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4 March 1980
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIXTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 March 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. YU Pei-Wen

(China)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENYAHINA

Argentina: Mr. A. DUFOIT
Miss H. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. A. BEHM
Ms. M. WICKES
Mr. P. NOLAN

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. P. BERG
Mr. J-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. J.T. SIMARD
Mr. C. SIROIS

China: Mr. YU Pei-Wen
Mr. LIANG Yu-Fan
Mr. YANG Hu-Shan
Mr. LIANG De-Fen
Mrs. GE Yu-Yun
Mr. XU Liu-Gen

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V. BORODOWSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. E. ZAPOTOCKY

Egypt: Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. N. GRACZYNSKI
Mr. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KÓMIVES
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. I.M. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. H.M.U. SILABAN

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. F. DE LUCA

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. MIYATA

Kenya: Mr. C.G. MAINA
Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G. MUNDU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Mr. N.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. VAGENIAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. H. PAĆ
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.I. USTINOV
Mr. V.P. PERFILIEV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN
Mr. Y.P. KLIUKIN

United Kingdom: Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOVEREE
Mr. G.M. SEIGNIOUS
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. J. CALVERT
Mr. H. DALEY
Ms. B. MURRAY
Mr. P. SALGADO
Mr. H. SANCHES
Ms. S. FLOOD

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLIARDAT
Mrs. R. MUGICA DE ADAMES

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. KALONJI TSHIKALA KAIWAKA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General

Mr. R. JAIPAL

The CHAIRMAN: The delegation of China assumes today, under the rules of procedure, the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. We are conscious of the heavy responsibilities placed on us and we shall do everything possible to discharge them properly, with the co-operation of the members of the Committee on Disarmament. The Chair will always be available for contacts and consultations with members of the Committee, and I look forward to having useful discussions with them which will help us to perform effectively the tasks before us.

Before beginning our order of business, I would like to express to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Donald McPhail, my gratitude and, I am sure, that of the whole Committee, for the skilful manner in which he conducted the work of the Committee during the month of February. In less than a month, he was able to guide the Committee to the adoption of its agenda for 1980 and to achieve substantial progress on a number of very important issues relating to the programme of work of the Committee and the establishment of ad hoc working groups on various items in the agenda. He carried out his tasks with patience, understanding, dynamism and diplomatic skill which made it possible for us to move forward in the short time that he presided over the Committee. He has made my task a great deal easier and he has set an example of leadership which I shall try to follow. I am sure that the results of his effective chairmanship will also be reflected in any decisions the Committee takes during the month of March.

I would also like to extend a cordial welcome to Mr. Martenson, Assistant Secretary-General, Centre for Disarmament, who is present at this plenary meeting.

Furthermore, I should like to express my gratitude to Ambassador Jaipal and his colleagues from the Secretariat. The progress made in our meetings will be inseparable from the efforts that they will make. Ambassador Jaipal has extended excellent co-operation to my predecessor, and I am sure he will give me equally valuable assistance.

You will recall that, at our informal meeting on Friday, 29 February 1980, the Committee agreed to devote the week starting 3 March to item 1 entitled "nuclear test ban" and item 4 entitled "chemical weapons", as well as questions relating to the establishment of ad hoc working groups and the programme of work of the Committee.

I shall, therefore, proceed along those lines.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, may I at the outset congratulate you, Sir, on taking the Chair and express to you my personal wishes as well as those of my delegation for success in the month ahead. I would also like to thank you for

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

your very kind words regarding my chairmanship during the month of February, and to pay particular tribute to the work of Ambassador Jaipal and his staff who, as you well know, were very closely behind me. You know, of course, that the expression of thanks which you addressed to me should, in fact, have been addressed to Ambassador Jaipal. I want also to thank all members of the Committee for the co-operation which they extended to me in what were sometimes difficult circumstances, other times less difficult.

My purpose today is to make a few observations on behalf of my Government on the question of a nuclear test ban which, as the Chairman has just said, the Committee agreed would be the first item on our schedule for this week. It is a topic of major concern to my Government and to others, as was indicated in the statement to the plenary made last month by my delegation.

Three main arguments have been advanced in favour of a nuclear test ban -- that it would limit the development of new nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, that it would effectively stop the full development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States, and that it would reflect the determination of the main military Powers to bring the proliferation of nuclear weapons under comprehensive control. My Government has suggested that other measures, such as a ban on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, also need to be agreed upon if this last objective is to be met. We have said that a package of such measures, none of them involving actual disarmament, would help to "suffocate" new strategic arms competition. As Mr. Trudeau said to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, "a total test ban will represent a real qualitative constraint on weapons development". It would then become more feasible, in our view, to reach agreements on more substantial reductions of nuclear weapons: the warheads themselves.

We still believe, however, that a CTB would have significance in and by itself for the reasons mentioned. The fact is that the testing of nuclear weapons is increasing. We must infer that such testing is thought to be useful for the development of nuclear weapons. There may come a time when this is no longer true. But it is true now. A ban on testing would limit the development of new nuclear weapons.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

The doctrine of nuclear deterrence is a reality of our times. A stable military balance is to be preferred to situations in which one side has a clear advantage. It is said that the over-all strategic relationship between the United States and the USSR is one of rough parity. An agreement between them to stop testing would surely give greater confidence to both that this situation would continue to exist.

Such confidence could only repose, however, on measures of verification that were adequate to detect nuclear explosions. I do not intend to explore this question now. We believe that the system for the exchange of international seismic data should be developed further, and if possible tested, without waiting for the conclusion of the trilateral negotiations. Enough States would appear to be willing to participate to make such testing useful.

An important objective of a CTB is to strengthen the system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to enlarge incentives for acceding to the NPT. This objective will be difficult to reach unless all nuclear-weapon States accede to a CTB. At the same time we can appreciate the argument that an agreement to stop all testing would tend to freeze the situation in favour of those two States which have by far the largest nuclear arsenals. We have therefore urged that these two States should agree to stop testing for a reasonable period of time so as to lay the groundwork for a situation in which the other nuclear-weapon States would find it attractive to accede to the Treaty.

In the meantime, these same States would be expected to continue to negotiate other questions of nuclear disarmament, including in particular further limitations on strategic nuclear arms. It would then be reasonable, it seems to us, for all States to accede to a test ban, in the context of real measures of nuclear disarmament -- to a treaty that would not automatically lapse but that would provide for a review conference and for the possibility of renewal.

At this stage it is legitimate to ask exactly what role the Committee on Disarmament can play at this time in the elaboration of a comprehensive test ban. The Committee has, of course, a general mandate to negotiate such a treaty; this has been one of the highest priorities in multilateral disarmament negotiations for a number of years. On the other hand, what are undoubtedly delicate trilateral negotiations are being pursued on this issue. Negotiations among some nuclear-weapon Powers could, in a short-term perspective, appear to hinder the work of the Committee (although one could also say the reverse is true); but in the longer term,

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

these separate negotiations should facilitate our task, since it is essential for the achievement of any agreement on this matter that the major nuclear-weapon Powers should be in accord on the substance to be included in any treaty.

Accordingly, we join those who continue to press for the tabling, just as soon as is possible, of the long-promised joint initiative on the subject. In the meantime, however, we believe that the CD has a positive and significant role to play. A nuclear test ban will require, for its functioning, the elaboration of a number of implementing measures. For example, the setting up of an international verification system will be of major importance, and in this context we think the CD could, and should, start elaborating the necessary institutional framework for such a system without delay. This was already suggested by Sir James Plimsoll on 5 February, and we recommend that the Committee pursue and refine his suggestion. We see this as a useful way in which to arrive at arrangements which such a treaty will require for its implementation, and we see no reason why the CD should not start working on issues of this kind now.

A CTBT will have many aspects. Some are under negotiation now among three nuclear-weapon Powers, and can only be tackled later by this Committee. However, other aspects, which may also be under consideration in the trilateral negotiations, could perhaps be considered simultaneously by our Committee. For example, we could look at mechanisms to promote implementation of and compliance with the terms of the treaty. These are only a few of the aspects in which our Committee could involve itself without impeding ongoing negotiations elsewhere. In fact, we consider that this work by the Committee would contribute to accelerating the elaboration of a treaty, once a joint initiative is tabled. We therefore hope that these suggestions will be looked on positively by members of our Committee and that it will be possible to define, by consensus, in this session, a practical and utilitarian negotiating role for the Committee in the complex over-all elaboration of a CTBT.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. BEHM (Australia): The early conclusion of a multilateral CTB agreement is a cornerstone of Australia's arms control and disarmament policy. Our attitude to the early conclusion of a trilateral CTB, and its early translation into a multilateral treaty, is well known. It has been set out in a forthright and clear

(Mr. Behm, Australia)

way in a number of international bodies during the last few years, and there is no need for us to rehearse yet again the principal features of our position. I would simply recall that the question of a CTB was given special emphasis in the statement delivered by Mr. Andrew Peacock, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, when the Committee on Disarmament began its work last year. Mr. Peacock said:

"Of the matters facing this Committee, the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon testing in all environments is of primary importance and deserves the earliest attention Even before the agreement is presented here, Australia believes the Committee could begin addressing the technical and operational aspects of an international seismic detection network This is essential if there is to be any possibility that an international verification system is to be operational by the time the Committee has completed its work in the drafting of a multilateral CTB treaty.

"A widely accepted CTB treaty will be a significant milestone in arms control and disarmament efforts. It will be a barrier to both the spread of nuclear weapons and the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals. It will contribute to a greater level of confidence among States in all regions of the world. It will also provide the opportunity for building further upon international verification procedures of the kind incorporated in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

In addition to these remarks, the Australian delegation made two major statements on CTB last year in which we reiterated our concern that progress should be made quickly. In seeking to realize our hopes for a CTB and to bring a multilateral CTB closer to conclusion, Australia has given great prominence to the item both here and elsewhere. We played a leading part in the development of the CTB resolution at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Given that the CD now enjoys the active participation of all five nuclear-weapon States, this resolution (General Assembly resolution 34/73) has a special significance. For the first time, a CTB resolution was adopted in the United Nations General Assembly without a single opposing vote. While it is true that two States, both of them nuclear-weapon States and both of them members of the Committee on Disarmament, abstained, the absence of any opposing vote was a clear indication of both the increasingly broad base of international support for a CTB treaty and the growing sense of urgency which the international community has concerning the complete cessation of nuclear testing by all States.

(Mr. Behm, Australia)

In its third operative paragraph, resolution 34/73 expresses the world community's conviction that progress in CD negotiations is vital if further vertical and horizontal proliferation is to be prevented. Since continuing efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a major concern of this Committee, we repeat our view that the CD must make every effort to make the progress which resolution 34/73 demands.

In its fourth operative paragraph, resolution 34/73 requests the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time as a matter of the highest priority. Australia wants these negotiations to begin as soon as possible.

A multilateral CTB requires the eventual participation of all nuclear-weapon States. We are aware that two nuclear-weapon States have indicated that they are not yet in a position to negotiate on the text of a CTB treaty. We hope that they will soon see their way clear to joining in CTB negotiations. But we are also aware that three of the nuclear-weapon States are engaged in active negotiations at present.

The trilateral CTB negotiations have been under way for several years. We understand that considerable progress has been made already, but we also understand that a number of issues remain to be resolved, and so we certainly encourage the three States to press ahead with their work with a view to reaching a final text as soon as possible. We acknowledge that they are negotiating in good faith and that they also want to reach a positive conclusion as quickly as possible. We would hope that a final text will be introduced into the Committee on Disarmament without any delay once it has been agreed by the trilateral negotiating parties.

Some countries have suggested that, in the interim, the CD should go ahead and negotiate a multilateral CTB irrespective of the continuing trilateral negotiations and without awaiting their conclusion. Some countries have even suggested that the participation of the three negotiating Powers is not really necessary at this time. In his statement on 5 February, Sir James Plimsoll pointed out that this position is completely unrealistic. The CD cannot negotiate an effective ban on nuclear testing without the participation of the three negotiating Powers. The role of the CD is to facilitate progress, not to impede it.

(Mr. Behm, Australia)

My delegation associates itself very much with the remarks that were made this morning by the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador McPhail. We think that it is very important that the Committee on Disarmament should work out exactly what its role is in elaborating a multilateral CTB, and that it should do so as quickly as possible. The elaboration of a multilateral CTB is the Committee's highest priority, and its realization will require, in our opinion, very careful and very painstaking consideration.

We think that it is very important that, in developing how it would go about negotiating a multilateral CTB, the Committee does not in any way impede the delicate negotiations which the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union are conducting at present. In these negotiations, the security of three major States is an essential issue. And just as they have a responsibility to reduce the threat of nuclear war and to eliminate nuclear arsenals, so we have a collective responsibility to ensure that the security of no State is diminished. In achieving its aims in respect of a CTB, the CD must act collectively. We, as partners in the process of negotiating such a treaty, must act in concert.

We attach, as I have said already, the highest priority to a CTB, but we consider that, in enacting our role in the negotiations of a CTB, we must take into consideration all of the factors involved. We think also that the Committee must give serious attention to the suggestions we have made and we would like very much to hear what reactions other members of the Committee have to the suggestions that we have made, that Canada has made, and, I am sure, the suggestions that we are going to hear as we continue our consideration of this item.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, may I first welcome you in your capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March. My delegation is looking forward to co-operating with you.

Although we have not yet formally agreed on a work programme, we are starting our deliberations on the items of our agenda with the comprehensive test ban. My delegation hopes that further progress can be achieved as a result of contributions that will be made during the debate which began this morning and which I personally find rather promising.

This morning, I would like to concentrate on a particular question in this field, that is, on the future activities of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was established in 1976. It was asked to recommend measures which could form part of the global control system for verifying the compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty. Two substantive reports have already been submitted to the Committee.

From 11 to 15 February 1980 the Group held its ninth formal session under the chairmanship of Mr. Ulf Ericsson who, in his oral report to the CD on 19 February 1980, stated that the main task in the next phase of the Group's work under the new mandate would be the compilation, summarization and assessment of new information and experience to be acquired through national efforts in areas of relevance to its work.

Taking up a suggestion put forward in the Swedish working paper (SW/GSE/27), the Ad Hoc Group has already been informed about the possible holding of a workshop at the Observatory at Gräfenberg near the city of Erlangen in the Federal Republic of Germany. Such a workshop would be comparable with similar undertakings which have taken place in Sweden and Japan.

The main topic of the workshop planned at Gräfenberg is a demonstration of procedures to obtain desired data at individual stations under a range of conditions which correspond to the new terms of reference as laid down in CRP/62.

It is the opinion of the Group that all participating network stations should be equipped with modern seismographs capable of a continuous recording of seismic data in digital form. As there is so far only limited experience with digital data handling on a routine basis, my Government feels that a workshop held at the Observatory at Gräfenberg would be useful and could very well fit into the work schedule of the expert Group. In this connexion I may quote from the second report of the Group that it "considers automatic extraction of seismic parameters to be a very desirable goal and recommends that further work be undertaken by the Group with the aim to develop standardized procedures in this field".

(Mr. Efeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

During the workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany, participants will have the opportunity to work on real seismograms by actually using the equipment. The experience thus gained might be useful for the further discussion of standardized operational procedures at the stations of the proposed network. My delegation will shortly submit a working paper giving some more technical details of the envisaged workshop.

My Government has the pleasure to extend herewith an invitation to the delegates and seismic experts from all States participating in the CD and/or in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. The workshop will be held in connexion with the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Group planned in Geneva from 7 to 18 July 1980. The dates for the workshop chosen are, therefore, ... 3-5 July 1980.

My delegation would be glad if delegations would indicate to it the number and names of participants at an early date, and not later than 31 March. More detailed information on the schedule and work programme will be communicated directly to the participants.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SHITTEI (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, I have two statements to deliver. The first one will be that of my delegation, and the second will be a statement on behalf of the Group of 21.

Allow me on behalf of my delegation to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March. I wish you every success in your assignment and assure you of my delegation's support. I wish to express my delegation's gratitude to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador McPhail, for the tactful and competent manner in which he conducted the affairs of the Committee during the month of February.

This is an appropriate time to look back and take stock of what we were able to accomplish during the first month of the spring session. We have been able to agree on a comprehensive list of agenda items. This action in itself sums up the importance all delegations attach to these items; they represent, in terms of the assignment of the Committee on Disarmament, the most urgent areas of concern to the entire human race. The fact that we took so long to reach a consensus implies that

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

we fully appreciate the gravity of the assignment given to this Committee and are prepared in all seriousness to scrutinize and analyse all proposals placed before us so that only those topics we agree to handle appear in the list of agenda items.

We have therefore committed ourselves to adhering to the agenda items we have approved by consensus. The remaining task of agreeing on how these agenda items should be handled has thus been made easier. The Group of 21, to which my delegation has the privilege to belong, has explained unequivocally its position on the establishment of working groups and their mandates. The Group has pointed out, and I quote:

"The ultimate objective and basic mandate of all the working groups should be to undertake concrete negotiations for the implementation of agreed measures called for in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

The Group has proposed the establishment of 5 working groups. It is my delegation's view that this proposal carries with it a measure of flexibility: no proposal can be accepted within the Committee on Disarmament unless it has the support of all the 40 members. The objective of each one of the items to be discussed was clearly spelt out in the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. To take one example, operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 34/73 on CTB states:

"2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority;

"3. Expresses its conviction that positive progress in the negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament on such a treaty is a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and will contribute towards an end to the arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament".

The message of the resolution thus quoted in part is clear: the comprehensive test ban treaty is given the highest priority. The best we can do is to adhere strictly to the requirements of this resolution; after all, 137 Member States voted for it, there were no negative votes cast, and China and France abstained. This is sufficient mandate in our hands to press for the formation of a working group to start negotiations on a CTB treaty; we are prepared to enter into negotiations at least on those subjects that can be handled at this stage.

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

We must also know what progress or otherwise has been made in the course of the trilateral negotiations among the oldest 3 nuclear-weapon States. These negotiations started early in 1977. We believe that this is long enough for those participating at least to give us a full brief as to what has been accomplished and what obstacles lie in the way. We are not asking for a favour; matters involving a nuclear test ban are of the highest concern to the whole world, since they involve matters of security at their most sensitive and dangerous stage. These discussions represent a choice between life and death; we ask to be kept fully in the picture as a right, we insist that we exercise that right to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Some time last week we spent considerable time discussing whether we should negotiate (within a working group) "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". The offending word "on" that was inserted after the word "negotiate" raised some serious doubt in my mind as to whether we were taking our responsibility with the seriousness it deserved and demanded, but my doubts were soon removed when a compromise was reached.

It has been suggested that we should delay the formation of a working group to negotiate on an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons until the summer session. This would be contrary to the requirements of General Assembly resolution 34/72 which states, inter alia, "Urges the Committee on Disarmament to undertake, at the beginning of its 1980 session, negotiations on an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as a matter of high priority". The resolution was adopted by consensus. This is not a new subject and, as a matter of fact, there is in existence a partial treaty to ban some chemical weapons. We therefore believe that there is enough of a serious threat posed against humanity by those who own these terrible weapons to justify urgent negotiations; even if they take 2 to 3 years to finalize, we should get started.

We had very frank and open dialogue between some members of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member nations. What became quite clear to my delegation is the fallacy that any one bloc could reach parity in terms of over-all defence requirements; parity in such matters is a mirage, for today the Warsaw Treaty nations may have

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

an edge over the NATO bloc, as indeed they do, tomorrow it will be the latter, and the arms race will have received its stimulus for a life and death rivalry in which there is no winner. This is why efforts directed towards disarmament are reasonable and should be embraced by all of us so that we can ease tension and minimize areas of mistrust. We invite the two blocs to narrow their differences and continue to seek détente; that is the only reasonable alternative, the other alternative leads to tension and confrontation and ultimately to war. Europe should know better; its own history has many lessons for those who can benefit from it. As Lenin said, "Learn from the past, don't weep over it".

Mr. Chairman, I now will read the statement of the Group of 21 on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and request that it be accepted as a document of the Committee on Disarmament.

"In its statement of 9 August 1979 (CD/50) the Group of 21 after reiterating the importance and urgency of concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, pointed out that during its 1979 session the Committee on Disarmament unfortunately had been unable to give substantive consideration to the question of a nuclear test ban treaty, despite the repeated resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly and its request that the Committee undertake negotiations on such a treaty as the highest priority item. The Group expressed its dissatisfaction with the report on the trilateral negotiations, conveyed at the very end of the Committee's session, and its belief that it should have been possible for the States concerned to provide a comprehensive and detailed report on the status of these negotiations and on the areas of agreement and disagreement.

"At its thirty-fourth session the General Assembly expressed grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing had continued unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States. In the two resolutions (34/73 and 34/83B) adopted on the subject, the General Assembly stressed with special emphasis the two points which the Group of 21 had made in its statement of 9 August 1979, referred to above:

"On the one hand, the General Assembly requested the Committee to proceed without any further delay to substantive negotiations on a CTBT, and on the other hand, it invited the members of the Committee involved in separate negotiations on a CTBT to make every effort to achieve a positive conclusion of these negotiations without further delay for submission to the Committee and, failing this, to submit to the Committee a full report on the status of their separate negotiations and results achieved so far in order to contribute to the negotiations in the Committee.

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

"At this second session of the Committee the Group of 21 again calls for complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments. The Group believes that there is adequate material to initiate immediate negotiations on this subject. As far back as 29 February 1972, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that only the political decision of States was necessary in order to achieve final agreement on this subject, all aspects of which both technical and scientific had been so fully explored.

"That conclusion is today even more valid. Among the numerous working papers at the disposal of the Committee there are even two draft treaties submitted to the CCD in 1977 (CCD/523 and CCD/526). At present the Committee is expecting a new study by the Secretary-General, requested by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session (decision 34/422).

"In its statement of 27 February 1980, on the establishment of working groups (CD/64), the Group of 21 has already expressed its considered view that such groups provide the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee. The Group urges therefore that a working group be established on the item on the Committee's agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban" during the first part of its 1980 session.

"The three nuclear-weapon States participating in the preparatory talks on a CTBT have a special responsibility to bring their negotiations to a positive and early conclusion in conformity with the will of the General Assembly. The Group of 21 requests the three negotiators to submit to the Committee a detailed report on the state of their endeavours.

"Finally, the Group of 21 wishes to underline the fundamental importance of progress on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing which as stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, 'would make a significant contribution to the ... aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons'."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. MARSHALL (United Kingdom): May I first just add my voice to those who have welcomed you today as you assume the chairmanship of our Committee. My delegation looks forward to working under your guidance during the coming month as we move into our substantive work and, also I am sure, rapidly disposing of our administrative arrangements. Sir, this morning, on behalf of the British delegation, I should like to reply very briefly to questions which have been addressed to the representatives of the three Governments engaged in negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. A number of valuable points have been put forward today at this session, and earlier meetings, both formal and informal. My delegation has listened with attention and interest to these various contributions to our discussion on this subject: contributions including proposals which envisage that the Committee should be more closely associated with the elaboration of a CTB -- a comprehensive test ban. I should like to assure members of this Committee that my Government is acutely aware of the interest in this important subject-- not only the interest of the members of this Committee, but that of the world community at large. That we also take this subject seriously is, I think, clear from the efforts we have put, and are continuing to put, into the tripartite negotiations aimed at the successful conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. And I do underline again that, in the view of my Government, the best way forward, in the first place, lies in those confidential tripartite negotiations. However, in view of the general interest to which I have referred, my delegation attaches importance to providing this Committee with information about the course of the negotiations. We are accordingly in detailed consultation with our United States and Soviet negotiating partners with a view to the provision, in this Committee, of as full a statement as is feasible -- given the delicate nature of the negotiations in progress, and given the fact that the current round of tripartite negotiations has only just recently resumed. The appropriate time for such a statement is therefore also a matter under discussion.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. FLOWEREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, may I also add my voice to those of previous speakers in welcoming you as our Chairman for the month of March and express my delegation's appreciation for the skilful manner in which Ambassador McPhail handled his challenging responsibilities in the first month of our session. I would also like to acknowledge the presence among us this morning of an eminent American personality. I speak of Ambassador George Seignious, who is seated directly behind me. Ambassador Seignious was a former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and is now a member of the President's Advisory Council on Arms Control and Disarmament Matters. Those of you who were here last June will recall that, immediately after the signing of the SALT agreements in Vienna, he visited us and gave us a most interesting and dramatic account of that event. We are grateful that he is in a position to continue to maintain his interest in the work of this Committee.

The United States delegation is conscious of the great interest of this Committee in the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the understandable desire of delegations to hear the views of the nuclear-weapon States on this subject. My delegation believes this Committee is entitled to a frank expression of the positions of the nuclear-weapon States on the best way to proceed towards the realization of a comprehensive test ban, an objective which the United States unreservedly supports. Since the views of my Government coincide with those of the United Kingdom, I will at this time simply associate my delegation with the statement just made by our British colleague.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United States for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. This completes my list of speakers for today. Does any delegation wish to speak?

If not, I would like now to turn to the question of the organization of our work for the present week. It seems to me that more consultations are needed in connexion with the establishment of Ad Hoc working groups of the Committee before we can engage in further consultations at informal meetings. I also believe that this question would have relevance for the programme of work to be adopted by the Committee and, consequently, it seems to me that we should encourage efforts to bridge differences on some specific aspects of our work. I understand that a contact group on chemical weapons has been meeting last week, but that further efforts are needed in order to bridge existing differences. I would urge that

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contact group to continue its efforts, and I would appeal to other interested delegations to join in those consultations, so that all possible approaches might be discussed in the contact group. The Secretariat would make the necessary arrangements for those consultations, as and when necessary.

At our next plenary meeting on Thursday, we could decide to schedule informal meetings on Thursday and Friday, if necessary, to consider those questions which need to be settled in connexion with the organization of our work. We could also, during a brief recess at our plenary meeting on Thursday, consider the requests made by some countries to participate in the work of the Committee on the question of chemical weapons.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation would not object to the timetable of work for this week proposed by you, but would like to make a proposal concerning the elaboration of the mandate of the working group on radiological weapons. The point is that this question has been discussed in some detail at one of our previous meetings, and contacts have taken place between various delegations. There are also several texts, and one of those texts -- that proposed by the delegation of Hungary -- is the one we commented on. Our proposal would therefore be that the contact group on the elaboration of a mandate for the working group on radiological weapons should work in parallel with the contact group on chemical weapons under your chairmanship. Perhaps you could request the delegations concerned to meet either today or tomorrow to advance that work further. This is the proposal of the Soviet delegation.

Mr. SHITETI (Kenya): I would like to announce that there will be a meeting of the Group of 21 tomorrow at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: As regards the contact group on the elaboration of a mandate for the working group on radiological weapons, we shall consult the delegations concerned and, at a later stage, call a meeting of the contact group. Are there other delegates wishing to speak? If not, I wish to say that the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at noon.