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THIRTY-FIFTH YEAR

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2196th MEETING

Held in New York on Saturday, 2 February 1980, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Peter FLORIN
(German Democratic Republic).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bangladesh, China, France, German Democratic Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2196)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
Letter dated 25 January 1980 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Malawi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13764)

The meeting was called to order at 5.25 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
Letter dated 25 January 1980 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Malawi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13764)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2192nd to 2195th meetings, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bedjaoui (Algeria), Mr. Tlou (Botswana), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Sekyi (Ghana), Mr. Maina (Kenya), Mr. Dennis (Liberia), Mr. Muwamba (Malawi), Mr. Monteiro (Mozambique), Mr. Usman (Nigeria), Mr. Sharif (Somalia), Mr. Wapenyi (Uganda), Mr. Daraja (United Republic of Tanzania), Mrs. Nguyen Ngoc Dung (Viet Nam), Mr. Komatina (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda (Zaire) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Members of the Security Council have before them document S/13777/Rev.1, which contains the revised text of the draft resolution sponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Mexico, the Niger, the Philippines, Tunisia and Zambia. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to vote on the revised draft resolution. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution in document S/13777/Rev.1 to the vote.

A vote was taken by a show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes to none.¹

One member (the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) did not participate in the voting.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): A number of delegations have expressed the wish to speak after the vote; I shall now call on them.

4. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): My delegation did not participate in the vote on the draft resolution which has just been adopted.

5. In discharging its responsibilities for administering Southern Rhodesia, the British Government will continue to apply the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement² as concluded between all the main parties in Rhodesia who were signatories to that Agreement. That is to say, the text of the Agreement will guide our every action. It will be the sole text, and we shall acknowledge the relevance of no other text. I have participated actively in this debate; I have listened carefully to the views expressed by the Ministers and Ambassadors of the African nations; I have faithfully transmitted those views both to London and to Salisbury. I have myself spoken at length in order to inform the Security Council about the current situation in Rhodesia, to try to clear up the many misunderstandings reflected in this debate and to refute allegations against the British Government and the Governor of Rhodesia. I have done that in the interests of maintaining the close co-operation with African countries which is so important in the present circumstances and in the hope of clearing the air. But it was clearly inappropriate for my delegation to go further by associating itself directly with any document purporting to give guidance on our responsibility for the administration of Rhodesia other than the Lancaster House Agreement. We cannot, that is to say,

associate ourselves with attempts to reinterpret in any way the Agreement we reached with all the main parties in Rhodesia.

6. Therefore the Council would not expect me to go into detail about our views on the resolution. It is enough to say that, in the view of my Government, it is unbalanced and selective. The United Nations has long insisted that it is the responsibility of the United Kingdom to administer Rhodesia. We are doing our duty, and I urge the Council to let us get on with it unhampered until independence is achieved in Zimbabwe.

7. Mr. LEPRETTE (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I hope you do not mind my leaving it to you to bring to a conclusion the question before the Council. You have just taken up your duties, but I am sure that your experience in the United Nations will enable you to conduct our proceedings in February successfully. That is my sincere wish in extending to you my warmest congratulations. I should also like to thank my colleagues wholeheartedly for the kind words they have addressed to me.

8. We have witnessed an impressive change in Rhodesia. Progress towards peace and independence, which began at Lusaka last August at the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, is continuing. In this connection, let us not forget to recall the merit acquired in the eyes of history by the States which participated in that Meeting.

9. Events are unfolding at a rate often difficult to follow. The initiative of the African Group in the Council no doubt responds to a desire to pause and take stock of the situation. For 15 years the United Nations, and particularly the delegations of the African States, have devoted too much effort to the Rhodesian question not to feel that they have the right to present their assessment of the situation right up to the last moment.

10. For my part, when I look at the 40 days that have just elapsed I can say—at the risk of occasioning surprise—that my delegation harbours feelings of hope. Surely it is truly remarkable that, in a country where war seemed to have come to stay, the sound of gun-fire should suddenly have been silenced over the major part of the Territory. Surely it is encouraging that men whom it was difficult to imagine one day living together have been able to agree to bow to the people's verdict and to enter an electoral competition which is sometimes dramatic in keeping with the best traditions of democracy. Surely it is noteworthy that the United Kingdom should have restored legality in Rhodesia and reassumed, for the time necessary, the essential trappings of sovereignty.

11. These events derive from the Lancaster House Agreement,² the fruit of efforts by all the parties concerned, the United Kingdom and all the signatories of

that Agreement, all of them encouraged by the clear and firm support of the front-line States and Nigeria. The French delegation wishes to pay formal recognition before one and all to the decisive contribution that they have made to this major event.

12. Of course, my delegation does not claim that everything now happening in Rhodesia is in keeping with the letter of the Lancaster House Agreement. For the time being France does not have any observer on the spot. However, it is probable that infractions have been committed by various parties with regard to the Agreement signed. The latter includes appropriate machinery for implementation and investigation. It constitutes a framework of action which it is vital to refer to and comply with scrupulously. The negotiators who worked it out were not unaware of the difficulties which would have to be faced. Indeed, how could one imagine that men who for years now have felt hostility and fear towards each other could overcome from one day to the next their mutual distrust?

13. However, in view of the progress that has been made in such a short time, these incidents should surely be viewed in their proper perspective. Have they really prevented the broad implementation of the Agreement signed in London from continuing? Have we not during these past few days seen further significant progress such as the withdrawal of foreign elements, the speeding up of the return of refugees and the restoration of regular communications with neighbouring countries?

14. What we should perhaps be surprised at, on the other hand, is that there has not been still further hostility. In the tension in which the inhabitants of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe are living on the eve of a major event that will for them reverse the course of history, it might have been feared that at any moment clashes of fatal proportions would have occurred. That has not been the case. Let us recognize that, for, in so doing, we are paying a tribute to the noblest elements in man, his capacity to rise to the challenges of history. None of the incidents that have occurred has degenerated into or rekindled hostilities.

15. Undoubtedly the Council had to take cognizance of the complaints of the various parties, if only to identify and overcome the obstacles still remaining on the path that is still to be pursued. Those obstacles have been identified by many of those who spoke in the debate. I shall not go back over them. I shall merely observe that thereby the Council was fulfilling its task.

16. But the role of the Council is also to make a positive contribution to the solution of the problem before it. Its role is to come to the assistance of and encourage those who are working for the restoration of peace in Rhodesia. Every day men who are on the spot must face up to new and unforeseen difficulties

in a climate of nervousness which is quite easy to explain. At this stage, it would not be merely futile, but actually dangerous, for various parties to blame each other. It is much easier to criticize than to act.

17. It is the task of the Council not to take the easy way out. It should face up to the facts and try to be far-sighted and to prepare the ground for the future. That is our duty. Much of what has been said since the beginning of this debate derived from this same idea, and for that I pay a tribute to the previous speakers. But let us see the situation as it actually is.

18. It is legitimate at this solemn moment for the most urgent appeals to be addressed to the parties, but we should also express the hope that the conclusion of this debate will give a constructive impetus in the final phase which separates Zimbabwe from freedom and independence. We should rise to the situation. After so many years and after so much suffering, the fact is that four short but decisive weeks remain before the final outcome of the struggle is known.

19. The Government of the United Kingdom has shouldered its responsibilities. Let us recognize this fact. Simple equity demands it. The United Kingdom, the cradle of parliamentary democracy, is now leading Rhodesia to independence with democracy. Let us not seem to be overlooking this fact. That would not be worthy of us.

20. The people of Zimbabwe, for its part, so near to its goal, feels a natural impatience. It cannot suddenly overnight forget its ordeal and the suffering which have accompanied its long march. Let us respect those feelings; they merit our consideration.

21. But let us hope that everyone will overcome his resentments, his disappointments and his fears, and will think only of the near future and the distant future. The day of the elections is near, very near. We are at the threshold of independence and beyond that threshold is the long road of the building of a new State for which the mobilization of all forces, of all energies and of all talents is so vital. Let us hope that the next few weeks will be weeks of solidarity and fraternity.

22. The resolution which has just been adopted, of course, does not meet the concerns of the United Kingdom, as we have just been told. We understand, in the circumstances, why the delegation of the United Kingdom decided not to participate in the vote. But that resolution does reflect an effort which should be properly appreciated. That is why, in spite of reservations with regard to certain language used which does not seem to us to be entirely in keeping with the situation, the French delegation voted in favour of that text.

23. Mr. ÅLGÅRD (Norway): The Norwegian delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution just

adopted. In certain respects we would have preferred different formulations. Nevertheless, we cast a positive vote since the text embodies renewed support for the Lancaster House Agreement² and its full and faithful implementation.

24. The position of the Norwegian Government on the problems of southern Africa has been stated in the Security Council on a number of occasions. We support fully the right of the peoples of that troubled area to independence based on genuine majority rule. Over the years we have given full and inqualified support to all attempts aimed at negotiated solutions to the complex problems facing southern Africa.

25. The new initiative taken at the Commonwealth Meeting at Lusaka in August of last year to break the deadlock on the question of Southern Rhodesia was, therefore, a most timely one and had our strong support.

26. After more than four months of intensive and extremely difficult negotiations under the auspices of the British Government, agreement was finally reached at Lancaster House. We welcomed that Agreement as an historic breakthrough which provided the people of Zimbabwe with a framework within which their aspirations for self-determination and genuine majority rule at last could be fulfilled. Furthermore, it represented a last chance for attaining these goals through a peaceful process. We felt, therefore, that the British Government, as well as all the parties concerned, deserved praise for their willingness to negotiate and to find the necessary compromises.

27. Hence, it was highly appropriate that the Security Council on 21 December 1979 should have endorsed the Lancaster House Agreement in its resolution 460 (1979), on the very day that important Agreement was signed in London by the parties themselves.

28. However, we never thought that all problems had been overcome through the attainment of that carefully balanced compromise. Above all, we sympathized with the administering Power that has the heavy responsibility and difficult task of leading a war-ridden country to peace and independence through free and fair elections.

29. Taking into consideration the many stumbling-blocks along the road in this complicated transitional period, we find that all parties deserve credit for having, in general, shown a spirit of co-operation that is necessary to give the democratic process a chance to work. We agree, therefore, that there has been considerable progress in implementing the Lancaster House Agreement. We are especially encouraged to see that all the leaders of the major political parties are at present actively engaged in an election campaign in Zimbabwe. We hope that, within another few weeks, this process will produce a new Government, freely and fairly elected by the people

of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, we welcome the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom [2195th meeting] that the South African troops at Beit Bridge have been withdrawn.

30. The present situation calls for full and faithful implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement by all parties concerned. All parties must be encouraged to make full use of the machinery provided for in the Agreement to settle outstanding problems and to avoid new ones. At this delicate stage, we feel that the utmost restraint and caution are called for. This applies also to the Security Council.

31. We have full trust in the administering Power and feel that it will spare no effort in crowning the success of the Lancaster House Agreement with an equally successful implementation of it. In that difficult task it enjoys our full support.

32. Mr. President, before concluding, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I can assure you of my delegation's full co-operation in the discharge of your important duties. I should also like to express my delegation's admiration of the way in which Mr. Leprette conducted the business of the Security Council in the month of January, during which the Council had to deal with major international crises. It was most valuable for the Council to have the benefit of Mr. Leprette's diplomatic skills and experience during those difficult times.

33. Mr. McHENRY (United States of America): Mr. President, may I add my good wishes to you upon your assumption of your duties and express my expectation and hope and confidence that you will discharge your responsibilities in the same outstanding manner as did your predecessor, the representative of France.

34. We have been meeting to discuss difficulties which have arisen in the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement² on Southern Rhodesia. We have done so and should do so with perspective. The Agreement represents a great achievement, an extraordinarily significant and hopeful step in the long search for peace in Southern Rhodesia and in southern Africa.

35. A year ago, despite years of diplomatic activity and consultation, efforts to find a settlement had reached a stalemate. The parties could not be brought together at a single conference to discuss ways in which the question of the independence of Rhodesia might be achieved. Efforts by the Smith régime further to consolidate an internal settlement were going ahead at full speed. Concurrently, the war and the killing were escalating.

36. Today a different picture is before us. The parties at Lancaster House, in an historic display of diplo-

macy, compromise and dedication to peace, negotiated a framework for an internationally accepted transition to independence in Rhodesia. Credit for this achievement goes to all the participants—to the United Kingdom, under whose aegis the negotiations took place; to the Patriotic Front, which combined statesmanship and compromise; to the front-line States, without whose support there would have been no agreement, and to the former Muzorewa Administration and the white citizens of Rhodesia for accepting the uncertainties inherent in the settlement and for their recognition that change in Rhodesia was inevitable and that they should participate peacefully in the process of change. The parties decided to compromise in the interest of a settlement. It was a decision to lay aside the gun and to trust in the ballot box.

37. None of us expected that the process of implementation would be without difficulty. It could not be otherwise. Hostilities were in progress. Years of distrust had to be overcome. Moreover, the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement are not self-enforcing. In most cases it is not a question of violation of the agreements. Differences were sure to arise, and they are the result of differing interpretations and judgements. The parties view the decisions from different perspectives and with different interests.

38. What has occurred in the short time since the Lancaster House Agreement was concluded? A cease-fire is in force. The principal leaders of the Patriotic Front have returned to their country. They returned to an enormous welcome and are now engaged in active campaigning. Zimbabwean national exiles are returning in large numbers. The security situation is improving. Even the discordant note which was the principal reason for the Council's current consideration of this question—the presence of a South African force at Beit Bridge—has been removed.

39. In my judgement, all parties should seek to build on these achievements and indeed try to maintain and enlarge the confidence and trust necessary to carry the transition to a successful conclusion.

40. It is clear that the violations of the cease-fire are not monopolized by any one party. Some of the allegations of violations and breaches of the cease-fire have undoubtedly been due to misunderstandings. Some seem to be deliberate. We know that the task of Lord Soames is difficult. At times it must be thankless, as his efforts to demonstrate sensitivity to the concerns of one party inevitably result in suspicions among others. We believe that Lord Soames is trying to ensure that the process of transition will be fair to all participants. All the parties should agree fully to carry out the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement. Force should be used as a last resort only after other methods to enforce compliance have failed, and even then only in such a way as to reduce suspicions of bias. We believe it is essential that all parties cooperate in taking steps beforehand to ensure that force

is not required to achieve compliance. We hope that the achievements made thus far will continue to be expanded, that violence will continue to decline and that it will in fact be brought to an end.

41. Those of us who are not parties to this difficult Agreement should in my judgement exhibit forbearance in our criticism. In particular, we doubt that the British need lectures on the conduct of free and fair elections from some who obviously have no experience with such elections.

42. The United States supported the resolution before us today. In doing so, we wish to make it clear that we do not accept the charges of violations of the Lancaster House Agreement. We do not view the present resolution as in any way affecting or interpreting the provisions of the Agreement. We do not presume to put ourselves in the difficult position of making those daily judgements which can be made only by those with responsibility. We view the resolution as calling upon the British and the parties to do those things which the British Government is already trying to do and which it could accomplish with greater certainty if only the parties would increase their co-operation.

43. The objective of the Council is not merely the passage of a resolution, nor is it the holding of an election. Rather, it is the conduct of free and fair elections which lead to that level of political consensus which provides the basis for democratic government. That is our goal for Southern Rhodesia.

44. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, before I explain the vote of our delegation, in favour of the draft resolution, I should like to make two points that I failed to make yesterday, because I did not have the relevant documents at hand. First, my neighbour, Sir Anthony, reproached me yesterday [*ibid.*] and said that nowhere and never had the documents of the United Nations described the Patriotic Front as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Zimbabwe. Either Sir Anthony's memory has betrayed him or his staff is not doing its work too well. Permit me to read from a document of the United Nations that must be well known to Sir Anthony and his staff. I shall read from a preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/34/L.65/Rev.1³ which says:

"Bearing in mind that the negotiations at Lancaster House in London were the direct result of the armed struggle by the people of Zimbabwe led by the Patriotic Front, their sole legitimate representative"—I repeat, "their sole legitimate representative".

This is not something that I have fabricated or thought up. This is a draft resolution, a document of the General Assembly which Sir Anthony should know.

45. Secondly, Sir Anthony reproached us on the grounds that we did not want, as he said, "a peaceful political settlement". I should like to quote to him a statement that was made by us in the course of the debate at the last session of the General Assembly.

"The Soviet Union has always been in favour of a political settlement of the problems of southern Africa, including Southern Rhodesia. However, we declare with the utmost vigour that the possibilities of a political settlement should be fully and honestly utilized. Such a settlement can be effective only if it is designed to attain genuine independence for the people of Zimbabwe and takes fully into account its vital interests."

Then the Soviet representative quoted from the statement of the Foreign Minister and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko. This is the quotation:

"All kinds of combinations,... which are aimed at preserving the domination of racists and colonialists with the help of hastily formed puppet régimes should be resolutely rejected".

46. Now I should like to explain the vote of the Soviet delegation in favour of the resolution just adopted, a vote we cast in an attempt to contribute to the fulfilment of the hopes of African countries for a just settlement of the problems of Zimbabwe.

47. The discussion in the Security Council about the situation in Southern Rhodesia makes abundantly clear the just nature and relevance of the current consideration of this question, which was put forward on the initiative of the African Group. At the same time it has become clear to everyone that the reluctance of certain countries to bring this problem to the Security Council for discussion was dictated simply by a desire to cover up and muffle the explosive nature of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, and thus to leave a free hand to those who would like to subvert the holding in that country of genuinely free and just elections that could allow that people to embark on a course of free and independent development.

48. The discussion in the Security Council made it abundantly clear that the representative of the administering Power was unable to refute the allegations or to justify the specific violations cited in the letter of the African countries. His arguments convinced no one because the statements of representatives of African countries irrefutably confirmed the justice of their claims.

49. In spite of assertions by the British representative to the contrary, South African troops still remain in Southern Rhodesia, and not only in the area of Beit Bridge, as was said here; they are still to be found at strategically important points throughout the country.

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42. The United States supported the resolution before us today. In doing so, we wish to make it clear that we do not accept the charges of violations of the Lancaster House Agreement. We do not view the present resolution as in any way affecting or interpreting the provisions of the Agreement. We do not presume to put ourselves in the difficult position of making those daily judgements which can be made only by those with responsibility. We view the resolution as calling upon the British and the parties to do those things which the British Government is already trying to do and which it could accomplish with greater certainty if only the parties would increase their co-operation.

43. The objective of the Council is not merely the passage of a resolution, nor is it the holding of an election. Rather, it is the conduct of free and fair elections which lead to that level of political consensus which provides the basis for democratic government. That is our goal for Southern Rhodesia.

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45. Secondly, Sir Anthony reproached us on the grounds that we did not want, as he said, "a peaceful political settlement". I should like to quote to him a statement that was made by us in the course of the debate at the last session of the General Assembly.

"The Soviet Union has always been in favour of a political settlement of the problems of southern Africa, including Southern Rhodesia. However, we declare with the utmost vigour that the possibilities of a political settlement should be fully and honestly utilized. Such a settlement can be effective only if it is designed to attain genuine independence for the people of Zimbabwe and takes fully into account its vital interests."

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"All kinds of combinations,... which are aimed at preserving the domination of racists and colonialists with the help of hastily formed puppet régimes should be resolutely rejected".

46. Now I should like to explain the vote of the Soviet delegation in favour of the resolution just adopted, a vote we cast in an attempt to contribute to the fulfilment of the hopes of African countries for a just settlement of the problems of Zimbabwe.

47. The discussion in the Security Council about the situation in Southern Rhodesia makes abundantly clear the just nature and relevance of the current consideration of this question, which was put forward on the initiative of the African Group. At the same time it has become clear to everyone that the reluctance of certain countries to bring this problem to the Security Council for discussion was dictated simply by a desire to cover up and muffle the explosive nature of the situation in Southern Rhodesia, and thus to leave a free hand to those who would like to subvert the holding in that country of genuinely free and just elections that could allow that people to embark on a course of free and independent development.

48. The discussion in the Security Council made it abundantly clear that the representative of the administering Power was unable to refute the allegations or to justify the specific violations cited in the letter of the African countries. His arguments convinced no one because the statements of representatives of African countries irrefutably confirmed the justice of their claims.

49. In spite of assertions by the British representative to the contrary, South African troops still remain in Southern Rhodesia, and not only in the area of Beit Bridge, as was said here; they are still to be found at strategically important points throughout the country.

According to the statements of the representative of the Patriotic Front and representatives of African countries, no less than 6,000 South African soldiers are stationed there. Even if some of them are wearing Rhodesian uniforms or are mercenaries, that does not change the racist nature of their presence, which is designed to interfere with the preparations for free and fair elections. Their presence is being used to ensure protection for the interests of Bishop Muzorewa and the white settlers and also to surround the forces of the Patriotic Front.

50. With regard to the views of Muzorewa, whom some people wanted to invite to the Security Council, I already stated what they were when I spoke in the Fourth Committee. However, it would not be without interest here to bring before the members of the Security Council his true attitude concerning the people of Zimbabwe and their independence. Talking with a foreign journalist, Muzorewa made the following statement:

“Africans cannot govern their own countries without the help of the whites. What good is independence in all these kingdoms and republics if, after the Europeans leave, all the perfumed soap disappears from the shops and the water in the hotels stops running? I am a pragmatist”—he said—“and so I prefer a warm shower in a hotel owned by whites to a dry bathtub in a hotel nationalized by blacks.”

Now what else need we say about Muzorewa? He has black skin, but his actions are those of any other racist in Rhodesia.

51. In the course of Security Council meetings, it was shown factually that, in violation of the Lancaster House Agreement,² the British Governor, Lord Soames, redeployed Rhodesian forces, including mercenaries and the so-called auxiliaries, in regions liberated earlier by forces of the Patriotic Front and used them to exercise control over those forces and to harass and do physical violence to soldiers of the Patriotic Front. The “auxiliary forces”, enjoying a free hand, have been disarming separate guerrilla groups returning to Rhodesia and terrorizing the population, trying to force it to support the Smith-Muzorewa clique.

52. In carrying out the will of certain circles in the United Kingdom, Lord Soames is deliberately placing the Patriotic Front in a disadvantageous position. The return of the leaders of the Patriotic Front has been deliberately delayed so that Muzorewa, a puppet serving the racists, may gain the advantage of being the first to launch his electoral campaign in favourable circumstances. It has been said here that the leaders of the Patriotic Front have returned. Of course they have returned, but when, and how much were they impeded in their return? The fact that so many people turned out to greet them demonstrates the

validity of the Patriotic Front's assessment, as expressed in the United Nations.

53. The forces of the Patriotic Front have been placed in a very difficult situation, in practical terms, in the carrying out of their electoral campaign. Indeed, they cannot circulate their literature. They have been deprived even of telephone services. They cannot get in touch with those people with whom they want to get in touch, so as to transmit something or to express their wishes and views. Their supporters are being overwhelmed by hostile propaganda, which comes from South Africa too, among other places.

54. The colonial authorities which have now re-assumed power in Rhodesia are doing everything they can to hinder the free expression of the will of the supporters of the Patriotic Front forces. It has been said that the detainees have been freed. But representatives of all the African countries and the Patriotic Front say that hundreds of political detainees are still languishing in gaol. As a rule, they usually put into gaol the most active representatives of the Patriotic Front. There is harassment of officials and supporters of the Patriotic Front.

55. Now they also talk about the return of refugees. It is true that refugees are returning: 4,000 have returned to the country. But outside Rhodesia there are 250,000 refugees and prisoners. The Governor has established a transitional period of two months before the elections. A month has now gone by; indeed there is less than a month left—less than four weeks for the Patriotic Front to carry out its electoral work under normal conditions and lift the spirits of the people. Is that an accident? Certainly not. Mr. McHenry must agree that it is not an accident.

56. The British Governor has unjustifiably extended for a further six months the state of emergency and martial law in the country, so as to be able to arrest and detain without trial a large number of supporters of the patriotic forces. In the final analysis, the aim of all this is to prevent the victory of the patriotic forces in the forthcoming elections. The question has already been asked why the state of emergency has been extended. If two months were allotted for the transitional period, the question arises: of what use is the state of emergency for another four months? In actual fact, is it possible to have free and fair elections in a state of emergency?

57. Now I shall speak about the two months. The electoral campaign in the United States begins almost a year before the elections, and in Rhodesia they have two months. In the United States the majority of the people is literate, but there the majority is illiterate. In the United States, after all, candidates for the presidency, for the Senate and the Congress do travel around and they can explain their programmes to the people. But how can this take place in Rhodesia, among an illiterate population and without the mass

media? How can the patriotic forces explain their programmes to the people when a state of emergency exists which permits people to be put in prison or killed on suspicion of anything?

58. The present situation in Southern Rhodesia and the obstacles created by the Administration of Lord Soames to hinder the people of Zimbabwe from achieving independence, represent a continuation of the colonial policy of the United Kingdom which it pursued in Africa in one form or another over many decades. When the process of the decline of the British colonial empire on the African continent reached the southern part of that continent, decolonization, as it were, stumbled, as one African representative said at a meeting of the General Assembly. Why was that? The fact is that southern Africa is a very juicy piece of the continent in a strategic and an economic sense. We cannot brush aside this question or conceal it; let us speak the truth here. That is the reason for the difficulties with decolonization in southern Africa.

59. One former official of the United Nations—I shall not name him, or my neighbour here will want to answer this—said that Rhodesia was a little garden of the House of Lords. I do not know whether he was right or not, but there is some element of truth in it.

60. When the British colonial possessions began to disappear one after another, then an attempt was made to bring to power in Rhodesia the racist régime of the minority. For 15 years the United Kingdom, disregarding the decisions of the United Nations about sanctions, in fact attempted to consolidate that régime, and it was only the heroic, valorous struggle of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, with the support of the non-aligned African countries, of all African countries and the socialist countries, that prevented the maintenance in power of the Smith-Muzorewa clique, as was correctly stressed here by the representative of the Patriotic Front. Even in the course of the London talks certain circles in Britain were still trying to preserve and consolidate the neo-colonialist racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. I would say that they are still trying to do so now, in the course of the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement. That Agreement can be appraised and interpreted in different ways. It can be interpreted as Mr. McHenry interpreted it, but it can also be viewed from a different standpoint. In particular, we have the right and good grounds for assessing it quite differently. We consider it inadequate. We know in what circumstances it was concluded in London. We know how often representatives of the Patriotic Front were given ultimatums, how often it was proposed that they leave in the course of the consideration of the draft constitution. It happened when the conditions for the transitional period were being considered. The same thing happened even when the question of the cease-fire arose. Those are the facts. There is no way they can be shrugged off. The British and American press are very low-key in their reports on the situation

in Rhodesia. Incidentally, this is the third day of our debate in the Security Council and what have we found in the American press or mass media about these meetings? So much is said in the United States about human rights, but the fate of a whole people hangs in the balance here, whether it is to be free or whether it is to be enslaved by the racists. And what do we find reported about that in the press, in the mass media? Nothing. It is not even mentioned. By the way, I should like to say that the “takes” given out to journalists by the United Nations Department of Public Information do not give a good account of the actual statements made by representatives in the Security Council.

61. The Soviet Union criticized and continues to criticize the Lancaster House Agreement, not because it expresses the goal of creating a free and independent Zimbabwe on the basis of genuine majority rule, but because it does not contain the necessary guarantees for attaining that noble goal. The attempts of my neighbour, Sir Anthony Parsons, to represent matters as if the Soviet Union had no interest in a final, peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problem are therefore in vain. Our country has consistently favoured and continues to favour a peaceful settlement in Southern Rhodesia; not just any peaceful settlement however, but one that would guarantee the people of Zimbabwe genuine freedom and independence. At the same time, we are against a settlement that would lead to the establishment in Zimbabwe of a neo-colonialist puppet régime. We have apprehensions about that and we have good grounds for having them. In that regard, yesterday and the day before we spoke in very clear terms on this question based on convincing evidence.

62. The British representative did not like the “awful Soviet jargon”—that is what was said yesterday—when we talked of neo-colonialist puppet régimes of Smith-Muzorewa and those like them. Of course, my neighbour, the British representative, would perhaps prefer to call the Smith-Muzorewa régime democratic and free, since it would appear that the actions of that régime are in keeping with his concept of democracy and freedom. If preparations for free elections mean what is now being done in Rhodesia, then permit me to say: spare us and everyone else such democratic elections.

63. Yesterday [*ibid.*] the British representative expressed dissatisfaction at the fact that we had called the elections held in Southern Rhodesia in April 1979 a farce and warned against a repetition of that farce. As he sees it, those so-called elections were clearly an example of the “democratic process” which he wanted to propose to us as an example.

64. However, the Soviet Union is not the author of these assessments and descriptions of what is happening in Southern Rhodesia and in a number of other places—Namibia, for example. It was not the Soviet Union that invented the assessments and

descriptions. I do not wish to be a Columbus and to claim that we discovered this language. This is the language of the overwhelming majority of the States members of the non-aligned movement and the Organization of African Unity, and many other States. These are the words of the Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on Guidelines and Measures for National and Collective Self-Reliance in Social and Economic Development for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, adopted at the sixteenth ordinary session from 17 to 20 July 1979, with which everyone is familiar. These are the words of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. These are the words of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979. We were just repeating them here in the Council to remind representatives of their actual relevance and significance. We speak the same language as all freedom-loving peoples, the language of the national liberation and anti-colonialist movements. It is of course no surprise that this language makes my neighbour, the United Kingdom representative, wince.

65. We have good grounds for believing that the issue here is not so much a matter of language as a matter of the substance of the problem. The United Kingdom representative abstained in the vote on Security Council resolution 448 (1979). Clearly, he abstained not only because the April elections in Southern Rhodesia were called "sham elections", but also because the resolution condemned all the attempts and manœuvres aimed at preventing the accession of the people of Zimbabwe to independence and genuine majority rule, because the resolution called on all States not to recognize the results of those elections. What other explanation could there be for the abstention in the vote on that resolution? If our aim was a free and independent Rhodesia, then it was our duty to vote for a resolution which, if properly implemented, could achieve that aim.

66. Many African delegations have pointed to the existence of a genuine threat in maintaining the puppet racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. In particular, the delegation of Algeria stressed that

"The measures taken by the Government cannot but elicit the most serious concern because everything is happening as though what was desired was the preservation of the racist and colonial *status quo* in Rhodesia, while an attempt is made to lend to its internal evolution a semblance of legality." [2194th meeting, para. 116.]

67. The delegation of Mozambique clearly indicated that there do not exist at the present time in Zimbabwe conditions for the holding of elections in complete freedom and without threats and that "the administering Power has not implemented with the required

strictness and exactitude the Agreement that has been signed" [2192nd meeting, para. 106].

68. In his statement, the representative of the United Kingdom attempted to assure everyone here that the turn of events in Southern Rhodesia was in accordance with the Lancaster House Agreement. I understand his position. He is obliged to make that attempt; these are the instructions of his Government. The delegation of the United Kingdom tried to prove that there was no need at all for the Security Council to discuss this question. But in statements made here by representatives of African countries, and in particular in the statements of the delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania [2192nd and 2195th meetings], it was clearly stressed that after the signing of the Agreement, none other than the United Kingdom had been the first to violate that Agreement flagrantly. That was said, as I have just pointed out, by the delegation of the United Republic of Tanzania, a country that did a great deal to promote the preparation and adoption of the Agreement. It would appear that there are serious grounds for the delegation of that country to make such a statement.

69. The delegation of Zambia stated:

"... if the British Governor, and therefore the British Government, had observed and adhered to the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, the prevailing tension would have been averted" [2193rd meeting, para. 41].

70. In the Soviet delegation's view, all these flagrant violations by the administering Power which have been revealed during this series of Council meetings basically were expressed in draft resolution S/13777/Rev.1 submitted by the non-aligned countries, which the Security Council has adopted today. Of course, the resolution would respond to the existing state of affairs to a larger extent if it indicated more clearly who is responsible for the extremely dangerous situation that has arisen in Southern Rhodesia, threatening international peace and security. We supported the draft resolution, however, because we consider that the implementation of the demands expressed in it could help to remedy the abnormal situation existing in Southern Rhodesia. We should bear in mind in this regard that those demands—such as the return of all refugees, not just 4,000; the release of all political prisoners, not just some of them; the rescinding of the state of emergency, which has been renewed by Governor Soames; the expelling of all South African forces, regular or mercenary, from Rhodesia—constitute the very minimum conditions to enable the people of Zimbabwe to make its choice and, by democratic and peaceful means, ensure the possibility of creating its own independent State, a State which would be recognized by the United Nations as a full-fledged member of the international community and whose representative could attend these proceedings.

71. The Soviet delegation whole-heartedly supports and approves of paragraph 10 of the resolution, under which the Security Council "decides to keep the situation in Southern Rhodesia under review until the Territory attains full independence under genuine majority rule". We became even more aware of the correctness of and need for such a provision when we heard the statements made here by the British representative, who, both today and in his statements at previous meetings, attempted to embellish and justify the actions of the administering Power in Southern Rhodesia. Disregarding and ignoring in that way the criticism levelled at the British administration in Southern Rhodesia demonstrates that the United Kingdom intends to continue on the course of establishing a puppet neo-colonialist régime in Southern Rhodesia. That is a potential source of considerable complications and dangers in the future. Therefore, all those who are genuinely interested in ensuring the free and independent development of the people of Zimbabwe must exert the utmost vigilance and do everything they possibly can to achieve the implementation of the demands contained in the resolution just adopted.

72. Mr. FUTSCHER PEREIRA (Portugal): Since the Portuguese delegation made clear yesterday [2195th meeting] its position on the subject before the Security Council, I can assure you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council that my explanation of vote will be extremely brief.

73. We have just voted in favour of draft resolution S/13777/Rev.1, despite our doubts and concerns on some of its passages. We have done so in a constructive spirit, because in our opinion the resolution just adopted reflects, basically, the apprehensions of the world community about the present situation in Southern Rhodesia and about the future of the country.

Our primary concern is that nothing should be done that could make more difficult the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement,² which of course must be the only guiding instrument on the path to free and fair elections leading to the independence of Zimbabwe. We recognize the extreme difficulties that the United Kingdom faces as the administering Power, and we should like to restate that the Portuguese Government entirely trusts the British Government to continue to implement the Lancaster House Agreement in an impartial way.

74. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): Over a number of months, I have been making modest and moderately worded attempts in public debate to convert my neighbour from the Soviet Union to my point of view. I appear to have been lamentably unsuccessful, in so far as our viewpoints are still widely separated. But I believe that I would be interpreting a consensus of the Council if I said that the Council would prefer me to continue those efforts in private.

75. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): I associate myself with what was just said by my neighbour Mr. Parsons. However, I should like to quote a French proverb: *Qui vivra verra*—Let's wait and see.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

NOTES

¹ See resolution 463 (1980).

² See *Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979*, Cmnd. 7802 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980).

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 90.

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