

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIXTIETH MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 14 February 1980, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. D.S. McPhail

(Canada)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina: Mr. A.F. DUMONT  
Mr. C.A. PASSALACQUA

Australia: Sir James PLINSOLL  
Ms. H. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV  
Mr. B. GRINBERG  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. PORTCHEV  
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING  
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. G.A.H. PEARSON  
Mr. J. SIIARD

China: Mr. YU Pei-Jen  
Mr. YANG Hu-Shan  
Mr. LUO Ren-Shi  
Mr. PAN Zhen-Qiang  
Mr. PAN Ju-Shen  
Mr. CHOU Hsein-Chueh  
Mrs. GE Yu-Yun  
Mr. XU Liu-Gen

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA  
Mr. F. ORTIZ  
Mrs. V. BORODOWSKY JACKLEWICH  
Mr. A. JIMÉNEZ GONZÁLEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RŮŽEK  
Mr. P. LUKEŠ  
Mr. E. ZÁPOTOCKÝ  
Mr. J. JIRŮSEK

Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI  
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. GRACZYNSKI  
Mr. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KÓMIVES  
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY  
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. I.M. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO  
Mr. M. MORENO  
Mr. C. FRATESCHI  
Mr. F. DE LUCA

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. T. NONOYAMA  
Mr. R. ISHII  
Mr. K. MIYATA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI  
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES  
Mr. H.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. M. CIRRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENTIAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. A.A. HASHMI

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO BELAÚNDE  
Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. H. PAĆ  
Mr. J. CIAŁOWICZ  
Mr. S. KONIK

Romania: Mr. T. IHELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. M. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN  
Mr. V.I. USTINOV  
Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV  
Mr. B.I. KORNEYENKO  
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER  
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY  
Mr. M. DALEY  
Mr. M. SANCHES  
Mr. P. SALGADO  
Mr. J. CALVERT

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. KALONJI TSHIKALA KAKWAKA  
Mr. NKONGO DONTONI BWANDA  
Mr. LONGO BEKPWA NDAGA  
Mr. BUKETI BUKAYI

Secretary to the Committee  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): As you will recall, in my statement of 5 February I indicated that I might wish to speak again soon in view of the direction in which our debate appeared to be heading. I now find it important to present a few observations by way of comment on some previous statements.

In our first intervention, my delegation deliberately concentrated on certain specific issues which this multilateral disarmament negotiating organ has traditionally had under examination. In doing so we were fully aware, of course, of the serious deterioration of the international climate in which the Committee on Disarmament was reconvening in 1980. Indeed, we acted on the assumption that each delegation recognized the general circumstances of the current international situation, as well as of the political atmosphere obtaining at this time. However, while admittedly each delegation is entitled to its own assessment, we expected that our Committee with its clear-cut disarmament negotiating mandate would not become a forum for the presentation of respective assessments in that regard. After all, these would in any case find their reflection in our positions, attitudes and approaches to the tasks which the international community legitimately expects us to tackle in a constructive way.

Incidentally, in that respect my delegation is in full agreement with the approach to our responsibilities which was adopted by a number of delegations, including the distinguished representatives of Mexico, Nigeria and India. They all deemed it necessary to refer to the vital importance of the Committee on Disarmament at this time. They all urged the Committee to focus its primary attention on the pressing business on its agenda instead of indulging in counter-productive politico-philosophical statements.

While my delegation fully shares the urgent appeals of these representatives, we need -- as it will be certainly appreciated -- to put into proper perspective some of the claims made by certain delegations, including those which concern the events in Afghanistan, in order to balance the one-sided picture that our debate might otherwise present. I need not add, of course, that my delegation is in full agreement with the comments which the representative of other Warsaw Treaty member countries made with respect to Afghanistan.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany referred to certain figures in order to show "where the arms burdens are the heaviest". We regret these figures have not been documented. Indeed, upon checking the 1979 SIPRI Yearbook, we found figures which do not seem to support that earlier claim, although this does not mean that the burden of military expenditures is anything but heavy for all European countries.

Thus, chapter I, on world military expenditure, after due warning about "casual use of figures" in NATO publications (see page 22), lists certain figures in appendix 1 A, to show military expenditure of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member countries as a percentage of their gross national product. What do we find in the respective tables on pages 37 and 39? Table IA 4 quotes data which suggest that the 14 NATO member countries in 1977 spent on an average 3.66 per cent of their gross national product on military purposes. The corresponding figure for the seven Warsaw Treaty member countries is 3.5 per cent (Table 1 A 7).

I do not know how these figures were arrived at. I do not know whether they are right or wrong or misleading. What I know is that statistics can be what one wants them to be.

By the same token, an assertion that "in 1978 the Western nations earmarked \$30 but the Warsaw Pact countries only \$1.6 per head of their population for official aid flows to developing countries" would be, perhaps, more telling were it compared with corresponding data to illustrate profit remittances from the developing countries to the Western multinational monopolies. Such a comparison might well show that a \$30 per capita expenditure is but a part of the total profits made. On the other hand, the co-operation between the socialist countries and the developing ones is based on the principle of mutually balanced benefits.

In the view of my delegation, there are certain basic preconditions and essential requirements which must be clarified and satisfied if disarmament efforts, also in this body, are to be constructive and productive. We submit that their clear understanding may be more relevant to our work than any set of statistical data.

Let us take the concept of détente. In most of the statements in our debate so far we noted keen, and we believe genuine, concern about the fate and the prospects of détente for the immediate and more distant future. All statements made it plain that détente is the only sensible alternative to growing confrontation in this divided world. We share that concern and that view. In point of fact, we strongly believe that détente will become an enduring and irreversible process only if and when the principles on which it has been painstakingly erected are fully and strictly respected by all sides. What, in our view, are these principles?

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

First: genuine détente in today's complex world must derive from and build upon the recognition of the differences which exist between partners to détente, naturally, with the recognition of all the consequences stemming from such differences. That recognition implies the need-- in fact the duty-- to respect these differences at present and in the future. The socialist countries consider that the principle of the inadmissibility of the export of revolution is among the foundations of the policy of détente. At the same time, this principle by its very definition must imply that the inadmissibility of the export of revolution must be matched, word for word, by the principle of the inadmissibility of the export of counter-revolution.

It is the considered opinion of the Polish Government that the sovereign and inalienable right of every nation and people to decide freely upon its fate and upon its political system can be exercised, provided the above principles are strictly observed.

Second: enduring détente can be constructed and promoted only on the solid foundation of the existence and acknowledgment of a lasting balance of security, or -- to put it in other words -- on the balance of power. As we know -- it was the mutual recognition of that particular principle which rendered possible disarmament efforts, including those undertaken between the USSR and the United States, and principally the SALT I and II agreements. At this juncture, it may be appropriate to stress with due emphasis and without any equivocation whatsoever that what my country and other States members of the Warsaw Treaty seek, first and foremost, is the balance of security, not the balance of nuclear terror, not the balance of deterrence. Any attempt to change that balance, under the pretext of restoring a perceived imbalance, is plainly untenable. Therefore, we feel that only a firm and unquestioned balance of mutual security can create the indispensable preconditions of mutual confidence -- of the balance of confidence, for that matter. It is precisely for these reasons, that Poland and its allies have vigorously rejected and protested the NATO decisions of December 1979 which cannot but upset military parity in Europe. Any step aimed at its undermining automatically works to destroy the basis of détente because, and here is the third principle -- political détente must be invariably and inseparably supplemented by specific measures in the field of military détente. Unless such steps are taken in this area -- political détente is doomed, sooner or later, to steady erosion.



(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

As we see it, the very essence of military détente, of effective and credible military détente, is the halting and reversal of the spiral of the arms race, the descent to the lowest possible level of the spiral, with due respect for equal and balanced security interests.

It has never been a secret that the old continent of Europe, especially Central Europe, has the sad distinction of being the part of the globe with the greatest concentration of military nuclear hardware and the greatest arsenals of the most sophisticated and destructive weapons man has ever known.

It has not been by accident, therefore, that my country has always focused on such efforts and initiatives as would contribute to defusing that explosive arsenal and contribute to the peaceful development of this part of the world. It is not my intention at this late hour to discuss either the underlying motives or the long history of these efforts. I will mention however, by way of recollection, that they ranged from the pioneer concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, the Rapacki plan, to the quite recent concept, embodied in a General Assembly Declaration, of the preparation of societies for life in peace.

In the considered view of my Government, the slowing down and halting of the accelerating arms race, and thus the paving of the road to genuine and meaningful disarmament, is at this time the supreme task in our common struggle for peace in Europe and throughout the world. Concerned about the dangerous course the nuclear arms race is taking of late, especially in Europe, and seeking to initiate steps to contain it, my Government has declared its readiness to act as host in Warsaw to a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe, an idea that was first launched by the Warsaw Treaty member States last year.

The assessment of the international situation with regard to disarmament is contained in document CD/60 on Poland's policy with respect to détente and disarmament. The document, which has just been circulated, presents major extracts from the report delivered by Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, on 11 February 1980 at the Eighth Congress of the PUPP. As the document makes it clear, Poland believes that the present political atmosphere should not present an obstacle to the holding of such a conference. Indeed, we are counting on the political realism of European Governments when we say that a decision to hold such a conference in Warsaw, taken -- for instance -- at the forthcoming Madrid meeting, could represent a major breakthrough towards improving the general international situation. Over the last few days we have heard references made to the need for a specific European effort in disarmament. We therefore have grounds to believe that common sense will ultimately prevail and that détente in Europe, both political and military, will pave the way to disarmament in the world at large as well

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my first words are to wish you success in the exercise of your functions and to assure you that you may rely upon the full and unhesitating co-operation of the delegation of Cuba in the work entrusted to the Committee. In congratulating you, may I also extend our congratulations to our former Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Burma, under whose leadership we successfully adopted the final report for the 1979 session, which was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly.

In welcoming the new representatives on the Committee, we look forward to collaborating with them in the same way as with all the other members, so that this body can carry out the mandate entrusted to it.

We have listened carefully and with surprise to some of the statements made so far in the general debate. The Cuban delegation firmly believes that the only way to comply with the letter and spirit of the mandate which the United Nations General Assembly has given our Committee is to devote ourselves responsibly and in sincerity of purpose to the task of negotiating disarmament issues in order to achieve general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, as soon as possible.

Many of the speeches that have been made are reminiscent of the language of the cold war, and demonstrate the extent to which international peace and security are now endangered. Certain questions of concern to the international community are arbitrarily raised, while others are disregarded in an effort to hide the true situation of the world today.

As far back as 2 October last year, the President of the United States announced his country's decision to increase its military presence in the Caribbean Sea and the Indian Ocean; and his Government's intention of creating the "rapid deployment force" as an instrument of intervention and aggression is well known. Equally dangerous is the decision to install in Europe new nuclear missiles which will be a threat not only to the Warsaw Pact countries but also to the neutral and non-aligned countries of that continent and to those of the Mediterranean Basin, North Africa and the Middle East.

Cuba condemns this policy, which is carrying the world towards military confrontation, and speaks out with all its force for the strengthening of international peace and security, for disarmament and for the right of every nation, great or small, to enjoy respect for its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and to pursue its economic and social development in accordance with its own decisions.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

The international climate is one of tension, but we have every confidence that this whole situation will be overcome.

The beginning of this decade coincides with a tense and complex international situation, and we are aware that the state of the world is more critical than it has ever been since the end of the Second World War. The peace gained at the cost of so many millions of lives is now being threatened, and it is the inescapable duty of all nations to strive for it; this is the aspiration of all the peoples, as was clearly stated in the following terms by Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro, our President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers, at the inaugural session of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, held in our capital city:

"Although the developing countries where there is great poverty and a very low average level of life are those which have least to lose in a war, we cannot be insensible to the need for peace on earth. That would be tantamount to renouncing all hopes of a better future for the peoples, and we do not share the belief that a world-wide nuclear war is inevitable. To take this fatalistic and irresponsible attitude is the surest way of making certain that humanity can be annihilated by a universal holocaust. Never before in the life of man has there been a real technological possibility of this. How can we be so foolish as to ignore this, since it was our generation that was called upon for the first time in history to face such a risk.

"In the present-day world, mountainous stockpiles of increasingly deadly weapons are accumulating side by side with the mountainous problems of development, poverty, food shortages, disease, environmental pollution, lack of schools and housing and soaring population growth. The struggle for peace and for a just economic order, for a satisfactory solution to the immense problems by which our peoples are weighed down, is becoming the fundamental issue for the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries."

At the beginning of a new decade, which also marks the start of the Second Disarmament Decade, we cherish the hope that by the time it ends, this multilateral negotiating body on disarmament will have made a valuable contribution to the international community, a contribution which will help to stop the arms race and further the cause of general and complete disarmament. The task is not easy, but it is our duty to work towards its fulfilment.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

Let us not forget that peace and disarmament are things that have to be asked for, demanded and conquered. They will not make their appearance spontaneously; and in the present-day world there is no alternative to them if we wish to save mankind. This was made quite clear in the address to which I referred before.

We realize that in working for disarmament, in seeking to put a stop to the arms race, we will encounter difficulties, and we cannot hope for immediate results. But we must not give up, we must persevere. We note with concern the postponement of the SALT II agreements and the plan to install new nuclear missile devices in Europe. We are not satisfied with the explanations that have been given here on these matters. What is essential is to halt and reverse the arms race, particularly the race in nuclear weapons, and that is why the agreements reached between the major nuclear Powers are so important.

We trust that in 1980 the Committee will be able to devote itself with the necessary energy to its appointed task of producing agreements, or, in other words, conducting negotiations on disarmament measures.

In the Declaration of the Sixth Summit Meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries, stress was laid on the importance of the Committee and the part it plays in disarmament, and its role has been further strengthened by the many resolutions adopted at the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

As to the agenda, my delegation has the following preliminary observations to make:

So far as concerns the comprehensive nuclear test ban, the conclusion of a treaty would undoubtedly offer a new opportunity to halt and eliminate the nuclear arms race. Paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament was categorical in this respect:

"The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interests of mankind".

It is no accident, therefore, that repeated appeals should have been made in this Committee for a fruitful conclusion to the bilateral talks.

As to nuclear disarmament, my delegation supported, right from the time when it was submitted, document CD/4 concerning negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

The preliminary exchange of views on this issue showed the interest taken by the members of the Committee in this crucial problem, and as this year we have with us a nuclear Power which was not represented in 1979 it should be possible to go more deeply into the matter, and thus obtain a clearer picture.

The question of chemical weapons has been under active consideration for many years at the multilateral level, and is regarded as one of the most pressing problems for the disarmament negotiations.

As a number of documents, proposals and draft conventions, etc., already exist on chemical weapons, the Group of 21 at the last session submitted a proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to begin preparing a draft convention which might be universally acceptable.

As to weapons of mass destruction, we have a draft on radiological weapons which my country fully supports. If the question is considered in a working group, it might be possible to submit a complete draft to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Furthermore, it is imperative that a group of governmental experts should prepare a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and, where necessary, specific agreements on particular types of such weapons, as recommended by resolution 34/79 adopted at the last session of the General Assembly.

As regards strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons, it would be desirable to continue the consideration of this question in an ad hoc working group, in the light of the work already done in 1979.

My delegation also considers it highly desirable to include the question of the general programme of disarmament on the agenda for the coming year. This is an extremely important matter. Another special session on disarmament is to be held, and this decade has also been declared a disarmament decade. It should be possible therefore for this negotiating body to have progress to report on this particular subject.

Disarmament is an obligation from which no member State of the international community can or should be excluded. This was said in the historic address given in the forum of the supreme world organization by Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Council of State and Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, and Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, at the thirty-fourth session

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

of the United Nations General Assembly. The statement, which was made on behalf of 95 countries from all continents, emphasized the following:

"We condemned [he was referring to the Sixth Summit Meeting] the persistent channelling of human and material resources into an arms race which is unproductive, wasteful and dangerous to mankind, and we demanded that a substantial part of the resources now devoted to arms, particularly by the major Powers, be used for economic and social development."

He concluded his statement by words which indicate the path to be followed by all those who in one way or another have a responsible part to play in the process of disarmament.

"Let us say farewell to arms and let us in a civilized manner dedicate ourselves to the most pressing problems of our times.

"This is the responsibility, this is the sacred duty of the statesmen of all the world. Moreover, this is the basic premise for human survival".

We have come to the Committee on Disarmament to work in the same spirit and with the same determination as in 1979. Before I conclude, may I refer to the closing words of Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, at the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly:

"The clashing of weapons, the threatening language and the overbearing behaviour in the international arena must cease. Enough of the illusion that the problems of the world can be solved by nuclear weapons. Bombs may kill the hungry, the sick and the ignorant; but bombs cannot kill hunger, disease and ignorance. Nor can bombs kill the righteous rebellion of the people. And in the holocaust, the rich, who are the ones to have the most to lose in this world, will also die."

To those who, fervently and in silence, long for peace and harmony among peoples, we hold out our hands to co-operate in this endeavour, but to those who advocate war and hatred we express our contempt, and our firm resolve to be steadfast, honourable and dignified in resistance, on our small island, to blackmail, intrigue and aggression.

A people with the teachings of Martí to go by, with the memory of Maceo to inspire it and with all its sons transformed into so many Camilo Cienfuegos, does not and never will fear imperialism and all its hirelings put together.

Mr. KALONJI TSHIKALA KAKWAKA (Zaire) (translated from French): Taking the floor for the first time in this Committee, I would first like to express my great satisfaction at seeing you presiding over our work, and I am happy to offer you the sincere congratulations of the Zaire delegation.

I am convinced that your great ability as a negotiator will succeed in overcoming the difficulties that our Committee will inevitably encounter during its work.

I would also like to welcome the Ambassadors who have joined our Committee during the year. As one of them, I can assure you that I will spare no effort to maintain Zaire's modest contribution to the success of the Committee's work.

My delegation is particularly pleased to see the fifth nuclear power -- China -- occupying its seat, which remained vacant throughout 1979. There is no need to reaffirm the important and special role to be played by all the nuclear Powers in ensuring the success of our deliberations.

The first session of the Committee on Disarmament for 1980 is opening at a sombre moment in international relations, when the prevalent international tension is causing peace- and freedom-loving peoples the utmost concern.

After so many efforts made by the international community to bring about détente and usher in an era of peace following the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, mankind has, since the closing days of 1979, been going through a period of crisis which threatens to undermine the achievements of the 1970s. We appear at the moment to be losing sight of the opening words of the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind".

Just as, through lack of firmness, and above all through lack of respect for the Covenant of the League of Nations, Member States were unable to prevent the Second World War, so does lack of respect for the basic principles of the Charter of San Francisco threaten to weaken the United Nations and make it powerless to prevent a third general conflagration, with the foreseeable consequence of the complete annihilation of mankind.

(Mr. Kalonji Tshikala Kakwaka, Zaire)

That situation brings out the extreme importance of the Committee's present work and my delegation would like to emphasize the urgent need for the Committee to enter into negotiations on the priority questions referred to it by the General Assembly at its tenth special session and reconfirmed at its thirty-third and thirty-fourth regular sessions.

Among those priorities are, firstly, the negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Here, the aim should be to complete the drawing-up of the programme before the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, in accordance with the desire expressed in resolution 34/83 B. In this connexion, proposals made both by the two Superpowers and by a number of non-aligned countries in the 1960s might be used as a basis for our discussions.

Secondly, there are the negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session and with resolution 34/83 J. In this connexion, Secretary-General U Thant was surely right when he said:

"... any comprehensive programme for disarmament must begin with a halt or 'freeze' or limitation of the armaments race, above all the nuclear arms race; thereafter measures must be taken to turn the spiral downwards by reducing and finally eliminating nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. A comprehensive programme must of course be balanced and flexible rather than rigid."

(United Nations Headquarters Press Release No. SG/SM/1261, of 22 May 1970)

Thirdly, an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States should be concluded in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 34/84, 34/85 and 34/86.

These guarantees must be unconditional, real and recognized on an internationally accepted legal basis by all the Powers.

I believe these are the only ways of bringing credit to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which a large number of States, including my own, have acceded.

At its last session, the Committee established a working group to study the problem. Unfortunately, we are obliged to note that this working group did not achieve any appreciable results, although it recognized the urgent need to conclude an agreement on the guarantees to be offered to the non-nuclear-weapon countries.



(Mr. Kalonji Tshikala Kakwaka, Zaire)

My delegation earnestly hopes that substantial progress will be made on this problem at the current session.

The programme of work for the current session of the Committee is certainly ambitious, but it is within the capacity of our States, provided that our Governments have the necessary political will to take real steps towards disarmament.

Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946 on Principles governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments, mankind has witnessed a reverse trend characterized by a frantic race towards over-armament in which considerable human and material resources are being mobilized to the detriment of development.

Thirty years after the adoption of that resolution, the international community recognized the danger of over-armament, and it was decided, on the initiative of the non-aligned countries, that a special session on the serious problem of disarmament should be organized.

Two years after that special session, the general euphoria which attended its conclusions seems now to be a thing of the past, and the present tension portends an uncertain future for the third-world countries, which, more than others, need a peaceful world in which to ensure, by their national development, the well-being of their peoples.

It is essential, once again, to emphasize the close relationship on the one hand between disarmament and security as an indissociable element of peace and, on the other hand, between disarmament and development.

For the countries of the third world, peace is an essential condition and prerequisite of their development. The hegemonistic policy of the great Powers and their desire to dominate the small and medium-sized States are major impediments to the purposes and principles of the Charter and place a restraint on the progress of the developing countries.

(Mr. Kalonji Tshikala Kakwaka, Zaire)

So far as concerns Africa more particularly, my delegation wishes to state that the possession of nuclear capacity by the retrograde and racist South African régime is a constant threat to the peace and security of the States of the African continent.

In the context of the negotiations in this Committee, it would be a matter of capital importance for appropriate measures to be studied with a view to removing this sword of Damocles which hangs over the heads of the African States.

The responsibility for the serious nuclear threat rests on those who have the capacity and the means of destroying our planet. The democratization of the international bodies responsible for disarmament negotiations and discussions is the result of a general desire that was clearly expressed at the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

The nuclear Powers must therefore realize that the elimination of war is a corollary of the need for peace and security, which itself is a condition of progress. Consequently, those great nuclear Powers must recognize the need to abandon their idea that some negotiations are the closed preserve of a few privileged States. This attitude is not only contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, but, and above all, it evinces a state of mind that is dominated by distrust. That is why, to be effective, disarmament measures must be accompanied by appropriate control machinery to restore confidence among States. General and complete disarmament is, and must be, a universal concern.

On the threshold of the Third Development Decade, the time is more than ripe for the enormous resources sunk in armaments to be liberated for the benefit of the developing countries, so that new conditions of life for mankind may be established.

Here I would like to emphasize the importance and significance of the concluding passage of the work by Arnold Toynbee, entitled "Mankind and Mother Earth",

(Mr. Kalonji Tshikala Kakwaka, Zaire)

in which the author asks: "Will mankind murder Mother Earth or will he redeem her? He could murder her by misusing his increasing technological potency. Alternatively he could redeem her by overcoming the suicidal, aggressive greed that, in all living creatures, including Man himself, has been the price of the Great Mother's gift of life. This is the enigmatic question which now confronts Man."

Zaire has always considered the ultimate aim of disarmament within the context of placing international security on a firm foundation, so as to promote the third-world countries' development.

However complex the basic aspects of the disarmament problem may be, our Committee has been given a mandate by the General Assembly to seek appropriate and judicious solutions.

Despite the difficult international situation, let us consider the present threats to peace as a passing phase, and let our acts continue to be inspired by the motives of the statesmen who brought the United Nations into being thirty-five years ago, so that the hopes of the international community, which were raised by the results of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, may not be disappointed.

No State in the world, including the nuclear Powers, can assume before history the heavy responsibility for bringing about the destruction of mankind.

All States in the international community must be guided by the constant desire to work for peace, and must express that desire in national policy.

Good-neighbourliness and the rejection of all hegemony will contribute towards the attainment of that objective.

In my delegation's view, our complete devotion to the ideals of the Charter provides the best legal guarantee. International security and world peace will only become a reality when the peoples of the third world cease to be both instruments and victims in the contest between the great nuclear Powers.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): At previous plenary meetings, many delegations, and in particular the delegations of Mexico, Nigeric, Yugoslavic, India, Burma and a number of other countries, have expressed their concern in connexion with the general deterioration in the international situation, placing particular emphasis on the danger of the course which consists of continuing to accelerate the arms race, undermining détente and thrusting the world back to the times of the "cold war". We, for our part, fully share this concern. The Soviet delegation agrees that, with conditions as they are today, the role of the Committee on Disarmament, whose task it is to conduct negotiations on questions related to the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, is more important than ever.

In its statement of 5 February, the delegation of the USSR spoke out in favour of a business-like and constructive discussion of questions directly related to the Committee's terms of reference.

At the plenary meetings held on 5, 7 and 12 February, however, certain delegations brought up questions related to the international situation as a whole, placing upon the reasons for its deterioration an interpretation which does not correspond to reality and with which we, of course, cannot agree. In essence, an attempt was made to hold the Soviet Union responsible for the general deterioration in the international situation and for the steps taken by the NATO countries for the purpose of accelerating the arms race, and to misrepresent the position of the Soviet Union, thereby introducing a spirit of confrontation into the Committee's work. It must be added that today also, unfortunately, certain delegations, including some sitting not far away from the Soviet delegation, have tried to make their contribution to this business, and to pour oil on the fires of confrontation.

Thus, certain delegations declared the basic reason for the current tension to be the events in Afghanistan and Soviet action in that context. Since the delegations of Bulgaria and a number of other socialist countries have already explained the essence of the events in Afghanistan and the reasons for the dispatch to Afghanistan of limited contingents of Soviet troops, I would merely like to emphasize once again that Soviet military assistance was provided upon the request of the Government of Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Co-operation concluded by Afghanistan and the USSR in December 1978. As you know, the Charter of the United Nations accords each State the right to collective or individual

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

self-defence, and this right has been exercised frequently by other States, including States members of the Committee on Disarmament. Soviet forces, as I keep saying, will be completely withdrawn from Afghanistan as soon as the reasons which caused the Afghan leaders to request their presence have disappeared.

As to the true reasons for the deterioration in the international situation in general, and as to the unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to the attainment of results in the matter of limiting the arms race in particular, an objective approach and an unprejudiced examination of the question inevitably give rise to the following conclusions, which the Soviet delegation considers it its duty to discuss in detail. It does so in reply to the general statements which many delegations saw fit to make in the Committee.

If we analyse the actions of the United States of America and some of its allies, we can see that, long before the events in Afghanistan, they had embarked upon actions which brought into question the continuation of the policy of détente, including the attainment of real new progress towards the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. Unilateral actions of this kind were undertaken in different areas of the world and in the most varied fields: in the Middle East, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and other regions in the fields of international trade, the use of the so-called "human rights campaign" against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and so on. Of course, these actions not only adversely affected the development of Soviet-United States relations but did considerable damage to the process of détente as a whole.

We would like to say that if attempts go on being made to discuss political questions in this Committee, including bilateral relations, the Soviet delegation reserves the right to set forth its own views on these questions. We do not intend to do so in the present statement, and shall confine ourselves to certain decisions and actions of the United States and its allies in the field which is directly relevant to the problems facing the Committee on Disarmament.

As you know, in May 1976, at the Washington session of the Council of NATO, when the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament was being held in New York and when the international community was expecting further steps to be taken to check the arms race and promote disarmament, a decision was taken concerning a 3 per cent annual increase in the military expenditure of the NATO countries. At the same session, agreement was reached in principle concerning the deployment of a new United States medium-range nuclear missile in a number of western European countries. These decisions ran counter to the process of détente.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Shortly after this, long before the events in Afghanistan, the United States began unilaterally to break off a number of bilateral negotiations in the field of arms limitation. In particular, the Soviet-United States negotiations on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean ceased more than a year-and-a-half ago. The negotiations on the limitation of the trade in armaments have come to a halt. Here the representative of Sri Lanka made a pathetic appeal to the two countries to resume the negotiations regarding the Indian Ocean. We cannot take delivery of this appeal, for it was not we who stopped these negotiations. The appeal must be addressed to the party which broke off the negotiations. At the same time, the United States began to intensify work on the transformation of its base on the island of Diego Garcia into a major strategic centre of the United States' military system in the Indian Ocean region. It also initiated other military measures, which assume particular importance today in the light of United States actions in this region. In September 1979, also before the events in Afghanistan, a report leaked to the press concerning a directive of the President of the United States according to which the United States must not enter into new negotiations on disarmament until it is absolutely sure that the negotiations will not adversely affect current military programmes. In the view of United States experts, this directive was designed to reduce the importance of disarmament negotiations in the foreign policy of the United States. In the autumn of the same year, the United States Government began to implement the decision taken earlier concerning the establishment of the so-called "rapid-deployment force", of which the representative of Cuba has already spoken today. Furthermore, despite the widespread approval of the conclusion in the summer of 1979 of an agreement between the USSR and the United States in the field of strategic arms limitation, the SALT II Treaty had hardly been signed when various influential circles in the United States began discrediting it, and the ratification process came to be used in effect as a means of impeding its entry into force. Finally, as you know, consideration of this Treaty in the Senate was recently postponed for an unspecified period on the proposal of the President of the United States.

Parallel to the curtailment of its participation in the negotiations on disarmament, the United States has embarked upon the rapid development and deployment in various regions of the world of new types and systems of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, United States leaders state frankly that the goal of the United States is to ensure the military superiority of NATO over the member States of the Warsaw Treaty by the middle of

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the 1980s. In his recent traditional "State of the Union" address to Congress, the President of the United States spoke openly of United States' claims to a leading role in world affairs, affirming that the United States must at all costs remain the strongest of all nations. This same message of the President of the United States made it known that, in the coming years, increased efforts were to be made to develop armaments in the United States and raise military expenditure. In the coming financial year alone, the military expenditure of the United States will increase by \$20 billion, and by the middle of the 1980s, the military budget of the United States will surpass the astronomical sum of \$200 billion.

Of course, the development of détente and of bilateral relations can only be negatively affected by the discussion -- also started before the events in Afghanistan, by the way -- that has recently developed in the United States concerning the wisdom of carrying out "a pre-emptive strike under certain circumstances" with strategic weapons against military targets in the territory of the Soviet Union. There is no shortage of references, in the various statements made by sometimes fairly important United States figures, concerning the need to pursue policies "from a position of strength" vis-à-vis the USSR. Even more alarming is the fact that, in accordance with a military doctrine which includes the possibility of carrying out a pre-emptive strike against a probable opponent, the armed forces of the United States are being expanded; a programme is being carried out to develop the MX mobile missile system; in October 1979, the United States navy began to take delivery of missile-launching strategic submarines equipped with the new Trident-1 missiles; cruise missiles with a range of 2,600 kilometres are undergoing final tests and are ready for service, and other military programmes are in progress.

As you know, the Soviet Union is surrounded by a ring of American military bases equipped with nuclear weapons. United States warships, including aircraft carriers and ballistic-missile submarines, are constantly on patrol near Soviet borders.

I would like to put the question, how the United States or any State represented in this Committee would behave if the Soviet Union arrogated the right to create and maintain an unbroken ring of military bases around it, as the United States is doing around the Soviet Union.

The United States continues to station 480,000 troops overseas and maintains approximately 400 military bases and installations, including 60 major naval bases and 30 airforce bases, in western Europe, the Mediterranean, the Far East

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

and a number of other regions in the world. The majority of these bases are in direct proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and are aimed directly at them.

In addition, in December 1979, on the initiative of the United States, the Council of NATO decided that some new medium-range weapons systems, comprising approximately 600 cruise and Pershing-2 ballistic missiles designed for strategic operations, would be moved up to the borders of the Soviet Union and deployed on the territory of western Europe.

As a pretext for this acceleration of the arms race and a justification for this or that military programme, the United States and the West in general usually have resort to the myth of the "Soviet military threat".

The Soviet side has already more than once had occasion to speak on this subject. We well know the real value of these myths. Today, however, instead of introducing the testimony of a Soviet expert, I would like to refer to an American specialist and former White House adviser, George Kistiakowsky. In an article published in the New York Times Magazine, he describes how these myths are manufactured. He recalls that, at the time, the programme for the development of American heavy bombers, firstly the B-47 and then the intercontinental B-52, was carried out under the pretext that the United States had fallen behind in terms of bombers. "Some years later", states Kistiakowsky, "it was generally agreed ... that the 'bomber gap' was a myth".

Shortly afterwards, however, a new myth was invented. In 1957 a top-secret study group reported to President Eisenhower that, on the basis of intelligence data, the "Soviet threat" would become critical by 1959 or early 1960, since by that time, it was affirmed, the USSR would be capable of producing intercontinental ballistic missiles with megaton warheads. And once again the demand was made for an increase in the military budget and the deployment of a multi-billion programme aimed at removing the "ballistic-missile gap" which was alleged to have made its appearance. For several years this question was the subject of a great furore, in which the presidential candidates took part during the 1960 election campaign. "And although Kennedy" -- I quote Kistiakowsky -- "learned upon entering the White House that the 'missile gap' was indeed a myth, he had our Minuteman and Polaris strategic-missile programmes greatly enlarged in compliance with his campaign promises."



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In the 1960s, despite the fact that large-scale strategic arms programmes were carried out in the United States, further legends were invented to the effect that the Soviet Union had put in hand a far-reaching programme of civil defence measures, which could give it the incentive to make a first nuclear strike against the United States; or that various anti-missile defence systems were being developed around Moscow and in some other regions of the Soviet Union, which would render ineffective a United States retaliatory nuclear strike "in the event of an attack by the USSR". To quote Kistiakowsky again: "Though rejected on available evidence by more objective American analysts, this projection was a major factor in the decision to develop a new missile system -- the MIRV's."

And now another turn is being given to the armaments spiral, in the same old way. Attempts have been and are being made to justify the NATO Council's December decision on the grounds that this step is a response to the Soviet Union's modernization of its medium-range missile system.

Here, they speak of missile systems which in the West are called SS-20. Permit me to dwell on this in more detail. It may be asked, what kind of system is this SS-20? In fact, it is a modernization of existing types of missile systems. And have not the NATO countries, too -- and that more than once -- modernized their armaments, including certain similar types of weapon? The western States' rejoinder to us on this is that it was -- they say -- a long time ago, whereas you have been doing it recently. But there is no logic in this. Is it better or worse, it may be asked, if the western countries managed to carry out their modernization before the Soviet Union? We should like to know whether our opponents think it would have been better if we had carried out this modernization earlier.

There is another important point here. During the past 10 years we have not increased by a single missile, or a single aircraft, the number of medium-range nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles in the European territory of the USSR. On the contrary, the number of medium-range launching sites has actually been reduced, as well as the nuclear payload of these missiles. The number of medium-range bombers has been cut down likewise.

During this time, the United States medium-range missiles which it is proposed to deploy in western Europe are aimed at the territory of the Soviet Union and that is a fundamentally new factor with a bearing on the whole strategic situation, on strategic parity. To put the NATO Council's December decisions into effect would mean upsetting the existing parity in order to ensure the military superiority of NATO over the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

During the general discussion, some delegations of western States alleged that the Soviet Union was refusing to engage in talks on medium-range nuclear weapons. But that, surely, is putting the cart before the horse, as it were. We say that, under the new conditions, when the NATO bloc has decided to produce and deploy new United States missiles in western Europe, the only way of making it possible for effective talks to be started on the question of medium-range nuclear weapons would be to cancel these decisions of the NATO bloc or to stop their execution, taking an official decision for that purpose. It would, of course, have been easier to begin the talks earlier, when the Soviet proposal was made, and when the NATO decision had not yet been taken, but the NATO countries preferred it the other way.

It may be stated in all certainty that the conception of military superiority which is taken by the western States as a reason for arming is the antithesis of the principle of not acting contrary to the national-security interests of States, and is one of the chief obstacles to the progress of negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament; it is an impossible basis for making any progress towards détente.

As everyone knows, an approximate balance of military power has come into being between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is a balance which cannot, of course, be weighed on the apothecary's scales, and it does not mean that the two sides possess all the types of armed forces and armaments in exactly the same quantities and qualities. The military potential of each side is naturally made up of components determined by a whole set of different factors, each of which has its own specific characteristics.

It is sometimes extremely difficult to compare even equivalent components of the different sides' military potential. When the term "balance" is used in relation to the ratio of strength between two States or between groups of States, it is taken to mean that, from the viewpoint of the military-strategic balance, the two sides are more or less on an even footing and neither of them has military superiority over the other.

The approximate balance of armed forces of which I spoke was not arrived at in a day, or even in a year. It was the outcome of the protracted opposition of the main military-political blocs formed after the Second World War as a result of the demarcation, in the international arena, of the forces of socialism and capitalism. This equilibrium is an objective reality of political life today. It is everywhere essentially acknowledged. It has also been spoken of by people

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

in the West, including the most authoritative political and military leaders. Suffice it to recall the well-known statements on this topic by the President of the United States of America, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and a number of other leading public figures of the West. Leaders in the Soviet Union, too, have frequently spoken about the existing approximate balance of armed forces.

And now, at the end of 1979, we have representatives of western countries suddenly saying that there is no balance; it will be achieved, they say, only after the already mentioned NATO plans have been carried out.

Another proposition, too, has received wide recognition, and we hope the delegations represented in the Committee will agree with this: a disturbance of the balance of armed forces which has established itself between the USSR and the United States will not only destabilize relations between those two countries but will have a negative effect on the whole complex of international relations -- and that in turn may lead to a serious aggravation of the international situation and create a threat to peace and general security.

The position of the USSR on this question is absolutely clear. Allow me to quote from the statement by Leonid Ilich Brezhnev:

"We have no wish to upset the approximate balance of armed forces which has now been achieved, let us say, between East and West in central Europe or between the USSR and the United States. But we demand in return that no one else attempts to upset it to his advantage.

"Of course, maintenance of the balance that has been reached is not an end in itself. We are all for beginning to turn the arms-race curve downwards and for gradually reducing the level of military confrontation. We wish significantly to reduce, and then to remove, the threat of nuclear war -- the most terrible danger facing mankind."

A policy which gambles on armed strength and on military superiority over others cannot ensure firm and lasting peace and general security and, consequently, the security of each State. History has shown more than once that action provokes counter-action. The appearance of a new type of weapon on one side has inevitably led to its appearance, and that in an even more perfected form, on the other.

It is absolutely clear from all that has been said that for a number of years a line has been taken aimed at upsetting the approximate balance of forces achieved between the USSR and the United States of America, between West and

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

East, and, under the pretext of the imagined "growing Soviet threat", bringing about the West's military superiority. In order to justify this line, propagandist ballyhoo is being organized and bandied about concerning various events, and crisis after crisis is being provoked. It suffices to recall, let us say, the "mini-crisis" fabricated in the United States in August and September over Cuba. As you know, it burst like a soap-bubble. And now, the Afghan situation is being used for the same purpose. These crises are needed by those circles which are intent on sabre-rattling and adopting a "position of strength" policy for armament purposes.

Thus, the chief cause of the aggravation of the international situation at the present time is the West's policy of upsetting the principle of equality and equal security -- that is to say, the principle on the basis of which the process of détente has developed and can develop.

The desire for military superiority only leads to an arms race, which does not guarantee the security of a single State or of any group of States. On the contrary, with each new step in the perfection of modern weaponry, in the creation of new forms and systems of weapons of mass destruction, a situation of even greater instability is created in the world, and the danger of war comes closer.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the national-security interests of States can best be ensured in conditions of peace and the relaxation of international tension, backed by concrete measures in the field of arms limitations and disarmament. The firmer and more stable peace is, the greater will be the security in which States and peoples live. This conclusion derives from the centuries-old history of mankind. The way to strengthen universal peace and security is not to pursue a course of military superiority over other States, or the notorious "position of strength" policy, but to adopt a sober, responsible approach to evaluation of the events of international life, and a readiness to take effective, concrete measures in the field of disarmament, based on strict observance of the principle of not acting contrary to the security interests of any of the sides.

Mr. YU Pei-Wen (China) (translated from Chinese): Allow me to express, in the name of the Chinese delegation, our sincere thanks to the many representatives who have extended in their general-debate statements a warm and friendly welcome to the Chinese delegation regarding its participation in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, my delegation wishes to reiterate that we shall proceed with a positive and constructive attitude in the Committee on Disarmament, this multilateral negotiating organ, to negotiate and examine the various questions with all of you and do our share to promote progress in the disarmament efforts.

Furthermore, I wish to point out that as a result of its invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has been strongly condemned by world public opinion, the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, the decision of the Islamic Conference and by many representatives here in this Committee. The desperate attempt on the part of the Soviet representatives to defend and deny Soviet actions on this question is utterly futile. As for the attacks and slanders he levelled against China in his statement at the previous meeting, they are even less worthy of a rebuttal.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Permit me, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, to greet you as the new representative of Canada, and Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February. I should like to express the hope that under your chairmanship the Committee will successfully continue its work.

The Mongolian delegation extends greetings to the new representatives taking part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament and wishes them success in their responsible mission.

The Mongolian delegation notes with satisfaction the valuable contribution made by the esteemed representative of Burma, Ambassador U Saw Hlaing, as your predecessor.

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament has begun its work in a difficult international situation which is due to a number of circumstances.

Facts confirm that the opponents of détente and disarmament are guided by the desire to seek unilateral advantage and military supremacy for the NATO bloc.

As you know, during the period when the first special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly was taking place in New York, the NATO Council adopted in Washington a long-term programme for the further accumulation of arms and for a sharp increase in the military budgets of the bloc's member countries.

Such striving on the part of militaristic circles in the West to give the arms-race spiral another turn recently found clear confirmation in NATO's latest dangerous decision to deploy qualitatively new types of American medium-range nuclear missiles in the territories of a number of west European countries.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In addition to these far-reaching dangerous plans, the examination by the United States Senate, with a view to ratification, of the new Soviet-United States Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), which, as you know, represents one of the most important achievements on the road to disarmament and the consolidation of international peace and security, has been postponed for an indefinite period.

The activities of certain Western circles in connexion with the development of new military programmes and still further increases in the military expenditures of NATO's member countries has been accompanied of late by a furious anti-Soviet slander campaign fanned by imperialist and Great-Power hegemonistic forces around the events in Afghanistan.

In face of a serious threat to Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty from imperialist and expansionist forces and other internal and external enemies, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan repeatedly appealed to the Soviet Union for assistance, including military assistance.

Under those circumstances, the Soviet Union, faithful to its obligations assumed under the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighbourliness and Co-operation, responded to the request of the lawful Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and gave and is still giving it the necessary assistance.

We therefore consider that this action is fully in accordance with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter.

Today, when the world community has entered upon a new decade with great hopes of achieving effective measures in the disarmament field, the role and responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament -- the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament matters -- have become even greater than before.

The opening of the 1980 session is significant in the history of this forum, by reason of the fact that all five nuclear-weapon States are represented in the Committee for the first time.

Mongolia has always attached the greatest importance to the participation in negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament of all the nuclear-weapon States without exception, and has constantly emphasized their special responsibility in the cause of the protection and consolidation of international peace and security, in the cause of disarmament. That was why Mongolia, together with others, welcomed the decision of France to join the Committee on Disarmament last year.

As for China's decision to take its place in the Committee this year, it entitles us to expect from its representatives a constructive participation in the work of this forum.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

It must be noted with regret, however, that the first official statement made by the representative of China in the Committee on Disarmament on 5 February this year forces us to draw the following conclusion: there has been no change of a positive nature in that Power's position on the principal issues of disarmament.

In that connexion, special reference should be made to the danger of the Chinese argument that the Soviet Union and the United States of America must be the first to reduce the arsenals both of their nuclear and of their conventional arms. Such an approach to disarmament matters profoundly contradicts the main principle of disarmament, the principle of the parity and equal security of the sides.

Likewise, we cannot agree with the proposition advanced by China concerning the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to have nuclear weapons of their own, allegedly for self-defence.

This proposition is fraught with the most far-reaching dangers if we bear in mind the adventurist ambitions of the ruling circles of Israel and South Africa to acquire nuclear weapons.

We consider -- and we hope that many others are of the same opinion -- that a decision to accede would be one of the first concrete manifestations of a spirit of constructive realism on the part of those countries, including China, which have not yet acceded to such international treaties and agreements already existing in the disarmament field as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, whose further strengthening is advocated by a majority of the world's countries, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, which have been signed by a majority of States, including the USSR, the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

Everyone is aware that the present Chinese leadership is openly steering a course towards closer military links with NATO with a view to further increasing its military potential, especially its nuclear-missile potential, while certain western States are meeting half-way China's desire for access to the latest modern arms and military technology

As a State neighbouring on China, Mongolia has every reason to express its anxiety and resolutely to condemn a policy whose cutting edge is levelled mainly at international détente, peace and disarmament, at the independence, sovereignty and security of peace-loving States, and which is aimed at the fulfilment of China's hegemonistic ambitions.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In this connexion we cannot but note that since the late 1950s China has adopted an aggressive-offensive strategy aimed at the attainment of hegemonistic goals. Of the 30 military conflicts which have taken place in Asia between the Second World War and 1980, 19 arose through the fault of the Chinese People's Republic. Peking's aggressive schemes were almost invariably accompanied by territorial claims against neighbouring countries, and also, in a number of cases (India, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam), by the seizure of foreign territory. In recent years, besides using methods of open aggression, China has begun to apply a new tactic of installing anti-popular pro-Peking régimes and supporting imperialist aggression against independent States. The latest example of open aggression against its neighbours was China's aggression against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam between 17 February and 16 March 1979.

Calls are heard from the peoples in different parts of the globe concerning the urgent need for still more active efforts to avert the danger of a new round of the arms race, to secure effective measures in the field of disarmament.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries of whose foreign-policy activities the struggle for disarmament has been and remains an integral part, is always active in coming forward with concrete proposals and initiatives aimed at halting the arms race and at disarmament.

The most recent proof of this was provided by the latest important initiative of the Soviet Union's announced in Berlin on 6 October 1979 by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Since the content of this initiative is well known to members of the Comitée and since it was explained in detail, in particular, by Ambassador V.L. Issraelyan, the esteemed representative of the Soviet Union, in his statement last week, I shall confine myself to pointing out that we regard this initiative as a concrete programme of action both in the sphere of military détente and in the cause of building confidence between States. In our view, it represents a concrete example of how to pass on to practical action and the adoption of tangible measures towards reducing military confrontation on the European continent and attaining the objectives of disarmament and strengthening the security of the peoples of Europe and the whole world.

The implementation of this important and timely initiative and of many other constructive proposals made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the United Nations General Assembly, in other international forums and here, in the



(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Committee on Disarmament, is becoming increasingly urgent and necessary in order to prevent a new, dangerous round of the arms race and to ensure the application of practical measures in the disarmament field.

Bearing in mind this important task, which directly concerns the Committee on Disarmament, the Mongolian delegation considers it necessary to proceed as early as possible to business-like, concrete negotiations on matters of substance.

Bearing in mind the important recommendations of the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly confirming once again the need constantly to give attention to matters relating to the prevention of the risk of thermonuclear war, the Committee should first and foremost concentrate its efforts on problems of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.

In this connexion, we attach great importance to the speedy initiation, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 34/83 J, of preparatory consultations on the holding of negotiations on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapons States and certain other States, as proposed by the socialist countries in document CD/4. The implementation of this proposal would have considerable significance in the sense that the most terrible means of mass destruction of human life could then be withdrawn from the arsenals of States, confidence between States could be considerably strengthened and the problem of protecting non-nuclear-weapon States from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them could be solved.

In our view, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is one of the key elements of nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation views the speedy achievement of agreement on this question as an important contribution towards strengthening the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prevention of the further qualitative improvement of such weapons.

We express the hope that the constructive proposals made by the Soviet Union with a view to speeding up the tripartite negotiations will facilitate to the fullest extent the conclusion of an appropriate agreement.

In this connexion I should like to mention the forthcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, whose important decisions are bound to assist our efforts in this field.

Side by side with measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, an important task awaiting solution is the drafting of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Erdembilog, Mongolia)

Mongolia's position on this issue was reflected in the draft convention submitted jointly with other socialist countries for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament last year (document CD/23).

At last year's session of the Committee, there was a highly useful exchange of views on this question which will we hope, be of considerable help in dealing with the question and concluding an appropriate international convention, as called for in a decision of the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The drafting of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons continues to remain one of the high-priority tasks before the Committee on Disarmament.

We consider that the USSR-United States joint report on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, submitted at the last session of the Committee, will serve as a valuable contribution towards speeding up negotiations in this field.

The adoption of effective measures for the prevention of the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction is becoming more and more necessary under conditions of rapid development of contemporary science and technology. Mongolia continues to advocate the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement which would prohibit the development and production of all new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

We regard this method of solving the question as the simplest and most reliable.

At the same time, we welcomed the joint Soviet-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, submitted for the Committee's examination last year. We hope that the examination of this proposal in the Committee will shortly lead to definitive agreement on an appropriate international treaty.

The questions I have briefly touched upon in my statement today have been before the Committee for a number of years. Some of them have been the subject of intensive discussion and useful negotiations, more particularly at the last session of the Committee on Disarmament.

We therefore consider that the Committee's main task at the present session is to continue the negotiations conducted last session, so that, by mobilizing all efforts and possibilities, progress may be made towards their successful completion.

In this respect we endorse the view of those delegations which have spoken in favour of not overloading the Committee's agenda for this year with new or, if I may thus express myself, insufficiently ripe questions, and of basing the agenda on that of the Committee's last session.

Such are the considerations of a general nature which the Mongolian delegation thought necessary to put forward at the present stage of the Committee's work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the words addressed to the Chair.

That completes the list of speakers. As at this stage it seems there will be no further statements by delegations, I would like to raise a couple of matters with the Committee. First, a Chairman's work is sometimes difficult, of course, but on other occasions it is rather pleasant, and it is my privilege, for a few moments, to turn to one of the more pleasant duties as Chairman of this Committee.

I believe that this is probably the last official meeting to be attended by Ambassador Fisher, the leader of the delegation of the United States to the Committee on Disarmament, and I thought that you would want me, on your behalf, as well as on my own, to say a few words of thanks and bon voyage to him. He was present at the end of the EDC and at the beginning of the CCD, and, after a lapse of time, he came to Geneva in 1977 for the last session of the CCD, as well as contributing actively, during the Special Session, to the Committee's renaissance, as it was adapted into its present form -- the Committee on Disarmament.

As most of you know, far better than myself, Ambassador Fisher has manifested for many years his dedication to the cause of disarmament -- not only in this forum, but within non-governmental organizations and governmental circles. He now leaves us, but I know he intends to pursue his interest in this field. Let us wish him continued success in his future undertakings, where I know he will still be working on behalf of the interests pursued by this Committee and its members. We will miss him as a colleague. Even I, with the opportunity of knowing him only during these first few weeks of our session, came quickly to appreciate his warm and colourful personality and the mark it has on the Committee's deliberations. Our Committee will lose an important source of inspiration.

However, I think you would want me to continue in somewhat less professional and formal tones, and speak of Ambassador Fisher, the man, the person. For example, he was not among those who would argue and run the risk of getting ulcers because they go mountain-climbing over mole-hills. I want to speak of the human being. Again I am sure that he would not be among those university professors who, when charged by an unhappy student that an examination paper surely does not rate an absolute zero, will reply: "I agree, but I am not allowed to award any lower marks than zero". He has a keen sense of the practical as well, and we have in my country something like Tennessee-style humour. On a matter of tactics, I am reminded of my two countrymen, amateur fishermen, who went one week-end to their favourite stream. The first,

(The Chairman)

highly successful, pulled in fish after fish, the second had no luck whatsoever. He complained to the first: "You are getting all the fish and I have none. Why?" Back came the response: "Simple. Your worm doesn't try". Finally I want to refer to his grasp of the essentials: he is the man who is capable of replying, to the affable waiter who says "Sometimes you find a pearl in our oyster soup" -- "Pearl? I'm looking for an oyster in your oyster soup."

In choosing to appropriate for myself Ambassador Fisher's occasional style, however imperfectly, in order to say 'au revoir' to him on behalf of the Committee, I do so to remind you of the real Adrian Fisher, who is a very spirited person, very human, sharply sensitive to the practical, surely, but purely and sincerely attached to the essentials, and that is, a man to whom essentials have mattered and to whom we all confidently know the essentials will go on mattering. In this Committee, I can say no more.

Mr. FISHER (United States): I would like to make a response, not by going to Southern Tennessee, but to parts of a delegation that has always had high representational skills here, namely Nigeria. When Mr. Obi was departing and people said nice things about him -- he made the comment, which I have adopted and transported to Memphis, that "an ugly woman is more pleased at being told that she is pretty than a pretty woman." In that context I am most pleased. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I will miss you all.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I also wanted the time to add a few words to what Ambassador and now Professor Fisher would describe as one of our distinguished and most learned colleagues, Ambassador Sir James Plimsoll, who is also leaving us, having lately been appointed as the representative of his country to London. He spent little more than a session with the Committee, and in that relatively brief period he has left his mark -- not least perhaps, with the interpreters as a result of his impromptu speeches. He impressed all of us with his strong commonsense and well-articulated arguments. The Committee faces a loss, and I know again that you would want me to speak for all of us -- I would be remiss if I did not -- in saying that we will miss his contributions to our work and offering him best wishes for success in his new assignment.

Sir James PLIMSOLL (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I shall reply just as briefly as Ambassador Fisher, so as not to give the unfortunate interpreters a greater burden than they are accustomed to. I must say, from all that I hear, they cope more than satisfactorily with what I say. I have not been here long, I have enjoyed it, and I have found it very valuable in every sense. One of the useful things about this Committee, for a diplomat, is that even if we are no longer present here, there is a carry-over into our next assignment, because disarmament is something that pervades the whole of international relations, and if one is really interested in it and believes in it there is a lot to say about it everywhere. I have found the greatest of kindness from every member of this Committee and from all groups. I have had great consideration from all the officers and from all the secretariat. I thank you all.

Mr. I. B. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. By speaking now I fear I might introduce a little bit of disorder into what you have now put into order. I speak because Ambassador Darusman of Indonesia, who is the current Chairman of the Group of 21, and Ambassador Gharekhan, who was the previous Chairman, have both informed us that they would not be able to attend this afternoon's meeting, and I have been deputed by the Group of 21 to express their sentiments and their regrets on the departure of Ambassador Fisher. Mr. Chairman, you have more than adequately expressed the sentiments of the Committee, you have remarked on the outstanding career of Ambassador Fisher and that he was present at the time of the death and the birth of more than one of these disarmament organizations. I wouldn't blame him for having delivered the last one, but nevertheless he was present.

My own acquaintance with Ambassador Fisher is also relatively recent, we came to know each other during the Special Session on disarmament. I am sure that the Group of 21 would like me to say, on their behalf, that notwithstanding occasions, not too frequent, where we had differences of opinion, we have all enjoyed Ambassador Fisher's participation and his contribution to the work of this Committee. We have, the highest regard for the agility of his mind and his great sense of humour, of which he gave an example just a moment ago. We shall miss his participation in our meetings, and I need hardly say that we shall miss his presence, in fact it will be difficult not to miss his presence. I am sure that the Committee also knows that Ambassador Fisher played a very significant role in another treaty which is closely connected with the work of this Committee,

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

which was often referred to in the last few days. I have in mind the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and his important contribution towards making it possible. Perhaps one would have wished that even if he did not participate in the future meetings of our Committee, he might be present at the next review of that treaty. Having contributed so much to the last one, his presence might make much easier the proceedings of the next meeting, because I am sure that he would like to maintain that same record.

Ambassador Fisher, on behalf of the Group of 21, I wish you all the best for the future. You are certainly not going into any kind of retirement, as you said that you are going back to your old university to be a member of the faculty of the Law School there. While we have no doubt what we shall miss here, your students will benefit greatly from your presence among them.

Mr. FISHER (United States): I will make a new record for briefness, and say thank you.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): I would like, on behalf of the group of socialist delegations present in the Committee, to join to your statement our feelings upon the departure of our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Fisher. We, all, highly respect him, and really regret that he is leaving us, because he is a man with whom we have worked extensively in discussions and consultations. His opinion was interesting although sometimes we disagreed with him. On these occasions, I could often use his own words when a statement was made with which he disagreed; he would congratulate you in spite of the fact that he disagreed with it, I think that this is the common sense of our Committee. We respect the views of others, and it is a good basis, despite our differences, for trying to find a common agreement. Ambassador Fisher is a man who respects the views of others, and with this respect and his wisdom, he helps us both as a professor and as a non-scientist in international affairs. Although we will miss him, I would like to extend to him our best wishes and success in his future work. As the world becomes smaller and smaller, we shall surely meet again; perhaps in disarmament events or in another field where we will be able to co-operate. Our best regards to you, Ambassador Fisher.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no other speakers, I would like to deal quickly with the question of our future business. I propose that tomorrow we continue informal consultations, at 11.00 a.m. I shall be present, as I am

(The Chairman)

sure Ambassador Jaipal will be, plus any delegation which wishes to help finalize our work on the question of the agenda. Hopefully, we will be able to move on to the Programme of Work, but essentially we will try to come to a conclusion concerning the agenda.

I propose that we have our next informal meeting on Monday at 3.00 p.m., and that the next plenary meeting of the Committee be held on Tuesday, 19 February, at 10.30 a.m. At the informal meeting on Monday we will confirm the time of that meeting on Tuesday, as well as the question of business to be discussed. Are these suggestions acceptable to the members of the Committee?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.