

CD/PV.57
12 February 1980
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 12 February 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

(Canada)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. BENYAHIA

Argentina: Mr. A. DUMONT
Mr. PASSALACQUA

Australia: Sir James PLIMSOLL
Mr. A. BEHM
Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. J-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV
Mr. S. STAIKOV
Mr. B. GRINBERG
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.A.H. PEARSON
Mr. J.T. SIMARD

China: Mr. YU PEI-WIN
Mr. YANG HU-SHAN
Mr. LUO REN-SHI
Mr. LIANG DE-FEN
Mr. PAN ZHEN-QIANG
Mr. YAN MING-LING
Mrs. GE YU-YUN
Mr. LI ZHANG-HE
Mr. PAN JU-SHEN

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
Mr. L.A. BARRERAS CAÑIZO
Mr. A. JÍMINEZ GONZÁLEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RŮŽEK
Mr. P. LUKEŠ
Mr. E. ZÁPOTOCKÝ
Mr. J. JIRŮSEK

Egypt: Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. J. ZENKER
Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI
Mr. R. HECKEL

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. H. MÜLLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KÖMIVES
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. I.M. DAMANIK

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. M. MORENO
Mr. C. FRATESCHI
Mr. F. DE LUCA

Japan : Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. T. NONOYAMA
Mr. T. IWANAMI
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. MIYATA
Mr. M. ICHIKAWA

Kenya : Mr. S. SHITEMI

Mexico : Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia : Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco :

Netherlands : Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria : Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO
Mr. T. AĞUIYL-IRONSİ

Pakistan : Mr. A.A. HASHMI

Peru : Mr. F. VALDIVIESO BELAÚNDE
Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland : Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIAŁOWICZ
Mr. S. KONIK

Romania : Mr. C. ENE
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. O. IONESCU

Sri Lanka : Mr. I.B. FONSEKA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK
Mrs. G. JONANG
Mr. O. DAHLMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.I. USTINOV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. P.M.W. FRANCIS

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. M. DALEY
Mr. M. SANCHES
Mr. P. SALGADO
Mr. J. CALVERT
Mr. J.W. MACDONALD

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mrs. R. MUGICA DE ADAMES

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. KALONJI TSHIKALA KAKWAKA

Secretary to the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to associate my delegation with the warm welcome extended to you as the new leader of the Canadian delegation and as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February. In wishing you every success in your assignment, I offer you the co-operation of the Hungarian delegation in both your capacities.

I take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Martenson, the Assistant Secretary-General and Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary of our Committee.

I take also this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues for the words of welcome addressed to me. I would like to assure all members of the Committee that the Hungarian delegation is ready and will be ready for co-operation with every delegation in achieving tangible results in the field of disarmament.

My delegation notes with satisfaction that our Committee is resuming its work in 1980 in its full composition, as called for by the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In its earlier statements the Hungarian delegation repeatedly emphasized that the active and constructive co-operation of all the nuclear-weapon States is indispensable to achieve progress on the most important **disarmament** issues. That is what we expect from the delegation of the People's Republic of China in the future.

Mr. Chairman, in welcoming the new leaders of several delegations, you were kind enough to mention that I had previously participated in the work of the CCD. I felt greatly honoured to be the first representative of my country to the CCD and I am equally honoured now, some five years later, to represent Hungary in the Committee on Disarmament. Making comparisons is always risky, but after my first impressions here, I venture to say that the CCD, according to my recollection, never had the sort of discussion I have now witnessed, not even in the darkest days of the war in Viet Nam.

The Hungarian delegation heard with a sense of disappointment the statements of some delegations raising subjects obviously irrelevant to our work and, what is more, offering distorted, one-sided interpretations of them. This is not the proper forum and not the proper time for such an exercise, as was very wisely pointed out by Ambassador García Robles.

The Committee on Disarmament has the clearly-defined mandate of a disarmament negotiating body. Nonetheless, some delegations felt obliged to raise the question

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

of the so-called "events in Afghanistan". The same delegations, on the same pretext, try to put the blame on the other side for the present international situation, and for the setback in the process of détente.

This situation prompts me to explain the position of my Government. It is of the opinion that the military assistance accorded to the Government of Afghanistan has been provided on the basis of a bilateral treaty concluded by Afghanistan and the USSR in full accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Charter of the United Nations, and considers it to be a matter of the bilateral relations between the two States concerned. The Hungarian Government therefore condemns the manipulations to fabricate an international issue out of the so-called "Afghan question" and to use it to poison the international atmosphere, impeding détente and disarmament.

Unfortunately it is an undeniable fact of our days that the international situation is tense. The Hungarian Government has stated many times and in different international forums that détente may eventually suffer unless complemented by détente in the military field, that is, by substantial measures in the field of disarmament. The universally-recognized principle up to quite recently was the principle of equal security, that is, no States or groups of States should seek military superiority. On this very basis, promising progress was made in various bilateral or multilateral negotiations.

So far, SALT II has been the most significant among them. Last July, at the time delegations in this Committee welcomed SALT II, they urged its ratification and expressed the desire that negotiations on SALT III should be started as soon as possible. There were hopes that the ratification of SALT II would open up new possibilities in the multilateral disarmament negotiations as well. This, however, did not happen. The reason for deferring the ratification of SALT II can hardly be found in Afghanistan, but in the plans of some Western circles to gain military superiority, and in the fact that they no longer accept the principle of parity.

Another instance of this is NATO's decision of December last on the deployment of new long-range theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe. We heard various arguments in justification of this action. My delegation thinks that no amount of rhetoric, however eloquent, can change the fact that the answer given to the Soviet proposal, suggesting among other things, a reduction in the number of its missiles

(Mr. Könives, Hungary)

called SS-20, was the aforementioned NATO decision. The Hungarian Government condemns all efforts aimed at upsetting the strategic balance of force, whether global or regional, as in the European area.

In the present circumstances it is more evident than ever before that the key to furthering détente is the achievement of progress in the field of disarmament. It is imperative now to increase our efforts to curb the arms race and to obtain tangible results in arms control and disarmament. The first requirement if we are to move ahead is to restore the constructive and business-like atmosphere in our Committee.

Mr. Chairman, the agenda and the programme of work have started shaping up under your constructive guidance, and I would now like to explain the views of my delegation on the items included in the agenda and programme of work of the Committee. The items are familiar to us, as they were on the agenda of our 1979 session. The basic approach of the Hungarian delegation is to continue our work where we left off last year.

It is a matter of satisfaction that a proper place has been accorded to the question of nuclear disarmament on the agenda, as requested in resolution 34/83 J of the General Assembly. My delegation is of the view that the Committee should continue -- preferably in a more organized manner -- the exchange of views and preparatory consultations with a view to creating a basis for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. The proposal submitted last year by the socialist delegations in the Committee on negotiations for ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed has become even more relevant. The presence of all the five nuclear-weapon States in the Committee gives us a better chance of clarifying where we stand and how we should proceed with the consideration of this high-priority issue. We think that the Second Review Conference of the NPT gives special urgency to the consideration of this subject and to achieve satisfactory progress on it.

My delegation welcomes the resumption of the trilateral talks on the comprehensive test ban treaty, the successful outcome of which will provide the Committee with a basis for proceeding with the elaboration of the treaty.

The Hungarian delegation welcomes the broad support of delegations in the Committee for the concrete consideration of the subject of strengthening guarantees

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This issue has now acquired a tradition, even if it has not been long on the negotiating list of the Committee. The keen interest in and -- unfortunately -- the divergence of views on -- the matter are highlighted by the three resolutions of the General Assembly. My delegation continues to take special interest in the subject and would very much support its continued consideration in the framework of a working group. We would suggest, however, that the working group should focus its attention on the substance of the issue, that is on how far we can go in defining the uniform assurances to be given to non-nuclear-weapon States and the range of countries to which these assurances will be accorded. Once we reach agreement on these elements, it will be comparatively easy to find the most appropriate form for their presentation. We also consider this subject crucial from the point of view of the forthcoming NPT Review Conference.

The prohibition of chemical weapons seems to have come to the centre of the attention of the Committee more than ever. It seems that the active, sometimes heated, debates of last year's session were not in vain. There is now a greater understanding of and a more mature approach to the problem of how the Committee could proceed with the matter and eventually work out a CW convention. The working papers submitted last year, and especially the joint USSR-United States document, greatly contributed to the creation of a workable basis for concrete negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as called for by General Assembly resolution 34/72. My delegation is of the opinion that the most effective way to proceed is a step-by-step approach, perhaps starting with the elaboration of the outlines of a future convention. My delegation hopes that resumption of the bilateral talks will facilitate the activities of the Committee and vice versa. The best organizational framework seems to be a working group with a mandate aimed at negotiations within the Committee with the ultimate objective of working out a treaty once the bilateral talks have been completed.

The Committee has also to give appropriate attention to the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. We displayed active interest in this subject in the past, and continue to do so. We are more and more convinced of the necessity and usefulness of a comprehensive approach in the light of the reasons I mentioned in the first part of my intervention. The first useful step might be to set up a group of governmental experts to study the subject as a whole and make recommendations to the Committee.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

Concerning radiological weapons, I learnt with pleasure that delegations which have made their statements expressed their readiness to start negotiations. My delegation willingly joins those delegations who have suggested the establishment of a working group to that end, and would suggest that it should be entrusted with a clear mandate to work out the text of a convention not later than the end of the present session of the Committee. The successful accomplishment of this task can hardly be overestimated from many points of view.

The General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session requested the Committee to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and to complete it before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Many of the delegations to the Committee were present at the session of the UNDC last year when the elements of that programme were being worked out. These delegates and those who participated in the previous efforts of the CCD in this field may know that the accomplishment of that programme will be a time-consuming exercise. My delegation is therefore ready to go along with the proposal to set up a working group and to start considering this matter.

In this statement I wanted to explain only the general, preliminary views of my delegation concerning the tasks before us. My delegation will return to individual subjects in a more detailed manner when they are taken up for consideration.

In conclusion I would like to assure you, Mr. Chairman, and all the delegations to the Committee that the Hungarian delegation will do its best to achieve progress in our common task.

U SAU HLAING (Burma): First of all, allow me to welcome you among us as the new head of the delegation of Canada, and to associate myself with other delegations in extending to you our warm congratulations on the assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. We are happy to see that the representative of Canada, the country which has always played a constructive role in disarmament negotiations, presides over this Committee in the opening months of the 1980 session. My delegation is confident that your wisdom and your rich and varied experience in the field of negotiations will give us a positive start in our work. To this end, I would like to pledge the full support of my delegation in the discharge of your duties.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to express its satisfaction that the People's Republic of China has taken its legitimate seat and has become a full partner in the negotiating work of this Committee. Now that all five nuclear-weapon Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations are assembled around this table, my delegation feels confident that our work in the Committee will be greatly enhanced and more meaningful.

I wish to join others in extending a warm welcome to the delegation of the People's Republic of China and its representative, Ambassador Yu Pei-Win.

My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to welcome the new heads of delegation-- Ambassador Kőmives of Hungary, Ambassador Kakwaka of Zaïre, Ambassador André Onkelinx of Belgium, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, and Ambassador Anisse Salah-Bey of Algeria, who have joined this Committee of late. I look forward to establishing close and sincere co-operation with them.

It gives me pleasure to extend our greetings to Mr. Ian Martenson, the new Assistant-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and to Ambassador Jaipal, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to distinguished representatives for the kind words they addressed to me. The success in submitting the report of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly in good time last year was in fact due to the co-operation and endeavours of all the members of the Committee.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

Mr. Chairman, you have brought us into the second decade of disarmament negotiations in which we will need to renew our efforts and strengthen anew our determination to achieve further results in the tasks and responsibilities entrusted to us by the international community. The new decade of the 1980s has begun with political problems. Unlike last year, our present session started its work in strained international situations. Confidence among the major Powers is at its lowest level following recent events and the change in the international political climate for the worse. The inherent tendency for the arms race to resume has begun to resurface.

My delegation does not doubt that international peace and security will always be threatened if mutual trust and confidence among nations are placed in jeopardy. We are convinced that the protection of future generations from the scourge of war and the future of mankind as a whole depend upon arms control and nuclear disarmament. Fruitful negotiations on arms control and disarmament are not possible in the absence of the political will of States. Political will as such cannot be cultivated around a negotiating table without mutual trust between States. Disarmament is therefore a problem on which progress or lack of progress is subject to political factors in the international situation, and such progress will depend considerably on the amount of mutual trust and confidence which induces a sense of security and is conducive to the relaxation of international tension. Only then will States be dissuaded from acquiring weapons and encouraged to reduce their present level of armaments. Any world-wide disarmament strategy must take into account the need for greater and sustained efforts to eliminate sources of tension, as well as to uphold the international rule of law. The use or threat of use of force as an instrument of international policy will run counter to the course of the relaxation of international tensions and world disarmament.

For more than two decades negotiators in this Committee and other committees before it, were often confronted with political crises that cast gloomy shadows over the processes of disarmament negotiations. What happened in the

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

international arena was proportionately felt in this meeting hall. The nature of our work, which is complex, delicate and sensitive, is so closely related to the epicentre of national interests and security of States that any tremor in relations between nations will have adverse effects. But we must withstand the challenge of time, fully aware of our basic responsibilities. It is therefore very important in our view to rebuild and further strengthen confidence and mutual trust among States, in particular among the major Powers, and to sustain our efforts in our quest for international peace and security through world disarmament.

In looking back over the past years, the work of this Committee and that of other disarmament forums preceding it has not been without successes, limited though they were in scope and magnitude. Unlike other negotiating bodies, the tasks we are entrusted with are, by and large, most complex and delicate matters that constitute a direct link with the vital and core interests of all nations. It has become a common belief that disarmament negotiations are naturally slow in making progress and coming to fruition. This notion may have valid logical reasons, but my delegation believes that they should not be the result of human lassitude and languor.

It will be superfluous on my part if a review of our work of last year or a balance-sheet of our failures and successes in the past is attempted here at a time when we all should be concentrating our efforts on the future. Nevertheless, my delegation feels that we should in no way lose sight of the direction and perspective we all maintained at the first session of this Committee.

During last year's session six items were included in the agenda for our consideration. Fully aware of the obligations derived from the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament and in response to the appeals of the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-third session, we made great efforts to achieve a breakthrough on a comprehensive test ban treaty. We must all admit that our efforts were of no avail. Lack of progress on the part of the trilateral negotiations dampened the pace of our negotiating fervour. We were all convinced that the impending

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

results of the trilateral negotiations played a pivotal complementary role in our work on this crucial subject. However, my delegation considered that the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group of Seismic Exports was a very valuable contribution to our common endeavours to develop international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. The next priority item was cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. To our regret we could not start substantive negotiations on this question. Then we considered negative security guarantees. We must congratulate ourselves for being able to constitute a Working Group under the chairmanship of Egypt. This was the only area where the newly reorganized Committee on Disarmament could register discernible results during its first year. On the question of chemical weapons, we regret to state that the progress report of the United States and the Soviet Union on their bilateral negotiations did not constitute positive headway. The issue of weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons seemed to have made a good start. The joint proposal of the United States and the Soviet Union on the major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling and use of radiological weapons provided a basis for our consideration.

The year 1979 left us with a number of unfinished assignments. However, if we were to consider all disarmament issues from a fresh angle in the light of changed conditions we would agree to that also. Nevertheless, my delegation is of the opinion that we could hardly afford to forget certain hard-won results of the 1979 session. A good number of proposals, working papers and concrete ideas on various issues submitted last year are in our possession and they could naturally provide us with a solid basis for our consideration this year.

The questions of a comprehensive test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the comprehensive programme on disarmament, and nuclear weapons in all aspects have been under discussion for years, and no substantive progress has been made so far. Nuclear armament is the greatest source of concern of all, and remains a matter of the highest priority. With the serious aggravation of international tension, the urgency of nuclear disarmament is felt more than ever in the international community in order to be able to remove the danger of nuclear war.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

General Assembly resolution 34/73 requested the Committee to initiate negotiations on a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time. In accordance with this mandate, my delegation would support the setting up of a Working Group on this topic so that substantive negotiations can take place in the Group and subsequently in the Committee. We are glad that the trilateral negotiations resumed again last week.

On the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, we have with us the report of a Working Group set up last year. My delegation would endorse the renewal of the mandate of the Working Group on negative security guarantees this year so that it can begin substantive negotiations without delay. The question of chemical weapons needs further investigation so that concrete results can be achieved during this session. My delegation would agree to the creation of a working group which would be necessary to go into all aspects of the question and to explore the feasibility of drafting the text of a treaty on the basis of facts we will have in our possession. We have before us a joint United States-Soviet draft agreement for our examination and hope that the Committee will be able to conclude a draft convention based on the facts presented in the joint document and other relevant information which we may have during our negotiations. We would also agree to the establishment of a working group on this question.

With the comprehensive test ban as the highest priority item, my delegation believes that the above-mentioned other three items which are carried over from last year's programme would suffice for serious consideration in our programme for the first part of the present session. One of our tasks, before we really go into substantive negotiations on these items, will be to decide how to organize the working groups that we intend to set up and to lay down their mandates and terms of reference. On the issue of the agenda for the 1980 session, my delegation will be flexible and would agree to one based on last year's agenda.

In conclusion, I should like to express our assurances of co-operation and support in the approach to solving these pressing disarmament issues before us in this Committee.

Mr. RŮZEK^{OV} (Czechoslovakia): I would like, first of all, to join all previous speakers in extending to you my congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the CD for the month of February and of the post of the Canadian Permanent Representative in Geneva. I am certain that your wide experience will be a useful contribution to the work of this Committee. I would like to remember here the friendly and effective co-operation which we had with your predecessor, Ambassador Harry Jay, and assure you of our readiness to continue our co-operation with you in the same spirit.

May I also on this occasion express our thanks to your predecessor in the chair of this Committee, Ambassador U Saw Hlaing of Burma, for his efforts and work during the period of his chairmanship which we had an opportunity to appreciate.

It is a pleasure for me to welcome among us the distinguished representatives of Algeria, Belgium, China, Hungary, Japan and Zaïre who are representing their countries in the Committee on Disarmament for the first time. I am glad that we have had an opportunity to meet and co-operate with some of them on previous occasions.

My best wishes go also to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, as well as to Mr. Berasategui, and to the Secretariat of the Committee.

I am also happy to see among us Mr. Martenson from New York who succeeded Mr. Björnstedt.

I want to express my deep conviction that the presence of the representatives of all five nuclear-weapon Powers and permanent members of the Security Council at this year's session of the Disarmament Committee is an assurance of more favourable conditions for its further positive work.

It is clear that a necessary degree of responsibility, co-operation and a positive attitude to matters at issue in the Committee are essential if progress is to be achieved regarding the agenda of the Committee. In this respect we must register our surprise and even disapproval as regards some elements of the Chinese statement on Tuesday, 5 February. It is necessary to keep in mind that any introduction of elements of confrontation exceeding the mandate of the Committee cannot but complicate its work.

World public opinion expects with justification that this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament will make progress on urgent questions of disarmament resulting from international political situations.

(Mr. Růžek, Czechoslovakia)

However, the Committee is meeting at a time when one cannot help noting a series of events unfavourable for the promotion of détente and, in some cases, creating a clear danger to its continuation.

Here I have particularly in mind the NATO Council's decision of 12 December 1979, by which NATO assumed a great responsibility for a new round of the arms race. The decision on the deployment of new United States medium-range nuclear missiles in a number of countries of Western Europe has destroyed the existing basis for talks on these weapons as suggested by the Soviet Union and other countries of the Warsaw Treaty in an effort to avert a new round of nuclear arms race. Both the production and the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles and the present cold war anti-Soviet and anti-peace campaign initiated by the United States is in clear contradiction with the major efforts being made by the socialist and other countries every day to strengthen international confidence and the process of détente. There is not the least doubt that the NATO Council's decision of 12 December 1979 is not an isolated act. It has to be seen as a continuation of efforts begun much earlier.

It is evident that a continuation of this policy will increase the danger of a global conflict against the will of an absolute majority of people in the world.

Czechoslovakia therefore fully supports the words of L.I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, when in his interview with the correspondent of Pravda he said among other things:

"The situation, unfortunately, has noticeably deteriorated at the junction of the 1970s and 1980s. And the peoples must know the truth about who is responsible for this. I will answer without any reservations -- the imperialist forces, and first of all definite circles in the United States, are to blame for this. The blame is on all those who see in the relaxation of tension an obstacle to their aggressive plans, to the whipping up of militaristic psychosis, to interference in the internal affairs of other peoples. The blame is on those who have a deeply ingrained habit of behaving in a cavalier manner with other States, of acting in the international arena in a way as though everything is permitted them.

(Mr. Růžek, ^{OV}Czechoslovakia)

"It has been clear for some time already that the leading circles of the United States and of some other NATO countries have embarked on a course hostile to the cause of détente, a course of spiralling the arms race and leading to the growth of the danger of war".

Speculation about the fate of the world during the 1980s is quite widespread. In spite of pessimism in some circles, prospects for reaffirming the positive course of events are not as black as some would like us believe. In any event our Committee can, should and -- I hope -- will contribute towards directing events in a positive direction.

Czechoslovakia -- guided by this noble intention -- initiated at the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly the draft declaration on international co-operation for disarmament. The plenary session of the General Assembly adopted this Declaration, submitted on behalf of 26 sponsors -- of which 8 are members of the CD -- by a clear majority of 116 votes. No delegation voted against.

This very fact is convincing proof of how widespread is the attachment to furthering the cause of peace and disarmament.

The Declaration, which became an official document of the United Nations, corresponds fully to the conditions and to the needs of the process of international détente and its projection into the military sphere. For the first time it sets out a new form of international co-operation in the field of disarmament which refers both to disarmament measures on various levels, the establishment of respective conditions for negotiations and to the constructive approach of States to the solution of questions of disarmament, including the establishment of favourable political conditions for the achievement of progress in this field. From this point of view, the Declaration represents a broad international document of political principles, and it may be assessed as a code of co-operation in the sphere of disarmament. We regard it as an instrument of long-term practical significance.

As to our Committee, it is stated in the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the Declaration that mutual co-operation must be developed and intensified in all forums where disarmament is discussed, and particularly in the CD, so that tangible results can be achieved as speedily as possible.

(Mr. Růžek, Czechoslovakia)

The Declaration further specifies the priority of negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as the general principle that these negotiations must outstrip the qualitative development and stockpiling of weapons and, wherever possible, prevent the emergence of new types of weapons and weapon systems, particularly weapons of mass destruction (paragraphs (a) and (f), section I of the operative part).

We welcome all initiatives aimed at creating favourable conditions so that efforts to achieve real progress in disarmament become more systematic, believing, as we do, that a more systematic approach can help in furthering progress in our work. For this reason we have always supported the idea of elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament as well as other ideas aimed at bringing elements of a more systematic approach into our work. A very suitable opportunity of developing efforts in this direction would, in our view, be offered by the world conference on disarmament in particular.

Czechoslovakia is determined, in close co-operation with other countries, to try to find permanently effective means for the reduction of the arms race and to strive for new practical disarmament measures. We shall also in the future develop efforts to overcome gradually old and new obstacles which slow down the necessary progress and hinder mutual understanding in solving the problem of disarmament. And I want to emphasize that, from our part, such obstacles have never arisen and will not arise. We understand the establishment of favourable conditions as being closely connected with the requirement of the concretization of the conclusions of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

However, we still face the question whether mankind will follow the path of disarmament or whether it will be driven in the opposite direction leading to nuclear catastrophe. That was why we so warmly welcomed the declaration of '95 non-aligned countries which at their summit in Havana last year, "reaffirmed their adherence to the objective of general and complete disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament, under effective international control and their determination to act within the United Nations and other bodies to achieve this objective".

As stated by the Chairman of the State Council and of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, Fidel Castro Ruz, at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

"It is necessary to put an end to the clattering of arms, to the language of threats and to the language of force in international relations. It is time to put an end to the illusion that the questions of the world may be solved by means of nuclear weapons ... Its very existence is finally dependent upon it."

We are determined to support all steps leading to the opening of concrete preparations for negotiations on halting the arms race in nuclear armaments and we commend -- as the basis for such preparations -- the joint proposal submitted by the socialist countries to the Committee on Disarmament last year (CD/4). We assume that the active participation of all nuclear-weapon countries in these deliberations could lead to constructive results.

As to the prohibition of the production of nuclear fissile materials for military purposes, this question should, in our opinion, be solved in the context of nuclear disarmament as a whole.

We also see certain possibilities in the work of the ad hoc Working Group aimed at preparing a draft international treaty on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. We regard the draft international agreement submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union at the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly as a suitable basis for the work of this Group.

We fully support the successful termination of tripartite talks between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear arms tests. In this connexion we intend to continue our active participation in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of experts for international co-operation in the seismic sphere.

We are resolutely in favour of the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and support efforts aimed at curbing a further qualitative increase of the arms race. We are of the opinion that these questions should be solved as soon as possible and that it is advisable that the Committee should move to matter-of-fact negotiations, the goal of which should be to work out a treaty in this field. In this context we would welcome the constitution of an ad hoc working group.

As to the preparation of the final text of the treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons by an ad hoc working group on the basis of the joint proposal of the USSR and the United States and other proposals, it is our task to work in such a way to make it possible to submit the final text of the draft treaty to the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We are ready to

contribute to the fulfilment of this exacting task. In this connexion I also want to recall that, in 1978, the socialist countries submitted a joint proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons which we continue to consider topical.

In the same way we consider it is urgent to achieve quickly an agreement on the prohibition and liquidation of stocks of chemical weapons on the basis of a joint proposal by the USSR and the United States. In this context we especially emphasize an efficient solution of the question of control in combining the use of national means or of certain international procedures agreed upon.

A number of constructive proposals are available for negotiations in the CD. They include the proposals repeatedly submitted by the Warsaw Treaty countries from Moscow, Budapest and the last one also from Berlin at the end of the last year. There are also a number of positive proposals by non-aligned countries, the proposal from Havana, etc. There is at the same time a number of precise political principles on how to approach the implementation of these proposals. These conditions themselves will not, however, achieve the necessary results expected from the Committee. It is therefore necessary that all participating countries without any distinction should adopt a constructive approach to the agreed principles and proclamations.

However complicated the international situation and the difficulties resulting from this situation might be, it is not possible to give in to a psychosis of war which would certainly lead only to disaster. Some circles in the West should in particular realize this fact, and they should make a sober assessment of world realities.

In this connexion we cannot fail to note that some delegations raised the issue of Afghanistan. Let me state that our Government fully supports the efforts of the Afghan people to bring about conditions for the improvement of their life as represented by the revolution of April 1978. It was on the basis of the defense of the aims and achievements of this revolution that the Government of Afghanistan, exercising its rights under the bilateral agreement with the USSR and the Charter of the United Nations, asked their ally for help, which was provided. In this connexion we should like to point out that the bringing of matters of this kind into the Committee exceeds the mandate of this body.

Our Committee has important tasks to fulfil, tasks which require a constructive approach on the part of all participants. For our part, we are prepared to assist the Committee in its work on all questions on its agenda.

Mr. HERDE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, let me begin my contribution to the general debate by joining previous speakers and congratulating you on behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. It is my delegation's firm hope that you will discharge this difficult mission in a way that is conducive to rapid progress in disarmament negotiations. At the same time, I offer warm greetings to all heads of delegations, and especially to those who are newcomers to our Committee.

I extend an equally cordial welcome to the new Assistant Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Ian Martenson, who has unfortunately already left Geneva, as well as to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Jaipal, and to his staff.

This year, a delegation of the People's Republic of China has taken its seat in the Committee for the first time. In this connexion the German Democratic Republic would like to point out again how essential it is that all five nuclear-weapon Powers and permanent members of the Security Council should participate in disarmament negotiations. Their active co-operation within the Committee is particularly needed. Their contribution to the cause of disarmament will depend on how they measure up to their special responsibility as nuclear-weapon Powers and permanent members of the Security Council.

We have clear-cut tasks before us. Our primary challenge will be the achievement of nuclear disarmament, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a ban on chemical weapons, the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and a ban on radiological weapons. The measures envisaged have the highest priority. They should be reflected in the Committee's agenda and in its programme of work for this session.

In addressing ourselves to the comprehensive disarmament programme we must look ahead to the future and to problems which can be solved if today's tasks are fulfilled. This, however, requires great efforts. It is in particular the worsened international situation that makes steps to curb and cease the arms race so imperative, because they could avert dangers to the peace and security of peoples and help restore a healthy international atmosphere.

The policy line pursued by our delegation in regard to the tasks before the Committee has been spelled out by Mr. Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic who said:

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"Now as before, the family of nations, to which we all belong, is faced with the challenge to avert the danger of a nuclear world war and to make peace lastingly secure. This requires steps to promote trust among peoples, rather than sow distrust.

"An essential element, in this context, would be measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament. The German Democratic Republic and its allies advocate putting an end to useless debates that do not bring us a single step closer to a secure peace. Rather, they prefer peaceful co-operation among peoples to the arms race."

Like other States, the German Democratic Republic has time and again warned against the risks involved in the continuing arms race. In our repeated appeals to the member States of NATO we have been insisting that political détente should be buttressed by measures of military détente, which would enhance the security of all parties concerned. We have urged them to refrain from any action that might make the success of disarmament negotiations impossible. Regrettably, the NATO States have maintained their dual strategy of purporting to carry on with détente and simultaneously escalating competitive armament -- a doctrine that is proving to be dangerous and deceitful.

At the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic noted:

"There are some who still ask the question whether peace and security can be achieved through disarmament or through armament. The answer should be obvious from the history of two world wars, for those two wars, as everyone knows, were preceded by armament programmes."

The present dangers to détente and the deterioration of the international climate are a direct outflow of NATO's course of continuing and accelerating the arms race.

This truth is inescapable. We therefore take it as a positive element that many of the statements made at the beginning of our discussions revealed a desire to continue the process of détente and to intensify efforts for disarmament. Only such an approach corresponds to the necessities of our time.

We equally support those who, in this context, recalled the importance of political and military détente in Europe. The interrelationship between the pertinent questions and the specific preoccupation of the Committee on Disarmament is obvious: Good or bad, the settlement of the burning issues in Europe will have global consequences. For it is incontestable that nuclear disarmament in Europe would very much facilitate the efforts of the Committee to achieve world-wide nuclear disarmament. A continuation of the nuclear arms race in Europe would conjure up additional complications for global nuclear disarmament.

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The socialist States have always attached special importance to issues of disarmament in Europe. This was again highlighted by the Soviet Union's far-reaching proposals presented by its supreme representative Leonid Ilich Brezhnev in Berlin on 6 October 1979. The wide spectrum of measures proposed by the USSR in full accord with the German Democratic Republic and the other socialist countries can make peace safer on this continent, where the bulk of annihilative weapons, nuclear and conventional, is still concentrated.

It is on record that the USSR has offered to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapon carriers deployed in its western areas on condition that no additional medium-range nuclear weapon carriers are deployed in Western Europe. Combining this with a renewed assurance that it will not use nuclear weapons against States which renounce the production, acquisition and deployment of such weapons, the Soviet Union has shown how the risk of nuclear war can be diminished and eventually eliminated.

The unilateral decision, with no strings attached, to withdraw about 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 tanks and other military hardware from the German Democratic Republic's territory is well suited to stimulate progress in terms of military and political détente, and particularly to break the deadlock in the Vienna talks. The first batch of these forces has meanwhile returned to the Soviet Union. The declared intention of the USSR to continue the unilateral withdrawal of troops will — no doubt — have a positive impact. Surely this attitude is eloquent proof of the socialist States' resolve to continue to contribute effectively in the future to minimizing tension in Europe and to implementing concrete steps of disarmament? Should it not receive a corresponding response from the other side?

The Committee Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty States which was held in Berlin on 5 and 6 December 1979 reaffirmed the determination of these countries to end the arms race. The set of steps proposed at the meeting is designed to lessen military confrontation in Europe and, elaborating on the provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, to strengthen confidence among States in Europe. The Committee of Foreign Ministers proposed that this and other concepts for strengthening confidence and reducing the risk of war should be discussed at an all-European conference on military détente. My delegation will submit the communiqué of that meeting to the Committee on Disarmament as a working paper.

The proposals I have recalled have had a strong public echo in many countries. In spite of fierce attacks by the opponents of détente, there is a growing awareness that these proposals are realistic and satisfy the urgent need for a continuing

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détente process in Europe and the security interests of all States and peoples. My delegation feels so much more entitled to make this statement as over 13 million citizens of the German Democratic Republic signed a manifesto to express their unqualified support for these proposals. The German Democratic Republic intends to work for their implementation in all forums. Likewise, it will work for progress in the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments. What the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty States said on this score in December last remains fully valid. Like the other socialist countries, the German Democratic Republic is interested in the early success of those talks.

The forthcoming thirty-fifth anniversary of victory over German fascism, whose war of aggression brought untold suffering to the European peoples, is an obvious reminder of the obligation of both German States to do everything to ensure that never again will a war start from German soil.

In a recent statement, which remains as valid as before, Chairman Honecker said:

"What both the citizens of the German Democratic Republic and the citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany need is not the stationing of medium-range missiles in Western European NATO States, but co-operation between the two German States in the field of disarmament and in line with the policy of peaceful coexistence."

Unfortunately, those circles which seek nuclear supremacy have gained the upper hand in NATO. With the decision to introduce almost 600 nuclear medium-range missiles, a qualitatively new generation of weapons, they want to upset the military balance of forces to the disadvantage of the socialist States. These weapons are strategic arms systems. According to Western information, they are capable of reaching 85 per cent of strategic targets in the USSR.

It would be a disastrous mistake if certain strategists were to believe that the deployment of such weapons in Western Europe would create the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe and would lessen the risk of affecting the territory of the United States. Implementation of NATO's decision would increase the risk of nuclear war across the board. This explains the resistance of the population of Western European States, whom the decision makes the potential victims of a nuclear war, and the resistance of all other States and peoples, which consider the elimination of the threat of nuclear war of vital importance to them.

The claim that the missile decision was taken to offset the West's inferiority in strength, does not stand up to close scrutiny. Even Western sources, such as the London Institute for Strategic Studies, have found in the course of recent research that there is a balance in terms of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The

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excuse that a counterforce of equal quality must be found to the Soviet SS-20 rocket is similarly only too easy to see through. Leading NATO politicians officially conceded that back in 1975, when there was not a single SS-20 deployed in the western regions of the USSR, NATO decided to expand its nuclear potential in Europe.

The actual reasons behind NATO's missile decision and NATO's numerous other global and regional armament measures were disclosed by the United States itself when, on 23 January, it reaffirmed its intention to be the strongest military power in the world.

Mr. Harold Brown, the United States Secretary of Defence, bluntly said in a statement in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the United States Senate that, as a result of the implementation of the "long-term defence programme" for the reinforcement of the allied forces, NATO will achieve general military domination over the Warsaw Treaty member States up to the mid-1980s. The NATO decision of Brussels, drawn up as an essential element in achieving military superiority of NATO, thus turns out to be the greatest obstacle to the reduction of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe as proposed by the USSR. The necessary prerequisite for such negotiations for their reduction and elimination is therefore to revoke or suspend this decision. As long as this is not done, the socialist States will be faced with the need to do their part to ensure their own security and independence and to protect the peaceful life of their peoples.

Now, in a situation where there is an increased threat of nuclear war, still greater importance is attached to the Committee on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating body for global measures of disarmament. The German Democratic Republic was and is ready, jointly with its allies and all interested States, to make a vigorous effort to continue the quest for peace and disarmament. In this endeavour the Committee on Disarmament is faced with tasks of primary importance. My delegation therefore opposes any attempt to divert this Committee from the tasks before it. If some representatives raise here what they call the Afghanistan issue to attribute to it the causes of the aggravated international situation, this has to be emphatically contradicted for various reasons, some of which I tried to explain in the first part of my statement.

First of all, the Soviet Union's military assistance to Afghanistan is a measure taken in full compliance with valid obligations under an international treaty and at the request of the legitimate Government of Afghanistan — a measure which is in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, the true reason why international relations are being strained and why détente is in jeopardy lies in the endeavours of leading NATO States to gain military superiority by all-outarmament efforts, and these endeavours have become ever more obvious in

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the last few years. Finally, it is the very forces that are opposed to détente who avail themselves of the so-called Afghanistan issue to manipulate emotions and thwart disarmament, in defiance of the interests of States and peoples. To raise this question in this forum is a disservice to the cause of disarmament. Nor can we leave it uncontradicted if the representative of that nuclear-weapon Power which for the first time this year exercises its membership in the Committee on Disarmament should have trailblazed that political campaign. This role cannot make one forget that his delegation adopted a negative attitude on at least two fundamental questions which are considered vital not only by the majority of Committee members but by the international community in general, namely, on comprehensive nuclear disarmament and on the banning of all nuclear weapon tests.

The Committee on Disarmament must adopt a constructive approach to make faster progress. To this end the last United Nations General Assembly furnished a number of positive starting points. Its resolution 34/83 J on nuclear weapons in all aspects gained broad approval. It gives the Committee the clear mandate to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The carefully-worded first paragraph of the operative part of that resolution defines in detail what tasks are to be tackled in this connexion at the beginning of this year's session, namely, to continue the deliberations and to undertake consultations on relevant negotiations. Jointly with other Committee members the German Democratic Republic will continue to work along these lines.

The complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is another matter of great importance. My delegation believes that all it takes is the political will to conclude the trilateral talks successfully and to clear the road to the completion of a corresponding agreement. In particular it has been the constructive attitude of the USSR that has helped to solve a number of the complex problems involved. We associate ourselves with those representatives who oppose linkage between a prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and other disarmament agreements such as SALT II.

We also attach the greatest importance to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which, in the framework of the Committee, is examining conditions for international co-operation on the detection and identification of seismic events. An expert from my country has taken part in the work of that Group for quite some time.

The thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly has also made a positive contribution to settling the problem of guarantees of the security of

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non-nuclear-weapon States. There is increasing awareness that an international convention is the most appropriate form for such guarantees. The two resolutions favouring a convention received broad support. My delegation will continue to work towards that objective.

Another matter of great importance is the prohibition of chemical weapons. Progress achieved in bilateral negotiations on this question has given an impetus to the Committee's efforts to solve this task.

The United Nations General Assembly has called upon the Committee to continue its efforts to seek a ban on the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. There can be no doubt that the application of new scientific and technological knowledge to the creation of new weapons of mass ~~destruction involves great dangers~~. It is therefore imperative that the Committee should find a solution to this problem. The German Democratic Republic is ready to participate in these efforts by contributing the services of scientific experts.

As regards a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the basic elements of such an instrument, as submitted to the Committee last year by the USSR and the United States, offer a sound basis for further negotiations on the completion of a text of a convention. This was the unanimous belief of the General Assembly.

In resolution 34/83 C, the Member States of the United Nations consider it necessary that the disarmament negotiations should lead to concrete results at a faster pace. In that document, in the preparation of which the German Democratic Republic was actively involved jointly with non-aligned States, attention is drawn to the measures described in the tenth special session's Programme of Action as being most urgent and feasible within a short period of time. The resolution reflects concern about the continued arms race and the lack of success in the negotiations on priority tasks in the field of disarmament. It calls upon all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to take steps leading to substantial disarmament agreements. Negotiations on the measures agreed at the tenth special session should be resumed or undertaken as soon as possible. The resolution, which was adopted by consensus without any reservations, gives prominence to the negotiations going on in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. Giving full attention to the Committee's tasks therefore corresponds with the explicitly stated will of all Member States of the United Nations. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is ready to work together with all other representatives to find a solution to these problems.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): In his statement a week ago, at the opening of the 1980 session of the CD, the Swedish Foreign Minister addressed the international situation in which this body starts its work in a new decade. I am today going to deal with some of the specific issues before our Committee, but I would however first like to make some general remarks. I shall be immodest enough to recall something I said in this hall about half a year ago. Looking back on the 17 years of work in the ENDC and the CCD, I stated then as my convinced opinion that we had for long conducted our work in virtual isolation from the military, economic and political realities in the world outside the walls of the Palais des Nations. This has meant, inter alia, that we traditionally indulged in an exchange of well-prepared rhetoric on the imminent need of and the possibilities for disarmament not very much related to the factors that shape these realities. I think it is quite clear by now that we should not delude ourselves into wishful thinking about the world as it should be, but rather to act to create an atmosphere of complete realism and frankness about the world as it is. We must, as it were, open the doors of this Salle des Conseils to that world and base our work on a thorough analysis of the reasons behind its present state. I ended that speech by expressing the belief that, if in the 1980s we do not achieve a dramatic breakthrough in disarmament negotiations, the prospects of our surviving this century without a nuclear war are bleak indeed.

In February 1980 it should be obvious to everyone that -- to paraphrase a well-known French book title -- les années quatre-vingts sont mal parties. If we are to overcome the discrepancies between what happens in the real world and what we try to achieve here, drastic changes will have to be made, and radically new moves will have to be undertaken in our work. And, looking at this world of ours, I would say, quite frankly, that it is justified to question the wisdom of its big and mighty, to question their capability to solve, on their own, the problems of co-existence, for which they carry a great responsibility but which affect all of us. Big is not always beautiful.

The fact is that the happenings in the real world in the last few years, with a tremendous, perhaps decisive impact on our common collective future, have climaxed into a situation where it would almost be an anticlimax to quote T.S. Eliot's seventh Chorus from "The Rock:

"What have we to do

But stand with empty hands and palms turned upwards

In an age which advances progressively backwards?"

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

It seems to me that we, whose task it is, and whose aspiration it is, to work for genuine disarmament, are largely reduced to regarding the performance from the sidelines while the bilateral big business spectacle featuring the contest for world domination and, hopefully, some mutual accommodation, goes on at a level which is supposedly beyond our grasp and responsibility. In the feeling that some are more equal than others, the Superpowers show continued unwillingness to accept real multilateral negotiation on central disarmament issues. This is both politically and morally unacceptable. In conformity with the call of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, it is imperative -- and at no time before was it as urgently compelling to emphasize this -- that the maddening arms race be reversed through common international action, so that the very survival of all nations ceases to be at the mercy of and subject to the vacillations of Superpower politics and international bickering.

Certainly, most of us do not possess the awesome weapons -- nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction -- which constitute the central perennial items on the disarmament agenda. But as potential victims of such weapons all nations are obviously directly concerned. We must jointly seek to establish some means, some way of pressure to divert the Superpowers and their alliances from their obsession with military hardware and military security to the detriment of all peaceful activities.

Unless this is achieved -- and we urge that this be achieved -- the international community, as represented in the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament will doubtlessly be forced to continue its irrelevant debates on procedural and secondary substantive issues. What has been called "the game of disarmament" will go on.

I may be allowed to quote from a remarkable speech by the late Earl Mountbatten in May 1979, printed in the September 1979 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He said: "There are powerful voices around the world who still give credence to the old Roman precept -- if you desire peace, prepare for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense. I repeat, it is a disastrous misconception to believe that by increasing the total uncertainty one increases one's certainty."

It is obvious that, under present international circumstances, the CD risks facing another year of eloquence but of little concrete progress. In making certain comments on this year's agenda I sincerely hope, nay, I request that the small and middle-sized States be -- at long last -- recognized as equal partners in the Committee's work. Real disarmament negotiations are long overdue. The doomsday clock has been moved very close to twelve.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

A cynical observer has suggested that the Superpowers consider disarmament work in the United Nations and in this body as a mere "damage-limiting game". He voiced the view that, while the serious-looking preambular phraseology of United Nations resolutions may voice serious concern, the operative parts all too often stand out as virtually devoid of real and realistic content. Although, given the meagre results of generation-long disarmament discussions, not all seem willing to refute this evaluation, I think it must be refuted. In order to do so we must, however, also show that such attitudes are unwarranted. Thus, as the ongoing talks between the nuclear-weapon Powers might reach a stalemate, the CD itself must assume the role assigned to it by the General Assembly for the preparation and conduct of negotiations in the nuclear field. For obvious reasons we shall this year have to be more successful in our endeavours than last year, which was another year of lost opportunities.

At our last session we discussed at some length, though without reaching any common conclusion, the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and initiation of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the NPT. One of the bases of our discussion was an initiative by seven socialist States entitled "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed". The initiative was commonly referred to as CD/4.

In my intervention on 26 June 1979, I suggested that this proposal and the proposal concerning the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and other nuclear explosive devices (General Assembly resolution 33/91 H), should not be dealt with separately. They should instead be taken up in the context of the consideration of the entire paragraph 50 of the Programme of Action in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. In its paper CD/36 of 12 July 1979, the Group of 21 underlined the close link between the various elements contained in paragraph 50 and proposed that the prerequisites and elements for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament should be identified taking into account this key paragraph of the Final Document.

In the informal discussions held on that subject last year, the Swedish delegation welcomed the fact that the sponsors of CD/4 accepted the broadening of the scope to cover the implementation of the entire paragraph 50. This formula was further adopted in General Assembly resolution 34/83 J in which the Committee on Disarmament was requested, inter alia, to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

In spite of the fact that three nuclear-weapon States voted against this resolution, the Swedish Government feels its request constitutes one of our primary tasks in this Committee. During the discussions last year, however, a number of questions were raised and answered on various aspects of such negotiations. Well, it cannot be said that all questions got very full replies, and there is still some doubt concerning the possibilities of embarking upon nuclear disarmament negotiations in the CD, perhaps in particular at this time. Like many others, the Swedish delegation would still like to become convinced that it is possible to carry out such negotiations on the basis of the present proposal.

I would therefore challenge the sponsors of CD/4 to prove the sincerity of their initiative by presenting us with a more elaborate proposal on how they envisage that paragraph 50 of the Final Document can be implemented through negotiations in which this Committee can play its proper role. Answers to the effect that such questions have to be left to preparatory consultations in the Committee are not, I repeat not, satisfactory. If ever meaningful consultations are to take place, a much more detailed proposal than the one contained in CD/4 must be presented.

The sponsors should also specify the division of work between this Committee and other disarmament forums. To judge the realism of the proposal, it is furthermore essential to have more detailed knowledge concerning the degree and timing of the participation by individual nuclear-weapon States. A revised proposal should also consider the relationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament, as well as the problem of verification.

As I dwell on the urgency of starting nuclear disarmament negotiations, the problems of nuclear proliferation will spontaneously come into mind.

This year will be crucial for international efforts to prevent this from happening. INFCE will soon be concluded. Many countries here present will meet in August to review once again the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The situation in the world at the end of the five-year period following the first NPT Review Conference does not augur well for the struggle against proliferation. The deterioration of confidence between the Superpowers, and its regional causes and consequences, have already caused a serious setback to prospects of ratification of SALT II and an equally serious delay in efforts aimed at the conclusion of a CTBT. These developments could have dire consequences for the non-proliferation régime and, in the worst of cases, even lead to its erosion.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Such risks are real. The impending danger of a nuclear arms race in south Asia has been much debated. What has happened in the south Atlantic remains obscure, but nevertheless gives rise to continued concern. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by any new State will have repercussions elsewhere.

Neighbouring States are, of course, the first to be affected. Increased instability in one region may, however, affect the security of other regions, and, in the final analysis, the world community at large. To quote from a memorandum stating the views of the Nordic countries on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at the United Nations General Assembly last autumn, it is our strongly-held hope that all States will do their utmost to enhance international confidence so that nuclear weapons proliferation will not take place.

It goes without saying that again, the main responsibility for the survival of the non-proliferation régime rests with the Superpowers which, during a decade of a NPT in force, have demonstrated their complete lack of ability and/or will to subordinate their perceived national interests to the common interests of all, including themselves. I refer of course to the glaring lack of implementation of the eleventh preambular of the NPT on the CTB and of article VI on the start of nuclear disarmament negotiations.

Increased efforts must be made to create a political situation -- including progress in the field of disarmament -- which helps to safeguard and strengthen the central role of the NPT. In a more technical sense, post-INFCE work towards an international régime of enhanced nuclear supply assurances will also serve the same purpose of non-proliferation. The possible internationalization of sensitive stages of the nuclear fuel cycle -- something which was suggested by the Swedish Government as early as at the CCD summer session 1974 -- retains its importance in this context. But, in my view, we shall also have to mobilize a great amount of fresh thinking on other constructive non-proliferation measures before, at, and after the Second NPT Review Conference.

An important part of efforts to achieve results in work aimed at nuclear disarmament consisted of the continuous debates and negotiations, all since 1963, on a CTBT, to which we attached such great hopes in the last few years. Part of these efforts were devoted to the problem of a satisfactory verification process.

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The Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts has successfully completed its first round of work. Its report to the CD (CD/43) shows that a world-wide monitoring system for a CTBT is feasible. The main functions of an international data centre were demonstrated in Stockholm last summer. I am convinced that the continuing work -- however highly technical and non-political in nature -- of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts which, under its new mandate, started a new session yesterday, will together with further national and international experimentation provide unambiguous results: it will become manifest for everyone that an adequately verifiable CTBT can be made operable at short notice.

All relevant technical prerequisites for a CTBT -- long requested by the non-nuclear-weapon States and long overdue -- are present, and a comprehensive test ban can become a reality once the necessary change of political attitudes has taken place. Regrettably such a change has not yet occurred. The record of observed nuclear weapons testing provides ample proof of this.

Twenty-eight Soviet underground nuclear tests were observed at the National Swedish Seismic Observatory in Hagfors during 1979, representing the largest number of Soviet tests ever observed during one single year. The Soviet Union has conducted on an average 20 nuclear tests annually during the 1970s.

Twenty of the nuclear explosions last year were carried out at the Semipalatinsk testing site in East Kazakhstan and on the Novaya Zemlya Island in the Arctic Ocean. Four other explosions were conducted at different sites in northern and central Siberia. The four remaining explosions were observed within a small area north of the Caspian Sea.

During the same year of 1979 the United States reported 15 nuclear tests, all carried out in Nevada. This figure is close to the annual average during the past decade.

One British test was conducted last year at the United States test site in Nevada.

No Chinese nuclear test was announced or observed in 1979, the first and only year of the past decade without any Chinese nuclear testing activity.

France conducted nine underground nuclear tests on the island of Mururoa in the Pacific. This is the largest annual number of tests ever carried out by France.

To summarize these disgusting statistics: a total of 421 nuclear explosions were reported during the 1970s, of which the Soviet Union made 191, the United States 154, France 55, China 15, the United Kingdom 5 and India 1.

Obviously, allowing underground testing only has not put any obstacles in the way of further qualitative improvements of nuclear arsenals.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

We must therefore, time and again, request the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the preparatory talks on a CTB to bring to us proposals for the elements of a draft treaty, in such a shape and with such a content that, through CD negotiations, we can work out a truly comprehensive and durable treaty on a CTB early in the 1980s. As the tripartite preparatory negotiations have just been resumed, we furthermore request the three negotiators to submit to us a detailed progress report on the state of their endeavours. And finally, we would, as firmly, request the setting up of a CD working group on a CTBT well before the Second NPT Review Conference.

Speaking of CD working groups, I am humbly grateful that we have at least one such group established last year under the able leadership of the delegate of Egypt, namely, the one on security guarantees.

Sweden attaches great importance to efforts to enhance the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, including efforts to achieve effective arrangements to assure these States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Such assurances could play a role in the process of strengthening international security.

Various forms of assurances have been discussed, and from some quarters the idea of an international convention has been pursued. Since the discussions in the CD last year, the matter has been further considered during the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

The Swedish Government has reservations about the idea of an international convention on this subject. A convention would be based on the assumption that all the States concerned -- nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon -- enter into some kind of reciprocal obligations.

But the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have already accepted their obligations by acceding to the NPT. There is consequently no reason for them to repeat this undertaking.

The responsibility to formulate a binding set of assurances acceptable to all States must therefore rest primarily with the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves.

Thus our preference would be that co-ordinated guarantees should be worked out by these Powers and thereafter endorsed by the Security Council. If the nuclear-weapon Powers prefer to formulate the agreement among themselves in a treaty or a convention they are, of course, free to do so. But as I just stated, for the non-nuclear-weapon countries to sign such a convention does not seem to serve any rational purpose.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The Working Group on this issue will continue its endeavours during this session. It should be taken for granted that the nuclear-weapon States will co-operate constructively with the other members of the Group in order to achieve early results to be presented to us.

I want to turn to another priority item on our agenda which we shall have to deal with effectively during this year's session, irrespective of the present international situation. But first a few words on a different matter.

We are all aware that, during last summer's session of this Committee, the United States and the Soviet Union jointly submitted draft basic elements of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons. The Swedish Government has carefully studied the relevant documents and we are prepared to enter into negotiations on a convention in the course of this session. I shall of course not, at this moment, make any direct comments on the draft text before us, but just limit myself to saying that, although this draft convention may be of value in certain prospective cases, it is of far less importance than the high priority matters which have been entrusted to us by the United Nations General Assembly and with which the CD and its predecessor struggled for many years without even being able to start real negotiations.

In the introductory part of this statement I emphasized in general terms the necessity of conducting the multilateral disarmament negotiations on the basis of broad and equal participation. But contrary to the intentions which are implicit in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the two Superpowers largely reserve for themselves the prerogative to decide when a disarmament matter is ripe for negotiation in this multilateral negotiating body. I am referring in this case to the question of negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. In spite of the compelling resolution of the thirty-third session which was adopted by consensus, and in spite of continuous efforts of a number of countries, especially those belonging to the so-called Group of 21, it proved impossible at last year's session to reach consensus on the establishment of a Working Group with the task of initiating real negotiations on a CW convention. This question has been the subject of protracted discussions, hundreds of working papers and even several complete draft conventions over many years. It is, therefore, no wonder that the majority of the members of this Committee and the vast majority of the Members of the United Nations increasingly feel that negotiations must no longer be delayed by Superpower resistance, by the fruitless waiting for a "joint initiative". What is at stake is respect for resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the credibility of this Committee as the international negotiating

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

body. Last summer we were put in a not very agreeable situation as the account of the preparatory bilateral Superpower deliberations was presented to the Committee only after the matter had been dealt with on the agreed agenda and after many of the experts concerned had left Geneva. We noted with some satisfaction that the account given was more detailed than had previously been the case. However, in view of the many years passed in fruitless deliberations, in view of the late presentation of the joint statement and, above all, the refusal to start real treaty negotiations on the matter, it is no wonder that most countries, including my own, refused to engage in renewed non-committal exchanges of views.

Real negotiations are long overdue, and Sweden intends, together with other like-minded countries, to press for such negotiations within this Committee. As in almost any disarmament and arms control issue, time is a crucial factor. The longer negotiations and agreements are being delayed, the more difficult they tend to become. It is therefore imperative that at the earliest possible stage of this session negotiations on a chemical weapons convention are initiated and that a working group is established for this purpose.

Nuclear disarmament and all the various aspects of that process are and will remain our foremost concern. It is legitimate to presume that all members of the CD will continue their active search for ways to come to grips with this tremendous problem, in the spirit of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament.

But concomitant with the nuclear arms race there has been -- as we are painfully aware -- a similar race in the field of conventional arms, a process involving an amount of military technology which is horrifying.

However, although this serious issue is dealt with in the 1978 Final Document, it has so far not been possible for the international community to find the ways and means to start a negotiation process in this field. It seems obvious that talks, consultations and negotiations on the limitation of conventional weapons should preferably be carried out on the regional level. We await with expectation the outcome of the ongoing United Nations study on the subject. Meanwhile the Swedish Government has noted with appreciation the thoughts, ideas and proposals on the possibilities of starting work in this field as well as in the control and limitation of the international arms trade, submitted by, inter alia, the Government of Italy and referred to in the statement by the Italian representative last week and in Working Paper CD/56. We shall certainly give this issue a most careful examination.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

This leads me to some very brief remarks on another task given to us by the United Nations General Assembly, namely, negotiating a new comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted to the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982. This task has been considerably facilitated by the work of the Disarmament Commission last year which resulted in document A/34/42, containing the elements of such a comprehensive programme. The Swedish delegation looks forward to participating in the important work ahead of us in this respect.

Mr. Chairman, it might seem that my statement today is very much the kind of traditional CD statement on which I made, in the beginning, some remarks. However, I have observed, with interest and quite some relief, a note of increased concern and impatience in the statements of many of my colleagues which is indeed highly justified considering the international political situation in which we have to continue our common efforts. My own remarks are intended to reflect the same sentiments. Never before since March 1962, when the CD was set up, has the urgency of disarmament negotiations been more clearly demonstrated here than now.

It is all the more important that we, the members of this multilateral body, pursue our activities in a spirit of concern and impatience but also of determination and cool composure. It is compellingly necessary that these efforts should be concentrated on the central disarmament issues which have been given high priority.

Sweden, like other countries, pledges itself to do the utmost to achieve constructive results in our work even if, or -- to put it in a positive way -- just because we live in difficult times.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.