

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 8 April 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. C.A. de Souza e Silva (Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. N. KERROUM
Mr. A. BELAID

Argentina: Mr. M. CAMPORA

Australia: Mr. R. BUTLER
Mr. R.A. ROWE
Ms. M. LETTS

Belgium: Mr. C. CLERCKX

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S.M. THOMPSON FLORES
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE
Mr. F.J. de CARVALHO LOPES

Bulgaria: Mr. V. BOJILOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U TIN TUN
U MYA THAN
DAW AYE AYE MU
U HLA MYINT

Canada: Mr. J.A. BEESLEY
Mr. R.J. ROCHON

China: Mr. QIAN Jiadong
Mr. HU Xiaodi
Mr. SHA Zukang
Ms. WANG Zhiyun
Mr. TAN Han
Mr. LIU Zhongen
Mr. LI Daozhang
Mr. YANG Mingliang
Mr. SOU Keiming

Cuba: Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. M. BADR
Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia: Mr. N. KEBRET

France: Mr. G. MONTASSIER
Mr. H. RENIE

<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. H. ROSE Mr. W. KRUTZSCH Mr. J. DEMBSKI
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. W. BOLEWSKI Mr. W.N. GERMANN
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. D. MEIZSTER Mr. F. GAJDA Mr. T. TOTH
<u>India:</u>	Mr. A.S. GONSALVES Mr. S. KANT SHARMA
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO Mr. A.M. AKBAR
<u>Islamic Republic of Iran:</u>	Mr. A. SHAFII
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. R. FRANCESCHI Mr. F. PIAGGESI Mr. M. PAVESE Mr. E. SIVIERO Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI Mr. R. DI CARLO
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. R. IMAI Mr. M. KONISHI Mr. K. KUDO Mr. M. SATO Mr. T. ISHIGURI Mr. T. OKADA
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. D.D. AFANDE Mr. P.N. MWAURA
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES Ms. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. L. BAYART Mr. S.O. BOLD
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. El. G. BENHIMA Mr. O. HILALE
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. R.J. VAN SCHAIK Mr. R. MILDERS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. B.O. TONWE Mr. A.A. ELLA
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. K. NIAZ
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. J. GONZALES TERRONES

Poland: Mr. J. RYCHLAK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. G. CHIRILA
Mr. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. J. DHANAPALA
Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden: Mr. R. EKEUS
Ms. E. BONNIER

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. S.B. BATSANOV
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN

United Kingdom: Mr. R.J.S. EDIS
Mr. D. SLINN

United States of America: Mr. D. LOWITZ
Mr. R. MAKINEN
Mr. R. GOUGH
Mr. R. O'CONNELL
Mr. R. BOWEN
Mr. P. CORDEN
Mr. L. BELGARD

Venezuela: Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ

Yugoslavia: Mr. K. VIDAS
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Mr. D. MINIC

Zaire: Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General: Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament: Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 354th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will begin today its consideration of agenda items 6, "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons" and 8, "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I wish also to recall that, as agreed by the Conference, we should take up for decision today the recommendation appearing in paragraph 14 of the Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, concerning the dates for its next session. As requested by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, and announced by my predecessor at the 351st plenary meeting, the Conference should also take note during this plenary meeting of the Provisional Summary of the Fourth Report of that Group.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sri Lanka, Argentina, the German Democratic Republic, Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, your Presidency for the month of April is a fitting acknowledgement of the Brazilian contribution to disarmament and your own long and illustrious career in that cause. It is truly unique for a diplomat of such distinctive ability and deep dedication to have been Chairman of the two deliberative United Nations disarmament bodies -- the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the General Assembly, as well as President of this multilateral negotiating body on disarmament twice over. My delegation salutes you and pledges our co-operation to you in the Herculean task you face to achieve even the most modest success, banishing the cynicism and setting right the distortion of our purposes and priorities that we are told to accept as the immutable reality of our time. May I at the same time thank Ambassador Clerckx of Belgium for his efforts as President for the month of March. We also express our appreciation for the continued support of the Secretariat so ably led by Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui.

My theme today is item 5 of our agenda -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- a subject in which my delegation has displayed a consistent interest. Our Conference remains without an ad hoc committee on this item while the bilateral United States-USSR talks have also made no progress on this issue, according to the information available to us and the public statements that have been made. This collective diplomatic failure to act on an issue of crucial importance in the field of disarmament requires some analysis. First, within the Conference, two months have elapsed since we began this session and no ad hoc committee has been established on item 5 because of our inability to agree on a mandate. For some this has probably been a convenient camouflage for a reluctance to take other decisions when an ad hoc committee is established. Last year the Ad Hoc Committee held 20 meetings in a preliminary probing of the subject before substantive work

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could begin this year. One group has insisted that last year's mandate has not been exhausted and that therefore we must continue with it. The Group of 21 has held out patiently for a change in the mandate more in tune with the recommendation contained in the 1985 Report of the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly resolution 40/87. In doing so we have demonstrated a willingness to compromise and to accommodate other points of view and have submitted a series of proposals in the negotiations conducted by the Presidents for the months of February and March. A proposal by the President for the month of February was acceptable to the Group of 21 but rejected by another group. More proposals are with you, Mr. President, as you commence the delicate task of seeking common ground to resume work on this important issue.

In response to these many proposals made by the Group of 21 not one single counter-proposal has been made even as a gesture reciprocating our earnest desire to seek a compromise. All we have had is an obdurate repetition that we must retain last year's mandate. This casts doubt on the existence of a political will to continue serious work on this issue in this multilateral negotiating forum. Already disturbing references are being made to the importance of effective verification mechanisms even before we have embarked on substantive work. Despite this my delegation will continue its efforts to seek a compromise which will enable us to continue to examine issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space while at the same time identifying areas of agreement that can be of value to the Conference when we finally approach the task, as we must, of negotiating a treaty or treaties to ban weapons in outer space. That final objective will not be achieved by an interminable examination of issues. If this body confined itself merely to the examination of issues relevant to disarmament we would replace the Tower of Babel as the symbol of confused confabulation. Our discussions here must not only be graduated but must also have a sense of direction towards finding where we can agree either through a natural convergence of views or through conscious compromise in the larger global interest.

This discussion of the purpose of our work here seven years after the establishment of the Committee or Conference on Disarmament seems incongruous. There are some who need to be convinced of the purpose of the Conference notwithstanding the transparency of paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Subsidiary bodies are established under the rules of procedure "for the effective performance" of the functions of the Conference so as to permit more sharply focused substantive and structured discussion on the various agenda items in the course of negotiations. It is true that such discussions are of mutual benefit to delegations to acquire a better understanding of the subject-matter from the expertise that is exchanged. But we are not here solely as an expanded and expensive adult education exercise. If that were so we would qualify for the economy measures that the vigilant eye of the Secretary-General seeks in order to avert the financial crisis confronting the United Nations system. No, we are here as a negotiating body and the entire gamut of our activity here including the adoption of our agenda, happily a quick process now, the plenary debates and the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committees is all part of this process of negotiation. It is inevitable that we should make more progress in some areas than in others.

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Mandates are not sacrosanct. It has been said here that we make something of a fetish of mandates and indeed my delegation has supported proposals for simplifying mandates most recently made by the Yugoslav delegation. However mandates and work programmes give shape and direction to our work and provide guidance to the Chairmen of Ad Hoc Committees to ensure that discussions are not irrelevant or deliberately digressive.

It is with this in mind that we have proposed suggestions for a mandate that would nudge us all towards finding areas of agreement on this contentious issue rather than examine issues from our respective national viewpoints. We have already seen how a broad mandate can be used to engage in polemics and mutual recrimination. We do not want a repetition of that. A well-drafted mandate and a sound programme of work will strengthen the hand of the Chairman and those in the Conference who want to see substantive work done and not spend their time listening to a litany of Treaty violations. My delegation is ready, however, as an earnest of our sincere desire to commence work, to set up an ad hoc committee on item 5 with a simplified mandate under paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation outlined the possible scope for work in an ad hoc committee on this item as far back as in April 1983 and this needs no reiteration. It was a comprehensive one which, inter alia, included confidence-building measures through greater international co-operation. Last year, we elaborated further on this drawing from other contributions made in this Conference on further measures that an ad hoc committee should undertake to prevent an arms race in outer space. Simultaneously we stressed the need to have clear definitional descriptions of the terms we use to describe various aspects in outer space activities in order to arrive at common understandings which are of paramount importance and a necessary prerequisite in the negotiating process to arrive at agreement or agreements on this item. The speakers who addressed this item before me in this Conference have lucidly explained the immense complexities that face us in resolving and identifying issues. Many delegations have stressed the need for identification of areas of agreements to arrive at further measures to stem an arms race in outer space. My delegation shares this view that the time is ripe for us to embark upon this identification exercise in order not to lose sight of our ultimate objective. In our work towards this goal in an ad hoc committee my delegation would favour a three-tiered approach which would primarily facilitate this identification process geared towards possible agreements.

Firstly, current ongoing activities relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be thoroughly examined. Primary emphasis should be on identification of permissible activities and activities to be banned and to find suitable definitions and descriptions. In this context, it may be useful to address various outer space activities that have military implications and their relation to strategic stability or instability. It is also possible to delineate in a broader sense the present systems in outer space as --
(a) support and surveillance systems and (b) weapons systems. The "open laboratories" offer of the United States delegation could be implemented in an ad hoc committee of the Conference with information provided by all delegations on the kinds of weapon systems that could be envisaged for the future with a view to designing a legal régime to ban them effectively. The

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useful statement of Ambassador Wegener on 6 March provided a glimpse of the military uses of outer space technology and other means of electronic warfare in space. It is the kind of contribution other delegations can make in an ad hoc committee adding to the body of knowledge on the subject. Thereafter we could concentrate on the legitimacy and the usefulness of these two different systems with a view to arriving at precise definitional descriptions of what is meant by each of these systems.

Secondly, simultaneous examination of current international agreements and understandings aimed at limiting military activities to prevent an arms race in outer space should take place. This must necessarily follow the examination of ongoing activities so as to evaluate how effective the existing legal régime is in banning activities that we agree constitute an arms race in outer space. Clarification of existing ambiguities in international law can only be productive in relation to an agreed basis as to which activities are permitted and which are not. Last year's exercise of analysing relevant existing treaties and agreements with a view to identifying lacunae should be continued with utmost vigour. The approach explained in the first tier is mutually complementary to the latter and useful to arrive at precise formulations and understandings. Thus, the ad hoc committee could identify emerging issues of treaty law interpretation in relation to definitions and descriptions regarding weapons in space. Therefore, this effort is obviously interlinked to the first approach and should be undertaken in that perspective. Drawing from results and deliberations on the above areas in this second tier the ad hoc committee could concentrate on identifying the legal aspects related to preventing the weaponization of space. Although elaboration of a legal régime at this juncture seems to be ambitious, if the political will to resolve the issues confronting us does exist, it need not be difficult to identify the main elements necessary in this legal régime.

Thirdly, independent of the first two approaches which are necessarily designed as an examination process to identify issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, all existing proposals and future initiatives could be examined. This exercise is also organically linked with other work in the ad hoc committee since these proposals and initiatives follow as a logical corollary. In this context there could be "further measures" as referred to by a delegation in this Conference a few weeks ago that could usefully be taken in the immediate future without prejudice to the examination process that may have a long gestation period. In particular, I refer to various proposals that were advanced in this Conference and elsewhere in relation to preventing an arms race in outer space. These measures, some of which are essentially short-term oriented, although not comprehensive could nevertheless provide some impetus towards preventing an arms race as necessary confidence-building measures. Some of them have been spelt out such as, agreement on "rules of the road" for outer space, high orbital ASAT ban, etc. Moreover, elaboration of an international régime of verification to be realized through an International Satellite Monitoring Agency could be a useful instrument to stem the arms race in outer space in addition to having the capacity to enhance strategic stability with due consideration and without prejudice to the aspirations of the third world countries. Furthermore, as an immediate urgent measure my delegation reiterates its support for the establishment of an expert group, outside the framework of an

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ad hoc committee, which could provide both expertise and guidance in preventing the weaponization of outer space. This proposal has been supported by many other delegations in this Conference.

While we are here engaged in removing the obstacles placed in our way to begin work on preventing an arm race in outer space the argument has sometimes been advanced that this complex matter should be left to those who have a space capability as if the rest of us should be content to be mere spectators. It has even been said that the Conference must not get in the way of the bilateral negotiations, as if this body was an inconvenient road-block. The United States-USSR Summit of November last year pledged solemnly to accelerate and intensify the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms. It is clear that on space there has been no progress while inconclusive debates go on. Ambassador Paul Nitze reportedly told a symposium in Washington on 13 March that round four of the Geneva nuclear and space arms talks had not shown any "tangible progress". The dispute on what constitutes "research" and the conflicting interpretations of the ABM Treaty go on making it even more important that the multilateral forum, which includes other nations with space capabilities, should be activated on this issue.

It is not enough that we set up an ad hoc committee. We must work purposefully in it. The agenda for action is extensive. General Assembly resolution 40/87 called upon "all States especially those with major space capabilities to refrain in their activities relating to outer space from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space". It is essential that this call should be heeded if we are not to have an arms race begin in space while we are still engaged bilaterally and multilaterally in efforts to halt it. This call in a General Assembly resolution supported by 151 Member States and not opposed by any Member State is a reflection, as similar resolutions are, of customary law or at least indicative of the direction in which that law is evolving according to the opinion of experts in international law.

Despite this we know that work on ballistic missile defence systems is going on allegedly on both sides. Their permissibility under the bilateral ABM Treaty is arguable. Whether the work is in the realm of fundamental research or basic research is not of importance. We have seen reports that technical feasibility has been demonstrated and that major experiments are now planned, attracting a multinational scramble for the financial spoils involved. It is the stage of testing and development that transforms the fantasies of some scientists into the horror of a new weapons system in a new arena. That stage also places us irreversibly in an arms race in space. The experts have stated unequivocally that a technical consensus exists that neither the United States nor the USSR can be defended by a multi-layered space-based or space-operated system against nuclear weapons without some nuclear weapons assisted by space mines landing and destroying their targets. The arguments of my delegation against space-based defence systems were set out in our statements of 5 March and 30 July last year and do not require repetition. I would however like to draw the attention of the Conference to a study of the United States Senate released on 30 March which reportedly warns that space-based defence could face countermeasures from the other side 10 times more daunting than projected. The study concludes that such systems are not feasible, pointing out, for example, the vulnerability of space-based

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battle stations that have to be launched and serviced at great cost. Thus a space weapon system will only become part of a first-strike capability forcing the other side to a "launch on warning" policy heightening the risk of nuclear war by accident. The El Dorado of a nuclear-weapon-free world through an impregnable shield has now faded away. Leaders of some nuclear-weapon States are dismissing the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world as a "pie in the sky" in strange contrast to earlier statements that nuclear weapons would be rendered impotent and obsolete.

While this research goes on we have now to safeguard existing satellites from ASAT systems. This can be done by banning ASAT systems or by limiting the destructive potential of such systems through various forms of counteraction. The latter is both expensive and uncertain and consequently we must work for an ASAT ban. A draft treaty has been submitted and remains open for discussion and negotiation. If it is not acceptable in its present form we could propose improvements to ban anti-satellite weapons and their testing from space. With one ASAT system in place and another being tested for operation by 1987 we are at an opportune moment to impose this ban. The verification of this ban on the testing and deployment of ASAT systems is feasible at present.

Many delegations have dwelt usefully and at length on the existing international legal régime relevant to preventing an arms race in outer space. We have found this valuable. However, their value would be enhanced if this analysis were to be undertaken after we have identified the activities we seek to ban and the weapon systems we want to outlaw. We have also heard a novel interpretation of General Assembly resolution 40/87 as having drawn a distinction between issues to be dealt with multilaterally and those which should be the subject of bilateral negotiations. My delegation, as one of the co-sponsors of resolution 40/87, can claim some acquaintance with the drafting of this resolution. Its import is quite clear. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations in this aspect of disarmament, as in all aspects, are complementary. There was no division of labour set out implying that we in the Conference on Disarmament should not trespass into an area reserved for the bilaterals and a careful reading of operative paragraphs 4 and 6 of the resolution proves this. In fact, operative paragraph 6 states unequivocally that the Conference "as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in all its aspects in outer space". My delegation therefore finds this interpretation both artificial and tendentious. It is all the more untenable when we know that no progress has been made in the space area of the bilateral talks. Another red herring in our plenary debates was the attempt to extend Article 51 of the Charter to certain space activities on the grounds that it will enhance stability and maintain international peace and security. The extension of this argument is perhaps intended to cover BMD systems in view of the elaborate claims made for such systems. The accepted view in international law is that Article 51 of the Charter can only be invoked in cases of armed attack. We consider this and the elastic interpretation of operative paragraph 2 of resolution 40/87 as examples that prove the need to have the ad hoc committee agree on a definition of what constitutes "peaceful activities in space". In the view of my delegation, any device, whether ground-based or space-based, in Earth orbit or in any trajectory beyond Earth

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orbit, designed physically to damage or interfere with a space object or to attack ground or airborne targets from space is a space weapon which should be banned. While the examination of international law is certainly relevant it is pertinent to remind ourselves that the military uses of space have gone on in spite of existing law precisely because our common security is disregarded in the ongoing arms race. We look forward with interest to the completion of the UNIDIR study on disarmament problems related to outer space and the consequences of extending the arms race into outer space. We are confident that the study will enrich our understanding of the issues and help our work in the Conference.

It is useful to look at the recent history of disarmament. Until the 1960s it was the safe assumption of the super-Powers that they alone possessed nuclear weapons. With that assumption destroyed, diplomatic efforts resulted in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which even if it did not attract universal participation did create a norm that proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether horizontally or vertically, was wrong and unsafe for humankind. Today the overwhelming space capability lies with two countries. However, the civilian space programmes of many countries, including third world countries, are forging ahead and their conversion to military use is easier than imagined. Space activities, like nuclear fission, have dual uses inherent in them. More countries are acquiring satellite launching capabilities and space programmes have the potential of military application. Countries with advanced technology could even gain control of space weaponry obviating the need to acquire nuclear weapons directly. These developments apart from the emergence of weapons to pierce BMD systems may take much less time than is envisaged at present. Consequently the urgent need for agreements to prevent an arms race in space must take place now and not after the two super-Powers have weaponized space. It will be too late then to prevent the proliferation of space weapons. We urge, therefore, the setting up of an ad hoc committee here on a mandate to enable us to make progress in preventing an arms race in outer space. We also call on the United States and the USSR to address the question purposefully and positively when the new round of their nuclear and space arms talks commences on 8 May. Outer space must be maintained as a weapon-free zone and a zone of peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Presidency. I now call upon the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador Cámpora.

Mr. CÁMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): We are beginning our meetings for the month of April, the last month of the spring part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, and also a month of particular importance because to a large extent it is during this month that the scope of the whole year's work is defined.

April is a key month for this Conference, and the presidency has passed to Ambassador Celso de Souza e Silva, our esteemed friend, whose diplomatic ability and high intellectual gifts are an earnest of progress in the Conference's work. Mr. President, you know that you may rely on our utmost co-operation and goodwill to follow the path along which you will guide us from your high post. This offer of co-operation is particularly prompted by the fact that, through you, this Conference has received an important message

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from President Sarney, describing very accurately the difficult international conditions that currently prevail and pointing out their origins and responsibilities. This message will be a major reference point in future for the Conference on Disarmament.

I should also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Clerckx for his activity as President during the month of March.

I wish to refer today to some of the issues connected with the negotiations which are under way on the convention which will prohibit once and for all the use and the very existence of chemical weapons.

The international community represented in this Conference has before it a unique opportunity for eliminating an entire category of weapons of mass destruction of real military significance. As a result, chemical warfare will cease to be an indiscriminate threat in the hands of those possessing this terrible destructive capability.

Over the last five years the great majority of States taking part in the work of the ad hoc Committee have put forward their views in detail, and an exhaustive analysis has been made of the technical, military, legal and other aspects of the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons. The objective pursued illustrates the need for a multilateral approach to an issue which affects the security of all countries, whether or not they possess chemical weapons. It also demonstrates that the bilateral talks should tend to facilitate multilateral negotiations, as may be seen, in our opinion, from the Joint Statement by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev of 21 November 1985. It is important to stress that in these negotiations the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of partial and regional approaches have been acknowledged, and thus all the questions connected with the issue have been tackled in a global manner. It is to be hoped that this experience will serve as an example in the treatment of other disarmament measures.

The time has come to take the necessary steps so that our Conference can rapidly submit the text of the convention to the United Nations General Assembly. We call on all delegations to redouble their efforts to complete this process which, in our opinion, is unjustifiably protracted.

There now exists a firm basis for drawing up the final text of the convention, and we think that those who possess the main chemical-weapon arsenals should take confidence-building measures to ensure that the negotiations on chemical weapons do not suffer the consequences of the confrontation between the Great Powers. It would serve this objective if all States refrained from producing chemical weapons during this final stage in the ongoing negotiations.

An effective and universal convention on chemical weapons should contain four essential elements. Firstly, it should include an absolute and unconditional prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Secondly, it should contain categorical provisions on the destruction of existing arsenals, production facilities and the prohibition of the development and future production of such weapons. Thirdly, it should include suitable verification machinery that must be in keeping with the scope and nature of the instrument

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in accordance with the undertakings entered into under the Treaty. Fourthly, it must in no way be discriminatory or represent an obstacle to civil chemical industry and international co-operation in this field.

From this standpoint, the convention should apply to chemical weapons in the strict sense of the word, in other words, super-toxic, lethal and toxic chemicals, including key precursors, which are produced exclusively for military purposes. Thus, the object of the convention would be to prohibit the development, production, etc. of such chemicals if they are intended for use as weapons. In this context, it should be borne in mind that chemicals are not weapons in themselves. On the contrary, many chemicals of varying degrees of toxicity are widely used in various spheres of civil industry. Obviously, the use of such chemicals for civil purposes should not be covered by the scope of the prohibition.

We agree with those who have argued that the purpose of the convention is not to regulate civil chemical industry but solely to prohibit chemical weapons. Consequently, we share the view that the term of "permitted purposes" in the convention should be replaced by something else which suitably reflects this situation.

In the light of these considerations, particular attention should be paid to the formulation of the scope of the convention and to avoiding excessively wide concepts. Thus, the time has perhaps come to re-examine the definitions and criteria contained in the text which reflects the state of the negotiations. In this connection, it is worth recalling that the basic premise of the provisions concerning what must be declared and eliminated is the general-purpose criterion.

We also understand that at this point in our negotiations the working group on this issue should attach priority to the identification and listing of chemicals used exclusively for the production of chemical weapons.

At the same time we recognize the dangers which can stem from other chemicals if used for hostile purposes. Consequently, the convention must include balanced and reasonable provisions to ensure that these chemicals are exclusively confined to peaceful purposes. In the treatment of these chemicals which are used for industrial, agricultural, pharmaceutical, research and other activities, the fundamental principle to be respected should be that of not establishing regulations which hinder development, production, transfer and use of any kind for civil purposes.

This is of particular importance for a country such as mine, where the chemical industry plays an important role in the development, of both the agricultural and the industrial sectors; hence our repeated insistence on the need to ensure that the future convention does not hinder economic and technological activities or harm international co-operation in civil chemical activities. The convention should not hinder the transfer of toxic chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of such chemicals for peaceful purposes, nor hinder the wide and non-discriminatory use of scientific progress in chemistry for peaceful purposes in accordance with the needs and interests of each State and its economic and social priorities. In the light of these considerations, the Foreign Minister of Argentina recently

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stated in this chamber our concern at references to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, an objective which constitutes a discriminatory approach in that the priority objective of the Conference in this sphere must be to arrive at the universal, and permanent prohibition of such weapons.

Another fundamental aspect of the future convention is the provisions concerning the elimination of chemical weapon arsenals and production facilities. In this connection, States possessing such weapons must consider the destruction process from the standpoint of the confidence and collective security which the convention should generate, and not from the limited standpoint of their own military interests.

It should also be pointed out that if all chemical-weapon arsenals and production facilities are going to be destroyed, there will be no valid reasons for retaining specified quantities of super-toxic lethal weapons for so-called "protective purposes".

We have serious reservations about a provision of this kind, in that it is tantamount to perpetuating or de facto legalizing, through a convention aimed at eliminating chemical weapons, the inequality currently existing between States possessing and States not possessing such weapons.

The complete destruction of existing arsenals by the few countries which possess chemical weapons is the necessary counterpart and prerequisite for the restrictions which those that do not possess and do not intend to possess chemical weapons have to accept on their activities.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now call upon the representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): First of all allow me to extend to you my congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency for the month of April. Exercising this office at this juncture constitutes a special responsibility; in fact, you have the difficult task of giving new impetus to our work during the last month of the spring part of the session, so that fruitful results can be achieved in the summer. I have no doubt, Sir, that under your able guidance our Conference can make a step forward, thanks to your diplomatic skills and experience. In order for this to be possible, the support of all member States is, of course, required. As far as my delegation is concerned I assure you of our fullest co-operation. May I take this opportunity to express, once again, my gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Clerckx, for the way he directed our work.

On 27 March, Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, reported on the twenty-first session of the Group, held from 10 to 21 March 1986. He submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a Provisional Summary of the Group's Fourth Report, which will deal with the results of the Technical Test of 1984.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

I should like to take this opportunity to express to the Chairman and all the other members of the Group my delegation's appreciation for the enormous work done in preparing, conducting and evaluating the Technical Test. The above-mentioned concise provisional summary provides an insight into the scientific and technical problems encountered and, in general, satisfactorily solved.

When the complete report on the Technical Test is presented, we shall have an opportunity to appraise the experience gathered. In this context, the question will have to be answered what activities the GSE should pursue in the future. My delegation wishes to reaffirm its position that all endeavours towards a CTB must be promoted. For this reason, the Group should continue its efforts. When it comes to the further development of the scientific and technical elements of the global system, it would be desirable to draw a conclusion from the experience obtained so far and determine which achievements of seismology should be taken into account in the years ahead.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic will continue to regard the activities of the Ad Hoc Group as a contribution to a verified test ban and oppose attempts to transform it into an instrument in charge of monitoring and justifying ongoing tests.

Obviously, the Group's future will be very much contingent on progress in drawing up the nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is regrettable therefore, that a dissenting opinion on this elementary fact is recorded in the progress report, something which is unique in the Group's history. I would like to state in this connection that the linkage between the Ad Hoc Group's activities and item 1 on the agenda of our Conference -- nuclear-test ban -- has been generally recognized in the last 10 years as a basic principle. The delegations which regard headway in the attainment of a nuclear-test ban as something that lies outside the Group's work should recall that the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament established the Ad Hoc Group on 22 July 1976, and I quote from the Group's first report, "to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban".

Also, in the decision which the Conference took at its 48th meeting, to which the progress report before us refers, it spoke of "the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in a protocol which could be an integral part of the treaty".

By affirming the full validity of the above text, the delegations concerned should dispel the doubts they themselves created. This would be important for the Ad Hoc Group's future work.

Since I have the floor, Mr. President, allow me briefly to put on record my country's unqualified support for the recent Soviet initiative aimed at ending nuclear testing. General Secretary Gorbachev's appeal of 29 March to take advantage of the current opportunity exemplifies the degree of responsibility towards mankind which should be displayed in this day and age by the two leading nuclear Powers. Yet, it took only a few hours for the Government of the other nuclear Power to bluntly reject the call for an act of reason, i.e., to come together and agree on a nuclear test moratorium.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Since it is still not too late, it is our hope that the pleas by Governments from all over the world, manifested also at this Conference, will not remain without a positive response from the United States Administration.

My delegation would like to express its fundamental conviction that the United States cannot justify nuclear testing in any way. Rather, from what is available in terms of facts, the following conclusions must be drawn:

Firstly, a comprehensive test ban would be a relatively uncomplicated but extremely effective measure to put a stop to the nuclear arms build-up and to facilitate disarmament. Anyone really committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be opposed to a test ban.

Secondly, by decreeing a mutual moratorium, effective right away, the Soviet Union and the United States would live up to their special responsibility to prevent a nuclear war. The moratorium would in no way adversely affect the legitimate security interests of either side. Those who reject a moratorium do not seek a military and strategic balance but superiority, i.e., destabilization.

Thirdly, compliance with a moratorium can be monitored by national means. It is even possible to agree on additional methods of verification. Furthermore, it is possible to ensure compliance with a CTBT by a completely adequate system of verification. Concrete provisions can be hammered out in the process of drawing up a treaty. This goes for complementary procedures as well.

In order for the drafting of a CTBT to begin, political will is required. My delegation is hoping, despite all obstacles, that a way may be found to enable the Conference to conduct business-like work within a committee.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Presidency. I now call upon the representative of Japan, His Excellency Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): I would like to make a few comments on the Progress Report on the twenty-first session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

I want first to express the gratitude of my delegation to Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, for his enduring efforts to finalize the Report on the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test concerning the exchange of Level I data through the WMO/GTS system, conducted during 1984. In spite of the endeavours of all the experts representing 24 countries, there still remain points of differences to be resolved further in this Report. Appreciating as we do that a Provisional Summary has been agreed upon this time, we are nevertheless disappointed at this inability to finalize the Report itself this time. We strongly hope that the Ad Hoc Group, at its next session from 21 July to 1 August, will finally be able to adopt the Report.

We also hope that during the next session there will be time enough to consult on the further work of the Ad Hoc Group, enabling us to consolidate a basis for its future activities.

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

In this connection, I would like to note with pleasure the statement made by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Issraelyan on 25 March that "the Soviet Union is prepared to support the proposal to continue the activities of the Group of Experts on seismology with the objective of the further sophistication of the international seismic data exchange". As I mentioned at the plenary meeting of 13 February, one major issue with regard to the nuclear-test ban is the question of verification and its limitations, which is obviously linked to the question of compliance. One important aspect seemed to be the technology required to detect, identify and evaluate very small-scale nuclear explosions as they take place in different geographic conditions and locations under the Earth's surface, while another issue of equal importance is the problem of an international system of data link to provide for common and well-organized determinations. The Ad Hoc Group has been working on these and other related problems for quite some time, and we hope that their mandate will be enlarged in due course so as to enable further in-depth study on identification and evaluation as part of a comprehensive verification system.

Seismic data may be divided into two categories, namely, parameters which are discrete and digital and waveforms which are more or less analogue information. For an exchange of parametric seismic data or Level I data, we have conducted GSETT and hopefully obtained satisfactory results. However, for exchange of waveform data or Level II data, which we will eventually have to consider, we do not have as common and powerful a tool as the WMO/GTS as a channel of information as we do in the case of Level I data exchange. In this connection, I stated in my speech of 13 February that Japan was considering taking a step to improve this situation. I am now pleased to be able to inform the Conference that our parliament, the Diet, recently authorized the budget which will enable Japan to further engage in Level II data exchange with other countries. Consultations have already begun with like-minded countries regarding the actual manner of conducting Level II data exchanges and we believe that we should start preparatory technical discussions and investigations into matters related to a waveform data exchange on co-operative national basis. During the recent session of the Ad Hoc Group, our expert, Dr. Suehiro, presented an explanation of our plan on co-operative national investigations of seismic data communications and exchange methods, to which all members are invited to participate. Up to now 17 countries have indicated interest in participating in these co-operative national measures. To participate in these investigations does not necessarily obligate parties to actually start waveform data exchange in the immediate future. Rather we call upon as many countries as feasible to begin the co-operative investigation of the technical issues relating to the exchange and to report the result to the Ad Hoc Group. We hope that the Ad Hoc Group will be kept well informed of the state of art in this field.

As is well known, Japan considers a comprehensive test ban as the task of the highest priority in the field of nuclear disarmament. In particular, it has been making an active contribution to the solution of verification problems. In June 1984, Foreign Minister Abe addressed this Conference and made a concrete and realistic proposal for a "step-by-step approach" towards the realization of a comprehensive test ban. In August last year I submitted a Working Paper, CD/626, entitled "Concrete Measures for the Realization of the International Seismic Data Exchange System". That we have now taken the

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

new initiative for the exchange of Level II data should be further testimony to our ardent desire for the prohibition of nuclear tests as well as to our belief in the importance of more refined and sophisticated means of verification which would convince us all of their reliability to the attainment of our goal.

We would very much appreciate the co-operation of the countries concerned in this undertaking of ours.

In concluding my statement, I would like to express my belief that the deliberations in the Conference on the nuclear-test ban will continue to benefit from the support of the Ad Hoc Group's expertise.

Mr. PROKOFIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Conference on Disarmament has before it for consideration the Provisional Summary of the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/681) and the Progress Report on the Ad Hoc Group's twenty-first session (CD/682).

The Soviet delegation has studied these documents. They show that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has carried out much useful work in the preparation of the Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the results of the technical test for the exchange of seismic data, carried out from 15 October to 14 December 1984. We approve of the results of the work carried out by the Ad Hoc Group at its twenty-first session. Unfortunately, the work on the preparation of the report on the above-mentioned technical test has been somewhat dragged out in particular because during the session some experts submitted new modifications which were not previously included in the Ad Hoc Group's materials.

We hope that the experience gained during the technical test will make a contribution to the further development of the scientific and technical aspects of a global system of seismic data exchange for the purposes of verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban.

At the same time, the analysis of the results of the test has not yet been completed, and we hope that the Ad Hoc Group will do its best to complete the preparation of an objective and scientifically sound report as rapidly as possible. The Soviet Union is concerned to obtain a nuclear-weapon-test ban as quickly as possible, and is therefore in favour of continuing in the Conference on Disarmament the work on the development on an international system of seismic data exchange for the purposes of the verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban. As stated in the message of M.S. Gorbachev to the Conference on Disarmament, the Soviet Union "is agreeable to the strictest control over a ban on nuclear weapon tests, including on-site inspections and use of all the latest developments in seismology".

The Soviet Union is ready to support the proposal for continuing the activity of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts aimed at the further improvement of the international exchange of seismic data. This position should be viewed as evidence of our desire to contribute in every possible way to drawing up effective verification measures for a nuclear-weapon-test ban.

(Mr. Prokofiev, USSR)

It is self-evident that the work of the Ad Hoc Group, which was set up and operates within the Conference on Disarmament, is organically linked with progress on the question of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This is clear in particular from the first paragraph of the Provisional Summary of the Ad Hoc Group's Fourth Report (CD/681 of 21 March 1986). I shall read out that paragraph:

"1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, so as to facilitate the verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, was established in 1976 by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and has later been maintained by the Committee on Disarmament (CD) ..."

Thus, it is absolutely clear that the work of the Ad Hoc Group should be directed towards working out an international system of seismic data exchange for the purposes of the verification of a nuclear-weapon-test ban. In any event, its work concerns the verification of observance of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear testing, but by no means the supervision of how such tests are conducted.

In this connection, we must express our concern at the lack of practical progress in resolving the question of a nuclear test ban. This is one of the top priority issues in modern international politics. As is well known, the USSR is doing everything it can for the question to be resolved forthwith.

We appeal to all concerned to adopt a serious and responsible approach to the problem of a nuclear weapon test ban, including of course, questions relating to the verification of such a ban, and, accordingly, to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement.

I have no more speakers on my list for this morning. Is there any delegation that wants to take the floor? If that is not the case, may I now turn to another subject?

As I announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, we shall now turn to document CD/681, containing the Provisional Summary of the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and to document CD/682, containing the Progress Report on the twenty-first session of that Ad Hoc Group.

I put before the Conference first document CD/681 containing the Provisional Summary of the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group. In that connection, you will recall that at our 351st plenary meeting my predecessor informed you that, at the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, the Conference may wish to take note of that Provisional Summary. At the 353rd plenary meeting, there were no objections raised to this procedure. Accordingly, I invite the Conference to take note of document CD/681.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Let us now turn to the Progress Report on the twenty-first session of the Ad Hoc Group, as contained in document CD/682. In paragraph 14 of that document, the Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session should be convened from 21 July to 1 August 1986 in Geneva. The Conference has agreed to take a decision on this recommendation at this meeting. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the recommendation contained in paragraph 14 of CD/682 concerning the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The United States delegation has asked for the floor.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, I regret the need to take the floor at this point, but my delegation believes it necessary to comment on the Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, CD/682, paragraph 14 of which the Conference has just adopted. The United States welcomes the continued progress the Ad Hoc Group makes on the important issues with which it deals, progress reflected in its Provisional Summary Report, CD/681.

My colleagues will have noted that paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Progress Report contain statements of an unusual character. For the first time, elements of a political nature that exceed the technical and scientific responsibilities of the Ad Hoc Group have been introduced into a report of this distinguished Group's work.

As a result of this failure to adhere to proper procedure by certain participants in the 21st meeting of the Ad Hoc Group, the United States and other participants were compelled to object, in the second part of paragraph 12, to the inappropriate introduction of such elements.

For my delegation, the statement in the second part of paragraph 12 also refers to paragraph 13.

The GSE does not, of course, conduct its work in a vacuum, without reference to the issues which the Conference has on its agenda. Quite the contrary. We in the Conference have requested the Group of Scientific Experts to undertake scientific and technical tasks of great relevance to the future of our own work. But the Ad Hoc Group should carry out its tasks in an objective way.

The point is that we should not seek to mix apples and oranges. The Conference on Disarmament provides the guidelines to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and the Group should not seek to involve itself with statements, or problems, beyond its competence.

We did not ask -- nor should we have asked -- the scientific experts from more than 30 States to delve into the political or diplomatic aspects of the nuclear-test-ban issue. Such a task would put the Ad Hoc Group in the inappropriate position -- and one that would be uncomfortable as well -- of telling us, the recipients and potential users of its products, what the basis is for the products they will provide. Such a task would not be the way to obtain progress on the scientific and technical problems whose solutions we