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NOTE

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Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2195th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 1 February 1980, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Peter FLORIN
(German Democratic Republic).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bangladesh, China, France, German Democratic Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zambia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2195)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:
Letter dated 25 January 1980 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Malawi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13764)

The meeting was called to order at 4.15 p.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): Since this is the first official meeting of the Security Council in February, I should like, on behalf of the members of the Council, to pay a tribute to the representative of France, Mr. Jacques Leprette, for his tireless efforts, his great diplomatic skill and his innate French courtesy with which he guided the work of the Security Council during the month of January. I am sure that these words express the feelings of all the members of the Security Council.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

- Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia:**
Letter dated 25 January 1980 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Malawi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13764)

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2192nd to 2194th meetings, I invite the representatives of Algeria, Botswana, Cuba, Egypt, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Bedjaoui (Algeria), Mr. Tlou (Botswana), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Abdel Meguid (Egypt), Mr. Dennis (Liberia), Mr. Muwamba (Malawi), Mr. Monteiro (Mozambique), Mr. Abubakar (Nigeria), Mr. Sharif (Somalia), Mr. Mkapa (United Republic of Tanzania), Mrs. Nguyen Ngoc Dung (Viet Nam), Mr. Komatina (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda (Zaire) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Ghana, Kenya and Uganda in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sekyi (Ghana), Mr. Maina (Kenya) and Mr. Wapenyi (Uganda) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like to inform the members of the Security Council that I have received a letter dated 1 February 1980 from the representatives of the Niger, Tunisia and Zambia, which states:

"We, the undersigned, members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Security Council, pursuant to rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, extend an invitation to Mr. Callistus Ndlovu, representative of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, to participate in the consideration of the item 'Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia' " [S/13776].

If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to extend an invitation to Mr. Ndlovu pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure.

It was so decided.

5. Mr. AHSAN (Bangladesh): Mr. President, I should like at the outset to express our warm congratulations on your accession to the presidency of the Council

for this month. We do this particularly because of the close and cordial relations that exist between our two countries. I am confident that under your experienced and capable leadership our work will be conducted with efficiency and purpose. I also take this opportunity to extend our grateful thanks to Mr. Leprette, the representative of France, who conducted our affairs with so much skill and dispatch during the difficult month of January.

6. The Security Council has been seized of the question of Southern Rhodesia for a very long time indeed. It has consistently sought to further the cause of decolonization in that Territory and the emergence of a sovereign independent State. The Council, therefore, exercises a particular responsibility over the course of events in that troubled Territory.

7. Only a short while ago [2181st meeting], the Council had occasion to welcome the Lancaster House Agreement¹ as a historic pledge of peace. The Agreement marked the beginning of a process which, through the commitment of all concerned parties to a new Constitution, a cease-fire and elections, would lead to free and unfettered exercise by the people of Zimbabwe of their inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and independence. Advances were real and opportunities gave hope of realization. Legality in Rhodesia was restored and the inevitability of genuine majority rule recognized.

8. No one has done more to bring this process into being than the valiant people of Zimbabwe under the dedicated leadership of the Patriotic Front. It was through their struggle and sacrifice that the promise of a peaceful and democratic change in that troubled country finally took shape. It is only natural, therefore, that they, as well as the members of the world community which extended to them full support throughout, should be genuinely concerned that what was gained in the battlefield might be lost, and the Patriotic Front put at a clear disadvantage *vis-à-vis* other contending parties in the elections.

9. My delegation views with deep regret the provocations that have taken place in Rhodesia, which violate the Lancaster House Agreement and prevent its faithful implementation. The continued presence of troops and mercenaries of the racist South African régime, whose opposition to genuine majority rule needs no elaboration, cannot but cause my delegation serious apprehension. We condemn South Africa's continued interference in Southern Rhodesia. We believe that the Council is charged with specific responsibility to call for prompt and adequate remedial action. Crucial responsibility in this context also devolves upon the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, fully and impartially to implement the Agreement.

10. Finally, we believe that, in spite of serious provocations, there exists a basic consensus that the Council should continue to play a constructive role

with a view to attaining the fundamental objectives to which all of us are committed.

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The next speaker is the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, Mr. Usman Abubakar. I welcome him here, and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

12. Mr. ABUBAKAR (Nigeria): Mr. President, I should like to begin by congratulating you on your accession to the presidency of the Security Council. I want most sincerely to thank you for giving me this opportunity to participate in this important debate of the Council on the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The period between now and independence in Zimbabwe is so critical that the Council must act quickly to save the British colonial authorities from themselves. Otherwise, the mechanism so carefully prepared to safeguard the conduct of fair and free elections prior to the independence of Zimbabwe will be irreparably damaged through flagrant violations of the Lancaster House Agreement¹ by Governor Soames and his interim Administration.

13. The last debate on the situation in Southern Rhodesia [*ibid.*], in which Nigeria had the privilege of participating as a member of the Security Council, was significant in many respects. While it left the verdict to history concerning the claim of Her Majesty's Government to be a miracle worker which single-handedly resolved the entire question of the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia at the Lancaster House Conference, the Security Council did not fail to spotlight the underlying problems which the British colonial authorities would have to address once the colony returned to legality if the Lancaster House Agreement was to be implemented objectively.

14. The first problem was the intense suspicion that existed in the minds of the Africans about Britain's motives and intentions. The rebellion in Southern Rhodesia lasted 14 years. It led to the senseless killing of more than 20,000 Zimbabweans and the wanton destruction of countless lives and property in the neighbouring countries. Throughout the period of the rebellion, not only did the administering Power, which had the primary responsibility of putting down the rebellion, pursue pussy-footing policies of improvisation and collusion with the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, but, as the London *Sunday Times* of 27 January 1980 revealed, the United Kingdom Government literally condoned the breaching of the mandatory sanctions that were imposed by the Security Council against the rebel régime. That *Sunday Times* article, in exposing the perfidious and cavalier manner in which the British authorities dealt, for instance, with the Bingham report,² cited annex III of that report, on evidence of criminal offences, which listed more than 300 directors of Shell and British Petroleum as well as several senior officials of the British Foreign Office who contravened the sanctions order. To

compound British perfidy on the matter, the United Kingdom Government recently announced that its Director of Public Prosecutions would no longer prosecute anyone connected with that shameful traffic and the proven violations of the decisions of the Security Council. Given this background of suspicion and lack of trust, the British Governor, Lord Soames, not only should have been fair in the performance of his functions, but should have been seen to be fair.

15. The second problem was the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement itself. Everything hinged on faithful respect for the spirit and letter of the Agreement. Annex E of the report of the Constitutional Conference on Southern Rhodesia, published in Her Majesty's Stationery Office document Cmnd. 7802,¹ stipulated the terms and conditions of the cease-fire agreement.

16. The main difficulties, to which the representative of the United Kingdom referred in his statement of 30 January [2192nd meeting], in the way of effective observance of the cease-fire were self-evident. No one expected that the violence and disruptions of a 10-year war could be turned off like water from a spigot; hence the various arrangements, mechanisms, commissions and undertakings provided for in the Agreement. The statements of the Chairman of the Lancaster House Conference made on 11 and 15 December 1979¹ were equally pertinent. A primordial condition of the cease-fire was prescribed in annex E, paragraph 1 of the Agreement: "This agreement"—that is, the cease-fire agreement—"will take effect on a basis of strict reciprocity". Nowhere in the British representative's interesting statement was there any indication that Lord Soames had scrupulously abided by this essential condition of reciprocity or of equal treatment of all the forces that complied with the cease-fire agreement, nor did he say that Lord Soames was treating the Patriotic Front forces that are now complying with his directions as honourably and as lawfully as the Rhodesian forces that have accepted his authority.

17. Instead, contrary to the cease-fire agreement, Lord Soames has not only failed to confine the former illegal régime's so-called Rhodesian forces to their bases, but he has also deliberately been deploying them officially and permitting them to undertake random operational duties that both threaten the security of the Patriotic Front forces and jeopardize the maintenance of the cease-fire. But for the maturity and sense of honour of the Patriotic Front forces that have led almost 22,000 of their men to assemble in their less than sufficient designated areas, there would not be any cease-fire to speak of today.

18. The brutal murder of seven members of the Patriotic Front forces at Lupane three weeks ago and of six others on their way to assembly points by the so-called Rhodesian forces is yet further proof of the flagrant violation of the Lancaster House Agreement

by the British authorities. Paragraph 3 of the statement by the Chairman of the Conference on 11 December 1979 says that "there can be no question of surrender by either side". How then can Lord Soames allow the so-called Rhodesian forces to retain their arms and to behave as if they were still in rebellion against the British Government and at the same time aver that the 13 freedom fighters of the Patriotic Front were killed in cold blood because they refused to surrender to the Rhodesian forces, their inveterate enemies?

19. Bernard Shaw once observed with characteristic Irish wit that the English are moral only when they are uncomfortable. I was therefore not surprised to hear the British representative admit that Lord Soames had assigned an independent role to the so-called auxiliaries and at the same time confirm that "The auxiliaries are part of the Rhodesian forces and were declared as such at Lancaster House". [*Ibid.*, para. 51.]

20. The auxiliaries are a band of bandits that should have been disbanded long before the cease-fire agreement was signed. It is inadmissible that they should be officially deployed purportedly to help the police to contain breaches of the cease-fire or let loose in the rural areas to terrorize and intimidate people at will. They are being encouraged to create dangerous conditions, which now make the projected free and fair elections impossible. It is insensate to argue that

"... In many important ways, the auxiliaries' activities are increasingly related to the re-establishment of civilian administration in the tribal trust lands where they are engaged in attempts to promote the inhabitants' return to normal life". [*Ibid.*, para. 52.]

Nothing could be farther from the truth.

21. I do not want my statement to be seen as an angry rebuttal of what the British representative told the Council, but I must say that he went too far in trying to justify the presence of South African troops in Southern Rhodesia and in playing up the so-called concessions made by Bishop Muzorewa and the illegal régime of the rebel, racist white settlers at the Lancaster House Conference. Muzorewa and Smith were part of the British colonial disease in Rhodesia. Had they produced the cure or any answer to the problem, there would not have been any need for the Lancaster House Conference. They personified the rebellion and illegality in that Crown Colony. They did not therefore make any concessions. History denied them that privilege. The victories of the Patriotic Front forces on the battlefield denied them that right. The British authorities in their realism saw to it that Muzorewa and Smith were in no position to make concessions. Indeed, Smith should have been arrested and hanged in the Tower of London as a traitor and mass murderer.

22. The Smith-Muzorewa tragic collusion with South Africa in the rebellion against the British Crown in open defiance of African and world public opinion ought not to be used as a reason for tolerating the presence of South African troops anywhere in Southern Rhodesia. It is duplicitous to say that South African troops are in Southern Rhodesia to protect a vital lifeline. What lifeline, I ask? Is the Beit Bridge more vital than were the thousands of lives that South African forces have destroyed in Zimbabwe in the past 14 years? Is it more vital than the economic and social life of the entire country and of the neighbouring countries which South African troops have dislocated?

23. The question of the presence of South African troops and mercenaries in Southern Rhodesia is not yet behind us. This may be unfortunate, but it is true. The withdrawal of one or two companies of South African troops from Beit Bridge will not change anything. Her Majesty's Government must honour its commitment to expel all South African troops and mercenaries from Southern Rhodesia. It is common knowledge that there are thousands and thousands of South African troops in the country in gross violation of the Lancaster House Agreement. According to knowledgeable Western press sources, there are more than 5,000 South African airmen and regular soldiers at the moment in Southern Rhodesia serving as distinct units or fully integrated into the rebel defence and security forces. There are South African parachute battalions at Rutenga and Chirundu. There are South African air force personnel flying the Mirage jets, helicopters and light aircraft that the illegal régime acquired just before the Agreement was negotiated. All these must be expelled, as no self-respecting African will accept a government installed on the sufferance of South African armed forces.

24. Nigeria does not see the role of the United Kingdom in Southern Rhodesia as that of an impartial referee. We see it as a role of leadership, of a colonial Power determined, with the support of the entire international community, to discharge its obligations to all the people of Rhodesia, black and white. The new British Administration should take the lead, the initiative, in creating the requisite conditions and climate of reconciliation and normalcy. It should encourage constructive developments, such as the one reported by Mr. Jay Ross in *The Washington Post* of 31 January 1980, according to which the Patriotic Front guerrillas and the Rhodesian police now carry out joint patrols, even without the assistance of the monitoring forces, to escort groups of Patriotic Front supporters to their assembly camps. The British authorities, particularly Governor Soames, should open and improve communication lines with the leadership of the Patriotic Front. In this connection, I fully agree with Mr. Paul E. Tsongas, United States Senator from Massachusetts, who suggested after his recent visit to Southern Rhodesia and other African countries, including Nigeria, that a policy of frequent, direct and regular contact between Governor Soames

and the political parties, particularly the Patriotic Front, would remove most of the deep-seated suspicion which taints the work of the Governor at present.

25. In the view of Nigeria, and I am glad to say that it is a view shared by the rest of Africa, it was an error of judgement on the part of Governor Soames to extend the state of emergency for another period of six months at a time when his preoccupation should have been the restoration of peace, tranquillity, trust and civil rule. Once the cease-fire came into being, the level of violence was bound to decrease progressively. In any case, he did not require a state of emergency and martial law to make suitable arrangements for polling stations or to provide reception centres for refugees. Nigeria has some notable experience in resettling refugees after a civil war and in organizing elections. We are therefore not talking through our hats.

26. The obstacles put in the way of the return of the Patriotic Front leaders, particularly Mr. Robert Mugabe, were both unnecessary and provocative. That both Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe returned to Zimbabwe to unprecedented tumultuous welcomes, the biggest crowds Rhodesia has ever seen, should settle once and for all the attempts to embarrass them. It should also settle the issue of who are the true leaders of the Zimbabwean people.

27. The humanitarian nature of the question of refugees is too wrenching to tolerate bureaucratic trickery. After years of homelessness, the refugees want to return without let or hindrance. Furthermore, as provided in paragraph 11 of the cease-fire arrangements,¹ adequate provision must now be made to permit the return of civilian personnel to Rhodesia during the cease-fire in order to vote or to engage in other peaceful political activity. In a press statement issued on 25 January 1980, the Office of the President of the Republic of Botswana called attention to some manoeuvres that are making it difficult, if not impossible, for Zimbabwean refugees in neighbouring countries to return to their country to participate in the forthcoming elections. Good sense demands that the British authorities address this issue forthrightly and urgently.

28. It is a measure of the continued commitment of Africa to the ideals of the United Nations and to peace, freedom and independence in southern Africa that my colleagues and I have been given a mandate by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to bring the question of Southern Rhodesia to the Security Council, barely five weeks after the Council had considered it at the instance of the administering Power and the African States. We called then, as we do again today, only for even-handedness and fair play on the part of the Government of the United Kingdom. We call upon it to honour the letter and spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement, of which it was a major architect.

29. The Patriotic Front leaders, who sacrificed their lives and wherewithal through 10 years of relentless warfare, who through their victories made the Agreement possible and who love their country and the independence for which they have been fighting, want to implement faithfully the Lancaster House Agreement. The African countries, particularly the front-line States, which have invested too much energy and too many resources in the struggle, do not want to see the fruits of that struggle being stolen through trickery and deceit. They therefore demand full respect for the Agreement. The international community deserves the grateful thanks of Africa for the sacrifices it made as a result of the sanctions decreed by the Security Council and for the moral, political and material support which it always gave to the freedom fighters. It must therefore remain vigilant to ensure that the cause of freedom and independence in Rhodesia, which it has always supported, is not subverted when its goal is so close to being reached. It must insist on full implementation of the Agreement. The Commonwealth of Nations, which all along was most solicitous in its concern for peace and independence in Rhodesia, and which at its last Meeting of Heads of Government, held at Lusaka from 1 to 7 August 1979, persuaded the United Kingdom Government to abandon the lost cause of Smith and Muzorewa, must feel very disappointed at the present turn of events. It must therefore be anxious to see to it that the letter and spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement are honoured scrupulously.

30. We live in troubled times. Crisis keeps piling on crisis. When the solution of one crisis is at hand, it would be an unforgivable folly to allow that crisis to blow up in our face. Nigeria is committed to supporting and honouring the Lancaster House Agreement. We pledge to recognize and honour the Government of an independent Zimbabwe chosen under it, provided of course that the elections leading to the formation of such a Government are free and fair.

31. Mr. ESSAAFI (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should like first of all to offer you my heartfelt congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. The German Democratic Republic and Tunisia have always enjoyed close relations of friendship and fruitful co-operation. Although you are new to this body, you are well known to everyone. Aware as I am of your thorough experience of the United Nations, I am convinced that you will direct our work with great competence.

32. I should like also to congratulate my colleague, Mr. Leprette, on the remarkable efforts he made and the exemplary way in which he conducted the work of the Council in a very difficult period during which we had to consider various and delicate events. My delegation pays a tribute to him for his exceptional qualities of competence, wisdom and diplomacy.

33. Tunisia has been following with particular interest the situation obtaining in southern Africa, in particular as a result of the conclusion of the Lancaster House Agreement¹ on the establishment of a free and independent Zimbabwe.

34. My delegation had hoped that Africa, at the beginning of this year 1980, would have a period of peace that would promote the solution of one of the thorniest problems still facing the southern part of that continent. To our regret, the recent developments in the situation in Southern Rhodesia have dampened our enthusiasm and dashed our hopes.

35. To our mind, the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement and strict compliance with all the clauses contained in it were inevitably to lead Zimbabwe to independence, with a genuine majority Government. Because it was convinced that the Agreement would lead to free and fair elections in Southern Rhodesia, and anxious to show its good will, the African community associated itself with the Security Council's decision to dissolve the Committee the Council had created to monitor the application of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

36. The administering Power is entrusted with ensuring the strict and complete implementation of the various provisions of the Agreement, in accordance with the recommendation contained in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 460 (1979). But the way in which the first phase of the electoral process has been taking place is a clear indication of the disquieting turn of events in that part of southern Africa.

37. In saying that, my delegation certainly does not intend to minimize the importance of the Lancaster House Agreement, the conclusion of which aroused great hopes throughout the world, and particularly in Africa. For its part, Tunisia, faithful to its philosophy of decolonization, has always advocated—alongside the armed struggle for freedom and independence—negotiation and dialogue with the colonizing Power every time the latter agreed to it. Hence, at the appropriate time we voiced our satisfaction at the laudable efforts made by the British Government to secure at the Lancaster House Conference an agreement acceptable to all the parties, thereby offering a framework for a peaceful solution of the Rhodesian problem and re-establishing the United Kingdom's primary responsibility in the decolonization of Zimbabwe. We should like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the Patriotic Front for its courageous and important contribution to the success of that Conference and for the great maturity and spirit of conciliation it demonstrated.

38. While we welcome the implementation of the process of the return to legality in Rhodesia, following the United Kingdom's formal agreement to assume its historic responsibilities in respect of the people of Zimbabwe, we have been deeply concerned about the

numerous violations of the letter and spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement that have recently been committed.

39. The presence of South African troops in Rhodesia contradicts the assurances given by the administering Power that no South African troops would remain in Rhodesia during the electoral campaign period. The presence of these troops, which the Africans view with legitimate condemnation and deep suspicion, not only stands in the way of the normal implementation of the various phases of the electoral process, but also constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region. It is therefore urgent, indeed imperative, to withdraw them from Rhodesia. In that regard, the announcement made by the representative of the United Kingdom that South African troops would be withdrawn from Beit Bridge is a step in the right direction. We hope that it will be followed by others, so that the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement can be strictly and completely implemented.

40. By contributing to the preparations for general, free, just and democratic elections, the United Kingdom would be fully and honourably discharging the mission entrusted to it under the Agreement. It would be faithful to itself by ensuring that these elections were free and impartial and capable of gaining the confidence of the electorate. To that end, it is necessary to facilitate and organize, in conditions of complete security, the return of refugees and exiled persons, to proceed to the liberation of all the political prisoners, and to put an end to the deployment of Rhodesian forces, confining them to their bases. It is only in those conditions that the Agreement will be crowned with success.

41. In conclusion, my delegation voices the hope that the British Government will show wisdom, moderation and its traditional sense of fair play in the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement and that it will assume its historic responsibility to the last—that is, until the birth of a truly independent nation of Zimbabwe, led by a genuine majority Government.

42. We express the hope also that the struggle waged by the people of Zimbabwe, under the heroic and perspicacious leadership of the Patriotic Front, will result in the concrete fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples to freedom and dignity.

43. Mr. YANGO (Philippines): To begin with, I should like to congratulate the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Peter Florin, as he assumes the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February and to offer him our whole-hearted co-operation in the tasks that lie ahead. I should also like to use this occasion to express my delegation's deep appreciation to the representative of France,

Mr. Leprette, whose presidency of the Security Council ended less than 24 hours ago, for the splendid way in which he steered the business of the Council during a month of crisis.

44. Today the issue before us is one of decolonization and the rights of a troubled people to full independence and sovereignty and to determine for themselves their form of government and their future. Those are principles which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and to which we are fully committed. It is regrettable that, long after the colonial era has ended in other parts of the world, there is still an important area where the process of decolonization is not yet complete. We cannot and should not remain indifferent until all the last vestiges of colonization have been erased everywhere.

45. The Philippines belongs to a group of countries which achieved their independence in the first wave of the decolonization process. Our salutary experience in that process obliges us to abide by a policy of commitment, which we have consistently and unwaveringly maintained, to uphold the inalienable rights of colonized peoples to their independence and sovereignty in the United Nations, which provides the best opportunity to pursue that end by peaceful means. In this connection, we believe that the United Nations has largely lived up to the role envisaged for it by its founders of accelerating the peaceful decolonization of all subject peoples. The adoption of resolution 1514 (XV) in 1960, which contains the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, has served as the principal impetus towards that end.

46. Once again the Council is seized of the question of the situation in Southern Rhodesia where the process of decolonization has been slowed down, if not arrested. It may be recalled that on 11 November 1965, the Philippines and 21 other countries brought to the Security Council's attention what we considered to be "the grave situation in Rhodesia arising out of the unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority Government" [S/6903], in our belief that the collective action of the international community was needed to avert what could become a grave threat to international peace and security.

47. It was an initiative that my country did not take in isolation, for we had also taken similar initiatives with respect to that region of Africa, in recognition of the fact that the problem of Rhodesia was part of a larger problem in the whole of southern Africa which included that of Namibia and of *apartheid* in South Africa.

48. My delegation is keenly disappointed that the threat to international peace and security that made us join in the initiative in 1965 has not as yet been averted; regrettably, we are still faced with the same question. This does not mean that nothing has been

accomplished since 1965 when the Council adopted resolution 216 (1965), condemning the unilateral declaration of independence made by the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, there have been many attempts to reach a solution by all the parties concerned and by the international community. In this connection, we should like to pay a tribute to the initiatives taken by representatives of the United States of America, of the United Kingdom and of the black peoples themselves—those of the front-line States of Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Botswana, for example—and, more particularly, by the representatives of the Patriotic Front to bring this problem off the battlefields and to the conference table. This was clearly evident in various international conferences of recent years, such as those held at Lagos, Dakar, Havana, Lusaka, Oslo and, most recently, London.

49. All the parties concerned are to be congratulated on their success in working out the Lancaster House Agreement,¹ which is undoubtedly an achievement of the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government held at Lusaka from 1 to 7 August 1979, and of the British Government. It should also be considered a personal triumph for Lord Carrington that should be traced to his persistence and firmness of conviction. At the same time, the Lancaster House Agreement indicates a clear manifestation of the willingness of the Patriotic Front to resolve peacefully difficult questions of many years' standing and to abide by an agreement that would be mutually satisfactory to all the parties, at a time when they were still locked in mortal combat. To my country, the Agreement is a clear sign that all the parties have at last found a way out of what had seemed for a long time a hopeless impasse. We firmly believe that, properly implemented, the Agreement can be a landmark in the history of the decolonization process. At this critical period there is only one more requirement—the willingness of all the parties to abide by and fully respect the original spirit of good will and accommodation that brought all the parties together in the first place.

50. But it seems that there are still a number of obstacles standing in the way of full implementation of the Agreement. We have heard in this chamber many charges and imputations, which have also been reported in the world press, against some of the parties involved, including the Administering Authority. In turn, we have heard denials and counter-charges. What brought all of us to this series of meetings of the Security Council are charges that South African troops continue to operate within the borders of Zimbabwe; that the forces of the rebel Government of Ian Smith and Muzorewa continue to exist as an aggressive force and operate against the forces of the Patriotic Front; that, as a result, the state of emergency and war continues; that political prisoners continue to be detained; that the Patriotic Front continues to be maltreated or discriminated against; and that refugees coming from the front-line States are being prevented

from returning to their homes. Plainly, if all that is true, the conditions for free and fair elections, which are required by the Lancaster House Agreement, do not yet exist.

51. It would indeed be a pity if the Lancaster House Agreement, the result of so much painful effort after so many years of suffering on the part of all the peoples in that region, were to come to nought. For the sake of those peoples, we must ourselves exert all efforts to see to it that the Agreement signed in London on 21 December 1979, which all concerned considered a workable instrument, becomes in fact a working arrangement that will produce genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe. It can be made to work only if all the parties without exception are made to abide by its provisions.

52. In the view of my delegation, the situation in Zimbabwe with respect to the Lancaster House Agreement is not a simple return to colonial rule. We believe that the administering Power's mandate is to administer the Agreement. By that, it has been invited to supervise a peaceful transition to independence and genuine majority rule by means of an election process in which all the people of Zimbabwe can freely and fully participate. Clearly, the act of transition and, therefore, the success of the Agreement, are premised on the recognition of the people themselves that they have achieved their aim through unhindered participation. Thus the success of the whole exercise rests, as my delegation sees it, on the perceptions of the people themselves that the necessary conditions exist for free and fair elections according to the stipulations of the Agreement. It is therefore in the interest of all concerned that the people of Zimbabwe should feel convinced that this exercise will be conducted in an equitable manner, for it is they alone who will inherit the fruits of either failure or success.

53. We are compelled to say this because sometimes there exists a wide gulf between the thoughts and perceptions of ruling authorities and those of the people they presume to rule, and large differences between what authorities recognize to be their responsibilities and what they are obliged to do and what the people themselves believe is happening to them. Under normal circumstances, it should not be too difficult to bridge such gaps by regular consultations, but in the hostile atmosphere of war, it is most difficult to dispel all suspicion about the intentions of the other parties. Where the administering Power is deemed traditionally to be associated with one of the parties, it is not easy to avoid doubts as to its impartiality. Hence, like Caesar's wife, it must be above suspicion. There have been too many instances in history when the best of intentions have become frustrated in resolving disputes, because the judge or referee becomes a party to the dispute and impartiality is thrown into doubt. My country is not a stranger to this travesty of human rights in our long subjugation under colonial rule. We have no wish for the Zimbabwean people to suffer the same fate when independence and national sovereignty are so near at hand.

54. In the view of my delegation, there is therefore no alternative to strict compliance with Security Council resolution 460 (1979), which, *inter alia*,

“Calls for strict adherence to the agreements reached and for their full and faithful implementation by the administering Power and all the parties concerned;” and also

“Calls upon the administering Power to ensure that no South African or other external forces, regular or mercenary, will remain in or enter Southern Rhodesia, except those forces provided for under the Lancaster House Agreement.”

Anything less than that may lead to disastrous results.

55. Mr. MUÑOZ LEDO (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like first of all in the most cordial terms possible to congratulate the outgoing President of the Security Council, the representative of France, for the exceptional ability he showed in conducting the business of the Council during the month of January. He enhanced the prestige which he already enjoyed among us all and increased our admiration and appreciation of him. We wish to extend to our new President, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, our very best wishes for success in the task before him and to express our conviction that he will display the same even temper and skill of which he has already given proof.

56. The Security Council is once again meeting to contribute by timely decisions to the self-determination and independence of the people of Zimbabwe. The African States have condemned specific acts and events and political symptoms which they consider to be serious and which, in their view, run counter to the Lancaster House Agreement¹ and the aims sought by the United Nations with regard to the total liberation of colonial countries and peoples.

57. After innumerable difficulties, the Agreement in question has come to represent the instrument which at this stage can guarantee the accession of Zimbabwe to independence by peaceful means. In the first instance, it derives from a compromise between the administering Power and the political forces that have struggled to liberate Zimbabwe. It reflects a consensus achieved between the front-line States, which have a prime interest in a satisfactory solution to the problem, and, furthermore, it has been welcomed by the international community.

58. Nevertheless, the debate in the Council leads one to think that the real situation does not correspond to the hopes placed in the Agreement and the machinery provided for the transition stage. We have heard here two differing interpretations of what has happened in Zimbabwe in the past few weeks. According to one of them, a great deal has been achieved in little time to restore peace. According to the other,

the decisions taken thus far by the administering Power do not guarantee the development of a genuine democratic process.

59. It is clear that we are dealing with two differing assessments of one and the same situation: one expressing optimism and satisfaction, the other keen disappointment and a feeling that not enough has been done. However, at the basis of the arguments put forward, there are two different logics at work, two interpretations with respect to the very meaning of the Lancaster House Agreement and the political commitment it entails.

60. What is essential in the eyes of the administering Power seems to be the maintenance of order and the prompt arrival at an institutional solution. What is essential for the States that have denounced the Agreement is that a genuine path be opened towards the process of national liberation. Hence every event and every incident has a different significance according to the point of view from which it is seen. Whether it is a matter of the presence of South African troops, of the limits with regard to the return of the political refugees, of the role of the so-called auxiliary forces, of the coercion to which the nationalist movements are being subjected or any other relevant aspect—we are faced with two divergent attitudes: that of those who hold that those are passing incidents that can be corrected and those who believe that behind those incidents is concealed a deliberate design of partiality and the intention to hold on to remaining privileges.

61. None the less, something of the highest political significance emerges from this debate, namely, the unanimity of the African States, regardless of their ideology or geographical position, in considering that the present application of the Lancaster House Agreement runs counter to the process of liberation in which, for several decades, not only the people of Zimbabwe but the whole of Africa has been involved.

62. Certainly the case of Zimbabwe is unique and to a great extent extreme, as are *apartheid* and the lamentable climate that fosters it, which is likely to be the case in the immediate vicinity of any centre that diffuses the most reprehensible forms of racial, cultural and political domination. Hence, the symbolic value and historical importance which the countries of the third world attach to the process of liberation in Zimbabwe. The difficulties and pitfalls which it has had to confront are a synthesis of those dealt with by many countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America throughout approximately 150 years on their road to independence and effective self-determination.

63. Mexico fully supports the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe. A long and painful experience has taught us that in matters of sovereignty, half a victory may easily become a defeat when fundamental principles and balances, on which national identity and the viability of independent existence depend, are at stake.

64. We are aware of the efforts made by the United Kingdom in order to bring about a peaceful solution to the problem. What seems hard to understand is that the Lancaster House Agreement could be interpreted in such a way as to work against those very forces of liberation in Zimbabwe that made it possible. It is not conceivable that it could be used to weaken the drive towards independence and the expression of the political will of the national majority.

65. What has taken place in Zimbabwe is the outcome of a heroic struggle; transition should not mean retrogression; the presence of an administering Power should not result in the retreat of those sectors that seek full sovereignty for their country nor the obtaining of unjustifiable advantages for minorities bound to the colonial past.

66. The Lancaster House Agreement was established specifically as a channel for the independent process, and not as a means of delaying or bypassing it. It represents a peaceful means only insofar as it is geared to the achievement of the purpose that justifies its existence. Otherwise, instead of eliminating the conflict, it would end by again fanning the flames, with unforeseeable results for international peace and security.

67. It is right and proper that the Security Council has been vigilant and is ready to use its authority in an issue as delicate as this one. We should adopt a clear position which would unambiguously establish the direction that should be taken at this stage of transition so that the fundamental principle involved will be observed, namely, the self-determination of the people of Zimbabwe.

68. The political process which concerns us is fraught with risks. Struggles for independence do not take place in a historical vacuum. Quite the contrary, the heritage of the past sometimes coalesces into a real power system which must be beaten down every day. No one had hoped, nor could anyone reasonably hope, that in the future the emergence of a genuinely independent national State of Zimbabwe would be free of problems.

69. What is required is the conciliation of political wills to ensure the best circumstances for the process to develop viably. In the present circumstances, the most constructive solution would be for the administering Power to agree to the requirements set forth in the draft resolution [S/13777] and an unambiguous renewal of the commitment it previously undertook.

70. The flexibility shown by the African States and the non-aligned States in the search for a text that would not be objectionable to any member of the Council is unquestionable proof of our readiness to find negotiated solutions to problems, and indicates the just and effective course that should be followed in this case.

71. At this time, the Security Council is confronting a great many responsibilities and tasks. In various regions there are serious signs of threatening conflict, clear transgressions of international law and attempts to redefine spheres of influence. We must not add further tension to a world which is already fraught with danger, nor can we allow the present state of polarization to be used as an excuse to violate the rights or belittle the interests of the countries of the third world. The price of peace cannot in any way involve a lessening of the sovereignty of the weaker countries or the emergence of new obstacles to the liberation process. It must remain, in the days ahead, a fundamental concern of the United Nations.

72. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The next speaker is the representative of Ghana. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

73. Mr. SEKYE (Ghana): Mr. President, we of the delegation of Ghana consider it particularly fortunate that the Security Council is considering the present item under your presidency, as you are the representative of a country whose commitment to the cause of decolonization has never been in doubt. Furthermore, I happen now to be speaking for a country that enjoys the most cordial relations with yours, and in this, too, we have an additional cause to rejoice. Finally, but not least, we have every confidence that your experience and skill in the affairs of the United Nations will guide the Council in its deliberations most successfully throughout the present month, and particularly in its consideration of the item before us.

74. You have picked up the mantle from a predecessor, Mr. Jacques Leprette of France, who, by universal consensus, guided the work of the Council with most outstanding ability during that most difficult month of January. To him, too, go our warmest congratulations on a magnificent job.

75. Mr. President, I should like to thank you and your colleagues of the Council for giving me the opportunity to state the position of my Government on the present situation in Rhodesia with regard to the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement,¹ particularly on the pre-election arrangements. My country's disappointment at the handling of certain aspects of the Rhodesian cease-fire agreement has already been publicly expressed in recent official statements. Since then fresh evidence available to my Government has strengthened our conviction that there have been serious breaches of the Agreement such that the preconditions for free and fair elections may already be said to have been destroyed at least for a part of the time when they should have been in force. We believe that immediate rectification is required, and the convening of the Security Council is therefore timely. The Ghana delegation hopes that, under your able leadership, the Council, having addressed itself seriously to the issues, will take

prompt remedial measures to arrest the situation lest the elections should be clearly nullified in advance and lest the situation then explode into a crisis of unmanageable proportions with dangerous implications for international peace and security.

76. As previous speakers have indicated, there is a transnational conspiracy aimed at promoting the Muzorewa-Smith political alliance at the expense of rival political groups in the Territory, particularly the Patriotic Front. Information reaching my Government indicates that, in their anxiety to see what they consider to be stability in that part of Africa, certain influential cliques in places outside the Territory, including, of course, South Africa, regard the prospect of a Zimbabwean Government dominated by the Patriotic Front with the deepest concern. Together with the racist Pretoria régime, these cliques favour what they call a moderate Zimbabwean Government which would maintain close ties with Pretoria. As far as they are concerned, that moderate Government can be assured only by the election of the Muzorewa-Smith clique to office. It is, therefore, the Muzorewa-Smith group that they wish to see win the elections planned for February in Rhodesia.

77. However, the spontaneous and massive support demonstrated by the Zimbabwean people for the Patriotic Front leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe on their return to Southern Rhodesia recently, and, above all, the will and determination of their followers in spite of obvious initial political disadvantages clearly show that the Muzorewa-Smith group cannot win the forthcoming elections. There are the strongest indications that the British Governor, Lord Soames, caught between pressure from the racist régime of Pretoria and from the white minority in Rhodesia, has been compelled to "bend the rules" of the Lancaster House Agreement, with a view to achieving results similar to those of the sham April elections or at least preventing the emergence of a strong Patriotic Front government. This, then, is the strategy behind the numerous and increasingly serious breaches of the cease-fire agreement which have prompted the leaders of OAU and of Africa to raise the complaints now before the Council. This reading of the situation may to some seem unduly harsh and cynical. I pause to observe that it is in fact the more charitable of the possible readings.

78. During the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, we declared our opinion that the Lancaster House proposals had at least one serious defect: the Patriotic Front was being asked to stake everything upon the outcome of elections held under an authority which could not be exercised in Rhodesia independently of forces loyal only to the Front's election opponents. We were of course referring then to the Smith-Walls establishment, which had continued to control the real levers of power during the Parliament of blacksmiths and would continue to do so in reality after that Parliament was replaced by a limited British

presence. It was our view, as we put it then, that mere substitution of a British Governor for the Parliament of the internal settlement, the mere addition to the existing Smith-Walls apparatus of a British administrator with no independently enforceable authority, would scarcely change the basic situation in Rhodesia beyond shedding a semblance of quasi-legality over the inevitable electioneering roguery.

79. That is precisely what seems to be happening in Rhodesia today. And we are not inclined to reject the assessment according to which, in his departures from the letter and spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement, the Governor is bending to local pressures rather than acting on the direct instructions of the administering Power. But this alternative interpretation—that he is acting on the instructions of the administering Power—is certainly a possible one. It is the more correct, indeed, in a certain formal sense, for it is a presumption that we, as Members of the United Nations, are entitled to make in laying responsibility for these breaches at the door of the administering Power. And that is a much more serious matter.

80. What are some of these violations? According to reports reaching us, they include the deployment of the former Southern Rhodesian forces, which, we are told, now assist the police in maintaining "law and order". They include the continued deployment in the country of a large number of South African combat troops. They include the deployment, particularly in the rural areas, of auxiliaries of the United African National Council (UANC) which are given a free hand and liberty to roam the countryside intimidating civilian populations. In addition, there have been serious delays in the repatriation of refugees and political exiles and in the release of detainees. Martial law and the state of emergency have been extended for the entire pre-election period and beyond.

81. These, in the view of Ghana, constitute the most serious breaches of the Lancaster House Agreement and have inevitably given rise to conditions that make the holding of free elections impossible. We in Ghana are frankly disappointed that they should have been allowed to occur, for, taken all together, they seem to present us with a style of operation scarcely distinguishable from that of the internal settlement régime. The expectations were totally different at the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, held at Lusaka from 1 to 7 August 1979, and even at Lancaster House.

82. Admittedly, the situation is a difficult one. Various explanations of these breaches have been heard. The auxiliaries are said to be merely helping a return to civilian life. The South African forces were merely protecting a vital route or lifeline. The exiles' return is delayed merely because they cannot yet be reabsorbed into the land of their birth—and so on and so forth. Since the explanations seem to be totally unconnected with the politics and policies of

the rival parties, one would normally expect the departures from the Lancaster House Agreement to favour now one side and now the other, or both equally or neither equally; but they practically all seem prejudicial to the political interests of one side and one side only—the Patriotic Front. This seems a strange coincidence.

83. There may be perfectly good reasons why the auxiliaries of Muzorewa and the regulars of Walls should be deployed, while the forces of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) are confined. But this could hardly be prejudicial to Muzorewa's chances for election. There may be perfectly respectable reasons why South African forces should have been deployed inside Rhodesia at the Beit Bridge, if not elsewhere. But this could hardly have lessened the chances of the Muzorewa-Smith clique. There may be all sorts of perfectly statesmanlike reasons why martial law should continue and why exiles and refugees should not all return yet. But such things have never worked against the Bishop's interests, nor are they now likely to. On the other hand, they all work against the interests of the Patriotic Front. It all seems quite strange really. In fact, there could not be a stranger set of coincidences, all pointing in one and the same direction, were the hand at the local helm of affairs the masterly old hand of Ian Smith himself. Indeed, as we have seen, there are practised observers of the local scene who seem to detect that very hand somewhere in it all.

84. However that may be, we remain deeply disturbed by the series of breaches reported. First, the deployment of Smith's regulars and Muzorewa's auxiliaries to help the police to contain breaches of the cease-fire. Cease-fires, as we are given to understand, are invariably negotiated so that neither belligerent derives, or may derive, a military advantage of any kind—a basic principle without which there can be no cease-fire.

85. The Patriotic Front could not conceivably have envisaged that the cease-fire upon which they had staked so much in the Lancaster House talks should become the one exception to this invariable rule, and to their own detriment. It is hard to see how the provisions of the cease-fire agreement could be made to yield any meaning according to which the Patriotic Front could be confined, while their antagonists were deployed all around them, with South African reinforcements, overt or covert. In the meantime their political leaders would have to contest an election also policed by their antagonists' forces, so that, if they lost, they would have to accept the results or find their own forces instantly mopped up, whilst, if they won, the same thing could still happen—and probably would happen. This surely is a travesty of the expectations at the Lusaka meeting and the undertakings at Lancaster House.

86. The most disturbing aspect of these breaches, in our view, is the fact that Her Majesty's Government involved Pretoria in the implementation of the Agreement. It is a matter of deep regret also that the "sensitivities" of African Governments do not seem to have been seriously taken into account. In our view, if there was any need at all for a small number of troops to protect a vital lifeline, forces other than those of *apartheid* could have been employed out of the many that had been offered.

87. But the Beit Bridge affair is by no means the whole affair. The claim that the South African detachment there has been withdrawn and that the dispute is therefore behind us ignores the seriousness of South African troop involvement in Rhodesian affairs. The fact is that South African troops are involved on a much wider scale and, indeed, in far greater concentrations than has been yet admitted. Reliable sources have it that South African troops and airmen have been in Rhodesia in significant numbers for quite some time now and that these troops have been engaged actively in operations in Zimbabwe over the years. They are combat troops estimated at around 6,000 or 7,000 men. In short, Pretoria, according to our information, has about five infantry battalions, one parachute battalion, two artillery regiments and six armoured squadrons, not to mention air contingents. The picture that emerges is that of a massive South African military presence in Zimbabwe. Not only does this troop presence cast an ominous shadow over the planned February elections, but it also makes the Patriotic Front nationalists at the assembly points "sitting ducks" for a possible combined attack by forces of Southern Rhodesia and Pretoria. Furthermore, Pretoria is reported to have massed troops estimated at brigade strength at Messina, just across the Beit Bridge. This force, we are told, has been put in combat readiness for intervention in Southern Rhodesia, should Pretoria decide that its interests are threatened and that it therefore requires more direct and open action. It is sobering to reflect that the force protecting the lifeline could then have served as the advance guard.

88. The removal of this South African menace, reinforced as it has been by Pretoria's open threats of intervention, presents the most serious challenge now to the Security Council; and the application, if necessary, of sanctions for this purpose certainly, in our view, deserves to be given serious consideration. For the time being the responsibility lies heavily on the administering Power to eliminate that threat well before the elections are due. Incumbent also on the administering Power is scrupulous observance in all respects of the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement, as called for, *inter alia*, by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session; and in the present state of things, this involves particularly the immediate confinement to base of Rhodesian security and auxiliary forces, the release of all political prisoners and the safe and speedy return of all refugees and political exiles.

89. Those are the indispensable prerequisites of free and fair elections and such elections are, in their turn, the indispensable prerequisites of peace and stability in an internationally recognized Zimbabwe. The only alternative to that is a long, bitter and bloody struggle in which, with sanctions now lifted, men, money, arms and materials will be poured out in support of the racists by those who need them as their defensive buffer, and by those who believe, however misguidedly, that their material interests are thus better served. But those who fight for liberty will not lack powerful friends and supporters either. One of the most dangerous brush fires our century has seen would thus be lit on the southern part of our continent. We ask and expect that the Security Council will now take the first steps, with the co-operation of the administering Power, to avert such a catastrophe.

90. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The next speaker is the representative of Kenya. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

91. Mr. MAINA (Kenya): I wish first of all to express the gratitude of the delegation of Kenya to you, Mr. President, and to the other members of the Council for allowing us to participate in this debate. My delegation wishes to congratulate you warmly on your accession to the presidency for this month. Knowing as we do of your long experience and thorough knowledge of the work of the United Nations and your outstanding qualities as a diplomat, we have every confidence that you will guide this debate to a fruitful conclusion.

92. May I also pay a tribute to the outgoing President of the Council, Mr. Leprette, for convening this series of meetings of the Security Council at our request. We are particularly grateful to him because we know that his task was not easy. He stood firm in the discharge of his duties, thus making it possible for us to meet. His was an unusually busy and difficult month, but he has conducted the affairs of the Council with the singular distinction that we have learned to expect from our dealings with him.

93. The decision to request this urgent meeting of the Security Council was not taken lightly. Everyone was conscious of the need to create a calm atmosphere in Southern Rhodesia to facilitate the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement.¹ However, violations of the letter and spirit of that Agreement had reached the point at which silence would have betrayed not only the freedom fighters who have taken the greatest risks in order to make the Lancaster House Agreement work but all the dead and living Zimbabweans who have sacrificed so much to rid their country of colonialism and racism.

94. I take no pleasure in having to respond to and disagree so strongly with some remarks made by the new British representative, Sir Anthony Parsons, in

his speech two days ago [2192nd meeting], since I have not had enough time to get to know him well. I should like to assure him, however, of my desire to work with him and of my immense goodwill towards him. However, I have to state that in his remarks he objected to the insistence of the African delegations on the holding of this meeting of the Security Council to criticize—as he put it—his Government's performance in Southern Rhodesia. He could not have been unaware of the breaches of assurances given by his Government, breaches which have greatly embarrassed our African Governments and all the Governments and peoples of the world opposed to the policies of *apartheid*. As representatives are aware, my country is one of the few countries which provides military personnel for the cease-fire monitoring forces in Southern Rhodesia. Kenya's modest contribution to that effort was made in the context of the Lancaster House Agreement and as a follow-up to the efforts made by the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka, to find a peaceful solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia. The British Government could not expect the Kenyan Government to acquiesce in or to be a party to the breaches of the Lancaster House Agreement. The situation was so bad that my President, Mr. Daniel Arap Moi, was obliged to make a public statement on 14 January 1980. As this statement is short, I shall read it in full. The President said:

“At the London Conference on Rhodesia assurances were given to the effect that South African troops would leave Rhodesia soon after the arrival in Salisbury of the British Governor. The presence of the South African troops in Rhodesia, as publicly admitted to by the Governor, is clearly contrary to those assurances.

“The British Governor has said that South African troops are in Rhodesia to guard the Beit Bridge. As a member of the contingent in Rhodesia for the monitoring of the cease-fire, Kenya considers it essential that the assurances given in London be honoured. In fact, I do not see how I can allow Kenyan troops to share Rhodesian soil with South African troops. The guarding of the Beit Bridge should be entrusted to the Rhodesian police force which, under the London Agreement, is to maintain law and order during the interim Administration in Rhodesia. If that is not considered adequate, the British Government should be invited to send additional troops to carry out that task.

“Once again I want to express the hope that the letter and the spirit of the London Agreement will be strictly observed by all the parties concerned, so as to ensure a smooth transition from the disastrous war of the past to genuine majority rule on the basis of a free and fair election. This is particularly important as we see no viable alternative to arrangements already agreed. The consequences of a collapse of the Agreement are too grave to contemplate.

"I take this opportunity to reiterate that Kenya cherishes peace and stability, and that it is necessary for the people of Zimbabwe to be able to conduct their own affairs under the direction of a government of their own choice. That is the only sound basis on which they can embark on the development of their country for the good of all."

95. Although the breach of the Lancaster House Agreement that has been the subject of the most discussion is the presence of South African forces in Southern Rhodesia, there are other breaches which, unless corrected now, will ruin all the good work done so far. I shall refer to only a few of these. The use of the rebel military forces of Southern Rhodesia alone by the Governor, without a balancing use of the freedom fighter forces, will in the end create the wrong impressions and produce wrong responses from the parties. This point nearly broke up the Lancaster House Conference. However difficult it may be, the Governor has to be, and appear publicly to be, even-handed in dealing with the military forces.

96. The existence of the so-called auxiliaries in the countryside, loose and armed, is bound to create problems that will mar the good job which the Governor is trying to do. These auxiliaries, as has been said—and as I can say from personal experience—are worse than the military or police forces because they are ill trained and poorly disciplined individuals most susceptible to all the human frailties. If they have to move about in the countryside away from their camps—if they have any—then it is absolutely essential that they should not carry any firearms. In any case, it is none of their job to do police work. They are highly motivated politically, and it would be most unwise to leave them loose and armed—and I emphasize "loose and armed"—during the campaign period.

97. I would not end my remarks without referring to press reports of loose talk emanating from highly placed military leaders about the intentions of South Africa if the people of Zimbabwe elect certain leaders. This kind of talk could undermine the good faith which everyone should be trying to create. We trust that the fears these reports are generating are unfounded. We would of course be happier if they could be denied publicly and assurances given to abide by the will of the people of Zimbabwe freely expressed through free and fair elections.

98. We wish to place on record our admiration of all the parties to the Lancaster House Agreement for negotiating it and for the practical steps they have taken to implement it so far. We wish to encourage them to complete the process they have started, so that Zimbabwe may have a Government freely chosen by a majority of its gallant people.

99. Mr. FUTSCHER PEREIRA (Portugal): Allow me, at the outset, warmly to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency

of the Security Council. Your knowledge and experience and your diplomatic skills are the best assurance that our work during the present month will be conducted in the most effective manner. I should also like to express our gratitude and warm appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Leprette of France, whose well-known competence and dedication and whose endeavours towards the fulfilment of our common goals we all deeply admired during his particularly difficult, indeed arduous, term of office.

100. Portugal has followed closely the evolution of events in Southern Rhodesia in the past years, not only out of our deep anxiety over the future of that beleaguered country, but also because of the consequences of those events for the neighbouring countries with which we have always had close ties of friendship.

101. After the Commonwealth Meeting at Lusaka, the conversations at Lancaster House started to instil in the world community the hope that there could be a peaceful solution to the seemingly insuperable problems assailing Zimbabwe. Against what looked like insurmountable odds, and always on the verge of breaking up, those conversations went on and eventually produced an agreement that, only a few weeks before, not even the more optimistic would have expected.

102. The world community has recognized and paid a tribute to the patience, goodwill and spirit of co-operation of all those involved: the British Government, which called and chaired the Conference; the parties in the conflict, which made important concessions for the benefit of a peaceful solution; and the front-line States, whose leaders once again showed their statesmanship in defending the long-term interests of their area. However, no one could expect that in a few weeks the profound divisions that have scarred Southern Rhodesia for the past 15 years could be healed, and that trust and mutual confidence could immediately replace all the tensions and deep suspicions inherent in the warlike conditions that had prevailed in the Territory for so long a period.

103. The Portuguese delegation has listened with the greatest attention to the statements made before the Council on the difficulties which have occurred in the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement and on certain aspects of the internal evolution of Rhodesia since the United Kingdom reassumed the administration of the Territory. The Portuguese delegation understands and shares the natural apprehension with which this is viewed by all those who are engaged in this process, and by those who are anxious to see it brought to a close through free and fair elections, allowing Zimbabwe to attain independence and occupy its rightful place within the community of nations.

104. But, while recognizing that these aspects and difficulties have been serious and, in certain cases,

have even constituted a threat to the peaceful continuation of this process, the Portuguese delegation cannot fail to note everything that the British Administration in Rhodesia and all the other parties concerned have already achieved. There have been violations of the cease-fire, but the cease-fire is sticking. There was the intolerable presence of South African military forces on Beit Bridge, but these forces have now been withdrawn. There were, and may still be, grave obstacles to the return of thousands of refugees to Rhodesia, but refugees have been returning. There were difficulties and delays in the concentration of the forces of the Patriotic Front, as well as in the return of their leaders to Rhodesia, but these difficulties and delays were overcome, and the leaders of the Patriotic Front are already in Zimbabwe, pursuing their political objectives in full liberty, with the help of their many supporters. Above all, the war is over.

105. There can be no doubt that the present situation in Zimbabwe is fraught with dangers, and we are certainly aware of its fragility. But, on the other hand, to call the present situation in Zimbabwe a still more serious threat to international peace and security than the one which prevailed two months ago seems unrealistic to us.

106. We have no doubt that all the parties concerned entered into the agreements in good faith and are willing to exert their utmost efforts to carry them out to the end. My Government is therefore of the opinion that it is incumbent upon the international community to avoid any action that, by underlining the negative instead of the positive aspects already achieved, might stress the divisions and suspicions and render the situation on the ground more dangerous.

107. The representative of the United Kingdom has asked the Security Council to trust his Government, even though we might not approve of all the decisions that the authorities in Salisbury have taken during this difficult period. The Portuguese delegation, for its part, is prepared to extend that trust, convinced as it is that the British Government deserves it and will not fail to take into account the concerns and apprehensions voiced during this debate.

108. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The next speaker is the representative of Uganda. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

109. Mr. WAPENYI (Uganda): I wish to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption today of the duties of the important role of presiding over these meetings of the Security Council—meetings that are very crucial to Africa. May I also, through you, thank the other members of the Council for allowing my delegation to participate in the deliberations initiated by the African Group on the issues at stake which are of great importance to my Government. Before proceeding, I should also like to pay a tribute to the

outgoing President of the Council, Mr. Leprette of France, for the efficient manner in which he conducted the Council's deliberations during a difficult month.

110. My Government, through a statement by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Otema Allimadi, made before the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-fourth session held at Dar es Salaam from 21 to 25 January 1980, stated that the Government of Uganda demanded that the United Kingdom immediately recall Lord Soames to avert the resumption of armed struggle in Zimbabwe. The Foreign Minister proposed that Lord Soames should be replaced by an appointed trustee who would command the confidence and trust of all the parties, including the Patriotic Front.

111. That was a strong statement, which came soon after the meeting of the front-line States and after my Government had received strong representations from the Patriotic Front and other sources regarding violations of the Lancaster House Agreement.¹ Those accusations, although denied by the United Kingdom, have been amplified by all delegations which have spoken at these meetings.

112. Some fears have been expressed in the corridors that perhaps calling for this series of Security Council meetings could amount to castigating the United Kingdom and thus could jeopardize the Lancaster House Agreement. We do not have any reason to believe that this was the intention. An assurance was given at Lancaster House by the United Kingdom that all South African troops and foreign mercenaries would be removed from Rhodesia. In Sir Anthony Parsons' statement [*ibid.*] on this particular issue of troops, we were informed that the South African troops who were guarding the Beit Bridge had been withdrawn. Sir Anthony did not elaborate on the related problem of other South African troops, some of whom are reported to use Rhodesian uniforms or are mercenaries in the employ of the Rhodesian authorities. There is also ample evidence to indicate that the contingency of South African troops numbers up to 6,000 men.

113. Among the demands made is a call on the United Kingdom, through its representative in Rhodesia, to confine all the Rhodesian forces and the auxiliary forces of Bishop Muzorewa to bases similar to those set up for receiving Patriotic Front freedom fighters.

114. In the statement made yesterday by Mr. Kangai [2193rd meeting] in the Council, he listed more than 10 points in respect of which the Lancaster House Agreement has been breached. We shall not go into detail, but we have been further informed that Lord Soames, the administering Governor in Salisbury, had even refused entry to more than 200 vehicles from Mozambique intended for use in the election campaign by the Patriotic Front. We are also informed that the same Governor had refused the distribution

of Patriotic Front campaign literature; and my delegation was very surprised to learn that the same Governor had hindered or delayed the provision of telephone services to the Patriotic Front offices in Salisbury.

115. Although some of those actions may appear minor, they could lead and have led us to pose the question: How fair could Lord Soames claim to be if he denied such essential communication services to one party? Or was his intention and that of his Government to make the Patriotic Front fail in its campaign? If that was the reason why the British Government acted in such a way as to frustrate African efforts, then we cannot believe the statement of its representative here that everywhere in Rhodesia there is mounting evidence of a return to normal life and that the British Governor is according equal treatment to all the parties engaged in the election campaign. We have learned that refugees wishing to return from various front-line States have either been stopped or delayed at the borders because of the British or the Governor's fears that many of those refugees would support and vote for the Patriotic Front.

116. Another point of contention is expressed in the question bound to be asked by anybody familiar with the Lancaster House Agreement: If the United Kingdom wanted a free and fair election for Southern Rhodesia, as planned, one wonders why the state of emergency was declared and is going to be maintained for a further six months, long after the elections. How could the United Kingdom, after the elections had been held and concluded by the end of this month, envisage such a state of emergency as continuing in effect for six months, long after an elected Government had been installed in Salisbury? Surely the decision to declare, maintain or end a state of emergency should be taken by the Government that will be formed or by the party or parties that win that election. They would be the rightful authorities to determine the question of how Rhodesia is going to be governed.

117. In conclusion, we can only reiterate what others have already stated here: the demands to have South African troops in any form or uniform withdrawn from Rhodesia, to have Rhodesian soldiers and auxiliaries confined to the bases set up for that purpose, to have the state of emergency in Rhodesia revoked so as to allow for a free atmosphere for the election and to have all political prisoners released. If it becomes necessary, the role that is being played by the Commonwealth Observers Force should be strengthened so as to ensure fulfilment of the purpose for which it was appointed and to monitor and eliminate all the violations that have been brought to light in the course of this debate.

118. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The next speaker is Mr. Callistus Ndlovu, representative of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe,

who has been invited by the Council to participate in the debate under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

119. Mr. NDLOVU: Mr. President, I should like first of all to say that it is a great pleasure for me to appear before the Council under your presidency. Your country's contribution to the struggle for Zimbabwe is unsurpassed and your commitment to the liberation of the people of Zimbabwe is demonstrated through the expression of solidarity that the German Democratic Republic has made by providing material and moral support to the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe. I also wish to pay a tribute to your predecessor, the representative of France, for having presided over the debate. We have seen how ably that debate was conducted under his leadership and have heard the contributions that have been made pointing positively to the fact that the Lancaster House Agreement¹ is being violated by the administering Power.

120. Mr. President and members of the Security Council, we wish to thank you for convening these meetings to consider the grave situation in our country. This grave situation is the result of the inability or the unwillingness of the British Administration in Salisbury to provide a decisive and effective leadership whose authority is clearly spelled out in the Lancaster House Agreement on Southern Rhodesia.

121. Before we make our submission to this body, we wish to pay a tribute to the United Nations for its continued interest in the future of the people of Zimbabwe; to the Organization of African Unity and the front-line States of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia for their selfless commitment to the liberation of Zimbabwe; and to the non-aligned group of nations and the socialist countries for their unwavering support of the struggle for human rights in Zimbabwe. The entire people of Zimbabwe is extremely grateful to the international community for its immense contribution to the just struggle for self-determination in Zimbabwe.

122. Mr. President, you are presiding over one of the most historic series of meetings of the Security Council. The outcome of the debate in these meetings will determine whether peace or war will prevail in southern Africa. The Council has already heard brilliant presentations on the subject of British violations of important aspects of the Lancaster House Agreement made by previous speakers, including my colleague, Mr. Tirivafi Kangai, of the Patriotic Front [*ibid.*]. My presentation will be supplementary to the list of violations put before this body by Mr. Tirivafi Kangai. The Council has also heard the British representative arguing that his Government's transitional Administration in Salisbury has been an unqualified success. For our part we appear before this body having come straight from Salisbury. We have come to

participate in this debate in the spirit of the Lancaster House Agreement, whose provisions we have done our best to observe. We shall therefore present to the Council a first-hand assessment of the situation, which any reasonable person familiar with the post-Lancaster House developments in Zimbabwe will find dispassionate and objective.

123. Members of the Council will recall that at the Lancaster House Conference on Zimbabwe, the Patriotic Front, the British Government and representatives of the Rhodesian régime agreed on an independence Constitution, transitional arrangements to implement that Constitution and cease-fire arrangements which would create suitable conditions for free and fair elections. According to the transitional arrangements proposed by the British themselves, and reluctantly accepted by the Patriotic Front, there was to be a Governor vested with both executive and legislative authority. In the terms of the cease-fire arrangements of the Lancaster House Agreement, both the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian régime undertook to end all military actions against one another. Their forces were accorded equal status under the law and were to assemble in designated places—that is, 16 assembly places for the Patriotic Front forces and 40 bases for the Rhodesian forces—and observe the cease-fire. For their part, the British undertook to set up an Administration which would be solely responsible for the maintenance of law and order in order to ensure freedom for all political parties to participate in the election campaign. During the transitional period, the British Administration in Salisbury would make sure that all foreign elements in the Rhodesian army were removed from the country.

124. The British representative, speaking in this debate [2192nd meeting], said that his Government did not recognize that the situation in Zimbabwe had deteriorated in the post-Lancaster House period. He went on to list what he called positive gains made as a result of the Lancaster House Agreement and the setting up of a British Administration in the country. He cited, among other things, the scaling down of the war, the return of refugees and political exiles, the release of all political detainees, evidence of a return to normal life everywhere, the opening of rail and road links between the country and its neighbours and so on.

125. To be sure, there has been some scaling down of the fighting. But that is because our forces have responded to the cease-fire directives of their commanders and have assembled in their designated assembly places. But to say that there has been a scaling down of the war is not to say that both sides have behaved according to the prescriptions of the cease-fire agreement. The Governor, Lord Soames, has left Rhodesian forces in a state of permanent mobilization. The so-called military auxiliaries—the private army of Abel Muzorewa—which are theoretically a unit within the Rhodesian army, but in practice a political army, have taken advantage of

this arrangement to take over positions previously held by Patriotic Front forces that have gone to assembly places. This permanent deployment of the Rhodesian forces, which gives undisciplined auxiliaries the opportunity to move about in the country intimidating opponents of Abel Muzorewa, cannot be whitewashed by a list of cosmetic accomplishments cited by the British representative in this debate.

126. During the negotiations for the cease-fire at the Lancaster House Conference, which were complicated and protracted, we warned the British delegation of the impracticability of timing the cease-fire to enter into force within seven days. We told the British delegation that it was not a practical proposition to demand that our forces should be at their designated assembly places in seven days, when, in order to create confidence in people that had been torn apart by a war bitterly fought for 14 years, one needed time to explain carefully to one's forces the terms of the cease-fire, and the terms of their movement to rendezvous and assembly places. Despite our detailed representation on this matter, the British would not be persuaded to modify their seven-day cease-fire deadline. In fact, in talking to the British delegation to the Lancaster House Conference, we got the distinct impression that they were not as concerned with effecting a workable cease-fire as they were interested in holding "elections" in any circumstances. Here lay the difference between the approach of the Patriotic Front and the Anglo-Rhodesian approach to the peace talks. While the Patriotic Front wanted a cease-fire arrangement which placed the two rival armies on equal terms and whose capacity, content and direction set specific and precise sanctions against those who violated the terms of the cease-fire—no matter who they were—the British appeared to be interested in an open-ended arrangement that left the implementation of the cease-fire subject to arbitrary determination by whomever the Governor chose to authorize to supervise the cease-fire. Hence, in anticipation of the problems that have emerged since Governor Soames came to Salisbury, the Patriotic Front had proposed an international peace-keeping force—preferably a United Nations force—instead of a powerless peace-monitoring force proposed and imposed by the British. In justifying such an arrangement for the cease-fire, the British argued that, vested with both executive and legislative authority during the interim period, the Governor had adequate authority to deal with breaches of the cease-fire and take complete authority over the entire administration of the country.

127. In one of their attempts to allay fears expressed by the Patriotic Front about the unsatisfactory nature of the powers given to the interim Administration, the British, through Sir Ian Gilmour, who was Deputy Chairman of the Lancaster House Conference—said of the Governor's role: "The Governor will hold the Government in trust on behalf of the people while the election campaign is fought." Since he came to Salisbury, has the Governor been able to show all

parties contesting the elections that he is holding "the Government in trust on behalf of the people while the election campaign is fought"? And is there any evidence that the Governor exercises the authority prescribed in the Lancaster House Agreement?

128. Those of us who have been doing everything within our power to live up to the letter and spirit of the Agreement are dismayed by the macabre manner in which the Governor appears to be co-operating with forces determined to reimpose the *de facto* authority of the previous Administration. As things stand at present, it can be said that in reality the Governor—whether he knows or not—is holding the Government "in trust" for Bishop Muzorewa. What is the evidence to support such a charge?

129. In justifying the institution of an all-powerful governorship, the British had argued that it was in the interest of the country that the administration of the country be in the hands of an impartial authority, so that no party could have an advantage over others. But is this what is happening in the country? First, Bishop Muzorewa is still referred to as the Prime Minister by the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) and the country's mass media. He and his former ministers still enjoy all the privileges of their former ministerial rank. Secondly, the flag of "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" still flies side by side with the British flag, thus making a mockery of the claim that the country has been returned to legality as a result of the Lancaster House Agreement. Thirdly, Muzorewa's private army now operating under the official title of auxiliaries of the Rhodesian security forces moves freely around the country carrying arms. Despite widespread reports of political intimidation by elements of this army who roam the country electioneering on behalf of UANC, no investigation of the activities of these auxiliaries, let alone action against these elements, has been taken by the interim Administration. Practically all the parties contesting the elections have, in one way or another, made representations to the Governor about the intolerable behaviour of these forces to unarmed civilians in the rural areas. And yet nothing has been done to correct the situation; there has not even been an investigation. The Council heard the British representative justifying this lack of action on the grounds that all charges made against the auxiliaries so far have been of a general nature. This is absolutely incredible coming from a representative of a Government that is the legal administering Power of the colony of Southern Rhodesia.

130. The Patriotic Front has compiled a list of complaints made by people harassed by auxiliary forces in various parts of the country. Most of these complaints involve people who have been attacked by auxiliary forces either for being members of the Patriotic Front or for attending a Patriotic Front meeting. If the British authorities in Salisbury were interested in getting facts about this problem, they

could get all the information they need. Talking about these forces in the positive language used by the British representative, when every evidence shows them to be terrorists and political partisans, is an insult to the African population that these forces have brutalized.

131. The Patriotic Front demands that all auxiliary forces be confined to barracks and assembly places. The fact that those forces remain in a state of deployment, free to roam the countryside campaigning at gunpoint on behalf of Abel Muzorewa's UNAC, is a blatant violation of the Lancaster House Agreement. The Patriotic Front cannot accept Lord Soames as an impartial authority in the country when his Administration appears to condone the lawless activities of a political army.

132. The Patriotic Front recognizes the authority of the Governor, as provided in the Lancaster House Agreement, to call upon any forces at his disposal to deal with breaches of the cease-fire. But such discretion on the part of the Governor should be exercised within the framework of the principle of equal treatment of the respective forces in the cease-fire. There cannot be equal treatment of the respective forces when one army is required to remain in the assembly places while the other remains in a state of permanent deployment. It takes two to effect or to observe a cease-fire. The fact that Rhodesian security forces appear to be free to move about or to roam the country carrying their arms and at times engaging in political campaigning poses a very serious threat to the whole Lancaster House Agreement.

133. Most of our people welcomed the Lancaster House Agreement in the hope that it would end all hostilities and create a spirit of reconciliation among all the people of Zimbabwe. The fact that, despite the signing of the Agreement, certain leaders have sought to heighten tensions rather than to promote the spirit of reconciliation comes as a terrible disappointment to the majority of our people. It is obvious that those whose support is either dwindling or uncertain want the country to enter the elections of 27, 28 and 29 February 1980 in a state of tension and communal violence, in order to cause confusion so that all of us will be losers in the elections. What are the British authorities doing about this dangerous trend, which threatens to destroy the country? In the face of such evidence that the authorities in Salisbury are doing nothing to contain a potentially explosive situation, one is persuaded to conclude that either the British Administration in Salisbury is utterly incompetent and lackadaisical or that the British Government is involved in a tragic international confidence trick on Southern Rhodesia. Otherwise, how on earth can anyone explain to us how such widespread intimidation can be tolerated, particularly considering the fact that most of it is conducted by what are called lawful forces?

134. If the British cannot cope with the situation, let them hand over the responsibility to the United Nations and allow the Security Council to take up the matter. As President Joshua Nkomo said on 13 January 1980, addressing a welcome-back-home rally in Salisbury, the Patriotic Front will do everything in its power to make the Lancaster House Agreement work. Hence, in pursuit of that policy, President Nkomo has instructed members of the party throughout the country to co-operate with legitimate authority to create conditions conducive to a free election campaign. Our members have been instructed not to engage in any political intimidation of members of other parties. Unfortunately, in certain quarters our call upon our members to treat their opponents as their brothers and sisters in the spirit of reconciliation, peace and tranquillity is being mistaken for weakness. Our members have been subjected to intolerable acts of intimidation and unprovoked violence. In the last two weeks some of our people have been killed or maimed. I personally witnessed an incident in which a young man wearing a Patriotic Front T-shirt was dragged from the street and killed. He was killed by supporters of Muzorewa. We obviously cannot allow this to go on unchecked. It is entirely up to the British authorities in Salisbury whether they will take immediate and effective measures to correct the situation or whether the Patriotic Front will be forced to make a commensurate response in defence of its members.

135. The presence of South African troops on Zimbabwean soil is another blatant violation of the Lancaster House Agreement. Recently, in an attempt to anticipate revelations that South African forces were still operating in Zimbabwe, Lord Soames admitted that a contingent of South African soldiers was guarding the Beit Bridge with his permission. This is reminiscent of the stationing of South African troops on the borders of Angola ostensibly to guard the vital installations of the Cunene Dam.

136. At the Lancaster House Conference the Patriotic Front demanded the withdrawal of all South African troops from Zimbabwe as a condition for its acceptance of the British cease-fire proposals. The British assured the Front that by the time the British flag was hoisted in Salisbury, there would be no South African troops on Zimbabwean soil. Lord Soames and the British may talk of a limited South African military presence to guard the Beit Bridge, but the people of Zimbabwe know that South African troops operate in full force within the Rhodesian army. Hence the withdrawal of the token South African force supposedly guarding the Beit Bridge does not solve the problem posed by the direct intervention of South Africa in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe. Unless all South African troops are withdrawn, the British Administration in Salisbury will remain guilty of violating the Lancaster House Agreement. South Africa's involvement in the training of military personnel for certain groups contesting the elections is well known.

What will prevent the South African soldiers stationed or fighting in the country from unseating an elected government of Zimbabwe after the British Administration has pulled out?

137. The presence of South African troops on Zimbabwean soil constitutes a serious threat to international peace, and as such it is a challenge to the Security Council. The Security Council must therefore demand that South Africa withdraw its troops from Zimbabwe. The presence of those troops at this time makes a mockery of the British claim that they are the sole and legitimate authority in Southern Rhodesia between now and the day of independence. We demand that all foreign troops operating outside the Commonwealth Cease-fire Monitoring Group leave the country immediately.

138. South Africa's involvement in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe is a serious violation of the Lancaster House Agreement. The Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) still relays news from the South African Broadcasting Corporation. Normally, the RBC should have been taken over by the British Broadcasting Corporation when the colony of Southern Rhodesia returned to legality as per the Lancaster House Agreement. The fact that it was not done shows how incomplete the whole process of returning Rhodesia to legality has been. News relays of the South African Broadcasting Corporation should cease forthwith. We do not want South Africa to influence the internal politics of our country through local radio facilities. Radio South Africa's broadcasts are openly anti-Patriotic Front, and they could influence the voters of our country in the forthcoming election.

139. It is important that the British authorities treat our complaints with the greatest sense of urgency and seriousness, because the success of the Lancaster House Agreement depends upon our co-operation. It is of no use dismissing these complaints in the simplistic and arbitrary manner that was displayed in the analysis of the situation made by the British representative in this debate. Defending the actions of auxiliaries whose treatment of the civilian population has been generally criticized by a wide political spectrum of people does not place British authority in Southern Rhodesia above partisan politics.

140. Any person familiar with the Rhodesian army knows that there is a difference between Rhodesian regular troops and auxiliaries. By insisting that in fact there is no such difference, the British run the risk of making the critics of auxiliary forces lump the whole Rhodesian army together with the politically motivated auxiliary forces. This is what the British want to see. This is not in the interest of those among the Rhodesian forces who want to make a career of military service. We therefore strongly advise the Governor to confine all auxiliary forces to assembly places or barracks. If our advice is not heeded, the work of Lord Soames will be made increasingly dif-

ficult by the growing conflict between rival political armies.

141. The Security Council should call upon the British authorities to confine all Rhodesian forces to their basés or barracks. The auxiliary forces should be withdrawn from the rural areas in the name of peace. There cannot be an effective cease-fire as long as political armies are free to roam the countryside intimidating people and making them vote for certain parties. If this state of affairs continues unabated, the Council can expect a serious confrontation that can jeopardize the whole election process. We sincerely hope that such a development will be averted by decisive and effective action before it is too late.

142. Long live the Patriotic Front.

143. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The representative of the United Kingdom has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of his right of reply, and I now call on him.

144. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): Mr. President, at the outset I congratulate you most sincerely on my own behalf and on behalf of my delegation on your assumption today of the presidency of the Security Council, and I think we can confidently anticipate a busy month for you and for your delegation. I should like also to express my warmest appreciation and that of my whole delegation to my good friend, Mr. Leprette of France, and to the whole French delegation for the skill, competence, efficiency and goodwill with which they conducted us through a number of complex and difficult negotiations during the month of January. These were the exact qualities which we would have expected from the delegation of France.

145. A large number of allegations have, in the course of this debate, been made against my Government and against Lord Soames, the Governor of Rhodesia. Many of these allegations have been of a general nature on such subjects as South African interference, the deployment of Rhodesian forces and auxiliary forces, the continuation of emergency legislation and martial law and alleged bias against the Patriotic Front parties. I dealt with these matters in my opening statement [*ibid.*] and will not go over all this ground again. But there are certain further allegations of a very specific nature to which I now reply.

146. I refer first to the major statement made by the Foreign Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania [*ibid.*]. I naturally respect the depth of his concern, but I cannot leave the tone and substance of some of his remarks unanswered. I was, I confess, deeply shocked by some of the things he said about my Government and about the Governor. For one distinguished political figure to describe another, Lord Soames, as "arrogant" and as a purveyor of lies and "vicious propaganda" is astonishing. Such personal

attacks can only stretch the web of tension ever tighter at this ultra-sensitive moment in the history of Rhodesia. They are hardly calculated to improve the relationship between the administering Power and the Chairman of the front-line States at a time when constructive dialogue is of fundamental importance; and I would once again emphasize that our collaboration with the front-line States, from the Lusaka meeting through the Lancaster House Conference, has been a major factor in all that has been achieved so far. I very much hope that this collaboration over the Rhodesian problem can continue.

147. I now address myself to some of the other allegations contained in Mr. Mkapa's statement and paralleled in those of other speakers. First, it has been charged that the deployment by the Governor of the Rhodesian forces is "contrary to the letter of the [Lancaster House] Agreement" and that they should be confined to the "40 designated bases". This was part of more general criticism about the use of the Rhodesian forces to deal with breaches of the cease-fire. I must refer the Council to what the Lancaster House Agreement actually says. I quote from paragraph 11 of the cease-fire agreement, which says the following:

"The primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the cease-fire will rest with the Commanders of the forces through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of liaison officers of the monitoring force. The Commanders will ensure, with the assistance of the monitoring force, that breaches of the cease-fire are contained and dealt with. In the event of more general or sustained breaches of the cease-fire the Governor will decide what action to take to deal with them with the forces which have accepted his authority."

The appendix to the cease-fire agreement says:

"The disposition of the Rhodesian forces, under the Governor's authority, will be as set out in the Chairman's statement to the Conference on 11 December."

Paragraph 25 of that statement says:

"... If, however, all Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia assemble with their arms and there is no further movement by externally-based Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia, there would be no need in those circumstances for the Governor to ask the Rhodesian forces to deploy from their company bases."

It is clear that, when the police find themselves unable to deal with the security situation, the Governor must take measures to maintain security in the country and that he acts entirely within the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement in doing so. The Rhodesian forces are, of course, fully monitored.

148. Security has, as I said in my original statement, been seriously threatened by the thousands of soldiers of ZANLA that have not assembled but have remained at large in the country, including very many who illegally crossed the border after the cease-fire date. The Patriotic Front guerrilla units outside the assembly areas at the present stage are unlawful. It is because of their presence that the deployment of the Rhodesian forces has been necessary. It is not true, as was alleged yesterday, that the Governor never uses the Patriotic Front to deal with breaches. Some joint patrols by the Patriotic Front and the police in the vicinity of the assembly areas have taken place and this will continue.

149. Patriotic Front officers have frequently been deployed, and with great success, to bring in units which were outside the assembly areas and generally to defuse difficult situations. But in cases where the Patriotic Front officers have been unable to persuade armed groups of their forces to proceed to assembly areas, the Governor has had no alternative but to use the Rhodesian forces to deal with the problem and to maintain law and order. For if he does not maintain law and order, it will not be possible to hold free and fair elections in Rhodesia. I would also again remind members of the Council that any breaches of the cease-fire are reported to and fully considered by the Cease-fire Commission on which all parties—and I repeat, all parties—are represented. Surely this is the best and, indeed, the only way of dealing with these problems.

150. Foreign Minister Mkapa complained that the Governor of Rhodesia has not given additional sites to the Patriotic Front forces. I again refer to the words of the Lancaster House Agreement. I quote from paragraph 3 of Lord Carrington's statement of 15 December 1979, attached to the cease-fire agreement and also an official document of the Conference:

"I can assure the Patriotic Front . . . that if the Patriotic Front forces at present in Rhodesia assemble with their arms and equipment in numbers greater than can be dealt with at the assembly places designated in the cease-fire agreement, the Governor will assess the need for additional sites in relation to the successful accomplishment of the assembly process by the Patriotic Front forces and in relation to the dispositions of their forces."

151. The fact is that none of the Patriotic Front leaders has suggested to the Governor that there is any need for additional sites. Indeed the contrary is the case. Some weeks ago it was decided, with the full agreement of the Patriotic Front, to reduce the number of assembly points by two, since so few Patriotic Front forces had assembled at those two points. So there are now 14 assembly points and no one in Rhodesia is suggesting or has suggested that this is too few.

152. Minister Mkapa referred also to the killing of Patriotic Front forces on their way to assembly points. I dealt with this in detail in my opening statement, but the Minister took exception to the fact that the Patriotic Front forces in the instances he quoted had been required to surrender their arms. He said that this was not provided for in the Lancaster House Agreement. The point here is that the incidents took place after the date agreed on at Lancaster House for the assembly of all Patriotic Front forces in the appointed places. The forces concerned were therefore unlawful under the terms agreed to at Lancaster House and contained in paragraph 10 of the cease-fire agreement. The Governor, however, was flexible in dealing with all those Patriotic Front forces who had missed the deadline. He enabled them to assemble at the designated points without measures being taken against them, provided that they laid down their arms. This proviso, I must stress, applied only to those who had rendered themselves unlawful under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement. It was specifically agreed—I must stress this point—by the Patriotic Front commanders that such men should be required to lay down their arms. I say again that the Governor and the British Government have stated their sincere regret that killings occurred. But surely we should all be relieved that there were not far more numerous incidents during that very difficult stage of the cease-fire arrangements.

153. Many speakers have developed charges about the disposition of the auxiliary forces. I must once again stress that those auxiliaries were part of the Rhodesian forces as declared at Lancaster House. This was specified at the time. I underline that they are monitored in their bases. I asked if there were specific allegations, not just blanket allegations, against the auxiliaries. The representative of Zambia made certain specific allegations. I telegraphed these, verbatim, to the office of the Governor in Salisbury and I have discussed them privately with Mr. Lusaka. The information which I have received is that most of these cases have not been drawn to the attention of the authorities or the Cease-fire Commission. I should again stress that the machinery is there to consider such complaints. It is working. It is the Cease-fire Commission, not the Security Council, which should hear such complaints.

154. At this point, I should say that I listened with very close attention to the statement just delivered by Mr. Ndlovu. I clearly recognize the deep sincerity and concern with which he spoke. I assure him that what he said will be transmitted faithfully to London and to Salisbury. I also assure him, in the context of what I have just stated, that I will also—if he so wishes—transmit immediately to London and to Salisbury the supporting evidence to which he referred.

155. We would always have been ready to go over these or any other contentious points with the Foreign Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania or his

officials or with any other African Government concerned, at any time and at any place. I deeply regret that we have had to air these differences in public when I believe that many arose from misunderstandings which could have been cleared up.

156. President Nyerere and his Government have of course made far-reaching contributions to the whole of the Lancaster House process, and the relationship between my country and the United Republic of Tanzania is deep and abiding. The same is true of the relationship between my country and all the front-line States. We know that there is no one more genuinely committed to a just and honourable settlement in Rhodesia than President Nyerere. We urge the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania to believe that we share this commitment and to continue to play its invaluable, constructive role.

157. I now turn to the accusations made by several speakers about the deployment of South African troops in Rhodesia. Many speakers chose to ignore the fact that the South African detachment at the Rhodesian side of Beit Bridge was withdrawn the day before yesterday. There were various further allegations which we must strongly deny about the presence of thousands of South African troops in Rhodesia. These allegations were made at the 2192nd meeting by the Foreign Minister of Liberia, by the representative of Malawi, in considerable detail, and by many others. There is no foundation for these charges. The references to South African divisions, combat battalions and armour are equally unfounded. There are South Africans, probably some hundreds, in the Rhodesian forces; but there are other nationalities as well. I have to say that there are still some hundreds of soldiers of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) with the forces of ZANLA, which have not assembled as they were required to do by the cease-fire agreement. We always made it clear at Lancaster House and thereafter that we could not be expected to conduct any sort of purge of the Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front forces. We took them as we found them.

158. I now address myself to the statement made by Mr. Kangai [2193rd meeting], representative of the Patriotic Front. Before I do so, I shall enlarge on the brief statement that I made at the beginning of this debate about the question of Mr. Kangai's participation—and we have now heard Mr. Ndlovu too.

159. First of all, in saying what I have to say, I mean no personal disrespect to Mr. Kangai or to Mr. Ndlovu. If they do not mind my saying so, I and members of my staff have had very good personal and working relations with them and with other members of the Patriotic Front in New York. But what I could not let pass was any implication that the Patriotic Front, together or severally, has special status over and above others to address bodies in the United Nations.

160. The representative of the Soviet Union [2192nd meeting] saw fit, when I entered a reservation about the decision to allow Mr. Kangai to speak, to make a confused interjection. It is not surprising that he seemed to fail to understand the point that I was making—which is that when a free and fair election is taking place, the United Nations should not decide to give a hearing to one group from among a number of contesting parties without being willing similarly to hear all others. The reason it is not surprising is, of course, that the Soviet Union has no experience of free and fair elections, no knowledge of the concept of political choice. But in answer to a point I think I understood him to make, my delegation has never supported resolutions referring to the Patriotic Front as the “sole authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe”. Neither do we support the wholly partisan calumnies directed against other parties participating in the forthcoming Rhodesian election.

161. I have covered, either in this statement or in my opening statement, several of the charges made by Mr. Kangai. I now deal with two of his detailed points.

162. The problem concerning the 200 cars being imported from Mozambique will, we very much hope, be settled very shortly when permission for the import will be given. The authorities in Rhodesia made special arrangements some weeks ago so that political parties could import vehicles under a specially simplified procedure. Some parties have taken advantage of this, but in the case of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), it has not yet been possible to complete the importation formalities. As I say, after reference to Salisbury, we do hope this problem will go away in the very near future.

163. Mr. Kangai has also been quoted as having referred to the seizure of ZANU election literature. Some such literature has been confiscated, but only when it has contained blatant incitement to violence, such as slogans calling for “death to the British colonial troops”, or similar inflammatory language.

164. Now, a word or two about the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union [2194th meeting]. His statement was predictably offensive and hostile. I flatly deny the allegations that my Government is attempting to preserve what the Soviet representative described, in his awful jargon, as a “neo-colonialist puppet régime” or that we are involved in any of the other grotesqueries enunciated by the Soviet representative. As I had occasion to say once or twice during debates in the General Assembly, Soviet hostility to the whole Lancaster House process seems to me to prove only that they are somewhat displeased by the prospect of a final, peaceful settlement to the problem of Rhodesia. This basic hostility to Lancaster House, shared only, it seems, by the Soviet Union and its few close allies, was again undisguised in the statement we heard yesterday. Some of my Soviet

colleague's remarks were so bizarre that I wrote them down. If the interpretation into English was correct, he said, in the context of the election, that anything could be done with money. That may well be true in the Soviet Union, but it seemed to me rather insulting to the electorate of Zimbabwe. He described the forthcoming elections as a comedy and a farce. I do not think that the political leaders in Zimbabwe would subscribe to this contemptuous judgement. But, fortunately, no one is likely to take the Soviet Union seriously as a judge of democratic processes. I seem to recall, in this context, the Soviet Union referring recently to the "election" of Mr. Karmal in Afghanistan.

165. I finish by giving the Council the latest report on progress in repatriating the refugees. There have, during the debate, been various ill-founded criticisms of the Governor's Administration on this problem. As I said in my first statement, there have been problems of a practical nature delaying the return of the refugees, but we are now beginning to make real progress. I must remind delegations that paragraph 19 of the pre-independence arrangements agreed at Lancaster House reads as follows:

"Many thousands of Rhodesian citizens are at present living outside the country. Most of them wish to return and it will be desirable that as many as possible should do so in order to vote in the election. The return of all refugees will be a task requiring careful organization. But a start should be made in enabling the refugees to return to their homes as soon as possible; and the British Government will be ready to assist with the process. The task of effecting the return of all refugees will need to be completed by the independence Government in co-operation with the Governments of the neighbouring countries."

That paragraph makes clear that the magnitude of the task of returning hundreds of thousands of refugees to Rhodesia was fully appreciated at Lancaster House and that it was recognized that the programme could not be completed before independence.

166. I must repeat that it would be very unwise to try to bring refugees back before it has been possible to set up adequate reception arrangements. But as a result of strenuous efforts made by the Administration, I can now confirm that the repatriation of refugees from Zambia and Mozambique will begin on 4 February. It has been informally agreed with the Zambian authorities that 600 to 700 refugees per day will be received. It has been informally agreed with the Mozambican authorities that the initial rate will be 500 per day, moving gradually, we hope, to 1,000 per day. But continued progress here will depend to a great extent on the security situation in the eastern regions of Rhodesia—a situation which is still, as I have said, giving considerable cause for concern. The latest news of refugees in Botswana is that

6,500 have already been repatriated and that the aim is to continue at a rate of 750 per day. This would mean that all refugees currently in Botswana will be repatriated before the election. I also take the opportunity of informing the Council that it has been announced in London that Britain is to provide £1.15 million to assist the repatriation of refugees to Rhodesia in response to an appeal by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

167. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The representative of the Soviet Union has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I now call on him.

168. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Before responding to the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, I should like to say a few words not related to the question that the Council is now considering.

169. Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you, the representative of a fraternal socialist country, the German Democratic Republic, on your assumption of the responsible duties of the presidency of the Security Council. I wish you all success in carrying out your important tasks as the Council considers very important questions affecting the maintenance of international peace and security. A guarantee for us is to be found in the peace-loving foreign policy of the German Democratic Republic, which through its consistent struggle against imperialism, colonialism and all forms of exploitation and racial oppression, and for the freedom and independence of peoples, has gained the esteem of the entire world. We are convinced that your outstanding diplomatic qualities and your great experience in the development of international co-operation will contribute to the success of your work as President of the Council. I should also like to express our gratitude to the representative of France, Mr. Leprette, for the spirit of co-operation and diplomatic tact and the deftness he showed in carrying out the responsible tasks he faced as President of the Security Council for the month of January 1980.

170. While reserving my right to speak on this issue once again, I shall speak on the substance of what was just said by the representative of the United Kingdom.

171. Once, British diplomacy was distinguished by the fact that many even vulgar things could be said politely, but that would seem to be a thing of the past, as shown by the statement made today by Mr. Parsons. He has mixed everything into this question, including extraneous things. At first I was ready to believe what he tried to convince us of today. But after his statement, I have even more doubts than before my initial statement. Perhaps he did not hear what was said today by representatives of the African coun-

tries; he replied to statements made yesterday. What was said today to the British representative? I shall read it. One representative stated that he did not agree with Mr. Parsons' statement. Another African representative—I shall not say who; that will be seen in the verbatim records—stated: "We cannot believe the assurances of the representative of the United Kingdom concerning Southern Rhodesia." I could read out some other things that are similar and Mr. Parsons could reply to them. They are questions that are primarily African in nature, they are not our issues. But I support the stand taken by the Patriotic Front and African countries.

172. And now on two things the representative of the United Kingdom said in his statement. He said that he doubted whether we have any experience with elections. His country should have the election experience that we have and his people the right to choose as we have and then it would be a happy country—if they ever had these things—although, of course, we have differences in this regard.

173. He said that we did not understand what he meant about another party. We understood him perfectly well. He wanted to bring into the Security Council puppets, racists who serve his side, and we are against that. We have the Patriotic Front here and its representatives have spoken. We have heard them. They were asked by African countries to be present. The British representative did not even dare to say who should speak from another side, because he knew that he would hardly find any support here. That is our reply to one of his comments.

174. There is another minor point about money, and here is our reply to that as well. Perhaps the British representative could reply to my question: what did Muzorewa distribute at the Umtali stadium after the initial elections of the puppet government, paper or money? Who paid money for Muzorewa? Did he give out \$10 bills to all, throwing them away? Who gave that money to him? If the British do not know about that fact they should look into it. We will come back to Muzorewa later.

175. The British representative referred to auxiliary forces. We venture not to believe his explanation. What do the representatives of Africa call those subsidiary forces? What did the Nigerian Minister call them? He said they were "bands of bandits". But how does the British representative describe them? And those "bands of bandits" are helping to prepare free and just elections? Permit me not to believe the British representative. I really cannot believe him. He said the Lancaster House Agreement was being complied with in so far as the gathering at assembly points was concerned. The Patriotic Front has laid down its arms and has sent its armies to the various assembly points. But what are those bands of bandits doing meanwhile? They have taken over the positions formerly held by the Patriotic Front and areas formerly

occupied by the Patriotic Front. Is that preparation for just and free elections? No. It is preparation for elections in conditions of tension, as was rightly pointed out by African representatives here today. It is preparation for elections that will not lead to the results that the people of Zimbabwe want to see—the results of free and fair elections.

176. Another minor point on money. We have heard dispatches from Johannesburg, South Africa on the radio here—not every day, but we do get them. I have been surprised that I could hear Africa here. But we have heard the representative of the Patriotic Front talking about radio broadcasts from South Africa to Zimbabwe that are flagrantly hostile to the Patriotic Front forces, to the people of Zimbabwe and would promote only the restoration of those who have been in power since April, that is the Muzorewa-Smith clan and their forces.

177. Mr. Parsons was not at today's meeting. That is a shame, because one African minister said that it was Smith's hand that was managing affairs in Rhodesia, and another said that the rebel Smith should have been hanged in the Tower of London. Those were not my words. I am simply repeating what has been previously stated here. It would have been good if Mr. Parsons had been present to hear that for himself.

178. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

179. Mr. KATEKA (United Republic of Tanzania): First of all, I wish to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you, Mr. President, in the Chair and to pay a tribute to the role that your country has played in Zimbabwe's liberation.

180. On instructions from the Foreign Minister of my country, Mr. Benjamin Mkapa, who had to leave New York for unavoidable reasons and because of urgent commitments, I am authorized to state the following, in reply to the statement just made by the representative of the United Kingdom.

181. I shall start by expressing disappointment. One would have expected the United Kingdom representative, instead of being on the defensive, to listen carefully to the various valid charges that could help the British in implementing the Lancaster House Agreement.¹ Unfortunately, Sir Anthony Parsons has chosen to try to refute the irrefutable.

182. Worse still, Sir Anthony seems to have misjudged the mood and the determination of Africa on the issue of Rhodesia. Frantic efforts were made to try to stop the holding of this debate on Rhodesia on the pretext that such a debate would complicate the implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement.

In other words, the British wanted us to let them go on violating that Agreement with impunity. Africa refused to be hoodwinked by that lame excuse.

183. Furthermore, Sir Anthony does not seem to understand what is going on. For example, when the African members sponsored [2192nd meeting] the appearance of the Patriotic Front representatives before the Council, Sir Anthony said—and he has repeated it—that a request for other parties from Rhodesia to appear before the Council should be considered and that they should be allowed to do so. We would have been very interested to know who those parties were, as the representative of the Soviet Union has just said. We would have been intrigued to see the United Kingdom sponsor the appearance of Smith and Muzorewa before this body, because it would have been the height of irony to see the rebels that have compelled the Council to remain seized of the Rhodesian question for 15 years appearing before this body to put I know not what case. What an affirmation this sponsoring of the rebels would have been of the case we have been trying to make!

184. In another display of ignorance, Her Majesty's representative referred to the war of liberation which raged in Rhodesia for many years as a "civil war". At first we thought that it was a slip of the tongue. But when the representative of the United Kingdom repeated these words "civil war", he confirmed the fear we have felt that Britain does not seem to understand Africa. How a war of national liberation can be called a "civil war" defies the imagination. I do not know how Sir Anthony would react if I were to refer to the Second World War involving the Allies against nazism and fascism as a European civil war. I am sure he would not be amused. So much for the *faux pas* of Sir Anthony.

185. I should like now to try to respond to some of the attempted denials by Her Majesty's representative in his statement a few moments ago—which I have not had time to study carefully—of what was said by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country. He referred to "a large number of allegations" made against the United Kingdom and Governor Soames. He said that they were of a "general nature" and then referred to some specific statements and what he called a major statement of the United Republic of Tanzania.

186. We in Tanzania take the question of Rhodesia, as Sir Anthony rightly said, very seriously. That is why we have taken the trouble to appear before the Council, and the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country was carefully considered. But Sir Anthony has tried to deny some of the charges we made in our statement. He quoted from paragraph 11 of the cease-fire agreement on the question of deployment of Rhodesian troops. Then he said that the Governor would decide how to deal with unlawful acts by any party, and that is why he deployed Smith-

Muzorewa forces contrary to the spirit of Lancaster House as well as to the statement of 11 December 1979 made by the Chairman of the Lancaster House Conference, the Secretary of State of the British Government. But, interestingly enough, the representative of the United Kingdom did not refer to the machinery established in respect of this matter, namely, the Cease-fire Commission, when he quoted that paragraph.

187. A second point was the question of the Patriotic Front forces and the killing of Patriotic Front forces. In our statement we referred to the question of equality of treatment. Contrary to what Sir Anthony says on equal treatment, the Council must have noted that while Smith-Muzorewa forces have been deployed by the Governor to kill Patriotic Front forces, the latter have not even been deployed for simple peace-keeping. And luckily for the Governor, Patriotic Front forces have exercised much restraint.

188. Another charge which the representative of the United Kingdom tried to deny was the question of additional sites for the Patriotic Front. Interestingly enough, he said that the Patriotic Front has not asked for more sites. What an interesting remark. According to the understanding in the Lancaster House Agreement and the official records and assurances, it should have been automatic for the Governor to give additional sites to the Patriotic Front once those assembled exceeded 16,000 soldiers, which would have been assembled in 16 places. But, instead, he says that there has been a request to cut the number of those assembly sites from 16 to 14. Naturally, when the forces are to assemble in remote areas—and that was one of the reasons that almost broke up the Lancaster House Conference—what else can one expect, especially if those places do not have the necessary facilities?

189. Another attempt to deny the killing of Patriotic Front forces by the Governor has been made this afternoon by Sir Anthony. Interestingly enough, he referred to that killing as merely a "most unhappy incident" to be regretted. This evening he said further that it took place because the Patriotic Front forces were going to camps after the time had elapsed for assembling in the designated places and, hence, when they were unlawful. And it may be that, by the natural extension of the same logic, they deserved to be killed, because that seems to have been implied by Governor Soames when he said that the Smith-Muzorewa forces were in order when they took the action they did.

190. Another reference was made to the auxiliary forces, which, in his statement this evening, the representative of the United Kingdom said were being monitored. But the Council will have noted that in his statement of the day before yesterday [*ibid.*], the representative of the United Kingdom admitted—and it is on record—that the Rhodesian forces, with these

so-called auxiliaries, had been deployed. That is what we contend is contrary to the Lancaster House Agreement.

191. On the question of South African troops, the representative of the United Kingdom has just said: "Many speakers chose to ignore the fact that the South African detachment at the Rhodesian side of Beit Bridge was withdrawn the day before yesterday." What the representative of the United Kingdom failed to say is that the detachment should not have been there after the entry into force of the Lancaster House Agreement. We quoted from the official records the understanding between Mr. Mugabe and the British Secretary of State. Sir Anthony chose to ignore that because it did not suit his case. So much for some of the specific charges which the British representative tried to deny.

192. But let me say once again that it is very strange to say that we should not air our grievances in public. We have tried all possible channels, and I understand that the British representative knows that. My President, to whom he referred, has had innumerable communications with the British Government about the Lancaster House Agreement and its proper implementation. Also, other members of the front-line States and the Chairman of OAU have had similar contacts. Some members have even made trips to the British capital on the question of Rhodesia. Therefore, when all these efforts failed, there was no alternative but to come out into the open before the Security Council, which has been seized of the Rhodesian question for the past 15 years, and ask the Council to take the necessary corrective measures because the administering Power has been derelict in its duty.

If the United Kingdom had stuck to the Lancaster House Agreement, we would not be here. We are not interested in coming here just for the sake of appearing before the Council. The United Kingdom should know better. Let the United Kingdom stick to the Agreement and there will be no further problems.

193. In conclusion, my delegation appeals to the Security Council to finish the deliberations on this issue. We hope that the Council will be able to act before the weekend is over, because this is a matter of great urgency. We have seen the Council act on other matters over the weekend, matters which have been dear to some Powers. Some of our heads of State have been awakened in the middle of the night by appeals for support. We hope that the Rhodesian question will be given equal treatment. We hope that a correct draft resolution will be adopted calling on the United Kingdom Government to stick to the Lancaster House Agreement. We hope that when the draft resolution [S/13777] is being voted upon, the United Kingdom will stand up and be counted on the right side, that is, the side of justice.

The meeting rose at 7.45 p.m.

NOTES

¹ See *Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979*, Cmnd. 7802 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980).

² T. H. Bingham and S. M. Gray, *Report on the Supply of Petroleum and Petroleum Products to Rhodesia*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1978.

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