

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 18 March 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. C. Clerckx

(Belgium)

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<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R.A. ROWE Ms. M. LETTS Ms. S. FREEMAN
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. C. CLERCKX Mr. P. NIEUVENHUYS Mr. J.C. DE BISSCHOP
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
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<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. A. CIMA
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Mr. J. JESSEL  
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German Democratic Republic

Mr. H. ROSE  
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Mr. H. PETERS  
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Mr. D. MEISZTER  
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Mr. R. FRANCESCHI  
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Japan:

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Kenya:

Mr. D.D. AFANDE  
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Mexico:

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Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART  
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Netherlands:

Mr. R.J. VAN SCHAIK  
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<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. A.A. ELLA
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<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. J.C. MARIATEGUI Mr. J.G. TERRONES Mr. J.F. RUBIO CORREA
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<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. J. DHANAPALA Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM
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<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV Mr. G.N. VASHADZE Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE Mr. R.J.S. EDIS Mr. I.P. CHALMERS
<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. D. LOWITZ Mr. T. BARTHELEMY Mr. R. LEVINE Mr. R. GOUGH Mr. P.S. CORDEN Mr. R.L. LUACES Ms. M. WINSTON
<u>Venezuela:</u>	Mr. O. GARCIA GARCIA Ms. J. CLAUWAERT GONZALEZ
<u>Yugoslavia:</u>	Mr. K. VIDAS Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
<u>Zaire:</u>	Mr. O.N. MONSHEMULA
<u>Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. M. KOMATINA
<u>Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament:</u>	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 348th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today begins the consideration of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to raise any matter related to the work of the Conference may do so.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Argentina, Peru, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Italy, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Mongolia. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Cámpora.

Mr. CÁMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): the Argentine delegation will deal today with agenda item 5, concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Over the last two centuries, and particularly since the Second World War man's intelligence has created a variety of technologies which have gradually allowed him to extend his dominion over the environment surrounding him. Areas which until only a few decades ago were considered inaccessible to man are now gradually coming under his control thanks to the creation of instruments which modern science and technology place at his disposal. Land areas such as the deserts or high peaks, or the heart of the jungles, as well as air space and the surface and depths of the seas, and the very poles of the planet, all of which were inaccessible to man, have now ceased to be so.

The inevitable result of these areas coming under man's sway has been the need to regulate human conduct in their use, exploitation and appropriation. Suffice it to mention the international rules drawn up to regulate the activities of States in the air and at sea and, more recently, the treaties on the Antarctic, the sea bed, environmental protection etc. The Earth is now physically under the dominion of the human species, and in the face of this fact the organized international community has faced up to the inescapable task of drawing up rules of conduct which should be observed by States and by the men of which they are comprised in order to avoid not only depredation but also conflicts of interest.

It is also the case that some States have advanced more than others in the development and application of modern technology, as a result of which they have taken the lead in the conquest of the new frontiers towards which man has advanced. It is likewise true that science and technology have simultaneously developed towards applications for military purposes in the environments concerned. This war-oriented creativity has roused the consciousness of the international community, and this has given rise to initiatives aimed at curbing militarization and setting limits to the arms race in these environments. The Antarctic Treaty is one example, and the Sea-Bed Treaty another.

The conquest of outer space once again raises these problems. Space science and technology have launched man into the conquest of space. A few countries with greater capabilities are in the vanguard of that conquest, while the vast majority of countries are taking part to a different and lesser degree. The international community has obtained limited results in its

(Mr. C  mpora, Argentina)

attempts to regulate the activities of States in outer space. The most resounding achievement was the adoption of the 1967 Treaty. Other international instruments of a multilateral and bilateral nature were also adopted, but there is no need to mention them because they are well known to us all.

The beginnings of international co-operation in the peaceful use of outer space both within the United Nations and in a bilateral framework has given rise to a variety of agreements leading to the use of satellites of great importance for communications, weather forecasting, geographical and natural resource surveying, among other things. In short, today no one can imagine a world without the benefits derived from the exploration and peaceful use of outer space.

At the same time, however, space science and technology have aroused man's imagination to create instruments of war. This is where the Conference on Disarmament is faced with its specific responsibility, and it has therefore included item 5 in its agenda, whose purpose is to prevent an arms race in outer space.

World public opinion already knows that the space powers have steadily militarized outer space. However, the international community must certainly be interested in also knowing whether the militarization of outer space has reached the point of no return. This is a question which we raise in the Conference on Disarmament. It is a question which will receive a definitive answer in the near future, since later the situation will become irrevocable if the policy of the space Powers continues along current lines. When the point of no return is reached, outer space will be militarized once and for all, and then here, in the Conference on Disarmament, we shall have to alter the title of agenda item 5 which refers to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and change it to refer to cessation of the arms race in outer space and space disarmament.

We believe, most unfortunately, that we are not far from having to make such a change in our agenda, which would mean changing our objective of "preventing" for that of "halting" an arms race in outer space. When that time comes, and everything suggests that we are heading for it, it will be a moment of tragic symbolism for the members of the Conference on Disarmament.

This Conference is continually aware that the space Powers have set out to militarize outer space. This is an obvious conclusion inasmuch as our work on this item has been watered down in general discussions and it is impossible to attain the necessary consensus to set up competent subsidiary bodies to study and negotiate agreements to prevent the militarization of space.

The six heads of State, including President Alfons  n of my own country, have drawn attention to this in their Joint Message addressed to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 28 February last, in which they said: "We are concerned, however, that no concrete measures have as yet been agreed which would help to prevent an arms race in space...".

At a time when disturbing trends in space armaments may be observed and events in that environment are rapidly transforming the destiny of mankind, the Conference on Disarmament must rapidly resume the substantive

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

consideration of this item. We are convinced that as time passes without effective solutions in this sphere, diplomatic efforts will be overtaken by irreversible military realities.

The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, clearly perceived the dangers inherent in the continuing militarization of outer space and the spread of the arms race to that environment. However, seven years had to lapse before the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body could establish, last year, the corresponding ad hoc committee with a timid mandate and for a brief period.

My delegation believes that it is urgently necessary for this Conference to continue its efforts on this issue, even if they are far from satisfying our aspirations and concerns. We have more than once expressed our satisfaction at the start of bilateral negotiations between the two main space Powers. At the same time, we have pointed out that these negotiations should not take place at the expense of the multilateral approach to the problem. We share the unanimous view point expressed in this Conference about the desirable complementarity between the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the multilateral negotiations for which the Conference on Disarmament is responsible. However, as we have pointed out previously, the complementarity between these two frameworks cannot exist if there is no communication between them. It would therefore be useful for us to be periodically informed about the course of the bilateral negotiations, as stated in General Assembly resolution 40/87. A report by the other space Powers giving details of the various military activities they are undertaking would also be something which would contribute to a better understanding of this problem in Conference.

Military activity in space must be classified and described because otherwise it will not be possible to prohibit it. To this end it is necessary to exchange information and give wide-ranging detailed reports on what that military activity consists of, what space object with military uses are, and what space weapons are.

Paragraph 51 of the Ad Hoc Committee's Report last year says that it would be most beneficial for experts to take part in view of the complexity of the item. We support this idea.

More than two decades ago the United States and the Soviet Union began testing anti-satellite systems. The reasons for the continued interest in such systems are obvious in view of the essential functions carried out by satellites in those Powers' military forces. Thus, we should recall that the technology of anti-satellite systems is connected with the development of anti-ballistic missile systems. The existence of such systems, besides provoking countermeasures to eliminate them, intensifies the development of nuclear weapon systems. This issue, which so far has only been taken up at the bilateral level, has serious implications for the entire international community.

The weapon systems to which I have just referred, and others which may be developed, will certainly trigger off an unprecedented and potentially uncontrollable arms race both in space and on Earth. This process, which has critical effects for the security of the two military alliances, also endangers the survival of the world as a whole because of its potential for unleashing a nuclear war. The multilateral approach is therefore necessary so that the security interests of all States are taken into account.

(Mr. Cámpora, Argentina)

In a period of constant evolution and change in research and development relating to new weapons and weapon systems, the possibilities of innovation are unlimited. Clearly, no type of weapon and no field of application will require as much investment as the development and deployment of space weapons. The fact that these economic and technological efforts cannot be used in a spirit of solidarity to overcome the backwardness of a vast proportion of mankind is to be deplored.

Outer space has been militarized for more than 25 years. As the latest SIPRI yearbook states, since 1958 2,219 satellites which carry out real or potential military functions have been launched into space. This represents at least 75 per cent of all satellites in space. The high percentage of satellites with military uses highlights the fact that the super-Powers' space activities are integrated with their weapon systems on Earth and their strategies and doctrines associated with the use of nuclear weapons. It is also not out of place to recall that some nuclear weapon States have used satellites to support military operations against developing countries. Serious events of this kind highlight the interest of all countries, space-Powers and others, in achieving the rapid demilitarization of outer space. The circumstances should be borne in mind when considering a legal régime for the protection and use of satellites.

Together with the vast majority of countries making up the international community, Argentina has always maintained that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and that consequently it should be preserved for exclusively peaceful uses in order to promote the development of all nations and international co-operation.

Space, a new dimension in human enterprise, makes all peoples of the Earth profoundly aware of man's common destiny. More clearly than ever our planet is, in the universal city of the Cosmos, the sole home of all men whatever country they may inhabit. Consequently the use of outer space cannot be based on criteria linked with military doctrines which reflect the specific national security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon space Powers. Criteria of this kind foster the process of action and reaction which perpetuates the arms race between them. This is a problem which must be approached from a broader standpoint fully reflecting the concerns and interests of all States on Earth.

Mr. MARIATEGUI (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, as I am speaking for the first time in this Conference, may I express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you preside over our work. Your country and mine have for a long time enjoyed exemplary relations of friendship and co-operation, and I should like to assure you of my delegation's unstinting co-operation in the difficult work which you are undertaking with your universally recognized intelligence and experience.

I should also like to express the Peruvian delegation's appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Richard Butler, for his dynamic and efficient imprint on our Conference's work during his presidency in the month of February. I should also like to thank, through you, the distinguished representatives who have been so kind as to welcome me to this Conference, the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Miljan Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, and all the distinguished representatives, whom I wish to assure of our broad co-operation and my personal friendship.



(Mr. Mariátegui, Peru)

My delegation wishes to convey to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, and his delegation our heartfelt condolences at the unacceptable disappearance of Olof Palme. Both the people and the Government of Peru were deeply moved by the tragic news of his death. Olof Palme will remain in our memories as an outstanding citizen of his noble country, as a tireless fighter for peace, an inestimable friend of the countries of the third world, and a builder of co-operation and understanding among peoples.

The Conference on Disarmament has begun its work this year in climate of justified hope originating in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva last November, and fostered more recently by the important statement made by Mr. Gorbachev on 15 January concerning a programme of disarmament and international security. This climate of hope offers our forum an invaluable chance to make progress in disarmament.

However, we are aware that these facts alone are not enough to warrant hope for substantive results. We are aware of the fundamental differences separating the Great Powers, especially as regards their own security perceptions, and as long as this overriding question is not resolved it will be impossible to make real progress in the field of disarmament.

Hitherto, international security has been based on the specific concepts and unilateral arms build-up of the main military Powers. Each of them has started from the conviction that it was faced with danger from outside which had to be countered by the accumulation of armaments and the steady technological development of those weapons.

These are the premises underlying the various views according to which international peace and security should be based on deterrence and a balance of terror which, far from guaranteeing peace and security, have increased the risk of war, including nuclear war, and have led to instability in international relations. Thus, in a world threatened with the permanent possibility of nuclear war, these concepts have lost all validity. The time has come to replace deterrence by means of weapons with a new concept of international security which will free us from the vicious circle of mistrust and the arms race. To do this, the primary task must be to build confidence. This will require courage, political will and serious commitment to negotiation.

Without confidence we will be unable to halt the arms race, since without it it is hard to believe that States will renounce security based on armaments for security based on disarmament agreements. Confidence-building must therefore become the centrepiece of international relations, and to achieve it we must search for solutions in the political field, which in the final analysis is where mistrust and the arms race originate.

For a long time the security of the great majority of States and the survival of mankind have depended on the security perceptions and interests of a handful of States. This situation has become more intolerable in the nuclear age, when the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a few States has directly and fundamentally endangered the vital security interests of all States. A new conception of security must therefore ensure the security of all States, since in our era none is free from the nuclear danger. Security should also be equal for all, since otherwise the imbalance which leads to the arms race will persist.

(Mr. Mariátegui, Peru)

The culmination to be desired from a new system of security is a link between disarmament and development, through the allocation of some of the enormous resources devoted to the arms race for the benefit of the developing countries. Our countries cannot wait any longer for the military Powers finally to begin a disarmament process, not only because our problems are in many respects qualitatively different, but also because for those countries the arms race is not an excruciating alternative to development as it is for us. This was the orientation of the Peruvian initiative on conventional disarmament at the regional level adopted by the General Assembly at its fortieth session, and of the Peruvian Governments unilateral decision to reduce military expenditures in order to channel those resources into development and foster a greater climate of confidence in the region. These initiatives do not seek to distract from the efforts made by the international community for nuclear disarmament. Through them we have directed our efforts towards a disarmament process in conventional weapons, which is an immediate problem for us, and one which it is within our own power to resolve.

The link between disarmament and development has not yet received the consideration it deserves in this Conference, even though it is included in the "decatalogue" of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and there are many General Assembly resolutions expressing concern in favour of the restriction of military expenditures and the reallocation of those resources for socio-economic development.

The accelerating arms race and tensions in the international arena have increased our Conference's responsibility as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The Final Document adopted by consensus in 1978 has clearly given it the unshrinkable responsibility for undertaking negotiations leading to disarmament and arms control agreements.

Our delegation highly appreciates the progress made last year and in January of this year by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the efficient leadership of Ambassador Turbanski, in its work to conclude a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. This progress may be seen in the process of defining and classifying the relevant chemicals and on the issue of the identification of chemical weapon production facilities and measures to eliminate them.

The question of a nuclear test ban has become the focal point of efforts to eliminate the nuclear danger. To achieve such a prohibition would really be to reverse the course of the nuclear arms race. On many occasions the United Nations has condemned nuclear testing and has expressed the belief that the continuation of nuclear tests will intensify the arms race and increase the danger of nuclear war. More than 50 United Nations resolutions have been adopted on the issue, which has been under consideration for 25 years.

At the latest General Assembly Peru, together with Mexico, sponsored resolution 40/80 A which received the largest number of votes in favour. The resolution contains an appeal to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular to the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1986 session of an Ad Hoc Committee to carry out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions.

(Mr. Mariátegui, Peru)

For many years there were no negotiations on this item because the nuclear Powers argued that the verification problem was the principal obstacle. In 1982 and 1983 an Ad Hoc Committee undertook substantive work on all aspects of verification and the necessary means to ensure compliance with a nuclear test ban, its work was technically exhaustive. Now the Soviet Union has formally stated that it is agreeable to very strict control of a nuclear test ban, including on-site inspections and the use of all the latest developments in seismology.

Various bodies have testified that the progress in scientific and technical means in this connection has reached a suitably effective level and could be still further improved. This is shown by the workshop on seismic verification in Norway last year and the so-called Five Continent Peace Initiative has also stated this. There is therefore no valid ground for continuing to oppose negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty simply by arguing that there are shortcomings in the verification systems.

To conclude, I think it is highly relevant to quote the words of the United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, addressed to our Conference at the beginning of this year's session:

"1986 is the International Year of Peace, the theme of which is the safeguarding of peace and humanity. It has begun under hopeful auspices of new opportunities to deal constructively with problems which threaten international security. Foremost among these is the problem of disarmament. The hope with which the Year begins can be fulfilled only if the foundations for significant measures of arms limitation and disarmament are speedily laid. All Governments know that, in this nuclear age, any major conflict carries with it the risk of world-wide disaster. All must recognize the common responsibility which this imposes for the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of international security. Your Conference has a major role to play in making it possible for this responsibility to be met."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, on 11 March the head of the Mexican delegation, Ambassador García Robles, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a Joint Message from the leaders of Argentina, India, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden and Greece to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M.S. Gorbachev, and the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan; it is contained in document CD/676. I should now like to read out the text of the reply by Mikhael Gorbachev to the Joint Message; at our request it will be circulated as an official document of the Conference.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

"RESPONSE BY M.S. GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, TO THE JOINT MESSAGE FROM THE LEADERS OF ARGENTINA, INDIA, MEXICO, TANZANIA, SWEDEN AND GREECE

Mr. Raoul Alfonsín, President of Argentina,

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India,

Mr. Miguel de la Madrid, President of Mexico,

Mr. Julius Nyerere,

Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden,

Mr. Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece,

I note with profound regret that, having been felled by the evil hand of a base assassin, Olof Palme, is no longer among you. His tragic death struck deep pain into the hearts of all who cherish peace, for the preservation of which he campaigned passionately and untiringly.

Sirs, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, I should like to express to you our feeling of deep respect for the consistency and purposefulness that characterize your efforts to curtail the arms race and avert nuclear war. In our opinion, your joint initiatives match up in full to the task of organizing constructive, creative interaction among States and peoples on a worldwide scale, especially now, when the very fate of the human race is in question.

The ideas on universal security without nuclear weapons that are expressed in your letter are fully consonant with the concept put forward by ourselves at the recently-ended 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of the creation of a comprehensive international security system. One of the fundamental principles of such a system must be - and we are unanimous with you in this respect - the complete and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons.

As I see it, our views also coincide on another point, that the halting of nuclear tests is an important step towards freeing humanity from the nuclear arms race with all its pernicious consequences that can be and must be taken.

Obviously, it is not by chance that you are raising this question anew today, shortly before the expiry of the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. The extra time we granted the American Administration to weigh up our proposals is running out. We cannot unilaterally extend it for ever. By refraining for over seven months now from all nuclear explosions, both experimental and peaceful, we have already paid a certain price, both militarily and economically.

However, in response to your appeal to the USSR and the United States not to conduct any nuclear tests prior to the next Soviet-American summit meeting, we hereby declare:

The Soviet Union will not conduct nuclear explosions even after 31 March - until the first nuclear explosion in the United States.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As regards the problem of verification, I should like to stress once again that we attach great importance to it, because we have an interest in agreements' being honoured unswervingly and in all parties' to them being fully convinced that that is so.

With respect to a nuclear test ban, verification can be ensured by national technical means and with the help of international procedures - including on-site inspection if need be. We propose to the American side the conclusion of an agreement on the granting to observers from both sides of the possibility of visiting, on a mutual basis and upon request, places where unclear phenomena occur in order to eliminate possible doubts as to whether such phenomena are connected with nuclear explosions.

We are willing to take up your proposal - if, of course, it is accepted by the other side too - to provide assistance, including on-site inspections, in verifying the halting of nuclear tests.

Naturally, in order fully to resolve the problem of tests there is a need for a treaty that would ban nuclear weapon tests in international law. We propose that a start be made without delay on drafting it and that talks to that end be resumed or begun in any form - bilateral, trilateral or multilateral - and without linkage to any other questions. To those who fear that questions of verification would be pushed into the background at such talks, we propose that a simultaneous start be made at the talks, and from their very outset, on settling those questions too, so as to have a comprehensive agreement as soon as possible.

I can assure you that the Soviet Union will, for its part, continue to do everything necessary to put the resolution of the urgent problem of ending nuclear tests on practical tracks and to secure the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals.

Yours truly,  
M. GORBACHEV"

Mr. FRANCESCHI (Italy): Mr. President, as a newcomer to the Conference, I should like first of all to stress once again the great significance my Government attaches to the efforts towards disarmament deployed by all countries represented in this forum.

These efforts clearly express the longing for peace and disarmament of Governments and of billions of men and women. The quest for peace and indeed for the necessary tools to achieve it is not the monopoly of Major Powers; it is a common duty and a primary responsibility of all countries.

It has nevertheless to be noted that this session of the Conference has opened in a more positive framework which is connected with last November's summit of Geneva and with the improved conditions for a dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Government and public opinion of my country attach particular importance both to the results of the summit and to the expectations which it has activated.

(Mr. Franceschi, Italy)

We sincerely hope that those favourable indications might contribute in the most constructive way also to positive developments in the work of the Conference on Disarmament and to concrete results on the various issues on its agenda, in harmony with the requirements of our time. We are looking forward to the expansion of this positive trend through deeds and acts which should gradually develop towards consensus in the negotiations which take place not only bilaterally but also in the multilateral forum of Stockholm, Vienna and especially here in Geneva.

General and complete disarmament under effective international control is obviously the most basic condition to prevent war, in order to reach this goal a balance of forces, both nuclear and conventional, at the lowest possible level of armaments will realistically continue to be an intermediate goal. We thus regard with apprehension any unnecessary proliferation of nuclear armaments. Security requirements differ in the various regions of the world. They differ indeed from country to country. We respect all approaches to security issues by all countries since we believe that only through the preservation of security is it possible to undertake a collective step towards effective disarmament. We therefore also feel entitled to respect for our own policy which, while regarding nuclear deterrence as essential to its national security, does act in all possible ways towards increased security and equilibrium at lower levels of all types of armaments.

I personally happened to be in Geneva at the time of a more geographically restricted Conference, the CSCE, which also dealt amongst other relevant issues, with the security problem, of Europe, now under consideration in Stockholm. Thus, I had a chance of witnessing the euphoria of detente which unfortunately did not respond to the very high expectations of the time. This should serve us as an example of dealing responsibility with the many problems which confront us in this wider context.

The 1986 session opened with an agenda which, prepared with the utmost diligence by the secretariat, has been approved since the very first plenary meeting of the Conference. It is an agenda on which we fully agree and which contains items that we consider all having great interest. We are really pleased that three Ad Hoc Committees have already been re-established, dealing with matters of major relevance. As to the other items on the agenda, my delegation renews its complete availability for an in-depth examination of all relevant issues and propositions. What seems most important to my delegation is to achieve progress in the substantive work of the Conference and avoid delays and obstacles of a procedural nature.

May I also underline, Mr. President, my warmest congratulations for your nomination to the Presidency of the Conference for the month of March. I also wish to give you the assurances of the full and complete co-operation of my delegation in the exercise of your important functions. Besides, I would also like to underline, just a few days after a State visit to Brussels of President Cossiga, the very close ties of friendship and co-operation which link our two countries in the field of bilateral and multilateral relations. I wish also to thank Ambassador Butler, who preceded you, for his work in the first month of activity of this Conference. Our appreciation also goes to the entire secretariat and in particular to Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui for their precious contribution to our work. May I also express the deepest condolences to the Swedish delegation on the tragic disappearance of Prime Minister Olof Palme, a great statesman indeed, deeply committed to peace and disarmament.

(Mr. Franceschi, Italy)

My statement today will be devoted to item 5 of our agenda: prevention of an arms race in outer space, a subject to which my Government, as is well known, has long attached special importance. In this connection I would like to recall that Italy was one of the first countries to work for a multilateral dialogue in the field of arms control in space. My Government did not confine itself to acceding to international instruments in this field but also in 1978 took the initiative at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of proposing new measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, a proposal which was reflected in paragraph 80 of the Final Document.

Great attention is indeed devoted to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space both at the political level and in the wider context of public opinion. We believe that this is rightly so, because arms control issues related to space have a very significant bearing on international stability and, therefore, on international peace and security.

We therefore witnessed with a feeling of satisfaction and confidence the launching in 1985, after several years' efforts, of the activities of an Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Even if it occurred quite late in the session, only allowing nine meetings on substantive problems, the discussions have been most useful. A carefully balanced programme of work has in fact allowed a first exchange of views, under the enlightened chairmanship of Ambassador Alfarargy of Egypt, on the general aspects of the military use of space, the relevant legal régime and the proposals made so far to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee, although brief and thus somewhat superficial, showed the great complexity of the issue to be discussed, as lucidly described by the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, in his remarkable statement of 30 July 1985. This same discussion has nevertheless opened the way for consideration in greater depth of the more significant problems relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. The analysis of proposals has only just begun; these proposals in many cases call for a further elaboration by their authors. But what seems particularly important in this context is a consideration of the question of effective verification mechanisms. The in-depth study of the problems, concepts, existing agreements and proposals should therefore be pursued, as it has proved useful and promising. The work-programme adopted last year gives us the widest chance to proceed in this direction. The assistance of experts might also be valuable for the consideration of a subject which, in its novelty, needs a thorough examination of almost all its aspects in order to achieve concrete progress at the multilateral level.

Under these auspices, the Ad Hoc Committee can make an important contribution in the field of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, thus responding to the attention with which this question is now deeply perceived.

For our part, we think that an in-depth consideration of many important aspects of this issue is possible -- and indeed necessary -- in this forum.

The General Assembly of the United Nations itself, in its resolution 40/87 of 12 December 1985 (paragraphs 4 and 6) seems to have implicitly drawn a distinction between certain issues that should be dealt

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multilaterally and other ones that should instead be the subject of bilateral negotiations. This distinction is particularly important as it signals the determination of the General Assembly to facilitate as far as possible the bilateral talks of Geneva.

I should like to recall, in this regard, that the Soviet-American agreement of 8 January provided for the opening of negotiations on space and nuclear arms with all these questions to be considered and solved in their interrelationship. The transfer of negotiations on those issues from the bilateral forum to another forum could seriously undermine the very basis of the Geneva talks thus also creating obstacles to the nuclear disarmament process.

The Italian Government wholeheartedly supports the goal proclaimed both by the United States Administration and by the Government of the USSR of a world free of nuclear, offensive weapons. It seems to us that these proclamations strengthen the prospects of general and complete disarmament which should be implemented in a context of stability and peace and which should include a peaceful use of space to the benefit of all mankind.

The Conference on Disarmament has a primary role to play and immense work to accomplish for the achievement of such goals and, in particular, it will have a wide range of activities to perform in dealing with questions concerning space. The more so since technological progress and scientific research constitute a reality which is in constant evolution and has a tremendous bearing on the problems of disarmament and security. Our main task in Geneva should especially be aimed at working out co-operative approaches and at conducting a timely consideration of the many aspects involved, so as to lay the ground for a clearer understanding and for a gradual solution of difficulties. We think that given the time which lies ahead before research programmes currently under way yield concrete results we shall have the chance to accomplish very useful work, if we do not indulge in procedural wranglings.

The Conference still has to decide whether to reconvene the Ad Hoc Committee and to confirm its previous mandate. The purpose of the remarks which follow is to assess some work which still remains to be done under such a mandate and to provide some conceptual guidelines for a discussion of issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space within the Ad Hoc Committee, also in the light of General Assembly resolution 40/87 of 12 December 1985.

The Conference on Disarmament exercises its responsibilities in an independent way in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, resolution 40/87, in spite of reservations expressed by a number of countries on paragraphs 5 and 9, contains a number of elements which are relevant to the definition of a conceptual approach to the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and which therefore deserves to be carefully examined.

Paragraph 1 of resolution 40/87 reads: "Recalls the obligation of all States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their space activities". The text of this paragraph is related to the discussions which were held last year, in the Ad Hoc Committee, whose programme of work included, as mentioned above, consideration of existing agreements relevant to the prevention of an



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arms race in outer space. However, neither the General Assembly nor the Ad Hoc Committee have investigated in depth central problems such as the relationship between the commitment made by United Nations Members under Article 2 of the Charter and the right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter, nor the way in which these interrelated commitments and rights may be applicable to the specific field of space activities. On a more general plan, the Ad Hoc Committee has failed so far to assess to what extent and under what conditions existing commitments or obligations which are general in scope can be dealt with so as to concretely contribute to the purpose of preventing an arms race in outer space. Similarly, useful work could be done in assessing compliance with existing obligations concerning space and other related activities. In fact paragraph 1 of resolution 40/87, in its broad formulation, opens a whole range of problems on which the Conference on Disarmament should fully investigate.

Paragraph 2 of resolution 40/87 touches upon a subject which was only marginally debated within the Ad Hoc Committee in 1985, although it is crucial to a correct consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The text correctly focuses on the peaceful purposes which must govern the use of space. Its impact should nevertheless also be considered from a wider angle. In fact, paragraph 2 links the use of outer space for peaceful purposes to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Moreover, resolution 40/87 expressly refers in its preambular part to Article III of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of State in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies under which States Parties to the Treaty have undertaken "to carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding". In the debates which took place in 1985 within the Ad Hoc Committee, while some misgivings were expressed on the role of observation satellites on the ground of their alleged capability to intrude into the sphere of national sovereignty, the importance of the role of such satellites in ensuring compliance with disarmament agreements was widely recognized, together with the stabilizing effect of this specific form of military use of space. These debates, as well as the text of paragraph 2 of resolution 40/87, provide a basis for defining the angle from which the problem of the military use of space and its implications for consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space should also be examined. If space is to be used for peaceful purposes only, the basic criterion to judge whether space activities are compatible with this purpose is not so much their military or civilian nature, but rather their capability to enhance stability and thus contribute to the goal of maintaining international peace and security.

Both the debates which took place in 1985 within the Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the deliberations adopted on this matter by the General Assembly at its fortieth session provide a clear picture of the complexity of the issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space which still need to be appropriately investigated. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the Conference shows that these issues have just been touched upon in the brief span of existence of the Committee and that plenty of work remains to be done to establish a consensual basis for the future work of the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

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At its 1985 session the Conference on Disarmament established an Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space under a mandate which offered plenty of opportunities for in-depth discussion of the most important issues related with that question. This mandate was agreed by the Conference bearing in mind the text of the relevant paragraph of resolution 39/59 of 12 December 1984 which was identical to the text of paragraph 9 of resolution 40/87.

The Ad Hoc Committee did not have the time during the 1985 session of the Conference to go beyond a preliminary discussion of the issues it had been requested to consider. That mandate has enabled us to make a beginning, but it has by no means been exhausted. This continues to be the view of the Italian Government. In 1985 the mandate was attained only with great difficulty, skill and perseverance. Attempts to re-negotiate it would probably involve further lengthy discussion at the expense of substantive deliberation. Moreover, the political and negotiating context in which the mandate was agreed has not appreciably changed. Indeed, while the United States and the USSR are seriously coming to grips with the negotiating objectives they have set for themselves, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we need to ensure that our deliberations although primarily responding to the interests of peace and progress, and ultimately to those of mankind, are complementary to, and not disruptive of, those negotiations.

The Italian delegation considers it therefore reasonable for the Conference on Disarmament at its current session to reconvene the Ad Hoc Committee under its previous mandate, leaving it to the Committee to formulate concrete suggestions on its future activities on the basis of the progress achieved in its consideration of issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ambassador Kamyab.

Mr. KAMYAB (Islamic Republic of Iran): Objectivity with regard to the maintenance of respect for international obligations and undertakings related to international law has always been emphasized by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as being of vital importance for the security of all nations and for the strengthening of the foundations on which the international community, composed of some large and many smaller nations, may continue its life with dignity and honour on the firm ground of prevalence of justice in international relations.

The adoption, however, of irresponsible attitudes on the part of certain countries in respect of many gross violations of international law, especially in the course of the Iran/Iraq war, has led to the continuation and further exacerbation of the violations in a much more blatant manner.

Nevertheless, Iran fights hard for the maintenance of respect for humanitarian principles and regulations concerning armed conflict to the almost unprecedented extent of not resorting to retaliation in kind even when confronted with instances of such gross violations as attacks against civil airlines and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Certainly

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there is also a role to be played by the international system and individual countries, or a group of them, in respect of such blatant violations of international law.

In the course of the past few years, Iraq has on many occasions resorted to the use of chemical weapons. The renewed use of chemical weapons during the course of the present year, however, became widespread during the month of February. The attacks were made against a number of Iranian cities and also against the new Iranian positions.

Therefore, a request was made to the United Nations Secretary-General for the despatch of a team of specialists to investigate the use of chemical weapons. On 24 February 1986, the Secretary-General gave instructions for the mission to assemble in Vienna and proceed without further delay to Iran and at the same time reiterated to the Government of Iraq his readiness to instruct the mission to visit Iraq also, to investigate Iraq's allegations with regard to this issue, should the Government so request. The request did not meet with a positive response from Iraq. The United Nations team of specialists visited Iran from 26 February to 3 March 1986, however, and with the support of the experience, knowledge and the results obtained during the two earlier investigations, conducted in 1984 and 1985, very important findings and conclusions were produced in the framework of their report to the United Nations Secretary-General.

The report S/17911 of 14 March 1986 will in the near future be presented to the Conference, but until then I consider it of importance to the Conference to draw attention to the most important parts of that report. It is recorded as an important point (paragraph 30) that there was a lapse of about two weeks between the dates of the first alleged attacks and the arrival of the mission in Iran, in addition, unusually heavy rain had occurred and many areas were flooded. The delay and the environmental degradation of chemical warfare agents that might have been used in attacks, particularly the nerve gas Tabun, made the chemical part of the work difficult, according to the report.

Paragraph 29 indicates that "it should be placed on record here that immense efforts have been made to attend to those exposed to chemical agents, that the medical treatment provided is perfectly in order, that the quality of the doctors responsible for such treatment is very high, that all the victims are treated with the utmost compassion and care, and the affected Iraqi prisoners are also treated with the utmost care and respect."

The chance that inaction on the part of the international system has given to Iraq for the improvement of its tactics is very well reflected in paragraph 42 of the report: "On this mission no unexploded bombs were found. This is not surprising as we were told by a captured Iraqi pilot during interview at the Shaheed Baghai Hospital in Ahvaz on 28 February 1986 that impact fuses were now being used in place of time fuses used previously and described in our earlier report. The pilot also stated that due to changes in tactics, chemical bombs are usually dropped from aircraft flying at high altitude instead of low altitude as used previously." And it continues on the next paragraph to say that "The Iraqi pilot also stated that the use of chemical bombs had to be specifically authorized and pilots were not permitted to examine critically those attached to their aircraft prior to undertaking a

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'special mission'. In spite of this restriction, the pilot was able accurately to describe the colour, shape, marking and mass of chemical bombs currently being used in attacks against Iranian forces and his description coincided with our description of the bombs examined by us in 1984."

The validity of the testimony given by the Iraqi pilot is emphasized immediately on the following paragraph (44). "The testimony of the Iraqi pilot given through an interpreter in the presence of all members of the United Nations team, was obtained without prompting or duress. The evidence is so vital that it cannot be ignored."

Very important points are also witnessed by other Iraqi casualties (paragraphs 51 and 52). "On Thursday 27 February 1986, we interviewed 9 Iraqi casualties, from a group of 15 being treated at the Labbati-Nejad Medical Centre for injuries suffered from chemical weapons in the Al Faw area about three days before. The interview was conducted by the mission in the presence of two doctors and through an interpreter. The information was provided by the Iraqis voluntarily without duress and with no prompting and in a free manner. The Iraqi personnel gave a consistent account of the attacks that caused their injuries, either after they had been captured by, or had surrendered to, Iranian forces or were in no man's land between the opposing forces. Almost all of the Iraqi personnel claimed that they had been injured by bombs dropped by Iraqi aircraft. When asked how they knew the identity of the aircraft they stated that the aircraft were bombing Iranian positions and were subject to Iranian anti-aircraft fire."

The specialists then point out that a hospital in Ahvaz they interviewed the Iraqi pilot whose aircraft had been shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile several days before. The pilot responding freely and voluntarily and without any duress, stated that he had participated in two "special missions" against Iranian forces using chemical bombs.

Paragraph 56 under the heading "Summary and Conclusions" states the summary comments in relation to the present investigation in the following manner:

"(a) detailed examination of Iranian casualties showed ocular lesions, ranging from mild to severe conjunctivitis with intense palpebral oedema, skin lesions including large vesicles filled with amber fluid, cutaneous separations, dark pigmentations and lesions approximating to second degree burns. In some of the cases respiratory injuries and reduced leucocyte levels were found. The same features were found in other casualties which were cursorily examined as well as in corpses. All the lesions observed were caused, without any doubt, by mustard gas (yperrite).

(b) using a special instrument designed to detect chemical warfare agents, low concentrations of mustard gas vapour were detected in numerous craters at three sites around Abadan. Contaminated soil collected from a bomb crater (resulting from an attack the previous day on a field hospital) when analysed in laboratories in Europe, was found to contain mustard gas. In addition a hair sample collected from a victim after he had been attacked with chemical weapons was shown to contain mustard gas.

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(c) examination of metal components of aerial bombs, collected from bomb craters around Abadan, showed that the items had come from bombs that were similar to those examined by the team in 1984. (During the present mission we did not find nor were we shown any other type of chemical weapons, such as artillery shells).

(d) significant new evidence was provided during the interviews in Tehran of Iraqi casualties. They stated that their injuries had been caused by chemical bombs dropped by Iraqi aircraft during attacks on Iranian positions.

(e) important new evidence was also provided by a captured Iraqi pilot. He confirmed that Iraqi aircraft had been used to attack Iranian positions with chemical bombs and that he had personally participated in two such 'special missions'.

The next paragraph (57), reads as follows: "From the present investigation the following are our unanimous conclusions:

(a) in areas around Abadan inspected by the mission, chemical weapons have been used against Iranian positions by Iraqi Forces,

(b) based on medical examinations and testimony of Iranian and Iraqi casualties evacuated from the Al Faw area, chemical weapons were also used in that war zone by Iraqi Forces,

(c) from the evidence examined by the specialists the type of weapon used was aerial bombs,

(d) the chemical used was mustard gas (yperite),

(e) the extent to which mustard gas was used could not be determined with the time and resources available to us. However, from the over 700 casualties actually seen in Tehran and Ahvaz it is our impression that the use of chemical weapons in 1986 appears to be more extensive than in 1984."

The concluding paragraph (58), however, indicated that: "after having conducted the examination of various sites, weapons components and numerous casualties in our investigations undertaken in 1984, 1985 and 1986, according to the guidelines given by the Secretary-General, together with circumstantial evidence, we unanimously conclude that:

(a) on many occasions, Iraqi Forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian Forces,

(b) the agent used mainly has been mustard gas although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed."

Finally in transmitting the report of the specialists to the Security Council, the Secretary-General notes with regret that "the specialists have confirmed use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces against Iranian Forces".

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The Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its sincere thanks to the United Nations Secretary-General and to the team of specialists (who also presented the first report on this subject in March 1984 (document S/16433)), composed of four eminent experts from Australia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, with Mr. Iqbal Riza as co-ordinator, for their devotion and courage in carrying out duties entrusted upon them.

Their courageous endeavour, though bringing to light only a minor part of the gross violations incurred by the régime in Iraq, calls indeed for sincere appreciation on the part of this Conference for the contribution this work has done towards the construction of a sure road to disarmament and security.

I am of the opinion that it would be highly beneficial to the activities of the Conference and particularly to the ongoing work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in respect of the verification aspects of the future chemical weapons convention, to draw the attention on my colleagues to the invaluable knowledge and experience obtained during the three successful chemical-weapon investigations in 1984, 1985 and 1986 by the United Nations team of specialists; and I put forward for consideration by the Conference the suggestion that a request be addressed in the appropriate manner to the United Nations Secretary-General for the provision to the Conference of the experience, knowledge and results obtained in the course of the three investigations carried out to date by the team of specialists.

Experience we gain one way or another, and we may even be able to conclude, hopefully in a near future, the chemical weapons convention; but what I believe to be the most essential precondition for the real success of the Conference on Disarmament is an uninterrupted and objective effort by all of us here to preserve respect for and maintain credibility of the principles of the existing law, so that we may build upon what we have in a consistent and meaningful manner.

Therefore I am compelled to reiterate the need, as pointed out on previous occasions when I addressed the Disarmament Conference on the same issue, for suitable action on the part of the Conference in response to such gross violations of the existing international law, in particular the violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in war. If we are serious in our work and have the sincere intention to make moves towards the sacred goal of disarmament in this Conference, we should not fail to condemn as the first step the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the most clear terms. In this manner our progress towards peace and disarmament may certainly be guaranteed.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, may I first of all sincerely congratulate you on behalf of the Mongolian delegation on your assumption of the important and responsible duties of the President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March, and wish you success in this post. My delegation notes that your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, made great efforts to enable the Conference to begin a serious dialogue on key agenda items, for which we are grateful to him.

The Conference is now halfway through the first part of its 1986 session, but it must be said that so far it has not succeeded in making tangible progress on the most pressing priority issues on its agenda. These are

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primarily the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and other items. The international community's attention is focused on these paramount problems.

The twenty-seventh session of the CPSU which recently finished in Moscow once again drew attention to these and other essential issues of concern to mankind, and established principled foundations for a universal system of international security. It stressed that the Soviet Union will continue to fight resolutely for peace and security and to halt the material preparations for a nuclear war, to reverse the arms race on Earth and not to allow an arms race in space, and to achieve the total elimination everywhere of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction by the twenty-first century. The decisions taken at the session fully respond to the vital interests of all peoples of the world.

Mongolia, like the overwhelming majority of other States of the world, is firmly convinced that in order to undertake practical steps to reverse the nuclear arms race and finally eliminate nuclear weapons altogether everywhere, it is necessary first to refrain from carrying out any further nuclear explosions. If there are no nuclear explosions, the foundations for the modernization of nuclear weapons and the development of new types and varieties of such weapons will disappear. At the same time there will be a quantitative reduction in nuclear stockpiles as a result of obsolescence, and in the long run they will disappear. The nuclear States will objectively be obliged to engage in a genuinely practical disarmament process. Circumstances are such that merely to reduce nuclear arsenals, without a nuclear-weapon-test ban, does not provide a way out from the dilemma of the nuclear danger, for it will not prevent the development of increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons.

That is why already at this point, pending an agreed nuclear-test ban, it is so necessary to have genuine measures in this field. A measure of this kind might be an agreement between the USSR and the United States to cease all nuclear explosions, on the understanding that the other nuclear States could rapidly join in this moratorium.

In this connection we welcome the Soviet Union's decision to extend its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions which was due to expire on 31 December 1985, so that the American side can once again weigh up the proposals for the cessation of nuclear explosions and give a positive response to it. As we see it once such a mutual moratorium exists it could remain in force until the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty.

There is no need to stress the seriousness of the step taken by the USSR. Its decision to extend the unilateral moratorium at a time of intensive nuclear testing by the United States is no simple matter, for the gap in the United States' favour as regards testing is continually increasing. The United States has already carried out one-third more nuclear explosions than the USSR, and together with its NATO allies, Britain and France, one and half times more. This is obviously a considerable gap. But now the stakes are so high, the responsibility so great, that every opportunity must be put to the test to enable the power of example to work on the position of the other nuclear States. The cessation of nuclear testing is necessary now, later it will be much more difficult to achieve.

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A full understanding of this necessity is once again fully reflected in the recent message by the leaders of the six States who were the authors of the well-known Delhi Declaration, addressed to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhael Gorbachev, and the United States President, Ronald Reagan, in which they appealed to them to refrain from conducting any nuclear tests during the period until their next meeting.

The Mongolian delegation derives deep satisfaction from the answer by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikhael Gorbachev, to this proposal, which has just been read out to us by the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan. The declaration, contained in that reply, on the part of the Soviet Union to the effect that it will not conduct nuclear explosions even after 31 March -- until the first nuclear explosion in the United States, displays a most profound sense of responsibility with regard to peace and disarmament, and once again demonstrates the Soviet Union's sincere determination and desire to do everything in its power to put an end to nuclear testing.

There are no convincing reasons why the USSR and the United States cannot take the joint step of mutually discontinuing nuclear explosions, there are simply none. We hope that the United States' refusal of the moratorium is not the American Administration's last word on this matter.

In fact, what objective obstacles can there be to the United State joining in the moratorium? The impossibility of verification of compliance properly is advanced as a major obstacle. However, this is quite false. As is well known, the Soviet Union has declared that verification is not a problem for it, and that if the United States agrees to discontinue all nuclear tests on a mutual basis the necessary verification of compliance with the moratorium will be fully ensured by national technical means and also by international procedures, including on-site inspection when necessary.

The Soviet Union and the United States possess extremely sophisticated national technical means which can reliably convince the parties that the moratorium is being observed. A further guarantee of the effectiveness of verification would be the silent testing sites. The fact that the Soviet Union has not conducted any nuclear explosions for eight months now provides such a guarantee.

In circumstances where no nuclear explosions are carried out, neither side could proceed to violate the moratorium without the risk of incurring the terrible burden of political responsibility for such a step.

In order to increase the effectiveness of verification, the Soviet Union, as is known, has also endorsed the idea of the six States concerning the setting up of special stations on their territories to monitor compliance with the agreement to discontinue tests.

Finally, the Soviet Union has stated that in order to establish a joint moratorium on nuclear explosions now, it is in favour of reaching agreement with the United States on some on-site verification measures in order to remove possible doubts concerning compliance with the moratorium.

We consider that the Soviet Union's approach is constructive and makes it possible to solve the verification problem. Needless to say, this concerns verification of the prohibition of nuclear testing, not of how nuclear tests are carried out.



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We consider that in general, when approaching any problem, however complicated, it is necessary above all to start from a belief in the possibility of overcoming and solving it positively, and not from doubt, distrust and suspicion. Without the united efforts of all the nuclear-weapon Powers, the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests cannot be solved. We therefore address our appeal for a moratorium also to the other nuclear Powers and not only to the United States. In the first place, needless to say, we await such a step from the United States. There would then be a much better chance that the other nuclear-weapon Powers too would find it possible to refrain from nuclear-weapon tests, since they would not fear that the United States and the USSR would advance further in building up and developing their nuclear arsenals.

Needless to say, anything that can be done to ensure strict compliance with moratorium on nuclear explosions could also be applied to an agreement for a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban. Such an agreement is possible. The one thing that is required to that end is a display of political wisdom, an understanding by States of their responsibility before the present and future generations.

Another of the major issues whose resolution brooks no delay is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The threat of such a race exists, it is a real one, connected with the United States' desire to create space strike weapons which would form a large-scale anti-ballistic missile shield.

Many delegations at this Conference have pointed out the destabilizing and dangerous nature of the American "Strategic Defence Initiative". This is something which should be mentioned over and over again. Many politicians, scientists and military specialists emphasise that the creation of space strike weapons would be an insurmountable obstacle to achieving agreement on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. This stems quite obviously from the link between defensive and offensive strategic weapons. There can be no rules in a space arms race. Any measure, any stage in the race will inevitably be followed by countermeasures from the other side, and the arsenals of both offensive and defensive arms will swell.

The inclusion in the structure of the strategic forces of one or of both sides of one more qualitatively new component, such as a large-scale ABM system with space-based components, confuses the entire system of evaluating the strategic balance and creates further difficulties for calculating the power relations of the partners in the negotiations. In addition, most likely, as already occurred in the case of strategic offensive weapons, developments in this sphere, (by the two leading nuclear Powers will take different paths, which will further increase the asymmetry in the strategic forces of the two sides, and makes it all the more difficult to compare them. This asymmetry will prove even greater if one takes into account the potential means of countering the space-based elements of an anti-missile system, as well as of the systems which may in turn be developed to counter those means. And this leads to the familiar circle: weapons -- counter-weapons -- counter-counter-weapons and so forth ad infinitum.

The SDI advocates assert that it is really only a research programme. However, the scale of the activity and the specific programmes and facts indicate precisely the contrary. For example, it was announced that at the White Sands test site in the United States a stage of a Titan rocket was hit

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by a powerful laser beam at a distance of one kilometer. At the Nevada test site underground nuclear explosions are being carried out to develop a nuclear-powered X-ray laser. In the Maxwell Laboratory in California journalists were shown an electromagnetic gun in action.

The "Strategic Defence Initiative" is loudly advertised as a particularly "peaceful", "defensive" programme which is allegedly intended "to save mankind from nuclear weapons". This is done in order to weaken criticism of it in the international arena, to justify its multi-billion cost, and to avoid the ban on offensive space weapons.

The technical characteristics of the space strike weapons being developed under the SDI programme indicate that they are capable of hitting not only intercontinental ballistic missiles and warheads in space. With their high energy beams or high-speed strike elements, as well as their long range, these weapons can suddenly destroy military or civilian targets in practically all environments -- space, air, earth and sea.

Even if it is considered that the initial development and deployment of space strike weapons will be intended solely to destroy ballistic missiles and warheads, later, when they are modernized and made more sophisticated, they will inevitably be given the capability to hit other targets: that is the logic of weapon development. Thus, this is not a question of defensive weapons but rather of weapons of aggression, of the creation of a first strike capability. Outer space not only strengthens the strategic offensive capability but actually becomes its most important element.

There is another factor which must not be overlooked. Together with space strike weapons, in the United States intensive work is under way on the development of systems for overcoming anti-missile defences. I am referring to the development of fast cruise missiles, the development of low-flying ballistic missiles, which as a result are invulnerable to space-based beam weapons; I am referring to the further development of dummy and manoeuvrable ballistic-missile warheads, and to efforts to develop means of shortening the boost stage of missile trajectories, and so forth.

A question must be asked: why develop systems to counter ABM systems if the SDI is to lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons? Clearly, this is being done not for defence but for a nuclear strike. Obviously, the United States understands that, in response to the SDI, the Soviet Union will also take suitable measures which may also follow the lines of defensive weapons, including space-based ones. The conclusion must be that they are developing in advance nuclear first-strike means capable of overcoming an opposing ABM system.

All this must necessarily cause deep concern. The expression of this concern is to be found in the proposals of delegations belonging to all groups in the Conference to put an end to the danger which comes from space.

Many delegations have expressed views on the creation of a régime for the protection of satellites, which today play an increasingly important role, inter alia in helping to maintain strategic stability. The USSR has proposed that an international agreement should be drawn up in the Conference to ensure the immunity of artificial space objects and prohibit anti-satellite systems.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

As you will all recall, this proposal was made in the statement by the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, G.M. Kornienko, in our Conference, and subsequently developed in Ambassador Issraelyan's statement at our last plenary meeting. Obviously this is not a comprehensive solution to the problem. However, it would be a major step in the direction of ensuring that space remains peaceful and free of weapons. We recently heard detailed proposals on the creation of such a system in the statement of the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener. It seems to us that the Conference can resolve this problem, which will be a concrete and substantial contribution to the strengthening of security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. That concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none. In that case I should like to remind you that there will today be a consultative meeting with co-ordinators on item 1, nuclear-test ban. The meeting will be held in the secretariat Conference Room on the sixth floor at 3 p.m., and will of course be open to any delegation interested in the item. Furthermore, I would remind you that tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m. there will be the usual meeting for consultations with the Group Co-ordinators. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 20 March, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.