

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 March 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. C. CLERCKX

(Belgium)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria</u>	Mr. N. KERROUM Mr. A. BELAID Mr. M. TEFIANI
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. M. CAMPORA
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R.A. ROWE Ms. M. LETTS
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. C. CLERCKX Mr. P. NIEUWENHUYS
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. V. BOJLOV Mr. H. HALATCHEV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. R. DEYANOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U TIN TUN U MYA THAN U HLA MYINT Daw AYE AYE MU
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. J.A. BEESLEY Mr. R.J. ROCHON
<u>China:</u>	Mr. QIAN Jiadong Mr. HU Xiaodi Mr. SUO Kaiming Mr. SHA Zukang Ms. WANG Ziyun Mr. YANG Mingland Mr. YU Zhongzhou Mr. TAN Han Mr. LIU Zhongren
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. M. BADR Mr. F. MONIB
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	
<u>France:</u>	Mr. J. JESSEL Mr. H. RENIE Mr. G. MONTASSIER
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. H. ROSE Mr. W. KRUTZSCH Mr. J. DEMBSKI

<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. H. WEGENER Mr. F. ELBE Mr. H. PETERS Mr. W.-N. GERMANN
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. D. MEISZTER Mr. T. TOTH Mr. F. GAJDA
<u>India:</u>	Mr. S. KANT SHARMA
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO Mr. A.M. FACHIR Mr. R.I. HENIE Mr. HARYOMATARAM Mr. A. MASBAR
<u>Islamic Republic of Iran:</u>	Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB Mr. F. SIRHANI
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. F. PIAGGESI Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI Mr. M. PAVESE Mr. E. SIVIERO
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. R. IMAI Mr. M. KONISHI Mr. K. KUDO Mr. T. ISHIGURI Mr. T. OKADA
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. D.D. AFANDE Mr. P.N. MWAURA
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. S.O. BOLD Mr. G. GONGOR
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. O. HILALE
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. J. RAMAKER Mr. R. MILDERS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. B.O. TONWE
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AHMAD Mr. K. NIAZ
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. J. RYCHLAK Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. I. VOICU Mr. G. CHIRILA

Sri Lanka:

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS

Ms. E. BONNIER

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Ms. A.M. LAU

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.I. ISSRAELIAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. G.N. VASHADZE

Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN

Mr. G. ANTSIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Mr. R.J.S. EDIS

Mr. J.F. GORDON

Mr. D.A. SLINN

Mr. J. GRAINGER

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ

Mr. T. BARTHELEMY

Mr. J. GRANGER

Mr. R. GOUGH

Mr. R. LEVINE

Mr. R.L. LUACES

Mr. R. NELSON

Venezuela:

Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMULA

Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of
the Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the three hundred and forty-fourth plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The international community, in particular the community associated with disarmament, was appalled to learn of the sudden disappearance of the Swedish Prime Minister, His Excellency Olof Palme. This unspeakable act has deprived us all of a particularly important contribution in the field of security and disarmament. Mr. Palme had a brilliant political career which brought him to the head of his country's Government after occupying a number of major political posts. We all know the role he played in the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, otherwise known as the Palme Commission. I should like to convey to the Swedish delegation, on behalf of the Conference and in my own name, our sincere condolences on this irreparable loss. I should also like to ask the Swedish delegation kindly to transmit to the people and Government of Sweden and to Mr. Palme's family our heartfelt sympathy and sincere condolences.

I invite members of the Conference and all persons present in this chamber to rise and observe a minute of silence in memory of Mr. Olof Palme.

The members of the Conference rose and observed a minute of silence.

Mr. KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, as Chairman of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States of the Conference on Disarmament, it is indeed my sad privilege to express the deep sorrow of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States to the Government and people of Sweden on the occasion of the demise of Dr. Olof Palme. Dr. Olof Palme was a man of integrity and compassion, one whose life was devoted to the struggle for the well-being of mankind. He was not only a highly prominent figure of his great country, Sweden, but he indeed belonged to the whole of the international community and to the non-aligned and neutral world in particular.

The time that he served, gracefully, in a high office of the United Nations very well reflected his deep conviction towards the principles of justice and equality in international relations. In the realm of North/South and East/West dialogue, Dr. Palme was an outstanding and trusted mediator and in many fields in the international arena his absence will be sorely felt.

Dr. Palme knew how to gain the confidence of the under-developed nations and the under-privileged everywhere and this quality coupled with his outstanding professional and intellectual capacities will be long remembered by the world community.

Dr. Olof Palme was a very special, far-sighted man of the battle to rescue the world from destruction to survival and from lawlessness and aggression to justice and prevalence of confidence among States. In the International Conference on Common Security, in 1982, Olof Palme said "It is essential to begin to understand what confidence can mean even between countries with deep political conflict or different military capabilities".

The almost rare sense of responsibility and of far-sightedness as emanating from the aforementioned sentence, in respect of confidence-building and security among all nations, were the powerful characteristics that guided

(Mr. Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

him in his invaluable efforts on the international scene. His death will certainly call the men of principle and courage together and together they come with a stronger spirit of loyalty to and conviction of the principles he fought for and died with.

On behalf of the non-aligned and neutral States I wish to express our deep condolences to the Swedish delegation and request this delegation to convey our condolences to the respected family of Dr. Palme and we pray that his family may show patience and tolerance in the face of this tragic event.

Mr. JESSEL (France) (translated from French): On behalf of the delegations of the Group of Western Countries, I wish to convey to the Swedish delegation our sincere condolences and profound sorrow on the occasion of the tragic death of Prime Minister Olof Palme.

We can well understand the grief of the Swedish people in such circumstances; it is shared by the whole world, as Mr. Palme's influence extended well beyond his country's frontiers. He gave Sweden a position that was respected by all, that of a country combining neutrality with tireless activity on behalf of human rights, peace and disarmament. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe is currently being held in Stockholm thus has both real and symbolic importance. He was an engaging man who combined to an unusual degree a statesman and a great-hearted man. His death represents a great loss not only for his country, not only for Europe, but for mankind as a whole. I would request Ambassador Ekéus to be so kind as to express our heart-felt condolences and sympathy to His Majesty King Carl-Gustav and the Swedish Government and people, and to convey our words of compassion to Mr. Palme's family.

Mr. RICHLAK (Poland): Mr. President, permit me, on behalf of the delegations of the Group of Socialist Countries, to convey to the delegation of Sweden our deep regret and profound condolences on the sudden and tragic passing away of the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme.

The great contribution of Olof Palme to the cause of peace and international security has won international recognition, and his enduring and diligent efforts towards disarmament shall never be forgotten. We all have in mind especially his latest call for speedy agreement on the nuclear-test ban. The Conference on Disarmament should honour the memory of Olof Palme by strengthening its efforts towards nuclear disarmament as well as preventing an arms race in outer space. We would like to ask the delegation of Sweden to convey our sympathy and condolences to its Government, to the Swedish people and to the late Prime Minister's family.

Mr. QIAN Jiadong (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, the Chinese delegation shares the profound feeling of shock and grief expressed by the other delegations over the tragic assassination and death of the Swedish Prime Minister, His Excellency Olof Palme.

Prime Minister Palme was a distinguished Swedish political leader and a renowned international statesman and enjoyed high prestige in the world. Over the years he worked tirelessly for the safeguarding of world peace and disarmament, and made outstanding contributions. His premature death is a great loss to the Swedish people and to the cause of peace.

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

I was privileged to participate in a follow-up meeting of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues sponsored and chaired by Prime Minister Palme, and was deeply impressed by his extraordinary talent, amiable manners and devotion to the cause of disarmament. At a time when the people of the world are eagerly awaiting progress in disarmament, evil bullets deprived him of his life. It is our firm conviction, however, that the forces of peace will eventually triumph over the forces of war.

The Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang has sent a message of condolence to the Swedish Government on the sad demise of Prime Minister Olof Palme. On behalf of the Chinese delegation and in my own name, I would like to express here to the Swedish delegation and, through it, to the bereaved family and the Swedish people, our deepest sympathy and most sincere condolences. May I also wish Mrs. Palme a speedy recovery.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The sentiments to which I might have wished to give voice as head of the Mexican delegation to the Conference on Disarmament have already been very well expressed by the Co-ordinator of the so-called Group of 21, to which Mexico belongs.

If I have nevertheless considered it appropriate to add a few words, as I am now doing, it is because I have the privilege of being the only representative in this Conference who is at the same time an original member of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which began its work in Vienna in September 1980 and as a result of its first 12 meetings adopted, in Stockholm on 25 April 1982, a report entitled "Common Security -- A Programme for Disarmament".

Olof Palme guided the work of that Commission so outstandingly and efficiently that today everyone refers to it not by its original title but rather by the name of its Chairman, in other words as the "Palme Commission". I should like to recall here some ideas expressed by that outstanding man which I consider to be particularly relevant. I shall quote them in the original in the interests of greater accuracy.

At the eighth meeting of the Palme Commission, in an informal colloquium held in Hiroshima at the beginning of December 1981, I ventured to suggest that it should be compulsory for the Heads of State or Government of the Nuclear Powers to visit the city and try to understand the message which could be learned from it. The Chairman of the Commission endorsed my modest suggestion and went on to add the following:

(spoke in English)

"I would widen it. I would bring here all the men in the laboratories, who work with these dreadful things. I would bring here all the men and women in the 'think tanks' and in the strategic commands, and some research institutes which play around with so-called scenarios -- first strike, counterforce, second strike and so on -- as if it was on a chessboard where everything is predictable. And they would, I hope, cease to play such foolish games once they have been here. And I would like to have all those who say that 'victory is possible' in a nuclear war to come here and see for themselves. And I doubt if they will ever say that again".

(continued in Spanish)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

With regard to the reasons why "common security" is necessary, in the introduction to the report to which I have just referred the Chairman said the following:

(continued in English)

"Our report expresses our deep concern at the worsening international situation, and at the drift towards war that so many perceive today. We are totally agreed that there is no such thing as a nuclear war that can be won ... It is therefore of paramount importance to replace the doctrine of mutual deterrence. Our alternative is common security. There can be no hope of victory in a nuclear war, the two sides would be united in suffering and destruction. They can survive only together. They must achieve security not against the adversary but together with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction."

(continued in Spanish)

The third and final quotation which I shall offer you today also comes from the Introduction to which I have just referred. It ends as follows:

(continued in English)

"Our vision is of an international order where there is no need for nuclear weapons, where peace and security could be maintained at much lower levels of conventional armaments and where our common resources could be devoted to providing greater freedom and a better life for people. I am convinced that this vision is shared by most people around the globe, and I have great faith in their ability to work for its realization."

(continued in Spanish)

I think that the views and judgements I have just recalled, to which I could very easily add many others of a similar nature, make it absolutely clear why it may be said without any fear of contradiction that the tragic death of Olof Palme is an irreparable loss not only for Sweden, his native country, but also for the most lofty and noble causes of peace and disarmament. That is why we believe that the best tribute we can offer to his memory is to continue to fight for respect for the principles and implementation of the purposes summarized in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a document which also includes what could be termed the birth certificate of this Conference.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, allow me on behalf of the delegation of Sweden to express our sincere appreciation to you and to all the delegations and colleagues who have conveyed to my delegation their condolences concerning the untimely death of Olof Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden from 1970 to 1976 and again from 1982 until the fateful night between 28 February and 1 March 1986. The people of Sweden are mourning. It is difficult for us to master our sense of loss. During his long time as a leading personality in Swedish political life, in Parliament and in

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Government, of which many years as the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme put one concern first, concern for the poor, for the oppressed. He was part of a great political tradition that held that social justice must build on solidarity. In his life-long struggle for the deprived and underprivileged he taught us that solidarity does not halt at national borders.

Olof Palme associated himself and his country with the historic struggle for national self-determination and national independence. He saw international solidarity as the key for coming to grips with the great economic and political problems of underdevelopment.

Olof Palme saw early on the dangers of the arms race and the growing international tension as threats both to peace and to the struggle against underdevelopment. Without peace and the halting of the growing militarization of our societies and international relations no liberation from social and political injustice was possible. As a member of the Brandt Commission, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, and later as Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, the so-called Palme Commission, Olof Palme took the lead in clarifying the relationship between peace, security and development. This understanding was the basis for Olof Palme's work for disarmament and peace.

Olof Palme had set himself the task of transforming this broad agenda of political, social, economic development combined with disarmament and co-operation instead of confrontation -- a concept he called common security -- into political action. He directed Swedish diplomacy to carry out this task in international fora, in the United Nations, in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and indeed in this Conference. Together with Heads of States and Governments from five continents Olof Palme was active in trying to influence international development and movement towards nuclear disarmament and peace. Indeed his last official act was to sign a statement of the Six Nations Peace Initiative.

Of the Six Heads of State and Government who 15 months ago launched the Peace Initiative, two have perished in violence. Olof Palme was a man of peace, his death in violence is a tragic irony. He was killed in action. The best thing we can do to serve his memory is to increase our efforts to promote the common goal of development and peace, of common security.

Mr. President, I would ask you to convey our profound appreciation to all those who have expressed their condolences to the people and Government of Sweden and to the family of Mr. Palme.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement. Following this tribute to Prime Minister Olof Palme, we shall go on to our agenda, but I should first of all like to tell the Conference how grateful I am for the honour done me and the confidence placed in me by calling on me to preside over the work of the Conference during the month of March. I should like to ensure the Conference that I shall devote myself wholeheartedly to this task. I consider myself at its disposal, and hope that this Presidency may make a contribution to the success of our work. I should also like to pay tribute here to the outgoing

(The President)

President, Ambassador Butler, who successfully guided our Conference through the reefs surrounding the opening of our session. There can be no doubt that we owe this success to the energy and vigour he imparted to us, as well as the masterly, calm and composed role he fulfilled in our work.

As Ambassador Butler is currently away from Geneva for a few weeks, I would request the Australian delegation kindly to convey the Conference's appreciation to him.

In accordance with its programme of work the Conference today begins the consideration of agenda item 5, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter related to the work of the Conference.

Immediately after the conclusion of the list of speakers, we shall hold an informal meeting to consider the question of the re-establishment of the ad hoc committee on radiological weapons, which we decided at our last informal meeting to take up again today, as well as other organizational matters.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina, Bulgaria and the Federal Republic of Germany. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Today's meeting will take place under the crushing burden placed on us by the incomprehensible death of Olof Palme, statesman, social reformer, personality of worldwide renown, and servant of the highest ideals of mankind in the realm of world peace, respect for human rights and democracy.

We present our condolences to the delegation of Sweden, a country whose Government, under Mr. Palme's leadership, has provided so much in the way of international co-operation in areas that need it. We grieve at his death because we shared his ideals.

Mr. President, at this meeting you are taking up your Presidency of the Conference for the month of March. The Argentine delegation offers you its close co-operation in the conviction that your diplomatic experience and personal ability provide a sure earnest of success in this high responsibility.

I should also like to convey to Ambassador Butler, through his delegation here, our appreciation for his determination to serve the objectives of the Conference during the opening month of this 1986 session. His dedicated and intelligent work has allowed us rapidly to take up the substantive consideration of our agenda items, and his Presidency will be remembered for the ground-breaking dynamism with which he carried out his duties. We must say that both his opening statement and the statement with which he closed his term as President last Thursday, as well as the intensive consultations he held to spur on the Conference in its work, add up to a style which deserves our wholehearted praise.

The Argentine delegation asked to be placed on the list of speakers today in order to make the following remarks on agenda items 1 and 2.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

The Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, whose significance and scope may be seen all the more clearly as disarmament efforts are delayed, declared that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger for mankind and the survival of civilization.

In accordance with this view, it stated categorically that in disarmament negotiations the elimination of nuclear arsenals has the highest priority. Aware of the complexity of such negotiations, it logically went on to say that in order to achieve that objective, a number of urgent measures should be considered. Paragraphs 50 and 51, inter alia, of the document highlight the significance of some of these.

Of the set of measures in the nuclear field, the international community has attached top priority to the negotiation of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. The United Nations General Assembly has adopted almost 50 resolutions and on many occasions has expressed its belief that the continuation of nuclear weapon testing accelerates the nuclear arms race and consequently increases the danger of nuclear war.

The fundamental value of a nuclear-weapon-test ban is its demonstration of the political will to end the nuclear arms race. This first step would improve the overall prospects for nuclear disarmament negotiations, begin a period of mutual self-limitation on the part of nuclear-weapon States, constitute a significant element in a general nuclear-weapon freeze, and help to halt the further qualitative development of nuclear weapon systems and possibly to limit the potential risks of the development of new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

It is a sorry fact that the appeals made for over a quarter of a century have so far not given the desired results. The policy adopted by some nuclear-weapon States shows that the missing element for being able to begin negotiations on nuclear-weapon-test ban is political will. Six years ago the parties to the trilateral negotiations then taking place stated that they were "determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion". Today, on the other hand, we are told that the negotiation of such a treaty is a long-term objective.

It is hard to accept that the security of a small group of countries should come before the security of the entire international community, and that it should constitute an insurmountable barrier to beginning multilateral negotiations on this instrument.

All States should participate with the same will and determination in the negotiation and speedy conclusion of a treaty to end nuclear-weapon tests once and for all. The difference in the size of the arsenals of the various nuclear weapon Powers cannot be accepted as a justification for any of those Powers to stay out of an effort which would represent the first step in the process aimed at eliminating the fundamental difference between the nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States. In this connection, we welcome China's decision to participate in an ad hoc committee and hope that this step represents a development in its basic position.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

The negotiation of the treaty should be multilateral so as to ensure that it is fair and non-discriminatory and furthermore that it will therefore attract universal adherence. Again, as is true in the consideration of other disarmament measures, the final purpose criterion should be applied to resolve questions which might arise from the dual use, peaceful and military, that can be made of any technology. The use of technology to promote economic and social development according to the needs, priorities and interests of each State should not be hindered.

As stated in paragraph 31 of the Final Document, the form and modalities of a verification system depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the corresponding agreement. Consequently, it is logical to believe that the requirements of the verification system should be considered in the course of the negotiations on a treaty. Only then is it possible to hope to reach agreement on suitable measures which will satisfy all interested parties because, in the absence of genuine negotiations, it cannot be expected that the necessary concessions will be made to arrive at generally acceptable solutions.

We therefore cannot accept the argument that negotiation of the treaty should wait until verification issues have been resolved, especially when the delegations taking this position are the very ones which consider that verification is the fundamental problem outstanding in the case of a chemical-weapons convention, on which we have been pursuing active negotiations for some years. In the case of the chemical weapons convention there was no insistence on resolving verification problems in advance.

In view of the foregoing, there is no practical purpose in analysing the details of a verification system. Nevertheless, I think it is worth stressing some fundamental principles which the delegation believes should govern the machinery and procedures relating to verification and implementation of a nuclear-weapon-test-ban treaty in order to avoid the rather unsatisfactory experience of other treaties.

The system should guarantee equality of rights and obligations of all parties, in other words, it should apply equally to all parties and ensure their right of participation and access. In this connection, I wish to recall the issues already raised by the Group of 21 in 1981 in document CD/181 and at the informal meetings held on the issue in March and April 1981. Furthermore, in accordance with the Final Document, verification methods and procedures should not only not be discriminatory but should not interfere unduly in the internal affairs of States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

At the plenary meeting on 18 February, I stressed the favourable international circumstances for the opening of multilateral negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-test-ban treaty, and recalled that the elaboration of a mandate for a negotiating committee was now within the Conference's reach, provided the necessary political will existed.

It is vital that the nuclear-weapon States should cease to view those weapons as essential elements of their security at the expense of the security of all others, and should begin the necessary multilateral process to end the nuclear arms race in quantitative and qualitative terms and its continuing spread in various regions and oceans of the world.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

Although the Conference on Disarmament is the single multilateral negotiating forum in the disarmament field and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is an issue of the highest priority, the recent consultations held during February by your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Australia, have shown once again that for one group of countries the inclusion of item 2 in our agenda is purely symbolic.

This situation is particularly deplorable at a time when the Conference has learned of the opportunity to consider a step-by-step comprehensive programme of nuclear disarmament with a specified timetable. We had hoped that in the circumstances the search for a common approach which would enable the Conference on Disarmament to discharge its specific responsibilities would be intensified.

While the obstacles to which I have just referred have arisen in the consideration of item 2, nevertheless during the month of February the item has been of special importance in the Conference on Disarmament because of the attention paid to nuclear weapons in plenary by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States.

The message of General Secretary Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament and the statement by First Deputy Minister Kornienko on 20 February, as well as the statement by Ambassador Lowitz of the United States on 27 February, are contributions which, while limited, in our view open up the possibility of complementarity between the work of this multilateral body and the bilateral negotiations.

We have repeatedly heard many delegations insist on the complementarity between the two spheres of disarmament negotiations, multilateral and bilateral. This complementarity, however, cannot be achieved if the two forums do not communicate with one another.

That is why in this Conference the United States and the Soviet Union have been called upon to provide information on the state of the bilateral negotiations. The Argentine delegation made such a request in its statement of 18 February.

When the fourth round of bilateral negotiations ended last week, on 27 and 28 February, there were highly interesting informal meetings between members of the Conference and the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union in the bilateral negotiations.

The statements made and the exchange of views will help to provide a better understanding of the complexity of the issue and the alternatives which exist to promote both the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. We hope that the channels of information between the two forums will be maintained and expanded in future.

It has been said, and it should be repeated whenever the occasion arises, that nuclear arsenals threaten mankind with extinction. And yet the nuclear-arms race does not cease, because the nuclear-weapon States manufacture them for their security. However, security is not armed peace. As the Argentine Foreign Minister, Mr. Caputo, recently stated before this Conference, when recalling the period of prosperity in Europe between 1870 and 1914, "for several decades it was emphatically maintained that the arms race

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

was the best guarantee of peace, since the dread of a tremendously destructive war would ward off the danger that one would occur". Twice this century history has proved that the arms race leads to war.

To conclude, the Conference on Disarmament would do well to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 2 with a suitable mandate and thus contribute to nuclear disarmament, for which the nations of the world are calling.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): The delegation of Bulgaria has been shocked by the tragic death of the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Olof Palme. The Swedish people have lost a great political leader who enjoyed enormous prestige and respect not only in Sweden but also beyond its boundaries. The whole world has lost a great man of profound dedication to the cause of peace and disarmament, universal justice and mutual understanding. Mr. Olof Palme has personally given a most significant contribution to the efforts of the international community to achieve a world free of nuclear menace. He has been the driving force behind a number of new valuable ideas and initiatives inspired by the desire to find a generally acceptable approach to common security. On behalf of the Bulgarian delegation I should like to convey to the Swedish delegation, and through it to the Government of Sweden and the family of Mr. Palme, our sincere condolences.

I would like to join the speakers who have welcomed you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. I wish to express the hope that under your guidance the Conference will accelerate the pace of its work. My delegation is grateful to Ambassador Butler of Australia for the dynamic manner in which he presided over the proceedings of the Conference and the good start given to its work.

I should like to express the appreciation of the delegation of Bulgaria of the fact that the Conference on Disarmament received the previous Thursday an important message by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. We regard the message as a gesture of high respect for the work of this Conference. The message is fresh evidence of the Soviet Union's willingness to seek generally acceptable solutions to the urgent problems of disarmament. This constructive approach has once again been confirmed at the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU.

My delegation fully shares the view expressed in the message of Mikhail Gorbachev that "mankind has approached a watershed in the history when it has to choose which road to follow: either it will overcome the inertia of the past when security was regarded above all in terms of a position of strength and of military and technological solutions, or it will remain hostage to a race in nuclear, chemical or, in the future, other equally awesome weapons". The time has come, indeed, for us jointly to take major steps to rid our planet from the threat of annihilation. Addressing the Conference, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Georgy Kornienko, rightly stated that "mankind should make a choice right now on the threshold of the third millenium, that will determine its fate".

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

One of the problems that the Conference is duty-bound to address in all honesty and responsibility is the issue of a nuclear-test ban and I will concentrate today on this.

Many speakers who have taken the floor before me have once again pointed to the special importance and highest priority of the NTB issue in the Conference agenda. This has been the problem most widely dealt with in numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly for the past three decades. The importance of discontinuing all nuclear-test explosions has repeatedly been spelled out by the international community at various disarmament conferences and public gatherings. The issue of a nuclear-test ban stood at the core of deliberations at the Third NPT Review Conference. Its Final Declaration called upon the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to resume their trilateral negotiations, and also called upon all nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament.

It is not with a routine expression of urgency that I underline the need finally to start the negotiating process to solve the problem of a nuclear-test ban. My delegation believes that now the time is more propitious than ever to make a breakthrough in this direction. The spirit of shared hopes and expectations that arose from the summit meeting in Geneva obviously needs to be substantiated.

In this context a moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests will be a measure of universal importance. It would meet the expectations of the overwhelming majority of States which, through General Assembly resolution 40/80, appealed to the States depositaries of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by virtue of their responsibilities and as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions.

In October last year, the leaders of six nations, in a follow-up to their "five continent initiative", proposed that the United States and the USSR "suspend all nuclear tests for a period of 12 months" and expressed a hope that "other nuclear-weapon States also should take corresponding steps". We share their belief that such a moratorium "would improve greatly the prospects for substantive agreements and would restrain the development of new, faster and more accurate weapons, which continue unabated, even as negotiations are under way".

The unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions introduced by the Soviet Union seven months ago is a golden opportunity for achieving a genuine breakthrough in nuclear disarmament. It is regrettable that the United States is not willing to reciprocate. Thus, it frustrates the efforts to make an important and widely sought first step in the field of nuclear disarmament. It is quite obvious that the USSR cannot be expected to unilaterally sacrifice its security and the security of its allies in the face of continuing test activities by the other side, aimed at achieving significant improvements in nuclear forces and introducing a new category of weapons, i.e. space strike weapons.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

A nuclear-test ban is, indeed, a necessary step for more dramatic breakthroughs in the field of nuclear disarmament. Without a nuclear-test ban, agreements to radically reduce nuclear stockpiles could leave room for further improvements in nuclear weapons which would be more effective and capable of carrying out the same or more military missions in lower numbers.

To put an end to nuclear testing is not a panacea that will instantly make all of us safe in a world with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. But it is an essential, practical and necessary first step to slow down, stop and reverse the nuclear-arms race.

Verification is not an obstacle to a moratorium and a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Both measures could be satisfactorily monitored by a variety of means, national as well as international. We find great difficulties in comprehending the concerns still being voiced by some delegations as to the need to wait for further improvements in the methods of verification.

We have heard reports on important developments in national monitoring capabilities, resulting from steady progress in research programmes in the field of geophysics and explosion seismology. New seismic arrays which measure high-frequency signals have been introduced recently in order to pick up extremely low-yield nuclear explosions at much longer distances than has been possible hitherto.

We were much impressed by the announcement made by Georgy Kornienko that after the introduction of the Soviet moratorium a very low-yield nuclear-test explosion carried out by the United States had been detected in the Soviet Union -- an explosion that had not been announced by the United States Government. Dr. Lynn R. Sykes, a Columbia University Professor and Pentagon consultant stated last November before the United States House Armed Services Committee Panel on Arms Control that "recent advances in seismology ensure that attempts to detonate clandestine explosions under a test-ban will even be easier to detect than was thought only a few years ago".

These scientific advances increase confidence that a moratorium, as well as a comprehensive ban on nuclear-test explosions, could adequately be verified, even from a long distance.

We welcome the offer made in the Six Nations Initiative to provide good offices in order to facilitate the establishment of effective verification arrangements. The establishment of verification mechanisms on the territories of these countries, as proposed by the six leaders, would undoubtedly be one useful way to achieve this objective.

Those who would seek further assurances of the adequate verifiability of the nuclear-test ban could base their final political judgement in this respect also on analyses using an international exchange of seismic data, organized within the framework of the respective comprehensive treaty. If there were a need to identify the real nature of a suspicious seismic or other event thought to be relevant to compliance with such a treaty, on-site inspections could well be contemplated. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev stated clearly in his message to this Conference that the Soviet Union is ready to accept "most strict control over a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and use of all achievements in seismology".

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The contention that it may be virtually impossible, at present, to verify a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, and that deep cuts in nuclear weapons should be achieved before such a ban is negotiated, is unacceptable even to the United States Congress. After the Senate 1984 resolution was passed by a vote of 77 against 22, the House of Representatives approved last week, by a majority of 268 against 148, a similar resolution urging an immediate resumption of negotiations with the Soviet Union on a comprehensive NTB treaty.

Emphasis has recently been placed on the perceived need of continuous testing as a means of maintaining confidence in the reliability of existing nuclear arsenals.

If for the sake of argument one accepts the proposition that there will be a deterioration of some components of nuclear weapons, one cannot escape the conclusion that such a deterioration would equally affect the weapons of both sides. Decreased reliability of nuclear weapons, if any, is likely to downgrade nothing but the confidence in the first-strike capability of a nuclear arsenal. Such a development would not be detrimental to stability, even if one thinks in terms of mutual deterrence.

Wolfgang Panofsky, a leading American expert on nuclear testing, clarified this point back in 1977 in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said: "It has been amply demonstrated that stockpile verification can be carried out without benefit of nuclear testing. On a longer time scale, there may well be a gradual deterioration of confidence which military planners have in the reliability of the nuclear-weapons stockpile. I believe on balance that this is a beneficial effect because it would tend to discourage pre-emptive strikes against the deterrent forces of the opponent. In contrast, the deterrent value of nuclear weapons is hardly affected by small decreases in reliability".

Dr. Harold Agnew, Director of Los Alamos Weapons Laboratory, also publicly stated in 1978: "I expect that with ample money, no restrictions on materials, and adequate non-nuclear testing, the stockpile could be maintained as is for a period of at least ten years". And ten years is twice the period of the five-year comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty proposed in the drafts submitted by the Soviet Union and Sweden.

Several resolutions of the fortieth session of the General Assembly contain specific proposals on how to proceed to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament aimed at drafting the provisions of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. Resolution 40/88, submitted by Hungary, which is co-sponsored also by Bulgaria and other countries, "resolutely urges all States and, especially nuclear-weapon States, to exert maximum efforts and exercise political will for the elaboration and conclusion of such a treaty". It urges the Conference to proceed promptly to negotiations on all aspects of this matter, including adequate measures of verification, with the aim of preparing without delay a draft treaty that would effectively ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere and would contain provisions, acceptable to all, preventing the circumvention of this ban by means of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The delegation of Bulgaria supports also the idea of carrying out such negotiations in an ad hoc committee on item 1, composed of two working groups, as specified in resolution 40/80, sponsored by Mexico. This idea could be

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

combined with the proposal for an ad hoc committee on this item, contained in resolution 40/81, sponsored by New Zealand and Australia. In this context, last Tuesday Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic suggested a concrete organizational format which provides for a balanced treatment of all major aspects of the NTB provisions in the two working groups. Such procedural arrangements would permit the Conference to move ahead with specific, meaningful work on the substance of this issue. The draft mandate proposed by the outgoing President for the month of February during his consultations constitutes, as a whole, an acceptable basis for the finalization of the joint effort to arrive at an agreement to begin concrete work.

It is to be regretted that up to now, throughout the consultations, the attitude of the Western Group has remained unchanged with respect to its previous position on item 1 of our agenda. My delegation finds this situation extremely disappointing, bearing in mind that the Group of Socialist Countries, the Group of 21 and China have all displayed a great deal of flexibility and willingness to find a solution acceptable to all.

My delegation believes that it is inadmissible for the Conference to lose one more year without any practical work. It is high time to put aside procedural debate and get down to business.

We urge you therefore Mr. President, to take up this issue as a matter of the highest priority and continue the efforts aimed at resolving the organizational problems which prevent the Conference from beginning concrete work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President, as well as for his appeal to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, the cowardly and despicable murder of the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme, has come as a shock to all who have admired his tireless commitment to peace, disarmament, human rights and justice. My delegation warmly associates itself with the condolences Ambassador Jessel has expressed on behalf of the members of the Western Group.

You, Mr. President, have assumed your high office on a day of mourning, a day when the disappearance of a great promoter of the cause of disarmament makes us all reflect, and take stock of our collective task. You will feel even more strongly the challenge of your assignment. Your broad diplomatic experience, your refined political judgement, and your well-known sense of balance and fairness will help you to meet that challenge. May I express to you my warmest wishes for a successful tenure.

According to our programme of work the current week is devoted to the consideration of item 5, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. I expect to address several aspects of this topic that are of particular

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importance to my delegation in a further statement later this week. Today I would wish to deal with an organizational issue that has not been assigned a specific place in our programme of work, i.e. the review of membership of this Conference. I would also like to make a few additional comments on the debate we have held, during the past two weeks, on the issues of nuclear testing.

Paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament recalls the agreement of the members of this body that its membership be reviewed at regular intervals. This task must in particular be viewed in the light of the fact that for several successive annual sessions formal applications for membership have been before the Conference from a great number of sovereign States Members of the United Nations. These applications for full membership presently stand at 13.

The Conference has been exceedingly slow in dealing with these legitimate requests, and we all know that the only result so far, after protracted labours, is a general undertaking, expressed both in the 1985 Annual Report and in the Working Paper reflecting this year's Agenda and Programme of Work, that the Conference will intensify its consultations with a view to taking a positive decision at its 1986 annual session with regard to expansion of its membership.

On the surface, this undertaking might provide some encouragement to the many applicants for full membership. But what is the reality behind this language and its seeming spirit of determination to act? It would be fair to say, even before a renewed process of intensive consultations is being embarked upon, that the chances to see this matter through during the present session, are not very high. More precisely, the truth of the matter is that the issue of enlargement of membership has come to a complete standstill, in blatant neglect of the interest of those countries who see their application postponed from year to year, and their prospects for normal consideration of their requests stultified.

The enlargement issue has thus become a case where the Conference fails to provide the most basic courtesy to other sovereign Member States of the United Nations. But, in its history of postponement and vacillation, it has also become an issue of the self-respect of this Conference itself. This should propel us to explore soberly the causes of the stagnation in which the Conference finds itself on this issue. The facts are clear: for almost two years now, the Group of Western Countries has officially nominated its candidate for enlargement. In the occurrence, the country so nominated has been one of the most active observer States, providing a permanent presence in our public proceedings and in most ad hoc committees, excelling in the presentation of useful working papers, and periodically honouring the Conference by the presence of high-ranking members of its Government. The candidacy of this country is uncontested in all quarters. The Group of Non-Aligned Countries, too, has let it be known that preparations for the nomination of two applicant States from among their Group have been undertaken, and that their respective candidacies would be presented as soon as all other obstacles to the enactment of the enlargement decision are removed. Those candidate countries that are the most likely to be presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States have also been with us for long years in an observer capacity, distinguishing themselves by their constructive contributions.

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The sole impediment to speedy enlargement does therefore reside with the Group of Socialist Countries since they -- without officially nominating a candidate country -- have given to understand that their likely choice is a country which, as we all know, would not find the universal approval of all members of this Conference. I should hasten to say that I do not wish to reflect in the least on the qualities and aptitude of the country in question. I look at the predicament I have described merely in terms of the chances of the process of enlargement, and the rules of behaviour which should be expected in that regard from all members of this body.

The Conference on Disarmament constitutes an autonomous Conference of States, acknowledged in its historically grown form by the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Member States. The ultimate decision on whether the Conference ought to be enlarged and how a process of co-optation should take place -- in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document -- would therefore rest with the Conference itself.

Such co-optation is a somewhat solemn process. Manifestly, it can only be effected on the basis of a joint decision of all members of the Conference. We are not dealing with the temporary presence of additional States in our midst, but we are called upon to admit such States to the same kind of permanent corporate rights which we jointly enjoy. It is therefore clear that it is a duty of all delegations and groups to take the interests and anticipated response of all other members into account when proposing a candidate. The Group of Western States and the Group of Non-Aligned Countries have proceeded by this essential rule of co-optation. There is no reason why the Group of Socialist Countries should not do likewise. This Group should be conscious of the fact that it is alone delaying the present enlargement process, thereby depriving at least three other countries of the possibility of working effectively in our midst.

Speaking about the rules of behaviour which assure the proper functioning of the Conference, a distinction ought to be made at this point in the argument. It is part of our rules of procedure that the President of the Conference will rotate on a monthly basis, and a President who accedes to his position by virtue of this rule does not need specific approval by any or all other States of the Conference. We have also adopted, over many years of practice, a rule by which the offices of the chairmen of working bodies rotate among the various groups. It is in each such case incumbent upon the group upon which the chairmanship of an ad hoc committee or working group devolves by agreement, to designate a candidate of its choice. For good reason, there has never been a suggestion that a candidate so designated should be vetoed by another group. There is a quid pro quo involved. A regular sequence of the representatives of all groups assures an equal sharing of corporate benefits. The principle of fairness is thus fully safeguarded. These rules of the game can in no way be compared to the process of co-optation of new members where, I repeat, only the principle of complete consensus could apply. Respect by all those who wish to nominate a new member for the potential response of others is thus a necessary ingredient of a successful co-optation process.

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As I have said earlier, the self-respect of the Conference commands that we complete the current review of membership in 1986. Those who have taken a rigid stand should now reconsider. This issue suffers no further delay.

However, should the present stagnation endure, paragraph 120 of the Final Document would still be with us and would still impel us to take action. In this hypothesis, we should be mindful that there are other models of review of membership which have been proposed to the Conference at earlier stages and which could be resorted to, failing the success of the model on which we had originally settled. I am speaking, specifically, of a possible model of future enlargement of the Conference which my delegation proposed in August 1983, and which is contained in document CD/404. In order to provide a solution to the enlargement dilemma which was already shaping up at that time, my delegation had proposed a staggered enlargement process over time, designed to take account of the greatest possible number of legitimate interests involved. The thrust of the model was the proposal of a periodic admission of three new members every three years, operating over a total time-span of 12 to 15 years. Its element of periodic incremental enlargement would correspond faithfully to the requirements of paragraph 120 of the Final Document. At the time, the model appeared to have the following advantages: instead of providing a one-stroke expedient, it would solve the membership issue over a substantial period of time and absorb the large majority of countries particularly interested in disarmament work. Staggered admission would specifically enable those who have most insistently worked for full membership to enter first, while other candidates could satisfy themselves with the perspective of entering with only a short additional waiting period. The reasonably safe prospect that a candidate country which could not be accepted at an early stage would ultimately acquire full membership could, by avoiding downright refusal, serve to satisfy legitimate considerations of national prestige and to attenuate psychological disadvantages. In view of the relatively rapid succession of enlargement stages there would also be no need to construct difficult models of geographical and security balance at each given stage. An acceptable general balance would rather be preserved or restored over a number of successive stages.

I have arranged with the secretariat to make copies of document CD/404 available so that delegations could study it anew as a possible alternative for the review of membership which is incumbent upon us -- in the event that we are prevented from proceeding with requisite speed on the earlier model which has now failed, for three consecutive years, to be enacted.

I was the first speaker under the agenda item on a nuclear-test ban, may I also be allowed to conclude that debate by way of commenting on this intensive two-week plenary discussion. Many delegations have taken the floor to address this vital subject, and many have done so with a remarkable degree of earnestness and sense of responsibility. On the whole, our debate has taken stock, more than in previous years, of the great complexity of the subject and of the dimension of the international efforts necessary to realize and implement a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Both the relationship of a future CTB to the larger problems of nuclear disarmament, and the challenge of effective international verification of such a treaty, have been extensively reviewed. This is important, since only a full grasp of the complexity of the issues will enable the Conference to elaborate, progressively, the solutions to the various problems that remain posed. Simplifying or denying the more

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problematic aspects of the nuclear-testing issues, on the contrary, will not help us towards the desired end. In this vein I would particularly like to commend the distinguished delegate of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus, for his statement of 27 February which provides a useful overview over the current problems, specifically in the realm of verification. His comparative analysis of the various contributions to an incipient seismic monitoring and verification régime for the future treaty will prove its value as our work progresses. It certainly raises the level of our discourse.

I regret to say that not all statements on nuclear-testing issues meet with these standards. I would therefore like to offer a number of critical comments on some contributions which did not seem to face up to the full complexity of the issues involved. I offer these criticisms, of course, in a spirit of constructive dialogue.

A first comment comes by way of clarification. Some delegations continue to recommend the rapid conclusion of a nuclear-test ban, but it emerges from the context that they only speak for the banning of nuclear-weapon tests. It should be clear that my delegation, together with the vast majority of delegations in this room, aims at a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty that would cover all nuclear explosions for all time.

On 18 February, I stated extensively the view of my delegation concerning the relationship of a nuclear-test ban and nuclear disarmament; I have nothing to add to my statement. The views of others on this relationship are manifestly different, and I do not wish to take issue with them at this time. I do, however, differ with the speakers when they attempt to show that those nuclear-weapon States which maintain that nuclear-weapon testing is essential to their security are not providing a logical argument. In the first place these speakers seek to invalidate the argument that nuclear testing remains necessary -- at least at a low level -- to solve so-called stockpile problems. This problem is sometimes too easily brushed aside. My country has no experience with nuclear testing but I think that a serious debate should at least take seriously the argument of those who provide factual evidence that in spite of the enhanced computational facilities, vast experimental experience and progress in non-explosive testing methods, a residue of suddenly emerging stockpile problems would still have to be solved by testing in the interest of the operability and reliability of existing nuclear forces. I do not want to prejudge the results of such an earnest debate but should it emerge that nuclear-weapon States cannot maintain the assurance of the reliability of their weapons without being able to test them -- at least in the framework of very limited testing options -- then the argument would also have to be addressed whether a state of affairs where the reliability of nuclear weapons is seriously doubted might not lead us away from further reductions of nuclear weapons, as nuclear-weapon States might rather choose to increase their numbers or yield. These questions remain legitimate and need to be answered as long as nuclear weapons still form part of the power and security equation between East and West. I agree that they should ultimately and indeed as soon as feasible be removed from that equation, but what I do want to argue is that the issue of stockpile reliability cannot be cast aside as a mere "bogus" issue at the present time.

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Some of the speakers go on to maintain that new weapons systems developed with maintained testing options would be of mere "marginal advantage" to their holders. Here again it is certainly true that the increasing use of large super-computers that simulate thousands of "experiments", might lead to viable weapons designs, and that therefore testing options could, to that extent, be foreclosed. But again, we have the testimony of experts from nuclear-weapon States that residual testing for the introduction of new -- and, as they claim, more stabilizing and safer -- nuclear weapons is necessary. The fact of the matter is, however, that the less testing is necessary for the emergence of new weapons designs, the more important the remaining few test shots are, so that a leading United States expert could say the following on the significance of individual tests: "We have seen that even one low-yield test could mean the difference between having a reliable weapon in the stockpile and not having that weapon". One can easily see how far weapons technology has moved from the time -- 20 or 30 years ago -- when large and seemingly endless test series were needed to bestow -- real or perceived -- military advantage on a nuclear-weapon State. Today even a very limited testing activity may bring such advantage, far beyond the level of "marginality". One may intensely dislike this state of affairs, but that does not obviate the need for an intensive and knowledgeable discussion of the strategic issues involved -- again, as long as nuclear weapons do form an essential part of the security equation of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

One speaker has attempted to deduce from the undertakings of the two Major Powers at the recent Geneva summit that nuclear testing has become "logically" excluded, and that those who continue to test would, by inference, be in violation of the summit agreement. This is an obvious non sequitur since it would amount to equating, in an undifferentiated manner, any nuclear test to a quest for superiority or to the inclination to start a nuclear war. These are wilful and unfounded accusations.

I expect -- and share -- the objective of moving closer, as soon as possible, to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. But this can certainly not be done by pushing aside or belittling weighty arguments that need to be discussed in full, and in full view of their strategic and military complexity.

In statements on the state of seismic technology and its role in the verification of a future test-ban treaty, it has been claimed that existing national and international seismic monitoring arrangements are now perfectly adequate for effective verification -- and that their eventual up-grading would also be problemless. Despite the rapid advance of seismic technology in recent years, this is manifestly incorrect, and the many working papers and statements before this Conference, including the contributions of my own delegation, should have provided that important message. The difficulties of discrimination between nuclear explosions and natural seismic events, seismic measurement uncertainties, the incomplete and uneven state of seismic facilities on a global scale, the lack of in-country seismic networks in countries crucial to a CTBT, and, finally, potential evasive options, including cavity decoupling, are insufficiently taken into consideration. The "scientific consensus" on several of these issues which such statements invoke simply does not exist. As my delegation has undertaken to establish, an effective global seismic monitoring and verification network can certainly be created over time but I have also made clear that this will be time-consuming and not entirely gratuitous. Such an exercise will need the best of our efforts.

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One speaker was particularly mistaken when he belittled the significance of very small nuclear tests. The increasing miniaturization of explosive devices, the possibility of constructing and testing nuclear weapons with a suppressed yield or, generally, a yield below the kt-range show that such nuclear events cannot be neglected, especially in view of the fact that in this realm significant military accomplishments may be attained -- as I have indicated above -- with one or two nuclear tests only.

It is not true that muffled explosions of a higher yield are the only methods of achieving such military advantages. But muffling is, of course, a largely unresolved problem and this becomes clearer when one accepts the scientific evidence that muffling in cavities can reduce the seismic signal by a factor of up to 100 -- two full orders of magnitude.

The same speaker dismissed possible evasion attempts of a future CTBT in a rather cavalier fashion. The necessary "degree of inventiveness" of a possible evader -- which he ruled out as a real possibility -- will certainly be mustered if the military advantage that could be gained by a violation of the treaty is of such proportions that it becomes an attractive security option. Evasion of the treaty, and the realization of evasion scenarios are thus not the material for far-fetched science fiction, but could be real perceived choices for one Power, or be attributed to a potential adversary, and indeed are choices that ought to be eliminated by appropriate verification techniques and the creation of mutual confidence. The gains which an evader might obtain are not "inherently speculative" but could imply very real risks against which any contracting party must hedge. In the same statement there is also an almost inexplicable denigration of the very principle of verification, when the speaker maintains that "political commitment" as such would be an effective deterrent against breach of the treaty. This statement is perfectly incompatible with paragraph 31 of the Final Document.

It is circular reasoning to assume, as the same speaker did, that since existing test sites would be particularly subject to verification measures (the critical question is, instead, whether verification measures can be effective there and elsewhere) evaders would resort to new test sites, and that such new test sites could not be developed undetected. Even a limited study of the working papers before the Conference would disclose the whole range of scientific facts relating to these issues.

A number of speakers have praised the Soviet Union's decision to observe a testing moratorium for a limited time. In the view of my delegation moratoria detract from the overall objective of a CTBT, and they should therefore very much be seen for what they are. Although proposals for the verification of testing moratoria have recently been made, the fact of the matter is that they are at present unverified and unverifiable. My delegation does not have the slightest reason to suspect the Soviet Union of not

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observing its own moratorium, but as a matter of principle, and speaking as an arms control negotiator, I must insist that an unverified claim that a moratorium is observed, remains on the level of a unilateral claim. A moratorium should also be seen as a very partial matter in so far as it does by no means exclude intensive preparations, in the meantime, for the post-moratorium period. When the Soviet Union chose to terminate, one-sidedly, the 1958 to 1961 moratorium, the intermediate period had obviously been put to good use, and the Soviet authorities surprised their American counterparts and everybody else by conducting, in the immediate aftermath of the moratorium a test series of unprecedented proportions, conducting about 100 tests in the atmosphere and an unknown but obviously substantial number underground in a very short period, ranging from very small yields to the largest nuclear explosive tests ever conducted, one of about 60 megatons. During that period the Soviet Union conducted more tests above 1 megaton than the United States has in its entire history. In assessing the value of moratoria, it would therefore appear wise to remain mindful of this historical perspective.

I have chosen to go into some details on these important testing matters, not least because we are still deprived of a separate working organ where these arguments could, perhaps more suitably, be developed. The purpose of my remarks was, as I have indicated, once more to underline the need for a detailed and realistic discussion of all the complex issues that have to be considered in connection with a CTBT to which we all in this room aspire, albeit with different degrees of urgency. In the future it will be important that we listen to one another carefully, and that all the serious research and profound thinking that has already gone into the subject matter be carefully studied and processed by all who participate in our work. My delegation is looking forward to a next, and we hope decisive, phase in our ground work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. That concludes the speakers on our list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the delegation of Sweden.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): I have asked for the floor to thank those speakers who have conveyed their sense of loss to my delegation and I will certainly also convey their words to the Swedish Government and people and to the family of Olof Palme.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden. If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene, in accordance with the calendar of meetings for this week, an informal meeting to consider the question of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. In the light of the results of the informal meeting, the Conference will resume its plenary meeting to formalize the decision I hope it will have reached. During the informal meeting, I should also like to take up other organizational matters. I therefore now suspend the plenary meeting and shall convene an informal meeting in about five minutes' time. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.35 p.m. and reconvened at 12.45 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 344th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. I place before the Conference for decision Working Paper CD/WP.221, 1/ dated 26 February 1986, concerning the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for the duration of the 1986 session. The text is identical to that of the decision adopted at the 1985 session. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I understand that there is also a consensus on the appointment of the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Carlos Lechuga Hevia, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to congratulate Ambassador Lechuga Hevia on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. We wish him every success in this major task which the Conference has entrusted to him.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 March 1986, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

1/ "The Conference decides to re-establish, for the duration of its 1986 session, the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1986 session."