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QUESTION OF CYPRUS

Report of the Secretary-General

1. This report is submitted in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 34/30 of 20 November 1979 on the question of Cyprus. In paragraph 12 of that resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to it by 31 March 1980 on the progress achieved in the negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus on the basis of the agreement of 19 May 1979 (A/34/620 and Corr.1, annex V).
2. During the past months, I have pursued the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council in resolution 367 (1975) of 12 March 1975 and continued by subsequent resolutions, including most recently resolution 458 (1979) of 14 December 1979. As I reported to the General Assembly on 8 November 1979 (A/34/620, para. 8), the intercommunal talks that had been resumed on 15 June on the basis of the high-level agreement of 19 May were recessed on 22 June. My report to the General Assembly and the report of 1 December 1979 to the Security Council gave an account of my subsequent efforts to bring about a resumption of the intercommunal negotiating process on the same basis (*ibid.*, paras. 9-19; S/13672, paras. 45-55).
3. I and my Special Representative in Cyprus have since continued intensive consultations with all concerned within the framework of my good offices mission, and following the approach outlined in my reports (see A/34/620, paras. 12-14; S/13672, paras. 48-50), so as to circumvent the difficulties that were encountered in June 1979 and get down to concrete negotiations on the substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem. I suggested that the elements of that approach might be embodied in a statement to be delivered by my representative at the opening of the resumed round of talks, outlining my understanding of the common ground that had been worked out in the course of the consultations. The statement would simply be noted by the interlocutors, who might if desired put on record their views on

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the matters covered in it, and would then go on to the consideration of the substantive aspects of the Cyprus problem.

4. The opening statement was to make it clear that both parties had reaffirmed the validity of the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979, and that both had submitted proposals providing a "bizonal" territorial arrangement in respect of the bicomunal federal system that was referred to in the Makarios/Denktash guidelines. Both parties had indicated that the matter of the security of the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as the security of Cyprus as a whole and of all its citizens, would be duly taken into account by the interlocutors during the negotiations. The practical application of both these concepts would be dealt with in the context of the substantive consideration of the constitutional and territorial aspects and would be reflected in the substantive positions and proposals of the parties concerning the various items of the agenda.

5. The opening statement would set forth the Secretary-General's understanding, on the basis of the 19 May agreement, that the matters to be discussed would include the following subjects:

(a) Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May agreement;

(b) Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6, which states that special importance will be given to this matter;

(c) Constitutional aspects;

(d) Territorial aspects.

6. Concerning procedure, it would be understood that the four items listed above should be dealt with in rotation at consecutive meetings. At an appropriate early stage, committees or working groups might be set up by the interlocutors.

7. The Greek Cypriot side, while taking exception to certain aspects of my description of the common ground, indicated that it could accept the over-all approach, having in mind that the statement of the representative of the Secretary-General would not be binding on the parties and that, as suggested (see para. 3 above), the Greek Cypriot interlocutor would be given the opportunity to place on record the position of his side.
8. The Turkish Cypriot side advised my representatives that it was prepared to resume the talks provided the text of the statement describing the Secretary-General's understanding of the common ground were negotiated and agreed upon as binding by both sides. In this connexion, Mr. Denktash suggested a number of amendments to the text of the opening statement. Some of these were based on my suggestions, on which the parties had been sounded out in August 1979 and which the Turkish Cypriots had accepted in October 1979 (see A/34/620, paras. 15-19; S/13672, paras. 51-55).
9. The Greek Cypriots rejected the modified approach and the amendments suggested by the Turkish Cypriot side, which in their view constituted a demand for pre-negotiating the basic elements of the Cyprus problem and entering into commitments consistent with the Turkish Cypriot position.
10. During this period, Mr. Denktash made a number of public statements in which he criticized the terms of General Assembly resolution 34/30 as impeding the resumption of the intercommunal talks. The Turkish Cypriot community, he indicated, did not consent to hold talks "even under the shadow of such a resolution". In an effort to clarify this aspect of the matter, the United Nations spokesman stated that the Secretary-General's efforts to get the talks resumed had been undertaken within the framework of the good offices mission entrusted to him by the Security Council, and on the basis of the high-level agreement of 19 May 1979.
11. When Foreign Minister Rolandis visited me in New York on 4 and 7 February 1980, I briefed him on my intensive efforts to bridge the gap between the positions of the two communities. In this connexion, Mr. Rolandis outlined certain steps that his side was prepared to take under the heading of "initial practical measures" (see para. 5 above, item (b)). These might include financial grants to the Turkish Cypriot community, public utility works throughout the island under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme and reopening the question of reactivating the Nicosia International Airport. He suggested that the Turkish Cypriot side reciprocate by agreeing to the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices (ibid., item (a)) and by reopening the Nicosia-Larnaca road.
12. On 21 February, Mr. Denktash criticized the above suggestions as a "handout" being offered to a "so-called minority". He noted that the Greek Cypriots were at the same time attacking his community in international forums and intensifying economic restrictions, in violation of point 6 of the 19 May agreement.
13. During this period I was ready, as part of my efforts, to send Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, on a mission to the area with the object of exploring further the possibilities of

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resuming an effective negotiating process. However, in the absence of any indication of sufficient flexibility to make such a visit worthwhile, I decided not to pursue the matter.

14. I further explored the possibility of adjusting the scenario for the reopening of the talks as well as the statement of my Special Representative so as to circumvent the difficulties outlined in the preceding paragraphs. In my view, contentious issues such as "bizonality" and the "security of the Turkish Cypriot community" could only be dealt with productively within the framework of the intercommunal talks, as part of negotiating the constitutional and territorial aspects. I therefore urged the parties to resume the talks and proceed as soon as possible to the consideration of concrete matters with a view to achieving progress.

15. President Kyprianou on 25 March reiterated his opposition to the Turkish Cypriot notion of negotiating a binding agreement prior to the opening of the talks. He was prepared to accept the opening statement of my representative provided the Greek Cypriot side were given the opportunity to reserve its position concerning certain terms (such as bizonality and security) to which the two parties had given conflicting interpretations. He also objected to the textual modifications proposed by the Turkish Cypriots as tending to alter the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 in a manner unacceptable to his side.

16. On 26 March, Mr. Denktash informed my Special Representative that his side adhered to the position that the opening statement of the representative of the Secretary-General would have to be a binding agreement if an immediate collapse of the talks were to be averted. He also pressed for modifications of the text of the opening statement to reflect the Turkish Cypriot position concerning bizonality, security and the "partnership" status of the communities.

17. In a last-minute effort to break the impasse, I presented a new suggestion to the parties on 28 March. Under this plan, there would be a revised opening statement containing elements of my suggestions of August 1979 (see para. 8 above); the interlocutors would note this statement and the Greek Cypriot interlocutor would, as requested, be able to put on record his reservation concerning the interpretation of certain controversial terms (such as bizonality and security) used in the statement. Thereupon the interlocutors would proceed to the substantive consideration of the matters on the agenda.

18. On 29 March, Mr. Rolandis indicated that his side could accept my latest suggestion, provided certain changes were made in the opening statement. If these changes were accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek Cypriots would agree to consider the opening statement as binding. Alternatively, he suggested reconvening the talks on the basis of the accord of 19 May 1979, without an agenda.

19. On 30 March, Mr. Denktash announced that his authorities had decided to accept the proposals of the Secretary-General (see para. 17 above) and that, if the Greek Cypriots also accepted them without conditions or reservations, the intercommunal talks could resume next week. Mr. Denktash rejected the suggestions of Mr. Rolandis (see para. 18 above) which, he said, would introduce the Greek Cypriot reservations into the body of the opening statement.

20. Mr. Rolandis criticized Mr. Denktash's announced acceptance of my proposal as misleading, on the grounds that the Turkish Cypriot side had rejected my suggestion that the Greek Cypriot interlocutor should express his reservations; in so doing, Mr. Rolandis said, the Turkish Cypriots had rejected an essential component of the Secretary-General's proposals.

21. I and my representatives continued intensive consultations from 30 March to 2 April. On 31 March, Mr. Rolandis suggested, as a new approach, that my Special Representative should undertake preparatory consultations with both interlocutors separately on certain controversial matters, including bizonality and security. This approach was turned down by the Turkish Cypriot side when, on 1 April, Mr. Atakol responded that such consultations had in fact been going on for some time. In further contacts by my Special Representative with the Turkish Cypriot side on 2 April to verify the possibilities for a compromise formula, it was ascertained that Mr. Atakol maintained the position of the Turkish Cypriot side that neither party should make any reservations.

22. In these circumstances, I wish to inform the General Assembly that, owing to the divergent and firmly held positions of the parties, the effort to resume the negotiations between the communities on the basis of the agreement of 19 May 1979 has not, so far, borne fruit.

23. I however continue to hold to the opinion that the intercommunal talks, if properly used, represent the best available method for negotiating a just and lasting political settlement of the Cyprus problem based on the legitimate rights of the two communities. I shall therefore pursue the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council to this end. I shall keep the General Assembly informed of the outcome of my continuing efforts to facilitate the development of a concrete and effective negotiating process for the solution of the Cyprus problem.
