

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.351  
27 March 1986

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 27 March 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. C. Clerckx

(Belgium)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. N. KERROUM  
Mr. A. BELAID  
Mr. M. TEFIANI

Argentina: Mr. M. CAMPORA  
Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. R.A. ROWE  
Ms. M. LETTS

Belgium: Mr. C. CLERCKX  
Mr. P. NIEUWENHUYS

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. V. BOJILOV  
Mr. P. POPTCHEV  
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U TIN TUN  
U MYA THAN  
DAW AYE AYE MU

Canada: Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China: Mr. QIAN Jiadong  
Mr. HU Xiaodi  
Mr. SUO Kaiming  
Mr. SHA Yukang  
Ms. WANG Jiyun  
Mr. TAN Han  
Mr. LIU Zhongen  
Mr. LI Daozhang

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA  
Mrs. R.I. DIAGO

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. B. BEDNAR

Egypt:

Mr. M. BADR  
Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:

France:

Mr. J. JESSEL  
Mr. H. RENIE  
Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE  
Mr. W. KRUTZSCH  
Mr. J. DEMBSKI  
Mr. M. SCHNEIDER

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W. BOLEWSKI  
Mr. H. PETERS

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER  
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. A.S. GONZALES  
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO  
Mr. A.M. FACHIR  
Mr. A.M. AKBAR  
Mr. SARWORO SARBINI

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. N.K. KAMYAB  
Mr. A. SHAFII

Italy:

Mr. R. FRANCESCHI  
Mr. F. PIAGGESI  
Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI  
Mr. M. PAVESE

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI  
Mr. M. KONISHI  
Mr. K. KUDO  
Mr. M. SATO

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. AFANDE  
Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO  
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA

Mongolia:

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. O. HILALE  
Mr. M.S. B'NRYANE

Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. van SCHAIK  
Mr. J. RAMAKER  
Mr. R. MILGERS

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ELLA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Poland:

Mr. J. RYCHLAK  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. G.H. CHIRILA  
Mr. S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA  
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. R. EKEUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. S. ALEMYR  
Mr. O. DALMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. G.N. VASHADZE  
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN  
Mr. G.V. ANTSIFEROV  
Mr. N.P. SMIDOVICH

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE  
Mr. R.J.S. EDIS  
Mr. J.F. GORDON  
Mr. J.A. GRAINGER

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ  
Mr. T. BARTHELEMY  
Mr. R. LEVINE  
Mr. R. GOUCH  
Mr. J. GRANGER  
Mr. R. NELSON  
Mr. C. GOBRECHT

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT  
Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 351st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference today continues the consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical Weapons". Any representative wishing to do so, however, may, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, raise any matter related to the work of the Conference.

I wish to inform you that in addition to a long list of speakers we have a very busy programme of work for this plenary meeting. We have a request from a non-member State to participate in the Conference's plenary meetings and the work of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. That request was circulated to delegations in all official languages of the Conference last Monday. A draft decision has been circulated today by the secretariat under symbol CD/WP.229. We shall consider the draft decision at an informal meeting today and then, if we have a consensus, formalize the decision at the resumed plenary meeting.

I should also like to inform you that the Group of 21 has asked me to submit to the Conference for decision today the draft mandate contained in document CD/520/Rev.2 concerning the creation of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear Test Ban". As usual, we shall consider the draft decision at today's informal meeting before it is submitted to the Conference in plenary for a decision.

I should also like to inform you that I have the intention of proceeding in the following manner today. We shall begin by hearing the speakers on the list wishing to make statements on matters not related to the draft decision contained in document CD/520/Rev.2. Then we shall hear other representatives, after which we shall hold an informal meeting to consider the request for participation by Ireland and the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21 in document CD/520/Rev.2. Immediately after that we shall resume our plenary to continue consideration of that document and to hear any representatives wishing to do so make statements on the issue before I submit the document for decision by the Conference. After the draft has been considered, we shall hear representatives who wish to do so at that moment.

Finally, I shall invite the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to submit the Ad Hoc Group's Progress Report, which has been circulated under symbol CD/682, and the provisional summary of the fourth report of the Ad Hoc Group which has been distributed as document CD/681. May I also draw your attention to the recommendation contained in paragraph 14 of the Progress Report concerning the date for the Ad Hoc Group's next session, planned for 21 July to 1 August 1986 in Geneva. The Conference should take a decision on that recommendation at its plenary on Tuesday, 8 April. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group has also asked to submit to the Conference on that occasion the provisional summary of the fourth report contained in document CD/681, so that the Conference may take note of it.

(The President)

I have on my list of speakers the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba, Zaire, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, France, Iran and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was recently held in Moscow, and it laid down the overall guidelines for the development of the Soviet Union and the path to lead our society into the third millenium. It proclaimed as major tasks the strengthening of the country's social and economic development and the firm consolidation in international relations of the principles of peace and of broad co-operation among peoples.

The Congress adopted a new draft of the CPSU Programme, the Rules of the CPSU, the basic guidelines for the economic and social development of the USSR in 1986-1990 and up to the year 2000, as well as a number of resolutions, including the Resolution on the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee. The adoption of these documents was preceded by a businesslike, concerned and critical discussion of all aspects of life of our society and of party activity, a discussion which took place not only in the Congress but also outside it. More than 6 million comments containing proposals and additions were made to the CPSU draft programme. More than 2 million people expressed comments on the CPSU Rules. In our opinion, this is an example of genuine democracy, when policy, both internal and external, is openly discussed and the people's aspirations are translated into practical actions by the political leadership.

In the foreign policy sphere, the Congress's decisions included the confirmation of the Soviet Union's principled course of action on disarmament, the establishment of normal, healthy relations among all States. They include a set of proposals for the creation of a comprehensive system of international security, the convening of a world congress on economic security, the prevention of nuclear disaster, and the cessation of the arms race, an end towards which the entire existing machinery of negotiations should deploy its utmost efforts.

The Congress advanced a philosophy for the formation of a safe world in the nuclear and space age, and underpinned it with a platform of specific activities. The main thrust of the USSR's foreign policy in coming years will be purposeful and consistent activity to implement the programme set forth in the statement of 15 January for the elimination of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction and strengthen international security.

The work of the 27th Congress of the CPSU and its decisions aroused wide interest in the world, including here in the Conference on Disarmament. In response to the request of representatives of various States at the Conference, the Soviet delegation is distributing a pamphlet containing the basic documents of the 27th Congress of the CPSU.



Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): As I am taking the floor for the first time during the month in which you are presiding over the Conference, I would like to express my thanks to you, Ambassador Clerckx, for the work you have done in performing your responsible duties. At the same time, I wish to join other delegations in extending my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Butler, of Australia, for his persevering efforts to make progress in our Conference.

Today I wish to deal with items 1 and 5 of our agenda. In view of the present state of the Conference, I feel obliged to make a few comments of a more general nature.

A certain degree of encouragement prevailed when the Conference commenced its work this year. People were hoping that notably the statement issued at the Geneva Summit might have a favourable impact on all the international forums concerned with the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament. Many delegations spoke about this subject and drew inferences to be taken into account in the Conference.

The first part of the 1986 session of the Conference is coming to a close, with no tangible progress in sight. Even the negotiations to ban chemical weapons are, in the opinion of my delegation, not moving at the anticipated pace. Glossing over the real situation will certainly be no help to us. Let me add, though, that justified disappointment must not lead to resignation. No, we are not going to oblige those who are eager to carry on their arms build-up with as little disturbance as possible. This Conference cannot afford to give up its endeavours to attain concrete results slowing down the arms race. What we need most of all at this stage is perseverance.

The discussion of agenda item 1, a comprehensive test ban, is the most striking example of how all attempts have failed so far to make headway in matters of highest priority. The frequently quoted declarations of intent issued at the Geneva Summit, the relevant resolutions adopted with an overwhelming majority of votes at the latest session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union's positive commitment manifest in the unilateral cessation of tests and its extension, the urgent appeal of the signatories of the Delhi Declaration for a reciprocal moratorium, and the resolution calling on the United States Government to negotiate, passed by the United States House of Representatives in February this year, nourished the hope of progress. Intensive consultations took place, with many delegations participating. Still, the end result is negative.

The delegations of the socialist countries are not only demanding a fresh approach to all the issues in hand, but are also acting accordingly. They have responded to the President's plea and incessantly searched for practicable ways in the last few weeks to lead the Conference out of the impasse. Nobody can contest that. No one can dispute either that, because of the absolute urgency of ceasing all nuclear explosions, the mandate of the Conference, and the international obligations which some of the nuclear-weapon States have undertaken, it is as imperative as ever that negotiations be conducted on a comprehensive treaty. With a view to arriving at practical results, the socialist countries have spared no effort to meet the delegations

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

in question half-way. This is true both of matters of procedure and of elements of substance. In this connection, I wish to mention first of all the statement by Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko, who addressed, among other things, the verification issue. The socialist countries were guided by the principle of a fair give-and-take. The Group of 21, China and some Western delegations made similar efforts.

The most important goal to be achieved was the establishment of a committee permitting purposeful deliberations on all political, legal and scientific-technological problems to be resolved in the process of working out a test-ban treaty. Such a debate would, of course, have to include the discussion of each and every paper tabled at the Conference.

Much to our regret, the Western Group rejected all reasonable proposals and frustrated all constructive compromise. Indeed, it did not move a single inch away from its old draft mandate, which is lopsided and thus unacceptable to the large majority of delegations. Those are the facts.

It is the United States' attitude that has caused the present situation. Compared with last year, the United States delegation has added new links to the chain of conditions to be met until the Conference can engage in practical and useful work. This approach may have been prompted by fears that the "verification brake" might not work any more. To dispel any doubts about its true intentions, the United States carried out a new nuclear explosion last Saturday. It must be regarded as a serious setback in the sincere world-wide effort to make at least a small beginning towards containing the risk of a nuclear war. The chance offered by the USSR's unilateral suspension of nuclear explosions was let slip demonstratively and provocatively. The insistent appeals of States, such as those made by the signatories of the Delhi Declaration, of scientists, of members of the country's own parliament and of world public opinion have gone unheeded. There is no justification for that. In the United States, the term "arrogance of power" has been coined to describe a certain pattern of behaviour. In fact, it is not the nuclear-weapons test alone that has caused greatest concern among peoples recently. The reply we heard last Tuesday from the United States delegation speaks for itself. It, too, does not answer the simple question why the security of the United States would be compromised if it stopped nuclear testing as the Soviet Union has done. The only conceivable explanation is that the United States is still seeking military superiority through an unbridled arms race, contrary to what it undertook at the Geneva Summit. Whoever does that must bear the responsibility for a growing nuclear war risk.

Under the present circumstances, my delegation can see no other alternative for the Conference but to decide upon the establishment of a committee. The German Democratic Republic is prepared to accept the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21 and contained in document CD/520/Rev.2. I am empowered to state this also on behalf of the Group of Socialist Countries.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

A consensus on this mandate would equally open up new opportunities for the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts to do useful work, as their activities, whose continuation the socialist countries are advocating, are intimately linked to progress in drawing up a treaty on the complete cessation of all nuclear tests.

The Conference needs to work more expeditiously to formulate measures against an arms race in outer space. The time left to find solutions is dwindling away.

On several previous occasions my delegation has presented its views on the military, political and economic consequences which the militarization of outer space would have. What we are receiving daily in terms of news and false information has corroborated our view that the implementation of the Star Wars programme would entail an extremely dangerous destabilization of the entire international security pattern. The risk of a nuclear inferno would increase sharply. The life and destruction of mankind would be entrusted to computers making split-second decisions. Ambassador Meiszter elaborated on that aspect in his statement last Tuesday. International security can be ensured for all time by eliminating all the weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. The champions of SDI, in turn, are trying to impose upon the peoples of this world a future of permanent nuclear terror.

The so-called defensive systems are designed to function as elements of a nuclear first-strike capability. This is an indisputable fact. At the same time, the use of certain components in offensive strikes from outer space against terrestrial targets becomes a possibility. What is still officially denied here in the Conference is being shouted from the housetops in Washington.

Development, testing and deployment in space of attack weapons is synonymous with triggering an all-out arms race of unprecedented dimensions. Such an action would represent a virtually insuperable obstacle to any arms limitation and disarmament effort. "Arms mania" would swallow up huge resources and prevent the resolution of burning economic and social problems everywhere, most of all in developing countries, with the big corporations and banks affiliated to the military-industrial complex pocketing stupendous profits.

One does not have to indulge for years in the art of establishing definitions to comprehend that the deployment of attack weapons in outer space is not only the direct opposite of the precept to use space for peaceful purposes and mutually beneficial co-operation, but also a gross violation of valid international treaties. This fact should be acknowledged notably by the United States and those who have even signed agreements in which they undertake the obligation to support the Star Wars programme.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The agreement to terminate the arms race on Earth and prevent it from being carried into space, as reaffirmed at the Geneva Summit, must be translated into reality. The question as to what measures are needed to rule out an arms race in outer space has been answered already. The most comprehensive and best solution would be a treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space, and from space against the Earth, as first proposed by the Soviet Union in 1983.

Certain States are obviously not yet prepared for that. This is why my delegation supports the idea of a gradual approach. It welcomes Ambassador Issraelyan's proposal of 13 March 1986 that the Conference should work out an accord to ensure the immunity of space objects, including the obligation not to develop, test and deploy anti-satellite weapons and to eliminate existing ones. Every effort should be made in order to reach a quick understanding on that matter and to set up an appropriate committee.

My delegation wishes to underline that we need to formulate concrete objectives, since abstract and endless discussions about definitions and technical terms used in existing international instruments are bound to distract our attention from our actual job. It is certainly not the discovery of loopholes in treaties that is at issue but the identification of what should be done in a practical way to prevent an arms race in outer space. From this perspective, it appears to be a matter of course that present treaties may play a role in discussions and negotiations. It would definitely be no disadvantage if a number of existing rules were reaffirmed in an agreement on the immunity of space objects whose wording would have to be worked out. Many examples from international law could be cited in support of this opinion.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is well aware that success presupposes the solution of many specific issues. It is all the more necessary, therefore, that we do something about it now, without any further delay.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia.

Mr. LECHUGA HEVIA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Thank you Mr. President. The fact that this is your last day here as President of the Conference will not prevent me from congratulating you, as this is the first time we are taking the floor this month. We should also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Butler of Australia for his work last month.

We will refer today to the question of a nuclear-test ban, the importance of which makes it an issue to which great attention should always be paid. But today we will do so because of the urgency it has acquired as a result of the attitude taken by the United States in carrying out a nuclear test on the 22nd of this month; that is something which cannot be passed over in silence in such a forum as this.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

This new atomic explosion has provided a dramatic illustration of what everyone suspected but refused to believe, namely, that the United States Government not only refuses to negotiate on this fundamental aspect of disarmament but wishes to proclaim its refusal to the four corners of the Earth, as if to show that a so powerful a country does not need to heed the demands of world public opinion.

The nuclear-test-ban issue has the highest priority in the international community's list of concerns, and recently it also appeared to occupy an important place on the United States' agenda. In 1979, on 19 June to be precise, the United States delegation, referring to the tripartite negotiations which were then taking place, stated that "in the comprehensive test ban talks, the United States and its British and Soviet negotiating partners are persevering in their efforts to achieve agreement on a treaty which will prohibit all nuclear weapons tests in all environments, with an integrally related protocol prohibiting peaceful nuclear explosions."

In the following year, 1980, the States taking part in the negotiations submitted a report to the Committee on Disarmament, contained in document CD/130 of 30 July 1980, entitled "Tripartite Report to the Committee on Disarmament", in which they stated that they had made "considerable progress in negotiating the Treaty"; that the Treaty would prohibit "nuclear weapon tests in any environment"; that the Treaty would be accompanied by a "protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes"; that the parties would use "national technical means of verification at their disposal"; that in the sphere of co-operative seismic monitoring measures they had "agreed on provisions establishing an international exchange of seismic data"; that they had reached an agreement on on-site inspections; and that they were "determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion".

All this heavenly music, these commitments to the exertion of will and persistence to sign a treaty, abruptly disappeared when the United States left the negotiations and for a year remained silent about the promises made to the international community, which naïvely believed that it was on the eve of the elimination of nuclear tests.

In 1981, emerging from this kind of spiritual retreat, the United States delegation stated the following in the Committee on Disarmament on 13 August: "It will not have escaped the notice of members of the Committee that the United States delegation has been relatively silent during our 1981 session", adding that it considered this "to be an appropriate posture, given the fact that the review of United States arms control policy is still continuing". Naturally, the total silence of the United States delegation had not escaped anyone's notice, and since then we have all been waiting for the announcement that the review of arms control policy has been completed to see if it will then be possible to make progress in negotiations in the Conference which, as we all know, has for a long time been paralysed precisely because of the refusal of the United States and its allies to engage in a substantive discussion of the problems on our agenda.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

The Committee on Disarmament ended its third year of existence without having been able to set up a subsidiary body with a suitable mandate. In 1982, thanks to a display of flexibility on the part of the non-aligned and neutral countries and the group of socialist countries, a working group was set up with a limited mandate, and again nothing satisfactory was achieved. The head of the United States delegation was categorical in his statement of 9 February that year, when he said that "while a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance". This statement revealed the United States Government's objectives very clearly, but was most obscure as to the logic employed to refuse to negotiate on a nuclear-test ban.

In the following year, 1983, the non-aligned and neutral countries and the socialist countries once again displayed flexibility, and even though the mandate of the working group set up in the previous year had been exhausted they agreed once again to work with the limited mandate, and once again no progress was made.

We have recalled these facts because it is worth stressing which country basically bears the responsibility for the failure to negotiate over the past years, and now the clearest demonstration of this is the nuclear test carried out a few days ago in the State of Nevada.

The United States has unremittingly repeated that the question of verification is the major obstacle in the way of the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests. It does not matter that the rest of the world is convinced that with existing means, both national and international, this is a problem that has been resolved: it goes on repeating this argument. But we believe that with the information given here in the Conference by Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union it will be very difficult for anyone to entertain the least doubt. We confess that it came as a surprise to us to learn of the abundance of means in the United States to monitor explosions in the territory of the USSR and, in comparison, the limited means available to the USSR to ensure sufficient verification of what is happening in the United States. According to that information, the territory of the Soviet Union is surrounded by seismic stations, many of them in territories adjacent to the Soviet Union or near the frontiers of its Warsaw Pact allies. There are some 200 of them, and they are capable of determining precisely the place, time, depth and intensity of explosions. But what is most important for members of the Conference is to know that with only 20 seismic stations the USSR states that it is in a position to detect nuclear tests carried out outside its territory. We do not know how it will be possible to go on talking in this forum of the impossibility of verifying nuclear explosions. And we will not repeat the other information supplied showing that with the means already available to the United States they can verify any type or variant of explosion, because you all heard the statement by the head of the Soviet delegation.

(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

We will not refer to the question of this olympian disregard for public opinion because it is an inherent part of the present policy of the United States: we see it every day, and as far as disarmament is concerned it is displayed as much in the General Assembly as in this Conference. The aim is to achieve military superiority, negotiate from a position of strength, raise international tension as an instrument of achieving the targets of that policy. As long as this strategy continues, the Conference on Disarmament will have great difficulties in fulfilling the function for which it was created, although we are sure that the battle for peace and for disarmament will one day be won despite the obstacles which today appear insurmountable. Every day, in every country without exception, the demand is growing for an end to the irrational arms race, and this demand will become an irresistible force which will bar the way to those sectors which are fomenting it, however powerful they may be.

To conclude, it is also worth stressing the gap between words and deeds, if we recall what was said here on the occasion of the tragic death of the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme, a tireless fighter for peace and advocate of the suspension of nuclear testing. The distinguished Ambassador of Sweden, Mrs. Maj Britt Theorin, stated on that recent occasion that the best tribute that could be paid to the deceased leader was to translate into concrete acts his aspirations for a world free of the threat of nuclear arms. Following this latest nuclear explosion, that still remains the best tribute which could be paid to him and to the millions of people in all countries who share that desire and hope: to pass from words to deeds.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Zaire, Mr. Monshemvula.

Mr. MONSHEMVULA (Zaire) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all, on behalf of the Zaire delegation and myself, I should like to convey to you our sincere and warm congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference for the month of March. With your experience and your skills as a wise diplomat you have guided in an able and masterly way the work of the Conference during this month which is drawing to a close. This is a matter of particular satisfaction to my delegation in that at this Conference you represent Belgium, a country with which Zaire has long enjoyed excellent relations of co-operation and friendship. Belgium, which is a major crossroads in Europe, host to the European Communities and headquarters of NATO, and a country which occupies a strategic geopolitical position enhanced by the nuclear facilities on and in the immediate vicinity of its territory, has made a significant contribution to the work of this Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

I shall also take this opportunity to express my appreciation to your predecessor, His Excellency Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia, who presided with energy and dedication over the work of the Conference in the month of February. I should also like to congratulate Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and his deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, who exert every effort to place their abilities at the service of the Conference and thereby at the service of mankind as a whole.

I should also like to convey my profound sympathy to the delegation of Sweden and through it to the people of Sweden on the occasion of the sudden death of the outstanding Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Olof Palme, who devoted himself body and soul to the cause of disarmament, our reason for being here in this chamber. Since this is the first time that I am taking the floor since the opening of the Conference, I should also like to perform the pleasant duty of extending a very warm welcome to the new Ambassadors who have joined us in our work here, namely the representatives of Algeria, Burma, India, Italy, Kenya, Morocco and Peru.

This is the International Year of Peace, and therefore the members of the Conference on Disarmament should redouble their efforts for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. For several years, such vitally important priority issues as a nuclear-test ban, the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, and the prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, have occupied a prominent place on the Conference's agenda, but it has not been possible to reach agreement on the manner in which to tackle them and deal with them in depth. The arms race has only grown stronger through the deployment of nuclear weapons in some parts of the world. Mankind is threatened by a real danger of seeing the arms race spread to space. Every day there are more open threats, pressures and military interventions against independent States, and violations of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which seriously threaten international peace and security. It is worth recalling that it is nuclear weapons which pose the most serious threat to mankind and survival of civilization, and that consequently it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to eliminate the risk of a war involving nuclear weapons.

As you know, the proliferation of nuclear weapons generates world military expenditures which are now some 25 times higher than the total amount available for development assistance, every minute, one and a half million dollars are spent for military purposes, every human being is sitting on a charge of three and a half tons of explosives, and the armaments in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers can destroy the planet Earth dozens of times. Another danger that has not been sufficiently emphasized is the potential annihilation of mankind by an accident leading to an explosion as a result of continuing endlessly to keep these terrifying weapons on Earth. We believe that nuclear testing should be ended. By continuing nuclear tests and stockpiling nuclear weapons, the danger increases of their spreading throughout the world through sales to non-nuclear-weapon countries, which would be a violation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.



(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

My delegation considers a nuclear-test ban to be the most important of all disarmament issues, as it is the first essential step for cutting back such weapons until they are completely eliminated. My delegation presses for the creation of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1 with a negotiating mandate. It is to be regretted that since its creation in 1979 the Committee, later the Conference, on Disarmament has been unable to conclude an agreement on any of the items on its agenda.

In resolution 40/152 A on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, the General Assembly recalls that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It goes on to request the Conference on Disarmament to consider, inter alia, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

A problem which has given rise to differences of view is that of verification, and yet the United Nations General Assembly remains convinced that existing means of verification are sufficient to ensure compliance with a nuclear test-ban agreement. Last year the Zairian delegation took part in the Workshop organized by the Norwegian Government in Oslo from 4 to 7 June. The programme of work of the Workshop included a demonstration at the NORSAR data processing centre, which is a fully equipped station and one of the biggest seismological laboratories in the world. The lesson that can be learned from the demonstrations and papers presented at the Workshop is that considerable technical progress has been made in recent years in the field of seismological verification of a nuclear test-ban. Furthermore, the conclusion has been drawn that it is essential to set up a world seismic network as proposed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Zaire delegation is in favour of the setting up of a world seismic monitoring and verification system.

We welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has unilaterally discontinued all nuclear explosions and has extended its moratorium to this day, which is fully in keeping with the provisions of United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/80 A. We therefore invite the other Powers which are depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to abide strictly by their commitments to seek to bring about at an early date and for all time the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons. All the other nuclear Powers should likewise follow the example of the Soviet Union and observe a moratorium on nuclear tests.

We welcomed the summit meeting last November between the President of the United States of America, Mr. Ronald Reagan, and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev. The Joint United States - Soviet Statement of 21 November 1985 at the end of the summit contains a solemn undertaking by the Governments of the two nuclear super-Powers to engage in bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space weapons as a whole. Whatever major differences may remain on several key issues, we note with satisfaction that the two parties will not seek to achieve military superiority and agreed, among other things, on some no less important points

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

such as 50 per cent reductions, appropriately applied, in the nuclear arms of the two parties and the idea of an interim agreement on medium-range missiles. They agreed that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Finally, the two parties also reaffirmed that they were in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles.

In addition, document CD/649, which has been circulated as an official document of the Conference and consists of the statement by Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of CPSU, on 15 January, concerning a programme for nuclear disarmament within 15 years, in other words a programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, deserves thorough reflection and serious consideration on the part of the members of our Conference.

Still on the question of bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers, the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 40/152 B states in its preamble that it is firmly convinced that any early agreement in these negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments, would be of crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security. It calls upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking the attainment of their agreed objective in the negotiations, in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament. In addition, it urges the Governments of the two States to work actively towards the achievement of that objective in order to enable the negotiations to make substantial progress.

My delegation is fully alive to the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to find mutually acceptable solutions to disarmament problems. However, efforts made at the bilateral level should, naturally, only complement the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the sole appropriate multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

The complete and effective prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction are one of the most pressing of disarmament issues. The Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 already prohibits the use of asphyxiating, toxic or similar gases. Nevertheless, it has loopholes because it is primarily the use of the gases mentioned in the Protocol which is prohibited, and not their manufacture, possession or sale. Today that Protocol is being violated by the use of chemical weapons in wars which usually take place in third world countries. Sanctions cannot be taken with regard to those that violate the Protocol because the text is silent on this point. It is therefore imperative to conclude a convention in this field which would supplement the obligations undertaken under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925. The progress made in chemistry makes it possible to distinguish between lethal agents and non-lethal agents whose neutralizing effects have often been sought after and used in combat. Chemical agents have a great potential for rapidly changing

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

their state as soon as they are used in one environment or another. Consequently, all possible reactions cannot be foreseen. The family of highly dangerous chemicals includes mustard gas and hemo-toxic gas which, in high doses, lead to a sudden loss of consciousness then rapid death by respiratory failure. It is well known that such weapons have been tested in the territories of developing countries, wreaking havoc among innocent populations as well as the flora and fauna of those countries.

Of all the items included in the Conference's agenda, the item on chemical weapons remains the only one on which in-depth work has been carried out and has reached an advanced stage. The discussions focused inter alia on various solutions concerning the manufacture of chemicals for permitted purposes, the manufacture on a laboratory scale of amounts of supertoxic lethal chemicals, the identification of production facilities which would be subjected to various measures under the convention to be concluded, the question of challenge verification, and others. It has been universally recognized that under the present circumstances, with the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq, chemical disarmament has become a matter of exceptional urgency and seriousness. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is progressing well, and my delegation hopes that members of the Conference will deploy their best efforts to speed up the negotiations on the drafting of a chemical weapon convention, which could be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-third session, as recommended in General Assembly resolution 40/92 A.

The Zairian delegation praises the efforts made in various continents to ensure security and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 concerns the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America by creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the continent. In the Balkans, the Heads of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania and the People's Republic of Bulgaria have just issued a declaration-appeal on the Balkans as a zone free not only of nuclear weapons but also of chemical weapons. On 6 August 1985 the Treaty on the South Pacific Denuclearized Zone was opened for signature at Rarotonga, in the Cook Islands, and has already been signed by eight Heads of Government. In Africa, despite a large number of resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly calling for the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, nothing is being done to prevent South Africa from threatening the continent with its nuclear capability. Zaire appeals to the members of the Conference to implement the provisions of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 40/89 A and B on this question.

Finally, my delegation supports all proposals made in the Conference by the Group of 21. It remains convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body, will be able to deliver mankind from the scourge of war for the benefit of present and future generations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Zaire for his statement and for the very kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): One can look at our work on a convention banning chemical weapons in one of two ways. On the one hand, one can cast an admiring glance at the tremendous amount of relevant materials already accumulated, at the multitude of useful concepts that have been evolved and been continuously rendered more precise, at the agreed structure of the future convention and the considerable number of articles on which agreement in principle has been reached or is in progress, and even at some paragraphs that have been negotiated more or less in their definitive form, untarnished by brackets, as fully carved stones that are ready to go into, and to adorn, the final edifice. While nobody would wish to belittle all these achievements, this view would be one of self-complacency.

The other look would focus on the tasks yet unaccomplished. This glass is half full, but it is at the same time half empty. Concentrating on the outstanding issues, sizing them up in their political significance and collecting the negotiating strength and political determination to tackle them, is the more responsible approach of negotiators, who in any event are not going to be measured by the aesthetic beauty of the half-finished product, but only by their success in bringing about a complete and operational convention.

Speaking in the First Committee at the fortieth session of the General Assembly, on 6 November 1985, my delegation attempted to direct the attention of all delegations to the major problem areas on which this year's negotiating effort would thus have to concentrate: the verification of non-production, and on-challenge verification. No substantial progress has been achieved in these two major focal areas; worse, a true negotiating effort has not been deployed on either of them, and delegations -- even at the relatively successful and constructive rump session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in January of this year -- have continued to indulge in a mere exchange of philosophical views.

Is there hope that this will change, that 1986 will bring us a breakthrough on the really significant political issues of the convention? Two events have occurred since my delegation voiced its concerns in this respect during the General Assembly's session last year, and both have been commented upon frequently and positively during the present spring session. On 21 November 1985, President Reagan and General-Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed their commitment to a chemical weapons ban and agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. There are 40 parties negotiating this international convention, but the significance of this firm undertaking by the two major military Powers can hardly be overestimated. General-Secretary Gorbachev's declaration of 15 January 1986, again, shows a welcome preoccupation with the elimination of chemical weapons. Both the joint statement of the November summit and General-Secretary Gorbachev's utterances on chemical weapons have largely contributed to the tangible spirit of optimism and the constructive atmosphere that have prevailed during this session of the Conference on the subject of chemical weapons. It is therefore particularly important to probe the extent and precise meaning of these two major documents under the auspices of the two overriding negotiating tasks of which I have spoken and on which the success of this annual session hinges.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

General-Secretary Gorbachev's statement in part IV of his declaration of 15 January is equally important for what it spells out, and because of the points he passes over in silence. The sense of urgency which the author conveys in speaking of banning chemical weapons and his appeal to all participants in the negotiations to take "a fresh look at things" are praiseworthy. It is equally gratifying that the Soviet statement -- here as in other areas -- seems to take a constructive and unencumbered view of the necessity for effective and appropriate international verification measures. In addition, the statement offers a number of new perspectives, both as regards the declaration of location of current production facilities and the preparedness to move forcefully on the future elimination of production facilities for, and stockpiles of, chemical weapons. In these areas the Soviet policy, as now announced, coincides with universally held views in the negotiations and can be put to good use in widening the existing consensus and intensifying the work on particular treaty language.

It appears that the "fresh look at things" has also been translated by the Soviet delegation, since the commencement of our annual session, into an open and constructive attitude on a number of issues, leading one to the hypothesis that in its search for means to accelerate the negotiations the Soviet delegation would now be willing to provide a greater amount of flexibility on controversial issues than has been the case in the past.

If that is what is meant by the Soviet call for a "fresh look", it would be all for the better. In a sense, the Soviet statement seems to have captured in its formulation the very essence of multilateral negotiating, for it is a necessary prerequisite for further progress in such negotiations that all participants, without exception, continuously reassess their previous positions, as evidenced in earlier Conference documents, and look anew to common objectives and the possibility of adjusting their previous stance to mutually acceptable positions, striking a balance between one's perceived national security needs and the security requirements of the international community at large.

Yet, behind this outwardly constructive attitude a number of serious questions emerge. Even though my delegation -- and, I am confident, all other delegations in this room -- are prepared to give the Soviet delegation the benefit of the doubt, it must be said that, so far, most of the principles enunciated in the Soviet statement of 15 January have not been translated into concrete negotiating positions, and that it has not become evident where possible flexible departures from earlier views could become a feature of the negotiating process. No doubt, a statement such as that of 15 January, with its enormous width and broad coverage of all disarmament problems, once agreed upon at high level, needs a certain time to be fleshed out and detailed at the working level. This is a natural ingredient of any bureaucratic process in a negotiating environment. However, more than two months have passed since the announcement of the Soviet proposals and, in all honesty, the Conference has not seen on any of the particular issues what the detailed manifestations of the new policy are going to be. In the view of my delegation, the time has therefore come to pose to the Soviet delegation a number of questions in order to satisfy the legitimate need of other delegations to know where the negotiations are heading.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The question is whether we will have the full benefit of a new constructive attitude or whether, conceivably, only a minimalist version will be offered to us and at the working level an attempt is made to nibble away at the more positive and constructive tone employed at the highest level of political authority.

It is in a spirit of earnest endeavour, seeking to explore the concrete negotiating mode of one of the major participants in our negotiations, that I have, on behalf of my delegation, the following questions to ask:

(1) The very problem areas that are of perhaps crucial significance for the ultimate success of our negotiations, control of future non-production, and the complex issues of fact-finding and verification in cases where a suspicion of a breach of treaty has been voiced, are not explicitly addressed by the Soviet Union in its statement. Can one nevertheless assume that its call for "a fresh look at things" and the preparedness to agree to measures of strict control, including international on-site inspections would also pertain to these important subjects?

(2) Is the Soviet Union prepared, in the spirit of its statement of 15 January to modify its present position, as expressed in document CD/636, that on-challenge on-site inspections should be carried out only with the consent of a State party in regard to which the request is made? What is the interpretation to be attached to the remarks of Ambassador Issraelyan of 22 January before the Ad Hoc Working Group on article IX of the Convention that the decision to accept an on-site inspection should not be of an "entirely discretionary nature"?

(3) In the light of this latter statement, what would be the interpretation the Soviet Union now attaches to "strict control, including international on-site inspection" in such on-challenge cases? Will the Soviet Union now be prepared to engage in negotiations on a meaningful fact-finding system designed to clarify and resolve any situation which gives rise to suspicions about actions in breach of obligations under the future Convention?

(4) Since the Soviet Union advocates, among possible interim steps, a prohibition to transfer chemical weapons or to deploy them elsewhere, and since the Soviet Union affirms that it already strictly abides by such principles, would this mean that there are at present no chemical weapons whatsoever on the territories of other States, specifically in the Warsaw Treaty area, that have been transferred to these States by the Soviet Union, or are produced or deployed under Soviet jurisdiction or control?

(5) Is it correct to assume from the readiness, as announced in the statement, to declare the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons, that presently existing military storage sites of such weapons are not going to be communicated? And if so, how can it be reliably ascertained that all existing stocks be fully declared at the inception of the validity of the Convention and be fully subjected to destruction procedures?

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

(6) In the spirit of its readiness to eliminate the industrial base for the production of chemical weapons, will the Soviet Union agree to subject the industrial manufacture of key precursors which are suitable for the production of chemical weapons to mandatory systematic international verification, designed to prevent effectively the circumvention of the future Convention on the one hand, but not hindering the economic and technological activities of the contracting parties in the field of peaceful chemical activities?

(7) Can one conclude from the statement of 15 January and its emphasis on eliminating the industrial base of weapons production, that the Soviet Union is now prepared to abandon an earlier approach by which the civilian production of super-toxic lethal substances for permitted purposes, as needed in any modern industrial society, would be limited to only one small-scale facility under international supervision?

I am certain that other delegations share the interest of mine in a reply to these important questions and may eventually have questions of their own. It would thus be useful for all participants in the negotiations to receive a reply to these queries, both in the plenary of this Conference and in the relevant negotiation committee. May I conclude by thanking the Soviet delegation in advance for giving attention to the various questions I have formulated.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, I have not had an opportunity until today to congratulate you formally on your Presidency for the month of March. I would like to express the appreciation of my delegation for your distinguished and valuable leadership; I take this opportunity to commend also, in his absence, the work of your predecessor, Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia.

I have asked for the floor today in my capacity as Co-ordinator of the Western Group on Chemical Weapons in order to make a statement on their behalf, concerning the report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

The delegations of the Western Group have noted with great concern the report dated 6 March 1986 of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, where it is unanimously concluded that "on many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces".

As members of this single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum engaged in the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, including that of use, we strongly condemn the said use of chemical weapons in contravention of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, and we strongly support the statement made in this connection by the President of the Security Council on 20 March 1986.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

On this occasion, we believe that the Conference on Disarmament should make further and increased efforts for the successful conclusion of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons at the earliest opportunity.

In the meantime, we as members of this forum, are deeply concerned about the extended conflict between Iran and Iraq, and also stress the urgent need for both countries to work strenuously for an early peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Japan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): I take the floor briefly to draw your attention to the fact that this morning invitations for participation in our Workshop on aspects of verification of non-production of chemical weapons, have been distributed to all delegations of the Conference on Disarmament, to observer-delegations taking part in the chemical weapons negotiations as well as to the secretariat. As I announced in my statement of 13 March, the Workshop will take place on 4, 5 and 6 June next. I do hope, Mr. President, that we can welcome all those invited at the official opening on 4 June. As you will see in the invitation, we would very much appreciate it if delegations could let us know by 18 April whether they intend to participate in the Workshop and, if so, who will attend.

We have just heard the statement by Ambassador Imai on behalf of the Western Group about the report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. My delegation associates itself with his statement. I already referred to this matter in my statement of 13 March.

In a press statement issued on 19 March by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, great concern was expressed at the findings of the experts' report. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Iraq is a party to this Protocol and thus acts in flagrant violation of this important part of international law. The Netherlands Government remains convinced that every effort should be made to work out a global treaty that will completely ban chemical weapons, as the only effective long-term solution to the problem.

Mr. JESSEL (France) (translated from French): As I am taking the floor at this last meeting in the month of March and have not yet had the opportunity to congratulate you so far on the manner in which you have presided over our work, I should like to thank you for the wisdom, authority and professionalism with which you have guided our activities. In this statement I wish to refer to two points. Firstly, on behalf of the Western Group, of which I am the Co-ordinator for the month of March, I wish to make a brief statement concerning the enlargement of the Conference. At



(Mr. Jessel, France)

our previous session, the Conference reaffirmed its decision to enlarge its membership by four States at most, and agreed on the manner in which those States should be chosen. The report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly at its fortieth session, the terms of which I have just recalled, also adds that the Conference will intensify its consultations in order to take a positive decision at its next annual session.

Pursuant to these arrangements agreed upon last year by the Conference, the Western Group has proceeded to nominate its candidate and it is therefore my responsibility and pleasure to announce that that candidate is Norway.

Naturally, the Western Group hopes that a Norwegian delegation will be able to join the States members of the Conference as rapidly as possible. We have often had the opportunity to appreciate the quality of the contributions made by Norway as an observer State, we are therefore sure that with Norway we will be acquiring a new member which is both dynamic and competent.

The decision to enlarge the membership is a decision common to the Conference as a whole. The Western Group hopes that the Group which has not yet reached a decision can do so shortly, so that the enlargement procedure can be carried out successfully and if difficulties arise they may be smoothed out in a spirit of realism and reconciliation, so that our Conference can attain the objective it has set itself with regard to this matter of its enlargement.

Secondly, the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, has just given the view of the Western Group as a whole concerning the report of the fact-finding mission sent to Iran by the United Nations Secretary-General. I should merely like to add a few comments as the representative of a depositary State of the 1925 Convention. As you know, on 21 March, the Security Council, having studied the report of the mission of experts, adopted a unanimous declaration. Thus, according to that report, the international community has noted that the Iraqi forces have repeatedly and again quite recently used chemical weapons against the Iranian forces. The depositary country of the 1925 Geneva Protocol cannot but express its profound concern at these facts and condemn them quite categorically.

Since it was signed, more than 60 years ago, the Geneva Protocol has been one of the few instruments of international law that have been very widely respected in the alas numerous conflicts during the period, and it has enabled mankind to be spared particularly awful suffering. Any violation of this instrument is therefore a backward step whose consequences are as dangerous as they are unforeseeable. Everything must be done to prevent such a retreat. Respect for the Geneva Protocol must remain one of the foundations of relations among States when they have broken off all peaceful relations, and that is why the French Government has always stated that the Geneva Protocol must remain in force and must be strictly respected.

The statement of the President of the Security Council also condemned the continuation of a murderous conflict which might spread to other States in the region; my Government wishes to renew today, most pressingly, the appeal contained in that statement for the settlement of the conflict by negotiations to be rapidly begun between the belligerent States.

(Mr. Jessel, France)

Finally, the French Government draws one conclusion from this situation for our work: it strongly hopes that the negotiations under way in our Conference on a convention for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for organizing the destruction of stocks and the irreversible elimination of production facilities should be speeded up.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of France for his statement and the kind words addressed to the President. We have exhausted the list of speakers who wished to make statements on items other than agenda item 1. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this point? If not, I now give the floor to the representative of Iran, Ambassador Kamyab, to introduce document CD/520/Rev.2.

Mr. KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am taking the floor in order to introduce document CD/520/Rev.2 on behalf of the Group of 21. I do believe there is no need to stress once again the fundamental importance of the question of a nuclear-test ban and the great responsibility of the Conference in this matter. It is a topic to which this Conference has devoted its attention for many years and one for which the international community has been calling for several decades. Today once again, the Group of 21 submits for decision by the Conference a draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. I would like to express the hope that we can reach consensus on this document.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Iran for his statement. I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and, in accordance with the practice followed by the Conference, convene an informal meeting to consider the request from Ireland and the draft mandate contained in document CD/520/Rev.2 submitted by the Group of 21. In the light of the results of the informal meeting we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to continue the consideration of our draft decisions and hear any representatives wishing to do so make statements on the subject. I now suspend the plenary meeting and shall convene an informal meeting of the Conference in about three minutes' time. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.25 p.m. and reconvened at 12.45 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 351st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

Following our exchange of views at our informal meeting, we must take some decisions on two questions: the request by Ireland to participate in the work of the plenary and of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 4, and document CD/520/Rev.2, submitted by the Group of 21, concerning a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1.

(The President)

I now submit to the Conference for decision working paper CD/WP/229 1/ concerning the request by Ireland. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would draw your attention to document CD/520/Rev.2, submitted by the Group of 21. I have no speakers on my list to speak before the Conference takes a decision on document CD/520/Rev.2. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): The Group of Socialist Countries has for many years been pressing for an international treaty on the complete cessation of all nuclear-weapons tests. It regards its conclusion as the first but crucial step along the way to terminating the nuclear arms race and initiating disarmament. The Soviet Union has launched a far-reaching initiative to promote understanding, particularly with its unilateral moratorium and the proposals in the programme presented on 15 January 1986. To date, the response of the other side has been negative. What is more, it has continued nuclear testing. It is all the more urgent, therefore, that the Conference should at last start work on a treaty. In order for this to be possible, a committee is needed. The draft mandate contained in CD/520/Rev.2 is best suited to this purpose. That is why the Group of Socialist Countries supports it and appeals to all other delegations to join in a consensus.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor before the Conference reaches a decision on document CD/520/Rev.2? If not, I now submit to the Conference for decision document CD/520/Rev.2, submitted by the Group of 21 and entitled "Draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban". Are there any objections to this draft decision? I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Mr. Rowe.

Mr. ROWE (Australia): In my capacity as Co-ordinator of a group of Western delegations for agenda item 1 I have to state that there is no consensus for the mandate contained in document CD/520/Rev.2.

In the view of a group of Western countries, the consultations which have been in train to try to establish common ground are by no means exhausted. It remains our view that efforts to achieve a consensus should be continued.

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1/ "In response to the request of Ireland (CD/683) and in accordance with rules 33-35 of its rules of procedure, the Conference decides for the present to invite the representative of Ireland to participate during 1986 in the plenary meetings of the Conference and in the subsidiary body established under item 4 of its agenda."

(Mr. Rowe, Australia)

For this reason, the Western co-sponsors will not be putting to a decision their draft mandate in document CD/521. We shall continue the search for agreement on a formula that will allow the Conference to undertake practical work on the nuclear test ban issue on our agenda. These efforts could include the discussion of possible programmes of work. In this connection I note that a group of Western countries has submitted a draft programme of work in document CD/621.

We believe that a considerable amount of useful work can be accomplished and we remain ready to discuss this. We strongly urge others to join us in seeking that agreement.

I wish to stress that the group of Western countries on whose behalf I am speaking want to undertake serious work on this item at our current session. As a further indication of our seriousness, I note that Western delegations tabled last year further working papers to contribute to the substantive consideration of this subject.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): After hearing the statement which has just been made, I must note that at present there is no consensus on the draft contained in document CD/520/Rev.2. I give the floor to the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Once again I deplore the negative attitude not of a group of delegations but of an extremely small group, one or two delegations, which have made it impossible for us this year to adopt a suitable mandate for an ad hoc committee on the item which has the top priority on our agenda, item 1. The distinguished representative of Australia has all my sympathy, and frankly I should not wish to be in his place on such an occasion. I am aware of the efforts made by the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, both here and in the General Assembly to reach an agreement. I think that his delegation is also aware of the efforts made by the Mexican delegation to the same end. With regard to this question that the time is not right, that the time can be used usefully, etc., I would recommend that the distinguished representatives should study the records of our sessions last year and the year before, where they will find a virtual repetition of what we have heard today, in particular at our 301st plenary meeting last year. Thus, in the face of this permanent and repeated refusal and the rejection of all efforts of good will to find a mandate which could be acceptable to all, there is no other course for you, Mr. President, than to do what your predecessor did last year and also the year before, here in the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran): On behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to express disappointment at the position taken by the group of Western countries which, once again, is to prevent the adoption of a mandate which would make it possible to begin negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It is regrettable that this single disarmament negotiating body cannot take up in a practical and serious manner an issue of

(Mr. Kamyab, Islamic Republic of Iran)

such enormous importance which has the highest priority in the disarmament sphere, as we all know. Nevertheless, the Group of 21 wishes to express once again its intention not to relax its efforts to find a suitable solution for the commencement, as rapidly as possible, of a negotiating process on agenda item 1, and it will continue to display flexibility in attaining that solution. We continue to hope that the delegations which have been unable to join in a consensus for drafting a suitable mandate will respond positively to the wishes of the majority of representatives at the Conference and to the demands of the international community.

Mr. PROKOFIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose, as Co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist Countries on agenda item 1, has already stated the Group's position on the draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban submitted in document CD/520/Rev.2. The delegation of the Soviet Union fully shares everything that Ambassador Rose had to say on this subject.

The position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the question of a nuclear test ban, which has today come to occupy the centre of attention in world politics, is well known and remains unchanged. It has repeatedly been set forth both at the highest level and in particular quite recently in the statement by the Soviet delegation at the plenary meeting of the Conference on 24 March. The Soviet Union consistently advocates resolving as rapidly as possible the question of discontinuing and prohibiting nuclear weapon tests. We are convinced that in the present circumstances major efforts must be directed towards the cessation of all nuclear explosions. We have already called for the immediate start of multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on all aspects of this problem, including suitable verification measures. Because it is concerned to prohibit nuclear weapon testing as rapidly as possible, the USSR is prepared to support the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21 in document CD/520/Rev.2. Since the United States and its partners in the North Atlantic Alliance are once again blocking constructive work by the Conference on Disarmament on this exceptionally important item, they must resume full responsibility for the peoples of the entire world who are calling for an end to nuclear weapon tests.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this point? If not, I shall now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Mr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the provisional summary of the fourth report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts distributed under symbol CD/681 and the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group contained in document CD/682.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events): I appreciate this opportunity to report on the results of the recent work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Group met during the last two weeks, from 10 to 21 March, and experts and representatives from 24 countries attended the session.

I would like today to introduce two documents, CD/681, containing a provisional summary of the report on the Group's technical test, and CD/682, containing a progress report on our latest session.

During its two weeks' session the Group discussed a draft of a detailed report on the test, prepared by our scientific secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal. The Group had more meetings during this session than I think during any session before, trying to accommodate and evaluate all results obtained at a large number of facilities around the world. We greatly appreciate the eminent services provided by the secretariat throughout the session. During our meeting, provisional agreement on substantial parts of this detailed report was reached. Due to considerable redrafting, which in part was due to requirements to limit the size of the report, it was, for practical reasons, not possible to finish the considerations of the detailed report and its technical appendices at this meeting.

However, the Group reached consensus on a provisional summary of the report, which is presented to the Conference in document CD/681. This report summarizes in eight pages the purposes of the technical test (GSETT), the results obtained and the conclusions we have drawn. In my view this summary contains a comprehensive review of what was achieved during the technical test conducted in 1984.

In earlier interventions on 4 April and 23 July last year I presented results from this test, a test in which 36 countries on all continents contributed data from 76 stations in all. Almost 5,000 messages containing more than 150,000 reported parameters were transmitted over the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization. Data were exchanged between the stations and the experimental international data centres operated in three countries.

Today I will present the overall conclusions from the test on which the Group has reached agreement: "Overall, the GSETT proved very successful, as the test has provided a vast amount of experience, previously unavailable, on many aspects of practical operation of a global seismic data exchange system. The GSETT demonstrated that the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization in many parts of the world ensures in general an operative and undistorted transmission of Level I seismic data for the proposed international system for exchange of such data. The GSETT showed that most of the procedures developed by the Group to collect, exchange, compile and analyse seismic Level I data worked satisfactorily in practice. However, the Technical Test also showed that in some areas further developments are necessary." With this I leave the provisional summary report of what I regard to be a successful international undertaking.

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group  
of Scientific Experts)

In its progress report, contained in document CD/682, the Group concludes that provisional agreement was reached on substantial portions of the detailed report and that this report should be submitted to the Conference on Disarmament following the Group's next meeting. The Group discussed plans for its further work and agreed "to recommend that it define the emphasis of its future work at its next session. The work would draw upon its previous results and experiences, taking into account all achievements of seismology, for the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system". As to the relation of the Group's work to developments outside the Group, different views were expressed and these are reflected in the progress report.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 21 July to 1 August 1986, in Geneva. This concludes my brief introduction of the two reports of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, the provisional summary of the report on the technical test (CD/681) and the progress report (CD/682), and I will try to answer any questions that distinguished members of the Conference might have.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for introducing those reports. The Conference will return to this subject at its plenary meeting on Tuesday, 8 April.

At my request, the secretariat has today circulated a timetable of meetings of the Conference and of its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was drawn up in consultation with the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies and as usual is purely indicative and may be amended as necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): As my Presidency for the month of March comes to an end, I wish to convey to the Conference my gratitude for the confidence and understanding shown me throughout my term as President. I thank the delegations which have made the effort to introduce new initiatives that would advance our work. This has evidently benefited the Conference. I am likewise grateful to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, for their tireless work and their skill in getting things going, as well as the effectiveness of the infrastructure they have provided at all times and the flawless functioning of the secretariat services during the month of March. The wise and discreet advice of the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General have been most valuable to me in performing my duties.

Throughout the month of March our Conference has been able to continue its work without major obstacles in three of the five areas it had set itself: chemical weapons, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. This must be a matter of satisfaction. In particular, the negotiations on the complete elimination of chemical weapons

(The President)

are of capital importance and we wish to inform the Conference with satisfaction that work in this field is progressing in an encouraging manner and without obstacles and with, as it seems in the month of March, a general desire to reach a successful conclusion.

On the other hand, it must be noted that the essential or primary aspect, the one which Governments and public opinion regard as the raison d'être of our Conference and the goal it has set itself, namely nuclear weapons, and, along with the passing of the years and the advances in technology, the additional concern to mankind, namely the militarization of space, have not so far been dealt with by the Conference at all, despite all the efforts made. This is something which must be regretted. In the course of the consultations and the efforts he has made, the President has been able to measure the degree to which the Conference is deadlocked on this subject. It is quite clear that the Conference is now deeply divided on the conception and the very nature of its work, of what it can and should obtain at present in these areas which are both vital for the strategies and security of States and fatal if they are not properly mastered. Our Conference's mission is to undertake as rapidly as possible negotiations, in particular to eliminate the nuclear arms race, to stop nuclear testing, to prevent nuclear war, to achieve nuclear disarmament and to prevent an arms race in space.

A number of States quite legitimately consider that the circumstances are not ripe at present to begin or even to envisage for the time being such negotiations, however legitimate they in their turn may be. Consequently, there are countries which refuse to accept any measure or any decision whatsoever -- even one relating simply to infrastructure, such as the setting-up of a working body -- which might in any way reflect a trend that cannot be reconciled with this basic conviction. This state of affairs has proved irreducible and unsurmountable. The Conference must at present recognize this state of affairs and draw the consequences unless it wishes to be drawn into a Byzantine sterility concerning the subsidiary bodies to be set up, their mandates, their guidelines and work programmes, at the expense of its fundamental work.

The obvious facts have to be faced that now, if we wish to work usefully, carry out something specific on the paramount issues of nuclear disarmament and outer space, we must try to find the common denominator, and at present that can only be the lowest one possible: in other words, something which in no way prejudices the beliefs and positions of any side. It is a choice that must be made.

At the close of my Presidency, I wish to express the hope that the Conference will decide to make that choice under my successor as President, the representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

The Conference may congratulate itself on calling to the Presidency now, as it did seven years ago, Ambassador de Souza e Silva, whose wisdom, experience and thorough knowledge of disarmament affairs will be particularly beneficial to it. I wish Ambassador de Souza e Silva a fruitful and effective presidency for the greatest good of our Conference, and to attain the objectives we have set ourselves, in the form of measured but steady progress in our work.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday, 1 April, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.