



**Security Council**

PROVISIONAL

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ENGLISH

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**PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND  
SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-EIGHTH MEETING**

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Friday, 13 June 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

**President:** Mr. RABETAFIKA

(Madagascar)

**Members:** Australia  
Bulgaria  
China  
Congo  
Denmark  
France  
Ghana  
Thailand  
Trinidad and Tobago  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
United Arab Emirates  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and  
Northern Ireland  
United States of America  
Venezuela

Mr. WOOLCOTT  
Mr. TSVETKOV  
Mr. LIANG Yufan  
Mr. ADOUKI  
Mr. BIERRING  
Mr. de REMOULARIA  
Mr. GBEHO  
Mr. KASEMSARN  
Mr. ALLEYNE  
Mr. SAFRONCHUK  
Mr. AL-SHAALI  
  
Mr. MAXEY  
Mr. OKUN  
Mr. AGUILAR

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The meeting was called to order at 11.40 a.m.

EXPRESSION OF THANKS TO THE OUTGOING PRESIDENT

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): As this is the first meeting of the Security Council for the month of June, I should like, on behalf of the Council, to pay a tribute to His Excellency Mr. James Victor Gbeho, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations, who presided over the Council last month. I am sure that I speak for all members in expressing our sincere thanks to Ambassador Gbeho for the diplomatic skill with which he conducted the work of the Council last month.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted.

THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS (S/18102 and Add.1 and 2)

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the debate, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Turkmen (Turkey) took places at the Council table.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I should like to recall that in the course of the Council's consultations, members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Ozer Koray in accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Koray in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the appropriate time I shall invite Mr. Koray to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them the report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 December 1985 to 31 May 1986 (S/18102 and Add.2) and for the period 10 December 1985 to 11 June 1986 (S/18102/Add.1). Members of the Council also have before them a draft resolution, contained in document S/18151, which was prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

I draw the attention of members of the Council to document S/18149, which contains the text of a letter dated 12 June 1986 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Australia, Bulgaria, China, Congo, Denmark, France, Ghana, Madagascar, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has therefore been adopted unanimously as resolution 585 (1986).

The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Allow me at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council for the month of June and to express appreciation for the skilful manner in which you conducted the consultations on the draft resolution just adopted unanimously, renewing the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another period of six months. It is a source of satisfaction for us that the presidency of this body is in the talented and experienced hands of a distinguished diplomat from a friendly country with which we share the closest of diplomatic relations, especially within the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

I extend our warmest congratulations also to your predecessor, the President of the Security Council for the month of May, a seasoned diplomat, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, whose wise leadership has already been acknowledged by this body.

I thank the members of the Council for the renewal of the peace-keeping mandate of UNFICYP, to which my Government had given its prior consent. The resolution that was just adopted meets the approval of my Government because it contains the basic provisions for the stationing of United Nations troops in Cyprus made necessary in light of the continuing Turkish occupation of part of our territory and the ongoing initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General.

The Government of Cyprus expresses its deepest appreciation to the Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and his collaborators for their untiring efforts in seeking a peaceful and just solution to the problem of Cyprus.

Our appreciation goes also to Major-General G. Greindl, Commander of UNFICYP, and to his officers and men for the dedicated manner in which they have performed their duties. Last, but not at all least, we extend our warm appreciation to the friendly Governments which, through voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, have enabled UNFICYP to continue rendering its services in Cyprus. In this regard I wish to inform the Council that the Government of Cyprus has decided to increase its contribution to UNFICYP to the sum of \$550,000.

The problem of Cyprus, seen in its right and only perspective, is one of foreign invasion and continuing occupation by Turkey of approximately 40 per cent of the territory of a small non-aligned country Member of the United Nations and the Commonwealth, the usurpation of lands, the inhuman expulsion of thousands of people from their ancestral homes and the massive violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

On 20 July 1974 - almost 12 years ago - under various pretexts, such as that of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community, or preserving the constitutional status quo under alleged treaty rights, Turkish troops brutally invaded the island, uprooting and expelling one third of its indigenous population and forcing them to become refugees in their own country.

This naked aggression, which left thousands dead, missing or enclaved and caused vast material losses, was repeatedly condemned by the international community and by world organizations, including the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth and many other world bodies.

Solemn Security Council resolutions - such as resolution 365 (1974), which endorsed General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX) of 1974, adopted unanimously and calling inter alia for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops and the return of the refugees to their homes and lands, as well as for non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus and for respect for the human rights of all Cypriots - remain unimplemented. As recently as 1983 and 1984, the Security Council again, in resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), called for an end to the occupation and condemned the attempted unilateral declaration of independence and all illegalities perpetrated in the occupied areas of Cyprus, such as the holding of so-called referendum and presidential and parliamentary elections. Most importantly, these resolutions demanded the withdrawal of the attempted secession and called

"upon all States not to recognize the purported State of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' set up by secessionist acts ... [and] not to facilitate or in any way assist the aforesaid secessionist entity". (resolution 550 (1984), para. 3)

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

It is heartening to note that no State other than Turkey has recognized this illegal concoction of attempted secession.

Yet this puppet régime continues with further illegalities, the most recent being the so-called municipal elections in which thousands of settlers, including officers of the Turkish army of occupation, took part in a parody of democratic process thwarting the free will of the Turkish Cypriots. It is self-evident that no lawful or adequate expression of free will can take place in the occupied areas because of the massive Turkish military presence and the uprooting and expulsion of the lawful inhabitants constituting 82 per cent of the population in those areas and the implantation in their homes of settlers from Turkey.

The Reuters announcement of 7 June of the intended visit of the Prime Minister of Turkey to the occupied areas of Cyprus from 2 to 4 July this year constitutes yet another proof of Ankara's affront to the United Nations. It is a contemptuous violation of Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) and demonstrates the hypocrisy of Turkey, which, on the one hand, states that it supports the initiative of the Secretary-General and, on the other hand, violates the very resolutions upon which the Secretary-General's initiative is based.

Furthermore, disregarding demands contained in United Nations resolutions and non-aligned declarations for the complete demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey, acting in violation of specific provisions of United Nations resolutions demanding the withdrawal of its troops, proceeded with the recent construction of a vast military airport in Lefkoniko and a naval base in Kyrenia. These actions, which connote its intentions to perpetuate its military stranglehold over our people and the occupation of our territory, are in stark contrast to our written acceptance of talks for the demilitarization of Nicosia as it appears in the Secretary-General's present report in document S/18102 dated 31 May 1986.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

The issue therefore, in addition to the main acts of invasion and occupation, is also the contemptuous disregard of solemn United Nations resolutions and decisions, for to date, notwithstanding a host of mandatory Security Council resolutions the Turkish troops and settlers have not been withdrawn, not a single refugee has been allowed to return to his home and land and, ironically, after 12 years of occupation, the people of Cyprus have not had an opportunity even to discuss troop and settler withdrawal and the question of international guarantees.

As a consequence of the Turkish invasion and continuing occupation and the non-implementation by Turkey of United Nations resolutions, the lofty principle of the non-use of force in international relations, enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter, is still blatantly and contemptuously disregarded. The principle of respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of States and that of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms have been violated by Turkey. The principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force is severely challenged and the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is no more in that beautiful island.



(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

The right to move freely in one's country is being suppressed and denied to our people under the yoke of the occupation troops. The tragic question of the missing - a totally humanitarian issue - remains unresolved, the fate of loved ones unknown, while the misfortune of the enclaved continues unabated as their numbers dwindle resulting from violations of their most basic human rights.

Cyprus, the historic and beautiful island in the Mediterranean destined to be a bridge of brotherhood between the three continents which surround it, continues to be a source of conflict endangering peace and stability in that strategic and sensitive region.

Segregation, so reminiscent of the deplorable system of apartheid in South Africa, has been imposed as the policy of Ankara in its effort to partition and annex to mainland Turkey the occupied part of Cyprus. Division of the territory through artificial boundaries of separation, such as the abominable and disgraceful Attila line cutting our island in two, and the segregation of our people are the official policy of the invader in Cyprus, carried out before a bewildered world community that has repeatedly declared its abhorrence of such policies.

With such separatist actions Turkey hopes, in vain, to deal a final blow to the traditional unity and co-operation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities forged by a common country and destiny. Thus, 200,000 human beings uprooted from their ancestral homes and lands watch across the fences their usurped homes and the familiar mountains and valleys, denied to this very day their inalienable right to return. These unfortunate people are indeed going through a unique tragedy. They are close to, and yet far away from, beloved places. They witness the daily importation of Anatolian settlers brought in from Turkey in thousands to usurp and colonize the occupied areas, furthering Ankara's attempts to change the demographic character of the island. Historical names of towns and

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villages embodying the legends and wisdom of our people are changed to Turkish place-names; historic monuments which are central to our cultural identity are looted by the invader, in order to destroy the age-old cultural heritage of our people. These actions are another plot in Turkey's history and constitute a crime against humanity recorded in the timeless book of history.

Because of this grim state of affairs in the occupied areas of the Republic, the Ministers of non-aligned countries, meeting in New Delhi in April of this year, "condemned all efforts or actions aimed at altering the demographic structure of Cyprus" and noted that these abhorrent and criminal acts acquired recently even more alarming proportions. The settlers are not only usurping the homes and lands of the expelled indigenous Cyprus population; they are also desecrating holy places, plundering what was created with the sweat and tears of our people, and adulterating through so-called elections their free will.

These colonists from Turkey even form "political parties". A settler and former Colonel of the Turkish Army, Mr. Ismail Tezer, who became a so-called minister in Mr. Denktash's régime, has openly declared that the aims of his party "are to achieve the partition of Cyprus and its annexation to Turkey ..." He admitted that the settlers came to Cyprus with Turkey's approval, that they were presented as "agricultural force", that almost all of them became citizens of the so-called Turkish Federated State, and that their purpose was to stay for ever in Cyprus. What lofty aims indeed and, may I add, what silencing evidence against those who try to deny it.

The Council will recall that, parallel with the crimes of aggression and the importation of Turkish settlers, in 1974 Turkey proceeded with the setting up of a bogus entity in the occupied areas to serve as a puppet of the invader. This fictitious entity is not recognized by any State, except Turkey; it has no

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

territory other than those occupied areas which constitute an integral part of the Republic of Cyprus, as reaffirmed by General Assembly resolution 34/30, and, as stated before, it has been condemned by Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). It is used by Ankara as a propaganda channel aimed at clouding the burning issue of Turkish aggression, by attempting to present it as an intercommunal difference, and hoping to cover up Turkey's grave crimes against Cyprus and its people. The so-called Prime Minister of that puppet entity, Mr. Eroglu, on 8 May of this year called

"for the official transformation of the occupied areas of Cyprus into the seventeenth province of Turkey and for the Turkish occupation to be extended to the southern shores of Cyprus"

as the only way for the abolition of the abominable Attila line.

It is obvious from the aforementioned that Ankara's target is the perpetuation of its stranglehold over Cyprus and, as a consequence, it is paying only lip-service to a negotiated settlement of the problem, using the talks as a smokescreen and a shield to mislead the international community and silence its criticism and also to gain time to complete its insidious aims. Instead of working for a solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of United Nations resolutions, the Turkish Government is consolidating the results of its aggression by speedily incorporating the occupied areas into the State of Turkey. Instead of strengthening age-old bonds that link the people of Cyprus together, it strives to eliminate them to serve its expansionist and annexationist goals.

The Turkish allegations that these separatist actions are necessary for the security of the Turkish Cypriot community are not only absurd but are fabrications to serve its expansionist goals. The allegation of security needs for the Turkish

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Cypriot community was originally aimed at paving the way for the Turkish invasion, and now that the Turkish occupation has dragged on for 12 years the allegation is still being used to provide the pretext for the continuation of occupation, in violation of a series of United Nations resolutions demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops. Similarly, the so-called mistreatment of the Turkish Cypriot community in the pre-invasion era is another Turkish fabrication used in a vain attempt to justify the unjustifiable military occupation. To prove the falsity of this allegation one can do no better than revert to the highest independent source on this subject, the late great Secretary-General U Thant, whose silencing pertinent paragraph 106 of his report in document S/6426 reads:

"... the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file."

On the other hand, Ankara's expansionist aims for invading Cyprus were clearly expressed on 10 July 1980 by Mr. Turan Gunes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the time of the invasion, who stated that "Cyprus is as valuable as a right arm for a country interested in its defence or for its expansionist aims".

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

Mr. Gunes further admitted that:

"Many States to a certain extent, because it suits their interests, want to see the Cyprus problem merely as our desire to protect the Turkish community in the Island, whereas the actual problem is the security of the 45 million Turks in the Motherland."

More recently, on 3 December 1983, the present Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ozal, called Cyprus

"an Island which pierces the middle of Turkey like a dagger, being extremely vital to its security",

and only a few days ago he embarked on a campaign of falsification of history to suit Turkey's sinister aims against Cyprus.

The continuing occupation over the past 12 years and Turkey's unending divisive and expansionist actions in the occupied areas, as well as the provocative and highly revealing statements made by the Turkish side, constitute insurmountable obstacles to the free search for a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem through constructive and meaningful negotiations on the basis of United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements of 12 February 1977 and 19 May 1979.

It is a cardinal truth that the success of negotiations depends on their being free and on their being based on the solemn provisions of Security Council resolutions. The very presence of the Turkish troops rules out any meaningful freedom to decide on the part of the Turkish Cypriot community and has the effect of a gun pointed at the Government of Cyprus. On the other hand, to judge from the actions and statements of the Turkish leadership, there is no change of mind with regard to the objective of the Turkish Government, which obviously remains the perpetuation of its occupation of the Island.

We are committed to a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem as a matter of urgency, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and resolutions.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

Only through such a solution can the people of Cyprus find peace, security and happiness. For that reason, we have co-operated with the Secretary-General in the discharge of his mission of good offices.

The Greek Cypriot side has made many painful concessions in order to reach a solution. It is because we want a solution that we have indicated a willingness to accept many - even unorthodox - provisions relating to territorial and constitutional issues. A couple of examples should suffice: We have shown our willingness to accede to a demand for 50 per cent representation in the Upper House and 30 per cent in the Lower House for the 18 per cent Turkish Cypriot community. It is because we want a solution that we agreed that the region under Turkish Cypriot administration might be in the order of 29 per cent, and not because we were agreeing to pay a premium for aggression.

It is entirely legitimate for us to be concerned when we are faced with unworkable constitutional structures and decision-making processes or other inequitable propositions. A viable solution is what we owe to our people. Our primary consideration must be the future of our country.

We have always been ready to co-operate with the Secretary-General. It has always been agreed that the Cyprus problem is to be solved as a package of interrelated and interdependent elements. We have always expected and have consistently demanded that the important issues should be resolved as a matter of priority and at the appropriate high level. The fact that the constitutional questions have been discussed for several years is indicative of our conciliatory attitude and of our willingness to co-operate with the Secretary-General. On the other hand, over the same period the Turkish side has refused to enter into any meaningful discussion on the crucial issues.

As the Secretary-General himself has often explained, his mission of good offices neither is, nor purports to be, a mission of mediation or arbitration. We

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

still recall the Security Council debate in May 1984 that resulted in the adoption of resolution 550 (1984), when Mr. Denktash shouted to all that the Secretary-General was only a "good-officer" and, therefore, could not submit any documents of his own. When the Secretary-General submitted his April 1985 documentation, composed of two documents, Mr. Denktash, in the same spirit, again wrote a voluminous letter of comments on the Secretary-General's 6-or-so pages. One needs to read it to appreciate how negative his attitude was to that attempt by the Secretary-General and, since many of Mr. Denktash's demands are reflected in the draft framework agreement of 29 March 1986, one might also be tempted to conclude that intransigence, regrettably, pays after all.

At the end of last year, the Secretary-General invited the two sides to lower-level meetings and had other contacts with them. We told the Secretary-General our position on the various elements his team raised during those meetings. Those positions were summarized in writing on 20 March in President Kyprianou's aide-memoire, which was issued as a Security Council document this morning and to which you, Mr. President, so kindly made reference.

We also proposed to the Secretary-General that further consultations be held in order to bridge the gap that was apparent to us and in order to clarify such terms as the "integrated whole-approach" concept.

Instead of holding further consultations, the Secretary-General produced a draft framework agreement that did not reflect Greek Cypriot concerns. All political parties in Cyprus agreed that the draft framework agreement could not be accepted as it stood. The constitutional provisions, as formulated, were found to be unworkable. The formulation of the territorial question had been changed so radically as to bear little resemblance to previous formulations.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

In fact, the implications of that formulation was an outright contradiction of the 1984 Vienna working points, according to which the most important factor in determining the territorial question was to be the resettlement of Greek Cypriot displaced persons in their homes.



(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

As the content of the draft framework agreement did not satisfy previous undertakings, the integrated whole concept was not considered to be sufficient protection for the Greek Cypriot side's position. To put it simply, the Greek Cypriot side would have found itself bound by an unworkable constitutional arrangement, without benefiting from corresponding commitments of the other side on issues of vital concern to the Greek Cypriots.

Because of the interrelationship of elements, our position on some could not finally be formulated - not only because of the absence of any commitments by the Turkish Cypriot side on the remaining elements, but, even more, because of continuous negative statements on the Turkish side. Is it surprising that we should be concerned, when in his reply of 21 April Mr. Denktash mocked the question of troop withdrawals with his statement:

"As for the withdrawal of non-Cypriot troops" -  
and the following words contain the mockery -

"excluding those that are to remain on the island ..." (S/18102/Add.1, p. 21)

The time has come to establish a balance among the elements of the framework. When balance is established, which will be possible only when there are discussions on the outstanding basic issues, further negotiations on the other elements of the package can be justified and in fact greatly facilitated.

We have proposed negotiating the important issues of the Cyprus problem. Those issues that have never been negotiated nor even discussed before, as repeatedly indicated - the withdrawal of troops and settlers, the guarantees and the three freedoms - constitute the cardinal aspects of the problem of Cyprus.

We have made proposals in good faith in an effort to maintain the negotiating process. We cannot accept that our proposal of 20 April 1986 was not viable simply because Mr. Denktash might reject it. If that is the case we are in fact being advised to accept a victor's peace in Cyprus.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

The Secretary-General in his oral message of 8 May 1986 invited us to express our views on the content of the draft framework agreement. The procedure is part and parcel of that content. We have given our views, as requested. This procedure will enable us

"to assess together the joint results of the outcome of this high-level meeting or international conference and the content of your 'draft framework agreement'." (S/18102/Add.1, p. 30)

We have noted with satisfaction that the Secretary-General refers to the proposal of the Soviet Union entitled "Principles of a Cyprus settlement and ways of achieving it". (S/17752, annex, and Corr.1) Those proposals are in conformity with the Charter and seek to implement the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus. The procedure envisaged is consonant with one of our alternative proposals submitted to the Secretary-General.

In his report the Secretary-General speaks of the dangers inherent in the present situation. We are aware of the many dangers we face, as we still have on our territory Turkish occupation troops and a secessionist Turkish Cypriot pseudo-State. That is why, like all small and defenceless States, we have put our faith in the United Nations, particularly in the Security Council. We remain confident that the guiding light of the Charter will shine in the Council's thoughts. Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) contain the compass points that should chart a path for all of us here today.

This body, as the guardian of United Nations principles and resolutions, has a solemn duty to see that Turkey abandons what was obtained by force of arms, withdraws its troops and respects the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, as demanded by a host of United Nations resolutions. It is Turkey that must implement Security Council decisions and resolutions upon which a just and lasting solution can be based. It is not, and

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

must not be, Cyprus, the victim, that must be made to sign its surrender. It is the aggressor, Turkey, that must account to the Security Council for its act of aggression and non-compliance with Security Council decisions.

It is regrettable that the tragic situation in Cyprus persists because the Council has not so far taken decisive and effective steps to force Turkey to comply with solemn Security Council resolutions. The tragedy of Cyprus amply illustrates the plight of our Organization and consequently the plight of the small and militarily weak States, which rely for their security on the United Nations. At the same time, it poses an agonizing challenge to mankind.

If the United Nations continues to allow its unanimously adopted resolutions and Security Council decisions to be contemptuously disregarded by invaders, the crisis now facing it - a political, economic and social crisis - will continue and the world Organization's prestige will be further eroded. The credibility and usefulness of the United Nations depend on its ability to fulfil its mission, by mastering the means to implement its decisions and by taking effective action when the situation warrants.

It is our duty to restore that credibility to our Organization and face positively and victoriously the agonizing challenge to mankind by implementing the Charter provisions dealing with the establishment of the system of international security provided by the Charter.

The Government of Cyprus is striving to secure the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, to make Cyprus an island without foreign armies or dividing lines and to rebuild the bridges of co-operation blown up by foreign interference and intervention. In this task our hopes for vindication and justice rest on the United Nations, which constitutes the cornerstone and main pillar of our foreign policy and the framework within which a just and lasting solution of our problem can be found.

(Mr. Moushoutas, Cyprus)

Until such a solution is found we feel that there can be no legalizing of the results of invasion and occupation, as there can be no vindication of the offender. So long as the violations of the Charter persist, so long as our lands are occupied by an alien element, we shall, with determination, perseverance, and faith, continue the struggle to safeguard our homes and country.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): The next speaker is the representative of Greece, on whom I now call.

Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June. I am sure that, with your great experience, diplomatic skills and tact, you will successfully guide the Council's deliberations. I should be remiss if I failed to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Gbeho, on the exemplary way in which he carried out his duties during May.

(Mr. Dountas, Greece)

For many years the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has, within the limitations of its mandate, carried out its duties consistently and has significantly contributed to the maintenance of peace in Cyprus. I should like on this occasion to pay tribute to all the men and officers of the Force who have served in Cyprus these past years. In particular our appreciation goes to General Greindl, the officers and the national contingents under his command. UNFICYP is to play a further important role in keeping peace in Cyprus.

At this stage I should also like to express the sincere gratitude of my Government to all the countries that have in past years selflessly contributed manpower and material to UNFICYP and have made its continued existence possible.

The Secretary-General, with the help of his able staff, has been untiring in his long and dedicated involvement with the Cyprus question. I should like to thank him and to reiterate at this point that my Government continues to support his mission of good offices.

It is now almost two years since the Secretary-General started his latest efforts to find out whether possibilities exist for a solution to the Cyprus problem under the present circumstances. The United Nations has repeatedly dealt with this question, and a number of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions state in the most unequivocal terms the sort of solution envisaged for Cyprus.

Solution of the Cyprus problem has always been seen as being based on a package of several elements. The interdependence of those elements is such that it is impossible for either side to commit itself to part of the package without knowing the whole.

Throughout the long process of negotiations, both before and after the Secretary-General's present initiative, only one group of subjects has been discussed extensively, namely that related to a new constitutional structure for the Republic of Cyprus. The territorial issue has also been discussed, although

(Mr. Dountas, Greece)

at a much later stage. The questions of the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, of guarantees and of the three freedoms have never been explored. The Turkish side has been adamant in its refusal even to expose its views, and least of all to enter into serious negotiations on the subject.

Deeply preoccupied with this situation, President Kyprianou addressed a letter to the Secretary-General on 20 March 1986, which has been circulated this morning as a Security Council document. President Kyprianou conveyed to the Secretary-General once more the basic position of his Government. I believe that it should have been clear from that straightforward communication that the positions of the two sides were still widely divergent on the crucial points of the dispute.

Nine days after the dispatch of President Kyprianou's letter, on 29 March 1986, the Secretary-General presented to the parties his draft framework agreement. As members of the Council might have observed, it deals mostly with the various constitutional aspects of the Cyprus problem while it refers only briefly - almost in passing - to the three major issues, namely the withdrawal of the army and settlers, guarantees and the three freedoms. It is therefore a text incomplete and consequently imbalanced. And it is indeed surprising that, despite the incompleteness of the draft framework agreement, a commitment even to initial acceptance is being sought from the parties. Faced with the situation created by the hasty presentation of this incomplete document, the Government of Cyprus decided to propose a new approach in a genuine effort to save the initiative of the Secretary-General.

President Kyprianou, with the full support of the Greek Government, suggested to the Secretary-General that one of the following alternative procedures be adopted in order to deal with the major remaining issues, which had never been dealt with before: either the convening of an international conference or the

(Mr. Dountas, Greece)

convening of a high-level intercommunal meeting. After these three issues had been discussed, and in the light of the outcome of the discussions, the two sides would be in a position to turn to the draft framework agreement. In the opinion of the Greek Government this position of President Kyprianou is conceptually and politically sound, given the imbalances and the far-ranging provisions of the draft framework agreement.

I do not intend to enter into a discussion on the merits of the draft framework agreement, nor do I intend to go into the substance of the constitutional and territorial questions. My colleague the Permanent Representative of Cyprus has already dealt with the subject. I should only like to set out in no uncertain terms the position of my Government regarding one aspect of the Cyprus question, namely the Turkish troops in the island and the guarantees. Since Greece maintains a special relationship with the overwhelming majority of the people of Cyprus and is also a guarantor Power with specific and legal responsibilities regarding the Republic of Cyprus, it cannot remain indifferent to developments in the island and particularly the presence of Turkish troops of occupation - particularly since that presence is linked with wider security considerations covering the whole area.

I have already stated my Government's support for the position of President Kyprianou set out in his communications to the Secretary-General of 20 April and 10 June 1986. For reasons I have already briefly touched upon, precedence should be given to the outstanding main issues of the Cyprus problem - that is, the withdrawal of the Turkish army, effective guarantees and the three freedoms. Allow me to elaborate on this point.

The draft framework agreement presented to the Greek Cypriots on 29 March is exhaustive in its constitutional provisions and takes into account all points of interest to the Turkish Cypriots. The questions relating to Greek Cypriot interests are actually bypassed. They are deferred for discussion to the ill-defined future, with no guarantees. At the same time the Greek Cypriot and

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the Turkish Cypriot sides are asked to commit themselves, even initially, to all the provisions of the draft framework agreement. However, it should be stressed that these provisions cover mostly points of interest to the Turkish side. The Turkish side is committed to nothing related to the issues of major preoccupation to the Greek Cypriots. Paragraph 8.1 of the draft framework agreement, which deals with the military aspect, is mainly of a procedural nature, and its substantive part could be interpreted to the detriment of the Greek Cypriot side. In this sense the draft framework agreement is in our view unbalanced. In order to redress this incompleteness, this imbalance, President Kyprianou presented his alternative suggestions.

I should have thought that President Kyprianou's proposals would have been accepted without any difficulty. They only indicate the obvious: that no agreement, particularly no far-reaching agreement such as the one provided for by the draft framework agreement, can be achieved without full knowledge at least of the position of the other side on the remaining main aspects of the question - particularly since, in the case of the Turkish troops and the guarantees, it was widely known that highly significant divergencies of opinion existed between the two sides.



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I am referring, by way of example, to the letter President Kyprianou addressed to the Secretary-General on 20 March - as I have said, nine days before the presentation of the framework agreement. That letter bears witness to the extent of the gap between the positions of the parties.

By that brief analysis I have simply attempted to demonstrate that when the draft framework agreement was presented to the parties their position on crucial matters was so far apart as not to justify, in our view, its submission for acceptance.

I frankly wonder why, in view of that reality, the following simple scenario could not have been adopted: A paper would be prepared which would reflect the positions so far agreed upon on certain points, as well as suggestions on how other, constitutional, questions could be dealt with. The outstanding main issues would then be discussed and the position of the parties on them would be defined and recorded. After all issues covering the whole range of the Cyprus problem had been dealt with, then the Secretary-General would be able to give a sound assessment of the situation, knowing the position of the parties on all aspects of the problem. He could subsequently conclude either that the positions of the parties were not reconcilable or that the gap had narrowed considerably so that a draft agreement covering all the positions might be presented for an overall solution to the problem.

A procedure such as the one I have just indicated would be to the detriment of no one. The positions of the two sides would be fully secured. A commitment of the parties at that stage would have been possible. One really wonders who could have any difficulties with such an approach and why.

We are therefore justified in asking what the reason was that made it so imperative hastily to present a document incomplete as far as the whole spectrum of the problem is concerned and, furthermore, to seek a commitment to it.

(Mr. Dountas, Greece)

Allow me to insist on this point. We really fail to understand the reasons behind that hasty submission of an incomplete document for acceptance, particularly since all the evidence surrounding the problem pointed to the fact that the moment was not ripe for an agreement. As I have just mentioned, President Kyprianou, nine days before the submission of the document, had made his position abundantly clear, in a straightforward and candid manner. What was the reason for the haste? Why could not a scenario like the one I have just indicated been followed - a scenario securing the interests of all the parties? Of course, it might be argued that Turkey was against it. Fair enough. But the framework agreement was not designed solely to protect the Turkish interests. What about the concerns of the Greeks? Who was going to protect those concerns?

Are we to assume that the document was submitted hastily with the intention of expediting the development of matters, to bring pressure to bear on one side to induce it to make further concessions so that finally an agreement would be achieved? Frankly, I am not prepared to accept such an interpretation. I have a very simple reply to the question I have posed: the hasty submission of this incomplete document was a mistake, an error of judgement. Even the most powerful and able secretariats can, despite the best of intentions, make mistakes. If we believe - as I do - that it was a mistake, then there is hope. Mistakes can be redressed. I do believe that the proposals by President Kyprianou open the door to the redressing of this mistake.

I wish to touch upon two other points.

First, it has been mentioned that the Greek Cypriot side could accept the draft framework agreement under an integrated whole approach and in the context of an ultimate commitment to a solution, depending on the eventual outcome of negotiations on the major issues. I have grave doubts as to whether the integrated

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whole and ultimate commitment approach described in the draft framework agreement and the accompanying letter could be considered as safeguarding, even remotely, the position of the Greek Cypriots. If, however, it could be so considered - if this clause of the integrated whole approach was a safe and sound approach - I would simply ask why it would not be possible for the Turkish side to agree on the modalities of the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, subject to an integrated whole and ultimate commitment approach; namely, the subsequent acceptance by the Greek Cypriots of the draft framework agreement. Have the Turks ever been asked to accept that approach? I am afraid that the integrated whole approach - as designed and described in the draft agreement - would, if ever accepted, end up as a euphemism for Greek Cypriot concessions through salami tactics. That would be the reality of the possible acceptance of this sophisticated clause.

I have already referred to a number of legitimate concerns and fears of my Government regarding the draft framework agreement. The letter addressed by Mr. Denktash to the Secretary-General on 21 April 1986 and contained in document S/18102/Add.1 increases tremendously these grave concerns of the Greek side.

Mr. Denktash makes it clear in his letter that part of the Turkish troops will remain in Cyprus indefinitely. I quote his words: "except those that are to remain on the island" (S/18102/Add.1, annex V, p. 21). As to the timetable for the departure of those who might eventually actually depart, his position is also quite clear. First of all the Government of Cyprus will have to be dissolved. It will have to commit suicide. It will be replaced by a transitional government paralysed by Turkish vetoes, as amply provided for in the draft framework agreement. Then, the Greek Cypriots will have to disarm their National Guard and it will have to be disbanded. The Greek Cypriots will have to abandon even the minimum of self-defence possibility provided for by the National Guard. Only then - after

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there is no Government of Cyprus, after the Greek Cypriots stand naked before the tens of thousands of Turkish occupation troops - will the Turkish occupation forces begin their partial withdrawal. May I ask the members of the Security Council whether they would be prepared to accept such provisions if their own countries were concerned?

I do not want to prolong my statement by elaborating on the other points made by Mr. Denktash. They are there for everyone to read.

I have another point to make at this stage. I wish to touch upon the contention that the Government of Cyprus, by not accepting the commitments contained in the framework agreement, is supposedly backing down from its previous acceptance of the documents of April 1985. I shall try to explain why this contention seems to my Government totally erroneous.

The Government of Cyprus, guided solely by the desire to reach a negotiated settlement, accepted in April 1985 the draft statement and the draft agreement presented by the Secretary-General. In doing so, it stated its willingness to accept painful concessions on the understanding that the way would thus be clearly opened to the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Cyprus.

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Indeed, there was a provision in the draft statement according to which the Turkish Cypriot side would not exclude a priori any timetable for the withdrawal of the Turkish troops. That provision, which permitted the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to present at the negotiating table its consistently, repeatedly and formally stated demand for the withdrawal of all Turkish troops before the formation of a transitional government, has disappeared. That clause was the only slim protection afforded the Government of Cyprus and was perhaps one of the main reasons that Government accepted the April documents.

Furthermore, I invite particular attention to the fact that a series of events subsequent to the acceptance of the April documents led to a sharp deterioration in the conditions which had prevailed when the documents were accepted. There is a change in the environment which surrounded the negotiations and the acceptance of the 1985 agreements. I am referring to the so-called constitutional referendum and elections held in the occupied territories; I am referring to the numerous demands of Mr. Denktash for changes in the April texts presented in his letter of 8 August 1985, which changes were later incorporated in the draft framework agreement. Incidentally, I regret that that letter has not been circulated as an official document; it would have contributed to a better understanding of the situation by members of the Council. I am referring also to the threatening statements by Turkish officials, and, last but not least, I am referring to Mr. Denktash's letter of 21 April which, as I mentioned before, clearly and bluntly reveals Turkish intentions in Cyprus.

In other words, since April 1985 a new draft text has been presented departing from the original 1985 draft text; also, the political conditions and the atmosphere that had surrounded the whole negotiating process and that were the basis for the agreement, have changed dramatically. The text of the draft framework agreement significantly departs from that of the documents of

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April 1985, and even the faint trust which had led the Greek side to risk the acceptance, with certain understandings, of the April 1985 documents, has been dissipating ever since.

I hope that this analysis makes it abundantly clear that the position taken by President Kyprianou was the only one for a responsible leader to take. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus could have eventually accepted trying to live with a constitution containing grave shortcomings. But it could obviously not accept sacrificing the Greek Cypriot community, which represents 80 per cent of the population of Cyprus, to the permanent influence of Turkey, thus turning the whole of Cyprus into a sort of Turkish protectorate.

I wish in conclusion to invite the attention of members of the Council to the self-evident fact that the question of the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Cyprus is not simply an aspect of a bicomunal dispute. It is related to a major offence by a Member State against the Charter and the elementary norms of international law. Thus, withdrawal of the Turkish army from Cyprus, apart from other considerations, has to be seen by the Council principally as a question of the military invasion and occupation of a State Member of this Organization. In keeping with the spirit and letter of the principles of the United Nations, it should be dealt with as a matter of absolute priority.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I thank the representative of Greece for his kind words to me.

The next speaker is Mr. Ozer Koray, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

Mr. KORAY: Allow me to thank you, Sir, and through you the other members of the Council for having given me this opportunity to address the Council on this matter, which is of direct concern to the Turkish Cypriot people. We value these

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opportunities to convey to the Council the views of the Turkish Cypriot side, one of the parties directly interested in Cyprus.

We, the Turkish Cypriot side, are trying to reach a just and lasting solution in Cyprus with our counterparts, the Greek Cypriots, through the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General. The differences between the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides are evidently still too deep to be instantly resolved. But for the second time in the space of 14 months we have had another comprehensive framework, in the form of a draft agreement on a federal solution, presented by the Secretary-General, within which the two sides could pursue the peace process with a chance of success. This necessitated some degree of moderation and sensibility, and that is what we would have wished to see on the Greek Cypriot side rather than an increased propaganda effort. However, once again the Security Council has had to endure an acrimonious presentation by the Greek Cypriot side, in which the truth was intended to be the main victim, as in all similar situations.

The Security Council knows only too well how the Cyprus problem erupted in 1963 and how it has evolved over the last 23 years. We strongly resent the content and the tone of the Greek Cypriot statement, but we have no wish to emulate that performance.

The allegations contained in that statement can all, without exception, be reversed and levelled against the Greek and Greek Cypriot side. The difference is that, unlike the unfounded Greek Cypriot accusations, what we say can be easily substantiated. We have been forced to do this on numerous occasions, either here before the Council or in our various letters circulated in response to these charges. Therefore, it is our intention not to allow ourselves today to be side-tracked from the real issue by diversionary tactics. I wish only to place on

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record our indignation in the face of the Greek Cypriot insistence on abusing our goodwill. I have to stress that this attitude is doing great damage to whatever chances we may have of lessening the distrust which exists between the two sides, as the Secretary-General has pointed out in his report (S/18102/Add.1).

What matters today is where the two sides in Cyprus stand with regard to the peace process as crystallized in the Secretary-General's proposals of 29 March 1986.



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After the rejection by the Greek Cypriot side of his draft agreement at the 17 January 1985 summit and after further relentless efforts and many rounds of consultations with both parties, the Secretary-General, with his deep knowledge of the Cyprus problem, his sagacity, sense of fairness and patience, furnished the two sides with a framework which, if concluded and adhered to in good faith by the two sides, could lead to a bicomunal and bizonal federal settlement based on the equal political status of the two peoples of Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriot side, always consistent in its approach to the United Nations Secretary-General's initiatives, gave its reply to the Secretary-General on 21 April, conveying to him its acceptance in substance and in procedure of his "Draft Framework Agreement" presented as an "integrated whole".

Having seen Mr. Kyprianou's reply to the Secretary-General, President Denktash wrote a second letter to the Secretary-General on 27 April in which he reiterated our unqualified acceptance of the draft agreement and expressed his readiness to sign the document after the envisaged filling in of the necessary dates. He also stressed the "integrated whole" character of the "Draft Framework Agreement" and the imperative need to abide by the procedure envisaged in it, without attempting to change the rules of the game, which would be unjustified and unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side.

It may be revealing to recall how the Greek Cypriot leadership decided on their response to the Secretary-General's framework agreement.

Mr. Kyprianou, who never misses a chance to pay lip-service to "independence" and "sovereignty", dropped all pretense and appeared before the Greek Premier, Mr. Papandreou three times in the space of just three weeks, from 29 March to 19 April. During the last visit, his entourage included all the party leaders in South Cyprus. That fateful meeting took place on 19 April and we are all aware of its end-product.

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The Greek Cypriot leaders, anxious and uneasy about the widespread displeasure that met their reply to the Secretary-General, did their utmost to gloss over it. The Greek Premier, Mr. Papandreou, however, in a speech at Alexandroupolis on 14 May, boasted about that meeting and described it as an "historic one" in that it decided that the Secretary-General's plan was unacceptable. On an earlier occasion, in a speech before his parliament on 23 April, Mr. Papandreou had also declared that the Greek Cypriot side was not alone in its rejection of the United Nations plan.

We are in no position to know whether Mr. Papandreou, too, was expected to inform the Secretary-General and the international community of his acceptance or rejection of the "Draft Framework Agreement on Cyprus", but at any rate we should like at this juncture once again to urge the Greek Prime Minister to withdraw his unhelpful shadow from over Cyprus.

The international press reported widely on both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot replies and converged on the conclusion that the latter was in fact a rejection of the United Nations plan. For example, The Guardian of 21 April reached this conclusion under the heading, "UN's Cyprus Plan Stalls". The Financial Times of the same date reported it under the heading, "Greek Cypriots Reject UN Plan". These are but two examples of this widespread convergence of views.

As stated in his report, the Secretary-General sent an oral message to the Greek Cypriot side advising it that its proposals "were not viable" and that the procedure contained in the draft framework agreement "provided for these issues to be dealt with without delay at high-level meetings". (S/18102/Add.1, p. 4, para. 11)

On the same date the Secretary-General, during a meeting with certain journalists in New York, felt the need publicly to urge the Greek Cypriot side to abide by the "integrated whole" character of his draft and to stay within the

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realms of the procedure envisaged by it. He considered that the Greek Cypriot suggestions were "not viable" and that he had asked for a formal "yes" or "no" on his "Draft Framework Agreement".

At last the long-awaited reply of the Greek Cypriot side came on 10 June 1986. It is contained in annex VII of the Secretary-General's report in S/18102/Add.1.

As we can all see, the answer of the Greek Cypriot side is a resounding and aggressive "no" to the "Draft Framework Agreement".

Mr. Kyprianou's letter is before the Council. It therefore needs no extensive evaluation on our part. It must be pointed out, however, that for tactical purposes the Greek Cypriot side deemed it useful to create confusion around three aspects contained in the "Draft Framework Agreement". We do not intend to comment on this situation, which clearly indicates how inconsistent and untenable the Greek Cypriot position is in view of the statement of the spokesman of the Secretary-General on 31 March 1986, which reads as follows:

"While it is not possible at this stage - for reasons that you can understand - to enter into the content of the Draft Agreement, I can say that the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot sides are in agreement on the manner in which the questions of the withdrawal of the non-Cypriot troops, guarantees and the three freedoms should be dealt with in the Draft Framework Agreement.

"The text which the Secretary-General has presented to both sides has remained absolutely faithful to what the two sides have agreed to on these questions."

In the face of this rejection of his draft by the Greek Cypriot side, the Secretary-General expressed his sentiments in his report. The Secretary-General regretted that

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"since one side is not yet in a position to accept the draft framework agreement of 29 March 1986, the way is not yet open to proceed with the negotiations I have proposed for an overall solution". (S/18102/Add.1, p. 6, para. 19)

We join him in expressing the same sentiments.

It is thus clearly evident that, as in the 17 January summit, another golden opportunity has been lost owing to the non-acceptance by the Greek Cypriot side of the Secretary-General's "Draft Framework Agreement". Indeed, it is a pity, as the Secretary-General stresses in his report, that the Greek Cypriot side refused to comprehend that this document, if approached and elaborated in good faith by both parties, would be "the right framework for negotiating a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem". (S/18102/Add.1, para. 18)

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It has once again been proved that the constructive approach and the political will of one of the parties to any question would hardly be sufficient to resolve the issue at hand to the satisfaction of both parties involved. In this context, we welcome the appeal contained in the statement of 12 June 1986 made by the troop-contributing countries to UNFICYP. In pondering on the situation we should all perhaps hope for the day the Greek Cypriot side will assume a positive attitude towards a negotiated solution. Until then the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will continue its independent existence.

Turning now to the resolution just adopted by the Council, I cannot but state that the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus rejects it, firmly and unequivocally, for the following reasons.

The Turkish people of Cyprus and its Government cannot acquiesce in the reference in the third preambular paragraph to a "Government of Cyprus" as if such an entity exists today or ever existed since 1963. The portrayal of such an illegal, unconstitutional entity as the legitimate "Government of Cyprus" is, was and will always be abhorrent to our people and its democratically elected, legitimate representatives. It is references such as that one that encourage and enable the Greek Cypriot Administration to reject and render fruitless successive initiatives for a just and lasting solution in Cyprus.

Reference is made in the fourth preambular paragraph to "other relevant resolutions". Since the Turkish Cypriot side has either rejected in toto or accepted subject to reservations the resolutions in question, that reference, too, is unacceptable to us.

In paragraph 3 a reference is made to the "present mandate". We have to stress that the mandate in question is not compatible with the radically changed conditions and circumstances of today. We believe, therefore, that a reappraisal of UNFICYP's mandate is long overdue and necessary.

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Despite its unavoidable rejection in toto of the present resolution, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is nevertheless disposed to accept the presence of UNFICYP on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on the same basis as that stated in December 1985. Thus, our position continues to be that, the principle, the scope, the modalities and the procedures of co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNFICYP shall be based only on decisions which shall be taken solely by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is, however, imperative that the troop-contributing countries display and be seen to display a neutral stance in the dispute between the two peoples of the island and respect the principle which lies at the core of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and his initiatives. After all, that is the foundation on which a bicomunal, bizonal federal structure is sought to be built and it is the only foundation that can support such a structure. It is vitally important, therefore, that the representatives of such countries visiting the island should take care to establish contact with both sides on the island and thus not only acquaint themselves with both sides of the story but also demonstrate their resolve to respect the all-important principle of the equality of the two peoples. By doing so they will, most certainly, be helping the efforts for a negotiated settlement.

Concerning the reference in paragraph 2 to the "mission of good offices" of the Secretary-General, the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus understands that mission to be emanating from Security Council resolution 367 (1975), and with that understanding pledges its full support to it. My Government is also aware of the other side's attempts to misinterpret, distort and paralyse that mission, and is determined to see such attempts fail.

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Before concluding, I should like to take this opportunity to extend to Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, our profound appreciation and thanks for his efforts within his mission of good offices. The Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hopes that his efforts will one day be given a chance to succeed. Our goodwill and good wishes are with him.

I should also like to convey our thanks and appreciation to Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General; to Major-General Gunther Greindl, the Force Commander; and to the military and civilian staff under his command for the efficient way in which they have approached their respective tasks.

Our thanks and appreciation go to Under-Secretary-General Mr. Goulding, Mr. Feissel, and Mr. Picco for their untiring efforts in pursuance of their duties.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): In view of the lateness of the hour, I propose to adjourn the meeting now. The next meeting of the Council to continue consideration of the item on its agenda will be held this afternoon at 3 o'clock.

I should like to remind members that the Security Council will consider the question of South Africa later today, after we conclude consultations - which, I hope, will be brief - that will take place following the meeting devoted to the situation in Cyprus.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.