CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 March 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. C. Clerckx (Belgium)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:	Mr. N. KERROUM Mr. A. BELAID Mr. M. TEFIANI
Argentina:	Mr. M. CAMPORA
Australia:	Mr. R.A. ROWE Ms. M. LETTS
Belgium:	Mr. C. CLERCKX Mr. P. NIEUVENHUYS
Brazil:	Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. V. BOJILOV Mr. H. HALATCHEV Mr. P. POPTCHEV Mr. R. DEYANOV
Burma:	U TIN TUN U MYA THAN U HLA MYINT Daw AYE AYE MU
Canada	Mr. R.J. ROCHON
China:	Mr. QIAN Jiadong Mr. HU Xiaodi Mr. SUO Kaiming Mr. SHA Zukang Ms. WANG Ziyun Mr. YANG Minglang Mr. TAN Han Mr. LIU Zhongren
Cuba:	Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA Ms. A.M. LUETTGEN DE LECHUGA Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
Czechoslovakia	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA Mr. B. BEDNAR
Egypt	Mr. M. BADR Mr. F. MONIB
Ethiopia	
France	Mr. J. JESSEL Mr. H. RENIE Mr. G. MONTASSIER

German Democratic Republic:	Mr. W. KRUTZSCH Mr. F. SAYATZ
Germany, Federal Republic of:	Mr. H. WEGENER Mr. F. ELBE Mr. H. PETERS Mr. W.-N. GERMANN
Hungary:	Mr. D. MEISZTER Mr. T. TOTH Mr. F. GAJDA
India:	Mr. S. KANT SHARMA
Indonesia:	Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO Mr. A.M. FACHIR Mr. R.I. HENIE Mr. HARYOMATARAM Mr. A. MASBAR
Islamic Republic of Iran:	Mr. N. KAZEMI KAMYAB
Italy:	Mr. R. FRANCESCHI Mr. F. PIAGGESI Mr. G. ADORNI BRACCESI Mr. E. SIVIERO
Japan:	Mr. R. IMAI Mr. M. KONISHI Mr. K. KUDO Mr. T. ISHIGURI Mr. T. OKADA
Kenya:	Mr. D.D. FANDE Mr. P.N. MWAURA
Mexico	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES Ms. Z. GONZALES Y REYNERO Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA
Mongolia	Mr. L. BAYART Mr. S.O. BOLD Mr. G. GONGOR
Morocco	Mr. E.G. BENHIMA Mr. O. HILALE
Netherlands:	Mr. R.J. van SCHAIK Mr. J. RAMAKER Mr. R. MILDERS
Nigeria:	Mr. B.O. TONWE
Pakistan:	Mr. K. NIAZ
Peru	Mr. J.G. TERRONES

Poland	Mr. J. RYCHLAK Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Romania	Mr. I. VOICU
Sri Lanka:	Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM
Sweden:	Mrs. M.B. THEORIN Mr. R. EKEUS Ms. E. BONNIER Mr. H. BERGLUND Mr. J. PRAWITZ
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
United Kingdom	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE Mr. R.J.S. EDIS Mr. D.A. SLINN
United States of America:	Mr. D. LOWITZ Mr. T. BARTHELEMY Mr. R. GOUGH Mr. R. LEVINE Mr. R.L. LUACES
Venezuela	Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ
Yugoslavia	Mr. K. VIDAS
Zaire:	Mr. O.N. MONSHEMVULA
Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. M. KOMATINA
Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 345th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should like to draw attention to the presence in the public gallery of participants from the "Women and Peace" seminar being held in Geneva who, are here on the occasion of International Women's Day on 8 March. I should also like to congratulate all the women working for disarmament and particularly those who contribute to the work of our Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference is taking up consideration of agenda item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space. As you know, however, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure any member may raise any matter related to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Poland and Sweden. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, the purpose of my statement today is to underline the urgency of an early resumption of our substantive work on agenda item 5, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and to offer a number of perspectives, that, in the view of my delegation, ought to be taken into account in the Conference's work on outer space.

Let us recall, as a starting point, that the Conference itself, in adopting the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space in its 1985 Annual Report, has solemnly undertaken to resume its activities on agenda item 5 at the earliest possible time. In that report it is acknowledged that the relevant Committee had had a wide-ranging discussion that contributed to clarifying the complexity of a number of problems and to a better understanding of positions. But the Committee also recognized the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and agreed that, consequently, all efforts should be made to assure that substantive work on the agenda item be continued at the 1986 session of the Conference.

The urgency of such work is further heightened by the fact that the bilateral negotiations between the two Major Powers on nuclear and space matters are now in full swing. We in this Conference all agree that the elaboration of further international legislation in outer space, including measures for the prevention of a future arms race in that environment, cannot be entrusted to these bilateral negotiators alone. More and more States -- many of them represented in this Conference -- are themselves outer-space Powers or participate in important programmes for the exploration and utilization of outer space, all States would be threatened by a military misuse of the outer space potential.

It is widely agreed that in view of the dynamic technological developments many aspects of a future outer space legal order inevitably necessitate comprehensive regulation by the international community as such. Global security issues need global solutions. The domain of outer space is one of those where by the very nature of the subject matter only global regulation can provide durable solutions, and where it would be futile for the bilateral partners to substitute themselves for the world community at large.

Yet, the existing outer space legal régime is manifestly incomplete. International law, as it relates to outer space, is a relatively young discipline, and its accomplishments so far do not enable it to limit, or channel, armament in outer space in a manner conducive to the maintenance of

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strategic stability, or to prevent the abusive military utilization of outer space. This is due to the ambiguity or insufficient detail of existing legal norms; the unclear or controversial definition of central legal concepts; and the inherent ambivalence of technology which may be used for various purposes, military or non-military, stabilizing or destabilizing, thus complicating the lawyer's quest for an improved legal order in outer space. There are also grave omissions in the present outer space legal régime: both the role of satellites and the overriding need for their protection are insufficiently covered by current prescription. However, there is no controversy that satellites with verification, observation, communication and command functions are vital components of strategic stability and that, correspondingly, it would be counterproductive to prohibit all military activities in outer space, instead of only those that imperil the foundations of deterrence -- in other words, the possibilities for the successful prevention of war -- or might heighten the danger of conflict.

Up to this time the international community has not succeeded in identifying and analysing fully these weak spots of the outer space legal régime and in evaluating them in context. By the same token it has so far been impossible to define guiding concepts in an operative manner and to work out the necessary remedial or supplementary prescription.

This situation indicates the dimensions of our task. In the view of my delegation, it also underlines our obligation, taking stock of the incipient result of last year's work of the Conference, to achieve the necessary clarifications of the present body of law, to identify further regulatory needs, and to evolve the contours of a future, more complete outer space legal régime.

I view last year's mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space as entirely sufficient to continue along the lines of last year's work and to take additional aspects of this work in hand. But whatever the precise formulations of the mandate on which we will agree -- and, I hope, agree soon -- our task would then appear to be triple: firstly, the clarification of specific important ambiguities of the current outer space legal régime; secondly, the implementation of paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the identification of "further measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space", completing the existing international legislation; thirdly, as precise a delineation as is possible between the regulatory tasks to be entrusted to multilateral fora, and those tasks that are intrinsically linked with the bilateral nuclear relationship of the two Major Powers, and must therefore, in the first place, be considered by them.

To this latter task there is a dynamic dimension in that the multilateral negotiating needs could very well change, or grow, commensurately with the progress of bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space matters.

In considering now these three tasks, I would like to share with delegations a number of perspectives that are, in reality, a further amplification of a statement by my delegation on 4 July last year.

Let me first dwell upon the obvious ambiguities and definitional deficits of the existing treaty and customary international law, as it relates to outer space.

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At the present time there are about 10 bilateral and multilateral treaties which, in their entirety or partially, deal with the military uses -- or abuses -- of outer space.

One basic norm needs to be highlighted at the outset. The Outer Space Treaty of 26 January 1967 extends the validity of the Charter of the United Nations, including its interdiction of the threat or use of force, and the principle of the peaceful settlement of conflicts also to the new environment of outer space. However, one important definitional element is missing here. So far, the international community has not succeeded in delineating, with every necessary precision, air space which is subject to national sovereignty, and outer space which is open for utilization by all States; and it is at present unclear whether the limit between the two would be at the 100 kilometres or 111 kilometres mark -- or perhaps elsewhere. More important: the general acknowledgement of the validity of the Charter has so far not been effective enough to eliminate the use of threat or force and military abuse from outer space. The mere fact that several components of outer space armaments, and especially ASAT capabilities, have already in the past been made the subject of specific treaty negotiations shows that there is an additional regulatory need in terms of concretizing the provisions of the Charter, as it applies to outer space.

The Outer Space Treaty has undertaken to ban a whole category of weapons -- weapons of mass destruction -- from outer space and to declare part of the cosmos -- the celestial bodies -- as weapon-free zones. However, these norms are manifestly incomplete since they do not contain any concrete definition for some of the central concepts contained in the Treaty. Apart from the concept of outer space itself, a definition of weapons of mass destruction -- for the purposes of the Treaty -- or of peaceful use has not been undertaken. I am only recalling past queries of my own delegation -- but which other delegations have also raised -- when reminding delegates that the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty do not prohibit all military activities per se, and that most military means of which one could think in this context are of an ambivalent nature. This demonstrates that the Conference should address, in terms of clarifying the existing outer space legal régime, the following issues:

Which forms of the utilization of outer space are compatible with the principle of peaceful uses of outer space in conformity with Article 3 of the Outer Space Treaty?

What is the extent of the protection which satellites of a clearly stabilizing nature enjoy against premeditated destruction or impingement on their functions?

In what category of cases would the general protective effect of Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 51 of the United Nations Charter be sufficient, and in what other category of cases would more specific regulation be necessary, given current and future technological developments?

To what extent could or should the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Outer Space Treaty, by virtue of which the stationing of nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons in full orbit is prohibited, also be extended to other destructive means or their components?

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Even if the existing treaties and rules of general international law are subjected to extensive interpretation, including appropriate analogies, no clear information can be obtained on the precise scope of actual prohibition. That, of course, also means that, objectively speaking, nobody can complain about the given degree of militarization of outer space, since it is unclear which forms of the utilization of outer space have been legitimized by the existing treaties and their underlying intentions and which ones are incompatible with current prescription.

In view of the almost unimaginable dynamics of outer space technology and its military uses, such ambiguities, lacunae and contradictions in the outer space legal régime can hardly surprise anybody. The general prohibition of the threat or use of force in the Outer Space Treaty was codified at a time when force against outer space objects could at best be imagined or should I say, at worst, be imagined, as a direct application of military means -- by way of collision, or conventional or nuclear explosion. Today, the vulnerability of outer space objects has become infinitely greater, and the threats have become multiple, involving new and partly exotic technologies

Let me provide an example for a new possible threat scenario. If a laser beam of limited brightness -- and definitely sublethal intensity -- is fired from aboard a United States space shuttle or a Soviet space station, or even from the ground via an advanced directed energy weapon, and hits a satellite, the very sensitive cooling aggregates for the electronic circuits could be overheated and the satellite be incapacitated without any external trace of application of force. It would appear difficult to qualify such "warming up" of the satellite surface by a few centigrades as use of force under international law, although the ultimate effect would be the same as that of premeditated destruction by killer satelittes or other destructive means, just as lasers or other advanced directed-energy weapons -- for instance particle-beam weapons -- are not unequivocally prohibited by international law. But there is no doubt that in principle they would be technologically capable of generating an all-altitude and instantaneous kill capacity against satellites. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has been working on such weapon systems for a considerable period, and the United States as of more recent date.

There are several other means of electronic warfare that are able of incapacitating satellites without any physical application of force, but with the same effect. One could cite the method of jamming (the overloading of a receptor device by excessive signals) spoofing (the feeding-in of misleading or deceptive electronic signals), dazzling (the blinding of satellites for a limited time) or the spoofing in the above-mentioned sense, of optical sensors.

There is no doubt that the instruments of international law in the field of renunciation of the use or threat of force must be adapted to meet these new technological possibilities. This specific regulatory need must be looked at under today's enhanced requirements of strategic stability and the ambivalence of most technological means which may be conceived as defensive, but may also be applicable to offensive use. It would obviously be unrealistic to deal with these new challenges by simply turning back the wheel of history by a quarter of a century. The complete elimination of these innumerable technological possibilities by the simple fiat of prohibition in international law does not appear as a feasible possibility, and other means of harnessing them with legal instruments must equally be considered. The wide array of new technologies that have an inherent antisatellite potential

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illustrates an important, indeed central, problem of the search for a modern outer space legal order: while the prohibition of other weapons by way of a comprehensive agreement is, and remains, highly desirable, the proliferation of weapon systems that are not initially directed against satellites -- for instance ICBM and ABM weapons -- and of other outer space systems -- space shuttles, platforms, space stations -- that have inherent ASAT capabilities, not to speak of the possibility that satellites could be destroyed inadvertently by collision with other space objects, make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to solve the problem of an adequate protection of satellites merely or essentially by norms that would prohibit all relevant or even specific weapons configurations; and one arrives at this view even before the formidable problems of verification are taken into account.

Yet the problem cannot be left unattended in view of the essential stabilizing function of satellites and their contribution to the enhancement of modern civilian life on Earth, especially given the extreme vulnerability of satellites.

Under the existing legal system there is no basis for the view that the premeditated development of space-based ASAT weapons, or their components, or even their stationing would already, by itself, constitute a violation of law, especially a violation of the Outer Space Treaty. There are no explicit norms to support such a conclusion. If they did exist, there would have been no reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to have concluded specific agreements on non-interference with national technical means in the SALT context; nor would there have been any reason for the initiation of specific ASAT negotiations, nor for the repeated appeals by the Outer Space Committee of the United Nations to the space Powers to resume negotiations to this effect. All these regulatory efforts would have been superfluous, if in the perception of States involved the United Nations Charter and the Outer Space Treaty would by themselves prohibit ASAT weapons or their utilization.

The inference is clear: if we must assume that the existing outer space legal régime does not offer sufficient protection of satellites and if, on the other hand, the multitude of weapons systems or other outer space bodies that could directly or indirectly be given an ASAT function could not, -- or not sufficiently -- be tackled with prohibitory norms alone, then, in the spirit of the Final Document, one must look for "further measures". In this perspective it would appear logical that the solution to the problem lies not in the search for additional prohibitive norms -- utimately unsuitable to deal with current and emerging threats -- but in the search for a special protection régime for satellites, designed to compensate for their vulnerability. This protection régime could conceivably consist in a combination of agreed restrictions on hardware -- predominantly to be negotiated in a bilateral format -- and the legal immunization of satellites -- predominantly under multilateral auspices.

The idea of a multilateral protection régime for outer space objects is not a new one. Introduced before this Conference originally by France in Working Paper CD/375 of 14 April 1983, the idea has been taken up and supplemented by several other delegations, including my own and the delegations of Australia and the United Kingdom; in addition, the concept of "rules of the road" for outer space has for some time been a subject of internal debate within the United States.

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A multilaterally negotiated protection régime for satellites would have two dimensions: the legal immunization of satellites on the one hand, and agreements on flanking confidence-building measures, possibly contained in a "rules of the road" agreement, on the other.

There is some precedent in the bilateral treaty relationship between the two Major Powers. The ABM Treaty, and the treaties on SALT I and SALT II provide immunity for the satellites designed to verify these agreements (one might compare for instance article 50, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the SALT II agreement). There are other satellites which enjoy immunity, -- those designed to maintain communications links under the Nuclear Accidents Agreements of 1971, the subsequent Protocol on the Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973, and the Hot Line agreement in its various versions. However, these treaties are all of a bilateral nature, and satellites of other nations are not protected in the same manner. Again, it is clear that the use or threat of force against satellites of third countries would constitute a violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, with the exception of course of Article 51 in the case of an armed attack. This would particularly be true in the case of satellites of third countries that would be manifestly for peaceful uses; but even here the question is unclear what constitutes an armed attack in outer space.

Beyond these cases the status of satellites with limited military functions is unclear. Such military functions could also be of a dual nature. Satellites that are deployed to verify arms-control duties could at the same time be used for the reconnaissance of sensitive military information; early warning satellites possess the same ambivalence. It would be difficult to say a priori in which function a satellite would be "immune" and in which function an impingement on its operability could be qualified as a legitimate act in the exercise of the right of self-defence. This definitional calamity might call for different approaches to the closing of these particular existing legal loopholes.

One might, for instance, consider making a distinction in functional respects by giving priority to the stabilizing function; a distinction could also be made according to geographical criteria, for instance by protecting satellites according to their deployment area, altitude of orbit or geostationary position, or within "space sanctuaries".

Another set of criteria might be qualitative: the immunity of certain satellites that would be indispensable from a strategic viewpoint could extend to the immediate environment of such a satellite, an environment to be controlled by special sensor satellites, capable of sounding the alarm in case of attack. However, the option of general immunity for all satellites, limited at most to objects with a particular identification or above a certain deployment altitude should be examined in the first place. Such a comprehensive protection régime should also include the immunization of related ground facilities.

There is no doubt that the effectiveness of any protection régime of this nature would presuppose the improvement of the registration requirement for space objects. A broadening of the obligation to register space objects and to identify their functions is, however, a delicate subject and should be approached with care. It might, however, be worth exploring the possibility of bestowing upon registered objects, by international agreement, a special

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protected environment, a "keep-out zone". This might enhance the actual possibility of protecting satellites -- for instance against space mines -- in a considerable measure.

An international treaty that would provide for the protection of space objects would require a number of flanking measures, the observance of which would be in the interest of all concerned and exercise a considerable confidence-building effect. Such flanking measures are particularly conditioned by the "over-population" of outer space and the resulting risks of unintended collisions of satellites with space debris and other objects that are not fully traceable or with space objects which break out of programmed orbits.

Such flanking agreements could comprise the mutual contractual renunciation of interference measures, the observance of minimum distances between space objects -- especially important for the avoidance of interference with transmitting frequencies -- the limitation of approach velocities of space objects, and the establishment of consultation mechanisms in case of accidents and other unexplained events.

A new code of "rules of the road" for outer space could contribute in large measure to attenuating the effects of unintended escalation and to limiting the risks arising from misunderstandings in crisis situations. Additional rules that could be comprised in such a code might include: restrictions on very low altitude overflight by manned or unmanned spacecraft; new stringent requirements for advanced notice of launch activities; specific rules for agreed, and possibly defended, keep-out zones; grant or restriction of the right of inspection; limitation on high velocity fly-bys or trailing of foreign satellites; and established means by which to obtain timely information and consult concerning ambiguous or threatening activities.

In order to reduce uncertainty regarding the purpose of certain satellites and the tension likely to result from an unauthorized close approach, it might be useful to establish specific rules regarding inspection, high-velocity fly-by and trailing -- rules required by the increasing deployment density of space objects. Such agreements might allow close approach and inspection under certain circumstances (i.e. prior consent), or they might otherwise ban high-velocity fly-by and trailing -- either of which could be a prelude to satellite attack. There already exists a world-wide network of facilities designed to trace all satellites in their orbital course, and enabling States to be aware, in a comprehensive manner, of all activities in space. Satellites have aboard a multitude of sensors designed to report about their operability and any possible disturbances. If minimum distances would be agreed upon, these communication facilities would provide a prior warning mechanism, if ever the minimum distances are violated, so that satellites, should they already possess such sophisticated capabilities, could evade the approaching object. These possibilities would be particularly useful in the case of space tests or the deployment of any space-based weapon systems that are not directly directed against satellites.

The two main areas in which my delegation thus sees a fruitful field for the identification of "further measures", namely, a legal protection régime for satellites, and the further development of "rules of the road" in space,

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are therefore of a supplementary and mutually reinforcing nature, both designed to preserve the essential stabilizing function of satellites, and to minimize the occasions for conflict and misunderstanding.

I would finally like to approach an institutional issue. For good reasons it has been suggested that the protection of satellites would be exclusively a legal matter within the competence of the Legal Sub-Committee of the United Nations' Outer Space Committee. My delegation attributes a high priority to the Legal Sub-Committee and its work and we wish that this important body should continue its valuable activity. The problems on which I have touched would, however, only very partially lie in the Sub-Committee's competence. The Sub-Committee should certainly consider the protective aspects of civilian activities, -- for instance, collateral damage that might emanate from civilian satellites themselves, the reliability of indicated orbital data, the risks of re-entry and crash, and the consequences of such accidents in international and private international law. As regards the military relevance of the protection of satellites -- specifically in their military and stabilizing role -- there does not exist any alternative to the consideration of the subject matter in the Conference on Disarmament. However, the precise delineation between the competencies of these two bodies could only be made definite at a later stage when the identification of specific regulatory needs for the completion of the outer space legal régime has progressed and the military significance of each individual measure been sufficiently ascertained.

Mr. RYCHLAK (Poland) (translated from Russian): At its co-ordinating meeting on 5 March 1986, a group of socialist States in the Conference on Disarmament considered the situation which has arisen in the Conference on the question of the expansion of its membership.

The group stressed its support for the position given in paragraphs 16 to 19 of the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly at its fortieth session, and also noted that the provisions of the group's informal working paper regarding the guidelines to solving the question of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/WP132), of 24 July 1984, remained on the table. It also stressed that the candidate of the group of socialist countries for one of the four possible new seats in the Conference on Disarmament is the socialist Republic of Viet Nam. At the same time the group noted that it had no objection to any of the States which had declared an interest in membership of the Conference, and was prepared to agree to the possible nomination by other groups of countries of any country which requested membership in the Conference on Disarmament, provided of course that there was no objection to the candidature advanced by the group of socialist countries. The group of socialist countries was determined to counter any attempt by States not members of that group to interfere in the group's choice of candidate. They also stressed that the expansion of the membership of the Conference can only take place on a balanced basis in accordance with paragraph 18 of the above-mentioned report.

The delegations of the socialist countries consider that they should present their principled position on this question at the beginning of the consultations on the possibility of resolving this issue during the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, they are obliged to respond to the remarks made by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at the 344th plenary meeting of the Conference on 4 March 1986, which are nothing more than a deliberate distortion of well-known facts in an

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attempt to throw the responsibility for the failure to settle the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament on to a group of socialist countries, although everyone knows full well who is actually creating the difficulties. It is therefore perfectly clear that the manoeuvres of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in an attempt to stand logic on its head are merely yet another contribution to the campaign of anti-socialist intrigues by some members of the Group of Western States, which the Conference has recently been running into more and more. This action on the part of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and similar activities by the delegations of other Western countries, which are endeavouring to prevent the appointment of representatives of socialist States to responsible posts in various subsidiary bodies of the Conference is entirely designed to distract attention from the issues of paramount importance, progress in the solution of which is being deliberately blocked by those very members of the Western Group. Thus, the delegations of socialist countries consider it necessary to repudiate these intrigues and accusations quite categorically. They only damage the work of the Conference on Disarmament. If they should continue, the socialist countries will be obliged to take them into account in determining their position with regard to the candidate of the Group of Western countries.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Mr. President, today, Sweden is a nation in a state of shock and mourning. The cruel and senseless assassination of the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Olof Palme, is not only the murder of an outstanding person and a dedicated politician. It is the killing of a head of a democratically elected government, and therefore it is in itself a vile atack on democracy.

To Sweden, it has been a source of great consolation to experience that our sorrow is shared by the international community. This has been shown also by the words addressed to us here in the Conference on Disarmament. For these words, Ambassador Ekéus has already conveyed the formal thanks of the delegation of Sweden.

My Foreign Minister has asked me, on behalf of the Swedish Government, to express our sincere gratitude and to share with you some of our reflections on the work of Olof Palme and how we best can honour his memory.

Violence was a constant concern to Olof Palme. During his entire political life he struggled against oppression and injustice. He condemned violations of human rights under whatever pretext they were performed. Above all, he devoted himself more and more to the cause of disarmament and peace and to the struggle against militarism and the arms race.

In the political work of Olof Palme, solidarity was a key concept: his solidarity with the peoples of the third world was founded in his early personal encounters abroad with colonialism and poverty. His solidarity with small nations all over the world was, as he saw it, a natural consequence of his own role as a political leader of such a counry eager to choose and to preserve its own independent political system. His solidarity included our future generations, as he saw the nightmare of a nuclear holocaust.

Throughout his political life, Olof Palme pleaded the cause of dialogue and open discussion. He stood up for international law and a just society. He spoke out for the victims of violence and oppression.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

With this perspective, it was inevitable that questions of peace and disarmament were to become more and more central to his work. Olof Palme saw war in the age of nuclear weapons as the ultimate threat to everything worth struggling for, to the survival of human civilization.

With his broad international contacts, Olof Palme -- as Prime Minister as well as during his years as leader of the parliamentary opposition -- made use of different opportunities and fora to pursue his struggle for security and disarmament. In 1980 he set up and became Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, known as the Palme Commission.

"Common Security", the report of the Commission, introduced a concept -- new and radical, yet expressing the common sense of people all over the world. In the nuclear age no nation can achieve security in splendid isolation and at the expense of other nations. Our destinies are intertwined, and solutions must be found in common and be built on co-operation.

Olof Palme was firmly convinced that nuclear deterrence could not provide a long-term basis for peace, stability and equity in international relations. He rejected it on moral grounds, because it holds the whole of humanity as hostage. He rejected it on political grounds, because it breeds mistrust and conflict. He rejected it on security grounds, because it justifies the constant development of new and even more sinister weapons and strategies.

The concept of common security means that no nation shall be barred from taking part in negotitions and decisons on global problems. Olof Palme was committed to multilateral diplomacy and to the United Nations. He was strong in his criticism not of the United Nations, but of the failure of Member States to live up to the ideals of the Organization.

The nuclear threat is a threat to all of us, therefore all of us have an equal right to make our voices heard and to fight for our survival. This fundamental idea was expressed in yet another initiative with which he became closely inolved during the last years of his life.

"It is simply not acceptable that the future of our civilization lies in the hands of only five nuclear-weapon States. The principle of self-determination must mean that we, the non-nuclear weapon States, have an equal right to be masters of our own destiny. This right is being circumscribed by the threat of use of weapons which would bring death and destruction to all peoples. We can never accept an order which in a way resembles a colonial system where the ultimate fate of other nations is determind by a few dominant nuclear Powers. We, the non-nuclears, must also have a say". These were his words in New Delhi a little more than a year ago.

The Five Continent Peace Initiative met with a resounding international response, and in particular support from non-nuclear nations. His no to an arms race in space and his yes to a comprehensive test-ban treaty are shared by an overwhelming majority of this disarmament body.

Olof Palme went beyond seeing the problems. As a political leader he saw solutions and fought to bring the nuclear Powers to take the steps necessary to change the course of events.

A number of concrete disarmament proposals are connected with the name of Olof Palme. Some were new ideas which he first presented. Others have a long

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history, but have been invigorated by his political thought. Some have remained for many years on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

As a few examples of the many proposals with which he was working during the last years of his life, I can just mention the idea of a corridor free from battle-field nuclear weapons in central Europe, a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area and a nuclear-weapon freeze.

Already in his first statements as Prime Minister, Olof Palme spoke out against the testing of new and even more diabolic nuclear weapons. A stop for this testing became of increasingly central concern to him. Up to his very last day with us, he in fact worked on this matter together with his advisors.

Olof Palme repeatedly emphasized that a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests would be the single most important step to halt the qualitative arms race. He took much interest in the work of sceintific experts on the problems of verifying a test ban and followed the efforts to start substantive negotiations here at the Conference on Disarmament.

In working for a stop to nuclear testing and for nuclear disarmament, Olof Palme became a spokesman for the broad peace community both in Sweden and inernationally. Its support was important to Olof Palme. He took every opportunity to meet with and to try to give encouragement to the peace movement, of which he considered the labour movement to be an important part.

For many years, Olof Palme played a major role in shaping Sweden's disarmament policy. At the same time, Sweden's role as a medium-size, neutral and non-nuclear country, provided the background to his interntional action. What Olof Palme undertook was essential to Swedish interests and enjoyed far-reaching support by the Swedish people and its political representatives.

Olof Palme was an educator, and he has many students. He was a leader, and he has many followers. His ideals will remain alive, all over the world.

Sweden is grateful to Olof Palme. In our work for peace, justice and disarmament we will remain inspired by his thoughts and his dedication.

In these days leaders of all countries have praised the international work of Olof Palme, in particular his untiring work for peace and disarmament. The Swedish people and Government is proud, happy and grateful for such words.

In the last interview given by Olof Palme, some hours before his tragic slaying, he expressed the hope that 1986 might be a turning-point. "The international situation has brightened. The distrust wavers like the mist on an early morning in spring. Let us hope for a mutual and verified ban on all nuclear testing. A test ban will provide the opporunity and time for dialogue and reflection. The control of it can be strengthened. it is obvious that we would live more safely if nuclear testing was brought to an end. I see 1986 as the year of the great possibilities. We must now all give our constructive contributions so tht the obviously possible also wil turn into reality".

There is no better way to honur the memory of Olof Palme than to transcend the border between words and deeds. There is no better way to honour the memory of Olof Palme than for the leaders of the nuclear Powers to

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

act: to act to achieve a verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; to act to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth; and to act to eliminate nuclear arms.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Theorin for the words she has just addressed to the Conference and the remarks she made on behalf of the Swedish Government. At its last meeting the Conference expressed its profound grief and distress at the assassination of the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme. It paid tribute to Mr. Palme's contribution as a statesman to the cause of peace and disarmament. I should like to reiterate these sentiments here and also repeat to Mrs. Theorin and the Swedish delegation how deeply we share in her country's tragic mourning.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, has asked for the floor.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): The statement of the delegation of Poland read out a moment ago on behalf of a group of Socialist countries has unfortunately confirmed the analysis contained in my statement of 4 March that it is that group of Socialist countries alone that blocks the orderly process of the enlargement of the Conference, as agreed upon by all members. I would like to reiterate that my delegation regrets this state of affairs, particularly in the interest of other Member States of the United Nations that are thus prevented from participating fully in the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. I have no more speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none. I shall therefore go on to another agenda item. The secretariat has today circulated at my request a time-table of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The time-table was drawn up in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. As usual, it is purely indicative and may be amended as necessary. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference wishes to adopt the time-table.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to remind the Conference that at the beginning of its annual session it received requests from non-member States to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. The communications from the non-members have already been circulated by the secretariat a few weeks ago, and I shall submit to the Conference draft decisions on these requests at an informal meeting next Tuesday.

Meanwhile, I should like to remind you that the countries which submitted requests for participation in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons are Norway, Finland, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Switzerland and Spain, in the order in which those requests reached the secretariat.

Finally, I should like to inform members of the Conference that following the meeting I held with Co-ordinators yesterday afternoon, I shall begin a new round of consultations on agenda items 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. I intend to hold

(The President)

(these consultations with the Co-ordinators for those items and the Group Co-ordinators, and subsequently, as work advances with the Co-ordinators, to invite members of the Conference to participate in open-ended consultations, if appropriate. I shall of course continue to hold consultations with individual members of the Conference as President of the Conference.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 11 March 1986, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.