Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Mr. P. BERG  
Mr. J-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE  
Mr. P. BORIO

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING  
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. D. McPHAIL  
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

China: Mr. YU Pei-Wen  
Mr. LIANG Yu-Fan  
Mr. YANG Hu-Shan  
Mr. LIANG De-Fen  
Mr. YANG Ming-Liang  
Mr. LI Zhang-He  
Mr. XU Liu-Gen

Cuba: Mrs. V. BORODOWSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI  
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI  
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI  
Mr. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER  
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN  
Mr. S. SARAN  
Mr. B. SHETTY

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN  
Mr. I.M. DAMANIK  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. D.B. SULEIMAN

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO  
Mr. M. MORENO  
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. T. NONOYAMA  
Mr. K. MIYATA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. M.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. H. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN-  
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI  
Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. J. MARKER  
Mr. H. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. H. PAC  
Mr. J. CIAŁOWICZ

Romania: Mr. C. ENE  
Mr. O. IONESCU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. L. NORBERG  
Mr. S. STROMBACK  
Dr. J. LUNDEN  
Dr. J. FRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN  
Mr. V.A. GANJA  
Mr. Y.P. KLIUKIN  
Mr. B.I. KORNEYENKO  
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY  
Mr. J. CALVERT  
Mr. H. DALEY  
Ms. B. MURRAY  
Mr. P. SALGADO  
Mr. M. SANCHES

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. KALONJI THSIKALA KAKWAKA

Secretary to the Committee  
on Disarmament and  
Personal Representative of  
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should first like to greet you as Chairman for the month of March. My delegation wishes you all success in your chairmanship, and offers you its fullest collaboration. I should also like, through you, to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador McPhail, for the successful and fruitful way in which he conducted our work last month.

The question of the banning of nuclear-weapon tests has been one of the main preoccupations of the United Nations. Since 1954, when the first initiatives for the banning of such tests were introduced in the General Assembly, there has been much talk and discussion on this question.

We are aware that very little that is new or original can be said as a contribution to the discussion on this problem of such importance for all mankind.

All the same, since my country is one of the new members of the Committee on Disarmament, admitted when the membership was enlarged last year, we should like to make a number of comments in order to present our position on the main aspects of the agenda item concerning a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

It must be recognized that there have been some positive developments in the course of the discussion process which followed the signing of the partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty concluded in 1963.

Firstly, since 1967 the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been conducting negotiations on the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

Secondly, since 1976, as a result of the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union have refrained from carrying out underground nuclear tests of over 150 kilotons.

Thirdly, since 1976 the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been engaged in studying the measures of international co-operation which could be taken to detect and identify seismic events, so as to be able to distinguish natural earth movements from those resulting from nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

During this period, however, underground nuclear tests have continued without any reduction in their number, and in fact the rate of testing has increased in the last three years: in 1977, 35 tests were recorded; in 1978 the number rose to 48. In 1979, 43 tests were carried out.

During the first session of the Committee on Disarmament, this item was included in the agenda, and in the programme of work of the second part two meetings were set aside for its consideration, in view of the importance and high priority attached to it.

Unfortunately, it could be seen from the outset that a sector of the Committee was attempting to limit consideration of the item to a study of the work carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, thus preventing the Committee from concentrating on the main question, which in our opinion should be the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Without neglecting the importance of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in the search for satisfactory solutions to the problems involved in the verification of compliance with the ban, the countries of the Group of 21 repeatedly called on the Powers participating in the trilateral negotiations to inform the Committee about the progress achieved.

It was only when the session was about to end that the representative of the United Kingdom, acting also on behalf of the United States and the Soviet Union, made a statement on the state of the negotiations.

The fundamental points of that statement were as follows:

1. The tripartite negotiations are being pursued intensively.
2. There is agreement on the following questions:
  - (a) The treaty should establish a ban on any test explosion in any environment;
  - (b) The question of explosions for peaceful purposes will be the subject of a protocol, which will be an integral part of the treaty;
  - (c) After a certain period, the parties to the treaty may wish to hold a conference to review its operation of the treaty;
  - (d) The verification of compliance with the treaty will be carried out by national technical means, with the possibility of on-site inspection;

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

(e) An important aspect of the question of verification is the exchange of seismic data; the three negotiating countries praised the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and stated that the Group's recommendations would greatly influence the way in which the exchange of data was implemented in practice; to assist that exchange, the three negotiating Powers are in agreement that a committee of experts drawn from the parties to the treaty should be established;

(f) Although there is agreement on the main elements of verification, negotiations are still proceeding on the detailed arrangements.

The tripartite report ends by stating that the three negotiating Powers recognize the close, legitimate and valued interest of the Committee in the earliest completion of the negotiations.

In document CD/50, which contains an appraisal of the work done during the first session, the Group of 21 expressed its dissatisfaction with this report, which had been presented at the very end of the session; what had been expected was a comprehensive and detailed report on the state of the negotiations and the areas of agreement and disagreement.

In fact, as pointed out by the Group of 21 in its document, what the report showed was that the holding of the trilateral negotiations did not justify delaying any further the initiation of concrete multilateral negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament.

Venezuela, which is one of the countries belonging to the Group of 21, fully shares and supports these views. Similarly, my country wholly endorses the document which contains the statement of the Group of 21 on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty presented last Tuesday by the representative of Kenya, which has been distributed officially as document CD/72.

The Venezuelan position on the main questions involved in this item may be summarized as follows:

1. Venezuela attaches top priority to this question. The General Assembly has on various occasions ascribed the highest priority and urgency to this item. In turn, the Final Document of the special session on disarmament stresses the need for the negotiations now in progress on a nuclear-test-ban treaty to be concluded



(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

urgently, so that the result may be submitted for full consideration by the Committee on Disarmament. In this connexion, Venezuela supports the view that the Committee on Disarmament can and should undertake substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty without having to wait until the trilateral negotiations are concluded, since there is sufficient suitable material for starting multilateral negotiations. This material will be supplemented and enriched by the study which the General Assembly requested from the Secretary-General in resolution 34/422.

2. Venezuela considers that the comprehensive test-ban treaty will be one of the most important steps along the road to nuclear disarmament, inasmuch as it will help to slow nuclear proliferation both horizontally and vertically. As to horizontal proliferation, the comprehensive test-ban treaty is very closely linked with the non-proliferation Treaty, particularly as regards performance of the obligation contained in article VI.

3. The ban established by the treaty should cover all explosions, in any environment, of any size and for ever. In our opinion, a partial ban will run counter to the objective of general acceptance which the treaty should necessarily try to attain.

4. As regards verification, while we recognize that this is the most delicate and difficult of the problems involved, we believe that the nuclear Powers should agree as rapidly as possible on a system which both safeguards the security of each of them and ensures fulfilment of the obligations they enter into under the treaty. The system should consist of a balanced combination of national and international methods of verification, including on-site inspections when justified, and the remote detection and identification of seismic phenomena.

5. On the question of participation, we believe that the parties to the treaty should include not only the nuclear-weapon States but also all States possessing the nuclear technology for testing nuclear devices by means involving their detonation. In the first stage, while preparation of the treaty is being completed, the nuclear Powers should impose a moratorium on themselves by voluntarily renouncing all nuclear tests without any kind of limitation (duration of the moratorium, environment in which the tests are conducted, power of the explosion, quantity).

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

6. As regards the question of tests for peaceful purposes, the solution to this question apparently agreed upon by the three negotiating Powers, i.e., the formula of the separate protocol which should form part of the treaty, only covers the formal aspect of the problem.

It remains to see how the substance of the question is to be dealt with. In this connexion we believe it is essential to bear in mind that in the present state of development of nuclear technology there are no exclusively peaceful nuclear explosions. Any nuclear test has its extension in the military field. The nuclear-test ban should therefore be absolute and cover all nuclear explosions. Only in very special circumstances and under very strict control by an international authority may a State be authorized to resort to the detonation of nuclear devices, always provided that the goal pursued is demonstrably peaceful, and adequate steps are taken to prevent use for military purposes.

For my delegation, and I am sure that the majority of the members of the Committee are in the same position, it would be extremely useful to know in detail the agreements reached on these and other questions by the Powers taking part in the tripartite negotiations. We are therefore gratified by the announcement made by the United Kingdom representative at the plenary meeting last Tuesday to the effect that his Government is very alive to the Committee's interest in being informed about the progress of the negotiations, and that it attaches great importance to the need for providing the Committee with detailed information on the progress of the negotiations. According to what the United Kingdom representative has told us, negotiations are now in progress to determine the time when that information will be given to us. If I understood correctly, this statement was fully endorsed by the representative of the United States.

We consider this statement from two of the States taking part in the trilateral negotiations to be really important and encouraging. We hope, however, that the information supplied to us will really be detailed and extensive, and also that it will be supplied opportunely, in other words, at a suitable moment in our work, which will allow us to study it with due care. This information would also represent a valuable contribution to the work of the working group proposed by the Group of 21, a proposal which we hope will receive prompt acceptance by the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, permit me to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month. Though you are called upon to discharge these functions soon after your country took up its seat in the Committee, we have no doubt that your wealth of experience in the field of multilateral negotiations will be of considerable benefit to the Committee. I should also like to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador D.S. McPhail of Canada, for the tremendous work he did during the month of February when he was Chairman.

No matter what the criteria we employ to define the term "ripeness", which has often been used in this Committee, be it on the basis of exhaustive consideration within the Committee on Disarmament and its predecessor, or on the basis of the quantum of materials available, or even the relentless pressure of the international community which was symbolized by the Final Document and annual General Assembly resolutions, no matter whether we use any or all of these criteria, the question of the cessation of nuclear tests is overdue for concrete negotiations by the Committee. The statement made on behalf of the Group of 21 by the distinguished representative of Kenya at the meeting of this Committee on 4 March has clearly made this point.

The impact which a nuclear-test ban would have on the nuclear arms race is pointed out in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. The paragraph points out, inter alia, that:

"The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to ... ending qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and ... preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

This importance had, even before the special session, been embodied in multilateral, legally binding instruments. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water adopted in 1963 had in its third preambular paragraph, referring to the parties to the Treaty:

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

"Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end ...".

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted in 1968, after recalling in a preambular paragraph the determination expressed by the parties to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, expressed in its article VI:

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament ...".

The extent to which these pledges have been carried out will be assessed fully during the Second Review Conference of Parties to the NPT, scheduled to be held in a few months' time. This much, however, one can say, at this stage. If the Review Conference were to convene and end without a CTBT having been negotiated or being actively negotiated, then it seems to my delegation a great disservice would have been done to the cause of non-proliferation.

Leaving aside for the moment the question of vertical proliferation, horizontal proliferation has for some time been under severe threat of erosion. In the last six months a most ominous development has been the reported test explosion by South Africa either singly or in league with Israel. Neither South Africa nor Israel is a signatory to the NPT, and neither is likely to become a signatory. Yet this fact has not stopped some nuclear-weapon States and some non-nuclear-weapon States who are nevertheless the exporters of nuclear technology from supplying nuclear materials to these two countries, ostensibly for use in their peaceful nuclear programmes. How can the best of friends of these two countries be certain of the channel to which they direct their nuclear programme, when neither is party to a legally binding instrument forbidding them to conduct nuclear-test explosions? If they hide under the cloak of the discriminatory nature of the NPT, is it not time they should be presented with an alternative means of showing their true intentions, through a CTBT?

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

Turning to vertical proliferation, I need only say, what everyone knows, that hardly any progress has been made, in the race among the nuclear-weapon States. Only a few days ago, one of them conducted yet another test, no doubt to over-perfect an already perfected arsenal.

These instances of both vertical and horizontal proliferations, or threat of proliferation, only point to one thing: that non-proliferation cannot and should not be based exclusively on the NPT. Non-proliferation in the 1980s based exclusively on the NPT will receive (from all indications) a severe setback in the light of the assault on it by parties and non-parties alike. NPT would have to be complemented very soon by other concrete steps, and a more immediately attainable concrete step seems to us to be a CTBT. Such a treaty, we hope, will present itself to be a less restrictive, less discriminatory and more egalitarian instrument than the NPT, and should therefore commend itself to those who are presently outside the NPT. This was why, in my opening statement of 7 February 1980, I urged the nuclear-weapon States not to put any obstacle in the way of the Committee on Disarmament in its need to establish an ad hoc working group to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Incidentally, I may add that the result of INFCE has indicated that it is unlikely that there will be agreement for the control of development of the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes through the so-called "Suppliers' Club". It is clear that it will not be possible to restrict such a use, and that the only way in which there could be an assurance that countries that want to take advantage of the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes will not divert such uses into non-peaceful purposes would be through a multilaterally agreed instrument such as a CTBT.

The situation in the Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating body, is different this year from what it was either last year or in the CCD. The CCD had only three of the five nuclear-weapon States participating in its work. The Committee on Disarmament, on the other hand, started with four nuclear-weapon States and, happily, this year, all the five

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

nuclear-weapon States are now participating in our work. Not only this, in one of the informal meetings we held on the question of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, during this current session, these two nuclear-weapon States, who have since joined the Committee, expressed their readiness to participate in the Committee's negotiations. Certainly, we have two alternatives, if a comprehensive test-ban treaty is really to achieve its purpose. One is to express the hope that the two nuclear-weapon States will join the other three nuclear-weapon States who are currently conducting negotiations outside the Committee on Disarmament. This is an alternative which does not commend itself to my delegation, and which, I am sure, does not commend itself to any member of the CD, including the two nuclear-weapon States concerned. The other alternative is to have the two nuclear-weapon States associated, at an early stage, with the negotiations of a CTBT, since it is the hope of my delegation and, I am sure, that of the international community, that these two will be able to become parties to the treaty when it is concluded.

Just as it will be unrealistic to think of a CTB negotiation without the participation of the three nuclear-weapon States who are currently conducting trilateral negotiations, so also in the view of my delegation is it unrealistic to presume that the other two nuclear-weapon States will be willing to accept a treaty negotiated without their active participation. Apart, therefore, from the inescapable role of the Committee itself in the negotiation of a multilateral treaty on disarmament, the presence of the two nuclear-weapon States who are not participating in the current trilateral negotiations makes the subject of the CTB vital for early involvement of the Committee in its negotiation.

The only reason which my delegation can find for further delay by the tripartite negotiators in submitting to the CD as detailed an account of their negotiations as possible, as well as for them to agree that the Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group should commence effective work, is if the tripartite negotiators themselves have concluded that the treaty they are negotiating will not commend itself to the two nuclear-weapon States not participating. We hope

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

that that will not be so. Of course, such a possibility may exist if the treaty they are thinking of is limited, or through an introduction of other discriminatory elements, such as the exemption of laboratory tests. We hope no such difficulty occurs.

If a CTBT is to be an effective multilateral treaty, then the Committee on Disarmament must have an early and important role to play in it. The best help which the tripartite negotiators can give to the Committee is at least to place before it the areas in which they have so far reached some measure of agreement as well as indicate areas of their further work. In the light of the delicate nature of these negotiations, and this has often been stressed by the spokesmen for the three nuclear-weapon States, my delegation would have thought that they would be the first to accept a working method which enables the Committee to make progress in a very confidential and not too formalized setting, such as will prevail in an ad hoc working group. It has to be said that, even in such areas where agreement has been reached among the three nuclear-weapon States, comments by the non-nuclear-weapon States members of the CD, and by the two nuclear-weapon States also members of the CD who nevertheless are not participating in the current trilateral negotiations, will be most vital, and could assist the tripartite negotiators either in pursuing further any particular course in their negotiations or in altering such a course as a result of views expressed.

For instance, the areas to which the ad hoc working group can for a beginning direct its energy may include the comprehensive character of the treaty, and several views have been expressed on this; it can also usefully take on the question of the duration of the treaty, the question of complaints and verification procedures, and the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, which are of interest not only to the trilateral negotiators but to all members of the Committee. There are also areas where the trilateral negotiators can, with appropriate leadership, arising from their negotiations, assist the work of this Committee without necessarily jeopardizing their own separate negotiations, the principle of which, of course, has been accepted.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

We hope therefore that they will heed our call, agree to the creation of a working group on a CTBT and assist the working group with at least as much devotion as we understand they have brought to their tripartite negotiations.

Let me turn briefly to the subject of chemical weapons. The latest General Assembly resolution, 34/72, urged the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, at the beginning of its 1980 session, negotiations on an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as a matter of high priority, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. This is as explicit as a mandate can be.

In the opinion of my delegation, a working group is now overdue to be created by the Committee on Disarmament to take on the negotiations on chemical weapons.

Considerable grounds have been covered in this field. There are various draft conventions presented by various groups. There also exists a working paper presented by the non-aligned and neutral countries. We have also the bilateral negotiations that have been going on for some time and some detailed account of which we were given towards the end of our last session. The creation of an ad hoc working group would enable the Committee to embark on a structural consideration of this issue.

The working group would have to go through and trace the work that has been done so far and start putting this into a format that would assist the Committee to undertake the beginning of drafting the convention.

Further elaboration would have to be borne in mind, would still be necessary, anyhow, in the various aspects of the chemical-weapons convention. Areas like the scope of the convention, the criteria for the definition of agents, verification, which we understood is still a sticky problem, the mandate for the "Consultative Committee", which we understood also is under consideration, and the different modes of verification would still need to be



(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

explored. Other issues, like the time frame for the declaration of stocks and production facilities, are all areas which can usefully be further discussed and negotiated by such a working group.

May I say briefly that my own delegation of course is strongly in favour of the full comprehensive convention which would prohibit all activities relating to chemical warfare agents and weapons, and which would provide for their destruction. We should emphasize that the destruction of stockpiles should be one of the most important aspects of the ban, and total declaration of stocks in the hands of those who possess them should be made at the time the convention enters into force. On verification, of course, we envisage a system that will help to combine both national and international means of verification necessary for double assurance and confidence.

Some delegations have expressed their views on what the ad hoc working group could usefully do or could not usefully do. I think that the exchange of views has led to the conclusion by my own delegation that there is enough work, given the goodwill, for such a working group to be able usefully to advance the course of negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament on this all-important subject.

We think that such an ad hoc working group would most effectively articulate all the various proposals and suggestions and channel them towards the goal of a convention. The signs are ominous that delay in undertaking negotiations quickly in the CD on chemical weapons may encourage feverish activities to develop or to test, or in fact to use as a means of testing, the effectiveness of these excessively inhumane weapons, and we hope that the Committee should not open itself to charges that it has contributed to such a development.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ISSR/ELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, first of all, may I express gratitude to the representative of Canada, Ambassador McPhail, for his skilful chairing of the Committee during the month of February. Under his leadership, the Committee conducted an important part of its work: it held a general debate, it adopted its agenda, and it exchanged views on the question of the programme of work of the Committee and the establishment of working groups. I would also like to extend wishes of success to the representative of the People's Republic of China, Ambassador Yu Pei-Wen, in his responsible work as Chairman of the Committee for the month of March.

The Soviet Union attaches enormous importance to the question of a nuclear-test ban. To enumerate all the concrete proposals made by the Soviet Government with a view to halting nuclear-weapon tests would take too long. I would only remind you of the most important initiatives taken by the Soviet Union for this lofty purpose. The Soviet Union was the first nuclear-weapon State to support an unconditional halt to nuclear-weapon tests. On 10 May 1955, the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission was presented with a proposal from the Soviet Government concerning arms reductions, a nuclear-weapon ban and the removal of the threat of a new war, one of the most important points in the proposal being the question of the cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

In late 1962, the Soviet Union once again emphasized the desirability of reaching agreement on the complete and general cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, and it called upon all the nuclear Powers to come to an agreement on the basis of the joint memorandum of non-aligned States submitted to the Committee on Disarmament for its consideration in the spring of that year. At that time, the Soviet Union's partners in the tripartite negotiations on this question opposed a complete and general nuclear-test ban. Thus, as a first step, a treaty was signed in 1963 prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, a treaty which became known as the Moscow treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in the three environments.

After the conclusion of this important treaty, the Soviet Union kept on trying to obtain a ban on underground tests as well. On 21 July 1974, in a statement made in Warsaw, L.I. Brezhnev said: "The Soviet Union is ready, in particular, to reach an agreement on the complete prohibition of all underground nuclear-weapon tests." The Soviet Union's position of principle on the question

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is reflected in the decisions taken at the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Acting on the basis of this position, the Soviet Union proposed the inclusion in the agenda of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations of the question of the conclusion of an international treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and it prepared a draft of such a treaty, which it submitted for consideration at that session. The Soviet Union's proposal received broad support in the United Nations. A General Assembly resolution adopted on the initiative of a group of socialist and non-aligned countries called upon all nuclear-weapon States, along with twenty-five to thirty non-nuclear-weapon States, to enter into negotiations, not later than 31 March 1976, with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Unfortunately, because of the negative stance of certain nuclear-weapon States, these negotiations were never begun.

In an effort to achieve some progress with regard to the complete cessation of nuclear tests, in 1977 the Soviet Union came forward with an initiative concerning tripartite negotiations involving the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Soviet Union attaches the greatest importance to these negotiations. The constructive steps taken at these negotiations by the Soviet Union with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions and ensuring the rapid conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests are well known. The Soviet Union continues to do everything in its power to ensure the successful conclusion of these negotiations.

With regard to the submission of information on progress made at these negotiations, such information will be submitted to the Committee at an appropriate time by agreement with the other States participating in the tripartite negotiations.

At the same time, we are sympathetic towards the desire of States members of the Committee on Disarmament, and of the world community at large, to take further steps towards achieving the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The expansion of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament and the fact that now all five nuclear Powers are present in it is rightly regarded by many States as a factor likely to favour the solution of the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

question of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. As before, we believe that a long-term and effective solution to the problem of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests can be achieved, provided, of course, that all the nuclear Powers without exception are parties to the corresponding agreement. In the light of the foregoing, the Soviet delegation does not object to the establishment of a working group on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, on condition that representatives of all the nuclear Powers take part in it and that its purpose is to discuss questions relating to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

In the second part of today's statement, the Soviet delegation intends to deal with a problem to the speedy resolution of which we attach particular importance, namely the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. From the earliest years of its existence, the Soviet Union has actively campaigned for the prohibition of chemical weapons, and it is not our fault that this goal has not yet been achieved. In the early 1920s, the young Soviet State was already demanding an unconditional ban on the use of poisonous substances and gases. The Soviet Union, among the first to sign the Geneva Protocol of 1925, has always acted, and continues to act, in accordance with the provisions, principles and goals of that Protocol. Moreover, attaching great importance to the Protocol, the Soviet Union has devoted a great deal of effort towards making it a genuinely universal instrument. I would like to point out that the goal of the prohibition of chemical weapons is clearly formulated in the decisions taken at the twenty-fifth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, decisions which lie at the base of all our States' foreign-policy activity at this time.

In accordance with these positions, the Soviet delegation is ready to take an active part in the Committee's consideration of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, and it will do all it can to advance the multilateral negotiations on this question. Recent discussions in the Committee have concentrated a great deal on the organizational aspects of the discussion of this problem. The Soviet delegation does not, of course, wish to belittle the importance of the organizational aspects of the matter, but we do not regard this as the main problem. The main thing for us is to find mutually acceptable solutions to key problems. We are pleased to note that most other members of the Committee take the same approach.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The problems which we have to solve in order to reach agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons are many. They concern the scope of the prohibition, the arrangements and deadlines for compliance with the various obligations under the future convention and, lastly, control. A large number of working papers and other proposals have been submitted on all these questions. A draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries has been on the negotiating table since 1972. Finding a common denominator for all these proposals is, of course, no easy task, particularly since time does not stand still. Those participating in the negotiations are constantly faced with new questions requiring study from all angles.

Under these circumstances, we, as in the past, do not object to the establishment within the framework of the Committee of a special working group whose ultimate purpose would be to prepare a draft international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At this stage, however, the working group's mandate should be restricted. It would be unrealistic to set ourselves ambitious goals right from the start without due thought as to where to begin. It would seem to us that the most efficient way of proceeding this year would be to discuss and work out the basic elements or contents of the future convention.

On the substance of the problems of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet delegation intends to state its position at a later stage, in the working group as well as in the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of the USSR for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, on taking the floor today, I should like first of all to join with the preceding speakers in welcoming you and congratulating you on becoming chairman of the Committee. The Italian delegation offers you its best wishes for success in carrying out this high and delicate task.

Allow me on the same occasion to tell your predecessor, Mr. McPhail, the distinguished representative of Canada, how sensible we have been of the intelligent and unwearied efforts he has made to plan the organization of our work.

Although we may be glad that we have adopted a realistic and balanced agenda, we can only regret that it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on the work programme and the establishment of the subsidiary organs needed to open realistic negotiations.

It is our impression that broad agreement had been reached on the desirability of setting up four working groups: namely for chemical weapons, negative guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. What remains to do now is to define their terms of reference in a generally acceptable way.

It is our conviction that if we show a spirit of understanding and of compromise, it should not be difficult to complete this task swiftly, and thereby to avoid perpetuating a painfully prolonged discussion which would ultimately be inimical to the progress of our work.

My delegation would like to make some remarks today concerning a problem to which everyone appears to assign the highest priority, namely the problem of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban.

Since I mentioned a moment ago certain aspects of procedure relating to the organization of our work, it must be noted that at this stage there is no agreement within the Committee as to whether a working group on the test ban should be established.

My delegation for its part has a very open mind on the subject and is very flexible in its position. If, however, it did not prove possible to set up a working group at the moment, we should nevertheless not lose sight of the need to reaffirm the role and the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament in this respect, and to work out an approach likely to favour the beginning of a process of real negotiation on the basic problem.

(Mr. Cordero di Montezemolo, Italy)

What has to be done here is, among other things, to go more deeply into and acquire a better understanding of the relationship -- necessarily a relationship of complementarity -- between the current trilateral negotiations and the work of the Committee. It will be our task to measure realistically and in a pragmatic way the concrete possibilities of our actions, so as to achieve a better articulation and harmonization of the Committee's efforts with the negotiations already in progress.

Resolution A/RES/34/73, of the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations "Reaffirming its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments would be in the interests of all mankind", shows us clearly what road to take. On the one hand, the resolution "Requests the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on such a treaty, as a matter of the highest priority." On the other hand, the resolution "Calls upon the three negotiating nuclear weapon States to use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament".

Our session has just begun, and we would therefore like to hope that the three States engaged in the trilateral negotiations will be able to inform us of the positive outcome of their consultations at an early date.

On this subject we have noted with interest the statement made at our last meeting by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

My delegation is of course aware of the special responsibility resting upon the Powers with the biggest nuclear arsenals. Their interests -- of security and balance -- are directly involved. Without their co-operation and participation, effective and credible measures could certainly not be contemplated.

We therefore impatiently await a new report from the three negotiating Powers, which we hope will be more explicit and detailed than before, so that the zones of shadow may be illuminated and answers given to the numerous questions that are still being asked.

(Mr. Cordero di Montezemolo, Italy)

We should not forget, however, that the nuclear-weapon-test ban is a stage -- though admittedly a priority and essential one -- in a gradual process of general and complete disarmament which concerns all mankind, and which cannot be concluded without the joint efforts of the international community as a whole.

The Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament reminds us, very relevantly, that: "All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament."

The same document ascribes to the Committee on Disarmament a negotiating function which it has a duty to discharge. It thus seems imperative to us that the Committee should set to work and consider what, at this stage, its contribution should be to the solution of a problem whose complexity is plainly apparent.

All the five nuclear-weapon Powers -- China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America -- are assembled for the first time around this table. The importance of this participation is obvious. Each of these Powers has a specific role to play if the final goal of a general discontinuance of tests is to be approached.

Within the framework of efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, my delegation has followed with attention and interest the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, which presented its last interim report to us on 18 February last.

The Group has done some very useful work and has undoubtedly made a valuable contribution to the elucidation of the technical and scientific aspects of the organization of an international seismic-data exchange on which verification of the observance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty could be based. The contribution made to this study by the World Meteorological Organization experts was especially appreciated.

Verification is an essential element of the future treaty. We well know that without adequate verification -- by international as well as national means -- there would be no treaty.



(Mr. Cordero di Montezemolo, Italy)

My delegation therefore considers that it would be highly desirable if we could proceed as soon as possible -- without necessarily waiting for the results of the tripartite negotiations -- to an experimental exercise for putting the operation of the verification system envisaged by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts to a practical test.

In this connexion we welcome the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany in organizing at the Grafenberg Observatory in July a demonstration which will usefully supplement the data obtained at the previous seminars organized in Japan and Sweden. My country will be pleased to participate in this exercise, which, though it will not be a substitute for practical testing of the verification system as a whole, may represent a positive step towards its realization in the near future. It is important that all members of the Committee should take part in these exercises, which also have the advantage of providing psychological training, such as may strengthen confidence among the participants.

At the same time we share the opinion expressed by some Western delegations, in particular those of Australia, Canada and Japan, that it could be particularly opportune at the present stage to undertake consultations within the Committee on the nature, the constitution and the characteristics of the institutional framework within which the control arrangements recommended by the Groups of Experts may exist and function. The putting into effect of this system would indeed have to be thought out and prepared with special care, so as to avoid any delay in the application of the treaty once agreement has been reached.

That is a concrete contribution which the Committee could envisage at this time. We do not of course assert that we have exhausted the range of possibilities offered to us of endeavouring to make concrete progress, starting from the present realities. Other options can be examined and discussed, freely and constructively, at a series of informal meetings which we should like to see devoted to this subject. The negotiating Powers on their side could inform us of questions which, in their opinion, could be examined or more deeply studied within the Committee, starting from this session.

What seems to us indispensable is that the Committee should become fully aware of its role and should neglect no effort to discharge its proper function of negotiating a multilateral treaty.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I wish to join previous speakers in congratulating you on your assumption of the chair of the Committee for this month and also in complimenting Ambassador McPhail for the solid work he did for us as Chairman of the Committee in February.

When I made my first statement in this Committee, on 5 February, I referred to the extreme importance of achieving a comprehensive test ban as a new step toward arms control in the field of nuclear weapons; I also urged the States participating in the trilateral CTB negotiations to expedite their negotiations toward their early conclusion. In that connexion I repeated my Government's request that the three negotiating States submit to the CD a detailed progress report on the trilateral negotiations at the earliest possible opportunity, and in any event well in advance of the NPT Review Conference.

I now wish to come back to the subject of a CTB and express my hope that the current round of trilateral negotiations is making progress and that the negotiating States will manage to overcome their remaining difficulties in the not-too-distant future. My delegation appreciated the statement, brief though it was, made by the delegate of the United Kingdom the day before yesterday, and supported by the delegate of the United States, to the effect that these delegations attached importance to providing to the CD as much information as possible on their trilateral negotiations, and that they were currently engaged in detailed consultations on the matter.

My delegation for its part thinks it can understand the considerable sensitivity of the subject matter under discussion in the trilateral negotiations, and wishes to make it quite clear that the last thing it would wish to do would be to hamper or in any way adversely affect the smooth and fruitful continuation of those negotiations. At the same time, my delegation is of the view that the CD, as a negotiating body, has a role to play in a multilateral CTB treaty. It is gratified to note that the three negotiating Powers themselves also seem to recognize that the Committee does have a role to play in this matter -- if not at this very moment, then at least in the months ahead.

If the moment is not yet ripe for the CD to start pursuing a meaningful role in the negotiation of a CTB, it would be most helpful if the three States could inform us on where they stand in their trilateral negotiations; this would help us to understand why the moment is not yet ripe. And they might also give us their views on the kind of work the CD might usefully undertake, when the moment becomes ripe, to supplement their negotiations, by examining, even in a preliminary way, for example, any matters which are not yet being covered by the trilateral negotiations.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

This is one of the reasons why a detailed report on the trilateral negotiations could be of considerable importance: it could be of great help to this Committee in its attempts -- futile so far -- to find a pragmatic and constructive role it could play in these negotiations.

But I have another reason for considering that the presentation by the negotiating States of a progress report would be of some significance, and that is of course in the context of the preparations already well under way for the forthcoming Second Review Conference of the parties to the NPT.

My country was not a member of the NPT when the First Review Conference was held here in 1975, although we did participate in the Conference as a signatory. And so we know that the First Review Conference was not an easy Conference.

It was shortly after that Conference that I became personally involved in the process of ratification of the NPT by my own country. It was a long and arduous process, finally leading up to Japan's ratification of the Treaty in June 1976. And when we recall the tremendous difficulties we encountered at the First NPT Review Conference in 1975, I think one can safely say that, if an agreement on a CTB Treaty cannot be reached before this year's Review Conference, some demonstration of concrete progress since 1975, and, consequently, a progress report on the trilateral negotiations very much more detailed and informative than the one we were given last year is the minimum that the non-nuclear-weapon States members of NPT are entitled to expect at this year's Review Conference, to say nothing of the States that have not so far seen fit to adhere to the NPT.

To sum up, my delegation strongly hopes that this year's NPT Review Conference will be successful; it hopes that the credibility of the CD as a negotiating body can be maintained; and it is aware of the concern of the world at large that a stop be put to all nuclear testing. These are the considerations that prompt me to call once more for a more forthcoming response from the nuclear-weapon-States -- all three of them -- to the legitimate enquiries put to them by many of the other members of this Committee regarding the CTB negotiations, as well as the suggestions that perhaps the Committee could at some stage be of help in preparing the ground for the negotiation of a multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, may I, at the outset, congratulate you on assuming the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of March and express our hope that in this period we shall settle all organizational matters and embark upon concrete negotiations on the priority items of our agenda.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

I should not fail to voice my delegation's appreciation of the performance of the distinguished Ambassador of Canada, Mr. McPhail in the Chair during February. The tact and objectivity that dominated his dedicated efforts to set in motion this year's session of the Committee should be noted especially.

The issue of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments is of special significance, and no doubt, is in the limelight of the attention of both the United Nations and the international community as a whole, while the main responsibility lies with the Committee on Disarmament. As paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the Special Session on Disarmament states:

"... It would make a significant contribution to the above aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Now that all five nuclear-weapon Powers are present in the Committee, we should reasonably expect our work in the field of nuclear disarmament to be further intensified and to yield much more practical results. My delegation is fully aware of the close interrelation between nuclear disarmament and the problem of the general and complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests, but at the same time we share the opinion of the distinguished representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Adeniji, expressed in one of his recent statements, that the two questions should not be mixed up, and that the CTB issue should be tackled by itself. There is no doubt that it is the CTB that we should start with in dealing with those complex matters.

The socialist countries and the Soviet Union in the first place have all along contributed in no small way to the efforts of the international community in this field. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, has just recalled in an eloquent manner several aspects and stages of this contribution. Unfortunately, not all the other nuclear-weapon States are demonstrating the same degree of constructiveness and political will which are indispensable for the successful solution of a problem of such magnitude and importance. We are looking forward to a positive outcome of the trilateral negotiations, the significance of which should not be underestimated.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

Looking back to the Soviet initiative and the beginning of the trilateral negotiations in 1977 one cannot escape the conclusion of their character being a non-comprehensive, partial one, especially having in mind the appeal contained in the CTB resolution of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly urging all nuclear-weapon Powers to start negotiations not later than 31 March 1976.

Now that the other two fully-fledged nuclear-weapon States have joined the Committee on Disarmament, the whole international community will hardly accept the lack of active, business-like multilateral deliberations in the Committee, and no delegation should reserve for itself the right to be a passive observer.

It is in this light that we support the idea of the creation of a working group on the nuclear-test ban, as desired by the great majority of delegations but only under the presumption, in the interest of its effectiveness, that all the nuclear Powers will participate.

In conclusion I would like to comment very briefly on the work of the ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. We share the opinion of several delegations commenting positively on the results of the first session of the Group under its renewed mandate. The Bulgarian delegation has been represented in the Group since its very creation. We are contributing according to our possibilities to the elaboration of the scientific and technical features of a future global system. We have introduced already two working papers on this matter and we are preparing a third one to be circulated at the summer session of the Group. We are making an assessment at this stage as to the possible utilization of our seismological and other scientific facilities in working out certain aspects or elements in the field of detection and identification of seismic events after the treaty on the general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is signed.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka): May I begin, Mr. Chairman, by associating my delegation with the good wishes that have been expressed to you on your assumption of the office of Chairman of this Committee. You assumed these duties very soon after China had taken her seat in this Committee, and I join all other members in assuring you of our co-operation with you in the work of the Committee during this month. May I also, Mr. Chairman, thank Ambassador McPhail for the work he undertook on behalf of the Committee when chairing its proceedings during the month of February. He spared no effort to try to achieve results, and I do not think he has any reason for disappointment, because he had a complete understanding of the mood of the Committee and what could be achieved during the month of his chairmanship.

If you will permit me, I would like to make a diversion and I trust no point of order will be raised on it. I make this diversion because I do think that it is more than of small relevance to the work of the Committee. I have in mind the events that have taken place during the last two days, the emergence of a new administration, a new Government, in Zimbabwe. And I think I would not be wrong in saying that those events are a contribution to the work of disarmament, and matters that interest this Committee. They are a contribution to détente, and a contribution to the reduction of tensions in a part of the world which has been under considerable strain over a long period of time. You will forgive me, Mr. Chairman, if I were to add that my delegation would like to say here that we congratulate and wish well the new leader of Zimbabwe, Mr. Robert Mugabe. We ought to congratulate the courage of their fighting men who were involved in their war of liberation. We ought to congratulate the front-line States that helped and supported them throughout these years. We ought to thank the socialist States and China, who gave them material support in this long struggle for independence, the Non-Aligned movement, which supported them and took up their cause. It is therefore no surprise that one of the first announcements of the new leader, Robert Mugabe, was that his country will follow a non-aligned foreign policy. We ought to thank the Commonwealth countries, who have contributed so much to make possible the arrangements for independence. And last but not least, on behalf of my delegation, I think we can thank the United Kingdom Government for having executed the agreement reached among the Commonwealth countries. I need hardly

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

say that the result of that election must have come as a surprise to many. It has not been an outcome that has left everyone happy; but that is the inevitable outcome of the system adopted, the secret ballot. And that is a system known in my country over many years. No Government is assured of what is going to happen, but that is the method by which Governments are elected by us. I have often wondered whether in the work of this Committee, if we did adopt a similar device, whether the consensus that emerges might also be somewhat different from that which emerges from what we are prepared to say in our plenary and informal meetings. I am not urging it, but I was just wondering.

Our programme of work is not finalized, but nevertheless what we have is acknowledged by all as a practical one that we can follow. Today's subject is the comprehensive test ban or the nuclear-test ban. I thought it right that I should intervene today to respond to some of the comments made at our last plenary meeting and comments made today on that subject by speakers who have preceded me. I had for a moment thought that in repeating the procedural approach which my delegation put forward in our first statement on 14 February, that it is time to have a working group, that we might look as if we were flogging a dead horse. But the views expressed by members last Tuesday and again today give me the impression, a certain confidence, that the nuclear-test ban is not quite a dead horse.

May I say very briefly, that my delegation associates itself fully with the statements and the position taken up by the Group of 21, with the statement made on behalf of the Group by the distinguished delegate of Kenya on the 4th of this month. He told us that there was enough material to initiate negotiations, that a working group is the best available machinery for negotiations and that a working group should be established for the nuclear-test ban during the first part of this 1980 session. I can only express the hope that delegations who have somewhat different views from this will not regard that statement or the views expressed by other delegations today as just made for the record; that they shall be heard for their nuisance value. I don't think delegations who have taken up the position that a working group is necessary, and can be formed, have done so merely for the record and would be satisfied by merely being heard.

In support of this view that it is time to negotiate, to have a working group on the test ban, we have the views of the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself, when he said, I believe in 1972, that the material, both technical and

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

scientific, has been fully explored, that it is adequate, and that what is now required is a political decision. The views of the international community were expressed again, the last time, during the last session of the General Assembly in resolution 34/73. Members will recall that that resolution, calling for a test ban and saying that a test ban is a sine qua non for non-proliferation and a cessation of the arms race, had the support of a large majority of the Members of the United Nations, and indeed it had the support of the two major nuclear Powers. I am also aware that two major Powers, France and China, abstained. I say this because in the discussions and the views that have been expressed in this Committee we have, on the one hand, the major military Powers telling us that they want a stable, military equilibrium and mutually balanced reduction of arms in the context of equal or undiminished security. I believe that an agreement like SALT II was negotiated and concluded in that context, in the context of stable military equilibrium and mutually balanced reduction. They also forswear, or assure us that neither of them is seeking, military superiority. But, at the same time, they persist with nuclear tests. What conceivable purpose can nuclear tests have, other than to refine and improve nuclear weapons? On the one hand, as I told you, they say they are not in pursuit of military superiority, but on the other hand, the tests go on. How does one reconcile the two? That is the question to which I think members would wish to address themselves, and I do think that the major nuclear Powers should give us some answer as to how they resolve this question.

My next question is one which many delegations have asked during the course of our discussions on the test ban. We have been asked: what is the role of the Committee on Disarmament on the test-ban treaty? And this is where I would like to take up some suggestions and proposals that have been made during our last meeting by the delegations of Canada and Australia and they are proposals that have been supported by other delegations here this morning. I believe the distinguished Leader of the Australian delegation made these proposals on 5 February, and my distinguished colleague repeated it, elaborated it, on behalf of the Australian delegation last Tuesday. The distinguished delegate of Canada supported those proposals.

May I begin by saying that as far as my delegation is concerned, we have no reservation, or no lack of understanding about the goodwill and the political conviction of the delegations of Canada and Australia, and may I add of the others



(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

who have supported those propositions. We have no doubt as to their conviction about the need for a nuclear-test ban. I had time enough to read carefully the statement made by our distinguished colleague from Canada, and I must say that it was most persuasive. I would particularly draw the attention of members to his statement where he says that there is rough parity in nuclear weapons between the two major nuclear Powers; and, on that ground, he suggested that it is about time that there was a stoppage of testing. He went on to elaborate it and to say that what might be desirable would be a treaty which would not lapse but would provide for review and renewal. I hope I am not taking the remarks of the distinguished representative of Canada out of context, but I have referred briefly to what I regard as very positive views expressed by him. We regard that as evidence of Canada's, and I think Australia's, political will for a test ban. I think they do reflect the views of the international community in this regard.

But it is the two alternatives that have been proposed by the delegation of Canada and the delegation of Australia that I would like to deal with now. One of the alternatives proposed was that perhaps the Committee could elaborate an institutional framework for an international verification system. That was one role which this Committee might perform. The second: **he has asked us to look at mechanisms to promote the implementation of and compliance with the terms of the treaty.**

With regard to the first suggestion, an institutional framework, my delegation would like to think that verification is largely a technical issue. We have the very useful work -- two reports, I believe -- submitted to the Committee by the seismic expert Group who have been working on it. But the question I ask is, can this Committee be asked to contemplate or to discuss an institutional framework on the technical aspects of a treaty on which the tripartite negotiators have told us very little? I will not say nothing, but so far very little. Can the members of the Committee be asked to address their minds seriously to an area which for us is still, shall I say, grey? How can we even outline something like the elements or titles for such an institutional framework when we are not privy to the conclusions, the agreements reached or the disagreements that prevail among the tripartite negotiators? I ask, where do we begin and on what?

And we have the second suggestion, proposed by Canada and Australia: we might consider mechanisms to promote implementation and compliance. Again I ask, in relation to what are we to consider this? Implementation of and compliance

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

with a treaty on which we have very little information? Are we to consider all this in a vacuum? These are just questions I pose, I do not have the answers, but I think that in the light of this very positive approach that these two delegations, Canada and Australia, and others, have taken today, one is obliged to ask, are these feasible, are these possible for a Committee which is still very much in the dark?

Having said that, let us at least agree that a test-ban treaty is essentially a political document; it is not something on which only experts can talk. In a sense it is no different from the NPT. The NPT has its technical provisions, but we laymen surely have to have a document which has political meaning which we can sell, not only to our own Governments, but to the wider world community, to the United Nations, its Members who have asked us for it. So it is essentially a political document. And we are told from time to time that we members of the Committee should not try to impede delicate, I emphasize the word "delicate", negotiations. By merely saying that the negotiations are delicate, is it suggested to us that that is an argument? Surely, describing something as "delicate" does not make it an argument. Let us at least be a little informed on the delicateness of this negotiation. Or let us be informed on the less delicate areas of the negotiations. I must say, it is a little difficult for members of this Committee to react delicately to an argument which merely says that the situation is delicate. For us that is a trifle delicate. I can only, without imputing any motives to the delegations that have suggested these alternative ways of proceeding, say that my delegation fears that if the Committee were to engage itself in these areas, difficult enough as they are in the absence of knowledge, we would be involved in a diversion. And I do not think, my delegation does not think, that this is the mandate that the United Nations, the international community, has entrusted to this Committee.

Another argument or view that has been expressed earlier in regard to the test ban, and a view that has been confirmed this morning by some speakers, is that for a complete test ban or a treaty, for an initiative to ensure a widening of the non-proliferation régime, not to mention weapons, all nuclear-weapon States must adhere to this. I have no quarrel with that at all. The distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union told us a moment ago that as far as the Soviet Union is concerned they are prepared to have a working group in principle, provided there is participation by all the nuclear-weapon States. I think that is a positive

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

approach, and I think members of the Committee will appreciate this approach, though it still has the qualification that all nuclear-weapon States should participate in it. Those remarks are addressed to the two nuclear-weapon States who have not so far been involved in the tripartite negotiations, and I would like to think that those two States, having taken cognizance of all the arguments that have been urged here, of the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly, will certainly give thought to that. But what I must point out is that it was my delegation's understanding that the absence of a response from the tripartite negotiators, at least so far, is not because of the absence of all the nuclear-weapon States. My understanding was that this was due to certain disagreements among themselves. I don't discount the proposition that all nuclear-weapon States should participate if this is to be effective, but up to now, certainly for the last three or four years, our understanding was that there are areas of agreement, I am sure, and disagreement, too, among the nuclear-weapon tripartite negotiators. And that is precisely what members of the Committee have consistently asked: do tell us; if you cannot tell us all, tell us something. But that has not been forthcoming.

I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to other remarks in the statement of the distinguished delegate from Canada. I referred earlier to his having told us, and I have no reason to doubt it, coming from the distinguished delegate of Canada, that between the two major nuclear Powers there is rough parity. Now, in this context, the distinguished delegate of Canada suggested that perhaps it was time for the two major nuclear Powers to agree between themselves and to stop testing, because it will give each of them the kind of reassurance they need between themselves, and it would certainly bring forward the possibility of a test ban. That suggestion from the distinguished colleague from Canada is one with which I think the great majority of the members of this Committee would agree. I have no wish to conclude these remarks of mine on a tone of recrimination. What I did want was to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to arguments and proposals made by Canada and Australia among others.

I would like to thank the distinguished delegate of the United Kingdom, who spoke last Tuesday and gave us the present position of the tripartite negotiators. My delegation regards that as an acknowledgement of the views expressed by members

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

of this Committee and also as a promise of something that is to come from the tripartite negotiators, not too late, not at the very end of our session as happened last year. Further, that it would constitute the kind of detailed report that many, many members of this Committee have repeatedly sought in their remarks in the Committee.

I would like to conclude my statement by welcoming the statement just made by the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union, where he agreed to the establishment of the working group on chemical weapons; and, as delegations probably are already aware, the working group on chemical weapons is much closer to reality. In this context, I think we owe a word of thanks to the distinguished delegate of Canada, who presided over our meetings last month. Though he could not produce this rabbit, he worked very hard to enable us to have it. I think that you, Mr. Chairman, during your term of office, will hasten the arrival of this working group and perhaps before our proceedings this week are over, we would have made some real advance in one area in which many members have expressed anxiety and concern.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Chinese): At our last plenary meeting, on Tuesday, we discussed some aspects of the organization of work of the Committee. I have been informed that the contact group on chemical weapons has continued to meet in the last couple of days, and that some progress has been made towards a possible compromise. I would request that contact group to continue its efforts and achieve a breakthrough, so as to enable us to set up a working group.

Also at our plenary meeting on Tuesday, I announced that I would consult with delegations on the establishment of a contact group on the elaboration of a mandate for an ad hoc working group of the Committee on radiological weapons. I have conducted those consultations with the assistance of the Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, and I would like to report to you on the results of these consultations.

As is usually the case with our informal consultations in the Committee, I believe that the contact group on radiological weapons should be an open-ended group, in which all members of the Committee wishing to participate might do so at any stage of the consultations. I also noted a general feeling that it might be advisable to nominate some members who have either expressed particular interest

(The Chairman)

on the subject or have been active in the consideration of the question of radiological weapons by the Committee. Therefore, after some consultations, I think that the Committee might ask the representatives of Australia, Hungary, India, Kenya, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to constitute this contact group, on the understanding that this group is open to any other member delegation which would like to be involved in those consultations. I have asked the Secretariat to make arrangements also for the meetings of this contact group, and I would request the delegations asked to participate in it, as well as any other interested delegation, to be in touch with the Secretary of the Committee, so that the contact group might meet as soon as convenient.

In view of the late hour, I suggest that the Committee should hold an informal meeting tomorrow morning at which we could discuss the requests made by some non-member countries to participate in the work of the Committee, as well as our programme of work for the 1980 session. Are there any views on the proposals I have made? If not, we shall meet tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. for an informal meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held as usual on Tuesday, 11 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.