

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.545
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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeka Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 545th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Sri Lanka and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rasaputram.

Mr. RASAPUTRAM (Sri Lanka): This is my first formal statement to this Conference. I would at the very beginning join the others in extending to you, Mr. President, my congratulations on the excellent productive work that has already been accomplished under your able guidance. It gives us confidence to forge ahead with hope and determination for the realization of our aims and objectives in the field of disarmament. The Sri Lanka delegation will always extend to you its fullest support and active co-operation. May I also thank the distinguished Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands for the efficient and skilful manner in which he speeded up and steered the work in the burdensome month of February?

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank sincerely all my colleagues who have extended a warm and inspiring welcome to me in this Conference. It is inspiring, because those sentiments signify the collective nature of the endeavour entrusted to us by the peoples and nations we represent, irrespective of whether our respective constituencies are large or small, strong or weak. That endeavour is to codify State practice that can ensure international peace and security through disarmament in a world of dynamic change in which the security of nations can be divisible only notionally. As my predecessor has stated here in this Conference, Sri Lanka has indeed felt it a special honour to represent not merely ourselves but, in a sense, also the vast majority of non-aligned States whose security is based not on weapons, but on the strength of the rule of law applicable in inter-State relations.

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome all those who arrived after me in this Conference. They are Ambassador Thomas Ariba Ogada of Kenya, Ambassador José Pérez Novoa of Cuba, Ambassador Hou Zhitong of China, Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki of Japan, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, Ambassador Horacio Arteaga of Venezuela, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States and Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico.

Recent statements heard in this hall and outside have acknowledged the momentous nature of changes taking place in the European region. The depth of analysis and comments made here by a number of speakers who preceded me indicate the broad range of possibilities in consolidating the work in this forum in safeguarding global security. As a small non-aligned country which relies on multilateral co-operation for the well-being and security of the

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system of nation States that we have today, we feel gratified that this single multilateral disarmament negotiating body is thus responding collectively to these changes.

Political changes that are taking place in Europe have been widely welcomed as being positive and creative. They have been characterized as laying foundations for the democratization of relations within and among States and for building new security structures based not on confrontation but on co-operation and understanding. We hope that these trends emerging in the traditional battlefields of Europe will provide a basis for a global reappraisal of security doctrines. As a non-aligned country which has advocated concordance and co-operation for global well-being and common security based on mutual assurances and sovereign equality rather than superior strength and implicit threats, we welcome these developments. As a democratic country which has practised universal adult franchise without interruption for over half a century, we welcome the process of democratization and what it promises in terms of global security and stability.

The peace-making and peace-keeping potential of the United Nations has been revitalized by the successes scored in finding peaceful solutions to a number of issues, including those relating to Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war and Namibia. The biggest multilateral forum is indispensable to meet the accelerating needs of economic and political security. The regional conflicts that have been so managed or resolved have again demonstrated that multilateralism can work when it is enabled to do so. The developing countries which have yet to recover from a lost decade of development, with all that it implies for their security, expect the multilateral process to be strengthened.

We also derive satisfaction from the fact that the two major Powers and their alliances have now recognized the need for genuine nuclear disarmament. The INF agreement and the 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear arms expected sooner rather than later are a demonstration of the political feasibility of a less weaponized state of security. The non-aligned countries have long held that the security of our diverse but interdependent world can best be ensured by shedding weapons and not by adding them. If the increasing number of soldiers and military hardware were the symptoms of a deep-rooted political malady as conceived by the cold war protagonists, we must, if belatedly, address ourselves to non-military dimensions of security at a time when both the symptoms and the malady are waning away. Given the interdependent and multifaceted nature of security and threat perceptions, it is axiomatic that those issues should be addressed multilaterally. This Conference, being the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, has an indispensable role to play in globalizing new security structures. Without that, any emerging security prescription will lack global validity, since no single part of the world can be assigned exclusivity in conditions of security. We are perhaps far away from a de-weaponized state of security, although general and complete disarmament under international control remains on the international agenda. But if we fail to globalize a less weaponized state of security, there will be the danger of variant forms of old power structures transforming themselves into multi-polar power arrangements manifest in

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different regions of the world. The attendant instability and accumulation of weapons in various regions would thus aggravate regional tensions which are already propelled by their own regional and internal dynamics. Such phenomena may be less discernible than what was a highly visible adversarial relationship between the two alliance systems during the cold war period. But they entail instability and insecurity for the large majority of smaller countries which do not rely on military power for their own security.

In a world poised for global integration on an unprecedented scale, the answer to this potential danger is not to be complacent in the belief that the managed and reduced nuclear terror will give us enduring peace but to harness the full potential of the multilateral framework to globalize a progressively less weaponized security structure. The non-aligned countries at their summit last year in Belgrade reaffirmed this imperative:

"The non-aligned countries do not pretend, nor are they in a position, to change the world by themselves; but neither can the world be reshaped without them. The non-aligned favour concordance rather than confrontation, regardless of whether common problems of mankind or issues of regional interests are involved."

If this multilateral forum is to be a conduit for global rethinking on new and more democratized security structures, the question arises as to how it should respond to this challenge. The distinguished Ambassador of Brazil focused on some of the issues relevant to this task and a few others have also done likewise. We are encouraged by the very fact that the Conference has already initiated a process of thinking with an open mind. Fundamental to this thinking process are questions which touch upon the attitudes towards the competence of this body and the agenda of the Conference itself. We believe that the Conference has not been debilitated by any structural deficiencies and it has done and will do what its member States enable it to do, no more and no less. The changes that have taken place have brought into sharper focus the need for the Conference to address its agenda more purposefully and seriously if the international community is to derive the benefits of new developments on a global scale. As regards the agenda, while we should be open to new ideas, we should not be hasty in jettisoning what we have, simply because the Conference has not been enabled to do meaningful work for reasons other than procedural and structural. New ideas we welcome. My own delegation and a number of others have in the past focused on the question as to how we should address conventional disarmament questions, whether they are regional or global. The distinguished Ambassador of Sweden referred to the very pertinent issue of naval arms control and related matters. The prohibition of fissionable material production is another question referred to. My delegation therefore believes that the "in-house" mechanism for a process of thinking and reappraisal referred to by the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil is most timely. We expect this exercise to enhance and not diminish the CD's role in responding to new developments.

Multilateral treatment of the cluster of nuclear issues on the CD's agenda deserves attention more than ever. The elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons by the INF Treaty and good prospects for deep reductions in strategic

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nuclear weapons are welcome developments. It is however a small mercy for the man in the street to know that tons of TNT stacked against him have been halved. Whilst we do not underestimate the complexity involved in pursuing the process of nuclear disarmament, it would indeed be against the spirit of positive developments which we witness today if multilateral participation in the nuclear disarmament process is denied. If concerns relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to other so-called destabilizing technologies are real, then surely answers will have to be found in addressing nuclear questions in a multilateral context. History has proved that the fragmentation of security concerns which are common to all countries and seeking unilateral control measures to address those concerns has been unsuccessful. It is counter-productive to deny the self-evident truth that nuclear issues are of concern to all countries. It is therefore indispensable that this forum should address these questions with a view to developing broad principles and a framework for the stages of the global nuclear disarmament process.

The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban has now become more topical and urgent. This is not only because persistent international endeavours for nearly three decades have failed to bring about a halt to nuclear testing but also because of recent developments and forthcoming events related to a CTBT. A comprehensive nuclear test ban remains one of the most decisive steps against the emergence of nuclear weapons and more nuclear-weapon States. If the risk of nuclear proliferation is real, the opportunity to erect an effective barrier against such an undesirable development through a CTBT is also real. The commitments enshrined in the letter and spirit of the partial test-ban Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time reflect this reality. The large majority of parties to these two instruments are puzzled and frustrated that persistent international calls to conclude a CTBT have remained unheeded. If the major nuclear Powers now recognize that they have built up excessive nuclear arsenals and that security could be achieved at lower levels of those armaments the need for continued testing seems unclear. The argument that continued testing will be needed to ensure the safety and reliability of a reduced nuclear stockpile seems to ignore the fact that reliability and safety requirements could be met without resorting to nuclear test explosions. These contradictions give rise to suspicions among those who perceive a need to produce nuclear weapons that vertical proliferation will continue. This is a blow to the international norm established and nurtured by the non-nuclear parties to the NPT. The difficulties of verifying a CTBT can no longer be invoked as a stumbling-block to the conclusion of a test ban. The United States-Soviet bilateral talks on nuclear test limitations provide increasing confidence and prove that given the political will verification problems can be effectively negotiated. As a matter of fact, the United States and the USSR are reported to have made good progress in finalizing necessary verification measures for the threshold test-ban Treaty. The commonly held technical opinion is that technical difficulties in verifying a complete test ban will be much less burdensome than those associated with threshold verification now being finalized.

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Tangible progress in commencing negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban is clearly a step that will be commensurate with the positive developments that we see in the field of nuclear disarmament. Although a few countries hold a different opinion about a time frame for concluding a nuclear test ban, it is considered as a desirable objective by all. Even if we were to address verification issues, this has to be done in the context of a possible structure of a treaty. Initiating a process towards negotiations on that basis will not prejudice anything, as we all know that such negotiations cannot be concluded within a short period. Given the various dimensions of a CTBT it is undeniable that such a measure should be negotiated multilaterally. We eagerly await the outcome of Ambassador Donowaki's untiring efforts in this regard.

The overwhelming majority of parties to the partial test-ban Treaty have made use of the due legal process provided for in the Treaty to convert that instrument into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are gratified at the constructive dialogue that has taken place in this context among the parties, including the depositary Governments. Sri Lanka, being one of the initiators of the proposal, looks forward to a constructive amendment conference which could provide the necessary political impetus to find a way forward for the realization of the purposes enshrined in the partial test-ban Treaty.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another priority item on the CD's agenda. We believe that this is another area of multilateral endeavour which could benefit from the existing "psychosphere" that is promising and conducive. My delegation hopes to revert to this item in more detail at a later stage. We are pleased that the Ad hoc Committee on this subject has been established under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Shannon of Canada. However we had expected improvements to its mandate commensurate with constructive work that is possible. Outer space issues, particularly preventive measures against arms competition in that environment, have assumed greater importance as the use of outer space has become a truly multinational endeavour. Given the investments that continue to be made by an increasing number of countries in the use of outer space and its economic and security implications for all countries of the world, the need to keep outer space for the benefit of mankind remains a matter of urgency. Over three years, the Ad hoc Committee has accumulated a substantial amount of political, legal and technical expertise on the subject. We should now guide its work towards more focused consideration of common elements which could be further developed in terms of the Ad hoc Committee's mandate. Regrettably however the Committee has had a tendency to engage in cyclical debates in which a replay of positions has overwhelmed possible efforts to identify common ground. For too long, the Committee has debated merits and demerits of different segments of its work programme of past years. This we think is unnecessary and unproductive. This is all the more regrettable since it would have been possible for the Ad hoc Committee to focus on elements of common interest without prejudice to the position of any delegation with regard to an eventual agreement or agreements that could be reached. My delegation has long supported the formation of an expert group to help move this process of delineation forward. Irrespective of the form this expert contribution may

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take, we look forward to the new ideas of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on this subject so that identification of common elements can be done in a way acceptable to all delegations.

There is a widely shared optimism that a convention banning chemical weapons is within reach. The energetic and imaginative leadership of Ambassador Morel last year made noteworthy contributions to pave the way towards that goal. We are confident that under the able and dynamic leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius, the Ad hoc Committee will take decisive steps towards completing this task.

My delegation shares the view that most of the technical infrastructure of the convention is in place. Very useful work done last year on the annex on chemicals, the protocol on inspection procedures and the thorough and practical work on instrumentation has greatly contributed to this accomplishment. We are particularly pleased with the work on instrumentation ably chaired by the Finnish delegation. The outcome of this work indicated that the complex verification requirements of the convention could be expected to be met by the technological means available. We appreciate the initiative taken by Australia in bringing together private sector chemical industry and government representatives. It seems to us however that if we are to maintain the momentum generated by the Paris and Canberra conferences we have to take decisive steps towards completing the task without dampening the enthusiasm that has been aroused. The time has now come to address remaining issues in a political perspective with a view to arriving at speedy and lasting decisions through compromise, consultation and consensus. Ambassador Morel's cogent observations at the end of the Ad hoc Committee's session last year are still valid: "Our time is not infinite, and ... the convention now being finalized will produce practical results only if it is universal in its application." Technical competence alone will not facilitate the early conclusion of the convention.

We are inclined to believe that a time frame for the conclusion of the convention could now be considered as a via media for seeking solutions to remaining issues. The questions relating to scope, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council, challenge inspection, assistance, the order of destruction, economic and technological development and the convention's relationship to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are issues which require political decisions in a spirit of compromise, bearing in mind the realities of desired universality. One could argue that these issues are politically interrelated in a manner that perhaps requires solutions in a package form during the terminal phase of negotiations. We therefore believe that a sense of timing should be infused into our negotiations in order to provide a proper framework for compromises. These efforts can take place parallel to the technical work that still has to be done in the working groups of the Ad hoc Committee. What must be avoided however is loss of focus in technical discussions risking reopening of the areas of agreement and convergence. The energetic efforts deployed by Ambassador Hyltenius to meet these challenges with a sense of realism give us hope and optimism.

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The key to the success of the future convention on chemical weapons will be its appeal to universal adherence. The other day the Group of 21 made unequivocally clear its commitment to a non-discriminatory convention embodying a comprehensive ban on the entire chemical weapons cycle. With the political authority flowing from the Paris consensus, such a convention can and should command universal adherence on its own merits. My delegation believes that universal adherence could best be ensured not by tactical means but by making the convention attractive to all countries in terms of their security and related economic and political considerations. Compromises on remaining issues, we believe, are possible in a way that would promote this objective by preserving the multilateral character of this instrument in its broadest sense. It is therefore necessary now to make a renewed effort to tackle the outstanding political issues with a view to taking a decision. Any deflection of the time available to matters of which some could best be handled by a preparatory commission could only lead to a diffusion of focus and loss of momentum. My delegation therefore hopes that such a situation will be avoided and decisive steps will be taken towards the final phase of our negotiations.

Although not directly related to the CD, the fourth review conference of the NPT, scheduled to take place later this year, will be an event of relevance to our work. Sri Lanka, as a State party to the NPT, and one which took an active part in the third review conference, looks forward to a successful fourth review. We do so with the knowledge that non-nuclear States parties by their scrupulous compliance with the Treaty - a fact recorded by successive review conferences - have established an important international norm, not by words but by deeds. For the fourth review conference to be a successful one, the most important prerequisite would be the reaffirmation of the confidence of States parties to the Treaty that the NPT obligations have been honoured by all States parties and in all respects. Whilst we welcome the progress made in bilateral nuclear arms limitation efforts, we are disappointed that multilateral manifestations in that direction were not forthcoming. Tangible progress towards negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty and satisfactory solutions to legitimate demands from non-nuclear countries for security assurances against nuclear weapons would be of fundamental importance for continued confidence in the NPT and to ensure a successful review process. Non-nuclear countries have taken courageous political decisions in keeping with their security interests, to join the NPT and to honour faithfully the commitments thus undertaken despite conceptual anomalies inherent in that instrument.

The genesis of political compromises that led to the realization of the NPT would indicate that the longevity of the Treaty will progressively be tested through the passage of time and the implementation of the Treaty in all aspects. If multilateral work in the areas which I referred to earlier remain paralysed it would give rise to concerns about the viability and credibility of the non-proliferation Treaty particularly in an environment where the utility of nuclear weapons and their vertical proliferation continue to be expounded. This will also act as a barrier against much desired wider adherence to the NPT.

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In conclusion, it is time that we display the necessary political will to revitalize this body and enable it to discharge its vital and unique mandate. Our agenda is rich in content and potential. We of course can and must improve on it. As your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands, observed at the end of his presidency:

"... the CD should take into account the exciting events which are occurring almost daily and which cannot leave our work in the CD unaffected. Indeed, the chances for a convergence of views and the conclusion of agreements concerning multilateral disarmament are greater than ever."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, I should like to extend to you my personal as well as my delegation's warmest felicitations on your presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the current month and to assure you of our full co-operation in the fulfilment of your important task. I should also like to take this opportunity to compliment your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Hendrik Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for the competent manner in which he guided us through the first stage of our spring session.

A number of colleagues have left us since the last time I addressed the Conference. May I take this opportunity to wish them every success in their future assignments.

The absence of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico from our midst will be felt particularly by all of us. His retirement after a long and distinguished career in the service of his country has left a void which will be difficult to fill. His work in the field of disarmament and his commitment to the furtherance of world peace has been recognized internationally. Don Alfonso has played a great innings and has earned a well deserved rest. My delegation and I take this opportunity to wish him a very happy retirement.

Since this is the first time I am taking the floor during the current session, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the United States and Venezuela. My delegation looks forward to working in close co-operation with them in the months ahead.

My statement today will address some of the issues which we believe have gained in importance because of the changing realities on the world scene.

Our session this year starts on an auspicious note. The events of the last six months in Europe have given this continent a new look. The fabric of mutual distrust and hostility woven during the cold war years is being replaced by a spirit of dialogue and understanding. Fear of negotiation has given way to a bold and co-operative relationship between the super-Powers. Arms control negotiations appear to be making rapid progress, and the world

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community is expectantly waiting for some major breakthrough during the months ahead. The pace of developments has demonstrated that the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear and conventional forces is a realistic objective, that it can be achieved in a way which enhances the security of all concerned, and that when the requisite political will exists, problems of a technical nature do not present insurmountable obstacles.

However, for the sake of realism, we have to admit that in the world of today, agreements between the two super-Powers alone to limit their arsenals and reduce their force levels do not constitute a sufficient guarantee for peace and security. Similarly, we would be deluding ourselves were we to pretend that all conflicts in our world are attributable to East-West tensions. We cannot, and we should not, ignore the fact that peace and tranquillity is increasingly being endangered not by super-Power rivalries, but by the primitive impulses of many a newly emerging regional Power seeking to dominate its neighbours. It is surely paradoxical that while the two super-Powers are beginning to move towards reducing their stockpiles of lethal weapons under conditions of growing mutual accommodation and understanding, there are developing countries which are diverting more and more of their scarce resources in men and material to the production and acquisition of weapons.

We are fully convinced that in order to reinforce the structure of world peace and security, it is absolutely essential that the commitment to disarmament should be extended to the regional level as well. The removal of tensions and the elimination of conflicts from various regions of the world is a vital element in the search for international security. This can become possible through the equitable settlement of disputes and by the establishment of a military balance which ensures security at the lowest level of armaments. The former requires a clear desire on the part of the different parties, particularly the militarily more powerful States, to address the root causes of regional disputes without trying to bulldoze them under the carpet of oblivion. The latter would have to take into consideration not only the respective military capabilities, acquisitions from external sources, levels of sophistication of arms, and indigenous production facilities of the States involved, but also their histories of past tensions, and their fears and doubts about ambitions for regional hegemony. Measures to create a regional balance, in our view, play an important role in the creation of a climate of mutual trust and confidence, which is an important prerequisite for progress towards disarmament.

We feel that because of the importance of the regional dimension of disarmament, the item should be placed on our agenda for our consideration. As the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, it is here in the CD that the question of regional disarmament ought to be addressed.

The expansion and modernization of naval forces by some States beyond the legitimate requirements of coastal defence has caused smaller States to feel insecure and threatened. This expansion, combined with increased sophistication of sea-based weapons systems, the deployment at sea of nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical, and the introduction of nuclear-powered

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submarines in different regions of the world, has given an alarming capability to the navies of a few States. As a result of these developments, the security of the small and medium-sized coastal States is now threatened from the sea on a unprecedented scale. This question of naval disarmament and the placing of limits on the military uses of the high seas, therefore, also deserves to be addressed by the Conference on Disarmament. Measures which could be discussed under this head could include effective nuclear disarmament at sea, limitation of the blue-water forces of major naval Powers, and increased sea-front security for the small and medium-sized coastal States. The capability for overseas power projection should be severely restricted.

Even though we are concentrating all our energies on the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, a goal in which my delegation is duly participating, we cannot ignore the fact that the question of a nuclear test ban remains the most pressing item on our agenda. This is a reflection, in the first place, of the primary importance which the cessation of nuclear testing occupies within the process of nuclear disarmament, and secondly, of our failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban, despite years of discussion and debate in a variety of international forums. No other question in the field of disarmament, it has been rightly said, has been the subject of so much study and discussion. And yet the prospects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty appear today to be as bleak as they were in 1962.

During the latter half of the 1970s, we were informed that the trilateral negotiations then in progress between the signatories offered the best way forward and that multilateral negotiations would interfere with and complicate the trilateral talks. However, after 1980, the trilateral negotiations were not resumed and the working groups set up in 1982 and 1983 wound up in abstract discussion. Since 1984, it has not been possible to set up a subsidiary body on the subject because of the opposition of a group of States to giving it an appropriate mandate. It is unfortunate that the mandate question continues to frustrate efforts to set up an ad hoc committee empowered to exercise substantively all relevant aspects of a nuclear test ban.

It is this frustration with the lack of progress in the Conference which has prompted more than 50 signatories to the partial test-ban Treaty to seek an amendment conference so as to convert it into a CTBT. We have heard arguments around this table that the appropriate forum to negotiate a test ban is the Conference on Disarmament, and that this objective cannot be achieved by convening an amendment conference. While we have no quarrel with the first argument we feel that countries which are sincerely interested in a test ban should use whatever means are available at their disposal to achieve their goal. If the initiative for an amendment conference is successful then it will have been well worth the effort.

Our discussions on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference are most relevant inasmuch as we feel that a review of our working methods, like that of any organization, should be a continuous process. We do not believe in change for the sake of change, but in view of the changing world situation there is a need to have another look at our agenda so that it properly reflects the priorities of the decade ahead of us.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

The Group of Seven has done some very useful work, and their deliberations have produced a wealth of ideas and suggestions. We would propose that the Group be revived and entrusted with the task of suggesting improvements in our existing structure.

We also support the early expansion of the CD by four members as was decided in 1983. However, with the changes in Europe still not completed, we should be very careful not to disturb the delicate political balance which is one of the essential prerequisites for the effective functioning of our Conference.

Opportunities for disarmament must not be missed. The widespread expectations raised as a result of the improvement in East-West relations should be complemented by measures to meet the challenges of our age. The question that confronts us today is whether we have the vision and courage to act in concert to ensure an era of peace and progress. The responsibility we face is heavy and we in the Conference on Disarmament should ensure that we do not condemn our future. We must rationalize our agenda so as to bring it into closer relevance with some of the grave problems facing us, and address it with a renewed resolve and a heightened sense of urgency. Given the political will and a constructive approach on the part of all its members there is no reason why the Conference on Disarmament cannot come up with a response commensurate with the historical proportions of the challenge that it faces.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies. It is, as usual, merely indicative and may be amended, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday 27 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 27 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeka Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 546th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the Ambassador for Disarmament of Canada, Her Excellency Margaret Mason, who is at present following this plenary meeting. I wish Her Excellency a successful mission in Geneva, where she is consulting on various disarmament issues falling under her responsibility.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representative of Japan, Ambassador Donowaki, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): Since this happens to be my first intervention at a plenary session of this Conference, allow me first of all to express my sincere appreciation for all the very warm words of welcome addressed to me by my senior colleagues around this table in this historic and magnificent conference room. As a newcomer, I pledge to do my best in co-operating with our colleagues and friends here in an endeavour to achieve higher goals in the field of arms control and disarmament.

May I also take this opportunity to join with preceding speakers in congratulating you, Mr. President, for the excellent leadership you are demonstrating in presiding over our work. At the beginning of this month, we had the pleasure of having the honourable Minister of External Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, His Excellency Dr. Lukman, address this Conference, and I felt proud about the great nation of Africa where I had the privilege of serving as Japanese Ambassador until recently, because Minister Lukman reaffirmed in unequivocal terms Nigeria's willingness to abide by its commitment and dedication to the cause of peace and security of the world just as it has over the years. In particular, the reference made by the Minister to the abiding faith Nigeria has in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons deserves wide and serious attention, in view of the upcoming fourth review conference of the Treaty later this year.

Before moving on to the main subjects of my intervention, I also wish to express appreciation to the previous Presidents of the Conference, Ambassadors Benhima of Morocco and Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for the enormous contribution they made in helping all of us to start smoothly this year's session of the Conference. My delegation also wishes to extend a whole-hearted welcome to Ambassador Margaret Mason of Canada today.

Listening to a number of eminent speakers and colleagues who took the floor before me, I was very encouraged and pleased to find myself among those people who dedicate themselves to the common tasks of achieving higher goals as participants in this unique multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and I was also struck by their shared concern that unless this negotiating

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body begins to produce concrete achievements, at this historic juncture of unmatched opportunities for arms control and disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament may be regarded as an inadequate body in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it.

It is only right at this point to refer to the very inspiring speech made by our eminent, esteemed and beloved colleague from Brazil, Ambassador de Azambuja, at the very outset of our Conference this year. In his speech he eloquently but painfully pointed out our failure so far to produce concrete achievements while super-Power bilateral and European regional East-West disarmament negotiations are harvesting unexpectedly rewarding results. He asked how our Conference, which is both structurally and conceptually a child of the cold war, can adapt to the new times.

Indeed, if the East-West confrontation is to be transformed into a kind of co-operation which will no doubt contribute to the stability and peace of the world, it is obvious that the existing grouping set-up in our Conference is bound to become obsolete. How to adapt ourselves is certainly not an easy question, but it may be time for us to begin to address ourselves to this question. Meanwhile, as for the substance of our work - although this is not an answer to the question posed by our eminent Brazilian colleague - I should like to share with you a way of looking at the things taking place in our multilateral negotiating body.

The chemical weapons convention, after so many years' hard work in this forum, is approaching completion, and Japan takes the strong view that this year should indeed become a critical year in settling remaining major substantive issues for negotiation, as was declared at the Canberra Conference last September.

When we reflect upon various factors which may have led us to the present fairly successful outlook, it should be noted that the sound progress of our negotiations owes much to the two successful meetings held to promote a total ban on chemical weapons, in Paris and Canberra. We should also pay due regard to the bold steps taken by the United States and the USSR in declaring their chemical weapons stocks, accepting the principle of on-site intrusive inspections as a means of verification, and, most recently, announcing their readiness to destroy the bulk of their stocks down to equal low levels, pending the adoption of the international convention. An agreement to this effect is expected to be signed at the United States-Soviet summit meeting in June this year.

My delegation also supports the strong appeal made by the United States to all CW-capable States to follow the United States and the USSR in declaring basic data concerning their CW stocks as early as possible, because by so doing in the spirit of more transparency and mutual confidence-building we should be able to better secure the universality and success of the CW convention.

The chemical weapons convention, which might not have been achievable if we still lived in the days of East-West confrontation at its darker stage, may well turn out to be the first significant multilateral convention of the new

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decade, which may belong to a new era, and our Conference on Disarmament may establish its position as a forum which, after a long period of inability to carry out its tasks, is now being activated to serve the requirements of the new times.

Allow me to make a few more observations on this very important negotiation we are engaged in as a matter of highest priority at this moment. Japan believes that it is time for us now to pay more attention to tackling the key issues of a political nature, renewing our political commitment to the elimination of chemical weapons. Then, for the remaining technical questions, active participation by experts from industrial and academic circles will serve as a lever for acceleration of the negotiation.

As one of the major chemical industry nations, Japan wishes to reiterate the importance of the verification régime with respect to non-production of chemical weapons. The verification of destruction may be over in 10 years after the entry into force of the convention, but the verification of non-production will last indefinitely and affect a far greater number of States. In this field, we are trying to create a truly epoch-making mechanism which may serve as a model for future disarmament conventions. In working out a verification régime for non-production, we will have to respond to the need to ensure the fulfilment of the purposes of this convention, and at the same time the requirement of keeping the cost of verification down to a reasonably low level. In order to work out such a régime of verification that would be reasonably effective and reliable, it is extremely important to try to have a fairly accurate picture of the chemical industry situation prior to the conclusion of this convention. From this point of view, Japan hopes that under the recently proposed system of "technical support" for the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, a data base on the chemical industry will be worked out as one of its activities. About one week ago, Japan presented the Ad hoc Committee with data on its chemical industry, and hopes that this will contribute to the deliberations by the Committee on such problems as the cost of verification, annexes to article VI, production thresholds and so forth.

Furthermore, my delegation wishes to reaffirm Japan's hope that its technologies might make some contributions to the resolution of difficult problems related to the CW convention, such as that of effective verification. As an example of such efforts, my delegation wishes to draw the attention of the Conference to the United States-Japanese agreement reached in Washington on 7 March under which the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute will work together in an experiment to test the reliability of remotely monitored sensors which operate unattended for long periods of time.

Now I should like to address myself to another important subject of my intervention today. Many questions are asked as to the adequacy of the Conference on Disarmament in adapting itself to the requirements of the new times. As I suggested at the beginning of my speech, it may well be that the recent encouraging developments in the East-West relationship have made it

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possible for the Conference to achieve major breakthroughs in the CW negotiations. In that case, we should try hard to achieve other breakthroughs in other long-standing issues before the Conference, thus turning this forum into a real working body serving the requirements of the new times.

Of course, what I have in mind are the issues of nuclear disarmament. Our colleague from Peru, Ambassador de Rivero, was so right in his speech on 15 February at this plenary session in pointing out that the reactivation of the ad hoc committee on the cessation of nuclear tests would "give the work of the Conference political symmetry". With respect to both nuclear and chemical weapons the two super-Powers are the largest possessors, and their reduction and ultimate elimination, as well as non-proliferation, are matters of great importance today not only to the two super-Powers but also to the entire world community. Thus, multilateral negotiations are closely linked to bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, as in the case of chemical weapons, advance in the dialogue and a co-operative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in recent years have made it possible to achieve significant breakthroughs in their bilateral talks in the field of nuclear disarmament. Japan whole-heartedly welcomes these developments, and is convinced that they are bound to be reflected in multilateral negotiations here in this forum.

When we consider the question of nuclear disarmament, the major efforts currently being exerted fall into three areas, namely the reduction of nuclear weapons, non-proliferation of those weapons, and a nuclear test ban. These three areas are interrelated, and a good balance among them will always have to be kept in mind. In all three areas, this year is expected to become a critical year. In the area of reduction of nuclear weapons, a START agreement is expected to be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the area of non-proliferation, the fourth NPT review conference is scheduled to be held. In the area of a nuclear test ban, the protocols for the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties are expected to be signed at the coming summit meeting between the United States and Soviet Union.

It is under such circumstances that the role and usefulness of the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, is being questioned. There is no doubt that, by resuming substantial work on nuclear test ban issues, the Conference will be able to make a valuable contribution in working out the best possible multilateral approach to this question, which would complement bilateral efforts being made between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It was from this viewpoint that my delegation has actively taken part in an effort to re-establish the ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. My predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, initiated a dialogue for this purpose when he was the President of the Conference for the month of March last year. In order to disentangle ourselves from the impasse of conflicting group positions, he consulted each delegation on an informal and individual basis.

As was announced by your predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, at the beginning of the session of the Conference of this year, I willingly agreed to continue the efforts initiated by my predecessor. At the outset of your

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presidency, you too kindly encouraged me to continue the efforts. I should like to take this opportunity to express sincere appreciation for the kind words of encouragement and support extended to myself and to my predecessor by a number of delegates at the sessions of this Conference.

It was only with such continued support and warm understanding by my colleagues around this conference room that we began to break new ground in our common endeavour to disentangle ourselves from an impasse. I was extremely encouraged to see that, on the 14th of this month, you, Mr. President, successfully conducted a presidential consultation by inviting all the group co-ordinators for agenda item 1, and confirming that all groups agreed, without prejudice to their preferred draft mandates, to work towards consensus on the basis of the draft mandate embodied in document CD/863. China also stated that it supported this approach and expressed its readiness to participate in the work of the ad hoc committee when it is re-established. This new development indeed represents a major break-through, and confirms the readiness of the Conference to resume substantial work in the ad hoc committee under agenda item 1.

My delegation hopes that all groups and each delegation will continue to show as flexible and constructive an attitude as possible on this question, so that the Conference will be able to resume, as speedily as possible, substantial work on the agenda item. My delegation will spare no efforts in facilitating such a process by doing whatever is necessary, and in co-operation with all other delegations.

As for the handling of the work of the ad hoc committee to be established, my delegation wishes to stress the importance of avoiding a repetition of rhetorical and political rituals. The deliberation will have to be concrete and realistic. Japan also realizes that the peace and stability of the world will continue to be based on the balance of power and nuclear deterrence for the time being. As a member of the Western group of nations sharing common ideals and values, Japan feels that the only practical way to cessation of all nuclear tests lies in maintaining a balance of nuclear weapons at ever-lower levels, and gradually reducing all nuclear test explosions and bringing them under effective control. In other words, the approach to this question should be exclusively within the practical framework of a step-by-step approach.

Therefore, Japan welcomed and supported the joint statement made by the United States and the Soviet Union on 17 September 1987, in which a stage-by-stage approach to the nuclear test ban problem was announced. Japan strongly hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union, after the expected signature of the protocols for the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties at the coming summit meeting, will proceed to the next stage of negotiations in this field, and that the bilateral United States-USSR negotiations and the multilateral deliberations in this Conference will be closely interrelated and reinforce each other.

Lastly, I cannot fail to refer to the very significant contributions being made by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to detect and identify seismic events (GSE). The GSE is now at a very important stage of its work in

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putting its conceptual design of a modern international seismic data exchange system through a testing operation. I note with great satisfaction that the second phase of the Group's second large-scale technical test (GSETT-2) has recently started, and hope that it will produce a number of successful and meaningful findings, which would contribute a great deal in formulating a reliable mechanism for detecting underground nuclear explosions. With a view to enhancing further the value of the GSE's work, I would like to call on those countries which have not yet done so to join this important experiment.

At the same time, we may be coming to a point where we should start thinking seriously about multiple facets of verification from a broader perspective and give proper guidance to the work of the GSE. I feel that by doing whatever is needed in our endeavour to work out a reliable and effective system of verification in the field of a nuclear test ban, the Conference on Disarmament will be carrying out the work most needed at this time of history full of promises and anxieties.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no other speaker inscribed for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

I wish to recall that, as provided for in the timetable for meetings to be held during the present week, the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will meet this afternoon at 3 p.m. in this conference room.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 29 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.547
29 March 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 March 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Emeke Ayo Azikiwe (Nigeria)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 547th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

After we reach the end of the list of speakers, I shall convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider how to proceed with agenda items 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", as well as a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Italy, Morocco, Ethiopia and Argentina. I now give the floor to the representative of Italy, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso.

Mr. NEGROTTTO CAMBIASO (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I fall in with the tradition of civility and courtesy which is a part of the work of the Conference on Disarmament and extend to you, on the occasion of my first statement in plenary, my warm appreciation and that of my delegation for the exemplary way in which you have been presiding over our work during this month of March which is now drawing to an end. You have done so with discretion, balance and efficiency, the ingredients necessary for good diplomacy. Allow me at the same time to thank Ambassador Benhima, who welcomed me to Geneva so cordially, and your predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, for the patience and tenacity with which he discharged his functions in the delicate starting-up phase. I would like to assure the future President, Ambassador Kamal of the very committed and convinced co-operation of the Italian delegation. Finally, allow me to express my appreciation for the valuable support being provided by the secretariat, thanks in particular to Ambassador Komatina and Ambassador Berasategui.

None of you, I believe, will be surprised if my first statement is entirely devoted to the negotiations for the total and universal prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. Many speakers have already stressed their central role in the present context of our work; and you are all, I think, familiar with Italy's commitment in this area, at the political level - I would say - first of all, here and elsewhere, in constantly repeating opportune et importune, as St. Paul would say, our conviction of the importance and urgency of the problem. We are now entering a phase of the negotiations which we all consider to be the final stage, while divergences remain among us concerning the consideration of the time factor and questions requiring prior solution.

In numerous statements made by eminent colleagues who have long been participating in these negotiations, it has been maintained that we are involved in a way in a race against time. I fully subscribe to this statement. If we are not able to speed up the pace of our deliberations, we will face the risk of a growing dyscrasia between the evolution of the real situation and the ideal point towards which our debates are converging.

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The present situation in fact is one of real discrimination. Theoretically, today we have reached the high point of discrimination. Italy does not possess chemical weapons and does not know how many other countries, aside from the United States and the Soviet Union, have such weapons at present. The convention represents the only means of achieving a progressive reduction of the anomalies until they are eliminated. Hence what is discriminatory, as we see it, is not the convention but rather its absence. For this reason Italy, which rejects this horrible category of weapons at the conceptual and at the political level, also feels the need for the rapid finalization of the convention, as an imperative that stems from its own perception of security: a convention which will free the Earth of all chemical weapons within 10 years after it enters into force; which, through effective surveillance, will prevent any covert production; and which, at the same time, inter alia as a result of appropriate co-operation measures, will make this attractive and acceptable to all.

Today emphasis is rightly placed, in all disarmament sectors, on the increasing importance of measures for building confidence. This has been and is still being discussed a great deal, and not without tangible successes, in the European negotiations. Consequently we wonder whether even in the CW negotiations, aside from the essential question of verification, the individuation of common ground in the area of assistance and technical co-operation might not constitute per se an important element of confidence-building and an additional encouragement to become a party. I have already referred to our perception of the convention as being the only means for reaching a more pacificatory situation. In this respect the question of assistance seems to us to be of special political importance, in the transitional period but also beyond.

Challenge inspections are, in Italy's view, the confidence-building measure par excellence. Intensive efforts have been made to uphold the merits of a purely bilateral, or alternatively a purely multilateral approach, in a debate which seems to be heading towards more balanced consideration of this dilemma, in which the two aspects are merged one into the other in a relationship of complementarity. Indeed, the very originality of this treaty lies in a balanced combination of bilateral and multilateral elements. Thus while the starting-point of challenge verification falls essentially, within the bilateral sphere, subsequent intervention by the multilateral organization implies inevitably, as my delegation sees it, that the final evaluation of the possible existence of a violation, as well as any decisions resulting from that evaluation, would fall to the body whose task will be to ensure that the convention is observed.

I would now like to express a few ideas concerning the problem of universality. This is a question which goes beyond a confidence-building measure, of which it is in a way the prerequisite. I do not think anyone would deny that the convention must be universally accepted if we hope that at the end of the transitional period chemical weapons will truly be eliminated from the Earth. Differences remain, however, concerning the most effective means of reaching that point. In this respect we deem it important not to forget the diversity of perceptions of security which exist in different countries, which sometimes face specific difficult situations. Thus in the present phase

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of major change and movement on the international scene, the regional dimension may be seen as a more and more independent variable as compared to the bipolar order, where security perceptions at the national level may influence analyses and cause security requirements to be overestimated.

Italy is ready to accede to the convention immediately when the time comes, within the desirable context of co-ordinated accession by a number of countries. Italy is also willing, through the strong relations of co-operation which it maintains with the countries of its own region, to continue exchanges of view on the problem of universality with all the countries sharing its concerns and interests.

In a Europe which is no longer squeezed between walls and curtains, a process is emerging which - as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs said in Vienna - could bring about the rediscovery of a civilization where we are ultimately "enemyless". The conclusion of our negotiations on chemical weapons would not only produce the most ambitious result ever achieved within a multilateral disarmament system, but could also become a driving element for subsequent achievements, perhaps within the context of an updated role for the Conference on Disarmament. We have to seize the momentum, as our English-speaking friends say, borrowing from Latin the idea of a period of time which is never complete - and certain events in the last few days are here to remind us of this truth. In the final analysis, these are encouraging signs which must be consolidated. But hope cannot be the monopoly of one continent or of a few countries, however important they may be. This is why we greatly appreciate the efforts which are being made towards the strengthening of all aspects of the future convention, even if it is not always easy for us fully to understand the need, at this stage, to get bogged down in prolonged debates on aspects which are essentially technical or of a drafting nature, or in conceptual disputes which run the risk of turning us away from what is essential. On technical aspects, in particular, we too are convinced that they could usefully be entrusted to a specific mechanism of the type proposed by the Australian delegation on behalf of the Western group: its very *raison d'être* is to speed up the pace of the negotiations. Likewise, we are in a position to confirm our full agreement on sending certain problems to the Preparatory Commission, or to a phase following the finalization of the convention, in the framework of the decision-making powers of the future organization.

The complexity of the problems of substance which still await solution should certainly not be underestimated; we have them all well in mind. Nevertheless we believe that it is possible to tackle the substance directly, under an overall approach which goes beyond excessive attention to specifics, without invoking an insufficient level of readiness or the need for a prior solution to other related technical aspects. Consequently, we appreciated the initiative taken by the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, designed to encourage a parallel and more general process of reflection, which, by freeing us from the grip of routine and our set roles, will force us to show our full hands.

Lastly, I would like to express Italy's appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the American and Soviet delegations. We are counting on them, and we are awaiting further progress, which could also contribute to the

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accomplishment of our work. The Italian delegation is inspired by the speed and the concrete nature of the bilateral CW negotiations. They benefit from the existence of a political deadline, but also from a different structuring of meetings, similar to that which was adopted in Vienna. We wonder whether we could not try to do the same ourselves, beginning with the chemical weapons negotiations. Shorter sessions would enable us to cope better with the requirements of such complex negotiations. I will simply add that my country would be willing to consider the adoption of a division of work into four annual sessions, within as short a period of time as possible.

I would like to conclude by placing myself, as I did at the beginning of my statement, within the context of the tradition of courtesy which inspires this forum and which has such a pleasant resonance for our spirits. I would like to thank all the colleagues who have extended their welcome and best wishes to me as a newcomer. In turn I extend to them my wishes for serenity and success with respect and warmth.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benhima.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, as your presidency comes to an end, it is particularly pleasant for me to express to you as an eminent son of Nigeria my delegation's congratulations on the dignity and determination with which you have guided our work. Of course, I cannot resist the temptation of saying to your predecessor, Ambassador Wagenmakers, how much we value the qualities he showed during his term of office. Many colleagues have left us, called to other duties, and I send them my wishes for success in their new posts. To their successors I wish a warm welcome among us.

For some months now we have been witnessing a great unfolding of events on the international scene and the birth of profound changes in the arena of the European continent. Whether they prompt hope or uncertainty, they are the result of a relaxation of tension which began some years ago and has gradually spread its effects. Disarmament is one of the sectors benefiting from this new international environment, which should be exploited in our common quest for further progress in the negotiations. While it is obvious that the two super-Powers have special responsibilities, disarmament is still the cause belonging to the whole of mankind, and the Conference, which is the emanation of the international community, cannot abandon its objectives nor renounce its mandate as an organ for multilateral negotiation. None the less its vocation is to encourage initiatives taken elsewhere and to encourage others, particularly in sectors where positive developments have not occurred.

The Conference's resolute involvement in the elaboration of a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons proves that this objective is within our reach. It is encouraging to note the substantial progress made last year on certain fundamental issues relating to the future convention. In this context I would like to pay tribute to the excellent work done by the Ad hoc Committee under the skilful and dynamic chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre Morel. I hope that under the competent guidance of

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Ambassador Hyltenius the Ad hoc Committee will achieve a breakthrough which will clear the way for further progress. The consensus reached at the Paris Conference, the Canberra declaration and General Assembly resolution 44/115A are all calls to the Conference to step up its work.

The current intensification of the negotiations, particularly in the light of the progress made in the bilateral American-Soviet talks, should allow a substantial reduction in points of divergence - we hope it will - and bring us closer to the finalization of the convention. In this context, my delegation shares the view that the keystone of the future convention should be an adequate system to verify compliance with the obligations arising from the treaty. Only a rigorous verification system can create confidence amongst the States parties. The proliferation of procedures which are at present being studied seems to us to be a positive factor, because it proves that effective verification is within our grasp since it is the expression of unanimity. To this end, we consider it essential to provide the inspection machinery with adequate resources so that it can carry out its mission properly. This machinery will have to have the necessary powers to enable it to make a judgement concerning compliance with the norms of the convention and the inspection reports submitted to it. An atmosphere of trust and co-operation should govern the conduct and implementation of this operation. The team responsible for the inspection should benefit from understanding and assistance on the part of the national authorities of the country being visited.

The scope of the future convention is also an issue of great importance, making it possible to gauge the extent of our commitments and give them appropriate content in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and particularly the Final Document of 1978. Our task is to proceed to the elimination of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, it being understood that the essential goal is the absolute prohibition of their use. On this latter aspect of the scope of the convention, my delegation, like all the members of the Group of 21, regrets the lack of consensus on the inclusion of the question of banning the use of chemical weapons in the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee. Since these elements represent the very reason why the convention exists, it goes without saying that its legal régime should be developed in such a way as to ensure that these postulates do not suffer from any exceptions. We must certainly set up flexible machinery which could help the parties to reach agreement on the entire text of the convention but that should in no way furnish a means by which the obligations entered into by all the parties could be weakened. It is just as necessary to arrive at unanimously agreed measures intended to deal with any situation which is not in accordance with the fundamental provisions of the treaty.

The realization of the international community's wish to produce a finalized chemical weapons treaty is above all a question of political will. This will is vital to ensure agreement by all concerned, particularly for achieving universality, a fundamental characteristic of this instrument without which our efforts would be in danger of being incomplete. The same political will should govern the search for consensus on the subject of the composition of the bodies responsible for monitoring the application of the

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Treaty, particularly the Executive Council. The process of sketching out a number of criteria for the appointment of the future members of this Council should be pursued in the same spirit as last year in order to bring the different positions closer together. The main bodies of the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons should have the necessary power to do their job properly. These bodies, the product of the will of the international community, should take account of the aspirations of all the parties in a balanced and non-discriminatory way. This is a necessary condition to guarantee technological co-operation among the States parties and free access for all to the purely civilian applications of the chemical industry.

While the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons represents a priority aim for our Conference, other issues are of no less primordial and crucial importance for this body. I have in mind nuclear disarmament, without which anything else that is achieved will remain precarious and subject to doubt. We reiterate the opinion that it is vital for our Conference to tackle the nuclear issues at last in order to justify its existence, which is closely linked with the nuclear threat hanging over the survival of mankind. The unrestrained nuclear arms race which has marked the last two decades has taken on substantial dimensions which are out of all proportion to the alleged requirements for security or deterrence. It was obviously time to start negotiations in the Conference to put an end to this competition. The dialogue under way between the two super-Powers on this subject has fortunately opened up some new prospects. At all events, our Conference cannot stand aside from this process.

The expected results of the future START agreement will, in spite of their scope, remain limited. Even after such an agreement, the arsenals of the two super-Powers will still contain no less than 30,000 nuclear warheads. The result will be continued serious disquiet at the risk of a nuclear holocaust, and for the future of détente in international relations. This is why we will not cease repeating that no nuclear disarmament process, however broad it may be, will be complete as long as it is not based on a nuclear test ban. In this respect we are bound to note that our Conference has been making persistent efforts for more than five years to agree on the terms of the mandate of the ad hoc committee on a total nuclear test ban. In this context we cannot but welcome the actions which the delegation of Japan has been pursuing along these lines for a year now. We are very grateful to Ambassador Donowaki for his willingness to continue the consultations led by his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, in looking for a consensus on the mandate of the committee in question. I would like to assure him of our full support and co-operation. In the view of my delegation, the formulation of the terms of this mandate does not matter very much, as long as the prime goal of the committee is the conclusion of a treaty containing internationally binding legal norms and directed towards a total nuclear test ban. The re-establishment of this committee in the coming weeks will certainly make a positive contribution to the success of the fourth conference of States parties to review the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, which is to take place next summer.

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The use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes remains one of the dearest wishes of the international community. Our Conference, as an international disarmament negotiating body, has the task of drafting legal rules to safeguard this common heritage of mankind from the arms race. We are bound to note that the Ad hoc Committee set up six years ago for that purpose has not yet met the hopes placed in it. The procedural approach embarked on by the Conference through the setting up of an Ad hoc Committee on this item in 1985 has not achieved its final aim of drawing up an international agreement intended to prevent an arms race in space, in accordance with paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is worth recalling that this document, as well as the numerous relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, urge the adoption of new measures and the commencement of appropriate international negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space. The need, not to say the necessity, for codification and negotiating work of this kind was clearly recognized in the last report of the Ad hoc Committee on space. Its conclusions expressly affirmed that the legal régime applicable to space did not in itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in that environment, which is why it was important to consolidate and strengthen the régime and enhance its effectiveness. If these observations enjoyed unanimous support in the Committee's report, desirable remedies should also have been agreed unanimously, in particular through the strengthening of the mandate of the Committee in question to enable it to negotiate measures to correct the shortcomings found in the legal régime for space. This is why, much as it welcomes the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on space, my delegation, like all the members of the group of non-aligned and neutral countries, still regrets the absence of a consensus on giving this Committee a negotiating mandate in accordance with General Assembly resolution 44/112. Voicing this regret, however, cannot prevent us from hoping that under the chairmanship of Ambassador Shannon of Canada, whom we congratulate and wish every success, the Ad hoc Committee will finally complete its mandate to examine and identify issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in space. We have high hopes that this exercise will be completed so as to start the Ad hoc Committee on a negotiating process as from its next session.

In contrast with what is happening in this double forum, negotiations on regional disarmament are continuing at the bilateral level and agreements such as the INF Treaty have already come into being; others are being concluded, either between the two super-Powers or between the two military alliances. But this dynamic in the negotiations does not seem to have been passed on to our Conference, leaving aside its work on chemical weapons. Given this immobility, and in order to prevent our Conference from seizing up, my delegation would like to associate itself with the call for a process of collective reflection made by many delegations, including those of the United States, Peru, Brazil and Venezuela. We think it is time to look seriously into the question of the effectiveness of the Conference. The former Group of Wise Men accomplished praiseworthy work, which should be put back on the agenda. It is true that the proposals made by the seven wise men do not satisfy all delegations. None the less, if we re-examine them in their true perspective, that of stepping up the negotiations, they will considerably facilitate our task.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Kongit Sinegiorgis, to whom I extend my warmest congratulations as well as, I am sure, those of the Conference on her well-deserved promotion to ambassadorial rank.

Ms. SINEGIORGIS (Ethiopia): Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your kind words.

As the month is coming to a close and being among the last speakers, it gives me particular pleasure not only to congratulate you on taking up the presidency but also to acknowledge the able and effective leadership that you have demonstrated during your presidency. We are happy to note, in particular, that as a result of your diligence and diplomatic skill the initiative you took has led to fruitful consultations with a view to informal plenary meetings on items 2 and 3 of our agenda, which without any doubt are of primary concern to all of us. We believe that this is a first step in the right direction, and we hope it will lead to effective multilateral negotiations on the issues in question. I might also add that the early establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 - Prevention of an arms race in outer space - is yet another worthwhile achievement.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador Hendrik Wagenmakers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, who successfully guided the work of this Conference during the month of February.

Allow me also to welcome most warmly our new colleagues who have recently joined the Conference on Disarmament, namely the distinguished Ambassadors of Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Italy, Kenya, Japan, Mexico, the United States and Venezuela. It is with pleasure that I assure them of my delegation's full co-operation in the successful discharge of our common endeavours.

The decade of the 1980s which has just ended was a decade during which the international community showed particular concern over the spiralling arms race and exerted considerable efforts to achieve concrete disarmament measures. It is to be recalled that two United Nations special sessions devoted to disarmament, and a Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, were held between 1982 and 1988. At the close of the decade two other important conferences that dealt with chemical weapons were convened - the Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons.

The last part of the 1980s also witnessed the unfolding panorama of a breakthrough in East-West relations. The disappearance of the dark and heavy cloud that had for so long enveloped the international scene has been enthusiastically welcomed by the international community. I must say that this relaxation of international tension has brought about positive changes that are certainly conducive to meaningful negotiations in the field of multilateral disarmament, thus making the future much brighter than it has ever been.

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

It is indeed encouraging that during the last few years steps have been taken by countries both at the bilateral and at the multilateral level in such areas as the reduction of conventional armed forces, the restructuring of military forces and other related confidence-building and security-building measures. More particularly, it is gratifying to note that the two super-Powers, having concluded the INF Treaty in 1987, are currently making progress in their negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear arms, and towards the banning of chemical weapons.

While we earnestly welcome such developments as encouraging sources of hope, we are agonized by the very fact that a lot remains to be done. In our view and without minimizing the enormous complexities involved in the conduct of nuclear disarmament, the bilateral arms control and disarmament measures that are being carried out should be not only accelerated but also supplemented by adequate multilateral efforts, if we are determined to free the world from the intimidation of the ever-increasing arms race and the ominous threat of insecurity.

In this regard, my delegation regrets that the first three agenda items of the CD dealing with nuclear issues are not given the attention they deserve. As has been stated time and again, the nuclear arms race and the threat of a nuclear war are issues of concern not only to the nuclear-weapon States but to mankind as a whole. It is indeed unacceptable that all nations whether or not they possess nuclear arsenals are forced to live under the threat of these abhorrent weapons. Therefore, it is imperative that this - the only disarmament negotiating body - should give priority attention to the cluster of nuclear issues so as to start the process of the extremely complicated and arduous task of multilateral negotiation on these issues.

My delegation believes that the time has come to reach a common understanding that all nations have a vested interest in these issues. It must be emphasized that no nation could accept the insinuation that nuclear issues are the concern of only those who possess them. This view was clearly expressed in the declaration of the ninth summit of heads of State and/or Government of the non-aligned countries during their meeting in Belgrade in September 1989. The declaration states inter alia that "general and complete disarmament under effective international control is by its very nature unattainable unless all countries join in its implementation. ... the use of nuclear weapons could lead to the extinction of human life on Earth. Since nuclear war threatens the very right to live, all nations have an equal stake in preventing it. ... the ongoing process of disarmament could be quickened and its coverage widened through the common endeavour of the entire international community".

It would be no exaggeration to say that there is growing frustration among the majority of the members of this body because an honest review of the work of the Conference to date reveals the grim picture that very little progress has been registered on the major issues of our agenda. Indeed, if we take only the very first item on our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", despite the high priority attached to it and the prevailing urgent desire by the international community to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early date, nuclear tests are still being conducted and the sophistication and

(Ms. Sinigiorgis, Ethiopia)

proliferation of nuclear weapons continues to be humanity's major preoccupation. The lack of an adequate verification mechanism, which is the usual argument for delaying negotiations on this important issue, cannot of course be considered valid. Notwithstanding this and despite the unceasing efforts and numerous initiatives made so far, the CD has not been able to set up an ad hoc committee, let alone begin substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

In this respect, my delegation highly appreciates the consultations being carried out by His Excellency Ambassador Donowaki of Japan on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the basis of the Vejvoda proposal, without prejudice to our original positions, of course. The progress report by His Excellency Ambassador Donowaki in his statement of 27 March 1990, that all groups have agreed to work towards consensus on the basis of the draft mandate contained in document CD/863, is indeed encouraging. In particular, we are satisfied by his assessment that "this new development indeed represents a major breakthrough, and confirms the readiness of the Conference to resume substantial work in the ad hoc committee under agenda item 1". We hope that this positive trend will allow us to establish the ad hoc committee on a CTB before the end of our spring session. In our view, the current international situation is favourable for such an undertaking - and we should seize this opportune moment to deal with the issue as expeditiously as possible.

The fourth review conference of the NPT is scheduled to take place in August this year in Geneva. As I stated earlier, even if progress is being made on a bilateral level, we are far from the full implementation of the main provisions of this very important treaty, particularly those relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, safeguards and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances. At this stage my delegation would only like to register its particular concern over the lack of progress in the above-mentioned issues. It will express its position at the forthcoming review conference.

Regarding the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, we welcome the important progress made during the previous year under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, whose dynamic and effective guidance has contributed substantially in laying a firm foundation for the convention. We are also confident that the Ad hoc Committee will achieve yet further results this year under the competent and energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

The delegation of Ethiopia is satisfied that the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has been considerably improved this year by the agreement reached to include final drafting of the convention. This is a clear reflection of the fact that we have actually reached the stage where we are in a position to come up with one effective, global and verifiable CW convention. No doubt there are still some outstanding problems to be dealt with. But seen against the backdrop of the work done so far, we are of the view that by setting a time frame, we can face the challenge of resolving the remaining issues and conclude the convention at an early date. We also share the prevailing general optimism that a convention on chemical weapons is now within sight.

(Ms. Sinegiorgis, Ethiopia)

As His Excellency Ambassador Stülpnagel said in his statement to the CD on 8 March 1990, "there is no reason why we should not set ourselves equally ambitious goals for the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Otherwise we risk being the last to change in a world of change, or those who did not change in time". We concur with this assertion; and in our view, at present the remaining issues are more of a political than a technical nature and as such, in order to conclude the convention what is most required is a firm political will, which we hope will be adequately manifested.

The need to adapt the CD to the changing positive climate prevailing in today's international relations has been sufficiently dealt with by those members who have addressed the CD before me. In this regard, I wish to pay my delegation's special tribute and sincere appreciation to His Excellency Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil, who at the outset of our Conference this year drew our attention to the importance and pertinence of reviewing our work in the light of the present reality.

It is to be recalled that Ambassador de Azambuja raised a number of very important questions related to this matter. In my view, an appropriate and timely response to those questions would indeed contribute to the effective functioning of the CD. Indeed, as the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil said, "the time has come for us to proceed to a thorough re-examination not only of some of our goals, but of our ways and means of approaching them". Concerning this matter, my delegation fully supports the proposal regarding the reactivation of the Group of Seven, and we hope that the necessary measures will be taken so that the Group can immediately start its work.

I need not remind this negotiating body that a lot is expected from us by the international community. Our achievements are bound to be measured against those lofty expectations. No doubt, a simple stock-taking of our work would clearly reveal that we have no reason to be proud except for the chemical weapons negotiations which are nearing their final stage. Unfortunately, however, even the progress we are witnessing in the chemical weapons negotiations still falls far short of our expectations due to lack of sufficient political will. In the light of the present conducive international atmosphere, which in the view of the Ethiopian delegation is indeed a unique period in contemporary history, we would be judged severely if this opportune moment were to slip by without meeting the challenges posed by mankind's quest to free the world from the threat of all weapons of mass destruction, and in particular the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we represent two countries brought together by common actions and objectives. Suffice it to mention the joint efforts undertaken to implement the Declaration of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic. It is in Lagos that the countries bordering the south Atlantic will be holding their second meeting very shortly. This time we will be pleased to have Namibia as a member of our unofficial community of south Atlantic nations.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

Mr. President, as your presidency draws to a close, I believe we are all absolutely grateful to you for your efforts to guide our substantive work. In fact, a large number of subsidiary bodies have been established, and you are attempting to structure the debate on two important and urgent items on our agenda. You are following the diplomatic tradition of another great Nigerian to whom the cause of disarmament owes a great deal - I refer to Ambassador Adenji.

On this occasion I wish to refer to one of the problems which, as we see it is of increasing importance on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament: the prevention of an arms race in outer space. When joining this body a few weeks ago I had an opportunity to convey to the delegations present here a message from President Menem in which he referred expressly to the space issue. There are specific reasons for this, some of whose characteristics it is my intention to deal with in this statement.

It has become customary to acknowledge the undeniable importance for space to the international community. Hence, I shall not dwell on the many different activities, including military activities, that are carried out by States in space. I do believe it important, however, to reiterate that the international situation at the end of this century as far as space is concerned is different from that of the 1960s and 1970s, which saw the most spectacular achievements in the technology race in space and, in parallel, the development of a body of rules to govern the peaceful use of space. Today we see that there are several countries besides those traditionally considered as space Powers that are acquiring the technologies necessary to gain access to space either directly or by placing satellites in orbit, in addition to the now almost universal use and commercialization of information obtained from outer space. Considered from the perspective of our Conference, these factors give a sense of reality and focus to our efforts. These factors do not merely reflect the existence of a series of general principles on the use of outer space for the benefit of the whole of mankind, but arise out of the concrete and tangible presence of an ever-increasing number of States in space. This of course creates possibilities and prospects which are positive, and at the same time raises important questions, especially from a perspective of global strategy and security.

A very superficial analysis shows the observer that in questions concerned with arms limitation in space, notions of exclusivity and partiality still prevail. When we speak of exclusivity, we refer to the fact that there is obvious reluctance to move forward in the elaboration of multilateral rules that would make the space environment safer and more predictable. What is even more serious is that so far as space is concerned we do not even have the apparently encouraging prospects that apply to terrestrial disarmament. In other words, the absence of a consensus on the need to complete and refine the legal régime applicable to space should be viewed together with the fact that at the bilateral level these agreements seem to come up against serious and thus far unresolved divergences. The ABM Treaty on the prohibition of anti-ballistic systems is a case in point that I need not dwell on further, except perhaps to say that this important bilateral instrument is at present resting on extremely precarious foundations. The two largest military Powers,

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

meanwhile, are forging ahead with strategic defence programmes about whose characteristics and definitions little is known. As an almost ironic feature we are even hearing some of these programmes being justified on the grounds of alleged threats from developing countries.

Without wishing to become involved in arguments about the content of such statements, we believe that it would be regrettable to waste the opportunity to make concrete and effective progress in preventing an arms race in space, at a time when the international situation appears particularly propitious. Nevertheless, my delegation believes that there is a need for an open and balanced dialogue on the subject, and is of the view that this is particularly appropriate now in that the voicing of reservations and judgements about potential threats to global security must be viewed together with more important elements, with more direct and negative consequences which have to do with concrete restrictions on international co-operation in the field of aerospace technology - a mistaken approach already tried out some years ago in the area of nuclear technology, and one which today is obviously at variance with the atmosphere of confidence and mutual trust prevailing in international relations.

Turning now to the work of the Ad hoc Committee, I believe we all agree here that the work done thus far by this subsidiary body of the Conference has been useful. Nevertheless, when the importance and the nature of the subjects before it are analysed in detail, this useful work proves extremely limited in scope. Thus far, we have had a constructive discussion on general questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. This has given all of us quite a good idea of what priorities are selected by States when analysing the space issue from a security standpoint. We have examined the legal régime applicable to space, and we have reached the conclusion that on its own it is not sufficient to prevent the possible extension of the arms race to space.

Lastly, we have before us quite a large number of proposals on concrete measures that could be the subject of multilateral negotiations. In the view of our delegation, the way is clear now to take a qualitative step forward in the work of the Committee. The consideration of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was an item on the previous agenda, allowed an exchange of views that was essential for determining the general framework of the debate, when dealing with questions such as the relationship between multilateral and bilateral negotiations in this field, the magnitude and lawfulness of military uses of space, the scope of peaceful uses of space, the characteristics of current space programmes and many other matters. My delegation believes that in the light of the discussions that have taken place on this item of the Committee's traditional programme of work, and without prejudice to our continuing this collective analysis, it is now high time for us to recognize the limits of the exercise. These limits are obvious in so far as, in the continuing absence of a progressive structural framework which would enable us to organize and direct the negotiations systematically, a generic debate on such a vast subject can no doubt be useful, but has now fulfilled its original purpose. Progress in space technology gives this subject its own almost unique dynamic, and makes any generic discussion of these characteristics tend inevitably towards

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

irrelevance, unless they are oriented within the framework of a "rolling text". Otherwise the work of the Conference on Disarmament will not rise above the level of an exchange of views more befitting a deliberative body than one with the characteristics of the CD.

As regards the examination of existing agreements relevant to outer space, another item in the traditional programme of work, my delegation proceeds from the premise recognized by the Ad hoc Committee itself that the existing régime, whatever its intrinsic value, does not per se guarantee the prevention of a military race in outer space. In this area too it is our view that discussions must reflect a qualitative change, moving beyond the repetition of positions well known to all, which, far from helping to find a common area of understanding, deepens the differences of interpretation that always arise in the analysis and exposition of a body of rules in any area of human activities subject to legal norms. As far as my delegation is concerned, to say that the existing legal régime is complete, perfect and sufficient is just as incorrect as to say that in this area we are moving in a total juridical vacuum. Perhaps it would not be superfluous if, before becoming immersed in intricate arguments on the scope of the existing rules, we were to recall that the analysis of the legal régime in the context of the Conference on Disarmament has a very specific framework and meaning, as this body in the final analysis is called upon to negotiate agreements to prevent an arms race from being unleashed in this environment. The Conference on Disarmament is first and foremost an organ with the task of negotiating agreements, not interpreting those that already exist. In other words, any analysis of existing rules must be clearly action-oriented, always bearing in mind that the object of the exercise is to identify gaps and define areas that require the elaboration of additional rules.

As to existing proposals and future initiatives, it is logical that the greatest expectations should be centred on this point. They reflect the thinking that delegations and groups have been devoting to the various ways in which States could seek and find acceptable formulae that would reconcile the activities of each with the common objective of providing a predictable and secure framework for an environment into which man has launched more than 3,500 objects. The Committee, especially in recent sessions, has made progress that we have no hesitation in terming qualitative. The fertile area of confidence-building measures in space is progressively gaining ground in the considerations and proposals coming from many delegations belonging to various groups in the Conference. This is a sure sign of the emergence of a framework of consensus which should be given meaningful content.

In our opinion, we already have sufficient critical mass to permit a more systematic approach to the various proposals that have been submitted to the Committee to date in order to build a framework of confidence and predictability in space. The task will doubtless be complex, but we believe that the time has come to move forward resolutely towards the devising of a régime which, at the risk of appearing simplistic, we could call the Helsinki-Stockholm of space. The major difference, and the major challenge facing us, is that in this instance and in view of the subject and scope of the negotiations, the process will not be confined to the 35 States that carried out this successful East-West negotiating process, but will involve

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

all States members of the Conference and the remaining members of the international community which will certainly join in the efforts. We believe that initiatives such as the elaboration of a code of conduct (rules of the road), the various proposals dealing with immunity and partial protection of satellites, those relating to remote sensing and others, form a nucleus around which a body of consistent initiatives could be built that would help to make space an arena for open co-operation in peaceful uses and transparency and predictability for military uses.

Happily, it seems that any statement made in the plenary of this Conference recently must contain a tribute to the present international climate and its promising potentialities. This gives negotiators an inevitable feeling of satisfaction because of the tangible progress made and the progress which is foreshadowed in the near future. On this occasion my delegation has shunned complacency in order to call the attention of the delegations present here to subject area which is of concern to us all, which is open and which has yet to be spelled out in detail. It is the subject area of space.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I shall now suspend it and in five minutes' time convene an informal meeting of the Conference to report to you on the results of the consultations undertaken on an appropriate organizational framework to deal with agenda items 2 and 3 during this annual session. We shall also consider a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 11.20 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: the 547th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of the discussions at the informal meeting just held on an organizational arrangement to deal with agenda items 2 and 3, I wish to put before the Conference for decision the following text:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides that informal meetings be held during its 1990 session on the substance of agenda items 2, 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', and 3, 'Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters', and that the discussions at those informal meetings be duly reflected in the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the text that I have read out.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like now to turn to another subject relating to the forthcoming informal meetings. Under the rules of procedure, the President of the Conference has the responsibility, in accordance with the normal duties of any presiding officer, to ensure that discussions at plenary or informal meetings are conducted in an orderly way. Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I have myself taken the initiative of preparing a list of topics for the purpose of facilitating a structured discussion at informal meetings on the substance of agenda items 2 and 3. That list is my own and therefore does not bind any delegation. Furthermore, it is understood that members wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the agenda item, as is the normal practice of the Conference. I shall now read out that list of topics:

Firstly, for agenda item 2:

Implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I in the light of the trends in international relations

Evaluation of the dynamics of the nuclear arms race in the light of recent international developments

The nuclear arms race in all its qualitative aspects, and related matters

Existing international instruments concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

The interrelation between bilateral and multilateral consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; participation in negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prerequisites for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in nuclear disarmament; role of the Conference on Disarmament

Security concepts relating to nuclear weapons in view of recent developments and in the light of the global consequences of existing and envisaged disarmament and arms limitation agreements

The role of nuclear deterrence in keeping the peace for 40 years: the need to proceed carefully and gradually in reducing reliance on nuclear deterrence

Principles governing nuclear disarmament

Proposals on stages and measures of nuclear disarmament

Cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and measures against the reuse for weapons purposes of fissionable material released by disarmament steps

Naval nuclear armaments and disarmament

(The President)

Collateral measures with the aim of consolidating and continuing the ongoing process of nuclear disarmament:

Non-proliferation of missiles and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as well as their technology

Confidence-building measures promoting nuclear disarmament

Verification in relation to the purposes, scope and nature of agreements

Existing proposals.

Secondly, for agenda item 3:

The impossibility of separating the problems of preventing nuclear war and preventing any war

Measures to exclude the use of nuclear weapons, inter alia:

Paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (code of peaceful conduct that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons)

International convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances (text annexed to General Assembly resolution 43/76 E of 7 December 1988)

Prohibition in a legally binding form of the use of nuclear weapons

Measures for confidence-building and crisis prevention:

Measures to enhance confidence and increase openness with regard to military activities, including a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents on the high seas

Measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to avoid and manage crisis situations, including the establishment of multilateral nuclear alert and crisis control centres

Measures to facilitate the international verification of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements

Criteria and parameters for defensive military postures; military strategies and doctrines; prevention of surprise attacks

New trends in weapons technology and their impact on security and disarmament efforts.

(The President)

I shall now offer the floor to any member wishing to make a statement at present. I have on my list of speakers the distinguished Ambassador of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): I wish to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 concerning item 2 on our agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". As the statement was originally drafted in English, I shall read it in English.

(continued in English)

The significance which the Group of 21 attaches to agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", is well known, and its views are already reflected in documents CD/64, CD/116, CD/180, CD/526 and CD/819. In keeping with its consistent position, the Group of 21 presented the draft mandate contained in CD/819/Rev.1 on 27 July 1989. It is a mandate that reflects the two crucial aspects of this issue - the urgency that the issue demands and the need to deal with it in the multilateral negotiating framework of the Conference on Disarmament. The Group of 21 regrets that despite the preliminary work carried out on this subject during previous years, it has still not been found possible to set up an ad hoc committee on this item.

In keeping with the discussions that took place on this item in the previous years, and as reflected in the report of the CD contained in document CD/956, the Group of 21 is convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, leading to the adoption of concrete measures, has been amply demonstrated. In its opinion, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament are long overdue. It welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral negotiations but reiterates that because of their limited scope and the number of parties involved, these can never replace or nullify the genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. It believes that all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The existence of nuclear weapons and their quantitative and qualitative development directly and fundamentally jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. It is an accepted fact that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of civilization. It is essential, therefore, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avoid the danger of nuclear war. At the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Belgrade in September 1989, it was noted that "while the overall international climate is positive, there is still much to be done to halt the arms race". The Belgrade summit also emphasized the extreme urgency of adopting measures for nuclear disarmament through a time-bound programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

It is clear that global security cannot be based on doctrines of nuclear deterrence. On the contrary, the advent of nuclear weapons obliges us to undertake a re-examination of the basic relationship between armaments and security. The belief that security can be enhanced through possession of

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

nuclear weapons must be challenged because the accumulation of nuclear weaponry constitutes a threat to the very security that it seeks to protect. In the nuclear age, the only valid doctrine is the achievement of collective security through nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty, as the first disarmament agreement which eliminates an entire class of nuclear weaponry, is a further vindication of the view that the reduction of nuclear arsenals leads to an enhancement of global security.

The Group of 21 is convinced that the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the ongoing arms race and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon a willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect participants and innocent bystanders alike. The Group of 21 rejects as politically and morally unjustifiable the view that the security of the whole world should be made to depend on the state of relations existing among nuclear-weapon States.

In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility. In keeping with respect for the security concerns of the non-nuclear nations, and refraining from action leading to intensification of the nuclear arms race, the nuclear-weapon States must accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament.

The realization that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought is a significant step forward, which must be translated into practical steps. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I indicated guidelines for the CD to provide an effective and complementary process in the multilateral framework. The Group of 21 remains firmly committed to the implementation of this paragraph, and believes that the establishment of an ad hoc committee provides the best means to achieve this objective. The Group stresses that its willingness to accept the format of the informal plenary to discuss this agenda item this year in no way prejudices its principled stand reflected in CD/64, CD/116, CD/180, CD/526, CD/819 and CD/819/Rev.1. The Group expects substantial movement on the issue of setting up an ad hoc committee on this agenda item next year, in keeping with the importance of the subject within the global disarmament agenda.

Mr. SHAHBAZ (Pakistan): I have asked for the floor today to make the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21 with regard to agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". The statement reads as follows.

We in the Group of 21 wish to express our regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3. We have shown ourselves ready to exchange views on this subject, here or in the General Assembly. But some delegations have not agreed with this, as their priorities seem to be different.

(Mr. Shahbaz, Pakistan)

I do not need to emphasize the importance that our Group attaches to this item. We believe that the greatest peril facing the world is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war, and that consequently the removal of this threat is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. While nuclear-weapon States possess the primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear war, all nations have a vital interest in the negotiation of measures for prevention of nuclear war, in view of the catastrophic consequences that such a war would have for mankind. As far back as 1961, General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) declared that the use of nuclear weapons, besides being a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, would be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime against mankind and civilization. Keeping this in view the Belgrade Declaration, adopted in September 1989 at the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, emphasized the extreme urgency of achieving nuclear disarmament through the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and "stressed the need for the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting all use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances".

It is a matter of concern for all delegations present here that no progress has been possible on this item since its introduction as a separate item on the CD's agenda in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/183 G. During these years the arms race has accelerated, leading to the expansion of nuclear-weapon stockpiles and the introduction of still more lethal warheads into them.

The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on this subject. During the 1989 General Assembly session there were three resolutions on this subject, which were adopted with overwhelming majorities. Two of these resolutions, 44/119 B on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and 44/119 E on the prevention of nuclear war, were introduced by members of the Group of 21.

In view of the irreversible consequences of a nuclear war, it is clear that conventional wars cannot, under any circumstances, be equated with nuclear war since nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. In this context, invoking the Charter to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right of self-defence against conventional armed attack is completely unjustifiable. We remain convinced that the shortest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. We have welcomed the declaration by then President Reagan and then General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", as also its reconfirmation in the joint statements issued subsequently. Now is the time to translate this will into a binding commitment.

The Group of 21 remains committed to the position expressed in CD/515/Rev.5 dated 27 July 1989, which contains a non-negotiating mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee that will permit thorough

(Mr. Shahbaz, Pakistan)

consideration of all aspects - legal, political, technical, military - of all the proposals before the Conference. We believe that such consideration will not only contribute to better understanding of the subject but also pave the way for negotiations for an agreement on prevention of nuclear war. Such an objective cannot be achieved only through discussions in the plenary or informal meetings. We are disappointed, therefore, that despite the urgency accorded to this subject and the flexibility displayed by the Group of 21, the Conference on Disarmament is not able to discharge its own mandate, which is reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I. However, the Group of 21 is prepared to start consideration of this item in informal plenary meetings in the hope that the importance of the matter will lead to a rethinking on the part of those who have expressed reservations on the mandate proposed by us.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): The delegations of the Western Group on whose behalf I speak have constantly stressed the significance of the nuclear items on our agenda. For many years draft mandates as just alluded to, calling for the establishment of ad hoc committees on these agenda items, have not been able to meet consensus. The Western Group continues to believe that the problems of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war can only be dealt with satisfactorily in the broader context of prevention of war in general. Narrowing the discussion down only to the problems of nuclear weapons would not do justice to the import of the objectives. What is needed is a comprehensive approach embracing arms control and disarmament and defence. It is important, therefore, to ensure that interrelationships between arms control issues and defence requirements, and between the various arms control areas, are fully considered. It is with this objective that the Western countries continue actively and constructively to approach these items. The Western Group considers that the establishment of subsidiary bodies for items 2 and 3 remains inappropriate. Under current circumstances, informal and plenary meetings constitute the most suitable framework for the continuation of work on the important nuclear questions.

Despite their preference for the consideration of these items in formal plenary sessions, the Western Group is ready - despite rumours to the contrary - as they have been in past years, to play a full part in the informal meetings on items 2 and 3. We accept the informal nature of this debate, which we feel enables us to have a useful debate in this area. Against the background that no consensus could be reached to establish lists of items, or to follow any other listing procedures, we take note of what you have said after the decision just adopted by the Conference on the list of topics which, in your opinion, should be discussed during informal meetings on items 2 and 3. As you pointed out, Mr. President, these lists were read out under your sole responsibility and are binding upon no delegation. We would also like to stress that we do not see in your statement any precedent whatsoever for decisions relating to the activities of this Conference.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): In my capacity as subject co-ordinator for item 2 and on behalf of my colleague, Ambassador Kostov, as subject co-ordinator for item 3, I have asked for the floor to express the views of our Group of countries concerning the decision just now agreed upon.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The Group on whose behalf I am speaking feels satisfied with the decision just taken by the Conference. The holding of informal meetings of the plenary on agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, offers all delegations the opportunity to enter into a specific exchange of views on topics of disarmament which have high priority in order to prepare the ground for negotiations.

We believe that the time is most appropriate to act along these lines. The improved international relations have created favourable circumstances for devising new security concepts and establishing the corresponding security structures. The example of the INF Treaty strikingly shows that nuclear disarmament is feasible. A Soviet-American treaty on the halving of their strategic offensive weapons is expected to be concluded before the end of this year. And last but not least, in Europe a start will be made on conventional disarmament soon.

The international community also expects the Conference on Disarmament to make a distinctive contribution in the fields of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war. A first step has been undertaken with today's decision. We hope that in the wake of the forthcoming exchange of views a convergence of positions will be achieved.

Our Group is willing to make a contribution of its own towards this end. In order to enable practical work on these agenda items to get under way, our Group has also decided for the time being not to insist on the establishment of committees on agenda items 2 and 3, which continues to be our preference.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I should like to congratulate you on having guided the consultations of the groups in an able and efficient manner to a successful conclusion. Your unremitting efforts in this endeavour deserve the appreciation and gratitude of my Group.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, the Chinese delegation would like to point out that, under your able guidance progress has at least been made on items 2 and 3 through constructive consultations, enabling the Conference to adopt a decision today to hold separate informal meetings on these items. This is another step forward in the month of March. I would like to express my appreciation for your untiring efforts in this regard, as well as for the constructive co-operation of the Group of 21. I would like to stress that we have listened with great interest and understanding to the important statements made by the Ambassador of Peru and the delegation of Pakistan on behalf of the Group of 21.

Item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", directly concern important questions which have a bearing on international peace and security. They have naturally aroused the widespread concern of the international community. For this reason they are also two of the most important items on the agenda of this Conference. In recent years SSODs, the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and the General Assembly have all adopted

(Mr. Hou, China)

important documents and resolutions on these items, calling on the CD to submit them to serious consideration and negotiation. Consequently, the Conference on Disarmament should carry out in-depth discussions of these items in a more formal and constructive way. However, for reasons known to all, the CD has so far been unable to perform this task. We cannot but express our regret in this regard.

The Chinese delegation has all along attached great importance to these two items, and has actively participated in discussions. We support the principled position of the Group of 21 on the establishment of ad hoc committees on these items. We have already set out our clear-cut principled stand in a comprehensive and systematic way, and have made a constructive proposal, and we have also put forward a working paper.

On 27 February Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, in his important statement to the plenary of the CD, once again reaffirmed the positive stand of the Chinese Government. He emphasized the urgent need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, stressed the priority nature of nuclear disarmament, underlined the special responsibility of the two super-Powers and advocated the right of all countries to take part in the discussion and settlement of these important questions on an equal basis. The Chinese delegation will continue to work with the Group of 21 and other delegations in the above-mentioned spirit, and will make its own contributions to the solution of these important matters.

Mr. President, this will be the final meeting in March under your presidency. In the past month your rich experience and your great diplomatic skill, have left a deep impression on our minds. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my admiration for your active efforts and outstanding contribution and to wish you every success in your future endeavours.

The PRESIDENT: The informal meetings referred to will be devoted alternately to agenda item 2 and agenda item 3. We will hold the first informal meeting on Tuesday 10 April, immediately after the plenary meeting on that date, in order to provide time for delegations to prepare their statements. As a rule, we shall deal with one agenda item per week, either on Tuesdays or Thursdays, on the understanding that, if for any reason we have no time to listen to all speakers listed for a particular day, we shall continue at the end of the following plenary meeting. Members wishing to place their names on the list in advance may do so, but this is not necessary.

I should like now to turn to another subject. I invite you to turn to document CD/WP.383, containing a note by the President on a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. I suggest that we now adopt the relevant decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the decision that we have just taken, I wish to declare for the record that the statement made by the President at the resumed 534th plenary meeting of the Conference also applies to the request that we have just discussed today.

The secretariat has circulated today at my request a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies and, as usual, is merely indicative and can be changed if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As I have no other business for today, I should now like to make my concluding statement.

Since this is the last plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March, I would like as the outgoing President of the Conference to make a few remarks regarding our work. However, before doing so, let me express to all of you my sincere appreciation for the very valuable support which you have so kindly accorded me during my presidency.

You will recall that on the first day of my term of office, my Foreign Minister addressed this august body. He underscored the importance which the Government of Nigeria attaches to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. He then gave an assurance that Nigeria will continue to work actively in this forum and others to initiate and support proposals for the promotion and strengthening of international peace and security. I also on that day pledged to continue to deal with all those matters which were still subject to consultation.

I set as a priority objective the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, at the earliest possible date; and the conduct of intensive consultations on agenda items 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". On agenda item 1, I welcomed the untiring efforts of Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, and promised to make myself available whenever necessary in order to accomplish the objective of promoting agreement on that subject. I equally drew attention to the need to expedite action on the expansion of the membership of the Conference and its improved and effective functioning.

It is against the background of the foregoing that I now intend to make a few remarks regarding my work as President of the Conference during this month. On 8 March, the Conference successfully re-established the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The Ad hoc Committee, as you are aware, is currently carrying out consultations regarding its programme of work. It is my sincere hope that, given the spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding, it will be possible for the Committee to start its work as soon as possible.

(The President)

As earlier indicated, I have conducted consultations on agenda items 2 and 3. I am happy to report to you that following these consultations, agreement has now been reached to hold informal meetings on the substance of agenda items 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", on the basis of the precedent of the 1987 arrangement for agenda item 2. These informal meetings are in my view the reflection of the beginning of adjustments in the Conference on Disarmament to the new international situation.

I would have been pleased to welcome the re-establishment of the all-important Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". I am sure that all members noted the statement made last Tuesday by Ambassador Donowaki of Japan in connection with the determined efforts that he has undertaken to obtain agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. His efforts will continue and I hope will succeed. At least, he has moved to a new stage in his consultations, that of drafting. This has been a welcome development during the month of March.

Informal consultations on other pending subjects are also worthy of attention. For instance, on the expansion of the membership of the Conference and the improved and effective functioning of the CD, I expect that my successor will continue the ongoing consultations with the hope of reaching consensus on those subjects.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the various group and item co-ordinators for their significant contributions towards finding solutions on a number of problems. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, whose assistance, co-operation and friendship made it a lot easier for me to fulfil my duty. My gratitude also goes to all the staff of the secretariat, as well as the interpreters and translators, whose competence and dedication we all appreciate.

Lastly, I would like to extend to my successor, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, my very best wishes for success in the exercise of his mandate. I am sure that under his competent guidance, the Conference will be able to carry on its work in the most efficient possible manner. I would like to assure him of my delegation's constructive support. As Ambassador Kamal will be away in Islamabad from 1 to 7 April 1990, his able deputy, Mr. Shahbaz, will preside during the interim period. I would also like to assure him of the co-operation of my delegation.

That concludes my statement. I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 3 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.548
3 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 3 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Shahbaz

(Pakistan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 548th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to two distinguished visitors who will address this plenary meeting. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Kjell Magne Bondevik, represents a non-member State which, over a number of years, has played an outstanding role in the Conference by contributing in a substantial way in several key areas of our work. His Excellency the Minister is a political personality of wide experience, having been a member of Parliament since 1973 and of its Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs. In addition, he has previously served in the Cabinet.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, His Excellency Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, has been conducting the foreign relations of his country for the last six years. He is a distinguished political figure in Spain, who during an outstanding and intense public career has assumed heavy responsibilities at important stages in the Spanish political process. His presence among us reflects the continuing interest of Spain in all matters relating to peace, international security and disarmament. It is no accident that he is addressing us in this conference room, known as the Francisco de Vitoria room, and surrounded by the works of that eminent Spanish painter, José Sert.

I should also like to welcome cordially, on behalf of the Conference, His Excellency the Director-General for Nuclear Affairs and Disarmament of Argentina, Ambassador Enrique Candiotti, a distinguished career diplomat, who is following the proceedings of this plenary meeting today.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda items 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, and the representatives of Czechoslovakia, India, Iraq and Poland. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Kjell Magne Bondevik.

Mr. BONDEVIK (Norway): Mr. President, may I be the first to congratulate Pakistan on taking up the presidency of the Conference for the month of April? Norway and Pakistan have enjoyed good relations for many years, and we wish you every success in your important endeavour. Let me also, at the outset, say how pleased I am to be here and to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament for the first time. I would like to reaffirm Norway's strong support for the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its important tasks.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

1989 was a revolutionary year in our part of the world. The process of change is continuing this year as well. The challenges before us are well known. We are now facing the task of building stable new political and security architecture in Europe, not based on political, ideological and military confrontation, but on confidence, co-operation and common interests.

The CSCE process has been and continues to be a vital element in the effort to replace the old divisions in Europe by co-operative patterns and structures of State interaction in a Europe no longer divided. The CSCE spans all the major dimensions of the new political architecture, including the political, military, economic and human dimensions. It is based on a set of fundamental principles and commitments which should also serve as a guide to Europe's future. It constitutes an ongoing process which has served us well in good times and bad.

It is in the light of considerations such as these that Norway has strongly supported the idea of a CSCE summit meeting this year. The summit will provide an opportunity to take stock of the political situation in Europe and stake out the future direction of our continent as well as the role of the CSCE in that process. It could also provide political impetus to ongoing arms control processes, particularly the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament.

In the field of arms control, the prospect of drastic reductions in conventional forces in Europe is now better than ever before. An agreement on conventional forces in Europe along the lines now emerging would improve the security of Europe as a whole as well as the security of each individual country. It would largely eliminate the capability for surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations. It would also consolidate the political changes that have already been achieved and set the stage for further progress. Finally, a first CFE treaty would pave the way for negotiations on United States and Soviet ground-based shorter-range nuclear missiles. For all these reasons, Norway attaches great importance to the completion of a first CFE treaty this year.

But in the context of the broad ongoing drive to strengthen stability and security in Europe, we should not neglect the potential of the Vienna CSBM negotiations. Confidence-building is an indispensable complement to disarmament and can make a vital contribution to the consolidation of the new security structure emerging in Europe. The recent CSBM seminar in Vienna on security concepts and military doctrines represents a pioneering contribution to enhanced transparency in the military sphere. Hopefully, the "open skies" negotiations will also lead to an agreement which will add to the security of all participating States.

We must not permit ourselves to be distracted from the task of achieving early agreement on a CFE treaty. Such agreement will be an important step towards a stable and lasting security order for Europe; however, it will not solve all of the continent's security problems. For this reason Norway believes that there must be no break in the conventional arms control process following a first agreement. In a second negotiating phase we envisage

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

further reductions as well as the inclusion of new equipment categories. The general objective should be to make military structures in all participating States defensive in character, through enhanced transparency and predictability and through a reconsideration of military doctrines.

I have spoken at some length about our European experience, particularly in the light of the CSCE process, and I have done so in the belief that this is also relevant to our global disarmament efforts.

This session of the Conference on Disarmament is particularly focused on the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We should now be ready to fulfil our commitment from last year's Paris Conference to intensify negotiations with a view to finalizing a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest date.

The revised and improved mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons permits the Conference to include the final drafting of the convention in the work of this session. It should now be possible to solve the remaining technical and political issues, and make 1990 a decisive year for the convention.

We fully recognize, however, that important, sensitive and complex issues have yet to be solved. The system of verification of non-production is one such issue. The Conference will have to find verification measures for plants producing dual-purpose chemicals which are not part of the regular routine inspection system. The national trial inspections have provided a great deal of valuable experience and information, which has been useful both for the negotiations and for the national authorities and industries involved in this work.

I am pleased to be able to report to this forum that Norway conducted its first national trial inspection in February of this year. The facility inspected was an organic chemical production plant producing a commercial product by application of a schedule 3 chemical. The inspection showed that it was possible to verify that the schedule 3 chemical was used in legitimate production, and that the flow of the schedule 3 chemical could be easily followed as well as accounted for. A report to the Conference about this inspection and our experience with it is under preparation and will be presented to the Conference before the end of the first part of the 1990 session.

The United States and the Soviet Union have declared that they possess chemical weapons. It is of paramount importance to the negotiations that all countries possessing such weapons make similar declarations and draw up plans for their destruction. All chemical-weapon States should furnish information about the location, composition and size of their stocks. This is not only important as a confidence-building measure, but must also be considered a prerequisite for universal adherence to the convention. Likewise all countries not possessing chemical weapons should make declarations to that effect. Norway has no chemical weapons and we have firmly stated that such weapons will not be stationed on Norwegian territory.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

The progress in the bilateral consultations on chemical weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States is, of course, of great significance to progress in the multilateral negotiations. These two countries have a particular responsibility to contribute to a convention that would be accepted by the entire world community.

Norway continues her research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. The programme is based on field experiments designed for such verification. Another research report will be submitted this summer. In this connection, I would like to express my support for those who advocate that a complete prohibition of use of chemical weapons must be given a proper place in the convention.

Let me now turn to another priority agenda item in the Conference on Disarmament, the question of a nuclear test ban. At last year's session, the Conference did not succeed in reaching agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on this issue. In our view, the draft mandate tabled by Czechoslovakia in 1988 would permit a committee to start substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues. In any case, these issues will have to be dealt with in detail before a test-ban treaty can be concluded. It is our wish that the ongoing efforts to reach agreement on a mandate will be successful.

In our view, the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban should be given the highest priority by the Conference on Disarmament once the chemical weapons convention has been concluded. This effort should go hand in hand with a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and defence structures.

Norway will continue her active participation in the Group of Scientific Experts towards the establishment of a modern global network for the exchange of seismic data. The global seismological network proposed by this Group will be an essential part of a future verification system. Rapid advances in recent years in computer and data communications technology have opened up new possibilities for improving the effectiveness of such a global network. The main phase of the large-scale experiment on the global exchange of seismic data carried out by the Group of Scientific Experts is scheduled for the autumn of this year, and we are looking forward to the results.

Norway is actively participating in this global data exchange experiment by providing data from her seismic array stations. The two regional arrays in Norway provide for excellent detection of small seismic events over a large portion of the northern hemisphere. A global network capable of providing a valuable analysis of weak seismic events is crucially important if we are to create confidence that a test ban is being complied with. This is the background for the Norwegian proposal that the global seismological network should as far as possible incorporate establishment of this type of array.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

The NORSAR organization is prepared to offer technical assistance to seismological institutions that are interested in establishing such arrays. This aspect of international research co-operation represents a serious effort on our part to contribute to the solution of the verification issues relevant to a nuclear test ban. We attach great importance to maintaining NORSAR as a research facility open to scientists from all countries.

The role of regional seismic arrays and their use in nuclear test ban verification was the subject of an international symposium organized in Oslo by NORSAR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February this year. More than 70 experts from 21 countries attended the symposium. The Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Komatina, honoured the symposium with his presence. A report is being prepared and will be presented to the Conference during the second part of this year's session.

Let me now turn to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the most far-reaching international disarmament agreement so far. Norway attaches the greatest importance to this treaty as a means of safeguarding international peace, strengthening the security of States and promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Universal adherence to this treaty would be the best guarantee for the achievement of its primary objectives: prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and pursuance of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The INF Treaty eliminating intermediate nuclear forces on land is a concrete step towards nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT commitment of the two most important nuclear Powers. We look forward to the next step in this direction, a START agreement on substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by each side.

The fourth review conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty later this year takes place at a time when tangible progress has been achieved in the disarmament process in both a bilateral and a regional context. The prospect of further progress is bright indeed. The scene should now be set for a positive outcome of the review conference, which would underline the continued viability and relevance of the Treaty.

Thus far, 141 States have acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. It is my firm conviction that if the two remaining nuclear-weapon States, as well as other States not yet parties, were to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, it would significantly strengthen the non-proliferation régime and ensure the objectives of the Treaty.

In closing, I repeat our hope that Norway, as the endorsed Western candidate for membership, may soon become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, His Excellency Francisco Fernández Ordóñez.

Mr. FERNANDEZ ORDOÑEZ (Spain) (translated from Spanish): I would like first of all to address a word of welcome to His Excellency Mr. Shahbaz, who is chairing our work this morning, and to sincerely wish the delegation of Pakistan, a friendly country, every success at this meeting. I would also like to greet all the distinguished delegates of the other countries on the occasion of this, my first statement in this Conference, and I must also say that I am very happy to be able to speak in this room overlooked by these paintings by José María Sert, which clearly illustrate the fact that peace is a collective task, a collective hope.

In this half-century we are experiencing momentous changes, perhaps more intense in nature than at any other time in recent history. The old relationships based on rivalry are being replaced by others based on co-operation. There is a new approach in East-West relations which will necessarily have an effect on North-South relations. The new climate will also have a positive effect in the field of disarmament. At this point we are in an ideal position to make a change, to exchange the traditional concept of security viewed as confrontation for another idea of security based on co-operation. In our view, this new strategy will have to be built around four interrelated aims. I am going to refer to these four aims, which we consider to be fundamental. First, the steady building-up of a climate of trust. We have often said that while mistrust persists, one country's security patterns will always be based on lack of security for others. The second point is the need to reformulate military doctrines and strategies so that the aim is not to make war but to prevent war. This will mean the elimination of strike capacity and military superiority where it exists. The third point is the establishment in various cases of a balance of forces at lower levels. These new levels must be set so as to correspond to the level of trust, the new trust, and the defensive character of military strategies, and must be accompanied by verification machinery, because without verification there is no security. And the fourth point is the need to channel the benefits of disarmament towards the development and welfare of peoples. Only in a system of co-operative security, security in co-operation, will we be able to make the triangular relationship between disarmament, development and security a reality. To sum up, I think that we are now living through a profound contradiction between political reality and military reality, and that the process of disarmament should cause military reality to march in step with political reality. This means that many objectives that were most ambitious until recently are now minimum objectives, and what we thought were final objectives are now intermediate stages. Lastly, we should not forget that the dimensions of the problem are universal, and that explains the importance of this Conference. The process of disarmament in issues of the scale of chemical weapons or non-proliferation of missiles require global solutions, world-wide solutions, and this also applies to confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament.

I would now like to say a few words about the process of conventional disarmament in Europe, which nowadays is centred on the negotiations taking place in Vienna. For Spain it is vital that these negotiations should move ahead at least at the same speed as the political changes that are occurring in the continent. We consider that it is necessary to make an enormous effort and work towards the signature of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe before the end of 1990, and that in some areas it is necessary to

(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

achieve a share of political compromise. I am referring, for example, to the case of fighter aircraft, where it will be necessary to display the necessary flexibility to seek a solution acceptable to everyone. With regard to these talks I should like to add that no disarmament agreement can be viable unless it is founded and built on a broad basis of trust. Hence we attach the greatest importance to the other talks, the talks which are taking place in Vienna between the 35 countries on confidence-building measures and which offer a guarantee of steady progress in this area. Finally I would like to add that the first conventional disarmament treaty we expect to sign this year is not the final goal but a point of departure, an initial step, and that these negotiations, the new negotiations on conventional disarmament, should go beyond the idea of the two alliances and highlight limitations for each country and each region, beyond the search for balance between alliances, and will require a new mandate that must be negotiated so as to complete it before the CSCE meeting in 1992. Spain considers that these new negotiations should also focus on greater arms reductions, structural changes in armed forces so that their configuration and doctrines are defensive, and limitations of a logistic nature which will reduce the possibility of large-scale offensives and surprise attacks.

Once the treaty on conventional disarmament starts to be applied, negotiations will begin on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It is difficult to imagine that in the not too distant future Europe might still contain short-range nuclear missiles, still less nuclear artillery. It is obvious, therefore, that we are moving, as I have said, towards a new pattern of security based on co-operation where political factors - that is human dignity, individual and collective rights, social justice, the right of nations to choose their own political and economic system, and so on - will contribute to the establishment of a new security equation. What I wish to say is that in this context it seems to us that the CSCE has been a fundamental instrument and will be or should be the most appropriate forum for dialogue directed towards creating a new security structure - a pan-European security system that should be created on the basis of the CSCE structure.

While speaking of this new security structure, I would like to mention a topic of particular concern to the delegation of Spain - I am referring to the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean basin today contains one of the most substantial concentrations of arms in the world. In addition there are political problems, serious demographic problems, problems of respect for human freedoms, ecological problems, problems of differences in incomes, and there is a need to look at the possibility of establishing a framework for co-operation in the Mediterranean that would cover all the aspects of confidence, transparency, security, economic and technical co-operation and political and social freedoms. Just as we talk about the Helsinki Final Act, and it came about in a similar situation, I think that we could imagine something similar to the CSCE procedure in the Mediterranean and one day we will have a Mediterranean final act to speak about - with satisfaction, I hope.

I would like to speak of the universal dimension of arms control after having made these specific comments. First of all, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Our country acceded to the Treaty because we believe that it has a very important dimension, and we would like to reiterate our position in favour not only of maintaining the non-proliferation régime

(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

but also of its being strengthened. However, there is also a need for the nuclear States to live up to their commitments relating to the transfer of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which, moreover, are transfers subject to the safeguards régime of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In 1991 a conference for the amendment of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty will be held on the initiative of a group of countries which seek to convert this partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We endorse the possibility of a total ban, but we think that the best ally of the disarmament process is a gradual and realistic approach. Consequently, in order to bring about the total banning of nuclear tests, we must start by making the necessary joint efforts to reduce nuclear weapons on our planet gradually until we have eliminated them. We hope that during 1990 it will finally be possible to ratify the two treaties of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses.

There is a non-proliferation issue which gives cause for concern: the proliferation of ballistic missiles with not only a conventional or chemical capability but also a nuclear capability. Spain is a party to the missile technology control régime and we hope that all countries with a technological capability in this area - not only European countries, but those belonging to any continent - will also join. I think that today, in the light of certain news items we have been reading about in the newspapers in the last few days and of which we have direct knowledge, we have reasons to be very concerned about the possible use of this kind of missile in regional conflicts, so that it is worthwhile to reiterate with the greatest vigour the appeal for the universal adoption of measures in this area of missile proliferation.

On strategic nuclear disarmament we hope that the signing this year of the START agreement, the delinking of the negotiations on defence and space between the United States and the Soviet Union and the START negotiations, will permit very considerable progress. It is our view that in this universal dimension of disarmament of which we are speaking, in the same way that European conventional disarmament has its foundations in the confidence-building measures adopted in Stockholm, the universal disarmament process requires regional or universal confidence-building measures. And if we accept the idea that there should be regional or universal confidence-building measures, we must stress the importance of the voluntary exchange of information on military budgets which takes place annually in the framework of the United Nations, and we think and propose that it would also be useful to exchange information on armed forces structures on a world-wide and voluntary basis, so that their purely defensive character can be evaluated. The universal forum of the United Nations is a suitable one for the negotiation and implementation of these universal confidence-building measures. That is the vocation of this international organization, and we endorse its work.

I have left until the end of my address any mention of the serious problem of chemical weapons. I have pointed out in various international forums, and I wish to reaffirm here, that Spain gives absolute priority to the search for a solution that will make possible the world-wide eradication of these particularly hateful weapons. Spain does not produce such weapons,

(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

Spain does not possess such weapons, and we consider it a matter of the greatest urgency to conclude the multilateral convention to ban their production, development, use or storage. Spain is aware of the difficulties involved in verification, but this difficulty should not serve as an excuse to delay a universal agreement. On the contrary, it should be an incentive so that all States make the necessary efforts. This urgency is underscored by the recent use of this kind of weapon in certain conflicts, and I would like to add in talking about verification that the intrusive nature of the verification machinery that will have to be incorporated into the convention should in no way be perceived by the chemical industries or by certain countries as institutionalizing interference in matters of industrial secrecy or interference in the development of chemical industry for peaceful or beneficial purposes. It is simply a question of accepting certain measures that provide the international community as a whole with an assurance that the horrors of chemical warfare have been eradicated. In this context, my Government welcomes the progress made in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, although this agreement is not sufficient because of course it is limited exclusively to the bilateral level. Spain believes it is necessary to continue to pursue the policy of non-proliferation of chemical precursors. We favour this complementary policy of non-proliferation, which is another way of achieving the ultimate goal of eliminating this threat. Spain considers that the multilateral convention on chemical weapons is not only a desirable goal but an imperative, and consequently it welcomes the national initiatives presented in this body in the form of declarations of non-possession or non-production, reports on national trial inspections or reports on the future composition and structure of national authorities. In this context I wish to announce the intention of the Spanish Government to make similar contributions in this forum, so as to add our efforts to those already being made in this Conference.

Finally I would like to say that in the present international situation this Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has acquired fundamental importance and responsibility. We fully support - and this is the purpose of my statement this morning - the efforts of this Conference, we have been participating actively for years as observers and we hope to be able to become full members as soon as possible so that we can contribute to its work in a more effective way. In the last few years the process of expansion of the number of full members has been blocked. This has prevented the entry of countries which, like Spain, have on many occasions shown, as they continue to show day by day, their interest in contributing effectively to this process. We consider that in a world like this, which is increasingly interdependent, it would perhaps seem anachronistic to restrict efforts to deal with a problem of such enormous dimensions as that of multilateral disarmament to a limited number of countries. It might be necessary perhaps to rethink the structure and working methods of the Conference, and we could benefit from experience with the chemical weapons convention. I think the international climate would favour progress in this direction. I am convinced that such a step would give a vital boost to the disarmament negotiations and help to ensure universal endorsement of what is adopted in this Conference because, sooner or later, the restricted Conference on Disarmament will have to face the problem caused by having a limited number of members, as happens now.

(Mr. Fernández Ordóñez, Spain)

At the beginning of my statement I pointed out that the process of disarmament must make it possible to bring military reality into step with political reality, so that they both move at the same speed. The political reality, the reality that we are living through, has recently been undergoing a radical and very positive transformation. The consequence is that a different international political context is being formed before our eyes, in which disarmament will no longer be a Utopian and endless task, but a reality within our reach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Pagac.

Mr. PAGAC (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation congratulate you on conducting the first April plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time may I ask you to convey our best wishes to Ambassador Ahmad Kamal upon his assumption of the presidency during the third month of the 1990 CD session? You can rest assured of my delegation's full support and co-operation.

Since I am addressing the Conference for the first time, I wish to join all the distinguished representatives who have, prior to me, expressed appreciation for the outstanding manner in which Ambassadors Wagenmakers and Azikiwe guided our work in the course of February and March.

The statements we are privileged to listen to at this Conference very often reflect the sweeping changes in the world, and recently in particular in Europe, and again very specifically in its central and eastern part. This provokes vivid discussions and gives rise to new courageous ideas. We can witness the erosion of old biased dogmas and prejudices. Former security concepts and doctrines stemming from them are swiftly becoming anachronistic and are fading away. The urgent need for a common endeavour is being felt in practically all spheres of international life. Favourable tendencies enable us to formulate new initiatives with better prospects of realization, not in distant visions but rather in the foreseeable future. And - especially significant for a country like Czechoslovakia - there is a role for the so-called small and medium-sized States to play.

Profound political changes in my country, as well as new realities in the "old" continent, have produced a somewhat distinct perception of our security needs. Czechoslovakia has put forward a number of suggestions on establishing new all-European security structures conceived in the broadest possible sense, including their economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects. These new structures of co-operation and European integration should gradually replace the functions of the existing alliances. In this respect we consider that it would be desirable to establish a "European security commission", as formally proposed at the Prague meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Organization held on 17 March 1990. The commission would, in our view, facilitate the historical process towards a united confederative Europe of free nations with equal rights for each one. However, I do not intend to elaborate on the new security concepts of the Czechoslovak foreign

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policy, nor am I going into a detailed explanation of our proposals for future security arrangements. Other international forums and possibly other opportunities in the Conference on Disarmament may be more appropriate.

Turning to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to stress two areas in which my country has traditionally been involved. These priorities for us are the nuclear test ban and the chemical weapons convention. My delegation appreciates all activities which can contribute to the cessation of nuclear weapon testing. We highly esteem the tireless efforts of Ambassador Donowaki to reach consensus on a drafting mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda based upon the Czechoslovak proposal, the "Vejvoda text" (CD/863).

Luckily enough, we are now in a situation where all the technical prerequisites for a comprehensive nuclear test ban have either already been met or can be met in a relatively short span of time. Technology which can be employed for future verification measures has recently improved to such an extent as to become highly reliable. It is therefore encouraging to observe the current results of the Second Technical Test (GSETT-2) organized by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Since it is understood that for full functioning of the eventual future verification system, the participation of as many States as possible is needed, Czechoslovakia hereby expresses its readiness to take part in GSETT-2 in keeping with its technical capabilities.

As for on-site verification, we believe it may be a significant step forward. Nevertheless, that system will always be limited to known test areas; only observers from some States can be present, and perhaps for a limited period of time. On the other hand, GSETT-2 offers the prospect of a system open to every State, a system operating independently 24 hours per day and checking the entire surface of the Earth. Current advances in measuring technology and world-wide data transmission should guarantee its sound operation. In this regard, I would like to say how highly we appreciate the activities of both the Swedish and the Canadian delegations. Czechoslovakia is ready to co-operate with all States in the exchange of technology, data and experience in the course of GSETT-2.

When we resumed our negotiations on the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, we did so under the favourable impact of the Paris and Canberra conferences, and, moreover, in the light of the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Morel the intensity of work was increased, and with the active assistance of technical and legal experts we have achieved important results in elaborating the "rolling" text. We are convinced that under the skilled guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will proceed successfully to the final drafting of the convention.

Czechoslovakia has consistently adhered to the principles and purposes of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which was signed as long ago as 1925. In this context, Czechoslovakia welcomed the

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conclusion last year of the work of the expert group of the United Nations Secretary-General that prepared technical guidelines and procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons.

In reply to the request made in resolution 44/115 B, Czechoslovakia informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it is ready to provide 2 consultants, 15 qualified experts and 5 laboratories for examination and analyses in the event of an investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical or biological weapons. The experts selected are highly qualified in the fields of analytical and organic chemistry, biochemistry, biology, virology and toxicology. They are prepared to take steps to solve the problem of the use of chemical or biological weapons, including assistance. On the instructions of my Government I have asked the secretariat of the Conference to distribute the aforementioned list as a CD document (CD/980), which is now being circulated.

Czechoslovakia believes that the list of experts and laboratories may be of interest to the Conference on Disarmament, since it is ready to involve both these experts and the laboratories in implementing the future convention and in particular in the work of the organs of the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Moreover, presentation of these data by a number of countries may result in more contacts between scientists, which will promote an extensive exchange of views, scientific publications or scientists themselves. Consequently, more effective measures not only against chemical weapons but also against highly toxic substances in general, including protection of the environment, could be discussed.

We believe that it may be a useful contribution to our deliberations here in the Conference to release information on chemicals and facilities relevant to the future chemical weapons convention. Therefore, Czechoslovakia will continue to present data on its chemical industry as it did for the first time in document CD/949.

We also welcome new contributions in the area of challenge inspections. Czechoslovakia, like other States, has carried out a national trial inspection and intends to perform a second in the first half of this year.

Somebody said very eloquently that history has accelerated its pace. Current political observers could certainly confirm this hyperbole. But when it comes to security arrangements in this powerful, all-encompassing process, full of unpredictability, one can wonder about its effect on the disarmament talks. Have they adapted themselves to these sweeping changes? Are they responding to new challenges provoked by rapid developments in the contemporary world? In the Vienna talks, maybe. Within the framework of the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations, let us hope. But what assessment should we give to the Conference on Disarmament? There is a widespread and strong feeling that more should be done. Nowadays, the representatives of a number of countries are rightly pointing out this problem. They are questioning the effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This subject may not be resolved at this session. But the important thing is that the discussion has begun.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Sharma.

Mr. SHARMA (India): Mr. President, it gives us great pleasure to see Pakistan, our immediate neighbour, preside over the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. I would like to convey my delegation's felicitations on your Presidency and to assure you of our co-operation in the fulfilment of your tasks. I would also like to take this opportunity to compliment your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria and Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for the extremely competent manner in which they guided us through the first part of our spring session.

I would like to wish every success to our colleagues who have left us since the last time I addressed the Conference and to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the United States and Venezuela. We look forward to working in close co-operation with them in the future.

We have entered the 1990s with a sense of both concern and expectation born of the many hopeful political developments that have taken place in recent years. I think we are all aware that we have reached a turning-point of major consequence. Apart from the significant relaxation in the political climate in recent years, we also have to squarely address the question of the longer-term expectations of mankind on the threshold of the twenty-first century, which we ourselves have to shape into reality. While the world is not a homogeneous whole, the recognition has to take hold more than it has that all its parts are fatefully bound together. It is our hope that the Conference on Disarmament will increasingly reflect this healthy multilateralism in its endeavours.

Today, there is a perceptible movement away from the precipice of disaster for humankind and a constructive dialogue has been started. For this, we must pay tribute to the sagacity of the American and Soviet leaderships, who have seen the folly of nuclear escalation and have started tracing the outlines of a pattern of disarmament. In our view, the INF Treaty is notable not so much for the few thousand missiles that are to be dismantled as a result of its provisions, but for the historical beginning it made, away from the old approach of seeking to manage an escalating arms race and, we hope, towards halting and reversing it. The INF Treaty was a historical departure in erasing a complete class of weapon systems for the first time. It demonstrated the principle, even if in limited form, that the road to enhanced security lies through nuclear disarmament and not through accumulation of nuclear weaponry. We look forward to the signing of the START agreement between the United States and the USSR later this year in the hope that it will pave the way for all States to join in the process of nuclear disarmament and thus enable the world to move in the not too distant future towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The process and logic of nuclear disarmament in one field should be extended energetically to other fields. For instance, the logic of the INF Treaty and the forthcoming START agreement dictates that the thousands of tactical weapons that still exist - and for that matter all nuclear weapons - must also follow the route of abolition. The positive momentum generated by international events today

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should not be allowed to dissipate, and the historic opportunity of ridding our planet of the apocalyptic menace of nuclear weapons should be seized purposefully.

The validity of nuclear weapons cannot be justified on the basis of doctrines of nuclear deterrence and the claim that nuclear weapons have maintained peace in the post-war years. Nuclear weapons cannot be given credence on the grounds that they stabilize the era of friction, which we wish to put behind us. Rather, the nuclear arms race has exacerbated the friction to a level of lethality which embraces the whole of mankind. It would indeed be an irrational world in which doomsday weapons could be seen or legitimized as a prescription. The rivalry which the nuclear arms race represented had a negative effect on all parts of the globe. Let us not see as any form of remedy a class of weapons which it is now proven would bring complete annihilation and a global radioactive winter in their wake. The world is beginning to see the imperatives of enlightened globalism in the challenge of poverty and development, degradation of the environment, economic and technological interdependence, the need to husband resources for common goals and the inter-connectedness of all the enormous tasks the world faces. It is our hope that this globality of concern will also inform the dialogue for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which should be the priority area in this multilateral negotiating forum. As we know from the prescient warning against the juggernaut of the industrial-military complex delivered four decades ago, a vast constituency composed of industry, the military, scientists, engineers and bureaucrats constitutes a critical and catalytic group of vested interests for the doctrinal underpinning and maintenance of the nuclear arms race. It produces the theorists, developers and deployers of ever more complex and destructive systems and devices. We have to believe that with sustained and enlightened political will and dialogue this ethos can be transformed. The United Nations Charter does give all Member States the right to individual and collective self-defence, but those who drafted these essential safeguards could not have imagined that they could be made to imply the right to threaten the survival of the world, which the Charter was supposed to lead into an enlightened new age.

We firmly believe that the time has come for the international community to engage in collective introspection on our present predicament. Serious consideration needs to be given to the attitudes, policies, doctrines, institutions and instruments required for a nuclear-weapon-free world, which it is in our hands to realize. In particular, the misplaced faith in the relevance of nuclear weapons for keeping peace and enhancing security needs to be speedily discarded. An air of cautious optimism and hope is all that we can allow ourselves at this stage. The recent signs of a turning-point that we have perceived are vulnerable. These cannot be nurtured in a world order based on any form of domination or divisiveness, whether political, economic or military. At SSOD-III, India proposed the outline of a nuclear-weapon-free and peaceful world order in the form of an action plan, which called upon the international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. While nuclear disarmament constitutes the central motif in each stage of the plan, it is supported by collateral and other measures to further the process in a comprehensive manner that would enhance global security. It includes proposals for banning chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction,

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bringing to a halt and reversing the arms race, using scientific and technological developments for the benefit of mankind and reducing conventional arms and armed forces to the minimum levels required for defence purposes, and sets out principles for the conduct of international relations in a world free of nuclear weapons. The action plan has been tabled in the Conference on Disarmament as CD/859 of 15 August 1988. We believe that the action plan will always be relevant in a world which seeks an alternative structure of inter-State relations.

This is the vision and backdrop against which we look at the activities of the CD, the sole forum of the United Nations for negotiation of disarmament agreements. My delegation attaches the highest priority to the first three nuclear issues on our agenda. Our record on these items has been disappointing. We still find ourselves unable to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. For many years, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions with overwhelming support regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and reaffirming the responsibility of this Conference in the negotiation of such an agreement. Partial or gradual approaches evade the issue and cannot provide the answer to this universal concern. In the Mexico Declaration, circulated as CD/723 four years ago, the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative offered to monitor a test ban in co-operation with the United States and the USSR. The twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has just ended. Very soon, phase 3 of GSETT-2, to develop a global system for seismic data exchange, will get under way. It is time an ad hoc committee on this item was established to provide the necessary political framework within which to consider the important results of GSETT-2. Ambassador Yamada of Japan and his successor Ambassador Donowaki have undertaken intensive consultations with all delegations to try and resolve the issue of the mandate for this committee. We are appreciative of their efforts. It is encouraging to note that there is a narrowing of differences. The flexibility shown by a majority of the members of the CD has to be matched by others if an ad hoc committee is to be established during this year. The situation is much the same on items 2 and 3 - "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" - where, once again, we have had to resort to discussing these topics, which should be of central concern to the CD, in the form of informal plenary meetings. While we welcome progress achieved in bilateral negotiations, nuclear-weapon States should, in keeping with respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear nations, accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. Whatever the differences in the theoretical models used, there is a clear consensus among all experts that even a limited nuclear exchange would produce catastrophe for our biosphere. Conventional wars cannot under any circumstances be equated with nuclear war. It is by now a truism that if nuclear weapons are ever used, it will not matter who used them first. It is, therefore, clear that nuclear weapons cannot be used for any kind of defence. Pending the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament, the only way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear holocaust is to conclude a convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, delegitimizing nuclear weapons as the currency of power.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

The malaise of inaction arising out of unshakable positions has also prevented useful work on agenda item 5 - "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Despite the fact that the Ad hoc Committee has once again been set up with a non-negotiating mandate, procedural issues like the programme of work have stalled our work in this very important field, where qualitative research on weapons systems has been undertaken with intensity. Over the past few years, we have debated this issue endlessly. Instead of getting into such a debate again, the Conference on Disarmament should work on specific proposals to prevent outer space from becoming the new frontier of the all too familiar terrestrial arms race. More than a dozen concrete proposals have been put forward by delegations. Priority should be accorded to halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, dismantling existing systems, prohibiting the introduction of new weapon systems in outer space and ensuring that the existing 1972 ABM Treaty is fully honoured and extended as required by new technological advances. The issues of verification are complex enough today. If anti-satellite weapons and other space weapons are deployed, this problem would threaten to become intractable.

The stagnation in the process of negotiations on the agenda items mentioned above is not due to inherent faults in the Conference on Disarmament, which is an institution of our times and subject to the policies of the Governments that make up the CD. If the CD has not lived up to the hopes that accompanied its birth, it is largely a reflection of our individual and collective failings. On the positive side of our efforts, we have the negotiations towards a chemical weapons convention. We are happy to note that the efforts of Ambassador Morel of France, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last year, are being matched this year by his able successor, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, as we move forward towards a convention. We welcome the bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR on the destruction of their CW stocks and CW production facilities, which has undoubtedly given impetus to our work in the CD.

Our common aim is the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are eliminated and that further development, production, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited. If we want a convention that will attract universal adherence, it should be non-discriminatory and should provide for equal rights and obligations for all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons and whether or not they have a large chemical industry. The convention should ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and should not hinder or impede international co-operation in peaceful areas of chemical industry development. If the proposed convention is to build on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it should be able to abrogate the "right" to retaliatory or second use of chemical weapons as long as these weapons exist after the entry into force of the convention, i.e., during the 10-year destruction period. Otherwise, we would be left, during this period, with a fragile and inefficient system which would undermine the possibility of attracting universal adherence to the convention. The provisions of article X, on assistance, should be adequate to deter any possible aggressor against a State party to the convention. Adherence to an international agreement cannot be forced. But it can be urged by demonstrating the advantages of the system of collective security offered by disarmament.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Similarly, article XI on economic and technological development should ensure that no arbitrary restrictions or export controls are imposed against another State party once the treaty is in place with its attendant verification system. The significance of the CW convention lies as much in the world community successfully abolishing an abhorrent class of weapons as in the successful example it would create of the universal approach which should characterize other deliberations of the Conference. We still believe, as we suggested earlier, that the Conference on Disarmament should take advantage of the political momentum by setting itself a deadline to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

The fourth NPT review conference is scheduled to be held later this year. Though India has not subscribed to the NPT on account of its discriminatory character and is not a State party to it, it is useful to recall that India, along with seven other countries, sponsored one of the first resolutions on this subject in the General Assembly in 1965. The resolution, which identified a set of principles to guide the negotiations on an eventual treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, was adopted unopposed. One of the principles was that the treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit proliferation by nuclear or non-nuclear Powers, and that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Unfortunately, the 1968 NPT failed to reflect either of these principles, and the apprehensions of vertical and spatial proliferation have been amply borne out. Even with the reductions under negotiation in the START talks, there will exist almost double the number of nuclear warheads that existed in 1968. It is relevant to recall that the NPT was not to be an end in itself but was meant to lead to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. It is in this spirit that India's action plan called for negotiations for a new treaty that would "give legal effect to the binding commitment of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2010, and of all the non-nuclear-weapon States not to cross the nuclear weapons threshold". We hope that the States parties to the NPT will take advantage of the 1990 session to look at the genesis of this Treaty and take decisive steps towards a more broad-based régime as part of a comprehensive system of peace and security.

Finally, I would like to quote the United Nations Secretary-General's end-of-year message of 27 December 1989, which sums up the options before us:

"Despite the present uncertainties and recent violence, 1989 has been a historic and epoch-making year: this is by now universally recognized. ... There is little doubt that these developments have unfrozen the old fears and animosities which dominated the world for decades. They hold tangible promise of ending the incessant arms race. ... They have thus phenomenally advanced the interests of global peace. ... the new possibilities for international co-operation will remain but shadowy or sectional if they are not brought to bear on the old stubborn problems, unrelated to the cold war. ... The agenda for international action is not, therefore, lightened in the slightest degree. If anything, it now invites the undeflected attention which it has not received so far."

It is our hope that the CD will reflect this prescription in exercising its mandate.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq, Ambassador Al-Ketal.

Mr. AL-KETAL (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to say how pleased we are to see you, who represent Pakistan, a Muslim and friendly country, presiding over the Conference on Disarmament, because everyone is familiar with your skills.

It is a particular pleasure for us to have yet another opportunity to address this body. The presence of Iraq in the Conference on Disarmament and its participation in the Conference's work in this and the previous year clearly demonstrate the interest that the Government of Iraq has in disarmament negotiations, as well as its support for all international efforts to devise effective methods to control nuclear armament, reducing it to the minimum level needed to protect the integrity and security of States, and totally eliminating all weapons of mass destruction in order to free our world from the threat of annihilation due to the accumulation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The Government of the Republic of Iraq is simultaneously endeavouring to ensure the advent of a world in which relations based on the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law and the settlement of bilateral and regional conflicts through direct negotiations among the parties concerned will prevail. My Government has expressed its belief in these principles by giving a positive response to international peace efforts and by respecting all Security Council resolutions adopted since September 1980 in which the Security Council has called for a cease-fire between Iraq and Iran and a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Iraq was the first to accept resolution 598 and informed the Secretary-General of its acceptance only two days after the adoption of the resolution.

For disarmament negotiations to result in effective measures that can win wide support, those measures must be conducive to the national security interests of States. In that regard, Iraq has always endeavoured to achieve a just, comprehensive and durable peace with Iran, and to eliminate the reasons which have compelled the States of this region to enter into an escalating arms race, so that they can redirect their efforts towards national reconstruction.

To ensure the security of States in an adequate fashion, it is not enough to take regional measures. Weapons have developed and can now reach their targets irrespective of national and regional boundaries. Likewise, the use of nuclear weapons would have a devastating effect on other States, even those not directly involved in the conflict. Therefore it would be unwise to focus efforts on security in just one region of the world separately from the security of other regions of the world. The security concerns of the developing countries are justified in so far as they do not benefit from the same degree of attention as those of the developed countries. In order for peace to be established in the world on a clear basis, disarmament measures must be encouraged. A peace based on mutual terror rather than equality and justice cannot endure.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

The presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle Eastern region poses a serious threat to peace and security and is a source of deep concern to the countries of the region. Iraq, together with all other Arab States, has called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region and the prohibition of the proliferation of such weapons in the countries of that region, regardless of whether those weapons belong to those countries and are under their control, or are under the control of a third State outside the region. However, Israel's persistent opposition and refusal to give up its nuclear weapons in a legally binding manner, as well as its refusal to subject its nuclear facilities to international control, as has been done by Iraq and other States of the region which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, constitutes an obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The continuation of the present situation is not conducive to the adoption of effective disarmament measures. On the contrary, it will lead to a further escalation of the arms race in the region.

Since the Paris Conference on chemical weapons, our Conference has continued its discussions on the total prohibition of these weapons and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. During this period, several conferences and symposia have been held on this subject in various regions of the world, including the Canberra Conference held in September 1989. No observer at these conferences would have any difficulty in acknowledging the following facts which have characterized international efforts in this field. Firstly, the Paris Conference greatly furthered international efforts, and the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament in particular, to draft an international treaty totally prohibiting the production and utilization of chemical weapons. However, the slow progress of negotiations and the persistence of obstacles and numerous problems that are as yet unresolved have diminished the momentum engendered by the Paris Conference. Secondly, the Conference on Disarmament achieved limited progress in negotiations last year, given the fact that many issues and problems were raised in regard to various aspects of the draft international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Moreover, some countries participating in the negotiations attached more importance to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons than to the elimination of the weapons which they already possess. Some countries have opted for a policy of placing greater constraints on the transfer of various products and technologies to prevent their use in the production of chemical weapons. Such measures not only violate the incontrovertible right of countries to acquire the technology and materials needed for development; they also constitute a violation of the Paris Declaration on chemical weapons, a declaration which was drafted by those countries themselves. Thirdly, since the signing of the INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR, the nuclear-weapon States have adopted no practical measure for the control of nuclear weapons, or for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests - despite the appreciable improvements that have occurred in East/West relations and the fundamental changes that have taken place in recent months in Europe.

Our presence in this Conference stems from our desire to participate seriously in all international efforts in the field of disarmament in accordance with the concepts and principles that I outlined at the beginning of my statement. However, we will not agree to become a party to any effort aimed at making negotiations on chemical weapons a pretext to prevent

(Mr. Al-Ketani, Iraq)

developing countries from having access to chemical technology and products or to impede a transfer of technology in this area. Hence, we call upon the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a clearly defined position on the transfer of technology, products and information, and to refuse to allow its efforts to be exploited for the purpose of impeding development in the developing countries.

With regard to the convention on chemical weapons, I have some comments to make. The convention must be drafted in such a way as to make it universally acceptable. The crucial issues in this connection include the legitimate, actual needs of the developing countries, and primarily security guarantees against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. The convention will be widely supported if it contains a binding commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to take nuclear disarmament measures as a corollary to chemical disarmament measures. They should also enter into a commitment not to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, along the lines of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and toxic gases. In this connection, we would like to express our satisfaction of the fact that our efforts have taken a step forward through the agreement to hold a Conference to review the partial test-ban Treaty in order to examine proposed amendments which we hope will convert this treaty eventually into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Our support for these measures does not signify premature optimism at the possibility of such a result, because that will depend on the attitudes adopted by the nuclear-weapon States during the review conference. The attitudes that these States have hitherto manifested do not make us particularly optimistic in this regard. In these negotiations, it would be particularly inadmissible for nuclear armament to remain isolated from the focal point of interest, thereby leaving this question in suspense and unresolved.

(continued in English)

I have now come to the end of my written statement. With your permission, however, Mr. President, I would like to add a few words with regard to a matter that is very much related to the work of the CD.

I am referring to the latest campaign of falsification - smears - against my country carried out in part in the United States and in part in the United Kingdom, echoed by other circles. First, I would like to say that all these accusations have been denied as unfounded and baseless by the Iraqi Government. Second, I will not try to go into the details of these allegations: all missions will receive a circular from the Mission of Iraq containing all pertinent details of the incident. You will find that the first act in this play was staged on American television, which by showing some aerial photographs, claimed without any proof that these were Iraqi installations. The network went on to say that this installation was used for uranium, the other one for so-and-so, without producing any proof. If one had questions about the timing of the programme, unhappily the answer came quickly from Heathrow. That was the second act in the play. What is the third act? We believe that these are actions designed to prepare the way for a new aggression against my country, against our scientific industrial installations, similar to that carried out by Israel in 1981. In this

(Mr. Al-Ketel, Iraq)

connection, I would like to state the following points of principle. First, Iraq is a sovereign State and has the right and duty to acquire the means needed to defend itself and to guarantee its security in accordance with international law. Second, Iraq as a sovereign State has the inalienable right to acquire any technology it deems necessary for its industrial, scientific and social development. Peaceful nuclear energy is no exception. Third, the aim of this campaign against Iraq is to lay the ground for a new aggression against Iraqi industrial and scientific installations, and to frustrate the legitimate ambitions of the Iraqi people for social progress. Fourth, the present campaign of distortions against Iraq, a party to the NPT, will if continued call into question the usefulness of the NPT as an international treaty. It will also have consequences for the coming review conference of the Treaty. Fifth, the NPT contains means and procedures of verification. It entrusts IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the task of verification and inspection. Attempts by a State to take the law into its own hands and to assume the role of policing others' commitments under the Treaty will seriously undermine the role of IAEA and greatly damage its safeguards system. Sixth, disarmament is a matter for negotiation among States with the aim of achieving reduced levels of armaments with undiminished security. Deviations from this norm, which is universally accepted, and attempts to replace it by unilateral actions will deal a blow to disarmament negotiations. Negotiations, by their very definition, are among equals, equals that enjoy the same rights. Campaigns of distortion - smear - cannot in anyone's mind be considered as confidence-building measures.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Iraq for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate your delegation on taking up the presidency of the Conference for this month. I can assure you of my delegation's full support and co-operation in your efforts. I wish to thank your predecessors in the Chair, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria and Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for their able guidance in our deliberations. Let me also take this opportunity to welcome all new colleagues who have recently joined us and assure them that my delegation will actively co-operate with them. I would like to ask them to convey to their predecessors our best wishes in their new appointments and in their personal lives.

I listened with great interest to the very important and thought-provoking statements made by their Excellencies the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Norway and Spain.

I would like to limit my intervention today to the issue of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. I was prompted to do so by the inspiring statements of many speakers who have preceded me during this spring session. Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil opened the series at the very beginning of our work. I share his opinion that "the time has come for us to proceed to a thorough re-examination not only of some of our goals, but of our ways and means of approaching them".

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

This is particularly true when we look at the inefficiency and lack of progress on many items of our agenda in the light of the positive transformation in international relations. There is a clear movement towards the peaceful solution of conflicts in many regions of the world. In this very context international institutions, and especially the United Nations, are regaining their place in international relations. Negotiations in many fields are producing significant results. Deep and essential political changes are taking place in central and eastern Europe. As our Minister for Foreign Affairs stated at the "open skies" conference in Ottawa, "the Europe of two ideologies and the confrontation based on them is becoming a thing of the past, though the two multilateral alliances still exist". At the same time these two military groupings are undergoing profound internal changes. More and more, past myths and illusions are dissolving. The black-and-white image of the enemy is giving way to a many-coloured image of the partner. These political processes have a direct impact on the vigorous dynamic of the USSR-United States bilateral talks and the European disarmament negotiations, which promise an early and rich harvest. The need for effective verification and various confidence-building measures has deeply rooted itself as an essential element of disarmament agreements.

Against this background the slow progress, and to a considerable extent the stagnation, of our negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, the inability of our Conference to come to concrete results, are less and less well understood by many Governments and by public opinion. And it is quite understandable that more and more frequently we ask: What has been the role of the Conference on Disarmament in these processes? What role can it and should it play in the future? Is it not necessary to adjust it properly to a new situation? What can be done to increase the effectiveness of the work of this forum? As was observed in the statement made in this forum by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, "the 1990s will be a decade of opportunities and challenges and of hopes and dangers, all existing side by side".

We feel that proper answers to these highly pertinent questions will help us find the most efficient way to avoid the dangers and get the best out of existing and emerging opportunities, because opportunity seldom knocks twice. This does not mean that the goals and tasks of the Conference on Disarmament are easy and simple. But at the same time I suppose everyone will agree that they are much easier today than, let's say, 10 years ago. If we fail to find such answers, the prestige of the Conference could be further damaged and the Conference itself will be more and more marginalized.

Despite the limited results of the Conference's work in the last 10 years, my Government strongly believes that this forum continues to be an important and, in fact, indispensable organ of the world community. A simple test can prove it: let us imagine for a moment that there was no Conference on Disarmament. Undoubtedly, the necessity to have such a body would immediately emerge as a question of priority in international deliberations on security issues. The Conference is a vital forum, especially for small and medium-sized States, of which Poland is one, and we believe that questions in the field of disarmament should not all be left for the decision of great Powers, although we fully recognize their major and global responsibility.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The membership of the Conference, comprising all the nuclear Powers and the representatives of all regions, emphasizes the universal responsibility for disarmament. It is an essential forum in the search for any global solutions. The present trend towards the democratization of international relations, as well as new needs which seem to be emerging in disarmament efforts, will further increase the role and value of this forum and its potential contribution to international security and stability. Some of these requirements seem to be the following: substantial progress in negotiations between the USSR and the United States, and between Warsaw Treaty and NATO States, will be important, but will form just a portion of disarmament endeavours; and changes in the international system, and especially the clear trend towards a less bipolar world, will give a bigger political role to other Powers and regions and will require their greater involvement in disarmament efforts. If these assumptions are correct, then they form an additional justification for our discussion on how to make the work of the Conference more effective and better adapted to existing and future realities.

Let me present some considerations on the part of my delegation related to the organization of work and the agenda of the Conference. As far as the methods of work are concerned, our principal aim should be to make them more flexible and more responsive to real needs and opportunities. If there is a chance of progress we should be able to concentrate our efforts on this particular problem and to pursue them as long as necessary and desirable. Opportunities and the willingness to make progress should dictate the pace and the rhythm of our work, not a pattern of negotiations established in other circumstances or the time frames of routine openings and closings of sessions. In this very context the legitimate question arises of how to avoid protracted discussions on the establishment of subsidiary bodies repeated at the same time every year. One wonders whether this question could not be easily and effectively solved by drawing up a general mandate enabling each body to continue its work until its task has been accomplished.

It seems to our delegation that we should be more flexible in determining the goals of our endeavours and ways and means of achieving them which better correspond to challenges and possibilities. My delegation has already presented some ideas related to this dilemma; let me just refer to them very briefly. Undoubtedly, the elaboration of new agreements placing legal obligations upon States is and should remain the principal task of this Conference. This basis approach, in the opinion of my delegation, need not, however, prevent the Conference from undertaking other measures, particularly in circumstances where the stage of negotiations or other considerations make them advisable and the only ones feasible. In fact, different situations may require different approaches and responses. Why should we not envisage, for example, a kind of intermediate arrangement or protocol of understanding or joint recommendations or declarations on confidence-building and security-building measures? These documents, with the character of political obligations rather than fully-fledged legal instruments, could be properly recorded in our annual reports.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

We believe that this more flexible approach to the possible results of the work of the Conference can make it more productive. Different types of intermediate measures can play an independent role in building security and can at the same time gradually evolve into, or be a part of, binding international rules, thus helping the Conference in its treaty-making endeavour, which - let me stress again - should remain its main responsibility. The changing international situation, the movement towards new security perceptions and real changes in the strategic policies of States and alliances - all this seems to make the proposed approach even more feasible and desirable.

Finally, let us remember that according to the rules of procedure the agenda of our work is always established by ourselves for each year's session. We have the opportunity and, in fact, the obligation to review it and adjust it, if necessary, taking into account our experience and realities. We should approach such a re-evaluation with both caution and boldness, as well as with imagination. Very often we should ask ourselves whether it is better to continue our attempts to reach ambitious goals, with rather little chance of success, or whether it would be more effective to concentrate our efforts on other or more limited aims, but based on common interest and offering better prospects of a positive outcome. The choice is not easy. But at least we should not forget that sometimes such a choice exists, and that we are responsible for making appropriate decisions.

In our discussion on the agenda we need realism and understanding that we are touching on really delicate questions. It is doubtful that any discussion on such changes will bring rapid, positive and substantial results. It is also doubtful that radical changes are desirable. It seems to us rather that we need an "evolutionary" approach, a gradual adjustment to new situations, taking into account other developments, including the results of other disarmament negotiations. Change should not be made for the sake of change, as was rightly pointed out by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, but because of the perception of new opportunities.

My delegation is ready to consider any suggestions concerning the agenda of the Conference, if they are acceptable to other members of this body. We note those which have been already presented. We have also some ideas of our own. One of them is that the agenda of the Conference could include - apart from the questions of the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments - measures related, for example, to the "organization" of international security, in other words measures consolidating international security, for example a world early warning system. There is no other place where such measures can be discussed. They could become important "technical arrangements" complementing the United Nations collective security system and making it more effective. They could also facilitate discussion on some disarmament agreements.

These are just a few considerations and ideas related to the future work of the Conference. However, it is our hope that they complement the views of other delegations on this issue. But probably none of us has a clear idea of what is the proper remedy. In fact, what we need is our collective wisdom in order to approach the issue correctly and define proper responses.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The distinguished Ambassador de Azambuja - permit me to quote him again - rightly stressed that "this task could be handled ... at least in its preliminary stage, by a small group of our most experienced members". My delegation fully supports this conclusion. We believe that the revival of an informal Group of Seven or some other informal team has become highly desirable. Such a group should be entrusted, among other things, with collecting through a series of consultations all ideas and proposals the members of the CD may have in mind. My delegation is ready to present this group with our concrete proposals.

We also need intensive consultations on the more effective functioning of the Conference among all States and groups of States participating or interested in the work of this body. All of them should take an active part in these consultations. They should be carried out both in Geneva and between our capitals. It is, however, extremely important that they should not hamper the work of the Conference. This is the only condition my delegation attaches to this debate - whatever its form and content. Indeed, it would be a sad paradox if our discussions on increasing the effectiveness of the Conference paralysed its work.

It is also important for us not to forget that our debate on the future work of the Conference is not a new one. We have behind us efforts undertaken by the Group of Seven, headed by Ambassador Fan of China, and documents presented by this Group. New and interesting ideas concerning the principles of work and the agenda of the Conference have been submitted last session and this session.

My delegation proposes that the secretariat of the Conference should prepare a register or compilation of these ideas and suggestions. It would be of great help in our further thinking and could become a good starting-point for the debate in a body entrusted with in-depth analysis of the problem and the elaboration of appropriate recommendations. It goes without saying that until these recommendations have been endorsed by capitals they cannot commit any delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): May I first congratulate you, Mr. President, and your delegation on your accession to the presidency? I am delighted to see in the Chair a country with which my own has such very close relations, and I am sure we are all fortunate that our leadership is in the hands of a delegation so rich in diplomatic skills and experience.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

I asked for the floor to respond to references by the distinguished Ambassador of Iraq to my own country and, in particular, to recent events in Heathrow airport. It might be helpful if I began simply by reminding delegations of the facts. The facts are as follows:

On 28 March, United Kingdom customs officials prevented the export from Heathrow airport to Iraq of a number of highly sophisticated capacitors made by a United States company. The capacitors are designed to a military specification for use in the firing circuit of nuclear weapons. This was the culmination of an exercise run jointly over several months by the United Kingdom and United States customs authorities against EUROMAG, a United-Kingdom-based company. The Iraq Airways Station Manager in London, Mr. Omar Latif, has been served with a deportation order and a number of other persons have been arrested and will be committed to trial in the United Kingdom. Those are the facts.

The distinguished Ambassador of Iraq also speculated about the possible aims, I think, of my own country as well as those of others. I can only speak for the United Kingdom: our aims are very straightforward. They are to uphold our commitment that we have entered into under the non-proliferation Treaty and, more specifically, under article I of that Treaty. Perhaps I might just remind this meeting of what that article states.

"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."

It was to fulfil those obligations that our action was aimed, and that was the sole aim. Similarly, we would look to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to scrupulously fulfil their obligations under article II of the Treaty. That article states that:

"Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

In our view, activities which might call into question the fulfilment of this commitment should be condemned by all parties to the Treaty and by all supporters of the principle of non-proliferation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Solesby for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the distinguished representative of the United States.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Mr. President, my delegation also congratulates you on your accession to the presidency, and pledges its co-operation and full support in the work before all of us this month.

My delegation endorses fully the remarks just made by our distinguished colleague from the United Kingdom. Regarding the remarks made this morning concerning nuclear proliferation by the distinguished representative of Iraq, let me make the following brief comments.

The United States has expressed at the highest level its deep concern at recent evidence of possible undermining of the goals of the non-proliferation Treaty. Let me affirm that this is a serious concern - it is a concern that will not be turned aside by charges that it is educed for other purposes, or simply to smear the name of another country. The United States stands by its statements on this subject and will pursue this issue. Far from undercutting the non-proliferation system, the actions of the United States support it. What we would welcome is convincing information that the evidence that recently came to light does not represent erosion of NPT objectives. This would be far more constructive than threats addressed against the NPT system. In this connection, let me call attention again to a statement made by President Bush on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT Treaty on 5 March of this year:

"It is essential in these times of great change and great promise, and of major progress in arms control, that the community of nations works together even more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, which poses one of the greatest risks to the survival of mankind. ... I call upon all States party to the Treaty to join our efforts to secure the integrity of the NPT, which benefits all countries."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Iraq.

Mr. AL-KETAL (Iraq): I would like to be brief in stating a few points. Iraq is fully aware of its commitment under the NPT, and we challenge all those who spoke before me to produce one item of evidence which shows that Iraq is not living up to its commitment under the NPT. Those capacitors they are speaking about - they know very well that they have plenty of uses and not only one use. Professor Goldblat of SIPRI spoke on this on Swiss radio - I heard that - and he enumerated many uses for these capacitors. One of these uses is for oil exploration and production. Others say it could be used for scientific research in many places. It is, as we call it, a campaign of accusations, falsifications, as this very notion that has been spoken about by the distinguished representative of Great Britain. Why do they have to assume that these are going to be used to trigger a nuclear device? All nuclear activities in Iraq are under IAEA surveillance, all nuclear material - so to take this triggering device to trigger what? To trigger new aggression against Iraq and nothing else.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to inform you that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday 5 April, when we reach the end of the list of speakers, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, will introduce the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of that Group, which will be circulated as an official document of the Conference under the symbol CD/981. As usual, members wishing to do so may comment on the progress report, as well as on the statement to be made by its Chairman. As is the practice in the Conference, we shall take action on the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report at the plenary meeting to be held on Thursday 12 April.

I should also like to inform you that, owing to consultations to be held by the Secretary-General of the United Nations during his mission in Geneva, the Council Chamber will not be available this afternoon and tomorrow morning. Accordingly, the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space which was to have been held in this conference room this afternoon will take place instead in conference room III. The meeting of the Group of 21 scheduled for tomorrow morning will be held in conference room V.

I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.549
5 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shahbaz (Pakistan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 549th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Egypt and Argentina, as well as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Dr. Dahlman will introduce the Ad hoc Group's progress report, which is being circulated today as document CD/981. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): It is indeed a source of pleasure to see Pakistan presiding over the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. Egypt and Pakistan have enjoyed, over the years, traditional excellent relations. We assure you, Mr. President, of our full co-operation in the fulfilment of your duties. Your predecessor, Ambassador Emeka Azikiwe of Nigeria, admirably guided our work during the month of March, and it gives me great pleasure to pay a sincere tribute to his contributions.

The year 1989 brought about unforeseen changes on the European scene - changes which will undoubtedly, in due course, have far-reaching repercussions throughout the world. It is generally accepted now that a new world order is evolving and a new security structure is emerging. What effect this evolving security structure will have on the Conference on Disarmament should be paramount in our deliberations. As the sole disarmament negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament has a responsibility to discharge. We should approach the new reality with an open mind - to enhance our contribution it may be necessary to adjust and update our agenda and review our working methods. Several representatives have rightly emphasized that the agenda must be reshaped so as to reflect better the new changes taking place, and to respond to such global challenges. My delegation wholeheartedly endorses this view.

One area which merits more attention is regional security. In such times of interdependence no single nation can find security by itself. World security, as a result, has become the aggregate sum of the security of all the regions around the globe. In the ultimate analysis international security rests on regional security.

A 1981 United Nations study on all the aspects of regional disarmament states in paragraph 143:

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

"... the regional disarmament concept must constantly be seen in its right perspective. Though in no way a substitute for general and complete disarmament, it can be an effective complement to global measures and an important constituent in the step-by-step approach to global disarmament. In particular it can facilitate negotiations on some of the areas identified for universal action, and contribute initiatives on other possible disarmament steps promoting stability, mutual confidence and co-operation within the region."

Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, in his statement of 13 March, highlighted the need to explore the possibility of discussing regional security questions and arms races outside the sphere of Europe. Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka also touched on the issue in his statement of 22 March. In the view of my delegation there are many independent regional initiatives which deserve our attention. One such initiative has been my country's proposal presented to the General Assembly since 1974 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. A group of experts was assigned the task of preparing a report on the subject. The Secretary-General will present the report to the General Assembly next fall. Can the Conference on Disarmament contribute in this regard? The Assembly has also in the past adopted a stream of resolutions on the denuclearization of Africa. The Disarmament Commission has failed up till now to reach consensus on this important regional issue. I believe all members of the OAU are entitled to expect this important regional disarmament measure to be put under consideration in the Conference on Disarmament.

During previous years aspects of regional disarmament were traditionally considered, inter alia, under the umbrella of item 8. This year there is an imbalance. No ad hoc committee on the comprehensive programme of disarmament has been established. A forum should therefore be devised to rectify this situation in order to afford regional issues suitable consideration. My delegation would like to propose a comprehensive discussion on the issue of regional disarmament within the framework of the CD.

I shall now turn to the chemical weapons convention. At the outset, I wish to pay tribute to the efforts of the former Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, and the five chairmen of the working groups, for their tireless efforts and their dedication to expediting the preparation of the draft convention. I also welcome the new Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, and wish him success in his task.

Since I last addressed the subject of chemical weapons in plenary in August 1989, many events have taken place, including the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, the United States-USSR memorandum of understanding in Wyoming, the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Soviet-American joint statement of 10 February 1990. Yet a breakthrough towards a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons seems at present to be still beyond our reach. We recognize that a considerable degree of progress has been achieved.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

We do, however, realize that we still have a long way to go to finalize the convention. This may be partially attributed to the fact that the 1989 session dealt mainly with "technical" issues. We understand very well the importance of resolving such technical aspects. In the course of the current session we hope meaningful progress can also be made on the political aspects of the draft convention.

Today, I wish to put before the Conference my delegation's reflections on some of these remaining questions.

An issue which attracts special attention, though from different standpoints, is that of the relation of the future convention on chemical weapons to other international agreements. It is our understanding that, in accordance with the general rules of international law and article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the chemical weapons convention, being a subsequent legal instrument on the same subject-matter, prevails over any existing international agreement covering the same subject-matter from the moment of its entry into force. Our work would be undone if unilaterally declared "rights" under the 1925 Geneva Protocol were transferred and thereby somehow eternalized in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Such attempts should be resisted in order to establish a non-discriminatory convention that contains one single universally applicable legal régime.

My delegation has raised this issue in the past. We consider it a political and not a legal one. No resolution to this problem has materialized, and it seems appropriate to propose that concerned delegations should consult further on this matter. We do hope that Ambassador Hyltenius will be able to reach a successful conclusion on this topic in his consultations on undiminished security.

Amendments are another important issue. This is a substantive and not a procedural matter. It entails highly political and legal considerations. It is the manner by which the parties to an agreement may alter the fundamental obligations when the need arises. With this in mind, the provisions on amendments, regardless of their formulation, should under no circumstances provide for a discriminatory régime that would consequently materialize in dual or multiple legal undertakings. The general rules contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may serve as guidelines in this respect.

A very important issue is that of sanctions. My delegation has been following closely the preliminary deliberations on this subject. The discussion over this question has clearly demonstrated the highly delicate political nature of the problem. It should be pointed out that the concept of sanctions is much wider than the incorporation of provisions on penal and punitive measures. We should strive for credible security guarantees. It is true that some of the material relevant to this subject is already scattered among the provisions of the draft convention. The end-product, however, should not be a weakened and fragmented edifice on the question of measures to redress situations of violation of and non-compliance with the convention. A clear-cut and credible provision should be expressly incorporated in a

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

separate and individual provision, the details and specificities of which may be referred to in relevant provisions, as currently demonstrated in several draft articles. The issue of sanctions will be one of direct cross-reference and linkage between the future Organization and the Security Council, which is the organ vested with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Confidentiality cannot be delinked from the issue of verification. We have not yet been able to solve the difficult equation of verification versus confidentiality. Trial inspections have had a role in demonstrating this fact. It is true that a degree of progress in the work on confidentiality and on the guidelines for inspections has been achieved. However, a comprehensive solution to this problem is not in sight. The solution to it should be in the view of my delegation well founded on the inviolability of proprietary rights and information.

Challenge inspections are dependent, in our view, on the outcome of the work on confidentiality. It is highly sensitive and political because it affects the national security of each State party to the convention. The true test of the success of this device hinges on ensuring that no abuses are committed.

On the organizational aspects of the convention, I wish to emphasize the role of the Executive Council. The size and decision-making mechanism should be determined on the basis of the limits of the functional requirements, that is to say, the rapidity of convening meetings and the ability to take timely decisions. All States parties to the Convention should have an opportunity to serve on the Council. My delegation, moreover, does not subscribe to any attempt to create permanent seats.

My delegation has studied attentively the proposal put forward by the Soviet Union and the United States on the "Principles and order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities". We subscribe to the view expressed in paragraph 2 (a), which stipulates that "Each State party should destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities ... beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing no later than 10 years, after the convention enters into force". We take it that such an obligation will not be subject to any reservation.

The Conference on Disarmament has been asked to take a decision on the creation of a new additional group in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to provide "Technical support for the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee". My delegation has studied this proposal. We appreciate the rationale behind it. However, we recognize the practical problems that lie ahead. One of these is the financial implications of this mechanism. The practical consequence of this is that the envisaged mechanism will result in a one-track dialogue of experts belonging to one group of States without due regard to equitable political and geographical distribution. Our preference is to channel all work through the subsidiary working groups of the Ad hoc Committee.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Before concluding my remarks on this item, I wish to refer to the statement made by the Ambassador of Sri Lanka on 22 March when he pointed out that "it is ... necessary now to make a renewed effort to tackle the outstanding political issues with a view to taking a decision. Any deflection of the time available to matters of which some could best be handled by a preparatory commission could only lead to a diffusion of focus and loss of momentum". I believe that this point needs to be carefully considered by us.

Our aim is to conclude a convention which will be universally adhered to. One way of approaching this objective is to consider ways and means of involving all United Nations Members in the actual preparation of the convention at a certain stage. An open-ended preparatory commission to precede or follow a ministerial conference could positively contribute towards the universality that we all aspire to attain, and could serve as a useful tool in our quest to encourage universal adherence.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I am particularly pleased to see you presiding over our deliberations. You are a member of a delegation which has left its mark on the efforts made in this forum. I remember Ambassador Ahmad's successful presidency in 1983 in the then Committee on Disarmament. I know that you and Ambassador Kamal, with whom I enjoy a special friendship, have applied your diplomatic skills to the renewed efforts that we must make in this negotiating body as we conclude the first part of our session.

The Conference on Disarmament is the only negotiating forum for disarmament in which States from Africa, America, Asia, Europe and Oceania participate. This geographical representation confers on this body a unique character and gives it an advantage in concluding universal disarmament treaties which has not been fully utilized up to now. The negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban offer an example of the special characteristics of the Conference and show to what degree it is possible to advance multilaterally, even when sensitive and complex technical and political aspects are being dealt with, provided there is political will. This is particularly significant if we recall the context in which the structure of the convention began to develop. At that time the principal military Powers in the CW field, whether or not they were members of military alliances, maintained positions and views that originated in security perceptions stemming from a climate of confrontation. No doubt these circumstances affected the pace of work, but - and it is important to point this out - they did not prevent progress. It is, to some extent, understandable that the initial process was characterized by numerous precautions that left their mark on the negotiations. I wonder to what extent we should, today, continue to apply the same logic, and I can well imagine the queries that an inexperienced observer might raise on pausing to examine the text contained in document CD/961. As far as some aspects of the draft convention are concerned, it would seem that the fact that the convention is

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to be implemented in future decades, and that therefore it cannot be viewed on the basis of past perceptions, is totally forgotten. One gets this feeling mainly because certain propositions regarding security are maintained as though they were dogmas. It is as if we did not allow reality to shed its light in the Council Chamber. And of course these propositions give rise to an entire body of provisions whose complexity increases in a geometric proportion to the degree of confidence pursued.

In order to avoid the paradox of drawing up an instrument whose assumptions do not fit in with the international trends that make it feasible, perhaps we should make a major effort to place security for all on a footing more in keeping with the times. We could thus envisage the simplification of the complex and burdensome mechanisms and procedures stipulated in the convention. It is highly unlikely that there could be a more effective guarantee of confidence than the transparency brought about by an international climate characterized by rational negotiations, the generation of a network of industrial, technological and scientific interests and intense international co-operation. My delegation is convinced that we are moving towards that goal. For that reason we consider it essential to maintain the momentum of international efforts to ban chemical warfare.

Several major events in 1989 brought the subject to the forefront of international attention. The multilateral negotiations on a convention continued to add to the enormous amount of work carried out since 1984, to take the date of the first negotiating mandate. In that climate of increasing interaction and understanding, there were bilateral agreements and initiatives that gave renewed vigour to the process and highlighted in particular the will of the United States and the Soviet Union to move forward towards the objectives of the convention. Now, in the final stage, the starring role in our opinion ought to be, and can only be, played by the Conference on Disarmament. In 1990, we would like to see in this room the eminent persons that made 1989 such a special year in the field of chemical weapons.

It is only logical that each of us around this table tends to highlight different aspects of the draft convention. From the standpoint of a State such as my own that has never possessed chemical weapons and does not possess them now, the effectiveness of this instrument depends basically on its ability to create a system that does not jeopardize the ensemble of elements that make up its perception of security. For developing countries, this implies taking into account indivisible factors of a political, economic and technological nature.

In August 1987, the then Argentine representative at the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Mario Cámpora, said that "the chemical weapons convention as we have known it so far would be a non-discriminatory treaty, since all the parties would be on an equal footing once the process of destruction of chemical weapons and existing production facilities had been completed. At that stage the treaty will serve as a model, because it will be unlike the non-proliferation Treaty, which lays down in law the existence of two categories of States: those that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. ... Thus we have within our reach the possibility of drawing up a

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treaty that would not be discriminatory from the political and military standpoints. It is also important that it should not be discriminatory from an economic and technological viewpoint".

This means that as of its entry into force, the convention must strike a proper balance between rights and obligations. For example, we should begin to consider including elements to compensate for and reduce the existing asymmetry among States parties during the 10-year period in which existing stockpiles will be destroyed. Furthermore, it implies agreement on a clear ban on the use of chemical weapons in any circumstances, as well as verification of compliance. The possibility that a State party to the convention might reserve the right to retaliate during the period of destruction cannot be justified in our way of seeing things, even from a military standpoint, inasmuch as the concept of chemical deterrence has fewer and fewer advocates. For the convention to be effective, basically, it must set up a rapid and transparent destruction mechanism. We share concern regarding the environment, and we believe it is indispensable to seek the assistance of the scientific community in order to find non-polluting methods that will allow us to reduce significantly the period of 10 years which has remained static so far. It would be unforgivable if we did not make every possible effort to minimize the Convention's legal weakness during this period. Linking the destruction of all chemical weapons to accession by certain States would seem to be equally unfavourable to the stability of the instrument. In our view, the purported aim of encouraging accession in this way could turn out to be counter-productive and foster tendencies that would in no way contribute to creating a chemical-weapon-free world. It is also important that we should endeavour to discourage initiatives that might lead a State to deem it prudent to wait until the end of the period of stockpile destruction before studying the desirability of acceding to the convention.

As is generally known, the verification system provided for in the draft convention is unprecedented in multilateral and bilateral disarmament treaties. It is clearly important to achieve an adequate verification system. But it is equally important to take into account the costs and benefits so that it does not constitute an excessive financial burden. In this regard, it might be necessary to consider, for example, whether it is appropriate to continue having a broad definition of chemical weapons embracing all toxic chemicals and not just those listed in the schedules, since that would mean that chemical activities in general would be subject to control and verification. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the need to implement an adequate inspection system and the aim of regulating chemical industry activity as a whole. For the sake of the convention's viability, there is a need to devise a verification régime which prevents interference that is not justified by the aims of the inspection. In this regard, the concept of "managed access", in so far as it entails the right to protect legitimate interests, provides a practical basis.

As regards various aspects of the convention now being negotiated, some delegations have attempted to press on us the concept of "CW-capable States". The debate on the general verification system which took place during the 1989 session demonstrated that different aims are being pursued on this

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matter, on which we would prefer not to draw any conclusions. However, we feel it necessary to point out that it is not particularly wise to put on an equal footing for the purposes of the convention countries that have stockpiles and those that have civil chemical industries of a certain size. There are only two types of State under the convention: those that possess chemical weapons and those that do not. Any additional category seems to be aimed more at supporting oligopolistic approaches rather than contributing to meeting the objectives of the convention. In this regard it would seem useful to put aside this concept that we have inherited from the joint Soviet-United States statements in the form of the expression "chemical-weapons-capable States".

When we design the Executive Council we should draw on the experience of the last four decades to improve on models that have not always proved satisfactory. The representativeness of this body must respond to objective guidelines and its size to practical needs. Membership should be based on the criterion of equitable geographical distribution. Furthermore, in terms of the effective application of the convention, the Council should adequately represent the entire international community. If we consider the membership of other executive organs of international organizations, they have around 50 members. The closest model is IAEA, whose Board of Governors works with 35 members; there have never been any complaints about its efficiency. In present international circumstances we would not be surprised if there were schools of thought once again evaluating the United Nations approach based on five regional groups. Bearing in mind what has been said by other delegations in favour of the industrial factor, we would not object to its being taken into account at the regional level. A system of counterweights would thus be achieved, avoiding an obvious imbalance in favour of the highly industrialized countries.

Before concluding, I should like to refer to the question of the prompt entry into force of the convention and various initiatives that States may adopt in pursuit of that objective. In 1987 we mentioned the possibility of reaching a political agreement at the regional level on arrangements for acceding to the convention. For that reason we support the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Arteaga at the plenary meeting on 15 March, for a meeting of Latin American and Caribbean countries to publicize the draft convention in order to create the conditions necessary for the convention's speedy entry into force. We hope that those regions that have not yet done so will follow suit.

Regional initiatives could go hand in hand with global initiatives to promote confidence in the convention. In this respect we could promote the idea that States which maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol should withdraw them, as Australia and New Zealand did in 1989. In this way the international legal régime banning chemical warfare would be strengthened while at the same time greater transparency and predictability in the international conduct of States would be achieved. In the same spirit it would be indispensable for those States which apply export controls to chemicals to issue declarations making it clear that these provisions would not be applied to States parties to the convention. A universal convention

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which is to be applied in the coming century requires a political understanding to avoid the unilateral or plurilateral establishment of requirements additional to those already agreed to in the convention in order to participate in international co-operation in the peaceful uses of chemistry.

Reality is providing us with many surprises. We hope that this climate will spread to the Conference on Disarmament and that in 1990 the surprise will be the finalization of the draft convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Before we proceed with the introduction and consideration of the progress report, I should like to ask whether any delegation wishes to take the floor on any other matter before the Conference. It seems not.

I shall now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlgren, to introduce the progress report on the Group's twenty-ninth session, as contained in document CD/981.

Mr. DAHLGREN (Sweden): It is a pleasure to report on the Group's recent meeting, held from 19 to 29 March, and to introduce its progress report contained in document CD/981, which is in front of you today. This was the twenty-ninth session of the Group, and experts and representatives from 27 countries and the World Meteorological Organization attended. We enjoyed the excellent eminent services provided by the secretariat throughout the session. We greatly appreciated their efforts and we are very impressed by the way they handled our technical material.

The second phase of the Group's Second Large-scale Technical Test which we refer to as GSETT-2, started on 16 January 1990. This phase, which will continue until our summer meeting, is designed as a gradual build-up of the testing of the entire system. The initial part of this phase involved the trial testing of existing facilities of the global system one day per week for eight weeks. The recent meeting of the Group had two main purposes: to review the results of this test period and to plan the remaining stages of GSETT-2.

The results of this first co-ordinated test of the components of the global seismic system of available facilities was quite satisfactory. Valuable experience was obtained by participating countries and facilities as well as by the Group as a whole. This was made possible because of careful planning guided by the co-ordinator of GSETT-2, Mr. Peter Basham of Canada, and the dedicated work of a large number of scientists and technicians at participating facilities around the world.

To operate a system in the real world differs considerably from conceptually designing it. Some of you may recall that during the Group's Technical Test in 1984, we received a message from one station saying "no data

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available - seismometer stolen". This time considerable interruption occurred in data transmission when a communication computer at one of the experimental international data centres was the object of a similar crime.

Twenty-one countries participated in this initial stage of the global test by establishing and operating national data centres usually referred to as NDCs. These 21 NDCs provided data from 46 seismological stations in all. The data volumes contributed by the stations are considerably larger than in the 1984 test, which involved only parameter data. A total data volume corresponding to about 60,000 pages of typed information was exchanged during these eight days. This is about half the size of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Only the future will tell whether our data contain as much valuable information as those prestigious volumes.

The procedures for operating an NDC, collecting and compiling seismological data and transmitting such data to experimental international data centres are now well established. All countries which tried to establish and operate a national data centre were quite successful in doing so. This should encourage more countries to engage in the experiment.

Broader participation and better coverage of the globe is essential if we are to meet the objectives of GSETT-2. These objectives are, as you may recall, to test the individual components of a modern data exchange system as specified in the Group's fifth report (contained in CD/903), and to test the interaction of these components in a realistic environment - that is, to demonstrate that the system is able to cope with all the seismic events that are observed around the globe.

The Group noted with satisfaction that efforts are under way in some 10 additional countries to join the experiment and to establish national data centres. To encourage even wider participation the Group decided to reduce the technical requirements for participation in the experiment. While maintaining that the prime purpose of GSETT-2 was, and still is, to routinely exchange and analyse level II or wave-form data, the Group agreed that countries that today do not have facilities available for the routine exchange of digital wave-form data may participate by contributing level I or parameter data only. It is now technically possible for every country operating a seismological station - and most countries in the world actually do - to participate in GSETT-2. I do hope this will encourage additional participation in areas where we have only few participants today, in particular in South America, Africa and some parts of Asia.

The Ad hoc Group has for many years enjoyed close co-operation with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) for global data exchange through the WMO GTS, which is their Global Telecommunication System. The Group and the WMO representatives agreed that further preparatory work was needed to utilize this communication system during GSETT-2 as well.

The Group welcomed a suggestion by WMO that it should be represented in Geneva between 21 and 28 May 1990 at the forthcoming meeting of the World Meteorological Organization's Commission for Basic Systems Working Group on

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the Global Telecommunication System to further discuss this issue. The Ad hoc Group suggests that, on the understanding that there are no financial implications for the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Peter Basham, Canada, assisted by Mr. Shigeji Suyehiro of Japan, should be requested to represent the Group at this meeting.

The experimental international data centres which we usually refer to as EIDCs, are operated in Canberra (Australia), Stockholm (Sweden), Moscow (USSR) and Washington in the United States. These centres are key elements of the system being tested during GSETT-2. Much effort and money have been devoted at these four centres to establishing adequate communication facilities and developing and introducing the hardware and software necessary to fulfil their demanding tasks. The introduction of the routine exchange and analysis of wave-form data, which are expected to substantially improve the quality of the results provided by the system, has significantly expanded the tasks of the EIDCs.

There is a saying that he who makes a journey has something to tell. This also applies to those who make scientific experiments. You thereby create new knowledge which is otherwise not available. Such valuable experience was gained at the experimental international data centres during the recent test period. It was found that the work-load was much heavier than expected and that the internal operations of the EIDCs have to be streamlined to allow for continuous operation over an extended period of time. To utilize the full potential of the wave-form data, the seismological methods and procedures have to be further developed and tested. Co-operation among the EIDCs to arrive at a common solution, a process usually referred to as reconciliation, is an important element of the analysis procedure. This was, however, not tested during this initial phase, mainly due to the overload at the EIDCs.

In the light of the experience accumulated so far, the Group revised its preliminary plans and instructions for GSETT-2, and agreed on a revised schedule which is annexed to the progress report.

During the time period until the Group's next session, phase 2 of GSETT-2 will continue with a number of activities, gradually building up to the envisaged full-scale operation of the system to be tested. These activities include the establishment of new national data centres in countries joining GSETT-2 and the establishment and testing of appropriate communication channels between these NDCs and EIDCs. Also included is work to improve the seismological procedures at EIDCs for analysis of wave-form data in particular, and the testing of such procedures among the EIDCs. An informal meeting of experts primarily from the four EIDCs will be hosted by the United States in early June 1990 to review the results of this work. A preparatory operational test will also be conducted involving the exchange of data from all participating stations and the processing of these data at the EIDCs for four days in late June.

The Group also discussed the schedule for phase 3, which is the main phase of GSETT-2. To be able to develop the analysis procedures to take full

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advantage of reported data, in particular the wave-form data, and to enable additional countries - and this is important - to make the necessary preparations, the Group decided to revise the preliminary schedule. The Group now plans to divide the third phase into two parts. The first part consists of one full week of continuous operation of the entire system to be conducted in late autumn, tentatively mid-November, this year. The second and main part of phase 3 will be a full-scale operation for a continuous period of about two months in April and May 1991. Such a schedule, which allows for both intensive testing and careful analysis and evaluation, is considered by the Group to provide the best foundation on which to build a scientifically sound assessment of the proposed system.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be convened from 30 July to 10 August 1990, in Geneva.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events for introducing the report contained in document CD/981. Does any other delegation wish at this stage to address the progress report of the Ad hoc Group?

As is the practice in the Conference, I shall put the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report before the Conference for adoption at the plenary meeting to be held on Thursday, 12 April. The recommendation contained in paragraph 13 relates to the suggested dates for the next session of the Ad hoc Group - 30 July to 10 August 1990. As regards paragraph 9, the secretariat has circulated today the draft of a letter that I as President of the Conference will address to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization in connection with the participation of a member of the Seismic Group in the next session of the WMO Commission for Basic Systems Working Group on the Global Telecommunication System. I am doing so to comply with rule 11 of the rules of procedure, which provide that the President shall, in full consultation with the Conference and under its authority, represent it in its relations with other international organizations. If there are no objections to the text of the letter before the plenary meeting of Thursday, 12 April, that letter will be sent as drafted.

I should like now to turn to another subject. The secretariat has circulated today at my request a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies and, as usual, is merely indicative and can be amended, if needed. As you can see, provision is made on Tuesday, 10 April for the first informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", immediately after the plenary meeting to be held on that date, as agreed by the Conference at its 547th plenary meeting. I should also like to inform you that Friday, 13 April and Monday, 16 April are official holidays for the United Nations Office at Geneva and that therefore no technical

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services can be provided on those dates. Accordingly, no meeting are planned in the timetable for Friday, 13 April. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 10 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.550
10 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ahmad Kamal (Pakistan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 550th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I am now assuming the responsibilities of President of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to make the following statement on behalf of the Pakistan delegation.

It is an honour for Pakistan to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, the most important multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, for the month of April 1990.

The international political climate today is characterized by a marked relaxation of tensions, growing understanding between the super-Powers and progress towards the resolution of regional conflicts. The improved global political situation has raised hopes that significant disarmament measures may be adopted in the near future.

While welcoming the relaxation of tensions between the super-Powers, we would also like to hope that the changed political environment will encourage moves towards regional peace and disarmament. It is necessary that détente and mutual understanding should spread to all regions of the world. It is also essential that the international community should whole-heartedly support and encourage all efforts directed towards regional disarmament, as only in this manner can the equal and undiminished security of all States at the lowest level of armaments be guaranteed.

Pakistan welcomes the progress achieved in East-West arms control. The conclusion of the INF Treaty and the prospects for an agreement on deep cuts in strategic weapons during 1990 are significant steps towards the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Equally significant are the successful conclusion of the Vienna Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the commencement of talks on confidence-building and security-building measures (CSBMs) and conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE).

We welcome talks between the super-Powers and between the two major alliances on disarmament issues. However, we continue to believe that they cannot be a substitute for multilateral negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations, where the vital security interests of the smaller countries would also be taken into account and protected. The Conference on Disarmament provides the most appropriate forum for this purpose. We must make optimum use of this multilateral forum for progress towards meaningful disarmament.

In view of the sea change in threat perceptions following upon the transformation in the international environment, we believe that the Conference on Disarmament must pay special attention to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention. The Conference on Disarmament must also examine issues which are increasingly engaging the attention of the international community, such as regional disarmament and naval disarmament.

(The President)

As we stand on the threshold of a new era, we must rededicate ourselves to the goal of general and complete disarmament as an important basis for the future structure of international peace and security. We must undertake efforts at both global and regional levels for progress towards this goal.

Disarmament is a necessary condition for the physical survival and the economic and social progress of humanity. It is indeed regrettable that enormous expenditure is incurred annually on armaments while the majority of mankind continues to suffer from grinding poverty.

We would like to urge that material and human resources should be diverted by all countries of the world from military uses towards the amelioration of the existing economic conditions of humanity, particularly in the developing countries. Hopefully the current favourable international climate will lead to the adoption of significant disarmament measures at the global and regional levels, leading to the utilization of the resources thus saved for the progress and prosperity of mankind.

We are convinced of the need to break out of the vicious cycle of insecurity, armaments and underdevelopment. This can be done if we sincerely and faithfully adhere to the United Nations Charter and pursue genuine disarmament which guarantees the security and independence of all States irrespective of their size or political inclinations. Pakistan will continue to work with the international community towards a future free from the threat of war, hunger, poverty and disease.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". In conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As decided by the Conference at its 547th plenary meeting, we shall hold today, immediately after this plenary meeting, an informal meeting of the Conference on the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Austria, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Egypt and the Federal Republic of Germany. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the representative of Austria, Ambassador Ceska.

Mr. CESKA (Austria): Mr. President, let me start my statement by expressing my satisfaction at seeing you personally in the Chair, and saying that I am particularly pleased to express through you my best wishes to Pakistan for its presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in the month of April. I am sure that this augurs well for the conclusion of this year's spring session of the Conference on Disarmament.

My statement today will not deal with the question of chemical weapons; let me point out, however, that Austria has finalized and will submit to the Conference before the end of the spring session a comprehensive report on an Austrian national trial inspection.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

Nuclear weapons were invented several decades ago and have since become a fact of life. Nuclear weapons do exist, and we can therefore not realistically expect a return to the status quo ante. What matters under present conditions, however, is their non-proliferation as well as their gradual reduction. Nuclear weapons always involve risk, even if they are meant as a deterrent only. It is therefore logical to keep the number of countries in possession of nuclear weapons as small as possible. Any further spread would increase the risk and make the world less safe.

On a global strategic scale the deterrent of second strike capability has worked so far, and has indeed been a stabilizing factor. Whether this deterrent has prevented a major military conflict which otherwise would have taken place is an interesting question which nobody can definitely answer. There is no need to do away with this system as long as it cannot be replaced by anything better.

The deterrent of second strike capability and strategic arms reduction do not exclude each other. The concept of second strike capability relies first and foremost on its predictability, in the sense that the other side must be totally certain that a first strike will immediately entail a counterstrike. This, however, does not require the presently existing quantities of nuclear weapons. Indeed, a second strike capability can be maintained at a much lower level. The risk inherent in nuclear weapons is linked not only to the number of States holding such arms, but also to the size of such armouries. Lower levels of nuclear weapons therefore mean lower risk - something the entire world has an interest in.

There is great potential for strategic arms reduction before we are eventually faced with the question of minimum standards, i.e. the levels necessary to preserve credible second strike capabilities. The conclusion of a START agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic nuclear forces would certainly not undermine the system of second strike capability, but at the same time it would considerably reduce risk - the risk involved with any given quantity of nuclear weapons - as well as costs.

In Europe we are confronted with a somewhat different situation. The INF Treaty has fundamentally downgraded the potential of nuclear escalation by doing away entirely with its land-based intermediate nuclear forces dimension. What remains are short-range nuclear forces, but even they might gradually become less important with changing military doctrines when, at the same time, they become less acceptable for the countries concerned in view of the encouraging political and economic developments under way in the region. We therefore have reason to be optimistic.

As a neutral country, Austria is particularly concerned about nuclear weapons whose effects can easily spill over into territories not involved in a military conflict. Austria therefore attaches great importance to, and takes a legitimate interest in, nuclear disarmament on a global scale, and, given the country's location in the centre of Europe, in the European region especially. We encourage the countries concerned to vigorously pursue these efforts regarding nuclear disarmament and thereby make the world a safer place. In this context, Austria would particularly welcome a treaty on the elimination of land-based short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

Addressing more specifically the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, let me turn to the forthcoming Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in Geneva from 20 August to 14 September this year. This review conference will once again provide an opportunity to evaluate the implementation of the Treaty.

It is certainly correct to state that all countries have benefited from the existence of the Treaty. This should in turn reinforce the case for its further strengthening. The treaty has not only prevented a general spread of nuclear weapons, but has also greatly facilitated co-operation in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In this respect, a tribute has to be paid to the work carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and its safeguards system.

With regard to the extension of the Treaty beyond the year 1995, Austria - I can refer here to the statement of the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alois Mock, on 6 February 1990 before this Conference - is in favour of such an agreement being reached well before 1995. This would allow a much clearer picture as to the need to hold two conferences, namely one regular review conference and one conference on the extension of the Treaty in 1995. In this context again, let me stress that Austria fully subscribes to the legal view that the Treaty will not under any circumstances expire after 1995.

Austria attaches considerable importance to a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Austria's participation, since 1979, in the work of the Ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts entrusted with the task of preparing a feasible verification system for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is a clear reflection of its interest in working for a rapid solution of all outstanding technical questions involved. Austria is aware of the significance of the current working phase, and will do its utmost to further enhance its contribution in this field. However, as the elaboration of a comprehensive verification system should constitute a conditio sine qua non for the conclusion of such a treaty, this will probably take additional time. In this context let me say that, after over 20 years of listening to arguments explaining why comprehensive and satisfactory verification does not seem to be feasible, we are very satisfied to find ourselves in a position to state today that it is in fact feasible.

Financial arguments do not seem to stand in the way of verifying a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, since one year of operating a comprehensive verification system in its form as currently envisaged would only cost the equivalent of one nuclear weapon test. Therefore, we expect the nuclear-weapon States to make provision for the necessary financial contributions for the world-wide installation of such a verification system as a first and most logical expression of the "peace dividend".

As far as the outstanding technical questions are concerned, we hope that the envisaged work programme for phases 2 and 3 of the practical test in 1990 and 1991 will lead to final conclusions. In this regard, the participation of as large a number of States as possible seems to be of the utmost importance for raising global awareness and eventually facilitating the world-wide implementation of such a verification system.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

As far as the initiative aiming at the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime by amending the partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty is concerned, let me state that Austria does not consider the forthcoming amendment conference an adequate means to achieve this goal. In particular, the amendment of an existing treaty prior to final solution of outstanding technical as well as political problems cannot be regarded as a feasible option.

The concept of legally binding assurances given by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States can, it would seem to us, never really serve its purpose. In a politically stable international environment, there would probably be no need for such assurances, whereas in the event of international crises, even legally binding assurances would not give adequate protection, unless nuclear weapons were under international control. Additional problems are related to definitions of terms such as "nuclear-weapon State", and to a feasible verification régime. Therefore, real progress, let alone the conclusion of a legally binding instrument, is not to be expected for the near future.

Regarding the prohibition of radiological weapons, it is tempting to conclude that the initial expectations of easy negotiations in this respect have proved to be unrealistic. Therefore, the finalization of legally binding instruments is beyond reach, at least in the short term. The prohibition of radiological weapons in the narrow sense involves difficulties since, according to common understanding, such weapons are not in existence yet. The problem of verifying such non-existent weapons seems to go beyond feasible solutions. The prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes raises similar problems, at least in its current methodological approach. Only the prohibition of attacks on any nuclear installation would, in our view, lead to satisfactory solutions. Distinctions between criteria of definition, such as use for military purposes or military headquarters, would, however, not allow adequate verification.

Let me conclude these remarks on a more general note. What we have first and foremost in mind in disarmament talks, in particular in multilateral forums like this Conference, is to further strengthen stability in a still antagonistic environment. The current forces of change at work give reason to be optimistic - probably more than ever before in the post-war era - and to hope that systemic antagonism can gradually be overcome. If we can all subscribe to common ideals, commit ourselves to a world-wide division of labour and thereby accept the consequent economic interdependence, there will be less cause for conflict and the world as a whole will be better off. Disarmament should then be just a matter of course.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Austria, Ambassador Ceska, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, let me first say how pleased my delegation is at seeing you presiding over the Conference. You represent a country which plays an important role in the Conference and in the Group of 21, to which both Sweden and Pakistan have belonged for many years. You have also personally taken a very active part in the work on the many vital

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matters before us, and I am convinced that with your well-known skill, experience and dedication to this work, we shall make further substantive progress during your presidency. I should also like to express the gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, and to congratulate him on the very successful manner in which he guided the Conference during the month of March.

The nuclear issues are priority items for this Conference. In my intervention today I will concentrate on these items on our agenda, including radiological weapons and negative security assurances. I will also take the opportunity to touch upon the forthcoming fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty.

The repeated calls for an urgent comprehensive test-ban treaty by the vast majority of the Member States of the United Nations General Assembly constitute authoritative support for the work of the Conference on Disarmament on a CTBT. My delegation notes with satisfaction that the efforts carried out last year by Ambassador Yamada of Japan, and continued this year by his successor, Ambassador Donowaki, have created better conditions for a dialogue on the issue of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. I hope that there will be enough flexibility in the Conference to agree on a reasonably balanced mandate, allowing us, at last, to get down to business on a CTBT. An ad hoc committee should be established without further delay.

Already in the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty expressed their determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The initiative to try to advance the issue through an amendment conference, with the aim of transforming the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty, is an expression of the frustration over the lack of results on this issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

The Soviet Union and the United States are about to reach agreement on verification arrangements for their bilateral threshold test-ban Treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. Thresholds of 150 kilotons do not impose meaningful limitations on nuclear testing. If linked to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a lowering of the threshold to yields below one kiloton would be a significant advancement towards such a treaty. In such a context, agreed reductions in existing nuclear-weapon stockpiles would be truly effective.

On the important issue of verifying a nuclear test-ban treaty, considerable progress has been achieved. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has, through close international co-operation, developed a global seismic verification system. A modern design of this system is now being tested. The experiment is proceeding successfully, but there is a need for increased participation in the test in order to achieve a more global distribution of seismic stations. In fact, many countries have technical facilities making it possible for them to participate in this global experiment. It is important that more States should take the necessary political decision allowing for broader participation. This would effectively contribute to the development of a global seismic verification system.

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Among other verification measures for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the monitoring of atmospheric radioactivity may be mentioned. It has on a number of occasions been discussed in the Conference on Disarmament, and Sweden has proposed that a global system should be established for this purpose. On-site and in-country monitoring stations, as well as satellite-based surveillance systems, can also play an important part in verifying a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On the basis of an extended mandate, the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts should start deliberations on these verification techniques too, drawing on the experience developed over a long period of time in this Group.

After this plenary meeting the Conference will have occasion to deliberate in an informal plenary meeting on agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The convening of informal plenary meetings is the result of successful consultations carried out by Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria as President of the Conference during the month of March. Item 3 on our agenda "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", will be subject to consideration in the same format later on. The Swedish delegation welcomes this opportunity to discuss these matters, and hopes that ad hoc committees will be established for continued work at next year's session of the Conference.

My delegation has proposed that considerations under agenda item 2 should include the issue of naval nuclear armaments and disarmament. Naval nuclear weapons, integrated as they are in overall military defence structures, should not be excluded, as they have largely been, from considerations on nuclear disarmament. More than one nuclear weapon in four in existence is earmarked for deployment at sea.

There is widespread concern over the risks related to nuclear weapons at sea in the context of unintentional nuclear war. My delegation is of the opinion that this question should be considered under agenda item 3. Under this agenda item questions covering increased openness, transparency and confidence-building measures in nuclear matters should be dealt with. Sweden has proposed that the issue of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea should be taken up in this context, as such incidents may play an ominous role in escalation into a nuclear war.

Another subject which, in the view of my delegation, should be considered at the informal plenary meetings under agenda item 3 is the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. This would seem to correspond to an emerging international norm against the use of nuclear weapons. The declaration by the two major nuclear-weapon States that a nuclear war must never be fought supports a process of de-legitimization of nuclear weapons. My delegation considers that the time is ripe to explore the possibilities of comprehensively banning the use of nuclear weapons, in an appropriate, legally binding form.

Means to enhance the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States have been discussed throughout the genesis and the existence of the non-proliferation Treaty. Negative security assurances have been at the centre of this debate. Sweden has continuously underlined the importance of such assurances, pending

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complete nuclear disarmament. Sweden has also deplored the sterility of the debate and the lack of results with regard to the work that has taken place in the Conference on Disarmament on this issue. It should be considered a natural and legitimate right of States that have foregone nuclear weapons through an international, legally binding commitment to receive equally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon Powers that they will not be attacked or threatened with such weapons. The matter should not really be made more complicated than that. The non-nuclear-weapon States have long been demanding and expecting this kind of straightforward, unequivocal assurance. Existing assurances, with their reservations and ambiguities, do not meet this need.

With the NPT review conference in mind, an initiative on negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States during this year's CD session would be very timely indeed.

The protection of nuclear installations against military attacks has become an agenda item in its own right, the subject of negotiations with a view to concluding a treaty. The experience of the tragic Chernobyl accident gives us some idea of what can happen if a large nuclear facility is attacked and hit. One must note, however, that Chernobyl was not a worst-case scenario. For example, there were no acute radiation deaths outside the plant in 1986.

A carefully planned and executed attack on a nuclear power station in a densely populated area in central Europe, for instance, could well cause thousands of early radiation casualties and hundreds of thousands of subsequent cancer deaths. Furthermore, vast areas of land would be contaminated and made unusable for a very long time. These conclusions, which derive from studies by national authorities in different countries, indicate the urgency and importance of the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. As in 1985, the NPT review conference will deal with the matter. Unfortunately, during the last five years there has not been much progress to report from the Conference on Disarmament.

The discussion in the working group on track B has started on the scope issue. Its fundamental importance certainly justifies this in-depth discussion. It is the hope of my delegation that the discussion will not be confined to a repetition of well-known positions, but rather will strive to overcome existing gaps. The work in the group on track B should now concentrate on drawing up a treaty text based on feasible and realistic premises that would serve a real and practical purpose. The elements of such a treaty are already in the track B "rolling text".

The Swedish Government attaches great importance to the future viability of the non-proliferation régime. In its view, the fourth review conference regarding the non-proliferation Treaty stands out as a major event. With the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT review conference taking place at the end of this month we are now entering the final phase of the preparatory work. Up to now the preparations have been running smoothly. Organizational matters have to a large extent been settled, and valuable background documents have been produced and discussed. It is my belief that there is a general and genuine will among States parties to do their utmost to bring this important review conference to a successful conclusion.

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The NPT is not yet a universal treaty. Although new States have successively joined, thus reinforcing the Treaty, some important States with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities have hitherto rejected adherence. Two nuclear-weapon States are also still missing from the ranks of NPT States parties. The credibility of the non-proliferation régime continues to be threatened.

The contribution of the NPT to world security and stability has often been evoked. In a period of drastic and rapid political change, with promising developments in many parts of the world, the Treaty as a positive element of stability plays an increasingly important role. Therefore, the NPT should be maintained and reinforced. The positive decision to renounce nuclear weapons contributes, in the view of my delegation, to strengthening the security of each individual State choosing this option. Sweden's decision to this effect and its subsequent adherence to the NPT were based on the assessment that its security would be best served without nuclear weapons. As the then Swedish Prime Minister expressed it: "That which should be our protection could equally well be transformed into the greatest threat to our neutrality and our peace". Sweden reiterates its call to all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the NPT - one of the most important post-war treaties in the field of disarmament, with more than 140 parties.

As long as nuclear weapons exist they pose a threat to the very existence of mankind. Their destructive power surpasses imagination. States with the power to decide about the use of nuclear weapons - as well as those who may plan to acquire such weapons - are not only gambling with the survival of their own countries; they are also putting in jeopardy the lives of us all. It must be perfectly clear that they have a responsibility to us - the have-nots - too. Three of the nuclear-weapon States are parties to the NPT. They have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Have these undertakings been fulfilled?

An important agreement, the INF Treaty, was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States a few years ago. An agreement on reducing their arsenals of strategic weapons will hopefully emerge soon. Sweden welcomes these efforts. But, as was pointed out by the Director-General of IAEA here in Geneva not long ago, there are more nuclear warheads in the world today than in 1968, when the NPT and its article VI were agreed.

All avenues should be explored in order to find new ways to reduce the nuclear weapon arsenals. In parallel, one measure of both practical and symbolic significance of the highest order would be the establishment here in the CD of an ad hoc committee on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Sweden has further proposed to the General Conference of IAEA that all transfers of weapons material to peaceful use should be verified through the application of Agency safeguards. If the nuclear material cannot immediately be used within peaceful programmes, the Agency's statute provides an instrument for storage under its custody.

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Similarly, all production of new nuclear materials for military purposes must cease. This idea is not new. From 1956 to 1969 the United States repeatedly proposed such a "cut-off". A United Nations General Assembly resolution on this issue sponsored by a large number of States has been adopted with an overwhelming majority for many years. If an undertaking to discontinue such production is to be credible it must be verifiable through inspection and constant surveillance. A pre-condition for a verifiable "cut-off" is a separation in the nuclear-weapon States of peaceful and military nuclear activities, whereby IAEA safeguards should be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities without exception. Sweden therefore urges all nuclear-weapon States to take measures to this effect.

The nuclear issues concern all the members of this Conference, and in fact all members of the international community. They cover a broad spectrum of our agenda. It is high time that they were addressed in earnest, if this Conference is to live up to its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. There are many ideas on how to improve the functioning of this body, and my delegation intends to revert to that matter in due course. However, no procedural or organizational improvements can compensate for the fact that it is the lack of political will to negotiate on some of the most pressing items of our agenda that is the real problem of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, for his very comprehensive statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, let me say first how pleased my delegation is at seeing you, the distinguished representative of friendly Pakistan, presiding over our Conference for the month of April. I am certain that under your able steersmanship our work will be fruitful. Allow me also to take this occasion to congratulate your predecessor, the Ambassador of Nigeria, His Excellency Mr. Emeke Ayo Azikiwe, on his excellent performance and formidable efforts in organizing our deliberations.

At today's session of the Conference on Disarmament I would like to present document CD/982 on the national trial inspection conducted in my country in the month of February this year.

Ever since the beginning of the negotiations on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, Yugoslavia has supported all the proposals related to verification measures. We are of the opinion that a verification system has to be efficient and cost-effective on the one hand, and on the other should include a well-balanced set of verification measures and should safeguard the sovereignty of all parties to the convention. The work to date within the Ad hoc Committee gives reason for optimism that these requirements will be met.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia neither produces nor possesses chemical weapons. However, we consider that last year's national trial inspection activity, which is being continued this year too, represents, as has been pointed out several times at the Conference, an important step in creating confidence among the parties to the convention and creating pre-conditions for multilateral inspection.

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As early as 1984, in document CD/482, Yugoslavia submitted a proposal on the scope of national verification, and the role, tasks and composition of the national team. Document CD/613 of 10 July 1985 contains a proposal whereby large-scale chemical industry production facilities should be subject to national verification measures. Many countries have already indicated, through their national trial inspections, possible solutions to problems resulting from such procedures. They have shown that the task is not an easy one, and that it requires a clear definition of the volume of work to be done, the tasks of each member of the inspection team and the role of the facility representatives, which can be a very useful one in dealing with and defining complex operations.

Against the background of experience with numerous national trial inspections, we organized a routine inspection of a plant for the production of chemicals declared under schedule [3] of the annex to article VI of the draft convention, as we do not produce chemicals listed under schedule [2]. A national trial inspection was organized to check that the facility was not being used to produce any chemicals other than the declared ones, and that the quantity produced was equal to the quantity declared. The inspection also checked the applicability of the relevant provisions of the draft convention.

The facility concerned is part of the PIB company - Industry of Basic Chemistry, Baric-Beograd - which produces organic chemicals. The chemical which was the object of our inspection was phosgene, listed under schedule [3]. The trial inspection was conducted in two phases. First, on its initial visit, the inspection team toured the facility to get acquainted with the production programme. The initial visit took two days, after which the details of the inspection were agreed upon. The second phase of the trial inspection was conducted in one day; the actual procedure of the inspection did not interfere with the normal operations of the facility. This phase was followed by the preparation of the report of the inspection team.

Both on its initial visit and during the routine inspection, the inspection team was composed of five members. The team included a chemical engineer (team leader) and a specialist in physical and chemical methods of analysis, both of them representatives of research institutes. In addition, the routine on-site inspection was attended by representatives of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the Federal Secretariat for National Defence and the Secretariat for the Chemical Industry in the Chamber of Economy.

The main conclusion of the inspectors on the basis of the information presented was that the characteristics of the facility corresponded to the standard features for the continuous production of phosgene. They concluded that a quantitative inspection of the process can be conducted either on the basis of the automatic records of raw materials and products (material balance), or on the basis of the inspection of technological parameters, also automatically recorded.

As it is specifically designed for the production of phosgene, the facility is not multi-purpose, and it is therefore doubtful whether such a facility can produce any other chemicals listed either under schedule [3] or under schedules [1] and [2]. In addition, several conclusions were drawn. A number of basic requirements have to be fulfilled for the inspection to be

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successful. Inter alia, there has to be, firstly, a precise description of the location of the facility, including the layout of the installations, together with the facility notification. A summary of the processes and operations which can be carried out in the facility should be attached.

Secondly, there should be a description of the process of synthesis of the chemical under inspection. This would offer data on the material balance of the processes, technological parameters and analytical methods for quality control of raw materials and products. The places and methods of sample-taking, the methods of analysis and all protective measures to be undertaken should be described with the assistance of the plant personnel. It was confirmed that the capability of a facility to produce other chemicals could also be established by inspecting the stocks of various chemicals and raw materials. The inspection team should include chemical engineers, specialists in monitoring and measuring instruments and automation, and specialists in physical and chemical methods of analysis, provided that at least one of them is a military expert.

A third requirement is the placing of limitations on the analyses of technological parameters. Some information on the production process can be of a confidential nature. However, if it is necessary to classify some information as confidential, it has to be determined in each case. The minimum set of technological parameters required for the successful conduct of an inspection should also be determined with the assistance of the facility personnel.

Fourthly, there is a need for proposals on a standard form of presentation of data on a plant in a report. Although it is clear that there are different plants and different production processes for the same or similar chemicals, we consider that for the successful conduct of an inspection it is necessary to propose a standard form of presentation both in submitting applications regarding chemicals and installations in a facility and in the report submitted to the inspection team.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin, for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): Mr. President, it is a source of great pleasure for my delegation to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament and to take the floor, once more, during the presidency of Pakistan. Your wide experience and your diplomatic skills are well known to all of us, and I am confident that these skills will help steer our deliberations in the spring session to a successful conclusion.

The subject of my intervention today is agenda item 5 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Since 1982 the Conference on Disarmament has had this important subject before it. In 1985, an agreement was reached on a mandate which made the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with this subject possible. That mandate, however, fell short of our expectations. Nevertheless, we accepted such a non-negotiating mandate in the hope that, by allowing the Ad hoc Committee to work, we could generate a growing momentum

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commensurate with the well-deserved importance accorded to the item. Instead, we have witnessed throughout the last few years deliberate attempts to weaken the work of the Ad hoc Committee and prevent it from attaining any form of progress, meaningful or otherwise.

Annually, the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space becomes the last subsidiary body to be established by the Conference on Disarmament. Such an imbalance must be avoided, and the Ad hoc Committee should be established early in the session in order to allow a structured and candid discussion on all related matters.

Outer space is the common heritage of mankind and carries hope for future generations. Substantive and serious work must be allowed to take place in the Ad hoc Committee. General Assembly resolution 44/112 requested the Conference on Disarmament, in paragraph 7, to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives, including those presented in the Ad hoc Committee at the 1989 session of the Conference and at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

It is an established fact that United Nations activities are anchored on the concept of the exploration of outer space for the benefit and in the interest of all States. In other words the concept of declaring outer space as the common heritage of mankind, and not subject to national appropriation, has been universally accepted since 1967. It is also conventional wisdom that the common interest of all mankind requires that the progress in the exploration and use of outer space be confined to peaceful purposes.

The 1967 outer space Treaty, which is universally considered as the primary and most authoritative source of international law regulating State activities in outer space, remains at the heart of the legal régime governing outer space. Before any attempt at analysing some of its relevant provisions, a few brief points should be noted. First, the 1967 outer space Treaty is a by-product of 1960s space technology. We are now at the threshold of the twenty-first century. Second, the pace and volume of technological developments since its adoption has been staggering. What was considered science fiction in the 1960s has already been attained or will soon be within our reach. Third, legal norms as a general rule should not be allowed to lag far behind technology.

The article in the Treaty relevant to our present discussion is article IV, which stipulates that parties should not "place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner". The article goes on to state that "the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes".

Here I would like to pause and present the following comments. First, article IV clearly contains a built-in limitation. Its scope does not extend to banning all types of weapons in outer space. It prohibits, inter alia, the placing, installing or stationing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction only. Its provisions do not therefore contain a clear-cut

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injunction to ensure that outer space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The principle of exclusive use for peaceful purposes applies only to the Moon and other celestial bodies. The only restriction placed on States parties pertains to the prohibition of the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapon and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies. What this means is that there is an inherent contradiction in the same article of the Treaty, thereby creating, as a result, not one but two legal régimes; one applicable to outer space and the other confined to the Moon and other celestial bodies.

A 1987 study prepared by UNIDIR accurately defined the present situation as follows:

"Different rules are established for outer space proper, on the one hand, and for the Moon and other celestial bodies, on the other. In the first case, what is involved is only a limited prohibition which, for example, does not prohibit the placing in orbit of non-nuclear ASAT or anti-missile weapons. In the second case, exclusive use for peaceful purposes entails more substantial restrictions, without necessarily going as far as total demilitarization. Because of its limited scope, the outer space Treaty left open the possibility of the introduction of weapons in space, other than nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, in particular ASAT weapons and space-based AVM systems."

From another perspective, several interpretations of the term "peaceful purposes" have been advanced. Peaceful purposes may mean "non-military" or "non-aggressive". As far as my delegation is concerned, a total ban on all non-peaceful uses of outer space should be our ultimate objective. Many delegations expressed similar views when the outer space Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1966. Egypt has consistently advocated this view.

Before concluding this point I would like to address one further aspect, namely that of offensive in contrast to defensive uses of outer space. Some States argue that defensive militarization of outer space is permissible. It is the considered view of my delegation that the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the contemporary rules of international law pertaining to outer space do not bear out this argument, for several reasons. Firstly, the Charter of the United Nations does not deal, as such, with the definition of what is defensive or offensive. The Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Secondly, the Charter recognizes the right of legitimate self-defence if an armed attack occurs, a fact also endorsed by rules of customary international law. Thirdly, the major difference between outer space and terrestrial space emanates from the special nature of outer space as the common heritage of mankind. A State has an inalienable sovereign right to use its territory for military purposes in accordance with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter. Outer space, however, is not part of the territory of any State and cannot be subject to the exercise of national jurisdiction. It follows that States should refrain from militarizing what belongs to mankind as a whole.

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Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that ambiguity surrounds the concepts of offensive versus defensive uses of outer space, this should not become a licence for States to increase military activities in outer space in a manner inconsistent with the principle of preserving space for peaceful purposes and preventing an arms race from occurring in outer space.

It is for these reasons that my delegation attaches great importance to the deliberations of, and the work conducted in, the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It is therefore essential that the Committee should enter into substantive discussions on ways and means of preventing an arms race in outer space by elaborating on the existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to arriving at concrete recommendations. The procedural wrangle that delays our work every year should not be allowed to continue.

Canada has always played a most constructive role on outer space matters, and my delegation would like to assure Ambassador Shannon of Canada, Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, of our full co-operation and wish him success in his endeavours.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby, for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me personally. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Lüdeking.

Mr. LUDEKING (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate you on taking up the presidency for the month of April. My delegation is satisfied to see you in the Chair presiding over the Conference during this month. At the same time, I wish to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, for the effective way in which he conducted the work of the Conference during the month of March.

The issue of verification of compliance is of crucial importance in our negotiations on a comprehensive global convention banning chemical weapons. And we knew from the outset that this issue would be one of the most difficult to resolve. Following intensive negotiations over the past years, a coherent verification system has been elaborated designed to reliably assure all States parties that the provisions of the convention are being complied with. This well-developed system consists of three basic elements: verification of declared CW stocks and production facilities, as well as their destruction; verification of non-production of chemical weapons, i.e. the monitoring of relevant non-prohibited activities in the chemical industry; and clarification and verification procedures in case of ambiguous situations and doubts about compliance. The conceptual approach underlying this verification system is sound. Last year's discussions on the pattern of verification testified to that. They also demonstrated that this approach is broadly accepted and considered to provide the basis for reliable and effective verification.

Last year's discussions in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons also focused on possible additional verification measures which are to supplement the existing ones already provided for in our "rolling text". As early as January 1988 my delegation put forward a proposal for ad hoc checks, a

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verification measure designed to complement the existing routine measures for the verification of non-production. We did so in an attempt to meet concerns expressed about the ease with which chemical weapons can be produced clandestinely in the chemical industry.

Ad hoc checks were designed to provide for a flexible, easily implementable and unintrusive means of verification at the disposal of the Technical Secretariat covering all facilities in the chemical industry which can be misused for the production of chemical weapons. Following our initial proposal, which was subsequently further developed in the course of the discussions (cf. CD/869 of 6 September 1988), other suggestions for strengthening the existing verification system have been put forward. In this regard I would like to mention specifically the very interesting and important proposal by the United Kingdom on ad hoc inspections.

The proposals which were put forward differed in their conceptual approach. However, the concerns which lay behind them were basically the same. The discussions on ad hoc verification, although they have not yet been conclusive, have contributed to greater awareness of the verification problem to be addressed by ad hoc verification. We welcome the determination of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius, to press for an early solution to this still outstanding problem in our negotiations.

In yesterday's meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons Australia presented a discussion paper which suggests an approach to ad hoc verification, which combines elements of the proposals of both the United Kingdom delegation and my delegation. This new proposal might provide a basis for our future discussions on the subject. It might also contribute to finding a solution to the issue of ad hoc verification acceptable to all. My delegation looks forward to in-depth consideration of the issue of ad hoc verification in the coming weeks. The proposal submitted yesterday by Australia provides an outline, which will have to be further fleshed out.

Since the extensive discussions undertaken in the course of the spring part of last year's session, my delegation has further explored the issue of national registers with a view to providing a manageable and effective solution. Our results are contained in a working paper, advance copies of which have been distributed this morning. In my statement today I have no intention of further discussing the concept of national registers suggested in our paper. Let me, however, just point out that in our view national registers are an indispensable element of any routine ad hoc verification mechanism as they would provide the necessary binding declaration basis. As such they would provide a comprehensive picture of the relevant parts of the chemical industry, listing all plant sites which can possibly be misused for the production of chemical weapons. In devising our approach for the establishment of national registers it was not only our aim to meet this objective. We also took account of the requirement that the approach must be feasible and easily implementable by States parties. In addition it had to be ensured that confidential information is protected. It is my hope that our proposal provides a good working basis. My delegation is looking forward to discussing it in detail during forthcoming meetings on the subject within the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Lüdeking, Federal Republic of Germany)

My delegation presented its views on challenge inspections in some detail in a statement earlier this session. On that occasion we were also able to present a report on our first trial challenge inspection in a military facility. Today I would like to introduce the report on our second trial challenge inspection. The report has been distributed this morning as document CD/983. This trial challenge inspection, again conducted in a military facility, was intended in particular to provide practical experience with inspection methods and equipment. The results are encouraging: we were able to conclude that portable testing and analysis equipment already available can be put to effective use in a challenge inspection. We hope that our findings will be of help in the further consideration of the issue of challenge inspections. We are continuing our series of trial challenge inspections. And we will continue to report on the practical experience we gain through them to the Conference on Disarmament.

With a view to promoting progress in our chemical weapons negotiations my Government intends to hold a workshop devoted to verification issues on 14 and 15 June this year in Munster, located between Hamburg and Hanover in Lower Saxony. The workshop is to focus on technical aspects of verification, in particular the use of instruments and equipment. The inspection equipment which was successfully employed in our trial challenge inspection, and on which details are contained in the report I have submitted today, will be demonstrated. In addition, the workshop will provide an opportunity to get acquainted with procedures for the safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons employed at the Federal Armed Forces' destruction plant in Munster for eliminating old stocks of chemical weapons that were found after the first and second world wars.

On behalf of my Government, I have pleasure in inviting all heads of delegation of CD members as well as interested observer States to attend this workshop. In addition to the heads of delegation one further member from each delegation is invited to attend. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will provide transport by special aircraft. It will also provide hotel accommodation and meals. It is planned that the aeroplane provided by the Federal Government will depart from Geneva on the morning of 14 June. The arrival of the return flight in Geneva is scheduled for approximately 5.30 p.m. on 15 June 1990. A written invitation with further details on the programme of the workshop will be provided as soon as possible. To be able to make the necessary arrangements for the workshop we would appreciate it if each delegation could inform us by 23 April 1990 whether it will participate in the workshop and, if so, who will be attending.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the generous announcement regarding the workshop in Munster, and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? Since that does not seem to be the case I should like to recall that, at the plenary meeting of the Conference to be held on Thursday 12 April, we shall take up the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as contained in document CD/981.

(The President)

The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Ambassador Shannon of Canada, informs me that he is to hold open-ended consultations with the group co-ordinators and the representatives of any other interested delegations following the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee this afternoon. Those consultations will take place in room C.108, next to the Council Chamber.

As announced earlier, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, five minutes after the conclusion of this plenary meeting.

As there seems to be no other business for today, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 12 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.551
12 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ahmad Kamal (Pakistan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 551st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". However, in conformity with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of China, the Republic of Korea, Japan and the German Democratic Republic.

I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): It gives me great pleasure to make my first statement at a plenary meeting in the month of April. At the outset, on behalf of my delegation, I would like to extend warm greetings and congratulations to Your Excellency Ambassador Kamal, the eminent representative of my country's friendly neighbour, non-aligned Pakistan, on your taking up the important post of President of the Conference for the last month of the spring session. I am confident that with your erudition, rich experience and outstanding diplomatic skills you will surely guide our work towards fruitful results and contribute to new progress in our deliberations and negotiations. You can count on my delegation's full and constructive co-operation with you and with the other delegations.

I would also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, and thank him for his skilful guidance of our work in March and for his remarkable efforts and accomplishments.

People throughout the world have long aspired to and pressed for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. Naturally, this has been a priority subject for in-depth negotiations in the Conference, on which world-wide attention is riveted. Since the spring session began, we have listened attentively to various ideas, views and proposals put forward by other delegations on this matter. Today the Chinese delegation would like to share some of its thoughts with other delegations, with a view to jointly exploring ways to deepen and advance the negotiating process. To begin with, I wish to point out that my Government has always attached great importance to and placed high hopes on the ongoing negotiations on the CW convention in our Conference. Premier Li Peng of the State Council of the People's Republic of China stated on 20 March in his report on the work of the Government to the National People's Congress that the Chinese Government hoped to see progress in the Conference on Disarmament in concluding an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Not long ago, during his first visit to the Conference, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichenn, in a statement at the plenary meeting, outlined the basic position and propositions of the Chinese Government on a series of important disarmament issues, including the prohibition of chemical weapons. This once again reflected my Government's positive attitude to promoting disarmament and contributing to international peace and security. My delegation will, as instructed by the Chinese

(Mr. Hou, China)

Government, work energetically towards the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

The Chinese Government pursues an independent foreign policy of peace aimed at safeguarding international peace and security. China therefore has always firmly stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons, so as to free mankind once and for all from the danger and threat posed by such weapons of mass destruction. It is well known that China is a non-chemical-weapon State that neither possesses nor produces chemical weapons. The Chinese people fell victim to such weapons in the past, and even today such weapons abandoned by foreign aggressors during the war are discovered from time to time on our territory. In their utmost abhorrence of chemical weapons and chemical warfare, the Chinese people are determined to contribute to the early realization of a world free of chemical weapons. We wish to reiterate that the objective of the CW convention is to ensure the unconditional, complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities, and a total and lasting ban on the production and use of chemical weapons. We also propose that pending the conclusion and entry into force of the convention, all chemical-weapon States should unconditionally undertake not to use or produce chemical weapons, while all other States refrain from the development, production and acquisition of chemical weapons.

It is gratifying to note that with the development in the international situation, some headway has been made in the field of disarmament. A series of important initiatives by the international community has generated good momentum for banning chemical weapons. The Paris Conference of January 1989 adopted a Final Declaration which reaffirmed the validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and urged the banning of the use of chemical weapons and acceleration of the ongoing negotiations on the CW convention. This was followed by the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons in September, which also provided a powerful political impetus for reaching the objective of prohibiting chemical weapons. Representatives from our Government and chemical industry took an active part in both conferences. We appreciate the French and Australian initiatives in this connection and the efforts of all participating States. The ninth non-aligned summit and the forty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly also adopted important resolutions and put forth numerous positive proposals on this subject.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that over recent years, with the energetic efforts of the CD members and non-members and under the skilful guidance of successive chairmen of the CW Ad hoc Committee, negotiations on the CW convention have registered positive results. The basic structure of the future convention has already taken shape, and a large measure of consensus has been achieved on quite a few provisions. The ongoing negotiations are gathering momentum and developing in depth. It should be mentioned that last year, under the dynamic leadership of Ambassador Morel, the Ad hoc Committee did a great deal of useful work and achieved certain results. This year the Ad hoc Committee speedily set about its work upon its smooth re-establishment with a new and improved mandate, which dropped

(Mr. Hou, China)

the phrase "except for its final drafting" that had been there since 1984 and incorporated the positive wording "at the earliest date" contained in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference. We appreciate this encouraging development. Currently, the re-established Ad hoc Committee, under the remarkable leadership of the experienced Swedish diplomat, Ambassador Hyltenius, is embarking on a positive exercise of in-depth negotiations. It is our hope and conviction that this year the Committee will register fresh progress as it approaches the critical stage of the negotiations.

Looking at the realities of the world today, one cannot but be keenly aware of the continued presence of disturbing factors of turbulence and instability. Threats to international peace and security remain. Mankind still lives under the threat of various types of barbarous weapons, including chemical weaponry. Although the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons has existed for 65 years, from time to time its authority has been challenged and its effectiveness undermined. A small number of military Powers already possessing formidable chemical arsenals are pressing ahead with the production and modernization of such weapons. This undoubtedly poses a major obstacle to the negotiations on the convention. The harsh reality facing us is that the answer to the question whether and when a breakthrough in our negotiations is possible depends by and large on whether the countries possessing the largest chemical arsenals have sufficient political will to fulfil their special responsibilities in real earnest. Without looking back too far into history, the international community has been urging the super-Powers at least since the mid-1970s to make substantive progress in their bilateral CW negotiations at an early date and to contribute with actual deeds to the multilateral negotiating process. The international community expects them to renounce the use of chemical weapons, destroy their existing stocks and production facilities completely and halt the production and development of chemical weapons. We believe that such an unconditional commitment on their part will surely have the most positive bearing on the multilateral negotiations, thereby contributing to progress towards the objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons on a global scale. That is the logical course for the ongoing negotiation to take.

Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of optimistic statements on the bilateral CW negotiations. Needless to say, substantive bilateral breakthroughs conducive to multilateral negotiations, once they do occur, should be duly welcomed. Years of negotiation between the United States and the USSR have so far yielded a certain measure of progress, with both sides announcing their readiness to reduce their huge CW arsenals. This is long overdue. No further progress is discernible, however, other than this vague expression of their intention to slash a portion of their CW arsenals within a relatively long time frame in the future. They have neither jointly pledged to halt CW production and improvement nor shown a common desire to refrain from the use of chemical weapons. This falls far short of the expectations of the Conference and the international community as a whole.

(Mr. Hou, China)

Alarmingly, not only is there an absence of commitment to the complete elimination and total destruction of existing chemical weapons, but also a new argument has been advanced for the retention of chemical weapons. It is held that even after joining the convention, a State party still has the right to retain a portion of its stockpiles should any country which it unilaterally and subjectively judges to be "CW-capable" not become a party to the convention. Furthermore, there are signs on their part indicating an attempt to keep their CW production facilities ready for resumption of production at any moment. The authors of this argument claim that this will enhance the universality of the convention. In fact, if anything this has set up new obstacles for the negotiations, and therefore has already caused widespread concern and opposition. The reason is simple and clear. Article I of the "rolling text" of the draft convention stipulates justly and unequivocally that the obligation regarding the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities should unconditionally apply to all States parties. If any State party is free to attach conditions to this fundamental obligation to meet its own needs, the very foundation of our negotiations will crumble and the nature of the convention will be changed. The convention will then at best be an instrument for quantitative restrictions or for CW non-proliferation. If the above-mentioned argument prevails, it will provide any State possessing chemical weapons and CW production facilities with a handy pretext for retaining a certain quantity of its stockpiles and production facilities, thus subjecting the numerous non-chemical-weapon States to a perpetual threat from chemical weapons. Obviously, this will either preclude the possibility of concluding the convention or lead to a convention of a discriminatory and unequal nature.

Here another closely related and important matter should be addressed, that is, the question of banning the use of chemical weapons. It is common knowledge that the prohibition of use constitutes one of the fundamental obligations under the future convention. Without this there will be no complete prohibition to speak of. It is precisely for this reason that since 1985 article I of the draft convention has contained the explicit obligation that "each State party undertakes not to use chemical weapons", to which no objection has been raised from any side. We have noted the reference to non-use in the recent United States-USSR joint statement, and we welcome this. However, in the multilateral consultations on the mandate of the CW Ad hoc Committee, there was downright rejection of the same reference, which cannot but make people feel puzzled. Its implications are even more disquieting when viewed together with the proposal that a portion of chemical weapons and their production facilities should be retained. Against this background, the Group of 21 non-aligned and neutral countries solemnly stated on 15 March that "the future convention on chemical weapons should prohibit the use of such weapons under any circumstance from the date the convention enters into force", that "all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities shall be destroyed during the destruction period of 10 years", and that "this undertaking shall be without any reservation". The Chinese delegation would like to stress that it fully supports these reasonable

(Mr. Hou, China)

propositions of the Group of 21, which are in complete accord with our own. We hope to see the speedy removal of this new artificial obstacle, so that our negotiation returns to its normal track.

The verification of the CW convention, including challenge inspection, is an important issue of universal concern in our negotiations. It not only has a direct bearing on the sovereignty and important rights and interests of all States, but also concerns the authority, effectiveness and viability of the convention itself. For this reason, it should be the subject of serious and in-depth consultations and negotiations so as to find a just and reasonable solution acceptable to all. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, set out the principled position of the Chinese Government in his statement on 27 February.

"... we are in favour of an effective, reasonable and feasible verification régime under the convention, including challenge inspection. In the mean time we maintain that challenge inspection should not go beyond the purposes, objectives and scope of the convention, and that its possible abuse must be strictly guarded against. Specific provisions should ensure a balance between the rights and obligations of the requesting State on the one hand and those of the requested State on the other, and give full play to the role of the future organization."

Firstly, this shows that China is in favour of an appropriate challenge inspection régime which is fair, reasonable and practicable. This régime should act as a deterrent to possible violations of the convention and contribute to timely detection and correction of such acts once they do occur. Such a challenge inspection régime will strengthen the effectiveness of the convention and confidence in it.

Secondly, I would like to point out that the principal objective of the convention is to enhance international peace and the security of all States through the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. The sole purpose of verification, including challenge inspection, is to serve the realization of the principles and objectives of the convention. To this end, it should strictly function within the scope of the convention to ensure effective compliance. However, any abuse of the highly intrusive challenge inspection procedure, any attempt to use challenge inspection to unduly interfere in the political, economic, military, technical or other fields of the security of States parties that have nothing to do with the purposes and objectives of the CW convention, would not only infringe upon the rights and interests of the States parties, but would also endanger the very existence of the convention. Hence it is necessary to stress the principles governing verification unanimously adopted by UNDC and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988. In these principles it is expressly stipulated that requests for inspections "should be used only for the purposes of the determination of compliance, care being taken to avoid abuses", and that verification arrangements should "avoid unduly interfering with the internal affairs of States parties or other States, or jeopardizing their economic,

(Mr. Hou, China)

technological and social development". These important principles are without doubt applicable to all forms of verification of international disarmament agreements, the highly intrusive challenge inspection being no exception.

Thirdly, given the complex realities in current international relations and the intrusive and sensitive nature of challenge inspection, the possibility of abuse of challenge inspection, like that of the violation of the convention, cannot be precluded. Both the violation and the abuse will compromise the authority and effectiveness of the convention, and should equally be guarded against. Appropriate and specific measures must therefore be instituted for such possibilities, so that in the event that violations or abuses of the provisions of the convention do occur, there will be timely detection, correction and, if necessary, adoption of sanctions.

Fourthly, it should be emphasized that challenge inspection in a global multilateral convention is an unprecedented novelty in the practice of international law, and should be treated with particular caution. With no precedent to guide us, we should follow strictly the 3 verification principles contained in the final document of SSOD-I and the 16 principles adopted by UNDC as the basis and yardstick of our work, and avoid going against them, for these principles have been formulated as a result of careful consideration by the representatives of all countries, taking into account the interests and concerns of all sides. It should also be pointed out that even in the arms control agreements between the two military alliances or the two super-Powers, including agreements and statements on chemical weapons, there has never been anything of such an absolute and all-embracing nature. Besides, multilateral agreements should not mechanically copy the provisions of bilateral ones, because there are significant differences between them. Any provision in bilateral agreements is based on equality and reciprocity between the two parties, which can be described as two sides of the same coin. The situation in the multilateral field is far more complex and varied, as States parties to the future convention include various countries of the East, West, North and South with great differences in their political, economic, military and security circumstances, as well as the level and stage of their scientific and technological development. Issues such as how to prevent discrimination and ensure the equality and equal rights and obligations of all countries, and how to establish a balance between rights and obligations for countries of different categories, are by nature extremely difficult, yet must be properly resolved. Otherwise, the universality of the convention will be only an empty word. Precisely because of this it is clearly stipulated in the aforementioned principles adopted by UNDC that "verification arrangements should be implemented without discrimination" and that "all States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties". Therefore, in addition to undertaking the obligation of being subject to verification, many non-aligned countries have expressed their wish to obtain rights for equal participation in verification, as well as the capabilities and means to exercise such rights. This is reasonable.

(Mr. Hou, China)

Fifthly, in our view, only at the initial stage of making the request is there somehow a bilateral dimension to challenge inspection. Once the request has been made and challenge inspection initiated, it becomes a serious matter of multilateral international relations. Therefore, it should be handled by the organization of the convention by normal international legal means rather than through bilateral ways and means. With regard to challenge inspection under the convention on chemical weapons, it is imperative to rely on the organization and its appropriate organs which should play the major role throughout the entire inspection process. Only in this way will it be possible to deal correctly with violations of the convention and redress them, prevent abuses as far as possible and handle the relationship between the various States parties in a fair, reasonable and balanced manner, including the respective rights and obligations of the requesting countries and the inspected countries.

Especially at present, when international relations are moving towards democratization, in settling disputes in multilateral relations no country should be allowed to be an omnipotent arbitrator playing at the same time the role of plaintiff, prosecutor, judge and investigator, while putting other countries in the position of defendants to be presumed guilty and sentenced without any right of appeal. Such a practice is both intolerable in the domestic law of any country and contrary to recognized international legal norms, and is therefore unacceptable. Naturally, to incorporate the above-mentioned principles and the sound suggestions made by many delegations into the relevant provisions and implementation procedures of the convention will require further in-depth study and consultation, as well as careful drafting.

The destruction of chemical weapons abandoned by foreign countries in the countries which have fallen victim to a CW attack constitutes an issue of principle which must be correctly resolved in the future convention. The abandoning of chemical weapons by a country on the territory of another not only concerns the past and the present but raises the possibility of a recurrence in the future. Thus it naturally concerns any potential CW-abandoning countries and attacked countries, that is to say the rights and obligations of all States parties are at stake. Therefore it is an issue directly related to the maintenance of peace and security. In this light, as a permanent international legal instrument of unlimited duration, the CW convention should contain equitable provisions of principle. It is only natural that the convention, as a minimum, should explicitly stipulate the responsibility of user countries and CW-abandoning countries for the destruction of chemical weapons in question. This is also a well-established principle in handling international armed conflicts and war liabilities, and should be reflected clearly as a rule of principle in the convention. Of course, the principle does not exclude appropriate specific arrangements by the countries concerned through consultations and negotiations. To require the attacked countries to bear responsibility for the destruction of the chemical weapons abandoned by other countries would be unfair and can only encourage the use of chemical weapons and aggression; it is therefore unacceptable.

(Mr. Hou, China)

I also wish to reiterate China's principled position and views on two important issues related to the convention - article X, on assistance, and article XI, on economic and technological development, in the "rolling text". The convention should explicitly stipulate that necessary international assistance should be provided to States parties attacked with chemical weapons. This is not only indispensable for their security, but will also serve as a deterrent and sanction against the use of CW. The convention should also encourage and promote the development of the civilian chemical industry, as well as strengthen international co-operation and exchanges in this regard. The Chinese delegation understands and supports the legitimate rights and interests and reasonable demands of the numerous third world developing countries in this regard. These two articles are also directly related to the important principle of the undiminished security of all States parties and the major issue of universal adherence, and should be appropriately addressed in the negotiations.

The realization of the objective of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons is an arduous task. We have traversed a long distance and made some progress, yet some complex and difficult issues have still to be resolved. We are fully convinced that we must and can reach our objective. The Chinese delegation will as always work in joint efforts with other delegations and contribute to the early achievement of this noble goal.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his important statement and for the courteous words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Sang Ock Lee.

Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, allow me to extend to you our warm congratulations on your taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. I wish you every success in discharging your important responsibility. As Pakistan and the Republic of Korea have enjoyed a friendly and co-operative relationship, and as you yourself were the diplomat on the spot as Ambassador of Pakistan to my country and made an active contribution to furthering the ties between our two countries, it gives me particular pleasure to see you presiding over the Conference. My country has been invited again this year to participate as a non-member State in the plenary meetings and in two subsidiary bodies of the Conference, namely, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. My delegation appreciates the decision and looks forward to making constructive contributions.

The reforms and changes taking place in Central Europe account for a transition away from the cold war system and open up a new dimension of international relations conducive to openness and co-operation among States transcending ideological and political differences. Amidst the unfolding of such developments, my delegation is inclined to render a positive view on the future of international relations. This evolution augurs well for the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Highlighting the warm climate of the times was

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

the summit meeting held in Malta last December between the two super-Powers, which set the stage for a series of positive moves towards settlement of major outstanding disarmament issues.

The breakthrough on a key issue at the Foreign Ministers' talks held in Moscow in February between the United States and the Soviet Union underscores a major step forward in the ongoing START talks expected to be concluded in the near future. Also viewed as a sign of headway in the negotiation is the reaching of agreement to sign a bilateral accord on chemical weapons at the forthcoming summit meeting.

The holding of the "open skies" conference in Ottawa demonstrated unremitting efforts to explore and validate a new dimension of confidence-building in the East-West disarmament talks. The Conference was also a venue for obtaining agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on troop strength reductions in Central Europe. With this accord reached, the conclusion of the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe is perceived as a likely reality before the year's end. My Government welcomes these developments and hopes that they will have a positive influence on the negotiations undertaken by the Conference on Disarmament.

Much effort has been devoted to negotiating a convention banning chemical weapons, as the issue has been the focus of world-wide attention and concern. Inter-sessional work by the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was a reinforcing and complementary link to this year's negotiations. My delegation hopes that the spirit of accommodation and compromise will continue to be the guiding force in narrowing the remaining differences.

The international Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons held in Canberra last year provided an excellent occasion to affirm the weighty responsibilities of industry in negotiations on chemical weapons, and demonstrated that progress is possible when political ideals and practical goals are linked. As my delegation stressed at the Canberra Conference, the development of chemicals for peaceful purposes and the protection of confidentiality are two important dimensions to which due consideration should continue to be given.

National trial inspections have contributed to the efforts to establish a common formula for verification. Much hope is placed on the realization of multilateral trial inspections in order to remove the remaining obstacles.

The Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be convened in Geneva in August of this year. As the forthcoming review conference is the final one of its kind under the mandate of the NPT, it will have significant implications for the future of the NPT up to and beyond the year 1995. Despite the long-standing contention on the genesis of the NPT, the contributions which the Treaty has made to international peace and security deserve wide recognition and appreciation.

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

The NPT calls for horizontal as well as vertical non-proliferation, as they are a corollary to universal adherence whereby the Treaty's success will be assured. As a party to the Treaty since 1975, my country is fully committed to its obligations under the Treaty, including international safeguards. As the safeguard measures are a sine qua non for non-proliferation, those whose commitments fall short of such steps are called upon to complete their commitments by placing their nuclear facilities under full-scope international safeguards.

Security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States from another facet of the problem whereby the question of non-proliferation has been addressed. Security situations vary from region to region and from country to country. They resist a common formula and make elaboration difficult. Nevertheless, unilateral declarations by individual nuclear-weapon States on negative security assurances, along with the positive security assurances set forth in Security Council resolution 255 of 1968, serve as a useful and practical basis pending further refinement of this approach.

The position regarding the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones is similar. The establishment of such a zone in one region does not necessarily warrant the same in another. The approach is viable only when there is agreement among all States concerned in a region, and when regional characteristics are fully taken.

The world-wide trend towards openness and reconciliation increasingly leads the way in favour of international dialogue and understanding. Regrettably, however, such is not yet the case with the situation on the Korean peninsula. With hostility and tension remaining unabated, it has not removed the vestiges of the cold war era. The improved East-West relations and the progress in their disarmament talks as we witness today are undoubtedly a result of confidence-building efforts pursued over a considerable span of time. However, current inter-Korean relations lack the necessary trust and confidence upon which any such reconciliation process has to be based.

A number of proposals on inter-Korean exchanges have been made by my country with the aim of increasing mutual trust and confidence between the two parts of Korea. Inter-Korean talks to this end have been conducted at various levels. Talks between the Red Cross societies on reuniting families displaced during the Korean war, talks between parliamentarians and talks on inter-Korean trade were the major undertakings in this endeavour. My Government sincerely hopes that the inter-Korean talks now under suspension will resume as soon as possible.

The idea of establishing a "peace city" in the demilitarized zone is also a significant initiative put forward by us as a confidence-building measure pending realization of active exchanges between the two parts of Korea. Also at the beginning of this year, we proposed the early conclusion of agreements

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

on inter-Korean travel and communications with a view to promoting mutual opening-up and exchanges. However, such initiatives have not been answered by the other side with comparable measures, apparently due to its inability to break away from isolation and follow the changes prevailing in today's world. As we strongly believe that the building of trust and confidence between the two parts of Korea is part and parcel of advancing any of their meaningful dialogues, including disarmament, we will continue to pursue these efforts. Despite the contention invariably put forward by the other side, it is an undeniable fact that security arrangements made by my country have proven to be a most realistic and effective means of preserving stability and peace on the Korean peninsula. The genesis of the Korean War makes such arrangements imperative, and as long as hostility and tension remains undiminished, there is a need to maintain the basic defence structure.

A joint military exercise with our ally called "Team Spirit" has been held annually. It is designed to enhance defence preparedness against the recurrence of hostilities on the Korean peninsula. This year the scale of the exercise was reduced. Invitations were extended to North Korea and China along with four member countries of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission overseeing the military armistice, namely Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, to send observers to the exercise, with a view to increasing the openness and transparency of the exercise's defensive nature. We are hoping that the steps we have taken will be reciprocated when similar military exercises take place in the northern part of the Korean peninsula.

My country is steadily improving relations with countries whose ideological and political differences were hindering factors in the past. Improved relations with these nations is an important confidence-building effort, and they also increase global influence for the removal of barriers standing in the way of the inter-Korean reconciliation process. When mutual confidence and trust lead to the removal of the barriers, the Korean people, both South and North, will be able to find the way to a durable and lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and attainment of the peaceful reunification of the divided country.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement, and would like to address a very sincere kamsa hamnida to him for the very courteous and kind words addressed to this Chair and to my person.

The last two speakers will deal with the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Before we proceed to consider it, may I ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor on any other matter at this stage? Since that does not seem to be the case, I will now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Mr. Watanabe, as co-ordinator of the Western Group for agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban".

Mr. WATANABE (Japan): It gives us great pleasure to see Pakistan presiding over the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. Pakistan and Japan have enjoyed excellent relations over the years. We assure you of our full co-operation in the fulfilment of your duties.

(Mr. Watanabe, Japan)

Today, on behalf of a group of Western countries, I would like to speak on the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/981, which was introduced by Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden on 5 April.

The delegations on whose behalf I am speaking highly appreciate the continued excellent work carried out by the Group, under its mandate set out in CD/46, in "elaborating instructions and specifications for international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events ... which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in a protocol which would be an integral part of the treaty".

We note with great satisfaction that the second phase of the Group's Second Large-scale Technical Test (GSETT-2) started successfully on 16 January 1990. Dr. Dahlman stated that "to operate a system in the real world differs considerably from conceptually designing it", but we are confident that the success of the phase 3 full-scale experiment now planned for the first half of next year has been made more likely by improved preparation to be conducted under the revised schedule of remaining GSETT-2 activities.

We share with the group its satisfaction that efforts are under way in some 10 additional countries to join the experiment and to establish national data centres. We welcome the Group's decision that countries able to contribute only level I data may now also participate in GSETT-2. And we sincerely hope that together with the rescheduling of future activities, this will encourage those countries which have not yet done so, especially in South America, Africa and Asia, to join in the work of the Group.

Before concluding, we would like to express our sincere appreciation to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which has made its Global Telecommunication System available to the GSE. Its continued co-operation will be essential for the success of GSETT-2.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement made on behalf of the Western Group, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze, who will speak in his capacity as Co-ordinator of the Socialist Group for agenda item 1.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): May I use this occasion, Sir, to express to you the extreme pleasure of my delegation at seeing you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament during this month. I am doing so in the conviction that under your efficient stewardship, the spring session of the Conference will produce positive and encouraging results which could lead us to a good start and substantial progress during the forthcoming summer session. Let me also express my appreciation for the efforts undertaken by you to facilitate the work of the CD in different fields. I assure you of my

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

delegation's fullest support. The outgoing President, Ambassador Azikiwe, deserves our appreciation and gratitude for his committed and competent efforts during the past period of work.

The group on whose behalf I have the the honour to take the floor attaches great importance to the work of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts. By devising and testing a global seismic data exchange system, the GSE renders a significant contribution to setting up the scientific and technological basis for verification of compliance with a future comprehensive test-ban treaty. In so doing, the Ad hoc Group is effectively contributing to the work on a nuclear item which falls to the responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament.

We are satisfied with the progress achieved so far in the experiment on the exchange of level II data. Wide experience has been gained in this process, which is valuable for its continuation and successful conclusion. At this juncture, I should like to express our gratitude and appreciation to all scientists from the countries participating in GSETT-2 for the purposeful work accomplished by them and, in particular, to Dr. Dahlman (Sweden) and Dr. Basham (Canada) for their dedicated activities in this endeavour.

As it was stated by Dr. Ola Dahlman on 5 April 1990 here in this forum, the Group of Scientific Experts, during its spring session, carried out comprehensive work with a view to solving manifold organizational and scientific and technological questions connected with this experiment. We welcome the activities planned to settle several problems that remain pending, especially in connection with the processing of the amount of transmitted data, which was much larger than anticipated. The co-operation with WMO will be conducive to finding answers to the unresolved questions concerning data transmission. We agree with the revision of the preliminary schedule for GSETT-2, as well as with paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of the GSE.

Our Group considers the broadest possible participation by States in GSETT-2 to be of major importance. This would help improve the conditions for testing the concept for a global data exchange system specified in the GSE's fifth report in a realistic environment. So far 21 countries, some of them having strongly differing starting positions in terms of science and technology, personnel and finance, have successfully participated in the experiment. We welcome the fact that more States, among them countries from our Group, have expressed their intention of taking part in future GSETT-2 activities and are making preparations in this regard. The decisions of the Ad hoc Group to reduce the technical requirements for participation in the experiment are appropriate for encouraging even wider participation in this important experiment.

The advanced stage in the work of the GSE offers opportunities for the Conference on Disarmament to consider broadening the scope of its deliberations of verification methods for a future CTBT. This includes, inter alia, the elaboration of procedures for on-site inspections, satellite remote sensing and atmospheric radioactivity surveillance. The countries on

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

whose behalf I am speaking consider that substantive work should be started by experts in the Ad hoc Group with an extended mandate or in another appropriate organizational framework which goes beyond questions of seismology.

In conclusion, permit me to make another remark regarding the establishment of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. We welcome the fact that all groups have agreed, without prejudice to their preferred draft mandate, to work towards consensus on the basis of the draft mandate contained in document CD/863. This signals increased readiness to resume substantive work on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". We hope that it will be possible to set up a committee on this agenda item at the very beginning of the summer session. As was emphasized in the plenary debate, this would provide the necessary political framework for consideration of the important results of GSETT-2.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and his very kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): The Chinese delegation listened carefully to the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. We would like to welcome the successful conclusion of the twenty-ninth session of the Group. The Chinese delegation expresses its appreciation of the constructive work of the Group of Scientific Experts. We are also appreciative of the positive efforts made by the Chairman of the Group, Dr. Dahlman of Sweden, and its Co-ordinator, Dr. Basham of Canada. En passant I would like to say that the appropriate departments and experts in our country are seriously considering participation in international data exchange experiments on seismic events. We have noted that the meeting of the Group has decided to postpone phase three of the large-scale experiment. This will lead to better results in the experiment on a larger scale.

The PRESIDENT: You will recall that at our last plenary meeting, I announced that we would take action today on the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

In connection with paragraph 9, the Chair circulated, at the plenary meeting held on 5 April, the draft of a letter that I as President will address to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization in connection with the participation of a member of the Ad hoc Group in the next session of the WMO Commission for Basic Systems Working Group on the Global Telecommunication System. It was noted at that plenary meeting that, if no objections were raised before today's plenary meeting, the letter would be sent as drafted. No objections have been received and, accordingly, I shall proceed as indicated.

(The President)

In connection with the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of the Ad hoc Group's progress report, we are invited to adopt it in order to determine the dates for the next session of that subsidiary body. The Ad hoc Group has proposed that its next session should be held between 30 July and 10 August 1990. If there is no objection raised I shall take it that the Conference adopts that recommendation.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have conducted consultations with the co-ordinators of the various Groups and with China on the question of the opening date for the second part of the 1990 session of the Conference. As a result of these consultations, we have agreed on Tuesday, 12 June. Therefore, I suggest that we now take the relevant decision. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference agrees on Tuesday, 12 June as the opening date for the second part of the annual session.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The secretariat has circulated today at my request a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of subsidiary bodies and, as usual, is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. As announced earlier, there will be no meetings on Monday, 16 April, as this is an official holiday for the United Nations Office at Geneva. Provision is made in the timetable for the first informal meeting on agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", on Tuesday, 17 April immediately after the plenary meeting. I might also mention, for the information of all delegates, that - very tentatively, and subject to a response ad referendum from one of the co-ordinators - we are considering the afternoon of Friday, 20 April, for the totally informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. The notification, subject to the response received from one co-ordinator, will be given at the beginning of next week.

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable as circulated.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 17 April, at 10 a.m. I wish you all a Happy Easter.

The meeting rose at 11.25 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.552
17 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 April 1990, at 10a.m.

President:

Mr. Ahmad Kamal

(Pakistan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 552nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference resumes today its further consideration of outstanding matters. It is also understood that, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have no speakers on my list today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

Since that is not the case, I should like to inform members that all Groups have now indicated agreement with my suggestion that we should hold an informal open-ended consultation of the Conference on Friday, 20 April, at 3 p.m., on the subject of its improved and effective functioning. We shall hold the consultation in this conference room with amplification services only, as is the practice for this kind of meeting.

As indicated in the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference during this week, we shall hold the first informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", immediately after this plenary meeting today.

As I have no other business for today I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 19 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.15 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.553
19 April 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 19 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Ahmad Kamal

(Pakistan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 553rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference continues today, in accordance with its programme of work, further consideration of outstanding matters. As usual, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

In that connection, I am pleased to inform the Conference that, today, the heads of the delegations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms will make statements at this plenary meeting on the status of those negotiations. This is a welcome development which, I am sure, will be appreciated by all members, as this enhances the role of this Conference as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. I therefore extend a cordial welcome in our midst to Ambassadors Richard R. Burt and Yuri Nazarkin, as well as to Ambassador David Smith, who will also address us today.

I should also like to note the presence among us of the new representative of Czechoslovakia to the Conference, Ambassador Juraj Králik, who is participating in our work for the first time today. Ambassador Králik is an old Geneva hand, and it gives me pleasure to extend to him a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and pledge to him my personal co-operation and that of my own delegation.

I further wish to inform you that immediately after we have come to the end of the list of speakers today, I intend to convene, an informal meeting of the Conference to consider two requests for participation from non-members which were received last week. After the informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary meeting immediately to formalize any decisions that may have been agreed upon informally.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Mr. President, you have already welcomed Ambassador Richard Burt, head of the United States delegation to the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, and Ambassador David Smith, chief United States negotiator for the defence and space talks. If I may, I would simply add that Ambassador Burt has pursued his distinguished career serving in a number of senior posts such as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and, most recently, as United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. He brings to his current position long and high-level experience in the field of nuclear arms control, as well as political, military and national security affairs in general. Ambassador Smith has worked with high distinction in defence and space matters for a good number of years, and comes to his current post here in Geneva from a senior-level position on the staff of the United States Senate. He is no stranger to these chambers, having served for more than two years on the United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament during the middle 1980s.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

It is our proposal that Ambassador Burt bring the Conference up to date regarding developments, as we view them, in the United States-Soviet strategic arms reduction talks since his last briefing last August. He will be followed by Ambassador Smith, who will brief the Conference on the current status of the defence and space negotiations. The United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament is pleased to be able to offer these briefings as a part of our continuing efforts to keep the Conference abreast of progress in these important bilateral arms control discussions.

Thank you, Mr. President. With your permission, I will turn the floor over to Ambassador Burt.

Mr. BURT (United States of America): I would like to thank Ambassador Ledogar for his warm introduction. I have known Steve for a long time. He is experienced and extremely capable, and the United States is proud to have him lead our delegation here at the CD. Indeed, his appointment to this important post was a statement of our high regard for this institution. I would also like to thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words and for the opportunity to brief the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you the greatest success during your tenure as CD President.

Once again, I am pleased to be speaking to the members of the Conference on Disarmament on the status of the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. As Steve Ledogar pointed out, Ambassador David Smith, the chief United States negotiator for the defence and space talks, is with me and will discuss those negotiations in a few moments.

Eight months ago, I came here to discuss the United States' objective in START - the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Our objective is to complete a treaty that provides for reductions in strategic offensive arms, enhances stability, and thus reduces the risk of nuclear war. I said then that, for President George Bush, nothing has higher priority than to achieve a fair and far-reaching agreement that strengthens peace.

Much has happened since my last visit to underscore these statements. First, President Bush and President Gorbachev met in Malta and committed themselves to resolving the major issues in these negotiations by their next summit meeting, which will begin 30 May in Washington. Secondly, Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met in February in Moscow, with the aim of advancing the objectives and priorities defined at Malta. With respect to START, this meeting resulted not only in a thorough exchange of views, but also in agreement in some significant areas, which I will discuss in a few moments. Thirdly, we have reached agreement with the Soviet Union on some of the trial verification measures first proposed by President Bush last June. As you may recall, last June President Bush proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union make a special effort to agree on and implement a series of practice verification measures. These measures are designed to enhance verification of a START treaty and to contribute to strategic stability. The measures will afford the sides practical experience in verification procedures. And finally, the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister met again two weeks ago

(Mr. Burt, United States)

in Washington. While there were some disappointments at these meetings, the Ministers did agree on an impressive agenda aimed at resolving a comprehensive list of issues in the START negotiations by the United States-Soviet summit.

As a result of all these factors, important progress has been made on key major issues, and the negotiations have gained unprecedented momentum. As an example of the pace of our talks, since I returned from Washington on Monday morning, I have met on seven different occasions with my distinguished and capable counterpart, Yuri Nazarkin. Now, I would like to highlight briefly some of the areas of progress as well as some of the additional issues being discussed here in Geneva.

First, while Ambassador Smith will discuss the status of the defence and space talks, let me just say that at the ministerial meeting last year in Wyoming, the Soviets made an important, positive step in the area of linkage. In February at the Moscow ministerial, the Soviets clarified their position by stating that, while it is their preference to include agreed statements to the START treaty regarding withdrawal should a party abrogate or withdraw from the ABM Treaty, it is not a pre-condition for agreement in START. This removes a fundamental obstacle to achieving and implementing a START agreement.

The issue of what comes after a START treaty has also become a key topic for Ambassador Nazarkin and me. At the Moscow meetings earlier this year, Secretary Baker and Minister Shevardnadze authorized us to begin such a dialogue. The Soviets have made proposals for such discussions - which some have begun to call "nuclear and space talks II" or NST II - although the details of what would be covered by such follow-on negotiations are unclear at this stage.

The issue of cruise missiles has proven to be a very difficult and vexing issue. The sides made great strides toward resolving the issues of both air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) at the Moscow ministerial earlier this year. These discussions continued in Geneva and at the Washington meetings last week. New problems have emerged, but I remain hopeful that the remaining technical differences on these issues can be worked out. On air-launched cruise missiles, the sides neared agreement on a package approach that includes ALCM attribution rules and provisions for distinguishing nuclear and conventional ALCMs. The issue of the ALCM range threshold is high on the list of problems that we are still working to resolve. We have also resolved important elements of the sea-launched cruise missile issue, agreeing on a politically binding declaratory approach. But such topics as the range of SLCMs and whether the declarations will cover nuclear SLCMs only or also address conventional SLCMs are still open issues, among others.

On the issue of numerical limits on non-deployed ballistic missiles and the warheads attributable to them, the sides agreed in Moscow to have such limits only for mobile ICBMs. Thus, non-deployed, silo-based ballistic missiles, non-deployed cruise missiles, and non-deployed heavy bomber weapons will not be numerically constrained. In addition, the sides further agreed on a régime governing the location and movement of all non-deployed ballistic missiles. The details of these agreements are also being negotiated in Geneva.

(Mr. Burt, United States)

Ambassador Nazarkin and I singled out for our personal attention the issue of the non-denial of telemetry data during flight tests of ballistic missiles. This is one area of verification that will determine whether START enhances our security and strategic stability by promoting transparency on both sides. While there are some significant issues remaining, we have agreed on major elements of a régime to ensure that such data will be obtainable. While these provisions will be included in the START treaty, they will be implemented at the time of treaty signature, through an exchange of letters.

I would like to report to you this morning that the sides have also made substantial progress on the issue of treaty duration. At the Washington meetings, the sides reached general agreement that the START treaty will remain in force for 15 years unless superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended by mutual agreement. We are working out the remaining details now here in Geneva.

The delegations in Geneva are also working on a host of other important, more technical issues. For example, we are engaged in active discussions concerning verification of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, phasing of our reductions, and attribution of warheads to future types of ballistic missiles.

Since round XIII began in late January, Ambassador Nazarkin and I, and our respective delegations, have been working hard to fill in the gaps in the treaty text and develop constructive ideas that will meet both countries' desires to resolve all the major issues by the June summit.

At the Washington ministerial last week, Secretary Baker and Minister Shevardnadze agreed on a list of issues which they instructed the Geneva delegations to attempt to resolve by the summit. Arguably two of the most important such topics are non-circumvention of the treaty and the details of a solid verification régime - at the core of which is on-site inspection. On the subject of non-circumvention, Ambassador Nazarkin and I are currently continuing the discussions that we addressed with our Ministers in Washington last week. I can report that the sides have made substantial progress on this issue, and that both sides have shown flexibility. A second issue is a verification régime that, both sides agree, will include a unique and unprecedented inspection régime. When historians look back at this treaty, it may well be that the single most important aspect of START was the remarkable inspection procedures that were put into place. Inspectors will visit almost every important strategic military installation of the other side. The impact of START on confidence-building and military transparency between the United States and the Soviet Union could be profound. These confidence-building and transparency effects of START, I believe, will foster better relations between our countries. Today, some 13 different types of inspections are incorporated into the START treaty.

In some cases, President Bush's trial verification measures and similar Soviet proposals have cleared away several hurdles, especially those that would prevent agreement because of a misunderstanding on operations and

(Mr. Burt, United States)

procedures for inspections. Last September, Secretary Baker and Minister Shevardnadze signed the first of these measures, an agreement on notification of major strategic exercises involving heavy bombers. In addition, we have reached agreement on other such measures. The Verification and Stability Measure for early Re-entry Vehicle Inspections and Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers are two of these steps. Under our Re-entry Vehicle Inspection proposal, for example, it was envisaged that each side would demonstrate its own proposed inspection procedures for verifying that specific types of ICBMs and SLBMs have no more warheads than the number of warheads attributed to them. In fact, the first such trial inspection will take place next week, when American and Soviet officials travel to F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming in the United States to validate procedures for counting warheads on the MX missile.

Finally, we have conducted reciprocal demonstrations of techniques for applying unique identifiers on ballistic missiles, a process referred to as tagging missiles. Experts from both of our countries met here to take part in this exercise. In essence, the "tag" on a missile will act as its fingerprint, thereby ensuring that each missile possessed by both sides can be uniquely identified.

As you can see, the United States and the Soviet Union have now implemented a series of these measures. They will substantially enhance transparency and predictability in the arms control process.

These past few months have been full of activity as both sides converge on our common goal. In my closing remarks, let me try to address the significance of the START treaty.

Clearly we are in a period of great East-West political change. Because of the impact of these changes, for some there is a tendency to believe that a START treaty has been overtaken by events. In my view, to think this is a major mistake. It is clear in our view that the American strategy of extended deterrence has had a stabilizing impact on East-West relations and world peace. The changing situation within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe undoubtedly offers important new opportunities to reduce the risk of nuclear war, but we must approach any modification of our existing strategy with a sense of constructive caution. It is our view that random changes to American security strategy and the doctrine of extended deterrence could serve to decrease stability during periods of great political change.

The START treaty will be the first arms control agreement in history to actually reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons. At the same time, the provisions of this treaty allow for a structured approach to this reduction that promotes stability. Given the rapid change in the world around us, it is very important to codify our accomplishments and the stability they provide. With this in mind, the United States approaches the upcoming summit meeting with the Soviet Union with great optimism and a sense of historical accomplishment.

Mr. SMITH (United States of America): Mr. President, I would first like to thank you for the kind words of welcome which you addressed to me, and also thank Ambassador Ledogar for his kind words of welcome. It is indeed a pleasure to be back here in the CD - I spent a number of years here and it is good to be back in a familiar surrounding with, in fact, some familiar faces. So I regard it not only as a privilege but also a great pleasure to be here with you today.

I appreciate this opportunity to share with the Conference on Disarmament our perspectives on the defence and space negotiations. My predecessor, Ambassador Cooper, spoke with you last August. Since then several positive developments have occurred, although key areas of disagreement remain.

Throughout the five-year history of the defence and space talks the United States has had a consistent objective. We seek to facilitate a co-operative transition to a more stable deterrence which relies increasingly on non-nuclear defences against strategic ballistic missiles, should they prove feasible. Today's strategic balance relies almost exclusively on nuclear offensive weapons. Advances in non-nuclear technologies now make it likely that greater reliance on advanced defences can be combined with stabilizing reductions in strategic offences to reduce further the risk of war.

To achieve these goals, the United States has a forward-looking approach in the defence and space talks. We seek to assure full testing rights for advanced defensive technologies, as allowed in the 1972 anti-ballistic missile, or ABM Treaty. We seek to free space-based ABM radars and their substitutes from outdated ABM Treaty limits. United States proposals would require serious and thorough discussions with the Soviet Union on specific measures for a co-operative transition prior to either party's future deployment of advanced defences beyond current ABM Treaty limits. United States proposals would also assure deployment rights after those talks. Finally, the United States seeks, through predictability - that is, confidence-building - measures, to avert future technological surprises by encouraging greater openness in both sides' activities in the field of strategic ballistic missile defence.

The centrepiece of the United States approach is our proposed defence and space treaty, aimed at facilitating a co-operative transition. The United States draft, updated last December, retains key understandings reached at the 1987 Washington summit and takes into account the outcome of the September 1989 Wyoming meeting of Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. At that session the Soviet Union dropped its demand for agreement on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union also dropped its linkage between signature and implementation of a START treaty and reaching a new agreement on defence and space. The United States welcomed this step.

The United States draft treaty provides for procedures whereby either party may declare its intent to deploy strategic defences by giving notice and proposing specific measures for implementing a co-operative transition. The parties would be required to conduct three years of intensive discussions of

(Mr. Smith, United States)

the proposed specific measures and the implications for strategic stability. Subsequently, unless agreed otherwise, if a party decided to commence deployments beyond those allowed by the ABM Treaty, it would have to give a further six months' notice.

This proposed mechanism offers a more stable path for deploying advanced defences than the current alternative, which is to exercise the supreme interest withdrawal provision of the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty permits a party to withdraw and deploy after only six months' notice. Our proposed new mechanism would help ensure a meaningful and timely dialogue on how to achieve a stable, co-operative transition.

The revised United States draft treaty also reflects the full rights of the parties under the ABM Treaty to develop and test advanced space-based ABM systems and components. To build confidence and prevent misperceptions about such testing, the United States offered a Space Testing Assurance in October 1988. It assures the Soviet Union that United States space-based ABM testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty could not constitute a prohibited deployment of defences. The United States pledged that only from a limited number of ABM test satellites would it conduct testing of a component of an ABM system based on other physical principles and capable of substituting for an ABM interceptor missile. Such testing would be to counter a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. The number of United States ABM test satellites in orbit simultaneously will not exceed a number well short of that associated with any realistic deployed capability. To build confidence further, the United States has proposed as a predictability measure notifications for launches, tests, changes of orbits, and deorbits of ABM test satellites.

The United States has also proposed that both sides be permitted to develop, test, or deploy space-based ABM radars and their substitutes without restriction. This would avoid future definitional and verification problems likely to arise because of advancing space-based technology, and it would encourage the evolution of stabilizing space-based sensors.

Another major concept in the United States draft treaty is ensuring predictability in the development of the United States-Soviet strategic relationship in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war. This objective was agreed at the 1987 Washington summit. In 1988 the United States proposed predictability measures to implement this objective. These measures include annual exchanges of programmatic data, meetings of experts, briefings, visits to laboratories, and observations of tests in the field of strategic ballistic missile defence. These measures would be carried out on a voluntary, reciprocal, and comparable basis. Their purpose is to create a better understanding of each side's ballistic missile defence activities as early as the research stage - years before the appearance of advanced defences in the field.

At the Wyoming ministerial, Secretary of State Baker began an effort to see whether the areas of agreement on predictability measures could be expanded to become a point of mutual advantage. To stimulate our Soviet colleagues' understanding of the United States predictability measures for

(Mr. Smith, United States)

"visits to laboratories", Secretary Baker offered a first-hand, practical demonstration. He invited a group of Soviet experts to visit two United States laboratories conducting SDI research. The visit took place last December and was very successful. My friend Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, who led the group, described the visit as a useful confidence-building measure. The Soviet experts received briefings, saw hardware first-hand, and had an opportunity to ask numerous questions of United States scientists conducting the research. The visit was designed both to foster transparency and to stimulate the negotiations on predictability measures. Subsequent to the visit, we were pleased when the Soviet Union accepted the concept of visits to laboratories as a predictability measure.

At the meeting between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Washington earlier this month, the United States proposed that the two sides agree on predictability measures in the form of a free-standing agreement - not linked to the ABM Treaty. The United States draft agreement calls on the parties to implement the predictability measures I have just outlined. To illustrate how such an agreement might work and to inform our negotiations, last month in Geneva the United States proposed reciprocal pilot implementation of the United States predictability measures for a single project on each side. The United States chose as its project the Infra-red Background Signature Survey. We have asked the Soviet Union to select a Soviet project for pilot implementation. The United States idea is that the sides should conduct a "try-out" before implementing the free-standing predictability agreement. In this respect the initiative is similar to "try-outs" in other negotiations - the joint verification experiment in the United States-Soviet nuclear testing talks, the verification and stability measures in the START negotiations, and the bilateral data exchange and verification experiment in the United States-Soviet chemical weapons bilateral discussions. There has been recent and important progress on predictability measures. The sides agree that they should expand and strengthen them.

On the remaining issues in our negotiations, much remains to be done to achieve a defence and space treaty that provides for greater stability in the years ahead as new technologies open the way for reducing the threat posed by ballistic missiles. Attaining this goal would contribute to greater security for the entire international community, and be the first co-operative transition in the history of United States-Soviet strategic relations.

Having spoken about our diplomatic efforts to achieve a co-operative transition to greater reliance on strategic ballistic missile defences, I thought it would be useful to discuss briefly the United States commitment to such defences and the contributions they could make. On 7 February, at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, President Bush stated: "In the 1990s, strategic defence makes much more sense than ever before". He added later that day in San Francisco: "Let's be clear: this purely defensive concept doesn't threaten a single person anywhere in the world. God forbid, if it ever had to be used, it would be used against missiles, not against people".

(Mr. Smith, United States)

The President's emphasis on the value of defences is best understood in terms of how they can contribute to international security for the balance of this century and into the next. There are four main reasons why effective defences can bring about a safer world. First, preventing nuclear war must remain a fundamental goal. Survivable and effective strategic defences would strengthen deterrence and reduce the risk of war by significantly complicating the planning and execution of a first strike with strategic offensive forces. Second, as the United States and the Soviet Union reduce substantially their strategic offensive arms, advanced defences can play a growing role in insuring against the consequences of potential abrogation, break-out and cheating in connection with such reductions. Third, new threats are emerging against which effective non-nuclear defences can provide substantial protection. As more countries develop ballistic missiles, along with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, threats to the international community will increase. Fourth, effective defences can provide protection against accidental or unauthorized launches of ballistic missiles. If such a catastrophic event were ever to occur, the value of defences in human lives saved would be incalculable. Taking into account these purposes and their relevance now, the United States is determined to preserve the option to develop and deploy effective, advanced, defences when they are ready, at a measured pace and in a co-operative way. This is our goal in the defence and space talks.

It has been an honour to appear before the Conference on Disarmament today. I wish you the best for a successful conclusion of the spring session, and I hope to have the opportunity to address this body again in the future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for introducing the statements that we have just heard and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. At the same time, I also wish to thank the head of the delegation of the United States of America to the bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms, Ambassador Richard R. Burt, as well as Ambassador David Smith, for their statements which have provided the Conference with information on the status of those negotiations. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): As the Soviet delegation is taking the floor for the first time in plenary in April I should first of all like to express our satisfaction at the fact that you, Mr. President, are leading the work of the Conference in the course of this month. We have already had direct experience of your great diplomatic skill, your tact and your singleness of purpose, and now we note with satisfaction that all these qualities of yours have once again very strongly manifested themselves in the course of this month, a month which completes the spring part of the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament. In the course of this time the work of the Conference has expanded even more. Under your guidance the Conference has begun to hold informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3. We are also pleased that tomorrow we are going to hold the first informal discussion of the crucial problem of the enhancement of the work of the Conference. Of course the Soviet delegation wishes you as successful a conclusion to this month as its beginning. At the same time I should like once again to express my gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador of Nigeria, Mr. Azikiwe, for his guidance of the work of the Conference in March. While I have this opportunity I should

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like to express my very best wishes to the distinguished ambassadors who are leaving us or have already left us and taken up new duties - the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azambuja, and the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

I should also like to heartily welcome our new colleague, the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Králík, who is participating in our work today for the first time, and wish him every success in this task. The Soviet delegation was also pleased to learn that our long-standing colleague Mrs. Sinegiorgis of Ethiopia has recently been appointed her country's Ambassador to the Conference.

The Conference has just heard statements from the distinguished Ambassadors Burt and Smith, who described the state of affairs at the bilateral Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms. I should now like to invite Ambassador Nazarkin, the head of the USSR delegation at the nuclear and space talks, to take the floor to brief you on this matter. Ambassador Nazarkin is well known to most of the members of the Conference because he headed the delegation of the USSR at the Conference for two years until the end of April last year. Before that Ambassador Nazarkin headed the department dealing with the peaceful use of nuclear energy and space in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. For many years he has been actively involved with disarmament issues, above all in the multilateral field, both in New York and in Geneva. So with your permission, Mr. President, I shall hand over to Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all I should like to express my gratitude for the opportunity afforded to me today to take the floor at the Conference on Disarmament, this crucial multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament, in whose work I had occasion to participate relatively recently. It is pleasant to see in this hall the familiar faces of my old colleagues and friends from our work in the Conference on Disarmament, and also to welcome the new ambassadors appointed as representatives of Kenya, the Netherlands, China, Japan, Canada, Venezuela, the United States, Mexico and in particular the representative of Czechoslovakia, Juraj Králík, who is attending a meeting of the Conference for the first time today.

I should like to ask the delegations of these countries to convey to their former heads, Ambassadors Simon Bullut, Robert van Schaik, Fan Guoxiang, Chusei Yamada, Montigny Marchand, Adolfo Raúl Taylhardat, Max Friedersdorf, Alfonso García Robles and Vratislav Vajnar, my very best wishes in their future life and work. In connection with the forthcoming departure of the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Paul Joachim von Stülpnagel, I should like to express my regret at the fact that his departure from Geneva will prevent my wife and myself from maintaining our warm and friendly contacts with him and his wife, Carola. I wish him every success in his new important post. I have also received information regarding the forthcoming departure from Geneva of the

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representative of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Azambuja, on his appointment to an important new post. In addition to my regret at his departure, I should like to ask the delegation of Brazil to convey to Ambassador Azambuja my sincere congratulations. I am pleased once again to see here in this room the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Vicente Berasategui, who is making an exceptionally useful and highly qualified contribution to the work of the Conference.

It was with great interest and attention that I listened to the statements made by my colleagues and friends, the head of the delegation of the United States to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, Ambassador Richard Burt, and Ambassador David Smith.

Eight months ago, here in this room, I had an opportunity to set out the state of affairs at the nuclear and space talks as of 3 August last year. Today I see my task as that of describing the progress that has been achieved in drawing up the START treaty since my previous statement. The Malta meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States held at the beginning of December last year had decisive impact on the progress of the talks. Their agreement concerning the need to resolve all the major problems related to the START treaty before the summer 1990 summit and to sign the treaty during the same year has basically added a qualitatively new dimension to the talks. The President of the USSR and the President of the United States also exchanged views on NST problems through the exchange of messages. Of great significance were the meetings between the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, and United States President G. Bush held in the second half of September last year and at the beginning of April this year, as well as the meetings between United States Secretary of State J. Baker and Soviet President M.S. Gorbachev at the beginning of February this year. These meetings took place during E.A. Shevardnadze's visit to Washington and J. Baker's visit to Moscow.

Before the meeting of the Soviet and United States foreign ministers held in Wyoming on 22 and 23 September last year, a process of reciprocal adaptation took place between the Soviet leadership and the new United States Administration. During this process political priorities were defined and various options were developed and selected. Throughout this entire period Moscow and Washington maintained contact, including contact at the highest level. Therefore, when the sides came to the Wyoming meeting they already had behind them considerable contact and an understanding that they could and should move further in developing their relations. It would be no exaggeration to state that the Wyoming discussions ushered in a new stage in the Soviet-American dialogue. The principal characteristic of this new stage is the fact that the sides have moved from mutual understanding to mutual action. The main goal of the Moscow meeting of the ministers held from 7 to 9 February this year was to undertake efforts aimed at resolving a number of specific problems where possible, in accordance with the instructions given in Malta, thus opening up prospects for further constructive preparations for M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Washington.

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The talks focused on the problems related to the drafting of the START treaty. During the talks progress was achieved in a number of important areas. As you know, the date of Soviet President M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States (30 May to 3 June this year) were set at the Washington meeting of the Soviet and United States foreign ministers held from 4 to 6 April this year. This summit meeting is to be a major landmark in world politics, and is to culminate in major agreements in the most diverse fields of international and Soviet-American relations. The constructive development of Soviet-American relations is an especially valuable factor of stability against the backdrop of turbulent and complex changes taking place in the world and the dynamic internal developments in various countries.

The Washington talks centred on arms limitation and reduction problems, and above all on issues related to finalizing the START treaty. The discussions received a political boost as a result of the message sent by President M.S. Gorbachev to President Bush of the United States, which set forth new major ideas both on general measures for enhancing strategic stability and on solutions to some important issues at the NST talks. The sides reaffirmed their intention, agreed in Malta, to work for the signing of the START treaty before the end of this year, and with that purpose in mind to have it initialled in the course of the forthcoming visit by M.S. Gorbachev to the United States. The participants in the Washington negotiations concentrated on seeking agreement on outstanding key issues in the future START treaty - relating to air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles. So far it has not proved possible to eliminate differences altogether, but the sides agreed to exert maximum efforts to do so in the time remaining before the summit.

Package solutions are being earnestly sought on both ALCMs and SLCMs. There are still divergencies on some elements of these packages, although on others such an agreement is already taking shape. But these are package solutions, and until we reach agreement on the whole there can be no final agreement on the constituent parts. This is the normal negotiating process.

At the Washington meeting a thoroughgoing exchange of views was held on future START talks which would begin immediately following the signing of the treaty on 50 per cent reductions which we are working on now. The Soviet side submitted its draft joint statement in this regard which could be adopted at the forthcoming summit. We see it as a statement of intent on what we are to do after the signature of the START treaty. We have a mutual understanding with the American side that it is at the forthcoming summit that we must determine the main lines and areas of work on reducing arms and armed forces and overcoming the military confrontation between the two countries. Throughout nearly all this period, the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms have continued here in Geneva working on the practical details of the START treaty and its accompanying documents. At the end of September last year, soon after the Wyoming ministerial meeting, round 12 began, which ended on 8 December. Round 13 began on 22 January this year and is still going on. In view of the huge amount of work before us, we have taken steps to make the negotiations as intensive and extensive as possible. Specifically, the negotiating process in Geneva did not stop either for the Moscow or for the Washington ministerial meetings, despite the fact that the heads of both delegations participated in them.

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I now turn to the status of the NST talks. The problem of ABMs and space occupies an important place at the talks. Our position is based on the existence of an objective interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. The point is that the establishment of large-scale ABM defensive systems, particularly space-based systems, can inevitably entail a qualitative and a quantitative build-up in strategic offensive arms. The existence of such an objective interlinkage was recognized by the USSR and the United States during their negotiations on the ABM Treaty in 1972. The idea was also taken into account when the mandate of the current nuclear and space talks was being worked out. The Soviet Union favours the preservation of the ABM Treaty and the strengthening of its régime. Compliance with the ABM Treaty was one of the most contentious issues at the talks. Until recently the sides' differences of approach on this issue were blocking the way towards the START treaty. At the meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the United States Secretary of State in Wyoming last September, the Soviet side proposed a new approach that opened the way to completion of the START treaty. The Soviet Union expressed its preparedness to sign and ratify the START treaty even should there be no agreement on the ABM problem between the sides in time for the completion of the treaty, but the sides would have to continue to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. That approach was reaffirmed at the subsequent Moscow and Washington meetings of foreign ministers. We believe that there should be an understanding that the withdrawal of one of the parties from the ABM Treaty, or its violation, would give the other party the right to withdraw from the START treaty. At the same time, in order to preclude any further disputes on the meaning of compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, the Soviet side proposed the negotiation of a common understanding of the boundary between permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty, and tabled a draft protocol to the ABM Treaty on this matter at the negotiations. The Soviet side also favours the elaboration at the talks of far-reaching confidence-building and predictability measures, which, in our view, should enhance the sides' confidence that obligations assumed by them under the ABM Treaty will be strictly fulfilled. We have submitted a draft agreement to this effect that provides for an array of such measures. It should be noted that despite a certain community of views on some predictability measures, the sides still have major differences of a conceptual nature.

In connection with the fact that today reference was made by Ambassador D. Smith to the American draft agreement "on measures to facilitate a co-operative transition to the deployment of future strategic ballistic missile defences", I should like to state the following. In our view the purpose of this draft in essence is to replace the ABM Treaty and to give the United States the opportunity to conduct the development and testing, under the SDI programme, of systems and components prohibited under the ABM Treaty. The draft also gives the United States the right to take a decision at any time to deploy large-scale ABM systems, including in space. The American side asserts that the deployment of such large-scale ABM systems will lead to strategic stability. We cannot go along with that. The creation and deployment of such ABM systems and the placing of weapons in outer space can lead only to the undermining of strategic stability and a reduction in the level of security, because it will inevitably lead to competition in the field of both strategic defensive arms and strategic offensive weapons - in other words, an arms race on a new and even more dangerous level. This will

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inevitably also lead to the destruction of fundamental international agreements in the area of arms control. Stability and security in our time can only be reciprocal, and are achieved not by the continuation of the arms race but rather through the consistent reduction of strategic offensive weapons together with strict limitations on strategic defensive systems, a ban on the placing of arms in outer space and the expansion of confidence-building and predictability measures.

I have already mentioned the question of confidence-building and predictability measures. However, in connection with what we have heard from Ambassador David Smith, I should like to make a few additional comments. Although both parties recognize the importance of developing and practically implementing such measures, there are fundamental differences between them regarding the purpose these measures should serve. We cannot agree with the American side's assertion that such measures should be aimed at fostering a transition to a régime which is more strictly based on defence, because the transition itself leads to the disruption of strategic stability and the undermining of security. It is our conviction that such measures can be useful where they are aimed at enhancing trust and guaranteeing the confidence of the parties in the fact that the obligations they assumed under the ABM Treaty are being complied with. It is quite obvious that without such confidence talking about predictability in the ABM field would be impossible.

I have already referred to the fact that there is a certain convergence in the parties' approaches to individual confidence-building and predictability measures. This enables us to continue conducting substantive work at the talks and to seek areas of agreement here. As for the proposals recently submitted by the American side regarding trial predictability measures, which Ambassador Smith also referred to, we are currently considering these proposals. On a preliminary basis I would like to say that, although the idea of trial measures is more and more frequently raised in the preparation of disarmament agreements, at a time when there are fundamental differences between the parties regarding the thrust of predictability measures it would be difficult to implement any trial measures in this field. First of all, we feel, it would be essential to bring the parties' positions closer together regarding the thrust of predictability measures, and then to give some thought to the actual conduct of such measures.

Ambassador Smith mentioned the visit I made in December 1989 as a member of a group of Soviet experts to the American laboratories at San Juan Capistrano and Los Alamos. We consider such visits to be a means of building confidence between the USSR and the United States. The contacts that have been established between Soviet and American experts, both in the course of visiting these two laboratories and in the course of informal discussions on individual aspects of the ABM problem, are useful. Moreover, this trip, as we saw it, reconfirmed how important it is that the ABM-related activities of the parties should not move beyond the confines of the ABM Treaty.

I now turn to the state of affairs regarding the drawing up of the START treaty. That work continues on the basis of the major parameters codified in the joint statements issued following the Washington (1987) and Moscow (1988) summits. The delegations' endeavours are now focused on negotiating joint draft texts of the treaty proper and its accompanying documents, that is,

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a memorandum containing base-line data on Soviet and United States strategic offensive arms and protocols on procedures for conducting inspections, conversion or elimination, etc. These drafts contain fully agreed articles and provisions and partially agreed language. One of the most difficult problems being dealt with at the talks is the problem of measures to verify compliance with the future treaty on strategic offensive arms. Of course, in this connection the practice and experience acquired with the implementation of the INF Treaty are being drawn on. However, the subject and the scope of the new treaty, strategic arms, call for broader and more far-reaching measures. As you know, the START treaty provides for the limitation of strategic systems rather than their complete elimination. The two sides' remaining armaments must be subject to effective verification. This means that the verification measures that are being drawn up must be more complex and extensive. The most important component of the verification machinery is the inspection activities carried out by means of on-site inspections, both on a routine and on a "suspect site" basis, that is on challenge, as well as continuous monitoring of production facilities for strategic offensive arms. As of now the draft treaty provides for 13 instances - that is, parameters and types of activities - for conducting different kinds of inspection activities. Broad and detailed procedures for those activities have for the most part been agreed upon in a separate document, the joint draft inspection protocol. This draft sets out arrangements for the formation of inspection teams, their status, transport to the inspection sites, inspection procedures establishing a schedule for providing notification of inspections, the conveyance of inspection equipment and supplies, the provision of lodging, meals and medical assistance to the inspectors and many other issues.

In parallel with efforts to negotiate the verification articles of the treaty and the provisions on procedures in the protocol on inspections, both sides are seeking ways to make it less complex without thereby undermining the effectiveness and viability of the treaty and the confidence of the sides in compliance with future obligations. The verification mechanism under the future treaty includes the use by each side of its national technical means of verification and prohibits interference with the national technical means of verification of the other side. In particular, it involves a ban on encryption of telemetry data transmitted during flight tests from ballistic missiles. There are still some differences in the two sides' approach to "suspect site" inspections. We believe that the basis for resolving this problem exists, but further efforts are needed. As you know, during the Wyoming ministerial meeting last September the two sides signed an agreement on principles for implementing trial verification measures. Such measures are being worked out, agreed upon and implemented in particular in regard to the conduct of a series of on-site inspections. Their purpose is to ensure maximum confidence in the effectiveness and reliability of the verification mechanism being developed. Here in Geneva the Soviet and American experts have already conducted an experiment on the tagging of strategic offensive weapons. In accordance with the agreed schedule heavy bombers were shown yesterday to American experts in the Soviet Union, to be followed after some time by the nose cone of a heavy ICMB of the SS-18 type and an SLBM of the SS-N-23 type. In turn the American side will show Soviet experts the nose cone of an ICBM of the MX type, heavy bombers and a Trident-2 SLBM.

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There is a convergence of positions on the issue of mobile ICBMs. The sides have finally agreed on imposing limitations on these systems. The remaining differences relate essentially to the methods for applying such limitations and verifying compliance. At the heart of this problem is the need to find and agree on an optimum balance between, on the one hand, preserving the survivability of mobile ICBMs, and, on the other, considerations of reliability verification of compliance with the limitations on these systems. Of course verification of mobile systems is more difficult than verification of fixed systems. However, mobility contributing to greater survivability should not be ensured at the expense of less complex verification. We are at present working to find a rational solution to this problem.

The delegations have also focused their attention on devising a formula relating to the obligation of the sides not to circumvent the future treaty. In this context it is necessary to ensure that possible channels for circumventing the treaty - that is, undermining its effectiveness - are securely blocked. It seems that we are now close to finding a solution to this problem too.

The outstanding issues also include the non-deployment of strategic offensive arms outside the national territories of the sides, and verification in this area. A schedule for the elimination of strategic offensive arms subject to reduction is being negotiated. The main concern here is to ensure a smooth process and preserve parity at all phases of reduction.

One of the main obligations that will be assumed by the sides under the future treaty is to reduce their strategic offensive arms to the agreed levels. Naturally, this obligation requires a solid guarantee that the above-mentioned reductions are genuine and irreversible. Hence, there is a need to work out appropriate procedures for conversion or elimination of systems subject to the treaty. The major requirement with respect to such procedures is that they should preclude the possibility that the systems being cut will be restored or reconverted to their prior status. It should be noted that the sides have already agreed on the bulk of these procedures. However, some problems, mainly of a technical nature, remain. They relate to the fact that certain types of armament of the USSR and the United States have their own specific features. Nevertheless, we believe that we will soon manage to resolve these problems fully.

I have broached only some issues that do not cover the entire range of work that needs to be done. It should be taken into account that when major political agreements are reached, they still have to be formalized in treaty language. Hence a great deal has yet to be accomplished at the negotiations.

I cannot fail to mention yet another difficulty which will have to be dealt with. The negotiations have now reached the final stage. Our efforts have brought us to the point where there should be clear vision of what lies behind one option or another, how it might affect national security interests and whether situations which can be used for gaining a unilateral advantage are securely precluded. The choices we have to make are hard. As far as the Soviet position is concerned, I must say that the principal considerations underlying it now are increasingly dictated by the need to ensure the

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ratification of the future treaty by the Soviet parliament. On many occasions we have heard our American colleagues saying that their acceptance of a particular provision would complicate the ratification of the treaty. After the political reform in the Soviet Union we are now using a similar touchstone. It is a fact that we and the United States now find ourselves in the same position. The emergence of this factor has resulted in certain difficulties and complex problems. This new situation means that we must check certain provisions of the treaty again and yet again against the new political realities in our country. What is needed is a more thorough examination of all problems so as to avoid difficulties in the future. This will provide an assurance that the agreement we are working on will prove to be stable. I believe that this would meet the interests not only of the Soviet Union and the United States but also other countries. The treaty will result in more stable security at significantly lower levels of nuclear balance, and the risk of nuclear war will diminish. The treaty will become a major factor in ensuring an improvement in Soviet-American relations, and hence the entire global political climate. Finally, the treaty will become a springboard for moving towards still more radical agreements in the field of reductions in and qualitative limitations of strategic offensive arms.

There is not much time left before the summit, and even less before the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the United States (to be held from 16 to 19 May), by which time mutually acceptable options with respect to outstanding issues with the START treaty must be found. As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, it has been instructed to expedite this work in every way.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the USSR, Mr. Batsanov, for his introductory statement and for his kind words addressed to me. I also wish to thank the head of the Soviet delegation to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms, our old friend and colleague Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, for the statement that he has just delivered on the status of those negotiations. I now give the floor to the representative of Senegal, Ambassador Alioune Sene.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time during this 1990 spring session of the Conference on Disarmament, I wish first of all to congratulate you on your election to the presidency of this important United Nations body. Knowing your outstanding qualities as a diplomat and your familiarity with international issues, we are certain that you will conduct our work effectively and successfully. These congratulations are also addressed to all your predecessors, including my colleague Azikiwe, who have helped our proceedings run smoothly. It is true that since my last statement to this august assembly on 25 August 1988 many distinguished colleagues have left and their eminent successors have arrived to continue this noble task in this sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament. Amongst those who have left, how could one forget our dean and friend García Robles, an outstanding figure in Mexican diplomacy, depositary of the values of Latin American humanism, strategist of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, fervent incarnation of hope, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and the witness of history at the end of this century? We call upon Ambassador Marín Bosch, his worthy successor, to be kind enough to convey to him our great admiration and our wishes for good health and

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happiness in an intellectually rich, intense and fruitful retirement. Finally, I would like to address my thanks to Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference, and Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, and the entire secretariat for their kind and efficient co-operation.

Today, after 40 years of cold war, we are witnessing unprecedented geopolitical and strategic change. The speed of change in Europe has taken even the wisest political observers by surprise. We have before us a process whose outcome we do not know but whose repercussions go far beyond the European continent. In any event the new politico-military order to which these changes will give rise has not been forged yet. It is finding its way and becoming organized and what is now involved is the disintegration of the international order that was inherited from the Second World War and was based on bipolar ideological and military antagonism between East and West, but as a result of the détente we are experiencing today we can say that 1989, the year of the bicentenary of the French Revolution, will have constituted an echo in the political field and in disarmament. For the first time in history we have seen nuclear-weapon States agreeing to eliminate, on a bilateral basis, a whole category of weapons. I refer to the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose distinguished representatives have just given us a briefing on the state of their bilateral negotiations concerning strategic weapons in the run-up to the forthcoming summit, for which we extend our wishes for success.

Following the same line of thought, the reductions in conventional forces and confidence-building measures that are the subject of intensive negotiations in Europe and in Vienna in the context of CSCE, as well as the quest for peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, show clearly that beyond the balance of forces, the concept of security implies the commencement of an era of international co-operation.

Hence the Conference on Disarmament must adapt to this new state of affairs, to the favourable international situation, in order to achieve concrete results in its area of competence so as to strengthen its credibility. In this connection we must welcome the considerable efforts that have been made by the Conference on Disarmament since last year to draw up a convention totally banning chemical weapons. The impetus which was thus given by the Paris Conference at the beginning of last year made the elimination of existing stockpiles and chemical weapon production facilities, as well as the total prohibition of the production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer or use of these weapons, a common and irrevocable cause for the entire international community. In short, all the States participating in the Paris Conference undertook to redouble their efforts within the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a convention banning chemical weapons at the earliest date.

Thus, under the outstanding guidance of Ambassador Morel, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons made remarkable progress last year. Thanks to his savoir-faire, Ambassador Morel contributed to the redefinition of concepts in the "rolling text" by reconciling the various points of view. In this connection we should point to the place of the new annex on chemicals, the protocol on inspection procedures and the work on techniques relating to the verification régime established under the convention, the progress made

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on the final clauses and the texts concerning the membership of the Executive Council - all reference points for chemical arms control. Subsequently, the Conference of Governments and chemical industry representatives that took place in Canberra last year also showed the need for co-operation with those working in the chemical industry in the implementation of any convention completely banning chemical weapons. Most certainly my delegation is convinced that under the guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, and working in a constructive spirit, the Committee will be able to attain the objectives assigned to it in a reasonable period of time. As of now, it is reassuring to see that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to reduce their chemical weapons gradually. Even if certain aspects are conditional, the commitments announced show that the two Powers in question, which have the largest CW stockpiles, recognize their special responsibility with regard to the destruction of these stockpiles until low and equal levels are reached pending the conclusion of the convention banning chemical weapons. This is indeed a decisive element that gives a positive impetus to the multilateral negotiations and a guarantee for large-scale accession to the future convention on chemical weapons.

As my delegation stated at the Paris Conference, Senegal has no chemical weapons and has no intention of acquiring any. So far as it is able, Senegal wishes to make its own modest contribution to the rapid conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons.

It goes without saying that the chemical weapons ban is not the only focal point on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The complete prohibition of nuclear testing is also a priority issue. In this very connection it is to be regretted that the Conference has still not managed to agree on a mandate for a committee to examine this issue. Nevertheless, a tribute should be paid to the vigorous efforts that Ambassador Yamada of Japan made last year to try and pin down the mandate of an ad hoc committee on nuclear tests. It is to be hoped that Ambassador Donowaki, who is continuing those efforts, will meet with success and find the way out of this impasse.

The United States and the Soviet Union have made progress in virtually concluding the development of the verification régimes provided for in the treaty on the limitation of underground tests and the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions, but it is true that we have had to wait almost 10 years since the signing of these two instruments in order to devise verification systems that show nevertheless that it is possible to guarantee compliance with a test ban. Others are proposing a conference to convert the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by jointly involving the international community. This, of course, is an interesting approach. Even if there is no short-cut in this field, as some believe, we should work out the terms for negotiations on this issue in order to persevere, on the basis of consensus, with the elaboration of a reliable and lasting system. In any event, all the multilateral questions relating to nuclear weapons are within the purview of the Conference on Disarmament. Consequently my delegation considers that the Conference on Disarmament should spare no effort to concentrate henceforth on the substantive issues concerning a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. It must be recognized that the Conference on Disarmament has not really made decisive progress on these last two issues either, whether from the point of

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view of a structured debate on the cessation of the nuclear arms race or on the negotiation and elaboration of principles and confidence-building measures for nuclear disarmament, which of course would be inseparable from prevention in the field of nuclear proliferation.

In all likelihood, the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to open shortly in Geneva and will offer an opportunity for an exhaustive analysis of all the factors that can enhance the credibility of the Treaty. The Treaty has proved to be a useful tool in efforts to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and for that reason the maintenance and strengthening of this régime deserve support. The fundamental objective of the Treaty is the reduction of nuclear arms, followed by their elimination. In this context, the proliferation of technologies making use of fissionable material, which have prompted so many warnings, also merits our attention.

The fourth NPT conference is to consider the validity of the Treaty after 1995. Senegal will participate in this forthcoming review conference with the hope that there will be consensus on the validity of the Treaty after 1995, which will make it possible to strengthen the universality of this disarmament instrument in the interest of peace and world security. In fact, the halting and banning of nuclear tests constitute the best means of fighting for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially as a real process of nuclear disarmament has begun. In the meantime, the non-nuclear-weapon States demand negative security assurances within the framework of an international instrument or a formula legally binding on all the parties. Since the nuclear-weapon States made unilateral declarations of negative security assurances, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to arrive at a legal arrangement in due form despite the broad consensus which, moreover, is based on the rules of international customary law concerning the prohibition of any resort to force except in cases of self-defence. It is true that, through their declarations on negative security assurances, the nuclear-weapon States have acknowledged that resort to such weapons could only be contemplated in a much smaller number of cases than resort to conventional weapons. At the very least it is to be hoped that the Conference on Disarmament will make progress on this matter by drawing up an arrangement or measures of an internationally legally binding nature.

Another problem which prompts as much concern as the others is the prevention of an arms race in space, concerning which we have just heard very detailed presentations. Naturally, in the age of satellites, space technologies and the services they offer make them fundamental media of communication, information and data transmission, important matters in the modern world today. But it is no secret that in the system for the exploitation of space, there is an inevitable dissemination of military technologies at both the strategic and the tactical level. Yet under article I of the 1967 outer space Treaty, which has been ratified by 110 States, the use of space must be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of development, and such use is also the province of all mankind. Two years after this Treaty in 1969, man set foot on the Moon for the first time and recorded there that his mission reflected a striving for peace for all mankind. Since then, the refinement of weapons has taken great steps forward that have undoubtedly led

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to the emergence of new generations of armaments which can thus be placed in space - and we have had proof of this just now. In a field such as space, which holds enormous promise for the international community, particularly where scientific progress is concerned, there would be a risk that the growing militarization that can give rise to an arms race in this environment would revive another form of antagonism among Powers. There is therefore an urgent need for the international community to adopt effective measures to ensure that space does not become a new area of confrontation. From this point of view the proposals that have been put forward in the Conference on Disarmament deserve our full attention. Whether they are for strengthening the registration Convention, the verification and protection of satellites, especially those with the scientific function of remote sensing and remote observation of the weather or the Earth, in a word all the equipment designed to safeguard common security and make the international environment safer. In short, the establishment of an international space monitoring agency could undoubtedly contribute to the verification of compliance with the treaties concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I will conclude by saying that through the current détente we must call more than ever on the political will of the Powers that have special responsibilities in maintaining peace and international security, as well as all the members of the United Nations, to take urgent measures with a view to halting the arms race, avoiding the risks of war and preventing the use of force or intervention, in order to move from an era of security relations based on antagonism to an era of relations based on co-operation and trust. In order to do this, there will be a need for detailed knowledge of each other's military doctrines and strategies in a climate of transparency, through "open skies", as the experts say nowadays, in order to study threatening asymmetries and offensive capabilities. Because if we wish to overcome prejudice, to dispel distrust and the fear of threat, we must come round to concepts of defensive strategy and minimal deterrence.

Of course, much remains to be done - we must keep our feet on the ground - to prevent wars and make military aggression throughout the world, an option that no Government could envisage and where military forces will have the role of preserving national independence and territorial integrity. Doubtless, what is happening today in Europe fills us with enthusiasm, because it marks a radical change in mentalities and in geostrategic outlook. At the same time, we know that this process started long ago, with the Helsinki Document in 1975, and covers a vast area ranging from economic co-operation to human rights. Yet will this happy period of dialogue and co-operation which is beginning between East and West do away with all the tensions here and there that are due to historical, political, ethnic, religious or socio-economic causes? Well, we think so, because we are convinced that human intelligence today is capable of building on the ruins of the old order a new, fairer, more prosperous, more fraternal order of greater solidarity. However, the establishment of a stable and lasting order of peace in Europe, which we ardently desire, cannot be separated from the rest of the globe in so far as strategic imbalances in other regions can have repercussions on world security and stability. And as we know, war is still raging in certain parts of the third world. We are even witnessing, according to certain sources, a build-up of nuclear weaponry in areas of tension among neighbouring countries, posing

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a new security problem, not to speak of the heightened risks of uncontrolled proliferation. The same sources discern a proliferation of ballistic missiles armed with chemical or nuclear warheads, as well as the spread of the requisite production techniques. Hence there is a need to find effective solutions in as broad a framework as possible in order to safeguard strategic stability and international security before these political hypotheses become reality.

The objective of world disarmament and the prevention of war, whether nuclear or conventional, necessarily requires mutual understanding among States, organized through creative co-operation in the areas of politics and security, economics and trade, ecology and culture, human rights and humanitarian action, responding to the fundamental aspirations of nations for freedom, dignity and well-being. At the regional level, we must give assistance in implementing measures for arms limitation, the cessation of the arms race, the conclusion of disarmament treaties, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace which can enhance confidence and stability amongst States, as well as the negotiated settlement of major international issues and, in particular, regional conflicts in the world.

In concluding, we wish to emphasize once again that in this historical period where the super-Powers are taking initiatives with regard to nuclear disarmament and the banning of chemical weapons by accepting verification as an essential element in any arms limitation or reduction agreement, it is clear that today we are moving away from the certainties of the cold war and the balance of terror, and so much the better. The moment has therefore come to think deeply about the structure of the Conference on Disarmament under the critical eye of the new international situation that we must at all costs make more harmonious and more peaceful for the benefit of development. Because the true question is how to maintain peace and international security in the age of the absolute weapon, that is to say, the atomic bomb and weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Most certainly, we must pursue the priority objectives of the disarmament problématique by quitting well-worn paths, as was very appropriately pointed out by Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil with all the authority, all the nobility of view, the enlightenment and the exhilarating eloquence for which we know him. Our best wishes go with him in his new post. Thus the task is to overcome differences of opinion and conflicts of interest, to broaden the basis of understanding and consensus approaches through dialogue and negotiation by adapting to the evolution of the international situation.

Finally, at a time when the world is entering the era of institutionalized negotiation and when the two super-Powers, which have the biggest and most sophisticated stockpiles of weapons, are taking up their special responsibility in the field of disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament should take advantage of the situation, as it has done today. The will to establish confidence, as was stated a few moments ago by the distinguished representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, can straightaway create a climate that is conducive to the solution of problems by devising concrete measures and lasting agreements in a flexible and practical way, through transparency in verification. The laudable efforts made by the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as the negotiation of a 50 per cent cut in their strategic arms, should, in order to set a better example, be based on

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a significant reduction in their nuclear and conventional stockpiles and a halt to the arms race. This, we think, would be the best way to consolidate the positive trends today which can accelerate the process of arms limitation and reduction. In this connection, the constructive parallelism between the Soviet-American bilateral negotiations and the multilateral disarmament efforts under the auspices of the United Nations should complement and strengthen each other in order to help jointly to build a safer and more stable world to maintain that peace on a global scale of which we have had a foretaste and promises today. In short, it is a matter of overcoming war and barbarism in order to better arm the human species - man - in combating the ecological imbalances on Earth today, combating poverty and illiteracy, combating hunger and disease in order to grapple with the challenges of survival and development.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Senegal, my friend, colleague and brother Ambassador Alioune Sene, for his important statement, as well as for the very kind words he addressed to me.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Kosin.

Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia): May I be allowed to express my appreciation to the distinguished Ambassadors Richard Burt and David Smith and our old friend and colleague, Yuri Nazarkin, for their comprehensive and substantive briefing on the status of the United States-USSR strategic and space disarmament talks? I hope that we will have the privilege of hearing them more often in our Conference. I would like to extend a warm welcome in our midst to His Excellency Ambassador Juraj Králík, head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia to the Conference on Disarmament, and wish him every success in his new assignment. He can count on the full co-operation of my delegation. I also take this opportunity to express our gratitude to our outgoing colleagues, Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil and Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, who contributed so much to the work of our Conference. I wish them all the best in their important new assignments.

Although the question of improved and effective functioning is not formally on the agenda nor in the programme of work of the Conference, I would nevertheless like to make a few observations on this subject as there is growing interest in it as we search for ways to exploit to the maximum the potentials of the Conference.

The Yugoslav delegation raised some aspects of this question as far back as 1985. My aim today is to try to make a step forward, if not in elaborating this complex issue, then at least in articulating the different notions.

It goes without saying that the efficiency of a system does not depend on technical and organizational arrangements nor on amending eventual structural deficiencies, but on political stands and on the behaviour of the protagonists within the system. Nevertheless, the Conference can improve its efficiency,

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or at least its image, by a continual reassessment of the way its role is being fulfilled. The starting-point in such a reassessment is, however, in the strong belief of my delegation, that the Conference is the only global multilateral negotiating body and that it cannot change its goals without taking the risk of losing its *raison d'être*. Of course, in accomplishing its negotiating role the Conference carries out intensive preparatory work and, through this process, identifies and shapes security and disarmament concepts. The speed with which this process leads to real negotiations sometimes depends precisely on how it approaches this preparatory stage of its negotiating role.

For better orientation, the question of improved and effective functioning should be treated at three different levels, even though at least two of them overlap, especially when speaking of the conditions necessary for establishing subsidiary organs, the extension of their mandates, the participation of non-member States, etc.

The first level would cover purely technical and procedural aspects of the Conference's functioning, as contained in document CD/WP.100/Rev.1. To this we could add issues on documentation, scheduling of the Conference and so forth.

The second level would cover questions that in part have to do with the provisions of the rules of procedure, and are to some extent political in character. The Group of Seven raised the right questions and offered alternatives in documents CD/WP.341 and CD/WP.286. It is regrettable that these documents were not more thoroughly discussed and that those innovations which would have made it possible to focus on substantive issues were neglected.

In this context, my delegation continues to attach particular importance to the following. Firstly, the easing of formalities in the decision-making procedure on the participation of non-members of the Conference, which could be done, for example, through mere notification of a non-member's intention to participate, or even by inviting a non-member for consultations at the Conference's own initiative. Secondly, more frequent resort to the participation of scientific and technical experts in the work of the Conference. Thirdly, measures to permit the setting up of working bodies on the basis of a unique, general mandate or even without a special mandate, keeping in mind that article 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I sets out the basic purpose of the Conference and that the working bodies are not separate organs but only forms in which the Conference works. Fourthly, review of the application of consensus in technical and procedural matters, and so forth.

Much more complex is the third level, dealing with the Conference's adjusting to new developments in international relations. These questions are eminently political in character and they encroach on the essence of the character, role and competence of the Conference as a negotiating organ.

The debate so far has shown that we are all thinking about the improved relations in the world; about diminishing the risk of conflicts; about reconsidering the concepts of security structures and setting up new ones; about the intensity of disarmament negotiations that have a global

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effect whatever the level at which they take place, etc. Such trends are creating more favourable conditions for interweaving and complementing multilateral, bilateral and regional negotiations, and impose the need for more flexible and realistic approaches in our work. I might mention in passing that the past few years, especially 1989, have led us to significantly change our perception of what is and what is not realistic, since the recent developments have taken us all by surprise, even the boldest futurologists. Although we all feel the new impulses and possibilities, we still draw different conclusions on how the Conference could improve its efficiency in changed conditions.

In the opinion of my delegation, adjustment should not change the negotiating role of the Conference by depriving it of the right to discuss certain disarmament issues. The most important issues cannot be solved exclusively within a bilateral frame, whatever its nature, while the definition of a stable security order can be a result only of broad international co-operation.

Adjustment can therefore be seen only as the strengthening of the Conference's role, the confirmation in practice of its right to deal with every basic disarmament issue. It is only in such conditions that the Conference can fully contribute to the existing dynamics of negotiations on a broader scale. It is only on such a basis that a layered and gradual approach to those questions on the agenda which are still resisting the multilateral negotiating approach will be possible and credible. This means taking into account the deliberative, pre-negotiatory and other phases, including the adoption of "intermediate" and "collateral" security-building measures, in order to promote the negotiations themselves. In order to make possible such a progressive approach, instead of a yes-or-no approach, and not reduce the role of the Conference to a kind of talking-shop, we all have to start changing and accepting the Conference in all its functions.

In other words, the Conference cannot behave as if it were the only sure democratic negotiating forum, that is, as if multilateralism were the only way to authentic disarmament. But nor can it be a simple collector of left-overs from other negotiating tables. In other words, its short-term, medium-term and long-term negotiating role has to be adapted to its real possibilities, without subordinating its activity to the existence or non-existence of working bodies, mandates or formal programmes of work. That is, it should use whatever possibilities it has to substantively consider all questions on all levels, to discuss programmes and proposals even when it is obvious that they are not ready for immediate negotiation because of divergences in views. In the final analysis the fundamental consideration of every problem represents, in fact, a stage in negotiating which, of course, cannot always be a drafting stage. The Conference thus has an important preparatory and informative role, which means the role of a catalyst in the permanent search for common elements and concepts, which should be constantly broadened and shaped on the road to concluding agreements.

Adjusting, therefore, is no abstraction, but is primarily the strengthening of the readiness to tackle all questions on the agenda, to bring methods of work up to date and innovate so that we may move forward faster to the ultimate objective in our negotiations on disarmament agreements.

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We should initiate, within this context, a more active and concrete debate on the agenda and bring it closer to the "decatalogue". We should begin to consider more concretely the possible addition of new questions, the possibility of merging certain items on the agenda or a possible échelonnement in dealing with certain questions depending on the level of convergence of views. In this way, without neglecting any item, we would facilitate a focus on those questions for which a successful conclusion is directly within reach, as is the case right now of, for example, the convention on chemical weapons. Since the present agenda is already elaborate, whatever addition is made should be followed by a defining of genuine and not formal priorities, at least for a medium-term or short-term period.

The Yugoslav delegation is prepared to constructively study all new proposals made so far, with a view to stepping up the work of the Conference and taking into consideration the present developments at the global and regional level. Besides the proposals already submitted, for example, the issue of the security of non-aligned and developing countries deserves particular attention, since the new security order is being framed primarily within the developed world. Precisely because our Conference is the only global multilateral negotiating organ, it should initiate debates on all issues of disarmament and security and should indicate the solutions.

The Conference should make use of all the opportunities it has at its disposal, ranging from plenary sessions and ad hoc bodies to informal meetings, open presidential consultations, expert bodies and scientific round-table discussions, etc., to maintain a permanent, substantive exchange of opinions and proposals in search of common ground for negotiations. A more flexible approach to the mandate under item 1 (NTB), and the acceptance, for the first time, of informal sessions for item 3 on the agenda, for example, show the beginning of a slightly pragmatic approach to the work of the Conference.

Although this does not strictly form part of the topic, I believe that an innovative approach to the problem of increasing the number of members could be an area for bringing the Conference up to date in accordance with the changing structure of the international community. Here I have in mind the possible reassessing of the criteria of political balance, for example. As this is a sensitive political issue, it is still early for concrete conclusions, but it is right that we should start thinking about it.

The search for new ideas and new issues for debates, on whatever level, as well as the reassessment of and critical approach to the way its role is being fulfilled, must be a continual practice. The Conference must be alert to any political change, and must register and use any opportunity for enlarging the possibilities for negotiating and for the assertion of its role in the objective conditions of its activity. If we cannot do that which is indispensable, we must try at least to do that which is possible, namely, to get used to a step-by-step approach, to gradualness, not losing sight, of course, of the true goals. Any step, however small it may be, would be a contribution to bringing our Conference more into line with the broader possibilities for becoming an unavoidable chain in the negotiating process.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Mr. Chirila.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to tell you how happy the Romanian delegation is at seeing you so ably chairing the work of the Conference on Disarmament for April. Allow me also to extend a welcome to Ambassador Králik as the head of the Czechoslovak delegation.

In its statement of 13 February to the plenary of the Conference, our delegation had the opportunity of describing the general features of the Romanian position, its hopes and especially its complete readiness to support and contribute to the efforts aimed at bringing about a broad, continuous and dynamic process of disarmament at all levels and in all aspects. Thanks to the tireless efforts made by you and your predecessors, Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands and Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, a concrete working context has been designed to bring about what we all agree to be necessary - the negotiation and above all the conclusion of agreements and measures agreed at the multilateral level, with universal scope, in the area of disarmament. Our debates and negotiations have highlighted in particular the fact that the more favourable political climate today offers conditions and hopes, but also imposes requirements, responsibilities and additional efforts to bring about meaningful results in the area of disarmament, inter alia and above all within the Geneva Conference. The discussions have also revealed that nuclear issues are still viewed as priority issues for this Conference. Our delegation takes note with satisfaction of the fact that, thanks in particular to the efforts of Ambassador Donowaki, more favourable conditions now obtain that could lead to a more specific dialogue on the question of a substantive mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. We hope that the Conference will soon find the flexibility and consensus which are so much needed to produce a reasonable, balanced mandate which can offer the required conditions for a substantive and well-targeted examination of this issue.

Concerning the important problem of the verification of a test-ban treaty, considerable progress has been made. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has developed a global system of seismic verification. My delegation is particularly pleased since, starting with this session, Romania has been participating in the Ad hoc Group and is going to commit its technical capabilities to the global international test that will produce its conclusions in 1991. We believe that, in order to guide other political decisions concerning participation in an international test of this nature, ways and means should be found, especially in areas hitherto insufficiently represented, to offer basic technical assistance and supplementary international co-operation. We consider that, in particular, the four international centres that have been established to test the global system seismic verification may be increasingly bearing this need and possibility in mind.

(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

Remaining within the context of nuclear disarmament, we share in the satisfaction that has been expressed of seeing the start of specific informal discussions on agenda items 2 and 3. Like many other delegations, we would have preferred the establishment of working and negotiating bodies - even ad hoc committees - on these two subjects. I take this opportunity to express our delegation's satisfaction at having heard the briefings given at this plenary meeting by the heads of the Soviet and American delegations to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms. We are sure that the substance of the statements made here by the two delegations will provide important points of reference for our informal discussions on items 2 and 3 on the Conference's agenda, and also for the work of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We reiterate our hope that the approach of the fourth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will encourage efforts and especially results in the entire nuclear sphere, including security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States. The re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in a fairly reasonable time frame has given us the legitimate hope that this year substantive work, focused above all on specific results, is possible and wished for by all. Unfortunately, the move to substantive consideration of this problem, which is ever more pressing, has been delayed.

I should now like to make a few references to the negotiations concerning the draft convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons. In its statement of 13 February to the plenary of the Conference, our delegation expressed Romania's political willingness to work for the rapid conclusion of such a convention. This readiness remains; we are in favour of an effective universal convention with an appropriate verification régime. We have clearly stated that Romania has no chemical weapons, and it has no intention of producing or acquiring any. The strengthened mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons leads us to believe that the negotiations for the conclusion of a universal convention banning these weapons have now, so to speak, entered the final straight. In this regard progress concerning the structure of the future convention in particular has been significant. We greatly appreciate the efforts to deal with all aspects in detail, but as many other delegations have already emphasized here, we too consider that certain extended discussions, consultations and negotiations on purely technical or drafting issues could divert attention from essential, substantive issues which, in our view, should be dealt with directly, under a general approach, while avoiding unduly dwelling on one detail or another. We fully appreciate the determined contribution the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius, has made in promoting the substantive work in order to clarify "sensitive" issues, to clear the way for the final drafting of the text of the convention. One problem cropping up very frequently in the discussion and negotiations is that concerning the universality of the future convention. We consider that the involvement of an ever-increasing number of countries in the negotiating process and the final adoption of the text of the convention by consensus are among conditions that favour the legitimate requirement of universality. Romania is ready to be an original signatory of a convention that is the result of such a process.

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Finally, our delegation has followed and has taken note with great interest of the comments and opinions expressed here with a view to improving and even re-examining the basis for the activity of the Conference on Disarmament. As Ambassador Sujka emphasized here, such legitimate concerns should not overshadow the substantive work, the carrying out of the negotiating mandate of the Conference. Ambassador Hyltenius correctly emphasized recently here that in the final analysis the prerequisite for negotiating and reaching effective disarmament agreements and measures was and still is political will. We express the hope - the conviction - that such political will will prevail more and more in our work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Romania, Dr. Gheorghe Chirila, for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

(continued in English)

I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Mr. Gizowski.

Mr. GIZOWSKI (Poland): We have already had an opportunity to congratulate your delegation on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, but would like once again to wish you every success in discharging your responsible duties. May I take this opportunity to express our thanks to Ambassadors Richard Burt, David Smith and Yuri Nazarkin for their interesting information on the state of affairs in the United States-Soviet bilateral talks, which are of great importance for disarmament in general and the Conference on Disarmament in particular? I would also like to welcome among us Ambassador Juraj Králík of Czechoslovakia, and extend to him our assurances of full co-operation with him and his delegation.

My statement in the Conference today is connected with the presentation of a working paper on data relating to Poland relevant to the chemical weapons convention (CD/985), which has been distributed today. The data, reflecting the situation in Poland as at the end of 1989, were provided on a voluntary basis by the Polish bodies and institutions concerned in accordance with the format proposed in document CD/828 of 12 April 1988 presented by the Federal Republic of Germany. Details of the chemicals which are produced, processed or consumed in Poland are submitted in accordance with the tentatively agreed lists contained in CD/952 of 18 August 1989 and are based on the following thresholds: schedule 1 - 100 grams per year; schedule 2 - 1 ton per year; and schedule 3 - 30 tons per year.

By providing the data Poland wishes to join a considerable number of States which have already presented such information, as it shares their opinion on the importance of multilateral data exchange for our negotiations. We are of the opinion that a compilation of data relevant to the convention from all participants in the negotiations would facilitate the solution of outstanding issues. At the same time, the provision of such data prior to the signing of the convention will constitute one of a range of confidence-building measures in its support.

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It seems obvious and indisputable that progress in the negotiations might be faster and easier if they were built upon as much broad and comprehensive information as possible concerning both existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and their possessors and other data relevant to the convention. Such information enables us to foresee better the requirements of the future process of implementation of the convention, and to design properly and effectively appropriate verification mechanisms and the shape of the future organization. Openness and mutual confidence, particularly among States directly involved in our negotiations, whether members or non-members of the Conference, not only create a favourable atmosphere but also offer a substantial indication of genuine commitment to the completion of our work on the convention and a contribution to making it universal in character. We therefore invite other States to join in this voluntary exchange of data as soon as possible.

I would like to take this opportunity to make some observations on the present state of affairs in our negotiations on the convention. In many statements devoted to chemical weapons during the spring session, we have heard that the year 1990 should be a decisive one in our endeavours. We share this opinion. More than that, we consider that there are solid foundations for such an assertion. This is not only because of the favourable climate generated by the conferences in Paris and Canberra and the positive course of Soviet-American talks in this field. First and foremost, it is the progress made and material accumulated during the long years of negotiations which make the task of finalization of our efforts fully feasible.

The results accomplished by the Committee during this year's session to date under the skilful chairmanship of Ambassador Hyltenius also confirm that progress is possible on even the most complicated issues, providing that all parties display maximum flexibility and readiness to reach consensus. I have in mind especially the advancement of work on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities. At the same time, this is just another positive example of the favourable impact of developments in the bilateral area on multilateral negotiations. Overall, however, the readiness of all parties in the negotiations to join in a common search for a mutually acceptable solution in so complex and difficult a matter has contributed to the final outcome.

Furthermore, new prospects are emerging for starting a more serious and concrete discussion on ad hoc verification. In our opinion, proper design of this verification instrument could take care of the legitimate concerns of many delegations connected with the "capability problem". In addition to efforts by the Chairman of the Committee to move our work ahead on the definite shape of challenge inspection, so competently directed previously by Ambassador Morel, it may be hoped that the general pattern of verification of the future convention will finally be worked out. An agreement on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, as well as the completion of a general pattern of verification, would create propitious conditions for resolving other difficult and still controversial issues. Use of the institution of "Friends of the Chair" seems to be the most effective form of work at this stage, allowing us to concentrate on narrowing divergent positions of delegations which attach special importance to a particular problem. I have the impression that it would be desirable to

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make greater use of smaller formal or informal groups which would be able to prepare and present to the Committee proposals on resolving outstanding issues. We hope that this form of work will rapidly bring concrete and good results.

We also appreciate the extensive discussion arranged by the Chairman of the Committee on the subject of "undiminished security". This made it possible to look at a range of political aspects of the convention in a wider environment, and particularly their interrelationship and interaction. Undoubtedly, the search for a solution has to take this broader context into account.

The first part of the 1990 session is coming to an end. As a result of a new approach by the Chairman of the Committee we have made further steps ahead on the road to the convention. We are approaching that moment in the negotiations when every participant must look more clearly at the distance already covered and that which is ahead of us in the context of the direct interests of the State he or she represents. The rights and obligations which are becoming more and more distinctly defined in the draft convention require substantive analysis from the point of view of their conformity with the political, military, economic, scientific and technological interests of each particular country.

Poland, being a country which does not possess or intend to possess chemical weapons, will naturally not have the same attitude towards such issues as the order of destruction, undiminished security, verification mechanisms and so forth as chemical weapons possessors. Our approach to the negotiations on these issues will be more general and indirect, whereas for them these issues are of direct and particular interest. On the other hand, we will have a special interest in negotiations on such issues as, for example, verification of chemical industry, assistance or co-operation. There will also be a different scale of obligations on Poland arising from our participation in the convention in comparison with "CW-capable" States.

At the same time global, regional and individual interests will become more and more visible. We will have to identify them at the right moment, single them out and seek proper compromise solutions. In our opinion, the advanced stage of negotiations on the chemical weapons convention now requires a different approach which more accurately and concretely provides opportunities to identify general - which means global - interests; particular - which means regional - interests; and individual interests. We should aim at the establishment of a mechanism for the future convention which will ensure an appropriate balance between rights and obligations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his very important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? Since that is not the case, I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider two requests for participation in its work.

The meeting was suspended at 12.40 p.m. and resumed at 12.43 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 553rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. The Conference will now proceed to take action on the note by the President, circulated by the secretariat as document CD/WP.384, concerning requests from two non-member States to participate in our work. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the decision that we have just taken, I wish to note that the statement made by the President of the Conference at the resumed 534th plenary meeting also applies to the requests that we have considered today.

I should like now to turn to another subject. The secretariat has circulated today a brief timetable for meetings to be held early next week, before we adjourn the first part of the session. As usual, the timetable is indicative and may be changed if the need arises. May I take it that the informal paper is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I have two announcements to make. I would like first of all to remind all delegations that a video film on a national trial challenge inspection conducted by the United Kingdom will be shown in room V at 3 p.m. this afternoon. I would also like to remind you that tomorrow, at 3 p.m. in this conference room, the Conference will hold an informal open-ended consultation, with amplification services, on its improved and effective functioning. In this connection, I am informed that the compilation of proposals requested from the secretariat on this subject will be available in the delegations' pigeon-holes tomorrow at noon. We look forward to a fruitful and meaningful open-ended informal consultation tomorrow afternoon.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, the last of the first part of the annual session, will be held on Tuesday, 24 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.554
24 April 1990

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 24 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Ahmad Kamal (Pakistan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 554th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with our programme of work, this is the last meeting of the first part of the annual session of the Conference. In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As agreed earlier, and if time permits, the Conference will hold today, immediately after this plenary meeting, an informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, the United States of America, Egypt, Canada, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, the German Democratic Republic and Mexico. Of these speakers, three today are friends and colleagues who will be leaving the Conference and who will be delivering their farewell statements today. I refer to Ambassador Paul Joachim von Stülpnagel, Ambassador Marcos de Azambuja and Ambassador Kamallesh Sharma, all three of whom have contributed significantly to the work of our Conference. I intend to bid them farewell on behalf of the Conference after they have made their respective statements. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Paul Joachim von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, it is a particular pleasure for me to make my last statement before this important body under your presidency. I do not want or need to qualify you or your stewardship because we have known each other too long not to be fully aware of how much there is mutual respect and friendship and on my side the recognition of your particular intellectual capacity. The month of April is normally not a month in which a President can make himself felt, but you always do and you do it well, even in the month of April. You may even find yourself in the Guinness Book of Records for having three colleagues depart in one day. The months of March and February are more prone to allow a President to make his mark, and I think Ambassadors Azikiwe of Nigeria and Wagenmakers of the Kingdom of the Netherlands did an exemplary job, appreciated by all. We owe to those two Ambassadors the fact that we have made progress in our work.

As I am leaving after almost four years, I of course regret - as so many others have done before me - that I did not have a chance to stay long enough to become the dean of the Conference on Disarmament, having had wide-ranging ideas of what I would have done, had I had this chance. But perhaps the thoughtful way and restraint and wise neutrality of our two longest-serving colleagues, Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia and Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, was more helpful for our work.

My country is currently not - as one says - at a crossroads; it has traversed a long-standing road-block to a new life, and as we hope, a future that is better for Germany as it will be better for its neighbours. We could not have done this alone. We gladly acknowledge the decisive help and guidance

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

and acceptance from Governments in East and West. In the first place there were of course the two super-Powers, which were instrumental in letting history change its course. There were the important, noble and audacious decisions by the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Polish Governments to let Germans leave their country, Germans who wanted to go to the other part of their country. The subsequent sympathy we Germans were spontaneously granted by our other European neighbours, and here in the first place those of the European Community, will help us to continue our responsible policy which in the context of the Conference on Disarmament is expressed in efforts to build a new and effective security order for Europe.

This old continent has young chances. Lasting peace and unity for our grief-stricken continent is no longer Utopian. A just order of peace has a realistic perspective now. Walls have tumbled, barbed wire has been cut. Europe is beginning again to remember its common history and culture and values. The realities of the military threat have changed substantially. East and West must no longer perceive each other as ineluctable enemies, even if the arsenals and forces have so far barely been influenced by the political developments. But we know from experience that disarmament always follows threat conditions and does not change them. This is one of the reasons why disarmament activities in Europe - and hopefully also in other parts of the world - now have a chance to be energetically activated. The mandate of all the peoples who have chosen the road to freedom and democracy and European unity is also a mandate for this body. The German step on the European road should help to foster new European policies of peace and unity.

Let me return to our Conference on Disarmament. When during all these years I have looked from different places around this square table at different perspectives of the pictures on our walls, I have wondered what they have to do with us. These pictures stem from violent times and they are violent and particularly brutal. They stem from a time when one thought that peace could be achieved only in the same way as it was broken. I think we know better today. The word "revolution" has taken on a different colour - at least in Europe. We no longer - I hope - live in a world of the victorious and the vanquished as depicted above our heads here; we have left the state of mind where even the angels carry sticks.

If there is a new approach to the problems of the world, we had a glimpse of it two months ago. In the month of February, when despite deep-seated feelings our Conference reached consensus on acceptance of the participation of more than 30 non-member States, I expressed my gratitude for that development then, and I would like to repeat it today. Then, at that time, political culture had won a victory.

It is my turn now to thank all those who have enabled us to do what we did. In the first place I have to thank our tireless Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, who with his impatient patience oversaw our debates, guided us skilfully, and was always looking for positive solutions with the aid of his deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, who is the institutional memory of the Conference on Disarmament, which should make good use of it. I would like to acknowledge the fine co-operation from which my delegation and myself have benefited over the years on the part of the entire secretariat. I would like to refer particularly to Ms. Pasqualin, who was always available to answer

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

ignorant questions, Mrs. Waskes-Fischer, who did a splendid job by informing the press about our proceedings, Mrs. Robert-Tissot, whose documentary help was always to the point. And last but not least, the whole chemical weapons crew, with Mr. Bensmail, Miss Marcaillou and Ms. Darby in particularly responsible places. Over my entire period of office I have admired our interpreters, who have coped with our occasionally bad but nevertheless rather far-fetched English vocabulary. But since our migrating body also needs the help and understanding of the New York branch of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, I would like here to thank its Under-Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi and through him his loyal international staff. I remember particularly their valuable services during the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which started with a high sense of expectancy and finally, in one bitter night, all those expectations broke down and crumbled. New York has its dramatic moments, and that was one of them.

The subject which has occupied most of my attention during my term of office here in Geneva has been chemical weapons. This is not only because my Government attaches the highest priority to the early conclusion of a comprehensive, global and securely verifiable ban on chemical weapons. The conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is an historic opportunity that the Conference on Disarmament must not let slip out of its hands. To speak for those who have suffered from chemical weapons use, it is no exaggeration to say that the Conference on Disarmament has to meet its responsibility to mankind. There is no time to lose to translate the existing overwhelming consensus of the international community for a global ban into an effective convention. As I have said before: time is not on our side. Reports meant to be alarming on a rapid spread of chemical weapons are indeed alarming. We are called upon to prevent these ghastly weapons from becoming an accepted means of warfare. Determined action is called for. Interim measures like export controls to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons, even when effectively applied, are clearly not sufficient. The same goes for the Geneva Protocol, which has proven to be painfully inadequate. The only means of establishing a global accepted norm is to make possession of chemical weapons illegal. To renounce the option of acquiring chemical weapons will not find sufficient incentive as long as arsenals of chemical weapons continue to exist.

For almost four years I have hoped that we would be able to conclude a convention soon, my hopes not being founded on illusions but on an assessment of the state of work in our negotiations. I always believed in a common resolve to come to terms with the issues involved in our negotiations. I am convinced that it would have been possible. Let me again stress that there is no reason in my view why we should not approach our task of concluding a convention in as ambitious a manner as we see now being displayed in other forums, and for which we are grateful. As I said in my previous plenary statement on 8 March: "Otherwise we risk being the last to change in a world of change, or those who did not change in time".

I think we all know that the necessary political and material prerequisites for the timely conclusion of our task of drafting a comprehensive and global convention effectively banning chemical weapons exist. I cannot help but observe that we are in many instances discussing

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

the same issues time and again, looking at them from various angles, trying to elaborate certain parts further. I have had an impression of *déjà vu* many times. Belabouring problems is not necessarily the best recipe for arriving at better solutions. Rather, the risk is real that we will get bogged down in unnecessary details and lose sight of the imperatives of our task. We have lately started an extensive drafting exercise which in my view is - before we have come to the necessary principal conclusions - a rather lofty undertaking. A question still persists: How can we make the sense of urgency and resolve prevailing in Vienna and in the bilateral Geneva negotiations contagious so that we too can achieve something concrete? If we cannot come to grips with the early conclusion of a global CW convention, we will no longer be able to demonstrate that multilateral disarmament can keep abreast of international developments and disarmament and arms control efforts on other levels.

Having said this, I have wondered a number of times about the protracted and vigorous yet futile debates on other items on the agenda of our Conference. Knowing full well that at this juncture we are not able to bridge existing differences and that these items are not ripe for serious negotiations, we continue to dwell on them with relentless joy. For chemical weapons at least we had the Paris consensus of 149 States. For the other subjects on our agenda there is certainly much less consensus, much less chance to get anywhere. The Conference on Disarmament is a negotiating forum, indeed the only international negotiating forum, and should negotiate in earnest an instrument of international law where this proves possible. If the Conference on Disarmament fails to fulfil this task entrusted to it even in fields where there is consensus, it is not only faced with a drastic loss of credibility.

Permit me to say a few final words about a few slogans which seem to guide our work. How do we understand the notion of consensus which I have just cited? We work by consensus. Otherwise one cannot come to an agreement on negotiated material, of course. That again presupposes some flexibility by negotiators and their capacity to negotiate. Extreme positions by one side provoke extremes on another side. In some cases that leads to not having a negotiated mandate at all. In other cases we lack a work programme. But in our most advanced field of negotiations we might create a credibility problem for ourselves, as for the world outside this chamber, if we continue a negotiation "as if". I have often wondered how much we have been really looking for consensus in many fields, or whether positions are just there to fill empty spaces.

Another guiding principle of our work is the security of the States we represent. Security is the most important single objective of any Government. The question is: If all other parameters change, can the perception of security remain unaffected? We ambassadors in this room are not here to make politics, we implement it. But if we cannot agree on almost anything, it is seeming proof that world and regional policies have not changed sufficiently to allow us to draw the consequences. Yet this is not true: world politics and regional politics have changed considerably. In this room - do we really feel that? The acoustics of this chamber do not seem to allow the right echoes.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Equality is another basis of our work, one would think. In fact I have not witnessed any discrimination against any delegation as to opportunities to express itself. But I have often wondered whether some delegations' opinions have been honoured with the same respect as others have demanded for theirs. How truly democratic is this body? In my view the answer is: Not more or less democratic than any other international conference. Some have thought we could do better. That has not proved to be the case.

Why is there so little sense of urgency in what we are doing? The Secretary-General of the Conference tells us every year how many hours we have lost, hours that were granted to us by this rather clouded process of allocation of administrative services. In other organizations you have deadlines, because people have to be served with concrete decisions. They need them for their existence or subsistence, and they demand them. Here we do not have deadlines, which, if proposed, are regularly depicted as being artificial. Deadlines are helpful in my view, and the word "artificial" does not make them less effective nor less attractive nor our work less meaningful. What we should have are deadlines.

Allegations of the absence of "political will" almost always mean a demand to accept one's own position. So in Canberra the Dutch delegation invented the notion of "practical will", to get us one step ahead of this old stereotype. I am afraid it is not political nor practical, diplomatic or administrative will that we lack very often, it is just the will to achieve some feat. So let me add to our dictionary the notion of the "will to achieve" as an element we are sometimes lacking, but for which we should always strive.

Another thing is the picture of the enemy which has persisted over so many decades in regional as well as universal contexts, and which in the first years of my presence here was very elaborate and colourful. Today we have a chance to change, thanks to the process induced by creative forces which have developed a new perspective, a new thinking, even in the most unbelievable places. All States represented in this room have lived for decades with clear pictures of their enemies which were ossifying their way of doing diplomacy. But it seems that the peoples of the world have become tired of the way diplomats have been painting things. I think we should try hard to learn that we can live without our traditional tableaux of enmity. We should in all sincerity try to identify our true and objective security needs in the light of the changes as being different from our perceived or even thought-of security requirements. History will punish not only those who come too late, but those who identify their real security needs too late.

I know I have spoken too long, but he whose heart is full - you know the rest. I part from you, my dear colleagues, with very sincere and best wishes for your personal happiness, but also with the expectation that the day may come when you find yourselves together in achieving one great task that until today has eluded us, with a success which will honour all of you, and will give you your deserved place in history.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank Ambassador von Stülpnagel for a highly thought-provoking farewell statement, as well as for the very kind and affectionate words that he addressed to my person.

Ambassador von Stülpnagel has served this Conference with distinction for almost four years. He was our President in March 1988. His diplomatic experience, his deep knowledge, his incisiveness and his competence in the subject of the Conference have been appreciated over these years by all of us, and also by his own Government, which has now appointed him to a new and important assignment. He has served his country in Geneva faithfully and ably, and he leaves behind many friends and many admirers among whom I count myself most particularly. All of us will miss him and Mrs. von Stülpnagel. I wish both of them, on behalf of the Conference, every success and every personal happiness in their new post, where I am sure that he will perform outstanding services once again for his country. We look forward, Paul, to meeting you again here or elsewhere, and always on the same side of the diplomatic table.

I now call on Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja to make his statement.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): It is with great pleasure and emotion that I come back to this room, surely one of the great rooms of multilateral diplomacy, a room full of history, full of distinction and full of honour, to say a few words about the work of the Conference on Disarmament and also to say farewell to dear colleagues and very close friends. I cannot but say that I feel very much at home here, among old acquaintances, and cherishing already fond memories of my work here for the last three years.

My delegation, Sir, feels great satisfaction to see you in the Chair. Your well-known and well-tested qualities of wisdom, sharpness and wit have assured us of a first-class stewardship throughout this month of April. I do not have to add my personal feelings and my high regard for you - we are, I think, very close friends; we will remain so. I would like to say a word about Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference, and Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General, who both deserve my praise and thanks, not only for their work during this month, but for their constant help and advice throughout my presence in this body. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all members of the secretariat and the interpreters and translators for their contribution, assistance, support and patience. I have been in contact with Under-Secretary-General Akashi in New York to tell him how much I will miss him and how much I valued the co-operation of the United Nations in our joint work. I must also say that I am delighted to say goodbye to the Conference on the same day that two dear friends perform the same duty - Ambassador Paul von Stülpnagel and Ambassador Kamallesh Sharma. I could not have had better company and closer friends if I had chosen them myself.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

When I first came to the Conference, in August 1987, the world was still haunted by the ghosts of mistrust and rigid ideological confrontation. The winds that have brought us so many political changes since then were only beginning to blow, softly and slowly. With the INF agreement, a new era of détente between the two super-Powers was ushered in, opening wide avenues of common endeavour in the search for disarmament. Today, we can have good and well-founded hopes of seeing, in the near future, a broad agreement in the field of conventional disarmament in Europe, a 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the two super-Powers and a universal and non-discriminatory convention banning chemical weapons for ever.

These very welcome prospects are not enough to dispel all of our fears and misgivings. There are still too many nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons remain and have been used, and there are threats that they could be used again. The risk of an arms race in outer space has not disappeared and naval disarmament is still not on everyone's agenda. Many States seem not to be ready yet to give up resort to military force to solve their differences with other States.

Even with the good news of recent vintage, the international community has to go a step further, and address in a global way those problems which are unequivocally global. The better way to do this is through increased use of the multilateral system, where all nations and regions are represented or can make their voices heard. A former Brazilian Foreign Minister, Ambassador Araujo Castro, once active in our CD, made a memorable speech many years ago dedicated to what he called the three Ds - disarmament, development, decolonization - which were then the main items on the United Nations agenda. With the recent accession of Namibia to independence, a most significant page of the saga of decolonization has been turned, and one of those three Ds is now almost disposed of. Disarmament and development, on the contrary, will be with us for a long while yet, and will constitute a significant part of the agenda of the international community in the 1990s.

This forum has a major role to play in the global process of disarmament, as the only multilateral forum that can negotiate measures in this field. I would like to share with you some of the general guidelines my Government considers it essential to follow if this process of comprehensive disarmament is to be acceptable to all members of the international community.

First, disarmament should be a process of asymmetrical reductions, based on the concept of levelling out. The States more heavily armed and those with the more sophisticated weapons systems have a special responsibility to disarm and should be the catalysts of the whole process.

Disarmament is essential to all members of the international community, and thus each of them, even the smallest and the poorest, has the right to have a say on a matter intimately linked to its survival.

Disarmament has to proceed from the most threatening weapons to the least, and concentrate, as its utmost priority, on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

Disarmament should never be used as a pretext to deny developing countries or other States access to science and technology, on the assumption that if civilian advanced technologies are mastered by the newcomers they will necessarily be diverted to military uses, as has happened in some, but not all, of the States which are the sources of those technologies.

Disarmament should not be used as a pretext to perpetuate inequalities in the international system, be it in the military, scientific, technological or economic fields.

Disarmament should not tie up resources released by cuts in military spending in highly redundant and expensive systems of verification.

Disarmament is as global a process as the protection of the environment or any other universal item in the agenda of the United Nations. It does not allow for exclusive regional treatment, except in the conventional dimension. In any case, in a world where nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missile technology and naval power enable their possessors to reach every point of the map, a merely regional approach would appear naïve or discriminatory and unfair.

Finally, disarmament cannot be separated from the more general process of building an international society based on the rule of law, which, as has happened internally in our societies, would permit the disarming of its members. The reinforced role the United Nations has found in the solution of regional conflicts is a promising avenue in this complementarity between conflict resolution and progress in disarmament.

In my statement before this Conference in February last I shared with you some of the ideas I had on the need to make this body more effective and useful in this era of fast change. I will no longer be able to participate in the day-to-day business of the CD, but I am sure that this forum will make a major contribution to the achievement of our ultimate goal of achieving peace through disarmament. I hope that the chemical weapons convention, to which you have devoted so much hard work, will be concluded soon and thus confirm the capacity of this body to help build a new order in the field of security. My thoughts and my best wishes will always be with you in your endeavours, and I hope from time to time to come back to this room and share my thoughts with you and learn from your collective wisdom and concern.

Ambassador Rubens Ricupero, a very good friend and a respected colleague, will be Brazil's representative in this Conference. He is well known to most of you and requires no introduction. It gives me great pleasure that a man of his talent and ability will be our spokesman and assure the undiminished interest of Brazil in all aspects of our extremely relevant and challenging agenda.

May God bless the efforts of this Conference and bring happiness to each and all of you.

The PRESIDENT: I would like to thank Ambassador de Azambuja for his important and lofty statement, and also for the very kind words that he addressed to me and to the Chair. Ambassador de Azambuja has served this Conference for almost three years in an unusually brilliant and competent manner. His outstanding diplomatic ability and the wit of his strategic insight has led to his recent appointment as Secretary-General for Foreign Policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brasilia. He, more than anyone else, has constantly urged us towards the process of consideration of the improved and effective functioning of this Conference, and I would like to assure him that with the process which has been started happily last week, we shall not fail to keep in mind his very valuable advice in the matter. I am convinced that Ambassador de Azambuja will be as successful in his new and important functions as he has been here in the Conference on Disarmament, and on behalf of the Conference I would like to wish him and Mrs. de Azambuja all the best for the future. As Secretary-General, Marcos, you will continue to oversee the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and so we hope to see you again here in this room this year. I welcome the sentence in your statement which holds out that hope for all of us. The children of this room always return to this room sooner or later. We have evidence here in the presence of Ambassador Yamada, whose presence I would like to salute in this room also. We wish you, Marcos, all the best, and hasta la vista.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Before making my remarks, I would like first to welcome to the Conference our new colleague, Ambassador Králik of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia. Ambassador, my delegation and I look forward to working with you and your staff. I would also like to take this occasion formally to bid farewell to three of our colleagues who are departing for new and important assignments - Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil, Ambassador Sharma of India and Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. Let me express appreciation for your important contributions to the Conference and wish you well as you take on your new duties. And lastly, Mr. President, I would like to express my personal appreciation for the wise and effective way in which you have guided the Conference during your tenure this month. We have all been beneficiaries.

Because today's plenary meeting marks the end of the spring part of our 1990 session, I have taken the floor in order to provide information to the Conference on the fifteenth round of the United States-Soviet consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which is currently under way and will end the day after tomorrow. My statement is made by agreement with the head of the Soviet delegation, Minister Serguei Batsanov, and supplements his statement to the Conference made on 8 March.

Since the end of the fourteenth round on 8 March, United States-Soviet discussions of a chemical weapons ban have continued in an intensive manner. During their meeting in Washington from 4 to 6 April, United States Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reviewed progress in the discussions and provided further guidance for our two delegations.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

In this round, the delegations have devoted particular attention to completion of a bilateral agreement on reciprocal obligations of the United States and the Soviet Union pending a multilateral convention including, inter alia, the destruction of the bulk of their CW stocks to equal low levels. Further progress was made and discussions are continuing in an effort to resolve the remaining issues as soon as possible.

In the discussions, both sides emphasized that in their destruction activities under the bilateral agreement the highest priority would be given to safety of people and protection of the environment. They also have agreed that under the agreement the CW stocks of both sides will be reduced to a level of 5,000 tons (i.e. equal to approximately 20 per cent of the current United States stockpile). The sides concur that, once the multilateral convention comes into force, its terms will take precedence over those of the bilateral agreement.

Another priority area during the fifteenth round has been implementation of the Wyoming memorandum of understanding. The sides continued their efforts to build confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the chemical weapons capabilities of the other side. In this connection, the delegations exchanged detailed information in preparation for the exchange of visits to chemical weapons storage facilities that will take place in June. Planning continued for the additional visits that will take place in August and in early 1991. Overall, there will be seven visits in each country, covering chemical weapons storage facilities, chemical weapons production facilities, and industrial chemical production facilities. The sides anticipate that, in addition to building confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union, these visits will provide valuable insights into the application of the provisions of the multilateral convention to such facilities.

Building on the very useful exchanges that took place during the fourteenth round, the delegations during the current round have intensified their work regarding bilateral co-operation in the field of destruction of chemical weapons. The goal of this co-operation is to facilitate safe and expeditious elimination of chemical weapons. For these discussions the delegations were reinforced by experts who are directly involved in the destruction programmes of the United States and the USSR. A number of special meetings devoted to destruction of chemical weapons took place. The experts exchanged detailed information on the programmes under way in each country, including the technology employed and the special difficulties that need to be dealt with.

In view of their desire to accelerate the conclusion of a multilateral chemical weapons ban, the two delegations are also conducting discussions for that purpose. During the round, suggestions for refining definitions and the guidelines for schedule 1 were communicated to the Chairman of the appropriate Working Group. The two sides are also discussing ways to promote the universality of the multilateral convention.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The fifteenth bilateral round will conclude on 26 April. Bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban will continue during the meeting of ministers scheduled for mid-May and at the summit meeting between President George Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev. It is the jointly expressed hope of both countries that the new bilateral CW agreement can be signed at the summit meeting and that it will be possible to report further progress toward a global, comprehensive chemical weapons ban.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): I would like to start by thanking the Ambassador of Canada for yielding the floor to me because I have to go to another meeting.

I am pleased to take the floor today to invite the attention of the Conference to a letter dated 16 April 1990 which the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General on a proposal to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The letter is contained in document CD/989, which has been circulated today.

The rationale of the proposal is to spare a region fraught with tension from the scourge of a possible recourse to any type of weapon of mass destruction. In this context it is appropriate to recall that as far back as 1948 the Commission for Conventional Armaments advised the Security Council that it considered that "weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above". This definition seems to be still valid. We believe that means of delivery should also be included in the proposed ban. This lofty objective requires the conclusion of credible and verifiable regional measures to ensure the total absence of all such weapons from the Middle East.

Since 1974 Egypt has presented annually to the General Assembly a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The international community has resolved that nuclear weapons are the most lethal and devastating weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, it has assigned the highest priority to the task of removing the threat of nuclear war. Our proposal has been endorsed by the General Assembly by consensus ever since 1980. A highly qualified group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General is now in the process of finalizing a report which the Secretary-General will subsequently submit to the General Assembly.

Egypt recognizes, however, that the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone needs to be strengthened by including other weapons of mass destruction. The rapid pace of progress in the production and development of weapons of mass destruction necessitates the adoption of a more comprehensive approach. For the sake of ensuring peace and security to future generations in our region, Egypt deems it imperative now to advocate the importance of widening the scope of the zone to comprise all weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

It is the considered opinion of the Government of Egypt that the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East merits urgent attention and serious examination. The document circulated today is self-explanatory. I believe a careful perusal of its contents will contribute to a better and more profound appreciation of our proposal. It is our earnest hope that this proposed comprehensive approach will command the active support of all concerned States as well as the international community as a whole.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Nabil Elaraby, for his statement and for the very important proposal which is contained in that statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): I am pleased to have the opportunity today to make my first formal presentation to the Conference on Disarmament. May I begin first by expressing my own delegation's great appreciation of your leadership during the past month, Sir, as well as our satisfaction that you will continue to oversee our affairs during the coming period while the Conference is in recess? I would also like at this point to thank your predecessors for the particular contributions each one made during their terms in office earlier in this session.

Second, I would like to say how pleased and honoured I was to learn that I would be joining this committed and truly very capable group, the heads of delegations to this Conference. Since I am myself a relative newcomer, it would hardly be appropriate for me to welcome those others who are also members of the class of 1990. But I would like to say a special word of congratulation to our colleague, Ambassador Sinegiorgis of Ethiopia, one of the longest-serving among the delegates to the Conference on Disarmament, on her recent appointment as her country's Ambassador and Permanent Representative. I would also like to extend best wishes in their new assignments to three colleagues who are soon to leave us, Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil and Ambassador Sharma of India.

I would also like to note the presence at the Conference again today of Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Ambassador Margaret Mason.

We have come to the end of our spring session. As our speakers' list today is a long one, I will not review in detail or place on record all of Canada's views concerning all the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We are an active Conference on Disarmament delegation. Where ad hoc committees have already been established, our views are being registered. Where we have decided that discussion on other agenda items can be more effectively advanced in informal plenary meetings, we have either expressed our own views or supported the collective views of the Western Group to which Canada belongs. Nevertheless, there are several broader concerns which I do wish to address this morning. Since you collectively have entrusted Canada with the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on outer space, I shall begin with that item.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I must say with feeling that my experience as Chairman has constituted quite an initiation into the complexities of multilateral disarmament diplomacy. On outer space there is both very little and a great deal to say. I say "very little" because, as we all know, we have spent the past three months trying first to establish the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and then to find agreement on a programme and organization of work. Thus we have not been able to begin substantive work until now. On the other hand, there is a great deal to say, in the sense that the Committee has much valuable work to do in furtherance of its goal of preventing an arms race in outer space.

As I mentioned at the first meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on 13 March Canada has for many years shown a strong interest in, and has contributed significant resources to, its work. It is precisely because of this that I was extremely disappointed by our collective inability to get down to substantive work during this spring session. I hope that our meetings during the summer session will contribute to greater understanding of the issues involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and will result in greater progress towards the goal of the Committee, a goal that is enshrined in its title.

As Chairman of the Committee I indicated to it that I have a number of definite ideas as to how our work could be made more productive. I will not detail these here today, as they are well known to the Committee members. But I would like to stress that, both in my capacity as Canadian representative and in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee, I will make every effort to ensure that our work will be constructive, productive and useful. I proceed on the understanding that we must concentrate on exploring the subject before us in all its complexity and search for areas of convergence in our thinking. The differences that will emerge in the course of that exploratory process must also be pursued with a view to finding common ground.

The Conference has not yet reached consensus on giving this Committee a negotiating mandate. However, this should not prevent us from amassing the technical and other information we will need when this Committee becomes in fact entrusted with conducting multilateral negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is on the basis of such reasoning that Canada has regularly distributed to the Committee outer space compendiums comprising plenary statements and working papers. These have been circulated every year since 1985; they bring together documentation covering the period 1962-1988 inclusively. I am pleased to inform you that we are today distributing as a CD document the compendiums for 1989. This afternoon, we shall also be distributing in the Ad hoc Committee itself a compendium of those working papers submitted to it over the last four years. We hope that these volumes will be used by delegations to advance our work in this area.

Next, I would like to speak to the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, the subject to which most of us are devoting by far the greatest part of our time, and where we are, I believe, beginning to see increasing convergence of views.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I begin my comments on this item by offering my belated, but no less sincere, congratulations to our Swedish colleague, Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Swedish delegation, particularly in the person of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, has long played a signal role in providing leadership in our efforts to develop a convention banning chemical weapons. My delegation and I look forward to continuing our full co-operation with Ambassador Hyltenius and his delegation in this most important work.

Indeed, I do not exaggerate if I suggest that the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention is the single most important task confronting the Conference during its 1990 session. Almost daily, it seems, we are being reminded that the threat posed by the existence of chemical weapons not only continues but is in danger of growing. And this notwithstanding the several important and encouraging developments that took place during 1989, both in terms of the progress achieved by the CW Ad hoc Committee under Ambassador Morel's inspired and energetic leadership, and in terms of the separate but closely related meetings in Paris, Canberra, and Jackson Hole, Wyoming. For my Government, it is critically important, therefore, that, under the spur of the continuing threat of chemical weapons, the momentum provided by these developments must be continued and must be rapidly translated into concrete progress in resolving our remaining differences.

In this respect, I am happy to note that, at this midway point in our formal session, there are several solid signs that some of our outstanding problems are well on the road to resolution. The various working groups have been particularly assiduous in tackling the difficult technical, practical, and legal issues before them, and I congratulate them and their chairman for their efforts.

Most significant to date, perhaps, may be the success so far achieved by Working Group B in developing appropriate texts on the crucial issue of the order of destruction of chemical weapons and CW production facilities. Thanks in large measure to the important contribution here from the United States and Soviet delegations, we are getting closer to resolving what has been one of the more difficult issues facing us. However, we are not yet out of these woods and further efforts need to be made.

My Government is especially impressed and pleased with the success Working Group C has had in addressing the immensely complicated set of legal issues involved in our consideration of sanctions, amendments, and settlement of disputes. Barely a year ago it might have seemed to a casual observer that these issues were intractable, but, thanks to the constructive spirit of compromise shown by delegations, it now appears that solutions are being identified that should meet the various concerns of all negotiators.

Working Group A has also been successful in continuing and completing the work begun last year on the protocol on inspection procedures. My Government has noted in particular the serious attention that has most recently been given to the issue of procedures for the investigation of alleged use, a subject that has long been of special concern to Canada. In this latter respect,

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

I might note that my delegation is in the course of distributing to the secretariat copies of a report prepared by one of the experts advising the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada on "Verification methods, handling, and assessments of unusual events in relation to allegations of the use of novel chemical warfare agents". This report develops a methodology for the examination of allegations of the use of novel CW agents and focuses on the need for epidemiological studies and on the type of national infrastructure that might be appropriate to oversee such investigations for a future Canadian national authority. While its general application might seem particularly relevant to longer-term objectives, my authorities hope that it may also prove useful to our ongoing discussions in these negotiations of the problem of novel CW agents.

The other development of particular significance that I wish to take note of here is the work that Working Group A has most recently begun on the question of ad hoc verification, based upon the discussion paper that was submitted earlier this month by our Australian colleague, Ambassador Reese. After careful consideration of the various approaches and proposals in this area, my Government has come to the conclusion that the concept of ad hoc verification must be an essential part of the structure that we are trying to develop to ensure the effective verification of the convention. In our view, ad hoc verification offers the most satisfactory means short of challenge inspection of ensuring that facilities relevant to the goals of the convention are subject to appropriate verification. We are therefore particularly hopeful that, early in the summer session, Working Group A will have productive exchanges on this proposal that will lead to the development of appropriate treaty language.

In highlighting some of the achievements to date in the 1990 session, I have been very conscious of the need to slight neither the other encouraging developments that have taken place nor the magnitude of the tasks that remain. My primary purpose in addressing these particular items has been to suggest that the momentum of 1989 is being continued and we are making considerable progress towards our ultimate goal. This has been due to the conscientious and constructive attitude that the negotiators have been taking towards their work. My Government fully expects that, if this attitude is maintained and strengthened during the summer session, we will have gone a very long way towards resolving most, if not all, of the remaining outstanding problems.

I should, perhaps, not need to add that my Government is fully committed to doing all that it can to assist in realizing our final goal. In closing my comments on this item, I should note, however, that to this end my delegation will also be distributing through the secretariat a number of other documents for the use of delegations in their work. Some of these documents I shall describe in a few moments, but I should like to note here that, as in previous years, we are distributing the latest compendiums of documents comprising the plenary statements and working papers of the 1989 session.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

This morning I am also pleased to be able to table a paper describing Canada's first national trial inspection, which is designated CD/987. Since Canada currently has no significant production of schedule 2 chemicals and there was no suitable plant available at the time that could be used as a substitute Canada was unable to participate in the earlier phase of this exercise. However, in keeping with the move to expand the national trial inspections into other areas, such as challenge and ad hoc inspections, Canada decided it could best contribute through an inspection at a simulated single small-scale facility for schedule 1 chemicals.

The trial was carried out in a facility based on an organic synthesis laboratory at the Defence Research Establishment Suffield, where research quantities of schedule 1 chemicals are occasionally prepared for protective purposes. The practicality of the inspection procedures in the "rolling text" was thoroughly tested and a number of suggestions are made in the paper for modifications and improvements. In addition, it was found that the model for facility agreements for single small-scale facilities found in appendix II was more appropriate for larger dedicated facilities and required some adaptation in order to be used for a laboratory. It is our hope that the results of this trial will prove to be a useful contribution to the work of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Further national trial inspections are being considered in Canada, and results will be reported when available.

There are in addition two other papers which we have also asked the secretariat to distribute to you. The first we originally made available in September 1989 during the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons. This report, which is entitled "Role and function of a national authority in the implementation of a chemical weapons convention", was prepared by Dr. Ronald Sutherland of the University of Saskatchewan. The report reviews the obligation to the chemical weapons convention of a State party that does not possess chemical weapons. It attempts to assess how such a State party can demonstrate compliance using existing organizations and also suggests the probable costs involved. We hope that this report will be of help both in furthering work on the "rolling text" and to Governments contemplating the establishment of a national authority.

And finally, we have asked that the secretariat distribute the fifth in a series of verification brochures issued on a periodic basis. Entitled "Canada and international safeguards: Verifying nuclear non-proliferation", this brochure provides background information on Canadian support of the nuclear non-proliferation régime and, in particular, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. It also describes the achievements of the Canadian safeguards support programme. While the brochure has been written for the general public, and thus represents part of an ongoing effort by our verification research programme to heighten understanding by Canadians and others of issues relating to arms control verification, we believe that it could also be of interest to the more professional audience comprised by the members of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

As I indicated at the beginning of this statement, I will not be dealing today with some other items on our agenda, such as items 6 and 7, negative security assurances and radiological weapons, although I must admit that, when Ambassador Ceska of Austria referred to these two items in his own recent statement, I took satisfaction that his down-to-earth and pragmatic approach to them closely approximated our own views. Nor will I say anything at this time about the first item on our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", except to express the strong hope, which so many among us clearly share, that Ambassador Donowaki's continuing patient exploration of the mandate issue will soon be answered by success.

There is one additional subject, however, on which I do want to put our views on record, and this seems to be the right time and place to do so. That subject is improved and effective functioning of the Conference, on which you, Mr. President, have already convened an open-ended consultation. In our delegation we also were struck by Ambassador Azambuja's wise suggestion that we give careful thought to how best the Conference on Disarmament might adopt and retain relevancy in face of the new international situation that has emerged during the past momentous 18 months or so. While all of us can concur in the correctness of Ambassador Azambuja's remarks, what I want to suggest today is that there are really two different aspects to the issue of improved functioning. There are good grounds for a very careful re-examination of our list of subjects; I appreciate that we should approach any changes to our basic agenda and programme of work with the greatest of care. Issues that are under consideration by us at this Conference reflect deep concerns with their substance. Nevertheless we are strongly in favour of dropping or modifying at least some of our items and replacing them with issues that have greater contemporary relevance. There is, as well, a second methodological aspect to improving how we function. I believe it would be relatively easy for us to agree to certain changes in our schedule to enable all our delegations to function more effectively and more efficiently. While the Canadian delegation is comparatively small, there are others much smaller. Even we find that, by the end of each of the current long sessions, we are increasingly overwhelmed by ongoing work-loads. We have too little time to give appropriate consideration and mature reflection to all subjects on our agenda. We strongly believe that, without changing the overall time devoted to our work, a modified rescheduling, which would provide for three shorter sessions and would at the same time allow for more frequent time between sessions for reflection, consultation and the development of policies, would be of real benefit to all.

I have spoken selectively today about only certain of the issues that confront us. There are other matters which I will wish to address in greater detail in due course, and I plan to return to these in the summer session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Shannon, the distinguished representative of Canada, for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Han Chang On.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, first of all I congratulate you on your able presidency for the last month of the current CD, leading the session to a successful conclusion.

It is the common aspiration of the world's peoples greeting the first year of the 1990s that the current decade will be a decade of disarmament free from the dangers of nuclear weapons and war in every part of the globe, and a decade of peace, friendship and co-operation. This aspiration became dearer to them as a result of recent changes in the international arena rather than the time conception that the 1990s is the last decade in the twentieth century.

Since many delegates have referred to the world-wide changes, in particular the progress made in the field of disarmament through bilateral or regional multilateral negotiations, I am going to avoid a repetition of them.

Disarmament and stability are not solely for particular countries and regions. Comprehensive and complete disarmament should be realized in all regions and in every part of the world; when various negotiations lead to adoption of measures aimed at this, world peace and security can be secured. The détente and disarmament process should be especially expedited in the region where mass lethal weapons, including nuclear ones, and huge military forces are concentrated and where confrontation and tension are high as a result of frequent military operational manoeuvres.

Measures of disarmament and détente for peace and security in Asia and the Pacific are urgently needed, both from the historical viewpoint and in the light of the present military and political situation. It is in the Asian continent that large-scale wars owing to interference in internal affairs by the big Powers after the Second World War have broken out most frequently, and it is in the Asian continent that nuclear military bases and foreign troops are being kept and large-scale military operations are being intensified.

It is well known that the Korean peninsula, where the danger of nuclear war is most threatening, is becoming the hotbed of tension endangering world peace and security and the potential cradle of a new war. The area of the Military Demarcation Line is the most heavily armed area in the world, where over a million troops confront each other in a state of semi-war along a line less than 250 kilometres long. Although it is generally known that 45,000 foreign troops, military bases and 1,000-odd nuclear weapons of various types are deployed on the Korean peninsula where the situation is tense, due attention is not paid to the stage the danger of nuclear war has reached and how serious it is. Over 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea - that is, more than one nuclear weapon per 100 square kilometres, with a density four times higher than that of NATO and a total explosive capacity of 13,000 kilotons - are enough to kill 160 million persons. Already modern facilities for carrying nuclear weapons have been deployed and special nuclear stores have been built there.

What is dangerous is that an operational command system has been established for the use of nuclear weapons at any moment and rehearsals for nuclear war are being stepped up. The joint military exercise known as "Team spirit", which has been carried out since 1976, is growing in size every year, and the nature of the exercise has become offensive. At this very moment the

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

joint military exercise "Team spirit 90" with 200,000 United States and south Korean troops is going on in a real war atmosphere in south Korea. Military experts and world opinion draw the unanimous conclusion that the "Team spirit" joint military exercises are offensive drills for nuclear war, considering their characteristics or the involvement of mainly nuclear war material such as the E-4B nuclear command aircraft, nuclear aircraft carriers, submarines and cruisers, the B-52 strategic bomber, F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers and all sorts of nuclear missiles.

No one can confirm that the strong nuclear-equipped force of 200,000 troops engaged in practical military rehearsals near the Military Demarcation Line would not invade the north.

The open armed intervention in the internal affairs of Panama last year increased our concern.

Unlike NATO, which has a Nuclear Advisory Committee composed of 15 countries and deters any wilful arbitrary use of nuclear weapons, the south Korean side is completely excluded and has no say as far as the deployment and use of nuclear weapons in south Korea are concerned. Moreover, the field commander of the United States army stationed in south Korea has full authority to use nuclear weapons at any moment. Since 1982 the threats to use nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula have been repeated, and recently United States Defence Secretary Cheney said that if there is a place on the globe now where disputes could turn into a war, that is the Korean peninsula.

All the facts show that in the Korean peninsula any accidental event could trigger a war, and that would be a nuclear war. If a nuclear war breaks out in Korea, Asia and the world as well as Korea will suffer a terrible nuclear disaster. Consequently, the prevention of war and the realization of disarmament on the Korean peninsula are very important for world peace and security.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1985 and put forward a proposal for the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, a proposal for phased arms reductions and many proposals for disarmament and peace, and initiated negotiations for their realization in order to remove the danger of a nuclear war. But even negotiations for disarmament are not being held in the Korean peninsula, owing to the negative position of the other side. Arms are being increased and the situation is growing more tense.

It is the unanimous aspiration of mankind to live peacefully in a nuclear-free world. The only multilateral negotiating body, the CD, has a heavy responsibility to realize this aspiration of mankind. Regrettably, however, there is no evident progress in discussions on various agendas on nuclear weapons; it is anyone's guess how long it will take to achieve the complete abolition of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

Under such circumstances we consider one of the most urgent priorities in preventing nuclear war is the early establishment of an international legal system that deters and bans the use of nuclear weapons. Since the use of nuclear weapons is recognized as a wanton violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against mankind, the adoption of such legislation is urgent. It is one of the important ways for nuclear disarmament to minimize nuclear deployment and establish and expand nuclear-free peace zones.

Today, when partial disarmament is under way and acute regional disputes are being settled by the withdrawal of foreign troops, there are no grounds for continuing to deploy nuclear weapons and troops in a non-nuclear-weapon State or region. Once all nuclear weapons and troops deployed in foreign lands have been withdrawn to their original State and the proposed nuclear-free zones have been established in all continents, the process of nuclear disarmament will be rapidly expedited.

I should like to emphasize that no region should suffer the introduction of all sorts of nuclear weapons and the construction of nuclear stores for any nuclear-weapon State by that State's own decision without any deterrence. A strict international system of surveillance and control should be established which would ban the deployment of even a single foreign nuclear weapon in a non-nuclear-weapon State or region; authorities which are unable to control the introduction of foreign nuclear weapons on their soil and exacerbate the danger of nuclear war and nuclear proliferation should be denounced by the international community.

The fourth NPT conference to be held in August in Geneva will be an important occasion for focusing international attention on comprehensive nuclear disarmament, and especially on eliminating the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and withdrawing all foreign nuclear weapons and troops. In this regard my delegation will support the proposal made by Nigeria and other developing non-nuclear-weapon States at the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee. It is a positive event that there are disarmament talks in progress and disarmament measures are being taken in Europe where world wars broke out twice. This should also happen in the Asian continent and other parts of the world. Unfortunately, weapons being reduced in Europe are surprisingly flowing into other continents; several delegates have expressed concern about this at the present session. The New York Times dated 25 March reported that 30 billion dollars' worth of equipment, out of that due to be withdrawn from Europe as a result of the CFE negotiations, would be sold to third world countries. In particular, 20 F-18 fighters worth 3.5 billion dollars will be handed over to south Korea. If détente in one continent causes tension in another continent, the détente will be meaningless and world peace and security cannot be expected. This will be another serious challenge to our Conference. Our delegation strongly maintains that all troops reduced should go back to the original States and their equipment should be destroyed or returned to those States.

What is needed as a solution for rapid overall disarmament is confidence-building, which is under active discussion today in various international forums, and in regional meetings in particular. At the Asia and Pacific regional meeting on confidence-building held in January in Nepal, urgent regional issues were considered.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

In confidence-building aimed at disarmament, the tendency to indefinitely defer disarmament by dissociating confidence-building from disarmament and making confidence-building a precondition must be resisted. What is important is to strengthen confidence-building through bold disarmament. Especially in the situation prevailing in the Korean peninsula, where peace is not guaranteed by law and where dialogue at all levels and exchanges are restrained by military super-tension, a breakthrough for confidence-building will come about only through the easing of military confrontation.

If our proposals for high-level political-military North-South talks, for turning the demilitarized zone along the Military Demarcation Line into a peace zone, for stopping large-scale joint military exercises with foreign countries, and for withdrawing foreign troops and nuclear weapons and reducing armed forces to less than 100,000 troops on either side, had been negotiated and put into implementation, the question of the Korean peninsula would never have remained an international question.

Early this year our Government proposed pulling down the 240-kilometre concrete wall built in the area south of the Military Demarcation Line, and opening all doors to allow free travel between the north and the south. This is a general means of building full confidence in the political, economic, military and cultural fields. Free travel promotes personal understanding, and opening all doors permits correct understanding of the policies of the other side; these are the best methods of confidence-building that we can offer. As for the south Korean side, the pulling down of the concrete wall that hinders free travel mentally and physically would be their best offer for confidence-building.

The Conference on Disarmament has undertaken this year's work with a new life power against the background of the changing international situation. It is the hope of all participants that it will be possible to submit a draft convention on chemical weapons next year at the latest. It is also the expectation of the international community. The bright prospect for chemical weapons is due to the energetic efforts of Ambassador Morel and his colleagues through difficult technical problems and such significant international meetings as those of Paris and Canberra. I express appreciation once again of these efforts. I am convinced that the final work will result in success under the guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words address to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Sharma.

Mr. SHARMA (India): My statement does not really qualify as a farewell statement. If it is one, it is singularly dry and technical, almost esoteric given the wide canvas of disarmament we deal with. However, from the last occasion I took the floor in the Conference some weeks ago, also under the presidency of your country, I had shared some parting thoughts concerning the crucial work we are engaged in within the Conference.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

My delegation has taken the floor today to present document CD/988, which contains the results of a national trial inspection conducted by India in the context of the proposed chemical weapons convention. The trial inspection was carried out in August 1989 at Searle India, Bombay, a multi-purpose unit manufacturing various drugs. For the purposes of the proposed convention, the facility is manufacturing diisopyramide phosphate from DIPC alcohol which is initially converted into DIPC hydrochloride (DIPC HCl) and then to nitride pyramixetosylate. Another product - propantheline bromide - is also produced by esterification of xanthanoic acid with DIPC HCl. The chemical DIPC HCl is listed in schedule [2] in the current "rolling text".

The inspection was carried out in accordance with the provisions contained in document CD/CW/WP.213 to identify effective means of verifying that the production, processing, consumption and transfer of chemicals are consistent with purposes not prohibited by the proposed chemical weapons convention. The intent of the trial inspection was to develop an adequate system of verification and establish the degree of intrusiveness required while protecting commercial confidentiality. Experience gained from the inspection was very useful in this regard.

Within the proposed convention, verification is one of the most complex areas. A considerable amount of work has been done, though some issues still need to be resolved. The scale of the exercise adds to the complexity. Our approach to the verification issue is based upon certain principles. We believe that these provide an effective set of guidelines for tackling the problems relating to non-production as well as those related to challenge inspection. While the conclusions drawn from the national trial inspection conducted by India are self-evident from document CD/988, which has been circulated today, I would like to reiterate that the principles of universality and non-discrimination are among the most important for any international agreement. For the chemical weapons convention to succeed in enhancing global security it has to be based on universal multilateralism.

The verification régime must be appropriate and adequate, and it should not unduly interfere with legitimate activities. The balance between "appropriate" and "adequate" is a delicate one. With greater interaction with the chemical industry, it should be possible to find the right balance. In developed countries, the importance attached to the fact that verification activities should not be unduly intrusive or interfere with normal commercial activities, especially in sensitive areas of research and development, and also maintain confidentiality of sensitive information, is appreciated. For the developing countries, the additional natural correlated concern is that verification measures should not in any way jeopardize the development of a peaceful chemical industry, which plays a crucial role in national planning and the national economy. Greater openness and transparency will be an important confidence-building measure and lead to increased peaceful co-operation among the developed and developing countries. The development of a verification régime on the basis of these principles can give us a régime acceptable and beneficial to all.

A similar approach can also help us in furthering our work on challenge inspection. Such a measure is likely to be invoked as a last resort, when all other measures have been tried and found inadequate. The procedure should

(Mr. Sharma, India)

therefore reinforce this conclusion. A challenging State has a far-reaching right, but it has to be curtailed by the obligation not to abuse it. The challenged State is obliged to accept such intrusive inspections provided for within the convention, with a right also to satisfactorily demonstrate its compliance with the convention through alternative measures. In view of the political nature of this exercise, it is necessary to balance the rights and obligations of both sides. When the procedures in the post-inspection phase are finally amplified, the principles elaborated above can enable us to develop an effective mechanism that will reflect a truly objective multilateral character.

Since this is the last time that I will be taking the floor before the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to all the colleagues with whom I have had the opportunity of working closely on all matters connected with the work of the Conference. It has been a very rewarding experience. I would like to wish the Conference much success in obtaining effective and speedy results in various items of paramount interest for the world community being deliberated by it.

It is a pleasure for me, Mr. President, to have made my last statement before the Conference with you in the Chair, as I have particularly valued our close personal association and friendship. We appreciate your very able stewardship of the work of the Conference during this concluding month of the spring session. I also wish to express our delegation's appreciation of the important contribution which Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui have been making to the functioning of the Conference, as well as the excellent support from the secretariat and the team of interpreters. My best wishes also go to Ambassador Azambuja and Ambassador von Stülpnagel, who share this occasion with me in making a final appearance before the Conference and for both of whom I have the highest personal regard. There is no doubt that in the high positions they will henceforth occupy they will bring to bear the exceptional skills and commitment which have been so much in evidence in their outstanding contributions to the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of India, Ambassador Kamallesh Sharma, for his statement. Ambassador Sharma leaves us soon, after one and a half years, as a result of the process of perestroika and the magnetic attraction of the events in Central Europe. He moves to a very important assignment where events are unfolding on a truly historic scale. He will be a privileged witness to those events and, to that extent, his gain is our loss. In the relatively short period that Ambassador Sharma has been associated not only with the Conference on Disarmament but also with the vast panoply of United Nations institutions which he oversees, he has earned the respect of all his colleagues for his dignity, for his moderation, for his commitment to enlightened principles. He and Mrs. Sharma will leave behind many friends, among whom I myself and my wife are privileged to count themselves. Kamallesh, we will all of us miss you and we look forward to meeting you on an early occasion.

I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Wisber Loeis.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): Mr. President, it is my great pleasure to associate by delegation with the previous speakers in expressing our immense pleasure at seeing you, the representative of Pakistan, a country with which Indonesia has always enjoyed a close relationship, presiding over our work in the Conference on Disarmament. Being one of the last three speakers on your list on this last day of our spring session, I think that I am qualified enough to say how much your skill, expertise and your vast experience have proved invaluable in guiding our deliberations in April. Moreover, it should be noted that your presidency has also coincided with the holy month of Ramadan and this, undoubtedly, has meant hardship for you personally. My delegation would also like to avail itself of this opportunity to extend its grateful appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, for his tireless dedication and constructive efforts during his presidency in March. To Ambassador Juraj Králík of Czechoslovakia, who has just joined the Conference, I wish to extend my delegation's warm welcome and pledge its readiness to work closely with him and his delegation. I would also like to warmly congratulate Ms. Kongit Sinegiorgis on her promotion to Permanent Representative and Ethiopian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me also to express my regret at the departure of Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil, Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany and my neighbour, Ambassador Kamallesh Sharma of India. Their wisdom and contributions to the cause of disarmament will be missed by all of us. On behalf of my delegation and myself, I wish them every success in their new and very important posts.

We have heard quite a number of statements made by eminent personalities and distinguished representatives of member as well as non-member States of the Conference during the past three months. None of them, including that of my own delegation, failed to refer to the recent developments in East-West relations. My delegation is pleased to note that all views aired brought into sharp focus the need for the Conference to address its agenda in a more purposeful manner.

The views expressed by various speakers during this spring session have confirmed the importance of a number of points crucial to our deliberations. One of them is the need for the Conference to retain its international credibility. I am in complete agreement with the observation that the Conference had no choice but to exploit recent developments.

I also share the opinion that the epochal changes taking place outside this forum should give fresh impetus to our work in the Conference on Disarmament, and that the changes should inspire the emergence of a new concept concerning international peace and security commensurate with the demands of the new international environment.

It is common knowledge that the narrow concept of international peace and security caters to deep-rooted bipolar antagonism. It undermines the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, which underscores that the purpose of the elaboration and implementation of measures for the regulation of armaments and disarmament is to promote the maintenance of international

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

peace and security. Today, when conflicts and confrontations have given way to dialogue and negotiations, and when political rapprochement and reconciliation are seen to be spreading across ideological boundaries, such a concept may need to be thoroughly reviewed.

I could not agree more with you, Mr. President, when, in your recent statement as head of the delegation of Pakistan, you mentioned that in the world of today, agreements between the two super-Powers alone to limit their arsenals and reduce their forces do not constitute a sufficient guarantee for world peace and security. Indeed, we will delude ourselves if we pretend that all conflicts in the world are attributable to East-West hostilities. In this connection, our efforts to establish a new international peace and security system through disarmament can only be assured if we formulate a framework which takes the following caveats into account. Firstly, the myriad of militarily-non-significant States participating in the multilateral disarmament forums should be recognized as having a legitimate role to play in the international peace and security system. Their presence and their claims, therefore, must not be dismissed as passing phenomena, nor can they be adequately responded to by the narrow interest of one, two, or several major Powers. Secondly, the non-military as well as the military dimension of international peace and security, together with increased global interdependence, should be approached as interrelated phenomena by concerted multilateral actions with a view to avoiding a recurrence of major tensions in the coming decade. Thirdly, multilateral and group diplomacy should not be avoided, and the most sensible course of action is to make them as effective and equitable as possible.

In order to assure the achievement of concrete results and avoid the pitfalls which have led to a prolonged stalemate in the past, the negotiations in multilateral forums should not be cast in terms of "demands" by one group of countries. In this increasingly multipolar world, democratic approaches should take greater hold in the conduct of inter-State relations, including our deliberations. In this way, the role and the function of the Conference on Disarmament as a single multilateral negotiating body could be enhanced.

It is encouraging to note the readiness of a number of delegations to adopt a positive approach towards the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. In view of the emergence of the positive international climate, we should continue our endeavour on this particular issue. In this connection, I wish to welcome the process of informal meetings organized as an in-house mechanism to examine ways and means of working for the improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

Concerning the agenda of the Conference, my delegation is of the view that the items now on the table remain cogent. While we are open to any suggestion to improve the agenda, we should however bear in mind that the proposed improvement should not distract the Conference from exhaustive work on items pertinent to the interests of the majority of States inside and outside this room.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

The honourable Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the distinguished Ambassador of Sweden and your good self, Mr. President, as head of the delegation of Pakistan, made reference to the very pertinent issue of naval armaments and disarmament. My delegation has always attached particular importance to this issue. Because of its geographical location between two major oceans and the geopolitical factors which have shaped my country's maritime outlook, Indonesia is particularly sensitive to and concerned by the build-up of naval nuclear armaments. We are also particularly concerned at the rapid development of new naval arms systems, including naval nuclear weapon systems. All of these factors, in our view, have added a new and dangerous dimension to the arms race in general, have heightened the threat to regional and international peace and security and may have a significantly adverse impact on international maritime commerce, as well as on the peaceful exploitation of marine resources.

A non-nuclear State like my own can only be affected in a negative way if there is a nuclear confrontation, or even a nuclear accident, in the sea of the region. My delegation sees the merit of the view expressed by Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden that thought should be given to the issue of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea. A question which has a global dimension such as naval nuclear disarmament also deserves to be put on the table, in my view. Agenda item 3 of the Conference might be suited to cover these questions.

The question of regional security and armaments referred to by a number of delegations is of particular interest to my delegation. Perhaps I should begin by acknowledging that in many regions there is a long tradition of regional co-operation in permanent institutions, as well as modalities which have been created to promote the reduction of tension and the settlement of disputes. In the region of South-East Asia, co-operation among States through ASEAN has helped reduce the sources of conflict and has strengthened peace and security in the region. Regional peace and security could grow out of successful national and regional developments resulting from national and regional stability, thus placing emphasis on the totality of social, economic, cultural and political aspects as bases for peace and security in the region, rather than on the military dimension.

With regard to peace and regional security, the ASEAN member States recognize that every State has the right to lead its national existence free from foreign interference, subversion or coercion. It is also accepted that the use or the threat of the use of force in the conduct of relations among States should be renounced. ASEAN has therefore created a mechanism as well as norms and methods of consultation on social, economic, cultural and political issues which have proved beneficial and effective for its members. In this regard, I wish to say that in dealing with the question of regional peace and security, armaments and disarmament, a thorough elaboration of issues relating to the enhancement of peace and security in all regions is called for. This is indeed quite a delicate undertaking, since each region displays different levels of security, concerns and conditions, differing levels of regional cohesion and different degrees of extra-regional military involvement. The feasibility of bringing in the question of regional peace and security and armaments therefore needs to be given some more thought.

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

Touching upon the nuclear questions, I wish to welcome the progress made in the bilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament endeavours which, in recent years, have resulted in some achievements. There is also an indication of success in the near future on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons through a START agreement which could crown the summit meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev next June. We are heartened by this development, and we are looking forward to such an agreement.

Concerning item 1 of our agenda, my delegation appreciates the tireless endeavours expended by Ambassador Donowaki in attempting to resolve the difficulties in establishing an ad hoc committee to deal with this item. It is encouraging to note that a path has been found towards a convergence of views concerning the mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee. In this regard, I would hope that at the beginning of our summer session, the ad hoc committee could be established.

The majority of States are waiting for concrete results from the work of the Conference in this particular field. Since the original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty proclaimed their commitment through the preamble of the Treaty almost 30 years ago, it is only natural that we, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, are impatiently awaiting the materialization of that commitment. It was not the non-nuclear-weapon States which initially commenced making commitments which sought to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and which were determined to continue negotiations to this end. It is therefore fully understandable that the majority of States, almost all of which are non-nuclear-weapon States, are anxious to see a concrete result emerging from any negotiation to ban nuclear testing comprehensively.

The fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty is scheduled to be held in August this year. In this respect, my delegation has been following with serious interest the assessments made during the course of this spring session on matters pertinent to the implementation of this international legal instrument. However, my delegation's view concords with that of the speakers who affirmed that the Treaty has been far from successful in curbing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the risk of repeating myself, I wish to reiterate that under article VI of this instrument, nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Since this year will mark the twentieth anniversary of this Treaty, my delegation would only like to express its profound hope that this commitment will produce more concrete results in the near future.

The non-proliferation Treaty has withstood the test of time and become one of the foundation-stones on which the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons rests. While the multilateral effort should continue, it is to be noted that the question of non-proliferation is primarily a matter of political will. A non-proliferation system can be respected only if it is based upon the conviction of States that their interests are better safeguarded within the system rather than outside it. I believe that the Conference could, if it so

(Mr. Loeis, Indonesia)

wished, give new impetus to the efforts to achieve nuclear non-proliferation, serving better the interests of States parties, as well as attracting States which are non-parties to become parties to the Treaty, thus strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

I have spoken about many issues, which mostly concern nuclear weapons and the effective functioning of the Conference in relation to the present international climate. It may be premature now to judge the work of our Conference. It seems to me, however, that the Conference runs a risk of being outpaced by political events prevailing in the relations among members of the international community, particularly in the East-West context. As the two super-Powers have done well with the strategic arms reduction talks and the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, I believe that the Conference should match them by setting a self-imposed time frame for the early conclusion of the CW convention if it is not to lag behind.

My delegation is heartened that a number of the obstacles at the technical level which have long impeded efforts to devise a verification régime have now been removed. Such circumstances facilitate the resolution of the remaining political issues. The time is now ripe to elaborate the questions which are more political in nature, such as the crucial issue of universal adherence.

There are many aspects to take into account if we wish to conclude a convention which can attract universal adherence. In addition to the points it raised during its last intervention, my delegation feels that it is of paramount importance that the convention should be non-discriminatory. In particular, it should ensure equal rights and obligations for possessor as well as non-possessor States.

The paramount importance of provisions concerning sanctions, assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and economic and technological development has been mentioned by many speakers during the course of the spring session. My delegation would like to echo the view expressed in this respect by other delegations that provisions which take into account the interests of States which do not possess chemical weapons should be included in the convention. This would, I believe, lead to universal adherence to the convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his very comprehensive statement and for the kind words that he addressed to myself. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): I have already had an opportunity to warmly welcome in our midst all new colleagues. Today, let me especially welcome Ambassador Králik of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, it is a less pleasant duty to say goodbye to colleagues leaving us - Ambassador von Stülpnagel, Ambassador de Azambuja and Ambassador Sharma intend to leave Geneva very soon. With their personal commitment, great experience and their diplomatic skill, as well as their well-known ability to foster

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

personal contacts, they have contributed much to resolving a good many issues within the work of the CD. In taking leave of our three colleagues, I wish them good health, happiness and success in their new assignments and, for bilateral reasons, this goes especially to Ambassador Sharma.

Today the Geneva Conference on Disarmament is winding up its first round of this year's session. Busy weeks lie behind us. A good many things have seen encouraging developments during this session. On the other hand, we know full well that not all our expectations in the spring part of this session have been fulfilled.

My delegation shares the assessment made during the spring session by virtually all delegations, both members and non-members of the Conference, that drastic and big changes in the international situation have laid a sound foundation on which far-reaching disarmament steps could be achieved in the near future, thus making 1990 a year of real disarmament.

We are convinced that the headway made so far in bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations needs to be strengthened and supported by purposeful action at the multilateral level. In this context, the role of the CD as a unique forum for bringing together all militarily significant States in the world cannot be underestimated. It is worth mentioning here that a record number of observers actively participated in the work of the Conference during its spring session, thus assisting in the search for universally acceptable solutions.

The negotiations on a CW convention yielded further progress this spring - this is our assessment. We regard the drafting of texts on article IV and the annex to article IV, as well as article V and the annex to article V, as an achievement of real significance. The close co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States produced results which contributed to agreement on important provisions concerning the destruction of CW and CW production facilities. Furthermore, procedures for the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons have been developed, and the inspection protocols and annexes have been further streamlined. Solutions are taking shape on a number of legal issues, such as amendments, settlement of disputes and measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance. We deem it especially remarkable that this year progress has not been confined to provisions of a merely procedural character, but has been extended to matters of substance.

This is all the more important since other matters of substance, such as completion of the verification system by solving the questions of ad hoc inspection and inspection on request, are still awaiting solution. We should make use of the recess to further address these issues. Material offered by the delegations of Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany will be helpful in this regard. We believe that the paper on article IX provided by the Chairman of the ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons deserves special attention. It should be regarded as a bold attempt to overcome a stalemate which has hampered progress on this important subject for a rather long period, adversely affecting the whole of our work on the convention. We would hope that all delegations, especially those which so far have had difficulties with

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

the existing concepts in this field, will open-mindedly approach the ideas in the Chairman's paper. We see a chance that the optimistic start to this year's work will yield further results. My delegation will spare no effort to advance our work on a subject which is of crucial importance to our Government.

The forthcoming fourth review conference of the non-proliferation treaty, to which my country also gives particular weight, highlights the need for our forum to intensify its efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. We welcome the fact that during the spring session all 40 members of the CD finally agreed on the basic approach to a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. We expect this committee to be set up early in the summer, thus allowing the Conference, after a long and - let me say - a not particularly encouraging recess, to proceed with practical work on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Although such a basis is still lacking with regard to agenda items 2 and 3, we none the less consider the decision taken by the CD to hold a series of informal plenary meetings on these items as a useful mechanism for identifying possible areas and topics for future negotiations. I am confident that, given the universal importance of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, such areas of common concern will be found.

At this juncture, let me add that the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime also calls for additional efforts by the CD on items 6 and 7 of its agenda. Although no major breakthroughs have been achieved, the work accomplished to date, in our opinion, provides a solid foundation to build on during the summer session.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another item to which my delegation accords high priority. I believe that despite continued procedural difficulties there is a further convergence of views, though not as broad as we would wish, concerning the importance of multilateral consideration of certain confidence-building measures. This, we hope, will help bring about more comprehensive agreements.

My delegation also welcomes the serious and interesting discussion commenced during the spring session on the need to adapt the work of the Conference to the new developments taking place in the world. We hope that the process of open-ended presidential consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the CD, which began last Friday under your very able chairmanship, Sir, will lead to concrete decisions, allowing the Conference to play an even more important part in the disarmament field. In this way, the CD will be able to come up to the expectations that the world community of nations placed in this forum in 1978.

As you already know, after free, equal and secret elections a new Government has taken the destiny of the German Democratic Republic into its hands. The policy statement delivered by Mr. Lothar de Maizière, the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, before the Parliament on 19 April touches on many aspects of the work of our Conference. May I therefore use this opportunity to inform you about some major points of his statement?

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

Germany is located in the middle of Europe, but it must never again wish to become a power centre in Europe. We do not want to stand between the peoples in Europe, but wish to be a pier of a bridge of understanding. Germany must be a factor of peace. The unification of Germany is to enhance the stability in Europe and promote the establishment of an all-European order of peace, democracy and co-operation. We want to contribute to a united Germany our awareness of the significance of internal peace. We know that therefore we have to come to terms with our history first. No more must there be one part which was to be blamed for everything while the other one had allegedly kept historically clean. We too have acknowledged our share of responsibility for the crimes of the National Socialist dictatorship. German unity is designed to strengthen the comity of the Europeans. The principal condition for that is the guaranteeing of the borders in Europe. This includes the need for our neighbours to be sure of the permanence of their borders with Germany. The recognition of Poland's western border - binding under international law - as described in the Görlitz Treaty between the German Democratic Republic and Poland and in the Warsaw Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, is unrenounceable. Upon unification of the two German States, the future German constitution, for instance, will no longer contain article 23 of the Basic Law. Germany has no territorial claims vis-à-vis other States, and will not make such claims in the future.

Unification has become possible in connection with world-wide détente and the end of the East-West conflict. The division of Germany has been an expression of that conflict. Human rights and disarmament are central elements of détente. At this stage of the process of détente there is an inseparable link between defence and disarmament policies. Also in this context we remember the roots of our country's democratic renewal, in which the peace movement has been playing a fundamental role.

It is incumbent upon the Government of the German Democratic Republic to pursue a policy which promotes the process of military alliances being superseded by structures that transcend alliances as a first step towards an all European security system. In that regard our aim in the negotiations is to help bring about a European security system with constantly decreasing military functions. We believe that expanding the term "security" to the economic, environmental, cultural, scientific and technological spheres is a dictate of our time.

For a transitional period there will exist, beside the Soviet armed forces, a drastically reduced and strictly defence-oriented national people's army on what is today the territory of the German Democratic Republic, whose task it will be to protect that territory. Loyalty to the Warsaw Treaty Organization means to us, among other things, that in the forthcoming negotiations we will always take into account the security interests of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty States.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic seeks a drastic reduction in all German armed forces. The German Democratic Republic renounces the production, transfer, possession and development of ABC weapons and would like to see a unified Germany take a similar position. Moreover, it favours a global ban on chemical weapons before the end of this year.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

The process of nuclear disarmament must go on. We hope for the favourable conclusion of the START negotiations on a 50 per cent cut in strategic nuclear weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States before the end of this year.

An order of peace and security in Europe can create the prerequisites for abrogating the rights of the Second World War allies with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. The Government of the German Democratic Republic considers that these rights should be annulled in the framework of the "two plus four" talks. These talks too belong in the overall framework of the CSCE process for creating an all-European peace order.

CSCE is of special importance to us. In particular, the Government of the German Democratic Republic supports the establishment of a CSCE security agency to verify disarmament and restructuring arrangements. Likewise, it advocates the setting up of a CSCE arbitration body and the establishment of a permanent joint council of foreign and defence ministers.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic wants to be in the vanguard of the disarmament process. We will take immediate measures to restrict as a first step and to completely cease in the foreseeable future, the production and export of weapons of war. There must be no arms exports at all to areas of crisis. We will initiate the restructuring of the national people's army and gradually scale down the German Democratic Republic's military obligations. By contrast, political co-operation within the Warsaw Treaty is to be intensified. To this end, the Government will contact the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty States in the near future. In the spirit of this policy statement, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic will continue to work for results which enhance security and stability for peoples.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Mexico would like to congratulate you on the way you have conducted our work during the present month of April. We thank you for your efforts and dedication. Allow me also to put on record our appreciation for Ambassador Azikiwe's work during the month of March. The delegation of Mexico would like to welcome Ambassador Králik of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia. We are also happy to note that Mr. Rubens Ricupero of Brazil has agreed to add the tasks of disarmament to his already considerable diplomatic duties in Geneva. We would also like to say goodbye to the three colleagues who have taken leave of us today. We thank Ambassadors von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany and Kamalesh Sharma of India for their constant dedication to the search for a solution to the various problems on our agenda. To them and their distinguished spouses we wish every success, personal and professional.

The presence of Ambassador Marcos de Azambuja of Brazil among us today is especially pleasant for us. Despite his new and important duties he has been kind enough to return to Geneva to say farewell to his many friends. My delegation thanks him for his valuable contribution to the work of this Conference and wishes him and his distinguished wife all the best.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Boa sorte. We would also like to express appreciation for the information which Ambassador Ledogar gave us this morning on behalf of the United States and the Soviet Union on the fifteenth round of bilateral talks on the elimination of chemical weapons.

As we near the end of our spring session we would like to make a few comments on the item concerning a comprehensive test ban. Twenty-seven years after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, and twenty years after the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty, not only has the agreement promised by the depositary States of both those instruments not been concluded, but this single forum for the negotiation of disarmament agreements is not even holding negotiations on the matter. If there is one item on our agenda that is worthy of inclusion in the lists of Robert Leroy Ripley it is without doubt that of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests. Believe it or not, in 1963 the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union proclaimed themselves "determined to continue negotiations" to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". And believe it or not, in 1968 those same three States reiterated that same "determination" in the preamble of the NPT. Some determination! We do not know if Ripley ever defined the verb "to determine", but our dictionary tells us that it means "to establish the boundaries of something" or "to resolve". In other words, since 1963 those countries have been resolved to put an end to all nuclear weapon testing, only they have yet to do so.

For years the international community has assigned the highest priority to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This was reaffirmed in December of last year by the General Assembly in its resolution 44/105. That resolution recalls that the question, "which has been examined for more than 30 years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament". It also recalls that over five years ago the Secretary-General - and I continue to quote from resolution 44/105, as if it were, as we have been told, a kind of holy writ - "emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament". Last autumn, on the occasion of Disarmament Week, the Secretary-General himself pointed out that "unless the present positive momentum in bilateral negotiations on various nuclear questions, including the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, is soon translated into concrete undertakings, the risks of both vertical and horizontal proliferation will become more acute".

Since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in 1963, this Conference has been unable to move forward substantially in working out a multilateral agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests. Since 1984 it has not even been able to establish an ad hoc committee to examine the question. In the course of this spring session we were told that there was a possibility of setting up such an ad hoc committee provided that all the groups were prepared to accept the proposed mandate contained in document CD/863. That was over a month ago and, in spite of Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki's intense efforts, we have not yet been able to establish the ad hoc committee - with the modest mandate proposed - because of the opposition of some delegations of the Western Group.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The flexibility shown by the other members of the Conference, including the Group of 21, to which Mexico belongs, has not been matched by others. It is obvious that we are not going to go on waiting indefinitely for certain parties to accept what they themselves have proposed.

During the 1960s we heard repeated promises by the three depositary States of the partial test-ban Treaty, promises concerning the prompt cessation of all such tests. That has been the basic working premise for the consideration of that item here and in the General Assembly. That also formed part of the balance in the obligations assumed in the NPT by the non-nuclear-weapon States on the one hand, and the nuclear-weapon States on the other. The NPT does not speak solely of horizontal non-proliferation; the measures it provides for in order to stem vertical proliferation are also clear. And a comprehensive nuclear test ban is the key measure in this regard. Neither the Moscow Treaty nor the NPT speak of a partial ban on underground nuclear tests. Nor do they speak of limiting such tests to a certain threshold, still less of a 150-kiloton threshold or limit or of "reducing" such tests "to a minimum". The threshold agreed bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1974 Treaty is equivalent to over 10 times the yield of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. Some threshold! With regard to the number of tests, the situation is equally disheartening. Between 1945 and August 1963, when the Moscow Treaty was signed, the annual average of nuclear tests conducted by the two super-Powers was some 28 tests per year. Between August 1963 and 1974, when the threshold test-ban Treaty was signed, the average was about 48. Between 1975 and 1988 the average was around 36 tests per year. In short, as the heads of State or Government associated with the Six-Nation Initiative on peace and disarmament stated in their Stockholm Declaration of 21 January 1988, "any agreement that leaves room for continued testing would not be acceptable" (A/43/125 - S/19478, annex).

The régime and perhaps the very concept of non-proliferation is being undermined by the Moscow Treaty and NPT depositary States themselves. What would be the reaction in Latin America or in the rest of the world if the depositary government of the Treaty of Tlatelolco were the first to stop properly complying with its provisions? A couple of months ago, on 14 February, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Hans Blix, stated in an address to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva: "I should in fairness point out that while 'horizontal proliferation' is a risk, 'vertical proliferation' is a reality". And he added: "The nuclear-weapon States, especially the super-Powers, are very active to prevent further proliferation. There is perhaps something paradoxical about nuclear-weapon States desperately urging non-nuclear-weapon States not to do what they themselves seem to find indispensable to continue doing, namely, develop nuclear weapons".

Over the past few years, some statements have been heard and some events have occurred which are frankly discouraging. In September 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to conduct the "nuclear testing talks". The aim of those talks is not to prohibit all nuclear tests, but rather to trace out an extended programme of "step-by-step" negotiations on nuclear tests and their verification. The position of the United States Administration announced in 1988 and repeated on several occasions,

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

including 18 October of last year, during the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is to regard the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests as a long-term goal, since his country's security and that of its allies depends, and will continue to depend, on the deterrent capacity of its nuclear arsenal. That same day in the same First Committee of the General Assembly, the representative of the United Kingdom reiterated his Government's identical position, stating that "an immediate move to a comprehensive test ban would be premature and perhaps even destabilizing. For the foreseeable future the United Kingdom's security will depend on deterrence based, in part, on the possession of nuclear weapons. That will mean a continuing requirement to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain effective and up to date".

At the beginning of January this year, the United States announced that, in relation to the nuclear testing talks, it had not identified any further limitation on nuclear testing (beyond those already laid down in the threshold test-ban Treaty) that would be of national security interest. The Soviet Union responded on 30 January that the new attitude of the United States could undermine support for the "step-by-step" cessation of nuclear tests.

Last month was the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT. In 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, "a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision", says the article, "shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty". So the 1995 conference will be rather different from the NPT review conferences that are held every five years in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3. At those conferences the States parties have been reviewing the NPT's operation "with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized". Following each such review, the parties have attempted - not always successfully - to adopt a declaration by consensus. This occurred in 1975, 1980 and 1985, and the same may be expected to happen this summer at the fourth review conference. In 1995, however, a majority - and not a consensus - of the 142 States parties will have to decide whether or not to extend the Treaty's life. Consequently, over the next five years the international community, and in particular the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, will have to consider in different forums the operation and the future of the present nuclear non-proliferation régime. One such forum will be the NPT fourth review conference, to be held in a few months, whose third and final preparatory stage began yesterday. In parallel, in a few weeks, the Moscow Treaty amendment conference will begin in New York. That will be another forum which will have before it various aspects of the question of nuclear testing with a view to finding a formula to convert it into a complete ban.

In conclusion, this Conference's situation regarding the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is thus becoming more and more delicate, and the coming years may prove especially difficult, not to say decisive, for its credibility. If in the near future we do not start to see concrete progress

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

on a comprehensive test ban, there will also be further erosion of the faith many countries have placed in the non-proliferation Treaty. Obviously those countries will have to take this seriously into account when in 1995 they are called on to take a decision on extending the life of the NPT.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch, for his incisive statement. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea): My delegation deeply regrets that the North Korean representative has introduced a statement of a contentious nature to the plenary at this stage when the business of the spring session is being wound up. If I were to respond to every point raised by the North Korean representative, I would have to repeat the points already made in my Ambassador's statement on 12 April, which I think is superfluous.

The statement made by the North Korean representative has once again disappointed us. The one-sided, uncompromising tone of the statement revealed to us that they are indeed out of touch with reality. While the world is changing rapidly and to a great extent, North Korea continues to turn its back on this reality. In this regard, my delegation wishes to clarify some points.

The North Korean representative alleged that a concrete wall has been constructed on the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone, hence comparing it to the Berlin Wall, thus placing the blame on the South for blocking inter-Korean travel. The so-called concrete wall is nothing but an anti-tank barrier built for defensive purposes. Such military barriers also exist on the northern boundary of the demilitarized zone. The North Korean representative stated that the concrete wall extends for 240 kilometres. Where has this figure come from? The total length of the demilitarized zone itself is 250 kilometres, and the demilitarized zone itself is the land of "no crossing". Why would it then have been necessary to build a barrier of such a length?

Under the present circumstances, where there are no exchanges of mail, telephone calls, not to mention freedom of travel, practical measures need to be taken for mutual opening and exchanges between the two sides of Korea. Such measures are of paramount importance, and in order to achieve this an agreement has to be made on the subject of inter-Korean travel and communications. The barriers that stand in the way of inter-Korean opening and exchanges are not physical barriers, but mental barriers. In order to eliminate this psychological barrier, dialogue and exchanges are matters of top priority.

Although the North Korean representative said that it joined the non-proliferation Treaty in 1985, it has not yet submitted itself to the international full-scope safeguard measures under IAEA, which increasingly provokes the suspicion of the world community concerning the dangerous potentiality of North Korean nuclear development for military purposes. My delegation once again takes this opportunity to call upon North Korea to complete its commitment to non-proliferation by placing its nuclear facilities under the full scope of the IAEA safeguards.

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

While one side is entrenched in dogma and dwells on propaganda, advancement of any meaningful dialogue is extremely difficult, if not insurmountable. The international trend for dialogue and co-operation is a great encouragement for us to overcome the obstacles ahead of us, and we will continue our efforts to convert distrust and hostility into trust and reconciliation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea. Before I give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I wish to point out that it is not part of the procedure or the tradition of the Conference on Disarmament to have rights of reply. Basically we are all here to hear statements and, of course, any delegation on the floor - whether member or non-member - is free at any time to ask for the floor to make their statement. Having said that, I give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, I am sorry to ask you for the floor again. However, I would like to ask you to give me the floor after the statement of the representative of the United States. I will answer briefly after hearing the two statements.

The PRESIDENT: May I ask the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for a clarification? I hope he heard that we do not have a system of rights of reply. If there is a statement to be made, my understanding is that when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has asked for the floor to make a statement then there is a statement to be made. If so, you have the floor now, Sir, to make your statement, because there is no concept, procedure or tradition of rights of reply. So, are you availing yourself of this opportunity to make a statement or are you yielding that opportunity?

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I am sorry to delay the conclusion of the Conference. However, it is regrettable to hear the statement made by the representative of South Korea saying this and that. It is not worth arguing, and I therefore refrain from doing so. May I make one thing clear? As regards the concrete wall, we are ready to invite anyone who has doubts to the site where the wall stands. Secondly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is ready to sign the safeguard agreement of NPT, and we have had negotiations with the Atomic Energy Agency twice, so that there is no need for them to worry about this and mislead world opinion.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Mr. President, I am very conscious of the comments you made and have no wish to prolong the session this morning. Let me just make two very brief points.

I feel it incumbent on my delegation to make clear that we make no apology regarding the presence of United States forces on the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, the United States believes, as was made clear in a statement by Secretary Cheney quoted here this morning, that the Korean peninsula is a potentially dangerous place. We are convinced that the presence of United States forces and our defence co-operation with the Republic of Korea have lessened the risk of war and contributed to stability.

(Mr. Breckon, United States)

I would also like to say that we take issue with comments that disparage proposals for steps that could begin to build confidence and reduce tension in that region, and we would urge that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea take another look at what is happening in the rest of the world and decide that the time has come to find practical ways to reduce a situation of military confrontation that is strikingly out of tune with the times.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement.

If there are no other speakers, I should now like to put before you for consideration the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the second part of its annual session. As usual, the timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As we conclude the spring session I feel that this is a good opportunity to pause for a few minutes, with the permission of the interpreters, to take stock and to see how far we have come since the beginning of the year. The coming break will also enable us to reflect on our future course of action for the remaining part of the session.

This session started against a backdrop of improved relations between the super-Powers. There was visibly a replacement of confrontation and mistrust by debate and dialogue, of suspicion by a spirit of understanding. Consequently, as we began this year's session there was a feeling of optimism in the air. It is against that backdrop that I would very briefly review the items on our agenda.

The first three items on our agenda deal with nuclear issues. On item 1, the nuclear test ban, my understanding is that Ambassador Donowaki is continuing his consultations. We look forward to the day when he will have something positive to report to us during the summer session.

On items 2 and 3, relating to "Ceassation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war and all related matters" respectively, we have moved forward by addressing these subjects in informal plenary meetings. This is a good beginning and a step forward. I hope that we can move to an even more structured discussion on these important subjects in the future as the international climate improves.

On chemical weapons, we were able to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee this year. I hope that we can achieve reasonable flexibility in national positions, particularly on some of the political aspects of the negotiations, so that a chemical weapons convention can be concluded at the earliest.

(The President)

On the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is my understanding that the procedural impediment which had slowed down the work of the Committee has been resolved. That is news which is welcome - better late than never. I hope that the Committee will be able to make progress on substantive matters during the summer session.

On negative security assurances, in view of some important events on the nuclear disarmament agenda for this year - the NPT review conference and the amendment conference of the PTBT - it is my hope that progress will be achieved on this issue, particularly in view of the very large consensus on the matter in the General Assembly.

On radiological weapons, efforts have been made to narrow down the differences between various delegations on the question of scope, and while success may not quite be around the corner, it is gratifying to note that the debate continues.

A significant point during the spring session was the briefing by the United States and the Soviet Union on the START and space talks. This is something to be welcomed. It keeps the members of this single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum up to date on developments. We hope that such briefings will continue on a regular basis in the future. We also look forward to the successful conclusion of the negotiations at an early date.

During the spring session also, the Conference adopted the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Group's usefulness has been acknowledged by delegations, and one expects that it will be able to successfully conclude its Second Technical Test as planned.

Finally, and in my opinion most significantly, on the subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, there is a general realization now that there is a need to review our direction and our procedures. Informal open-ended consultations have started, and it is my hope that they will lead to a Quo Vadis mechanism, which will enable us to see by the end of this year's summer session how far we can go to bring the Conference on Disarmament into tandem with the developments and changes taking place in the real world outside.

To sum up, therefore, there has been progress during the spring session but much remains to be done.

Before closing the plenary, I would like to thank all of you. I would like to thank the secretariat, and I would like to thank the interpreters for their co-operation. I look forward to the presidency of Peru in the month of June, and until then I remain at your disposal for any interim housekeeping which is required.

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I would like to make two announcements. The first is that the informal meeting which was supposed to be held immediately after this meeting on the subject of agenda item 2 will no longer take place, because we have run out of our allocated time today.

(The President)

The next informal meeting will now take place on Tuesday, 19 June, and it will be devoted to agenda item 2, which is being carried over from today. The plenary meeting which was originally scheduled to take place on 19 June, on agenda item 3, will in consequence also be pushed back by one week to Tuesday, 26 June.

The second announcement relates to the open-ended consultations on effective and improved functioning. The next open-ended consultation will take place on Thursday, 21 June at 3.30 p.m. I would be grateful if, long notice notwithstanding, that date and that time is duly noted in your calendars.

As I have no other business for today, it is my intention now to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 12 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.555
12 June 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 12 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

The PRESIDENT (Peru) (translated from Spanish): I call to order the 555th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all I wish on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner, who is joining in the work of the Conference today. In so doing I take pleasure in congratulating him on his appointment, and I wish him all the best in discharging his important responsibilities. I am also pleased to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of Norway, Ambassador Oscar Vaernø, who has also just taken up his duties. As we are all aware, Norway is a non-member State, but it contributes actively to the progress of our work and we welcome him.

I would now like, in keeping with the practice of the Conference, to make an opening statement as Peru begins its term as President for the month of June.

It gives me particular pleasure to address you as we resume our work in the Conference on Disarmament and to express the great satisfaction and honour for me personally and for the delegation of Peru to take up the presidency of this distinguished forum for the current month. I should like to stress that the Government of my country attaches the highest priority to the work of this Conference, and that we shall continue unfailingly to contribute all we can to attaining the common objective of strengthening international peace and security.

During the work of this Conference on Disarmament we should not lose sight of the present international climate and the new trends in international relations that are bringing forth a new concept of international security which is setting aside the classic, traditional view of security based solely on national military and strategic factors. Security is now beginning to take on a planet-wide, global and shared significance. Security embraces an economic component and a component of food security. This new concept also includes the conservation of the environment, the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking, the protection of human rights and the development of democracy. Disarmament is indisputably, now more than ever before, an indispensable element of this global and planet-wide security which is common to all States. The development of this global, planet-wide and common security should be the new interpretation of the concept of international peace and security set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. For this reason we must strive to ensure that the reinterpretation of this basic concept is effected in the light of present-day international interdependence and allows us to transcend unilateral perceptions of security which in the past were viewed solely on the basis of each country's specific strategic interests. We must open the way to a new system founded on a global and common form of security for this small planet.

This new trend is even being reflected in the course taken by the military alliances in Europe. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been coming to recognize that they must place more emphasis on the political dimension, abandoning military interventionism and assuming greater responsibilities in the area of disarmament.

(The President)

As we heard on several occasions during our spring session, we are in the midst of a particularly interesting and positive trend in the field of disarmament, which gives us reasonable grounds for hoping that by the conclusion of this year's session of the Conference we will see substantial progress. Consequently we must note that all the subsidiary bodies set up during 1990 have now started work. The first informal plenary meetings on agenda items 2 and 3 have been held. Agreement has also been reached on the procedure to be followed with respect to items 7 and 8 of our agenda. Thus, during the first part of this year's session the Conference was able to agree on how to proceed in respect of all substantive agenda items with the exception of item 1, the importance and priority of which is widely recognized. I hope that the necessary will to compromise and spirit of co-operation which I have observed in all of you, and which now marks the international situation with respect to bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, can be expressed in concrete progress in this forum.

This year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is also particularly important as we are on the eve of the fourth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Undoubtedly there is a close link between the work of this Conference and the positive atmosphere surrounding the preparations for the NPT review conference, and in fact this has played a role in ensuring that countries with major nuclear capabilities that are not members of the NPT wish to attend the august conference as observers. This atmosphere should be encouraged and promoted by our forum. In this context I must say that we should give the highest priority to the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider the matter of a nuclear test ban. This subject is one of the corner-stones on which the progressive advancement of the work of this Conference should be built, and there can be no justification for the fact that since 1984 we have not managed to undertake a constructive debate on this issue within a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament. In the light of the great capacity of this forum to solve organizational problems it is paradoxical that we have not been able to reach an agreement on this issue, particularly bearing in mind the general convergence of positions that has emerged with respect to the mandate of a subsidiary body. It is for this reason that I am of the view that we can delay no further in the prompt adoption of a substantive decision towards initiation of the work of an ad hoc committee on the matter of the total cessation of nuclear tests. I assure you that I will make every effort during the present month so that the consultations being carried out with such competence and diplomatic skill by Ambassador Donowaki meet with success. I invite him to redouble his efforts in view of the short time left during the current session to conduct substantive work jointly on this important agenda item. It goes without saying that I stand fully ready to co-operate with Ambassador Donowaki whenever he deems it necessary.

However, we might say that this Conference has its own "home front". We must strive to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament is much more effective, giving greater continuity to our work, dropping positions which are merely rhetorical, linking our work in a realistic way with the progress being made bilaterally, and focusing on those areas in which it is reasonable to hope that concrete results can be achieved, without this implying, of course, that we should abandon the aspirations of each of our countries on the

(The President)

question of disarmament. In short, I think that we should work hard and quickly to achieve a real improvement in the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. To this end - and I am sure that you will all agree with me - I feel we could not have adopted a better decision than that of electing Ambassador Kamal to preside over this necessary and all-out effort at renewal.

The negotiations that have made the greatest progress in this Conference are undoubtedly those concerning the chemical weapons convention. In this regard Ambassador Hyltenius, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, has shown commendable dynamism and efficiency. Under the present circumstances the speediest possible conclusion of the convention is incumbent on the entire international community. We should demonstrate that we can achieve concrete and effective results, multilaterally, that would complement the positive agreements recently reached by the countries possessing the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons. There is an urgent need to arrive at a unified and comprehensive text for a convention providing for the total and final prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as the complete destruction of existing stocks, within the transitional period laid down in the agreement. The text should meet the aspirations of all our countries and should enshrine a universal and non-discriminatory régime for the elimination of chemical weapons. With respect to the bilateral aspect of the present political situation, and without prejudice to extensive and detailed analysis of the situation, I must place on record the general welcome given to the results obtained a few days ago at the presidential summit meeting in Washington between the heads of State of the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the 35 per cent cut in the stocks of strategic weapons held by these two Powers will influence the approach this Conference must adopt to halting the nuclear arms race, and we hope that this is a step that will immediately be followed by others, as we move towards the aim of general and complete disarmament. Special mention should be made of the bilateral agreements concerning the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. The substantial percentage to be destroyed under the agreement, and the link between the destruction of the remaining percentage and the conclusion of the convention on a chemical weapons ban which is under negotiation in this forum, should spur our countries on to exercise maximum political will in this Conference.

I cannot and must not conclude without placing on record our profound appreciation to my predecessors who have served as President of the Conference on Disarmament during the current session - Ambassadors Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, Azikiwe of Nigeria and Kamal of Pakistan. I hope that I will measure up to the outstanding contributions that these distinguished diplomats and friends have made during the course of recent past months.

Following my opening statement, I now propose that we move on to our list of speakers for today. On the list are the representatives of Sweden, Bulgaria and the United States of America. I now call on the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, whom I am very pleased to see here among us again.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on taking up the important task of guiding our Conference during the crucial month of June. I am confident that our work will greatly benefit from your well-known diplomatic skill. I would also like to express my thanks for the outstanding presidency of your predecessor, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. I regret that some colleagues have left Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament - Ambassadors Azambuja of Brazil, Sharma of India and von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. My best wishes go to them in their new responsible functions, and my sincere congratulations go to Ambassador Sinegiorgis for her well-deserved promotion. I am very happy to see the appointment of another female ambassador to this Conference. I also wish to take this opportunity to welcome the new ambassadors to the Conference - Ambassador Králik of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil, Ambassador Chadha of India and Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany, and I also welcome to Geneva my friend, the distinguished representative of neighbouring Norway, Ambassador Oscar Vaernø.

Nuclear missiles are now being turned into objects of art. And American Pershing-2s and Soviet SS-20s are to be placed side by side in the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington and in the Central Military Museum in Moscow.

We are, indeed, living in historic times. Disarmament is picking up speed. Through unilateral undertakings. Through bilateral agreements. Through multilateral negotiations. There may have been more progress in disarmament in the last 30 months than in the previous 30 years. And, in a sense, more progress appears to have been recorded in the last 30 days than in the previous 30 months.

A couple of years ago, the two super-Powers agreed to eliminate their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Today they are systematically destroying them and steadily approaching the goal of the final elimination of these missiles. But not quite total elimination, however. They have agreed to salvage two pairs of such missiles for posterity. One pair in a museum in each super-Power capital for future generations to examine and to ponder over. These missiles have finally come to the right place and been put to the right use. As post-modern sculptures or museum artefacts, illustrating human madness.

Progress in disarmament was dramatic in the late 1980s. But in the 1990s we have only had to wait five months for the super-Powers to agree in principle on the most spectacular disarmament deal ever. The Washington summit 10 days ago endorsed the beginning of significant strategic nuclear disarmament. Considerable cuts in nuclear weapon arsenals by the two major Powers are welcomed by all States.

It should be recalled, moreover, that the two super-Powers had previously agreed that, ultimately, their bilateral negotiations "should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere". Nuclear test explosions are carried out for the progressive refinement of nuclear weapons. And nuclear testing continues. Modernization is the main driving force from behind these tests. But the international community can never accept that quantitative reductions may be offset by qualitative improvements.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

A comprehensive nuclear test ban would still be the single most effective measure to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt. A CTB would effectively promote quantitative reductions and would hamper qualitative improvements and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The test-ban issue is particularly topical this year in view of the fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty in August-September. Furthermore, the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty will be convened in January 1991. These developments must generate the additional political stimulus required to permit a breakthrough, at long last, on the comprehensive nuclear test-ban issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

In the partial test-ban Treaty, nearly 27 years ago, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty undertook to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and expressed their determination to continue negotiations with this objective. In the non-proliferation Treaty, more than 20 years ago, they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. A slow, gradual approach, which justifies continued testing, sustains the nuclear arms race. The two threshold agreements between the super-Powers are technically and militarily meaningless. Threshold arrangements can only make genuine contributions to nuclear disarmament if they are linked to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the swift phasing out of nuclear tests.

An effective nuclear test-ban treaty, with universal adherence, must be negotiated in a representative multilateral body. Complete draft treaty texts are on the table. In the Conference on Disarmament, where all five nuclear-weapon States are represented, the appropriate negotiating mechanism is already at hand. What is needed is the political decision to set it in motion.

It has to be added that there is strong international opinion against continued nuclear tests by the principal nuclear testing Powers. In the current international atmosphere, these Powers should declare a nuclear test moratorium in anticipation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Over the years, the Conference on Disarmament has made considerable progress in its work on test-ban verification. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has elaborated a system for global seismic verification, which is currently being tested. Other verification techniques - such as the monitoring of airborne radioactivity and satellite-based surveillance of the infrastructure - could also be developed and could usefully be entrusted to the Group of Scientific Experts for deliberation. The global and reliable exchange of data is of crucial importance.

The verification issue can no longer be used as a pretext for not even negotiating a nuclear test ban. This is a political, not a technical matter.

There seems to be a declared willingness on all sides in the Conference to contemplate a mandate for an ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban. With sufficient flexibility in the Conference, an ad hoc committee could be established with a reasonable mandate at the commencement of this summer

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

session. This would be a constructive response to the repeated calls by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly for action by the CD. This single measure could contribute greatly to a successful fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty in just two months.

Efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race and a proliferation of nuclear weapons are as old as the technology for developing such weapons. These efforts have failed to prevent a nuclear arms race. And these efforts have not succeeded in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a handful of States. Nevertheless, 20 years ago these efforts were crowned with significant partial success when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force.

Today, more than 140 States have acceded to the Treaty. In two months' time, the fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty will be meeting in Geneva. I want to take this opportunity to comment on some major aspects of the NPT and the forthcoming review conference, where many of us will be meeting again.

The Preparatory Committee has concluded its work in a constructive spirit which gives us reason to hope that the review conference itself will produce concrete and positive results. In Sweden's view, that conference stands out as a major international political event. All parties to the Treaty should do their utmost to bring the fourth review conference to a successful conclusion. It is extremely important that the NPT, the corner-stone of the international non-proliferation régime, should be further strengthened. In order to facilitate the success of the review conference in 1990 and the prolongation of the Treaty in 1995, I strongly urge the nuclear-weapon States to continue nuclear disarmament and move towards a test ban.

We have to admit that the NPT is not yet a universal treaty. Two nuclear-weapon Powers and several other States with major unsafeguarded nuclear facilities have so far chosen to remain outside it. Despite this, the NPT, with its more than 140 States parties, is one of the most important post-war treaties in the disarmament field. Sweden again urges all States which have not yet done so to accede to this treaty. International security would be greatly strengthened, and our planet would become a less dangerous place, if all States joined forces to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In this context, I should like to emphasize the following issues. States which have abstained from nuclear weapons by adhering to an international, legally binding commitment have a legitimate right to receive binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States that they will not be attacked or threatened with such weapons. Existing assurances, with their reservations and ambiguities, do not meet this need. With the fourth review conference in mind, Sweden would welcome a constructive initiative on negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States. In this context, I would also like to note the interesting proposal made by Nigeria.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

All production of new nuclear material for weapons purposes must cease. In order to make an undertaking of such cessation credible, all future production of fissionable materials must be subjected to safeguards. A pre-condition for a verifiable "cut-off" is the separation of civil and military nuclear activities in all nuclear-weapon States. Sweden therefore urges all nuclear-weapon States to take measures to this effect.

It is important to continue the work on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In view of the forthcoming review conference, the parties participating in the negotiations on such a prohibition should re-examine their positions so as to achieve a pragmatic understanding. And all other States should support continued efforts to achieve such an understanding.

In the radically improved international climate, there are new opportunities for disarmament negotiations. In part, these opportunities have already become manifest. Not least in the last few days and months. It is vitally important that the prevailing constructive atmosphere should embrace all aspects of disarmament. However, while land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles are now in the process of being scrapped; while bilateral super-Power reductions in strategic nuclear arms have been agreed in principle; while agreement has been reached between the two major military Powers on the elimination of the bulk of their chemical arsenals; and while prospects for conventional disarmament measures have greatly improved - naval nuclear disarmament has not yet begun.

Naval forces are an integral part of overall military structures, and must not be excluded from disarmament efforts. At least every fourth nuclear weapon is said to be earmarked for maritime use. Large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons are deployed on naval vessels routinely crossing the oceans, our common heritage. While it could be argued that sea-borne strategic nuclear weapons may contribute to stability, this does not apply to these tactical nuclear weapons. While sea-borne strategic nuclear weapons may be the last ones the nuclear-weapon States will forgo, tactical naval nuclear weapons should swiftly be phased out.

Widespread naval activities by nuclear weapon Powers are a source of concern for many States, since the mobility of naval forces allows for flexible and rapid deployment.

Sea-borne nuclear weapons are a global concern and should be speedily integrated into the disarmament process. A series of measures may be envisaged in this context - tactical naval nuclear disarmament, whether by unilateral, bilateral or multilateral means; the reconsideration of the principle of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on board naval vessels; confidence-building and security-building measures.

My delegation has proposed that the Conference on Disarmament should include the issue of naval nuclear armaments and disarmament in its deliberations. Sweden has further proposed that the risks pertaining to nuclear weapons at sea should be considered by the Conference on Disarmament in the context of the prevention of nuclear war.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Sweden notes with satisfaction that important deliberations on naval armaments and disarmament have taken place within the framework of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Sweden further welcomes suggestions made by other States in the UNDC deliberations in the naval field, including the possibility of using the United Nations standardized reporting system for military budgets for the sharing of information concerning naval forces.

A great number of States participated actively at the UNDC in the negotiation of a Chairman's paper on naval armaments and disarmament. This document marks clear progress towards an open and fruitful dialogue on naval issues. I recognize that not all States represented here are committed to this paper. Still, perhaps I may express the hope that it will now prove possible to continue the dialogue on naval issues with the active participation of all the major naval Powers.

Sweden has long taken an active interest in naval nuclear disarmament. Increasingly, naval issues are debated in both military and civilian circles, both outside and within various disarmament forums. On the Swedish side we have listened carefully to the pros and cons.

It is the view of my Government that all military forces should be dealt with in the appropriate forums, and that no single category of weapons, be they nuclear, chemical or conventional, can be excluded in the search for security at lower levels of armaments. Sweden would like to challenge those who may wish to pursue a selective logic, arguing in favour of disarmament and openness in certain fields, but not in others. Furthermore, time will show that it is essential to prevent the circumvention of agreements reached in other areas by means of changes in naval force structures. And maybe it is time for a little optimism in this respect. It now seems possible that sea-launched cruise missiles will be encompassed in forthcoming bilateral agreements. This may be a breakthrough.

Another area where further progress may come is the sharing of information acquired by various means, in and above international waters. Globally, it may even prove less difficult to achieve agreement on this kind of information-sharing than on information acquired through observation of national territories. Furthermore, it appears that more and more nations recognize the value of agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea. I hope that such agreements can be standardized through multilateral negotiations in the CD as soon as possible.

All possible measures should be actively pursued to increase openness and transparency concerning vessels carrying nuclear and conventional weapons. This includes the sensitive but important issue of the navigation of such vessels, which has created a great deal of mistrust. The nuclear-weapon States should abandon their outdated practice of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board any particular ship at any particular time.

If naval experts can now agree that tactical nuclear weapons on board surface ships serve no useful military purpose - if nuclear weapons have a military purpose at all - why not try to settle this issue once and for all? The most effective way of dealing with the problems of distrust related to

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

nuclear weapons at sea would be to prohibit all naval tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, we have in mind all nuclear weapons on all ships and submarines, other than those classes specifically designated by agreement. Such a ban should include all sea-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The Swedish Government feels that the time has come to start seeking wider support for this and other closely related disarmament issues.

These are truly global issues. They should, therefore, be discussed in a global forum. It is our belief that discussion and analysis in the United Nations will promote progress in the area of naval disarmament. It is therefore our intention to consult with other Governments on how such a discussion can be continued in the most fruitful manner. Following such consultations, Sweden intends to raise the issues related to the problem of naval nuclear disarmament in the General Assembly this year, either through a draft resolution or in another form conducive to progress.

Sweden welcomes the important agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to halt the production of chemical weapons and to start the destruction of the bulk of their chemical weapons stocks. The logical consequence should be an undertaking to proceed with the destruction of their entire chemical weapons stocks. It is therefore with some disappointment that we have learned that the idea of keeping 2 per cent of the stocks until all chemical-weapon-capable States have joined an international chemical weapons convention has survived the summit meeting. Only on the basis of an unambiguous undertaking not to use chemical weapons and to destroy them entirely can the work on a chemical weapons convention in Geneva be crowned with success.

The United Nations General Assembly stated last autumn that the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament would be of pivotal importance in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. There are in fact several reasons for viewing the situation with some optimism. The mandate for the negotiations was improved at the beginning of this year's session. An increasing number of States are participating in the negotiations, and progress has been made in all the working groups. The two leading military Powers have contributed significantly to the work of this Conference on a multilateral chemical weapons convention by submitting several texts, most recently on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and on chemical weapons production facilities. It is crucial that they continue to contribute actively to these negotiations and that they now devote even more effort to this work.

It is also a source of satisfaction that an increasing number of States are conducting trial inspections to test the viability of the draft "rolling text" and to prepare themselves for the entry into force of the convention. In this context, I should like to mention that Sweden has just carried out a trial inspection under article IX at a military facility. The Swedish delegation will submit a report on this inspection as soon as possible.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The consultations conducted by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee have clearly borne out the importance that all delegations attach to universal adherence to the Convention. My delegation welcomes initiatives to hold regional conferences on this vital subject. The conference at Ma'in in Jordan last month made an important contribution by highlighting the particular implications of the chemical weapons convention in the Middle East.

This year, the work of the Committee has largely focused on the political issues. It is high time that agreement was reached on at least some of them. For example, it should not be too difficult to agree on article X on assistance and protection, article XI on economic and technological development, and article XIII on amendments. As regards another, more difficult issue, namely article IX, the Chairman has presented a comprehensive draft text in an attempt to make a new start on the basis of the useful work done under previous chairmen. If this draft can be accepted as a basis for negotiations, it would be a decisive step forward. Work could take place in parallel on all aspects of verification in the convention. It should then be possible to bring this work to its conclusion before the end of this year's session.

The Convention is within reach. Decisive efforts should now be made to resolve the remaining problems. No obstacles must be allowed to impede agreement on a non-discriminatory convention which will ensure the complete prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and their total elimination. Several avenues must be explored to ensure universal adherence. All States which are participating in the negotiations here in the CD should consider making a declaration of intent, individually or collectively, to become original parties to the forthcoming convention. Sweden for its part intends to become one of the original parties to the convention. In this context, I propose the convening of a well-prepared conference at ministerial level, aimed at achieving the simultaneous signing by all States.

The decision by the United States and the Soviet Union to place two of their intermediate-range nuclear missiles side by side in museums in Moscow and Washington is profoundly symbolic. As the super-Powers eventually approach the final elimination of their strategic nuclear weapons, it would be equally appropriate if they similarly reserved a couple of strategic missiles as well to be exhibited in museums. Likewise, I hope that, here in the Conference on Disarmament, we will soon be in a position to consign the last chemical weapons to a museum. A museum is where these weapons rightly belong.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for her kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the second speaker on the list, the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, it is a pleasure for my delegation to see you presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the very important first month of its summer session. My congratulations on this occasion are directed to you both as a representative of Peru, a country which has been for years actively committed to the cause of disarmament, and as an

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

esteemed colleague whose high professional and human qualities I admire very much. I wish you a lot of success in the discharge of your duties. I would like also to express my delegation's gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan for his very active and able stewardship in the month of April.

We have all been impressed by the recent summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Though higher-level contacts between the two great Powers have recently ceased to be unusual, every new meeting of this kind is rightly regarded as a most significant event in international life. The last one is no exception, in spite of the fact that this time, the mass media did not provide, in my opinion, the same extensive coverage of the event as they did on previous occasions. I am sure that our Soviet and American colleagues will generously help us fill this information gap - something that we are also becoming used to in the Conference on Disarmament. Especially since the results of the meeting in the field of disarmament, which we wholeheartedly welcome, have a direct bearing on the CD. This is particularly true for the agreement on chemical weapons. We hope that it will help speed up the conclusion of the multilateral convention under negotiation in the Conference.

The Conference on Disarmament should cover part of the road itself. Nobody will do it for us - neither summits, nor the Vienna talks, nor the "open skies" conference. Therefore we are again and again confronted with the question of the effective functioning of the Conference. We are satisfied with the fact that this question received serious attention during the spring part of the session, and with the decision on the organizational format to handle it. Ambassador Kamal was kind enough to take upon himself a daring task. Knowing well his diplomatic skills, personal tact and devotion to our work, I am confident that the consultations on this very important topic will proceed under his guidance in a businesslike and results-oriented manner. What we are now engaging in should differ from the deliberations within the Group of Seven, which had primarily the character of an intellectual exercise.

We shall soon mark the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter. On 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, the Charter of the United Nations was signed as an expression of the determined wish "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

Despite the awful recent experience of the most devastating war he has ever known, man created the means for his own destruction, a modern Frankenstein - the Bomb. In the end we are all dependent on monsters of our own creation, to put it in Goethe's words ... The Bomb gave a new meaning to the notion of the "scourge of war". Had the founders of the United Nations known what would happen in only a few weeks' time, they would certainly have found stronger words when drafting the Charter. Like disaster, or cataclysm, or maybe Armageddon. But it is not words that matter. What matters is the ability of man to realize that in a nuclear age military power can no longer be an absolute guarantee of security. That the arms race cannot be won, but can provoke at any time the fatal spark that will ignite a global fire, this time the last one on the Earth. The national security cannot be opposed to international, common security.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

We have to learn to think in a new way, warned Einstein. But have we? "Mutual assured destruction", "balance of terror", "deterrence" ... Is this our new way of thinking? What kind of thinking is it that makes terror the main motivation of human behaviour? I hope these terms will soon go into oblivion. The process of reconsidering strategic concepts and doctrines, which I feel has already begun, must fully take into account universal human needs and values.

It is often argued that nuclear weapons have preserved peace, at least in Europe, for the last 45 years. This assertion is far from proven, as one cannot prove a negative. Nobody can know for sure what would have happened in the absence of nuclear weapons. But what we do know for sure is that the doctrine of deterrence has been closely linked to an unbridled arms race, to enormous build-up of highly sophisticated means of death and destruction. What we also know for sure is that deterrence and the arms race that has ensued have been accompanied by a continuous increase in tension, distrust and instability. And that in such an environment, it has been extremely difficult to conduct rational policies. The outcome has always been the same - further and further rounds of the arms race and more and more insecurity. A situation compared once by Olof Palme with addiction to a drug when you continually need a larger and larger dose. Nuclear armaments are our heaviest common burden and a matter of common concern. Nuclear disarmament should therefore find the priority place it deserves in multilateral negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament.

I completely agree with my former colleague Ambassador Sharma, who pointed out on 3 April that we have to "squarely address the question of the longer-term expectations of mankind on the threshold of the twenty-first century, which we ourselves have to shape into reality". What our future will be depends to a great extent on our ability to draw all necessary conclusions from past experience and to avoid past illusions and mistakes. This is exactly the reason why I expanded on the political situation in the world which, until recently, was not a source of inspiration.

The world is now in a unique situation in its post-war history. For a very short period of time it became possible to reverse the negative trends and start building international relations on a new basis. We have recently been witnessing changing attitudes to war and military power. We feel a greater awareness of the inadmissibility of war and the need to curb the arms race, the interdependence of countries and peoples. Fundamental changes are occurring in Soviet-American relations - from confrontation to dialogue and co-operation. The "image of the enemy" is fading away. The rhetoric, mutual insults and recrimination seem to be left in the archives. There is now an apparent determination on both sides to seek radical reductions in nuclear arms. A crucial point was the INF Treaty. It made a first break in the vicious circle of military actions and counter-actions and the corresponding political arguments and counter-arguments. It demonstrated that nuclear disarmament is practical and possible. Yet there is still a long way to go.

We must all work together to build a system of collective and comprehensive security. The most urgent task along this road is the removal of the threat of nuclear war - a task which can be resolved most effectively through the complete elimination of the means of nuclear warfare. We

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

therefore welcome the resolve of the super-Powers to remove a considerable portion of the nuclear weapons hanging over the world like the sword of Damocles. We have the right to ask the other nuclear-weapon States, even if their arsenals are smaller, also to commit themselves in a manner corresponding to their responsibility as possessors of such awesome weapons. We have every reason to insist on a universal and clear-cut renouncement of the nuclear option by everybody. We also have the duty to help uphold the non-proliferation régime through, inter alia, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a ban on all space weapons, negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States and other measures, the adoption of which will be our Conference's contribution to the general public demand and aspiration for lasting peace and common security.

This is my last statement in this hall as head of the Bulgarian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. In only a week I shall leave Geneva. The period of time which has passed since I took up my post has been particularly rich in political changes in the world. The years of my service here were an excellent experience and a real pleasure for me. This I owe very much to all of you, dear fellow ambassadors and colleagues. I greatly enjoyed the close contacts, both professional and personal, which I had with you. I benefited a lot from your experience, your knowledge and your wisdom. To all of you and to the members of your families I want to extend my best wishes for health, well-being and success. As I am not leaving multilateral diplomacy and disarmament, my hope is that we shall be meeting again in the years to come.

Finally, I would like to warmly thank my goods friends Ambassador Komatina, Ambassador Berasategui, all the members of their team in the secretariat, translators, interpreters, documentation, conference services and security officers - everybody who is involved in the work of this body - for all they are doing in order to make our job easier and more effective.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Thank you very much, Ambassador Kostov. I thank you for your statement and for the kind words you addressed to all of us and to the Chair. Ambassador Kostov has just pointed out that this is his last statement in our Conference. Ambassador Kostov has played an active part in our work over the past two years, contributing to the pursuit of our tasks with his recognized diplomatic skill and professional competence. He has represented his country with the effectiveness of an experienced diplomat, and in addition he served as Chairman of the Conference's Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances in 1988, an occasion, I repeat, when we were able to appreciate your qualities, Mr. Ambassador. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish to convey to you and your wife our best wishes for personal happiness and professional success, and for meeting us in the future.

The last speaker on the list is Mr. Breckon, the representative of the United States, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Mr. President, as we open the summer session of this year's Conference, I would like to extend to you our congratulations upon your assumption of the Conference presidency, and pledge to you my delegation's full co-operation as we proceed with our work. In a similar vein, I would like to express my appreciation to Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan for his excellent work as Conference President during the last session in April, taking note especially in the area of improved and effective functioning of the Conference. Thanks to your efforts, we are starting to move to make the improvements we all know are necessary. And lastly, may I join in the expressions of welcome to our new colleagues from Brazil, Ambassador Ricupero, from the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Wagner, and from Norway, Ambassador Vaernø. The United States delegation looks forward to working closely with you as we move forward in the CD's work. Finally, may I bid farewell on behalf of our delegation to Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, and express our appreciation for his significant contributions to the Conference and wish him all the best in his new responsibilities?

As we begin our work this summer, I would like to provide information to the Conference on a few of the achievements of the summit meeting that took place in Washington at the end of May and earlier this month, especially those which have been alluded to already by other speakers and which relate closely to the CD's areas of interest. This statement by the United States delegation is made with the agreement of the head of the Soviet delegation, Minister Sergei Batsanov.

When Ambassador Ledogar reported to you on 24 April regarding the results of the fifteenth bilateral round of United States/USSR discussions on chemical weapons, he expressed the joint hope of both countries that a new bilateral chemical weapon agreement would be signed at the summit meeting, and that it would be possible to report further progress toward a global, comprehensive chemical weapons ban. I am pleased to report that this hope has been fulfilled. On 1 June, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a bilateral agreement which calls for the destruction of the vast bulk of the United States and Soviet declared chemical weapons stockpiles, with on-site inspections to confirm that destruction has taken place. To promote the objective of a global ban, both countries have agreed they will not produce chemical weapons when the bilateral destruction agreement enters into force or thereafter, and they will encourage all chemical-weapons-capable States to follow suit.

Key provisions of the bilateral CW destruction agreement are as follows: destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to begin by the end of 1992; destruction of at least 50 per cent of declared stocks by the end of 1999; declared stocks to be reduced to 5,000 agent tons by the year 2002; both countries agree not to produce chemical weapons upon entry into force of this agreement and thereafter without waiting for the global chemical weapons ban; on-site inspections during and after the destruction process to confirm that destruction has taken place; annual exchanges of data on the stockpile levels to facilitate monitoring of the declared stockpiles; details of the inspection procedures will be worked out by 31 December 1990; both countries will co-operate in developing and using safe and environmentally sound methods of

(Mr. Breckon, United States)

destruction; the United States and USSR will take steps to encourage all chemical-weapons-capable States to become parties to the multilateral convention. Both countries took an initial step in this direction by exchanging data on declared chemical weapons stockpiles in December 1989.

The bilateral United States-Soviet agreement was designed to provide new impetus to the conclusion of a comprehensive verifiable global chemical weapons ban at the earliest possible date. Toward that end, both countries have agreed to accelerate their destruction of chemical weapons under a global chemical weapons convention so that by the eighth year after it enters into force, the United States and USSR will have reduced their declared stocks to no more than 500 agent tons. In addition, the United States and USSR will propose that a special conference be convened at the end of the eighth year of a multilateral convention to determine whether participation in the convention is sufficient to complete the elimination of chemical weapons stocks over the following two years. In this regard, you should note that we will have specific modalities to propose regarding the procedures that will apply at this eighth-year conference, to ensure that its objectives regarding participation are achieved.

The summit meeting was also the occasion for the United States and USSR to release a joint statement on non-proliferation. This statement addresses the problems of proliferation in the nuclear weapons, missile technology and chemical weapons fields, notes our agreement to work closely together and with other members of the international community to develop and put into action concrete measures against the proliferation of these types of weapons, and calls on other nations to join a renewed commitment to effective non-proliferation measures as a means of securing international peace and stability and as a step toward the effective limitation world-wide of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and missile technology. Of specific interest to this Conference, the joint statement reaffirms the commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to a global, verifiable ban as the best long-term solution to chemical weapons proliferation. In this statement, the United States and the USSR further undertake to expedite the CW negotiations with a view to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date.

In closing, may I add that the summit meeting recorded significant and concrete achievements in a number of other relevant areas as well. My statement this morning, however, is intended to address just those areas of immediate importance for the future work of the Conference. In this regard, Minister Batsanov and I will be asking you to circulate as Conference documents the texts of the bilateral CW agreement and the joint statement on non-proliferation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States, Mr. Breckon for the statement he has just made, and I also thank him for the kind words and co-operation offered to the Chair. I shall also ensure that the secretariat circulates the documents that he mentioned.

(The President)

I have no other speakers on my list for today, and I wish to ask whether any delegation wishes to take the floor. None does, and I shall therefore move on to the organization of our work for the next few days. As you will recall, in the timetable for this week we had scheduled an informal meeting to take up the programme of work for this second part of the 1990 session. As it was not possible to organize prior consultations to begin consideration of this matter, I think it would be better to postpone that informal meeting to Thursday morning. I have asked the secretariat to circulate the document that we should all have (CD/WP.385), which contains the draft programme of work, so that the groups may take it up in their meetings tomorrow morning and the Chair can have the views of the groups at the co-ordinators' meeting and consultations to be held tomorrow afternoon. By way of a brief presentation of the paper I would say that the draft is identical to that adopted by the Conference for the second part of the 1989 session and basically the same as that adopted this year for the first part of our work. This applies to the order followed for consideration of the agenda items by the plenary, the time allotted to each one and the paragraphs that come after the programme of activities of plenary.

Members of the Conference will note that the closing date for this annual session is not indicated in the draft. This is because during the consultations that took place in April, the vast majority of delegations thought it best to conclude our work on Friday 24 August, following the precedent of 1985 and bearing in mind that during the last week there are no other meetings apart from the two plenaries, the last of these being to adopt the report. However, no agreement was reached at that stage. I think it would be useful for everyone to know the closing date as early as possible. For that reason I would suggest that the groups should take up this matter too tomorrow, so that we can take a decision when we look at the programme of work on Thursday. If a consensus is reached, and I hope that will be the case on these matters, we would resume the plenary at the end of the informal meeting on Thursday to formalize the agreement reached. If you agree, we could proceed in that way.

I have no other matters to be dealt with, and I will proceed to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday 14 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.556
14 June 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 14 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

The PRESIDENT: I call to order the 556th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As a result of the informal meeting we have just held, I would like to place before the Conference the programme of work for the second part of its 1990 session, as set out in document CD/WP.385. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the programme of work has been adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As I mentioned at the informal meeting, I have no speakers on my list for today's meeting. However, in accordance with the practice of the Conference, I should now like to ask if any delegation wishes to take the floor. None does, and so I wish to turn to another matter.

Today the secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As far as the plenary is concerned, I would remind you that on Tuesday, 19 June, we shall resume the informal meetings on item 2 of the agenda. "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In addition, as was decided in April, the Conference will hold informal open-ended consultations on the improved and efficient functioning of the Conference on Thursday, 21 June, at 3.30 p.m. In that regard, I wish to inform members that, as decided previously, the secretariat will place in delegations' pigeon-holes, at noon on 18 June, a revised version of the informal document containing proposals on this topic.

As is customary, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed in the light of developments in our work. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the proposed timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As there are no other matters to be dealt with, I shall now close this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 19 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.557
19 June 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 19 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call to order the 557th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

The Conference begins today consideration of agenda items 1 and 2, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may make a statement on any other subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I should also like to remind you that immediately after this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on item 2 of the agenda I have just mentioned. On the list of speakers for today I have the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to express the satisfaction of the Soviet delegation at seeing you occupying the post of President of the Conference at this time. I look forward to fruitful co-operation with you, which would be a reflection of the warm relations that exist between our delegations and our countries, and of course we feel that the work of the Conference is now in good hands. At the same time, I would like to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Kamal, who worthily bore the heavy burden of serving as President of the Conference during the previous two months.

As I am speaking for the first time at the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to welcome the newly arrived heads of delegation, our new colleagues Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador I. Chadha of India and Ambassador Joaquín Pérez-Villanueva of Spain. At the same time, we note with great regret that Ambassadors Kamallesh Sharma and Ibáñez have left us recently, and that Ambassadors Dimitar Kostov, István Varqa and Luvsandorjiin Bayart, and also Ambassador Tran Hoan, have been appointed to new posts and will shortly be leaving the Conference. We wish them happiness, good health and success in their future work.

The Soviet delegation has distributed within the Conference on Disarmament the text of a declaration of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow on 7 June 1990, and also a communiqué about that meeting. We took this step in our capacity as organizers of the meeting and in accordance with established practice. As far as I am aware, these documents will be issued by the secretariat tomorrow.

I would like to say a few words on the declaration by way of introduction.

Its adoption was dictated by the rapidly changing situation in Europe and the world as a whole. Thanks to the joint and convergent efforts made by States of East and West the threat of war has been banished to the past, and the security system which took shape during the years of the "cold war", founded on military antagonism and power confrontation, has begun to be dismantled. For the first time in the post-war period a unique opportunity has arisen to build a qualitatively new world based not on blocs but on joint structures of European and universal security.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

In these circumstances, we believe, the elements of confrontation contained in documents of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic alliance in past years no longer correspond to the spirit of the times. The nature and functions of these alliances should be transformed so that, in the period of transition, they can perform new, urgent tasks related to disarmament and the creation of a pan-European security system. The military/political alliances should be transformed step by step into political/military alliances, and then into purely political organizations.

In this context, the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow also decided that the nature, functions and activities of the Warsaw Treaty should be reviewed, as well as its transformation into a treaty among sovereign States with equal rights, built upon democratic foundations. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty created a temporary commission of government plenipotentiaries which will submit appropriate concrete proposals to the Political Consultative Committee by the end of October this year. These proposals will be considered by the Political Consultative Committee before the end of November this year.

The declaration takes a positive view of the trend towards changes in NATO and a number of concrete steps recently taken by that alliance. We expect that these changes will become more rapid and more thorough-going, and also that they will be reflected in appropriate substantive changes in the Alliance's activities. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are also ready to co-operate constructively with neutral and non-aligned countries.

I would also like to highlight the part of the declaration in which the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty expressed their wish for a successful conclusion to the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and on confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe, in order that agreements on these subjects can be adopted at a meeting of leaders of CSCE participating States at the end of this year.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I would like to ask whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor. None does, and as I have no other matters to be considered at present, I shall adjourn this plenary meeting, which will be followed by the informal meeting on agenda item 2. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 21 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.558
21 June 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 21 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 558th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First, on behalf of the Conference and myself, I should like to warmly welcome the representative of India, Ambassador Indrajit Singh Chadha, who is with us today. I am pleased to convey to him my congratulations on his appointment and to wish him success in the functions entrusted him by his Government - Welcome, Mr. Ambassador.

Today, the Conference is continuing consideration of items 1 and 2 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members who so wish may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on today's list of speakers the representative of the German Democratic Republic and the representative of Argentina. I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Dietze. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. DIETZE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, I have already had the opportunity to warmly welcome in our midst Ambassador Chadha of India and Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner and to wish Ambassador Dimitri Kostov, who left Geneva yesterday, all the best in his future assignment.

May I, with your permission, use this occasion today to bid farewell to two of our outstanding colleagues leaving us soon. Ambassador Luvsandonjiin Bayart of Mongolia and Ambassador Istvan Varga of Hungary have significantly contributed to the endeavours towards the achievement of the objectives of our Conference. Their great experience and diplomatic skill and their ability to foster personal relations is well known to all of us. We are not only losing two colleagues, we are losing also the dean of the diplomatic corps in the field of disarmament, Ambassador Bayart, who has rendered distinguished service to this Conference during his tenure.

In taking leave of our colleagues, I wish them all success in their future responsibilities, good health and well-being.

Mr. President, my statement today refers to item 4 of the Conference's agenda, i.e. the negotiations on chemical weapons. Like many other members of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the German Democratic Republic accords high priority to the conclusion of work on the convention on a general, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest date. In order to encourage the speedy continuation of the negotiations on a CW convention and to gain experience in translating the already elaborated parts of the convention into practice, trial inspections were conducted in the German Democratic Republic, also in the field of challenge inspection. The three working papers I should like to introduce

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

today are based on the experience gained by such an inspection in a chemical industry plant. The report on an inspection in the military field will presumably be submitted to you soon.

I should like to offer some explanatory remarks concerning the documents at hand. The inspection was carried out in March of this year in the WOFATOX factory of Chemistry AG, Bitterfeld, a facility producing the organophosphorous pesticide parathion-methyl. The aim of this inspection was to develop and test an inspection methodology for challenge inspections in industrial plants. Inspection procedures and time frames were not the primary objectives of the trial.

The results and preliminary conclusions are set forth in working paper CD/996 entitled "Report on a Trial Challenge Inspection in a Chemical Industry Plant" before you.

A detailed description of the inspection methodology developed is contained in the second document, CD/997, entitled "Inspection Methodology for Challenge Inspections in Industrial Chemical Plants". The approach designed for our trial challenge inspection was a "layered inspection methodology", i.e. a step-by-step approach. More intrusive steps were triggered off by the results of the preceding less-intrusive inspection layers. That approach was considered to allow an inspection team to develop its actual inspection strategy depending on the specific situation at the site. Four such inspection layers were designed.

The third working paper, CD/998, addresses questions concerning chemical analytics and a prototype measuring instrument, i.e. a portable PC-supported ion mobility spectrometer, which was tested in these experiments for verification purposes. This instrument was used in laboratory experiments and in the actual inspection. It was to demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting memory effects in a chemical plant in order to identify residues of former production at trace level.

Thanks to the support of Mrs. Rautio, the prototype instrument was introduced in the Technical Group on Instrumentation last Tuesday and a detailed description was presented to our distinguished experts.

It is not by chance that questions of methodology have been in the focus of our investigations. Thereby, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic is continuing the work it commenced on this issue in its working papers CD/CW/WP.198 and 208. We are acting on the assumption that a sound inspection methodology, especially for challenge inspections, can conduce, firstly,

- to carrying out such inspections with a high degree of efficiency and credibility; and secondly,
- to excluding the unjust disclosure of confidential information.

(Mr. Dietze, German Democratic Republic)

We deem it instrumental that such an inspection methodology, which is founded on objective criteria and applied according to the specific circumstances, ensures the stability of the verification régimes of the CW convention. The elaboration, improvement and streamlining of such verification methodologies will surely be within the responsibility of the future CW organization's technical secretariat. By the working papers at hand, my delegation intends to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of challenge inspections and to help resolve still outstanding problems.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair, presiding over the deliberations of the only negotiating body on disarmament. You represent a country for which Argentina has particular admiration, great affection and respect. We wish you the greatest success.

Mr. President, the resumption of negotiations by the Conference this summer offers a good occasion for some observations on the development of the international scene, particularly as regards aspects relevant to the Conference, as well as for some reflections on the way in which our Conference reacts to the stimuli of the global security context or, perhaps more accurately, why it does not do so to the extent that we would all like to see.

There has been no slackening in the international dynamic since we ended the first part of this year's session - far from it. We have witnessed events tending to confirm a period of change and revision of patterns which seemed to be immutable elements of reality. Meanwhile, another summit meeting of the Presidents of the two States which have major arsenals of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons has marked the continuity of dialogue at the highest level on matters of international security.

From the results announced by the press, one may hazard the guess that both super-Powers continue to be reasonably committed to the objective of reducing their nuclear arsenals even further. However, the information at our disposal is scanty and we confess that we are somewhat surprised that the delegations whose Heads of State were the protagonists in such an important international political event have not informed the plenary of the Conference about the results of the summit meeting.

We have been told about a bilateral agreement on chemical weapons and the adoption of a joint declaration on the non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and missile technology. Beyond that, the Conference on Disarmament knows little. The implications of this fact deserve attention not only from the point of view of the oft-mentioned complementarity of the multilateral and the bilateral system but also, and perhaps much more, when we see that the summit dealt with and agreed on documents in such fields as nuclear testing, which, let us remember, is still the item that heads the agenda of this Conference.

The same can be said about nuclear weapons, an item included in our programme of work for discussion this week. Obviously, such bilateral negotiations are not simple, but we observe with some concern that the targets

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

announced by the actors themselves often seem to dwindle in the face of the complexity of reaching the desired goals within the time-limit set.

Thus, to give a concrete example, the oft-repeated commitment to reduce the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union by 50 per cent is now a pre-agreement whose scope is, in fact, limited to 30 per cent, depending on which source or military analyst we may wish to credit for even lower figures are being mentioned.

None the less, it would seem that some important points of convergence have been achieved: rules of counting geographical scope of the systems to be included in the reductions, and verification procedures which look like being even more refined than those of the INF Treaty - the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Undoubtedly, the fact that negotiations are continuing is a positive development and we welcome it. We therefore hope that, as they did during the first part of the session, the heads of the delegations involved in the negotiations on nuclear and space arms will once again give the Conference their analysis of the development and prospects of these bilateral discussions. Similarly, we trust that those delegations will maintain the indispensable tradition of providing the Conference with the official documents from the various negotiating forums.

Without prejudice to the option of speaking again on this subject in greater detail on another occasion, I consider it important to point out that the emergence of two negotiating authorities on the same subject - chemical weapons - one in a multilateral framework and, simultaneously, the other in a bilateral one between the United States and the Soviet Union, is beginning to show some jagged edges that I would venture to describe as disquieting.

No one can doubt that it is a good thing for the two super-Powers to reach agreement on the elimination of weapons. However, in the specific case of chemical weapons, there exists an ongoing intense multilateral process in which many of our countries are investing a significant amount of political energy and willingness to commit ourselves. In view of this reality and of the existence of a rolling text which, given the necessary political will would now be a treaty, it must be noted that bilateral agreements and arrangements are beginning to take shape that are attached like juridical artificial limbs to the general text of the convention, generating a two-track method of negotiation, in which States negotiate with one eye on a table seating 40 States (plus observers) and the other on what may be negotiated in other, more limited forums.

We believe that the trend we are referring to is harmful in that it ultimately legitimizes an implicit veto that reintroduces situations which we thought were a thing of the past in multilateral negotiations on disarmament and which establish categories - perhaps it would be more appropriate to call them hierarchies - of States, depending on whether or not they possess the

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

weapons that are to be eliminated. This is not the approach which, in our view, should be given priority if we are seeking a convention with universal participation.

Mr. President, all these negotiations in parallel, including the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and the European regional negotiations in Vienna, although apparently unrelated, do have, from a global perspective, an internal logic and coherence which must not be disregarded. This may be seen clearly in the many links existing between the various weapons systems under negotiation.

If one had to identify a single common thread between all of these negotiating processes, it could be found in the fact that all of them, regardless of their results, aim at redefining the framework of international security.

It is already incontrovertible that as security concerns in the European context become a less dominant factor and the relative advantage of the super-Powers - their nuclear supremacy - becomes less and less relevant in the process of change, the maintenance of a system of security based on the presence of two military alliances is doomed to obsolescence. The present structures may persist for a while, longer or shorter, depending on the political will and audacity of the actors involved, but we can have no doubt that a formidable challenge is emerging for the international community which concerns all of our States and from which none of them can stand aloof.

The task now, Mr. President, is to create the architecture of a new network of international relations in the sphere of security. That does not by any means imply a completely unfettered exercise of the imagination. On the contrary, the new dynamic will certainly incorporate important elements of the system that prevailed since the end of the Second World War, but it is also undoubtedly bound to have novel aspects and will therefore give rise to other realities.

And it is here that we think that there is an objective common to the entire international community; it is precisely in this area that the Conference on Disarmament - contrary to what some may regard as its inevitable decay - is called upon to play a relevant role.

This forum, in which countries of the North and the South - like yours and mine - of East and West are participating, has enormous potential at the present juncture. We cannot imagine a different kind of body that would be capable of properly tackling the common security problems that are emerging in a world in which bipolar confrontation is significantly weakening.

The blueprint for a new European security system should not preclude the negotiation of a comprehensive system. To continue with a basically Euro-centric vision of international security could lead us to repeating the dogmatic manoeuvring and political mapmaking which characterized the power pattern of the twentieth century.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

It is time to go forward with the building of a more integrated world, Mr. President. The common problems which unite us are more important and greater than those which divide us: development, economic growth and social justice; scientific and technological co-operation; human rights and the environment; and, in our own area a new standard for disarmament.

Mr. President, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the banning of all nuclear-weapon tests, naval weapons, the relationship between disarmament and development, are all elements of one reality facing the international community and in dealing with it the Conference on Disarmament should be given a special role.

The interconnection of those elements in the present international panorama appears obvious. Let us look at some examples.

Taking the case of naval nuclear weapons, to which Ambassador Theorin referred just a few days ago, we consider it one that exemplifies the new trends we have mentioned. Concurring with many of the arguments put forward by Sweden, we regard the subject as particularly relevant in that it is associated with what seems to us a clear manifestation of a substitution strategy which, while reducing medium- and short-range nuclear weapons, shifts its weight to sea-launched systems.

Apart from the legitimate concern which my country, like many others, may feel about strategy escalation, there is, in the matter of naval nuclear weapons, the additional destabilizing factor of their mobility and their almost complete undetectability, which, given their range, nature and power, make them a matter of serious concern for many countries, particularly those with long coastlines, like my own.

It appears that the positioning of nuclear weapons is undergoing a physical redistribution in which those responsible for nuclear strategy are opting for the marine environment as the place of choice for such weapons. Mr. President, the Argentine delegation had occasion to mention some of these concerns when, a little less than a year ago, the parties to the Sea-bed Treaty reviewed it for the third time.

On that occasion, our delegation ventured to draw attention to what we regard as a growing imbalance between reductions in land-based weapon systems and weapon systems based at sea or in space, now or in the future.

The results of bilateral negotiations on the subject and the difficulty of addressing such issues in multilateral forums would seem to confirm this assumption.

With respect to space-based systems, once again we are faced with a group of problems which present serious difficulties in the bilateral context and on which no progress is being made at the multilateral level. The difficulties encountered in bilateral negotiations were clearly explained to this body by distinguished Ambassadors Burt and Nazarkin. Nothing would seem to have happened since then to change the picture that they drew for us then.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

The situation, in our view, has been worsened by the evident impossibility of making any progress in the multilateral area either. I would like to dwell on this consideration because it links, as I said at the beginning of my statement, the global problems with the way in which this Conference on Disarmament reacts to the stimulus of situations that undoubtedly require concrete responses at the multilateral level.

Five years ago, the Conference on Disarmament set up a subsidiary body to deal with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This unquestionably was in response to the common view of the members of the Conference that it was desirable to deal, in a more specific and detailed manner than was possible through discussion in plenary, with the problems associated with the militarization of space.

Since then, nothing or virtually nothing has happened in the Conference. Without wishing to reiterate ideas that I voiced when I devoted an entire statement in plenary to this matter, I would say that that is not exactly due to the fact that delegations see such inaction as connected with a comforting conclusion that space is exempt from any kind of activity that would be potentially destabilizing from a military point of view.

In my opinion, there is an unexploited area of consensus here - no doubt partial in scope but none the less significant - by way of confidence-building measures applied to space.

Unfortunately, going round in circles seems to have some faithful supporters in the Conference, and the first meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee tend to confirm that the frustrating experiences of earlier sessions have to be repeated in 1990.

Another item, Mr. President, where reality outside the Conference and its negotiating activity contrast, although this time with the same tone of irrelevance, is that of nuclear tests.

At the bilateral level, the United States and the Soviet Union have at long last agreed on the details relating to verification of the Threshold Agreements of the early seventies. This should now enable their respective legislative bodies to ratify the treaties, whose real impact on military-strategy matters, in our opinion, is nil.

This Conference on Disarmament, meanwhile, accompanies that process without reaching agreement on the terms of a mandate whose features in any case ensure that a treaty on a complete nuclear test ban would be far from imminent.

At the same time, the process of the Amendment Conference of the Moscow Treaty is moving forward, providing further evidence of the way in which the Conference on Disarmament has put itself on the sidelines on this issue.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

Mr. President, it will be obvious to any observer that, like many other existing institutional bodies, the Conference on Disarmament, must, in view of dramatic and rapid changes and the evolution taking place in the premises on which its work was based overcome its present bewilderment and set itself a clear course.

The international disarmament agenda now paradoxically requires the Conference to play a perhaps more meaningful role in the future.

An unbiased look at our agenda may also well be in order. Subjects such as the nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space must be dealt with appropriately. Others, whether from the "decatalogue" or from our own collective wish, could no doubt be added. We referred a while ago to the question of naval disarmament.

In this rapid review of topics, we also deem it appropriate to mention the relationship between disarmament and development, or, in a broader sense, the whole range of subjects which may be regarded as generically related to the economic and social consequences of agreements on disarmament and arms control. At a time when references to "peace dividends" are part of the daily language of military and economic analysts, any collective analysis emerging from the Conference on Disarmemmt acquires special significance.

Mr. President, in this rather long statement, we have endeavoured to focus our attention on the future and have tried to point out, albeit in a somewhat disjointed fashion, the directions in which the Conference should be heading.

The inaction of the Conference on Disarmament is certainly not in the interests of anyone - neither of the States among us which are not major military Powers nor should it be in the interests of those States which possess nuclear and chemical weapons or the capacity to use space for military purposes.

The sterilization of the only multilateral forum for negotiations on security and disarmament at a time of historic changes and weakening of bipolar confrontation is exactly what must be avoided.

It is our hope, Mr. President that this conviction may provoke a consensus of the 40 States represented here.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to my country and to the Chair.

I have no other speakers on today's list. Does some other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

Members of the Conference, the Secretariat has circulated at my request a time-table of the meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. It has been prepared, as always, in consultation with the

(The President)

chairman of the Ad Hoc committees. As to the work of the plenary, in addition to the two regular plenary meetings, the Conference will, immediately after the plenary on Tuesday, build an informal meeting on the substantive aspects of agenda item 3. As indicated in the timetable the open-ended informal consultations on improved and effective functioning of the Conference will continue on 28 June at 3.30 p.m. in this room. Of course, the proposed time-table is merely indicative and can be modified if circumstances so require. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts this indicative time-table.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As I have no other business before me, I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 26 June, at 10. a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.559
26 June 1990

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 559th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First, allow me, on behalf of the Conference and of myself, to express to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran our deep-felt condolences on the tragedy afflicting his country. The magnitude of the disaster, especially the appalling loss of human life, has stirred the international community and strengthened the feelings of humanitarian solidarity which bind us to all men in such grave emergencies as that affecting the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is comforting to find that that humanitarian solidarity is being demonstrated not only in words but also in deeds, by material assistance and co-operation to relieve the sufferings of the victims of the catastrophe.

I should now like to proceed to our work and begin by warmly welcoming His Excellency, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, who is listed to speak at today's meeting. This is the fourth visit of the Under-Secretary of State to the Conference. I thank him for the interest with which he is following our efforts as well as for the contributions which his country has been making to the work of the Conference, in particular in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in which Finland chairs the technical group on instrumentation.

The Conference continues its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members who wish to do so may make statements on any other matter related to the work of the Conference.

I wish to remind members that today the Conference will be holding its second informal meeting on the substantive aspects of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

On today's list of speakers I have the representatives of Finland and the United Kingdom. I now give the floor to His Excellency, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, the challenge of disarmament is global. Political and military changes are sweeping all regions of the world. The Conference on Disarmament is charged with the demanding and complex task of bringing together the interests of the whole international community in some of the most urgent issues of international security.

All efforts should be intensified to resolve regional conflicts and disputes, for they feed the alarming arms competition that we are witnessing today in many such crisis areas. A new confidence on the global scale is needed to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, prevent the spread of chemical weapons and reach a global ban on such weapons. These measures, we hope, should help to stop the arms race and bring about effective disarmament.

A real disarmament process is well under way in Europe. The deep division into two antagonistic blocs is withering. This is giving place to new security structures. The CSCE is becoming the focus as the truly all-European security framework. The "summit" of the 35 CSCE States towards

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

the end of this year will mark a milestone in the continuing process of building a better political order in Europe by peaceful and stable means.

Mr. President, we cannot exclude the possibility that these changes will sooner or later affect what have been regarded as lasting elements of international security. It is widely believed that nuclear weapons have contributed to stability between the two bloc systems. With East-West tensions subsiding, the balance of terror may not be the only alternative to help mankind survive. We could ask ourselves whether we are coming to an end of an era which euphemistically has been called "Pax atomica"? Everyone seems to agree that nuclear armaments will have a lesser role in the future. If that is so, how are the nuclear-weapon States responding to such a vision? And what measures should the international community take to encourage and facilitate nuclear disarmament?

Four weeks ago, the United States and the Soviet Union took another significant step by issuing a joint declaration on strategic offensive arms. Hopes were rekindled that the first START Treaty will see the light of day before the end of this year. And what is equally important, the Soviet Union and the United States also confirmed that there will be further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of the two countries. Finland welcomes this progress in the negotiations between the leading nuclear Powers.

Another category of nuclear weapons is rapidly ripening for negotiation. Progress in the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces, along with the political change in Eastern and Central Europe, is rendering short-range nuclear weapons obsolete. Unilateral decisions concerning their withdrawal or non-modernization are signs which, we hope, contain the message that there is no turning back.

A forecast for naval nuclear disarmament seems less clear. Finland shares the view that sea-based nuclear systems must not become a means of circumventing disarmament agreements elsewhere. Nor should naval forces be left outside the growing openness in military matters. Finland has appealed for the total elimination of long-range sea-based nuclear weapons since the prospect of their large-scale deployment first emerged. Prompted by recent findings concerning the risks and low military value of sub-strategic nuclear weapons at sea, the nuclear Powers should, in Finland's view, seriously consider getting rid of that entire category.

Mr. President, in less than two months the representatives of the States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will gather here in Geneva to review the functioning of that Treaty. In Finland's view, the NPT remains a cornerstone in multilateral disarmament efforts. The non-proliferation régime needs the continuing support of all the Parties to the NPT in order to be further strengthened. They must perceive it as corresponding to their security needs also in the future. At the same time, the way should be paved for new accessions, to make the Treaty truly universal.

Here I would like to commend the efforts of Egypt in pointing out the need for dialogue with non-parites. I would also like to greet the proposal made by you, Mr. President, to organize consultations between 1990 and 1995 to ensure the prolongation and universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These are goals that Finland fully shares.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

The NPT Review Conference will discuss all elements of the Treaty, including proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament. It cannot be denied that the perils of proliferation are still with us. But they also serve as a reminder of what we might be facing without the Treaty.

In the period under review, however, nuclear disarmament has made an unequivocal turn for the better. The nuclear-weapon States will have a record to show on this score. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was made for a less than perfect world. Despite its shortcomings, it has greatly enhanced international security. No better treaty is in sight.

Mr. President, nuclear test explosions continue to be a divisive issue in international disarmament discussion. It took the leading nuclear Powers a decade and a half to agree on how to verify the "threshold" treaties. Meanwhile, non-nuclear weapon States have in vain made efforts to make the commonly agreed goal of a comprehensive test ban more attainable. Positions have hardened and frustrations grown.

Finland remains firmly committed to the achievement of a nuclear test ban treaty as a strong priority of the international community. We regard a comprehensive, universal and verifiable test ban as the surest way to slow down the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. In our view, the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty should be utilized as a unique opportunity for the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon States to embark on a common road leading to test ban. Realistically thinking it will not be a freeway, but the common goal should be reconfirmed and negotiations begun without delay. Fresh ideas from all sides would help loosen and perhaps open the knots.

It is Finland's view that nuclear testing has never been a matter for the nuclear-weapon States only. Environmental concerns, inter alia, contributed to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. New evidence suggests that there is no such thing as environmentally safe underground testing either. Safety measures at the test sites are being questioned by countries which fear that they get their share of radioactive particles from test explosions. In Finland's opinion, the best way to dispel such doubts would be for independent experts to be invited to familiarize themselves with safety measures at the test sites.

Within the Group of Seismic Experts (GSE) at the Conference on Disarmament the building and testing of the seismic network for the verification of underground nuclear tests as well as all kinds of seismic events will continue. The results from the on-going GSE Second Technical Test (GSETT-2) will give valuable information on how to further develop the seismic methods and their transmission, which is the truly global way to manage test-ban verification. However, eyes should be kept open also to complementary verification and control methods if they can help to increase the reliability of test-ban supervision.

Mr. President, the bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the destruction of the bulk of their chemical weapons, which

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

was signed at the Washington summit, is a timely one. It is self-evident that the countries with the largest arsenals should be the first in the disarmament process. By starting the gradual elimination of their chemical weapons these two countries are assuming in earnest their responsibility for the successful conclusion of the CW negotiations in this Conference.

The commitment by the United States and the Soviet Union to work for an early conclusion of the global CW convention and to give precedence to the provisions of that convention over the terms of their own bilateral agreement should be a catalyst to our efforts. It is now up to the international community as a whole to make sure that the precedence given to the global convention will in practice lead to a faster rather than to a slower timetable for the destruction of existing stocks in their entirety.

Finland has consistently emphasized that the commitment to destroy all chemical weapons within the 10 year period should be unconditional. We have also felt that an attempt to determine who is CW-capable and who is not may become a wild-goose chase which can only be satisfactorily solved when all countries are included. If completion of the destruction is linked to the findings of a conference close to the end of the 10 year period, a degree of uncertainty of the final outcome would prevail, unless participation is universal from the beginning. In the latter case, examination of the participation of the convention would become a theoretical exercise and all parties could be assured of total destruction of chemical weapons from the outset. Consequently, universality and its achievement is a vital goal, which we have to keep in mind when we discuss the details.

For many countries, as for Finland, the chemical weapons convention is primarily a security treaty which deals with weapons, not with chemicals as such or with industrial development. For these countries, the convention has to provide for increased or, as a minimum, undiminished security either in their particular setting or in general. However, for a larger number of countries chemical weaponry is not a primary factor. When they join, they are, however, equally subjected to intrusive inspections and have to pay their share of the costs of the organization. If we are to achieve universality, the convention has to be made attractive to this latter group of countries as well. Hence there is a necessity to include in the Convention also a component, such as article XI, which provides the necessary incentive to join. It cannot be disregarded either that for a number of countries for whom the security concerns are of primary importance, article XI provides an important additional incentive.

For its own part Finland intends to be among the original parties to the convention.

Mr. President, I would like now to deal in more detail with a number of specific aspects of the future convention.

As is well known in this Conference, Finland has for a long time centred its own activities on verification analysis and instrumentation. We have been glad to see that interest in these technical issues has been growing rapidly

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

during the last year or so. Meetings of the Technical Group on Instrumentation seem to become a regular part of the work programme rather than remain isolated events. There is also a growing tendency to increase national resources devoted to CW verification research.

It is often said that once the remaining political issues are resolved, the other pieces will fall into place. But it is also true that the speed of dealing with these other pieces is largely determined by the technical credibility of the proposed verification régime. Many of the technical details can and indeed must be left to the Preparatory Commission. Nevertheless, before that can be done there must be a clear understanding of the technical requirements of the convention and of the ways to meet them reliably.

As a first attempt to test and possibly improve the reliability of the analytical methods that the verification mechanism depends on, 10 laboratories organized an international inter-laboratory comparison test, a so-called round-robin test, last autumn. The Finnish Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament acted as the co-ordinating laboratory of that test. A summary of the results of that test was circulated in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last April (CD/CW/WP.288). The full account of all the findings has been prepared and will be circulated shortly in the Blue Book series. A second round-robin test with more laboratories participating will be conducted later this year. It is our view that comparison tests of this kind should in time become routine exercises in international methods development.

The second novel activity that Finland has been engaged in is the training programme on CW verification methods for analytical chemists from developing countries. The first four-month long course was completed in May this year. I am glad to report that the course surpassed our highest expectations. That, of course, is as much due to the dedication and enthusiasm of the participants, who came from Brazil, Kenya and Pakistan, as to the organizers themselves. A detailed report of the experiences gained during the programme will be prepared for the Blue Book series next year on the basis of experience gathered from three courses by then.

The second training course will start in the coming August. The invitation to nominate candidates for next year's two courses was circulated some time ago and we hope to receive the nominations before 15 September. I can also add that, as of next year, we will be able to increase the number of participants in these courses so as to reach eight chemists per year.

Finland fully shares the concern of the international community of the spread of chemical weapons. We have passed new legislation to control the export of CW precursors. This new legislation which enters into force next month covers a list of 37 precursors under export-licensing requirements. Thirteen additional precursor chemicals will be placed on a warning list. As appears from the Finnish data relevant to the CW convention as provided to the Conference (CD/CW/WP.297) there is no production in Finland of any of the scheduled substances, except in laboratory quantities for protective and research purposes. There are only four facilities altogether which use five of the Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals in their processes.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

Mr. President, the detailed structure of the technical secretariat of the future organization has not yet been subject to discussion. However, with regard to the laboratory side of the organization we have worked on the assumption that there will be a need for a central laboratory and a global network of other designated laboratories. The central laboratory would be the primary tool of the technical secretariat for organizing the necessary analytical work, for maintaining the high quality standards, and for any research and development programmes the organization may wish to undertake. The designated laboratories would perform the duties which in the present rolling text are assigned to off-site laboratories.

It is with these considerations in mind that the Government of Finland has made the offer to place our own existing verification laboratory at the disposal of the future organization for use as the central laboratory.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I should like first to associate myself with your words of condolence for the terrible suffering of the people of Iran in recent days. Our deep sympathy goes out to them.

Mr. President, may I express my pleasure at having you as President of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. It is good to have your experienced leadership of our deliberations. May I also warmly welcome the newly arrived ambassadors to this Conference. I look forward to working closely with them.

Mr. President, as members of the Conference on Disarmament will be aware a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held at Turnberry in the United Kingdom on 7 and 8 June. On behalf of the delegations of Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United States and the United Kingdom, I arranged for circulation of the text of the document issued by that meeting and it has been circulated today as document CD/1006.

The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Council will be followed by that of the Heads of State and Government in July in London.

The document of the Foreign Ministers consists of two parts: a short message, followed by a more detailed final communiqué. Whilst I would urge delegates to read the text in full, it might be helpful for me to draw attention to some of the major points.

The Foreign Ministers of the Alliance express their determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order based on freedom, justice and democracy. They extend to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries the hand of friendship and co-operation. They stress the importance of mutual acknowledgement of the legitimate security interests of all States and welcome the positive spirit of the declaration issued by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow on 7 June and introduced as a CD document by my distinguished Soviet colleague last week.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The Foreign Ministers urge that the arms-control process must be vigorously pursued. They examine in some detail ways in which this can and should be done.

The Ministers strongly emphasize that they attach the highest priority to the conclusion this year of a conventional forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Allied Governments will continue to work for substantive results in the confidence and security-building measures negotiations, in the form of an agreement later this year. Such positive results would lay the necessary basis for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe summit this year. As soon as a CFE agreement is reached, the NATO allies will be prepared to undertake follow-on negotiations to further enhance security and stability in Europe. The ministers endorse the United States President's recent proposal that negotiations on United States and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons systems in Europe begin shortly after a CFE agreement is concluded.

The Ministers welcome the progress attained in the United States/USSR Summit held in Washington from 31 May to 3 June and, in particular, the agreement on major outstanding issues concerning the START treaty that will result in deep reductions in both sides' strategic nuclear weapons, as well as agreement to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces after the current treaty is completed. Ministers take special note of the progress represented by the signature at the Summit Meeting of verification protocols for treaties limiting nuclear tests.

Of particular relevance to our work here in Geneva for a chemical weapons convention is the solemn statement made by Ministers that "all allies hereby state their intention to be among the original signatories to the [chemical weapons] convention and to promote its early entry into force. We call on all other States to undertake a similar commitment".

Ministers express satisfaction with the United States/USSR Agreement that will drastically reduce both sides' stocks of chemical weapons. They believe that this will provide great impetus towards the earliest possible conclusion of the convention being negotiated here in Geneva, which remains a goal of all members of NATO. Ministers also reaffirm their determination to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and all missiles capable of carrying such weapons.

The realization of the unity of Germany has always been a primary goal of our Alliance and the Turnberry Communiqué contains an important statement on this question. Ministers stress that a united Germany must have the right, recognized in the Helsinki Final Act, to choose to be a party to a treaty of alliance. European stability, as well as the wishes of the German people, require that a unified Germany be a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance. The security guarantee provided by articles V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty will extend to all the territory of a united Germany. The Allies seek no unilateral advantage from German unity and are prepared to demonstrate this, taking into account legitimate Soviet security interests. A free and democratic Germany will be an essential element of a peaceful order in Europe in which no State need harbour fears for its security against its neighbours.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Ministers recognize that the developments which we are now witnessing in Europe, and of which the Allies have been and will continue to be among the principal architects, are producing far-reaching changes in the political and military fundamentals of European security, and consequently in the conditions under which our Alliance is required to work. The principles of Alliance security were set out in May 1989 in the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament (issued here as document CD/926). These principles remain the basis for our assessment of the implications of the changing situation in Europe for our strategy. The Allies accept that whilst ensuring that the permanent principles which form the basis of our alliance and guarantee its effectiveness are preserved, we must today adapt it to the enormous changes now taking place. This process has already begun. Although the prevention of war will always remain the fundamental task of the Alliance, the changing European environment now require of it a broader approach to security, based as much on constructive peace-building as on peace-keeping.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to me.

I have no other speakers on my list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the floor.

Mr. MASHHADI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, I take the floor at this juncture of chagrin and deep sorrow for my country and my people to express our sincere and deep appreciation for the words of sympathy and condolences expressed here in the Conference on Disarmament to the grieving families who have lost everything including their best and beloved ones in this devastating tragedy. As you rightly mentioned, Mr. President, the magnitude of the disaster is so great and beyond any imagination that only the solidarity and sympathy of the international community, extended in the form of expression of condolences and relief support to the afflicted people, will alleviate some of the sorrow and grief. We are thankful to all countries, relief organizations and individuals, who have expedited humanitarian aid to the mourning families.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no other business before me and I shall therefore adjourn this plenary meeting.

As I have announced, immediately following the plenary meeting, there will be the informal meeting scheduled for today on agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday, 28 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.560
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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 28 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I call to order the 560th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda items 1 and 2, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may make a statement on any other matter relevant to the work of the Conference.

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Mongolia. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The present session of the Conference on Disarmament is being held at a turning-point in world development. These are not just idle words but a momentous reality. The world is undergoing headlong change, in a way that can truly be called revolutionary. Today, more happens in one year than formerly in decades, and more in one month than in years. Before our very eyes, walls are collapsing, seemingly inviolable lines of confrontation are eroding, new States are emerging and the political map of the world is changing - as a result not of wars, as in the past, but of peaceful, democratic development. These changes are affecting not only Europe but also other regions of the world, where the ideas of democracy, freedom, justice and equal rights are asserting themselves, although not without difficulties, sometimes major difficulties.

Profound changes are also taking place in the Soviet Union. Our perestroika, which began five years ago, has assumed an irreversible character. At the same time, it has revealed such fundamental contradictions in society, accumulated over decades, that all of its structures, both horizontal and vertical, have begun to experience tremendous strains. It is now obvious that these structures cannot be left untouched since they have become a hindrance to the renewal of society and are undermining the foundations of its progress and stability.

The complexity of the problems that we have to solve at home is not making us want to fence ourselves off from the rest of the world. One of the imperatives of perestroika is to overcome the psychology of autarky, of self-isolation and exclusiveness, and to create an open society.

The changes taking place in the world and in our country are of an objective nature and historically conditioned. No one can halt them or slow them down. But any change also has a potential for instability. That is why we are seeking to find the optimum combination of renewal and stability. Stability is not synonymous with ossification of old structures. What has outlived its time must be sent to the scrap-heap of history, but in a way that does not harm the emergence of the new. In this context, now more than ever, what is needed in relations between States are confidence and mutual respect,

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and, in politics, a transition from passive mutual understanding to active interaction and businesslike partnership with a view to maintaining dynamic stability under rapidly changing conditions.

Another important reason for ensuring stability is that the world today still carries the burden of over-armament characterized by huge arsenals of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. Our country, too, has accumulated a large amount of weapons. We are fully conscious of the responsibility that this imposes upon us. For a whole series of domestic reasons and foreign-policy considerations, the Soviet Union is now no less interested than other States - possibly even more so - in the steady advancement of the arms control and disarmament process. However, disarmament is, of course, not an end in itself but only one of the means for building the secure, democratic and civilized world which we need and part of which we wish to be. But without disarmament it is impossible to create a new world order and new security structures.

Never during the entire post-war period has the possibility of a drastic weakening of the levers of military force in world politics been so close as today. A general consensus has already developed that the threat of war has receded into the past and that a unique chance is appearing of building a qualitatively new world, based on normal, civilized relations between States and groups of States. The prospects that have emerged at the Vienna and Geneva negotiations are opening up the possibility of the progressive dismantling of the security model which developed in the years of the "cold war" and which was based primarily on military confrontation. As we understand it, our Western negotiating partners are proceeding, in principle, on the same assumption.

If in the near future - this very year, we hope - we succeed as a result of negotiations in arriving at agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in the nuclear potentials of the USSR and the United States, and on removing the potential for surprise attack from the arsenals of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO conventional armed forces, that will radically improve the entire situation on the European continent and in the world as a whole, have a multi-dimensional constructive effect on East-West relations and be a sign that the post-war period of confrontation is over. Evidently, it will then be possible to speak of the irreversibility of a fundamental improvement in the world situation, a decisive turning-point in the matter of disarmament, and the beginning of a real shift from over-armament to reasonable sufficiency for defence.

The Vienna talks are undoubtedly of special importance for European security and stability. Assessment of the present state of affairs in Vienna makes it possible to identify a high degree of agreement among the 23 participants on a number of questions of principle, including those relating to the conceptual approach to the structure of the initial understanding. At the same time, there are still many questions of substance to be settled, not to mention a multitude of technical details. We are concerned that in the 35-party negotiations agreement has not yet been reached on a new generation of confidence-building measures that would include, in

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particular, activities of naval and air forces, although some progress is being seen on other elements of the subject-matter of those negotiations. Nevertheless, the Vienna talks have entered their decisive and, we hope, final stage. At this stage of the work, it becomes particularly important to take fully into account both collective interests and the interests and concerns of each State. The situation would prove difficult to redress if, at this stage of the negotiations, emotions prevailed over common sense and the conclusion of an all-important treaty were frustrated or indefinitely postponed.

It must be clearly realized that delay in Vienna in finding solutions to the remaining problems - and they could be enumerated: personnel, aviation, definitions of the main categories of arms, regional division, verification and elimination procedures - may have a braking effect on the entire all-European process, especially as the Vienna treaty is one of the key items of the all-European summit meeting to be held at the end of the year.

It is now becoming increasingly clear: the political situation in Europe is developing so quickly that it is already beginning to outdistance the disarmament process.

Of course, it is the German question that now constitutes the crux of European security and stability. Today, no one can have any doubt that Germany will become an important component of united Europe, making a major contribution to the construction of the common European home and the single all-European spaces - economic, ecological, legal and humanitarian. Moreover, in the circumstances that have arisen the process of Germany's unification can and must become a stimulus - and the new united German State, an engine - of profound qualitative changes in Europe organized on the principles of joint security, confidence and good-neighbourliness.

But there is something else that is true. A united Germany will not fit into the landscape of a new Europe if, in Europe, everything remains as before. In such a case, German unity could upset the balance of forces established over the previous decades and lead to an aggravation of contradictions. We consider the isolation of Germany undesirable, and we are in favour of joint efforts aimed at creating dependable structures of peace.

The leaders of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty declared, at a meeting of their Political Consultative Committee, that the organization would have to undergo very profound changes if it wished to play a constructive role in the further development and improvement of the European structures of co-operation and security. Our alliance has embarked on the path of radical transformation of its activities in all fields, including the military field. We have proposed to the NATO States that they should start moving in a similar direction, and we note with satisfaction that we have heard a positive response from Turnberry. As we begin this movement, we must bear in mind that not only is its direction important, but even more so are the dynamics and the magnitude of the accompanying changes. In this connection, we are looking forward with great attention to the decisions of NATO's London session.

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As new joint security structures are moulded in the continent and the world as a whole, nuclear arms too must be looked at anew. We put forward the ideal of a nuclear-free world, and we remain true to it. But we recognize that we are not living in an ideal world. The huge arsenals of nuclear weapons have become so firmly established in security systems that the idea of eliminating them at a stroke is unrealistic. Nuclear disarmament is only part of a far broader phased process involving deep cuts in armed forces and conventional arms and the modification of their structure on the basis of non-offensive defence, as well as the establishment of machinery to ensure openness and monitoring, not only to guarantee the implementation of disarmament through all the facets of this process, but also to create a relaxed atmosphere in relations between States. And, lastly, radical changes in East-West relations generally, the progressive replacement of instruments for maintaining peace by military force by security guarantees in the political, economic, humanitarian and environmental fields and their enshrinement in appropriate bilateral and multilateral agreements. Such an approach will require us to progressively overcome the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, an organic component of the system of international security which was established after the Second World War, and which we want to rid ourselves of within the foreseeable future.

Today, as never before, this doctrine deserves detailed, impartial consideration. On the one hand, it is impregnated with the concept of the enemy, the idea of mutual intimidation and competition in stockpiling nuclear weapons. It somehow absorbs into itself - or rather into the instruments of its implementation - all the weight of the stereotypes of mutual mistrust, suspicion, animosity and false, often grotesque perceptions about each other, which were built up during the long years of the "cold war". On the other hand, as long as these stereotypes and perceptions are not overcome, the doctrine of deterrence gives some countries a sense of security. Perhaps it is a misleading feeling similar to being under the influence of drugs. But it would be rash to deprive people of a sense of security, even if the security is imaginary, without giving them something in exchange. Finally, one must recognize that sometimes we were guilty of a simplistic approach to this doctrine and turned a blind eye to the fact that, in a given historical context, this doctrine did play a useful role in maintaining peace. To put it in a nutshell, I think it would be impossible to overcome this psychological barrier in a single leap and do away with nuclear weapons, as some suggest, unless humanity can see that the world it is entering will be more secure than the one it is leaving behind. In the present conditions building a nuclear-free world certainly cannot be understood as a simple return to the pre-nuclear world with all its problems, contradictions and threats. In this context the achievement of a level of "minimal deterrence" seems for the moment to be a realistic stage on the way to a nuclear-free world. This will lead to the elimination of the most dangerous dimensions of the doctrine of deterrence while maintaining the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons themselves. The first steps in this direction have been taken. These include not only the Soviet-American Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, but also the achievements in the elimination and reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

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One of the main results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Washington is that it created conditions for finalizing the treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. Almost no one, it seems, now harbours any doubt that the treaty will be signed by the end of the year. After that it will be discussed in the highest legislative bodies of the two countries. At the same time the treaty on strategic offensive weapons is already attracting great attention, and its agreed provisions are being carefully analysed. Indeed, it is already drawing criticism. Yet despite all the differences in the assessment of the treaty, almost nobody now questions the view that it will become an important milestone, both in the history of arms control and in relations between the USSR and the United States. Of course, there have been earlier periods in Soviet-American relations when important bilateral agreements in the military and strategic field were signed. But they resulted only in the containment of the arms race in specific areas, and some limitation of the military rivalry between the USSR and the United States. It is a fact that the 1960s saw a rapid build-up of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, while the 1970s and 1980s saw even more rapid growth in the aggregate number of warheads as a result of the installation of multiple independently targetted warheads on these missiles. That growth was not halted either by the interim agreement on SALT I (1972), nor by the SALT II treaty (1979) - which of course does not diminish the unquestionable value of these agreements.

Should a Soviet-American treaty on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms be concluded, for the first time in the history of the development of the strategic triad the steady build-up of all its three components will be halted and, over a seven-year period, both the number of strategic delivery vehicles of nuclear warheads (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and the number of nuclear warheads will be reduced. That would mark the beginning of a process of real reduction of strategic arms, an extremely substantial reduction measured in hundreds of delivery vehicles and thousands of warheads. Even more importantly, these reductions will be designed to make a first strike less likely. That will result in increased stability and a lessened threat of war.

It should be pointed out that with the beginning of the START negotiations substantial changes took place in the military programmes of the USSR and the United States, moving towards a reduction in the quantity of the arms concerned deployed and the postponement of the move to new arms systems. The number of new military programmes has also plummeted. The draft treaty provides for substantial quantitative and qualitative limitations to be imposed on the modernization of strategic offensive arms. For instance, limitations are fixed for the aggregate throw weight of ballistic missiles and the maximum number of warheads on these missiles; new types of heavy ICBMs and SLBMs and new types of ballistic missile launchers are banned; and ALCMs with multiple independently targetable warheads are banned. Many other limitations and bans are also provided for. Overall it can be said that for its own purposes the draft treaty resolves the problem of limiting the modernization of strategic offensive arms.

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Although the treaty on strategic offensive arms will not contain a direct limitation on sea-launched cruise missiles, each side will provide the other with a unilateral declaration of its policy concerning nuclear SLCMs, and subsequently, each year for the entire duration of the treaty, will provide unilateral declarations regarding its plans for deployment of nuclear long-range SLCMs, i.e. those with a range in excess of 600 kilometres. These declarations will be politically binding. The annual declarations will specify the years in which the treaty is in force, with the condition that the number declared must not exceed 880 units. The reductions and limitations spelt out in the treaty will be accompanied by far-reaching verification measures, including the conduct of 12 kinds of on-site inspection on a basis of reciprocity, the use of national technical means of verification, with a ban on interference with them and on denial of access of telemetric information, and the regular exchange of data on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of strategic offensive arms. In order to promote achievement of the aims of the treaty, the sides will set up a joint compliance and inspection commission.

We understand that the parties' strategic armaments structures which will remain in place after reductions under the treaty may not fully correspond with the views of the two sides as to strategic stability. However, we view this as an additional argument in favour of an immediate start to negotiations on the next stage of reductions in strategic offensive arms once the treaty being prepared has been concluded.

The determination of the USSR and the United States, as recorded in the special joint statement signed during the Washington summit, to hold consultations without delay after treaty signature regarding future talks on nuclear and space arms and on the further strengthening of strategic stability, and to begin these negotiations at the earliest practical date, is of course of no less importance than the treaty itself. Indeed, a balanced and objective assessment of the treaty can be provided only within the broad context of the intention of the two countries, explicitly stated at the Washington summit, to take further steps towards nuclear disarmament, for which the treaty provides the necessary pre-conditions.

According to the joint statement on future negotiations on nuclear and space arms and further enhancing strategic stability, the USSR and the United States have agreed to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. Their objectives are to reduce further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries. In these new negotiations emphasis will be placed on removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving priority to highly survivable systems.

In evaluating the significance of the future treaty on strategic offensive arms it is also important to keep in mind that without one the USSR and the United States could have more than twice as many IBMs and SLBMs and

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could considerably increase the number of heavy bombers armed with nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs. Nor would there be any limitations on the planned deployment of nuclear SLCMs. In the context of such a large-scale approach to strategic arms reductions, strategic stability becomes considerably more sensitive to non-strategic nuclear arms, both land-based and sea-launched.

The elimination of imbalances and asymmetries in conventional armed forces in Europe under the treaty being negotiated in Vienna would open up a realistic prospect for fairly radical reductions in land-based tactical nuclear weapons to the level of "minimal deterrence". What that level will be remains to be determined in the course of negotiations. It is clear, though, that when reduced to that level the capabilities of the sides should be limited to the deterrent function and should not create the perception on the part of the other side that they may be used in a first strike, including their use for the purpose of initiating hostilities involving conventional forces. I would like to remind the distinguished participants in the Conference that in that direction as well we have already begun to move unilaterally. In 1989 500 nuclear warheads were withdrawn from the territories of our allies - 166 aviation warheads, 50 artillery warheads and 284 missile warheads. In the past two years we have not modernized our tactical nuclear missiles by means of replacement or by other means.

In order to create a favourable climate for negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons which the Soviet Union proposes to begin as early as this autumn, we have decided to reduce our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe further. Specifically: by the end of this year in Central Europe, the USSR will cut 60 launchers of tactical missiles, i.e. missiles with a shorter range than those being eliminated under the INF Treaty. In the Soviet Union these missiles include the "R-17" or "Scud-B" (300 kilometres), the "Tochka" or "SS-21" (70 kilometres) and the "Luna" or "Frog" (70 kilometres). Moreover, in Central Europe over 250 pieces of nuclear-capable artillery will be cut. These include heavy artillery of 152 mm calibre and above. Finally, 1,500 nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from that zone. This includes nuclear warheads from missiles subject to reductions, nuclear artillery shells and gravity bombs. However, the USSR is not limiting the sphere of its unilateral reductions to Central Europe only. In the European region the USSR will cut a total of 140 tactical missile launchers and 3,200 nuclear-capable artillery pieces by the end of this year.

We are taking these steps unilaterally without making them subject to any pre-conditions, although we believe that they create favourable conditions for the forthcoming negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. We also note certain steps with regard to the removal of tactical nuclear warheads from the European continent taken by NATO in recent years, and we view positively President G. Bush's decision to abandon the "Lance" programme and cancel any further modernization of munitions for United States nuclear artillery deployed in Europe. We would still prefer a decision on the complete elimination of both short-range missiles and all other categories of tactical nuclear weapons, including their nuclear components. However, if NATO

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countries are not ready for such a radical solution to the issue at the present time, we could also consider the possibility of an intermediate stage, that is, an asymmetric reduction to the lowest possible level.

The limitation and reduction of sea-based nuclear weapons constitute a significant problem directly related to the task of ensuring a level of "minimum nuclear deterrence". Unless that problem is resolved, efforts in other areas of nuclear disarmament are likely to be devalued, since broad prospects will open up for an intensive rechannelling of military rivalry to that area of the nuclear arms race, outflanking future agreements. In this respect we note the comprehensive statements made on this topic in our Conference by the distinguished representative of Sweden, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, Ambassador M.B. Theorin of Sweden, and the distinguished representative of Finland, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs A. Karhilo, as well as the distinguished representative of Argentina, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán.

We have proposed to the United States a start on negotiations on the phased reduction and elimination of sea-based nuclear weapons (this means not just SLBMs); the elimination of all nuclear weapons on surface ships could be dealt with in the first phase of these talks. Moreover, the talks should produce a definite solution to the problem of long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, which should also be eliminated. This could of course lead to the establishment of "minimal nuclear deterrence" at sea.

As applied to land-based and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, the concept of "minimal deterrence" is of course a relative one, and can be viewed as merely an intermediate phase on the path to complete elimination of such weapons. After all, minimal deterrence, in all probability, implies at the same time as high a "nuclear" threshold as possible, whereas in objective terms this threshold will become lower as non-strategic nuclear weapons are introduced into the parties' nuclear arsenals.

Returning to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, you will probably also recall that it emerged in specific historical circumstances and in a specific regional context. The ground is now being prepared for the establishment of new conditions in this region which should enable everyone to take a new look at the role of nuclear weapons as well. It took four decades of confrontation, several crises, every one of which might have been the last one, an irretrievable waste of enormous resources and finally the realization of the necessity to build relations between States on a qualitatively new basis, to make it possible for such a statement to be made. And it would be a very grave mistake if the theory of nuclear deterrence or a theory of deterrence based on other types of weapons of mass destruction, began to gain force and to materialize in other regions of the world as well.

A serious cause of the continuing threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons lies not in the fact that the efforts of the USSR and the United States in the field of nuclear disarmament are allegedly insufficiently effective as yet, but rather in a growing potential for instability and a high

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concentration of non-nuclear weapons in various parts of the world. In this respect the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is an integrated problem and is linked with the search for solutions to other regional disarmament issues (in particular, non-proliferation of chemical weapons, missiles and missile technology, limitations on the arms trade, etc.), as well as the reduction of tension in zones of potential conflict and crisis situations. At the summit meeting the USSR and the United States adopted a comprehensive statement setting out specific avenues for interaction between them in various of these areas, as well as for co-operation with other countries. It reflects a common recognition of the fact that the accelerating process of arms reduction must be strengthened with measures aimed at countering the spread of weapons throughout the world. The USSR and the United States have also made substantial efforts to settle regional conflicts.

Where nuclear disarmament issues are concerned, our forum, that is to say the Conference on Disarmament, has so far been left out of the picture. In dealing with actual multilateral nuclear disarmament, the Conference is undoubtedly the very place where negotiations should be held. But three nuclear States say that pending the emergence of certain conditions, they are not prepared to join in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. This does not mean that conceptual work must not be pursued, let us say at the same informal meetings of ours. In this respect I would also like to draw attention to a particular nuclear disarmament issue, the prohibition of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In essence, such a ban would be the most radical and the shortest path to the elimination of nuclear weapons, for in the mean time the destruction of launchers alone is being negotiated, and warheads remain in States' arsenals. Therefore, strictly speaking, mankind has not yet embarked on nuclear disarmament proper, and this is a matter for justified concern on the part of the world community. The cessation of the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium would inevitably lead to cuts in the actual industrial base for making key components of nuclear weapons. We believe that an objectively favourable situation now exists for the solution of this issue: in the United States the production of weapons-grade plutonium has virtually stopped; in the Soviet Union the production of weapons-grade uranium was halted in 1989, three reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium have been shut down and a programme has been adopted to decommission all plutonium reactors of this type by the year 2000. Hence we may certainly raise the point here that in these circumstances the Conference could start practical consideration of the monitored cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes - under effective control, of course.

If we were to look for the most glaring example of the international community's impotence to solve the tasks it has set itself within a few decades, the problem of nuclear tests would be among the major candidates. The fact that the Conference has failed to take action in this regard undermines its authority. At the same time it is obvious that a test ban is not only a measure to curb the nuclear arms race but a very important means of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The time has truly come,

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we believe, to establish an ad hoc committee on this issue, which could set to work, and the sooner the better. The Czechoslovak proposal for a mandate for this committee might provide a basis, and this has been recognized by all. Essentially, the discussion is about words. Maybe it would be better to stop this dispute and agree to accept the draft mandate as it is? It is a suggestion based on compromise, which emerged after long disputes and discussions. In this connection, I should like to reaffirm once again my delegation's support for the efforts being undertaken by the distinguished Ambassador Donowaki in this direction. We see no contradiction between the Conference's starting work on the testing issue, which will inevitably be of a step-by-step nature, and the step-by-step approach which the USSR and the United States agreed upon as a basis for negotiations on nuclear testing, although the stage-by-stage approach may of course take different concrete forms.

Protocols to the Soviet-American threshold treaties of 1974 and 1976 have been signed, and this means that the first aim of the bilateral Soviet-American talks has been achieved. In accordance with the existing agreement, we support the continuation of these bilateral negotiations for the purpose of considering further limitations on the number and yield of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union has suggested resuming them in September, and we expect a positive reply from the American side.

Literally a few words on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Space technology is one of the most rapidly developing fields. It is directly related to security and stability. We do not know exactly what kind of space technology we will have to deal with in 10 or 15 years' time, in particular that which may be of military significance, although we do know about the research being conducted in this field. To see that the Conference on Disarmament has been going round in circles on space issues for many years gives rise to gloomy thoughts. Like many other members of the Conference, the Soviet Union has introduced a number of proposals for radical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space - measures of a prohibitory nature aimed at preventing the development and deployment either of any space weapons at all, or of specific types of weapon, such as anti-satellite weapons. However, experience shows that such radical measures cannot become the subject of concrete negotiations in the near future. As a result, more and more delegations are opting to begin with confidence-building measures in space. We believe that this is right. The idea here is not to start negotiations just for the sake of negotiations, in order to be able to report that we are conducting negotiations on outer space, but rather to take the first steps towards establishing the basis for confidence with respect to States' space activities - if you will, to build up experience with constructive multilateral work as regards the outer space dimension of security and stability. However important the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations are, multilateral efforts are vital here, because an increasing number of States are becoming involved in space activities. Therefore, we suggest that the concept of "open outer space" should become a subject of consideration at the Conference on Disarmament. The most important measures related to the realization of the "open outer space" concept, in our view, include (a) the

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strengthening of the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; (b) the elaboration of "rules of the road" or a "code of conduct"; (c) the use of space-based monitoring devices in the interest of the international community; and (d) the establishment of an international space inspectorate. France's proposal for the establishment of an international centre to process images obtained from space also deserves a positive response. These measures cannot endanger anybody's security, and we urge all States to study thoroughly the positive potential embodied in the "open outer space" concept.

In conclusion, a few words on chemical weapons. It is generally recognized that in present circumstances the most promising direction in the work of the Conference is the drawing up of a convention on this subject. Great importance is attached to the Soviet-American agreement on chemical weapons in this regard. The USSR and the United States are to begin to implement its major provisions without waiting for the convention to be concluded. The obligation not to produce chemical weapons is of special importance, in our view, within the context of this bilateral agreement. Indeed, it is a corner-stone of the future multilateral convention. And the fact that the USSR and the United States have agreed to assume such an obligation without waiting for the convention to be completed is, in our view, convincing evidence of the readiness of the parties to the bilateral agreement to work for the early conclusion of the multilateral convention. For the USSR, this also means that its unilateral decision to stop production of chemical weapons (and this was done in 1987) will be formalized as an international treaty, thus settling unequivocally and irrevocably the question of whether Soviet society will devote new resources to the production of chemical weapons.

The bilateral agreement provides that, at the multilateral negotiations, the USSR and the United States will introduce a proposal to hold a special conference at the end of the eighth year after the convention enters into force, to decide by a majority vote whether the participation in the convention is sufficient for the final destruction of chemical weapons. The joint statement contains details of this proposal. In this connection, I would like, not just on behalf of my delegation, but also on behalf of the United States delegation, to draw the attention of the distinguished delegates to a working paper in the CD/CW/WP.... series, but I think without a number as yet - this is an advance copy which is before you. Both our delegations plan to dwell in greater detail thereon in due course and in the appropriate context, and this step has been undertaken in pursuance of the bilateral agreement signed on 1 June in Washington.

Now turning back to my own statement, I would like to stress that here we have a compromise proposal that takes into account both elements of the United States proposal known as the "2 per cent" proposal, and the criticism of that initial American proposal by the USSR and a number of other participants in the negotiations. Both the need to evaluate participation in the convention by States which are important from the point of view of its

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effectiveness, and the importance of avoiding incentives to acquire chemical weapons, are taken into account. Moreover, this proposal stimulates States possessing chemical weapons to become original parties to the convention.

Finally, with all due respect to those who have criticized this proposal, I would like to say that I do not in any way share their perception of attempts to impose some sort of Soviet-American diktat, or a wish on the part of the two countries to force their decisions upon other participants in the negotiations. The bilateral agreement clearly states that the two sides have agreed to introduce the proposal - and I stress, the proposal - at the Conference on Disarmament. And this, of course, is the legitimate right of every participant in the negotiations. For our part, we are satisfied with this joint approach and we will champion its advantages in our future work. At the same time, we consider it essential to step up efforts to solve the problem of the universality of the future convention.

In this connection, I should like to return to the statement adopted by the NATO foreign ministers at Turnberry, and specifically the passage in which the members of the North Atlantic bloc state their intention to be among the first to sign the future convention. We welcome that declaration. Of course we also welcome the even more far-reaching statements made here by Sweden and Finland concerning their readiness to become original participants. We have great hopes that during the summer session of the Conference, the multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons will acquire new dynamism, which, unfortunately, they have sometimes been lacking in recent times. Strictly speaking, not much remains to be done, and it is important to lay a solid foundation within the remaining time to solve all outstanding issues, first and foremost those concerning definitions and challenge inspections, ad hoc inspections, assistance to victims of CW use, etc.

In its statement today, the Soviet delegation has shared its views with you on a number of key aspects of the problem of disarmament and the role the Conference on Disarmament could play in finding solutions. I think that one of the significant phenomena of our work today is the fact that this Conference is turning its eyes on itself. We have begun to look collectively for our place in a rapidly changing world. We plan to dwell on this subject and some other issues pertaining to the work of the Conference in the near future.

MR BAYART (Mongolia): first of all, Mr President, I wish to congratulate you on the effective and skilful manner in which you have conducted the work of the Conference on Disarmament during the month of June. I also wish to thank Ambassador Ahmad Kamal, of Pakistan, for his excellent work as President of the Conference in April. This is the last opportunity for me to address the Conference on Disarmament before relinquishing my post as the head of the Mongolian delegation. Allow me to say a few words of a somewhat personal nature.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

During the years of my service here in Geneva, historic changes have taken place in international relations. A model of international security is being forged through collective efforts. Democratization of international relations is taking shape. These changes are profound in nature and open new, brighter horizons for disarmament negotiations. Important landmark agreements have been concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States. The verification issue, which has long been the stumbling-block on the road to disarmament, proved to be solvable, given political will, a spirit of compromise and co-operation.

I hope that the latest agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons will serve as a catalyst in our common endeavour to achieve the early conclusion of a global convention. I also believe that the future convention on the banning of chemical weapons is a unique one with its innovative approach to a number of traditionally extremely difficult problems. I am confident that the carefully crafted procedures on verification and implementation will serve as a model for future multilateral disarmament agreements.

It is a pleasure for me to announce that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic has decided to withdraw the reservation it made on the ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. In our view such a step constitutes an important measure to strengthen the prohibition régime envisaged in the Protocol.

The Mongolian Government welcomes the joint statement of the USSR and the United States concerning the treaty on strategic offensive arms. The START treaty, which is expected to be ready for signing by the end of the year, should become an important milestone in the disarmament negotiations of recent years. By cutting the strategic offensive arms of the two Powers almost in half, this treaty would make an important contribution to international peace and enhance stability.

I am returning to my country at a time of sweeping changes. The process of restructuring and renovation in Mongolia has accelerated. Undoubtedly political developments during the first half of this year will have a profound impact on the future of my country. The main goal of the radical changes that Mongolia is undergoing is, in short, the attainment of genuine democracy. The Government is directing the thrust of its policy to the human and social dimensions of development. The restructuring embraces all spheres of the country's social and political life, including its foreign policy. The Mongolian Government has consistently pursued the policy of developing and strengthening its relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence, mutually beneficial co-operation and respect for the right of peoples to choose their own path of development, and it remains faithful to those principles. The Government of Mongolia has adopted non-alignment as one of the basic principles of its foreign policy. My Government will continue to

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

pursue its policy of keeping Mongolia free of nuclear weapons; it will not station on the territory of Mongolia foreign troops or armed forces directed against a third country; it continues to promote and strengthen mutual confidence with neighbouring and all other countries. On the basis of these principles Mongolia will seek to guarantee its security by political means. My country will continue its active participation in the work of the United Nations and other international organizations, and will promote the solution of global problems such as disarmament, environmental protection, the establishment of a new economic order, etc.

I have been in Geneva for more than five years. For me personally they have been fascinating and highly rewarding. I shall always cherish the fond memories of my personal friendships, official contacts and co-operation with my colleagues. I have tried my best to benefit and learn from them. I have always admired and respected my colleagues' deep knowledge of disarmament problems and diplomatic skill in conducting negotiations. In my diplomatic career I have been associated with the Conference on Disarmament for more than 10 years. I share the view that the Conference on Disarmament has inherited too much from the past, such as its agenda, its decision-making process and the organization of its work. It is evident that the Conference on Disarmament should take steps to adjust itself to the present reality. This is a process that will require serious negotiations and can be realized gradually. I firmly believe in the Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and I am sure that the collective efforts and political wisdom of its members will find the right solution to the important question of the improved and effective functioning of the CD. And, in the light of the improved international climate, I have every reason to be optimistic and expect that the time will come soon when constructive and productive negotiations will commence on a number of priority issues, in particular the comprehensive nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

In conclusion, I wish to thank most sincerely Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Ambassador Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, for the unfailing support and co-operation they have given me during my assignment here, especially at the time when I had the honour to serve the CD as its President in July of last year, and when I chaired the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in 1986 and 1989. I also wish to thank the able and efficient staff of the disarmament secretariat and all those whom we do not see in this Council chamber but whose dedication and high professional performance keep the CD running so smoothly. With sadness in my heart I say goodbye to you all. I wish you and the Conference on Disarmament every success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia for his statement, as well as for the kind words he addressed to me. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf I wish to convey to Ambassador and Mrs. Bayart our best wishes for personal happiness and professional success in their country. Ambassador Bayart, as we are all

(The President)

aware, has represented his country effectively, skilfully and honourably, not to mention his well-known gifts as a linguist. During his activities in this Conference he made an outstanding contribution to our work as President, and on two occasions he also chaired the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. On both occasions Ambassador Bayart, who is leaving us as deputy dean of the representatives in the Conference, served with his usual skill. We wish you every personal good fortune, Ambassador Bayart.

I have no other speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I would suggest that we take up our timetable of meetings for next week. The secretariat circulated this timetable today. As usual, it was prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. As you will see from the text, open-ended consultations on the question of the improved and more effective functioning of the Conference will take place on Tuesday 3 July instead of Thursday 5 July. That date has been given to the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 5. As always, the timetable is merely indicative and may be changed if necessary. If there are no objections, may I take it that the Conference adopts the timetable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I would like now to turn to the closing date for the 1990 session of the Conference. I wish to inform you that as a result of the consultations which have taken place over the past few days, there seems to be agreement on concluding our work on Friday 24 August. This is on the clear understanding that the plenary meeting that is scheduled for Thursday 23 August will be put off to the next day at 4.30 p.m. May I take it that there are no objections to the date proposed?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I would now like to make my closing statement as President from Peru for the month of June 1990.

As this is the last plenary meeting at which I will serve as President on behalf of Peru, I wish to share with you some thoughts in my capacity as outgoing President. First of all, I should note that the work of the second part of the 1990 session began in good time in keeping with the tradition of the Conference on Disarmament, and that includes the activities of subsidiary bodies. The programme of work for the second half of the session was adopted and, after successful consultations, we reached the hoped-for consensus on the date for the closing of the 1990 session - that is, we will conclude our work on 24 August next. We have had six plenary meetings including this one. In the six meetings we have had less than 10 speakers, and I must confess that sometimes I felt somewhat lonely in plenary. But at all events I am pleased that I managed to keep the Conference going in an exceptionally competitive atmosphere in Geneva, a period rich in attractions such as the visit to Munster and the meetings on non-proliferation, including the one organized by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan on behalf of the Bellerive group, which had great drawing power.

(The President)

During these 17 days in which I served as President, I had a particularly close view of Ambassador Donowaki's efforts to finalize the establishment of the ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. While I have taken an impartial position as President, and that will always be the case, I cannot remain neutral in the face of the delay in establishing an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban in this Conference. The setting up of such a committee is indispensable, and this must take place in the immediate future if there is to be symmetry in the work of this Conference. By that I mean that the intensive work that has been done in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons must also be balanced by similar efforts in dealing with the nuclear issues, particularly the question of the nuclear test ban, and also within an ad hoc committee. I am sure that the establishment of such an ad hoc committee will in the future strengthen the legitimacy of the Conference on Disarmament in promoting discussions on the nuclear test ban at a time when we are witnessing new and positive trends in nuclear and conventional disarmament and arms control, and, above all - I wish to stress this point - it would in the future prevent bitter discussions at the forthcoming conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Inflexibility in respect of setting up an ad hoc committee on item 1 would, I sincerely believe, create an unnecessary atmosphere of confrontation within the positive climate that now exists for the holding of the fourth conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I hope that common sense and a spirit of compromise will finally prevail, and that in the first week or two of July my successor Ambassador Sujka of Poland will be able to announce the setting up of the ad hoc committee which has been called for on so many occasions.

On Items 2 and 3 of our agenda, informal plenary meetings have been resumed to discuss elements of substance relating to two issues of the greatest interest. In this respect we would express a wish that, as requested by the Group of 21 in the first half of this year, the START negotiators will in the near future participate in these informal meetings so as to inform this Conference, off the record, of details of the START negotiations after the Washington summit.

On 14 and 15 June, at the kind invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, almost all the representatives accredited to the Conference on Disarmament visited the training and research centre at Munster, enabling us to acquaint ourselves on the spot with the various aspects and stages of the process of detection and destruction of chemical weapons, as well as the practical application of some verification methods. On behalf of my delegation and the Conference I wish to request Ambassador von Wagner to convey to his Government our gratitude for its kind hospitality and the excellent organization of that most useful visit.

As you know, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has also resumed its work under the capable guidance of Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden. With respect to this item I should mention in particular the meeting

(The President)

taking place currently with representatives of the chemical industry which is due to end tomorrow and which, I think, will be very useful in ascertaining the views of the private sector on the various aspects of the draft convention, for example the question of confidentiality.

Another subject which should be highlighted in these first few weeks of this second part of the 1990 session concerns the beginning of informal consultations on the question of the improved functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, under the chairmanship of my good friend and colleague, Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan. This is a major first step, the outcome of the clearly expressed wish and determination of all the members of this Conference, and it should therefore be followed by other steps to finalize gradually the agreements reached starting in 1991.

I think it is a positive sign of convergence that the programme of consultations submitted by Ambassador Kamal for our consideration has been accepted without objections. Thus in the first working session there was extensive analysis and exchange of ideas on various positions concerning expansion of the membership of the Conference. Interesting initiatives emerged which could serve as a basis for exploring new models or formulae that would lead us to a solution allowing for expansion, as all wish.

Last but not least, I am pleased to transfer the presidency of this Conference to the experienced hands of Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, who will be succeeding me. I wish him every success as he carries out his duties. I wish to thank the secretariat for its important and ongoing work in support of the President. In particular I wish to express my appreciation to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and to Ambassador Berasategui.

I see there is no other business, and I shall therefore proceed to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday 3 July at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.