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EDITORIAL NOTE

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook contains a review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament and taking place each year, together with a brief history of the major aspects of the over-all question. The series started with the 1976 edition.

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook makes no claim to present fully the views of States Members of the Organization, or even of the Powers directly concerned; for further information on the official positions of States the reader should consult the official records of the General Assembly and other sources.

For a more detailed account of the work of the Organization in previous years, the reader may consult *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1) and *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1).

ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	anti-ballistic missile
CCD	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
ENDC	Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
INFCE	International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
MIRV	multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

INTRODUCTION

THE PRESENT VOLUME IS THE THIRD in the series prepared each year by the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with the endorsement by the General Assembly, in its resolution 31/90 of 14 December 1976, of the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament.¹ As before, *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, volume 3: 1978, contains a descriptive review of the main developments and negotiations in the field of disarmament during the year.

The approach followed in the preparation of the 1978 volume has been to cover primarily the disarmament questions discussed by the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

The organization of the present volume, however, has been greatly influenced by the exceptional event of the year in the field of disarmament—the holding by the General Assembly of its tenth special session from 23 May to 30 June, which was the first devoted entirely to the subject of disarmament. Activities connected with the special session also influenced the consideration of disarmament in various bodies both before the session and following it. As a consequence of the importance of the special session, part one of the present volume, comprising three major chapters, is devoted to a rather detailed discussion of the activities directly connected with the session, and the text of the Final Document which the General Assembly adopted at the conclusion of the session is reproduced in appendix I. The remaining topical chapters contain sections summarizing the consideration of the General Assembly at its tenth special session of particular topics and the corresponding excerpts from the Final Document. They also contain brief historical introductions which indicate the status of the issues concerned as well as summaries of the consideration of those issues in various bodies during the year. While this structure involves some repetition, it also enables review by the reader of the major disarmament issues discussed during the year in relatively concise and self-contained chapters. To minimize the repetition, a number of the chapters contain cross-references. The present volume also contains for the first time, in appendix II, a review of recent actions taken regarding existing arms regulation and disarmament agreements. That review complements the information contained in the publication entitled *Status of Multilateral Arms Regu-*

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 36 (A/31/36)*, chap. II.

*lation and Disarmament Agreements*² by providing details of changes which occurred during 1978 subsequent to the writing of that publication. Future volumes of the Disarmament Yearbook will contain such an appendix covering the relevant calendar year.

With regard to activities occurring outside the aegis of the United Nations, the ongoing bilateral negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments are considered briefly in chapter VIII, and international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as related to the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons is considered in chapter XIII. In addition, certain outside conferences are mentioned in the topical chapters to the extent that those conferences took positions on the issues concerned.

As in previous years, the text was prepared mainly by the United Nations Secretariat. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency provided the text for chapter XV entitled "IAEA safeguards" and the United Nations Environment Programme provided the information on its activities related to disarmament which is contained in appendix III. Summaries of the activities of the specialized agencies of the United Nations related to disarmament were provided by the agencies themselves—the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Health Organization and the World Meteorological Organization—and are reproduced in appendices IV, V, VI and VII, respectively. Appendix X contains a list of the disarmament and disarmament-related resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, in 1978.

² United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78. IX.2; issued as a special supplement to *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4).

PART ONE

**Special session of the General Assembly
devoted to disarmament**

Preparatory work for the special session

Introduction

THE PROPOSAL FOR HOLDING A SPECIAL SESSION OF the General Assembly devoted to disarmament dates back to the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961. That Conference,¹ in its declaration, recommended that the General Assembly should adopt a decision on convening either a special session or a world disarmament conference with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament. The proposal was reiterated on numerous subsequent occasions, including the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in 1976, which, in its Political Declaration,² recommended that the non-aligned countries, pending the convening of a world disarmament conference, should request the convening of a special session of the General Assembly. Subsequently, at the initiative of the non-aligned countries, with widespread support from other Member States, the General Assembly at its thirty-first session on 21 December 1976 adopted without a vote resolution 31/189 B, which provided for the holding of a special session devoted to disarmament in May/June 1978. The resolution also established a Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament consisting of 54 Member States, and invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the questions relating to the special session.

During the year 1977 the Preparatory Committee held one organizational session from 28 to 30 March and two substantive sessions from 9 to 20 May and from 31 August to 9 September. It reported on the work of those three sessions to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly later that year.

With regard to organizational matters pertaining to its own work, the Committee agreed to be governed by the relevant parts of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly with a general understanding, reached during prior consultations, that every effort should be made to ensure that, as far as possible, decisions on matters of substance would be adopted by consensus. It

¹ For an extract from the Declaration, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. III, document A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1.

² See A/31/197.

also decided that States which were not members of the Committee could participate in its work, without the right to vote. In addition, provision was made for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to be represented at meetings of the Committee and for the dissemination of communications from those organizations. The Committee also agreed to recommend to the General Assembly that it should approve the holding of additional sessions of the Committee in 1978 which would be devoted to working out the draft principal document—or documents—of the special session.

Concerning the organization of the special session, the Committee devoted particular attention to the questions of the agenda and the rules of procedure. After thorough exchanges of views and taking into consideration the replies of Member States addressed to the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 31/189 B, the Committee agreed to recommend to the General Assembly a draft provisional agenda, the substantive parts of which read as follows:

8. General debate

9. Review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament, the continuation of the arms race and the close interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security and economic development

10. Adoption of a declaration on disarmament

11. Adoption of a programme of action on disarmament

12. Review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament, including, in particular, the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

With regard to the rules of procedure, the Committee recommended to the General Assembly that the same principle governing the Committee's work should apply to the special session, that is, that the rules of procedure of the General Assembly should be observed on the understanding that, regarding decisions on matters of substance, every effort should be made to ensure that they be adopted by consensus.

The Committee also made a number of other recommendations to the General Assembly pertaining to the organization of the special session, including the recommendation that the session should be convened in New York between 23 May and 28 June 1978.

In the course of its 1977 sessions the Preparatory Committee had before it the replies of Member States to the Secretary-General containing their views pursuant to resolution 31/189 B, as well as a number of working papers submitted by members of the Committee further elaborating ideas which, in their view, should be reflected in the documents of the special session. While the Committee did not deal with the substance of the proposals, it was able to reach consensus, in principle, that the main document or documents of the session should contain the following four sections: (a) introduction or preamble; (b) declaration on disarmament; (c) programme of action; and (d) machinery for disarmament negotiations. The Committee also noted that there was a growing trend among its members in favour of one final document.

The decisions and recommendations of the Committee were contained in its report to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, which the Committee adopted unanimously on 9 September.³

The holding of the special session was also discussed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in the course of its 1977 session. There was general support by its members for the session. Many of them also stressed the need to achieve tangible results in the work of the CCD as a contribution to the success of the special session. Some States, notably those of Eastern Europe, while supporting the special session, expressed the view that it should be a stage in the preparation of a world disarmament conference.

The General Assembly, at its thirty-second session, devoted a great deal of attention to the special session in general and to the report of the Preparatory Committee in particular. It was widely felt that the decision to convene the session was timely, since the arms race was continuing unabated. Many Member States also felt that the session would provide an opportunity to consider the entire range of urgent disarmament problems, thus generating new momentum for disarmament efforts. However, it was pointed out by many States that the session could be successful only on the basis of the concerted efforts of all. Eastern European and several non-aligned States again expressed the hope that the special session would lead to a world disarmament conference.

The report of the Preparatory Committee with the recommendations contained therein was endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 32/88 A and B adopted by consensus on 12 December 1977. Resolution 32/88 B also requested the Preparatory Committee to continue its work on preparation of a draft final document or documents for the special session.

Work of the Preparatory Committee, 1978

Pursuant to resolution 32/88 B, the Preparatory Committee held two substantive sessions, one from 24 January to 24 February, and the other from 4 to 21 April. In accordance with a decision taken during the last two sessions of the previous year, the Committee held formal meetings as well as a number of informal meetings as a working group.

In the course of the Committee's work a number of individual States and groups of States submitted additional working papers elaborating in greater detail elements of various sections of the document or documents of the special session. Those papers, together with the papers previously submitted, formed the basis of the Committee's work at its last two sessions. With the exception of several remaining questions pertaining to the organization of the work of the special session, which also had to be dealt with at that time, the sessions were entirely concerned with the substantive issue of preparing the draft final document or documents.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 41 (A/32/41 and Corr.1).*

The various papers before the Committee, as well as the statements made by Member States participating in the work of the Preparatory Committee, had one theme in common: they emphasized the need for a comprehensive approach to the question of disarmament. That in itself was seen as a step forward in the consideration of disarmament matters and greatly facilitated the task of the Committee. However, the Committee still had a long way to go in harmonizing the positions of the delegations on a number of key issues.

Those positions are reviewed in the following summarization of the papers submitted, first of the papers covering major aspects of the draft final document presented by groups and then by individual States in alphabetical order, then of those on more specific questions, also arranged by groups and by single States, the latter again arranged alphabetically. Subsequently the positions set out in a number of the papers are reflected in the subsection entitled "Draft final document" below.

Papers on major sections of the draft final document

The non-aligned members of the Committee outlined their views and positions on major issues in two working papers.⁴ The first of the two papers contained only preliminary ideas concerning the contents of the various sections of the final document or documents, while the other presented a complete draft of the declaration on disarmament, the programme of action and machinery for implementation. The approach of the non-aligned countries reflected in those documents rested on five basic ideas concerning the existing situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament, as they saw it: (a) disarmament negotiations within the framework of the United Nations as well as the regional and bilateral negotiations had not produced the expected results in most cases; (b) contradictions between the urgent necessity to curb the arms race and the standstill in disarmament efforts were felt to be increasingly intolerable; (c) expenditure, particularly on the development of new and more sophisticated weapon systems, was spiralling; (d) the continuation of the arms race posed a direct threat to international peace and security and slackened economic and social development; and (e) the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament must be strengthened. Thus, the draft declaration emphasized that general and complete disarmament remained the ultimate goal of the international community and that progress towards its realization would require agreements on genuine measures of disarmament, the first priority of which should be the outlawing of nuclear war and the elimination of nuclear weapons, followed by measures relating to all types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the regulation of conventional weapons in the context of general and complete disarmament. The draft noted that other measures, such as confidence building, could also play an important role in achieving disarmament. It also pointed to the link between disarmament and

⁴ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1), vol. IV, documents A/AC.187/55 and A/AC.187/55/Add.1 and Corr.1 and 2.

international peace and security on the one hand, and disarmament and development on the other.

In view of all this, the draft declaration enumerated certain basic principles which should guide disarmament negotiations in the future, thus facilitating the attainment of the goals set forth in the programme of action. Particular emphasis was placed, as a general principle, on the right and duty of all States to contribute to disarmament efforts and to participate in disarmament negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States having the primary responsibility for halting and reversing the arms race. Another general principle stressed the primary role and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The third general principle spoke of verification as an indispensable part of disarmament measures. The other principles dealt with more specific aspects of the disarmament process. They called for the adoption of disarmament measures in a balanced manner, both quantitatively and qualitatively, so that no State or group of States would obtain advantage over others. They insisted that a mutually acceptable balance of rights and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed and, in that connexion, that measures of disarmament should not hamper the exercise of the right of all States to develop or to acquire without discrimination nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Nuclear-weapon States were also called upon to undertake to respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace. Finally, one of the principles stated that a substantial part of the resources released as a result of disarmament measures should be primarily devoted to social and economic development, particularly that of the developing countries.

The draft programme of action further spelled out the order of priorities set forth in the draft declaration and provided for specific measures to be carried out in each area. For example, in the area of nuclear weapons, which headed the list of priorities, the measures envisaged were actually designed to provide, in the first place, for the immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, to be followed by gradual reduction of nuclear weapons, leading in the final stage to their complete elimination. The draft specified at length those measures which were urgently required for the initiation of that process. They included, *inter alia*, renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, renunciation and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against States which had no nuclear weapons and the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes. They called also for the complete ban of nuclear-weapon tests, the freezing of the quantitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and the cessation of research and development on new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance. Concerning the next priority area—other weapons of mass destruction—the draft called for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, as well as for the comprehensive prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Another priority referred to in the draft was the urgent need of reaching agreement on the regulation of both incendiary weapons and other specific

conventional weapons with especially inhumane effects. In the draft, the area of conventional weapons was approached in much the same way as was the nuclear field: first, the prohibition of the development, production and deployment of new types of conventional weapons and new systems of such weapons, which would then be followed by the limitation and gradual reduction of conventional weapons on a global basis in the context of general and complete disarmament. It would also include the reduction of the armed forces of States. Regarding priority measures, the draft particularly pointed out that their implementation should lead to general and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal of all disarmament efforts, and that negotiations to that end should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. In view of this, the document called for urgent elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures, proposing that the task should be entrusted to a special committee of the United Nations to be established for the purpose. In addition, the draft recognized the importance of confidence-building measures. To that end, it called upon States strictly to observe the principle of non-use of force or threat of force as a means of creating a climate of confidence, and suggested that this should be accompanied by measures such as the prohibition of the establishment of new foreign military bases and of stationing of troops in foreign territories, the withdrawal of troops and dismantling of existing foreign bases and the freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets of States.

The third section of the paper dealt with machinery for disarmament negotiations. It was based on the conviction that the United Nations had and should continue to have a primary role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Consequently, the paper emphasized that the General Assembly would remain the main political decision-making organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament responsible for monitoring the implementation of disarmament measures. It also insisted on the establishment of an organic link between the General Assembly and the negotiating body—the CCD—suggesting at the same time a number of specific measures designed to improve that body and to make its membership more representative by providing for the participation in its work of a larger number of States, including all nuclear-weapon States.

The Eastern European States members of the Preparatory Committee—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and USSR—also submitted their proposals for the final document or documents of the special session. One working paper contained the basic provisions of the declaration on disarmament,⁵ while the other one concerned basic provisions of the programme of action on disarmament.⁶

The working paper on the declaration pointed to the grave danger of continuing the arms race and to the need of achieving disarmament. It stated that the actions of the enemies of détente and the interests of the military-industrial complex were pushing mankind into a dangerous and destructive

⁵ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1), vol. V, document A/AC.187/81.

⁶ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/82.

arms spiral involving an enormous waste of resources that could be used to advance human well-being. There was, therefore, an urgent need to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament. It was further noted that in spite of the actions of the anti-disarmament forces it had been possible in the past few years to achieve a positive movement in the development of international relations towards détente, thus establishing favourable conditions for successful negotiations on disarmament. In the opinion of the sponsors, the recently concluded agreements provided tangible proof that it was possible to solve the problem of disarmament. In that connexion the document recalled several agreements which had been achieved as well as various proposals of the socialist community that required translation into practical terms.

The paper then dealt with the fundamental provisions and principles that should form the basis of negotiations and decisions on curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. After having stated that the relaxation of international tensions and the resulting positive political processes could be truly stable only if accompanied by measures of military détente, the document referred to general and complete disarmament as the principal, ultimate objective of States' efforts in the field of disarmament. It further noted that specific partial measures for limiting the arms race, reducing armaments and achieving disarmament could play an important role as stages on the way to general and complete disarmament. The document also stated that in order to prevent a continuing arms race it was essential, on the one hand, to put an end to qualitative improvements of arms and, on the other, to involve in the disarmament negotiations and agreements the largest possible number of States, particularly nuclear Powers and militarily major States. It was also stressed that measures to curb the arms race should not impair the interests of any of the parties to an agreement, and that disarmament agreements must provide for effective verification. In addition, it was pointed out that the universal acceptance of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations was extremely important for ensuring favourable conditions for curbing the arms race. Finally, one principle stated that the resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used to promote human well-being and the economic and social progress of the developing States.

The second working paper, which dealt with the programme of action, set forth principal areas in which appropriate international agreements should be sought. Concerning nuclear disarmament, the document defined the following areas: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; (b) measures to avert the danger of nuclear war; (c) complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; (d) consolidation of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and (e) the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. With regard to other weapons of mass destruction, the document envisaged the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, and the prohibition of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Concerning conventional armaments, it called for limitation and reduction of armed forces and weapons. There should also be reduction of military budgets. The document also recommended complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, as well as regional measures of military détente and disarmament.

The paper stated that, on the whole, the existing machinery for disarmament negotiations—multilateral, bilateral and regional—was suited to the scope and nature of the varied problems of disarmament and, therefore, those types of negotiations should be utilized further in order to reach the necessary international agreements. In order to achieve a breakthrough in solving the problem of disarmament the document proposed that a world disarmament conference should be convened as the broadest and most authoritative international forum for considering disarmament problems. It was pointed out that that forum could consider with expertise and in sufficient depth the totality of disarmament questions and, if properly organized, could work out specific effective measures aimed at curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament. The document also proposed the setting up of a preparatory committee for practical preparation of the conference, as well as determination of the date when it should be convened.

In the course of the Preparatory Committee's work, groups of Western countries submitted three working papers dealing with various sections of the final document or documents of the special session. The first, sponsored by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,⁷ contained a draft declaration on disarmament and consisted of five parts.

After the introduction, the part dealing with general objectives stated that the ultimate goal of disarmament negotiations was to ensure the survival of mankind and the elimination of the possibility of war, and proposed, to that end, that agreement should be reached on a comprehensive and integrated programme of action which should ensure that disarmament would be general and complete under effective international control and would be accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Charter. As a further goal, the draft stressed the need to release resources in order to facilitate efforts to attain a more just world order that would eliminate present inequalities and ensure that a significant portion of the resources freed by disarmament would be devoted to the economic and social needs of humanity, particularly in developing countries.

The third and fourth parts concerned, respectively, principles governing relations among States and principles governing disarmament negotiations, stressing, with regard to the latter, the importance of securing the active participation and support of all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, and of other militarily significant States, for disarmament negotiations and the need of applying the principle of consensus in the conduct of negotiations about measures and, wherever possible, the terms of any agreements adopted. Other principles stated that all measures of disarmament should be balanced, which implied the gradual reduction of manpower and armaments to agreed

⁷ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/87.

levels and that progress in the arms control and disarmament field depended upon agreement on effective methods of verification.

The fifth part of the draft declaration described general measures of disarmament and priorities. It stated that multilateral disarmament measures dealing with specific issues should be undertaken as soon as possible and referred to some of the problems and measures within the three different areas of immediate concern—nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. With regard to nuclear weapons and non-proliferation, it was pointed out, *inter alia*, that nuclear-weapon Powers and other militarily significant States had particular responsibilities for the achievement of effective disarmament measures, and that efforts to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race must include measures to prevent horizontal and vertical proliferation, as only progress in both areas could enhance international security. In that connexion, it was stated that partial agreements on nuclear arms control and, in particular, universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty could make a vital contribution to progress towards that goal. It was further noted that States should ensure the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation, as a minimum, by the application of internationally agreed controls to international transfers of nuclear material, equipment and technology. Concerning chemical weapons, the draft considered the prohibition and elimination of those weapons and of all other weapons of mass destruction, including any future weapons based on new scientific principles, to be of great importance. In the area of conventional weapons, references were made to the increasing build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world and the need to bring under control the unabated international transfers of such weapons. Reduction of military budgets in all countries was also included among measures which could help reduce international tensions and lead eventually to the release of resources for economic and social development.

The second working paper,⁸ submitted by the same group of Western countries with the exception of Turkey, dealt with a draft programme of action and was intended to give practical effect to the principles set down in the declaration on disarmament. The programme was designed with a view to giving priority to negotiations which could be completed over the following few years, but it also set out concurrent measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress towards general and complete disarmament.

In the first category of immediate measures of arms control and disarmament, specific proposals were made in each of three different areas. In the nuclear field the emphasis was placed, as the central objective, on preventing both horizontal and vertical proliferation. This would be achieved by (a) the halting and the reversal of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the nuclear arms race, especially by the second SALT agreement, (b) the earliest conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions, (c) further measures to develop an international consensus on the strengthen-

⁸ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1), vol. VI, document A/AC.187/96.

ing and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, based primarily on adherence of all States to the non-proliferation Treaty and on the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and (d) the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones suitable to specific conditions in the regions concerned. In addition, nuclear-weapon States should provide assurances, as appropriate, designed to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack. In the area of other weapons of mass destruction, the measures proposed included the regulation of chemical and radiological weapons and a continuing review of the question of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles. With regard to conventional weapons and armed forces, the draft proposed placing restrictions on the production, transfer and acquisition of conventional weapons, regulation of the future use in armed conflicts of certain conventional weapons which might be indiscriminate or cause unnecessary suffering, as well as measures on a regional basis for strengthening peace and security.

Since realization of the proposed measures required a degree of mutual confidence, the sponsors of the document proposed also a number of steps to be undertaken by the States Members of the United Nations, in order to strengthen international confidence and deepen the dialogue between bodies involved in defence matters in different countries. In addition, the document requested the Secretary-General to carry out several studies covering various aspects of the arms race and disarmament.

The third document,⁹ with somewhat different sponsors—Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, New Zealand, Norway and United Kingdom—dealt with the international machinery for disarmament. It recommended some steps which the sponsors were convinced would correct certain shortcomings in the existing disarmament machinery, both within and outside the United Nations, thus further facilitating the disarmament process. Concerning the role of the United Nations, the document underlined the need for the General Assembly to continue to be a deliberating body and in order to enhance its effectiveness suggested certain changes in the agenda of the First Committee. With regard to negotiating machinery, the sponsors maintained that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to exercise its function as the principle multilateral negotiating body. There would be no change in the CCD's consensus procedure, but the sponsors suggested that its structure, procedures and functions should be improved so as to provide for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in its work, to encourage further participation of non-nuclear-weapon States by a limited increase in its size and by other arrangements, and to strengthen the link between the Committee and the United Nations. One section of the document dealt also with the role of the United Nations Secretariat, suggesting that it should be strengthened.

A paper submitted by France¹⁰ referred to all three main sections of the draft final document or documents. Thus, with regard to the declaration on

⁹ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/103.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/105.

disarmament, France believed that it should clearly spell out the idea, based on existing world realities, that while the principles of disarmament were everywhere the same, their practical application should be adapted to the diversity of specific situations and variety of regional contexts. Concerning the programme of action, France made three specific proposals. One was on the establishment of an observation satellite agency. In that connexion, France pointed out that at present two countries had military observation satellites which provided them with information gathered in the territory of all other States. If information useful for the strengthening of security and trust were placed at the disposal of the interested States that would in itself facilitate the international disarmament effort. The agency, with the various modalities of its operation to be agreed upon by consensus by the international community, would be directly responsible to the United Nations and would have as its task the collection, organization and dissemination of data obtained by satellite in fields directly affecting security and the control of disarmament agreements. The second proposal concerned the establishment of an international fund for disarmament and development and was motivated by the unacceptable disproportion between the sums allocated for expenditure on armaments and the sums devoted to aid to developing countries. According to the proposal the fund would be financed, at first, by voluntary contributions primarily from the nuclear-weapon Powers and other developed and militarily significant States, and at a later stage contributions would be counted in the 0.7 per cent of the gross national product fixed as the target for aid to development. The third proposal referred to the establishment of an international institute for research on disarmament responsible to the United Nations whose purpose would be to make available to the international community technical studies on problems of disarmament. Finally, with regard to disarmament machinery, France made a proposal for reforms of both the deliberative and negotiating bodies. The objective of those reforms was to reaffirm the authority and responsibility of the United Nations and, in addition, to enable all the members of the international community to take part in the general debates on disarmament. To that end, France considered that the deliberative functions would best be carried out by the First Committee sitting as a Disarmament Commission, and the negotiating functions by a new negotiating body, which could be called the Disarmament Committee, which would replace the CCD and be responsible to the Disarmament Commission.

The first of the two papers submitted by Italy¹¹ contained suggestions for a disarmament programme. The first part of the document dealt with general objectives and principles. It noted that future negotiations should combine consideration of general and complete disarmament and adoption of specific measures since the two were closely linked. The document further stated that support of all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, which bear a special responsibility in the disarmament process, was needed. One of the principles also stated that effective verification methods were an essential part of disarmament measures. The second part of the working paper contained the main elements of the disarmament

¹¹ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/97.

programme. With regard to nuclear weapons, Italy proposed the inclusion of the following measures: (a) conclusion, as a measure of the highest priority, of a comprehensive nuclear test ban; (b) limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; (c) cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; (d) strengthening of the non-proliferation régime; and (e) the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Concerning other weapons of mass destruction, the document urged early conclusion of an agreement on chemical weapons and called for efforts to be made to reach agreement on radiological weapons and new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles. In the area of conventional weapons, the document proposed that limitation and reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces should be negotiated in parallel with nuclear disarmament progress as part of a balanced comprehensive programme. There should also be restraints on the transfer of conventional arms, and agreement should be sought, on the basis of consensus, on the prohibition or limitation of use of certain specific conventional weapons. The third part of the document dealt with the strengthening of international peace and security.

The second paper tabled by Italy¹² dealt with the international mechanisms for disarmament. Italy considered that the General Assembly was the most appropriate forum for the consideration, on a universal basis, of the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. The task would be normally carried out through the First Committee but *ad hoc* committees could also be set up to deal with issues deserving special consideration. In due course, a further special session might be convened for the purpose of appraising the implementation of the Programme of Action, identifying guidelines for the next sequence of negotiations and considering and possibly adopting a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In addition to the functions of the General Assembly, the paper suggested that consideration should be given to the contribution which the Security Council could make to disarmament progress, *inter alia*, by establishing subsidiary organs for specific disarmament purposes. Concerning the negotiating body, Italy maintained that because of their very complex nature, effective multilateral disarmament negotiations could be undertaken only within a body of limited dimensions operating by consensus. In that perspective, Italy suggested that the CCD should continue to function as the main negotiating body, noting, however, that a recommendation might be made to it to review its structures and methods of work, including a limited increase in its membership and means to make it possible, under appropriate circumstances, for other States to participate in the discussions. Italy also considered that the association of other nuclear-weapon States in the work of the CCD would enhance its role. In a separate section of the paper, Italy proposed that the United Nations should also consider the establishment of a permanent international organ for verification of disarmament measures. Finally, the paper suggested that the organization and functioning of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be improved to enable it to carry out studies and research on specific disarma-

¹² *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/110.

ment issues requiring clarification, and provide broader information and stimulate a greater international public awareness of disarmament problems.

The working paper submitted by Mauritius¹³ contained elements to be included in the Declaration on Disarmament. Stating that disarmament should be approached in a comprehensive manner, the document set out several principles which should guide disarmament negotiations. The principles, *inter alia*, referred to the need of giving the highest priority to nuclear disarmament, the participation of all States in negotiations on the basis of full equality, and the responsibilities of all nuclear-weapon States and other major military powers for the containment of the nuclear arms race. One of the principles emphasized a central role of the United Nations in keeping the public informed of the situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament and, in turn, that the United Nations should be kept informed of all unilateral, bilateral or multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament. The document also listed a number of principles relevant to the disarmament process itself. Those principles, *inter alia*, emphasized that the disarmament agreements concluded so far should become universal and the obligations arising from them be fulfilled by all parties; that the disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence and in a balanced manner; and that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. It proposed, among other measures, that the General Assembly should review every three years the comprehensive programme and revise it as warranted.

Another member of the Committee—Mexico—submitted its views in two working papers. The first one¹⁴ dealt only with some fundamental principles and norms for possible inclusion in the declaration on disarmament; the second paper¹⁵ presented an outline of a draft final document. The introductory note accompanying the second working paper provided a detailed explanation of the fundamental concepts contained in the first, while the addendum to the second working paper comprised examples of short-term measures.

The draft declaration on disarmament, envisaged as a statement of the fundamental principles underlying the programme of action, listed as an example two principles which seemed to be generally acceptable: first, that all the peoples of the world had a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and, secondly, that general and complete disarmament under effective international control should be the final objective of mankind. With regard to other more sensitive principles, Mexico pointed out that they should be formulated on the basis of the various proposals tabled in the Preparatory Committee and, in that connexion, mentioned that its first paper enumerated some 25 principles and norms. Several of them dealt with priorities in disarmament efforts, according the highest priority to measures of nuclear

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. IV, document A/AC.186/60.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/56.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. V, document A/AC.187/89 and Add. 1.

disarmament, followed by measures with regard to other weapons of mass destruction and for the regulation of the international transfer of conventional weapons. Some others were of a more general nature stating, for example, that the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in a balanced manner, and that international verification constituted an indispensable aspect of many of such measures. A number of the principles referred in particular to nuclear problems. They pointed out, for example, that there should be an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, that the proliferation of nuclear weapons could endanger the security of all States, that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace constituted one of the most effective disarmament measures within the reach of those States which did not possess nuclear weapons, and that access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes constituted an inalienable right of all States. Several principles dealt with economic and social aspects of the arms race. Thus, it was noted that a considerable part of the resources freed by the adoption of disarmament measures should be devoted mainly to the promotion of the economic and social development of the developing countries. In that connexion, one principle referred to a close relationship between disarmament and international peace and security, on the one hand, and disarmament and development on the other. One of the principles also pointed to a primary role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament and further principles stated that the deliberative machinery should be reinforced and the organization and procedures of the CCD subject to the modifications deemed appropriate for the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States. The last two principles referred to the role of world public opinion and non-governmental organizations.

The basic concept of the draft outline was to put immediate emphasis on short-term measures, while a comprehensive programme of disarmament would be worked out in the meantime and implemented afterwards. The short-term measures would be chosen from among the most urgent and meaningful issues which might realistically and objectively be considered susceptible of being successfully implemented during a three-year period. The actual selection and enumeration of specific measures that would form the three-year disarmament plan were left to be determined by the Committee. The draft, however, included provisions which would enable the General Assembly to review the manner in which the plan was to be carried out and to make any appropriate recommendations resulting from that review. In order to stress the transitional nature of the plan, the programme entrusted the CCD with the task of the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament became a reality. The comprehensive programme would have to be completed in time for the second special session, proposed to be convened in May 1981, the main objective of which would be to consider and adopt that programme. The last section of the draft outline, entitled "Guidelines for disarmament negotiations", contained examples of some measures that would facilitate disarmament efforts. In that connexion it was stressed that, for maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies were required for disarmament negotiations—deliberative and negotiating—the

former function being entrusted to the General Assembly and the latter to the CCD. Specific measures and reforms were suggested in order to increase the effectiveness of the latter body and, in particular, to enable the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in its work.

The draft declaration on disarmament proposed by Pakistan,¹⁶ in its introductory part, pointed to the marginal and negligible progress achieved so far in disarmament negotiations within and outside the United Nations and stated that the efforts of the great Powers, especially the two major nuclear Powers, to maintain a strategic balance were the greatest stimulus to the global arms race. The draft declared, *inter alia*, that nuclear weapons posed the most immediate and all-pervasive threat to peace and security and to the survival of mankind and that nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace were effective instruments for preventing proliferation, which, however, should not jeopardize the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Concerning conventional weapons, it was stated that reduction of outstanding disputes would greatly facilitate their progressive and balanced reduction. Finally, the draft declared that the United Nations had the primary responsibility to promote general and complete disarmament and to oversee, monitor, facilitate and encourage all measures—unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral—in the field. The last part of the draft declaration listed a number of goals and principles which should guide all disarmament efforts. One principle noted that partial measures would be productive only if they were an integral and sequential part of measures aimed at general and complete disarmament, while others spoke of verification as an essential component of disarmament agreements, the need that the disarmament process be balanced, and the responsibility of nuclear-weapon Powers and other militarily significant States. The use of nuclear weapons was described as indefensible, and their prohibition and elimination, including other weapons of mass destruction, as a matter of first priority. The need for security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was emphasized and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace was seen as one of the most effective disarmament measures. In the latter connexion, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to undertake binding obligations to respect the status of such zones. In addition, one principle spoke of the rights of States with regard to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The last three principles referred to restraints and progressive reduction of conventional arms and armed forces, beginning with major Powers and other militarily significant States, a balanced and equitable reduction in the arms expenditures and armaments of States, and the use of the financial savings and human and material resources made available through disarmament for the promotion of economic and social development, especially in the developing countries.

The other working paper submitted by Pakistan¹⁷ contained a draft programme of action on disarmament. It envisaged several distinct areas within

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/91.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/92.

which various agreements would be pursued. The first concerned prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States were urged, first, to give security assurances to the non-nuclear Powers and to States comprising nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace and, then, to initiate negotiations for an agreement on the total prohibition of the use or threat of use of all nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The second area dealt with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and prohibition of their qualitative development. The next two areas concerned the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the promotion of nuclear technology for economic development, especially of developing countries. With regard to the former, the document urged that all facilities not presently subject to IAEA safeguards should be brought under international inspection and control and requested that international safeguards by IAEA should be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis. In the latter area the draft called for the adoption of an international programme, under United Nations auspices, for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology in accordance with principles to be approved by the General Assembly. In another two areas, on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and on the creation of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions, a number of specific measures and steps were elaborated that would enhance the possibility of realization of those objectives.

The three working papers submitted by Romania dealt separately with a declaration on disarmament,¹⁸ a programme of measures and action,¹⁹ and negotiating machinery for disarmament problems,²⁰ which closely corresponded to the sections of the final document or documents as recommended by the Preparatory Committee in its 1977 Report.

The draft declaration on disarmament contained both an assessment of the current arms race and its consequences on the world situation, and the guidelines and principles which should be observed in order to attain practical results in the field of disarmament.

The draft programme of measures and action listed various aspects of the arms race which should be urgently checked. It also formulated specific steps, in order of their priority, which should be undertaken with the view to realizing that task. The draft programme, in the first place, called for the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which should be carried on without interruption in a forum especially designated for that purpose, preferably within the framework of the Disarmament Commission. With regard to nuclear disarmament, the second area of concern, the draft provided for the measures designed first to strengthen security of States and increase their mutual confidence and, then, to curb the nuclear arms race and lead to the achievement of nuclear disarmament which would guarantee unlimited rights and opportunities for all States to make peaceful use of nuclear energy

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/77.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/78.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/79.

on an equal basis and without discrimination. Concerning the third area of priority—other weapons of mass destruction—the draft envisaged, on the one hand, prohibition of research, planning and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including total prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. In the area of collateral measures, listed in the fourth place, the draft programme called, *inter alia*, for a freeze on and gradual reduction of military budgets, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the dissolution of military blocs. Finally, the draft pointed out that all measures must be subject to suitable control and be made an organic part of the programme for implementing the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The working paper on the negotiating machinery for disarmament problems was drafted with two basic premises in mind: first, that the existing machinery, in spite of all the efforts made, had failed to produce tangible results; and, second, that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament should be strengthened if effective results were to be achieved. In view of this, the draft envisaged various functions for the General Assembly which included examination of all the problems of disarmament, adoption of decisions, resolutions and recommendations on disarmament questions, taking decisions on the establishment of negotiating forums, co-ordination of their activities and examination of their reports, including examination of the draft treaties prepared in different negotiating forums and their finalization. The General Assembly would carry out these tasks through the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and other subsidiary bodies whose agenda and priorities would have to be clearly defined. The Disarmament Commission, in addition to negotiating the disarmament problems entrusted to it by the General Assembly, would also exercise supervisory functions with respect to the implementation of international agreements in the field. In conclusion, the draft pointed out that within the framework of the negotiating machinery a decision could also be adopted concerning the convening of a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States.

The Swedish working paper²¹ did not contain drafts of entire sections of the final document or documents but rather elements to be included in two of them—the programme of action and the machinery for disarmament negotiations. Sweden felt that in order to maintain the momentum generated by the special session it was essential both to agree on a series of specific measures to be implemented within a relatively short period of time and to secure an effective follow-up of the session. Thus, with regard to the programme of action, Sweden proposed that the General Assembly should decide to convene a second special session and establish a preparatory committee for that purpose. Concerning specific measures of the programme of action, Sweden attached particular importance to nuclear disarmament. In its opinion the General Assembly should urge negotiations concerning measures aimed at the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons. Those measures would com-

²¹ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1), vol. VI, document A/AC.187/95.

prise freezing of the qualitative improvements, cessation of the research and development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance, cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems. Sweden also proposed that the Secretary-General should be requested, *inter alia*, to initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development on the one hand, and to organize a pilot test of a system for the reporting of military expenditures by States on the other. Finally, the General Assembly would, according to the Swedish proposal, recommend that the 1979 United Nations Conference on specific conventional weapons should seek agreement on the prohibition and restriction of use of such weapons as those whose primary effect was to injure by fragments not detectable by x-ray, incendiaries, land-mines and bobby-traps, certain small calibre projectiles and certain blast and fragmentation weapons. As far as the machinery was concerned, the proposal dealt with certain changes in the CCD which would provide for some form of participation in its work by non-member States, replace the co-chairmanship by a bureau of four members and introduce rotating chairmanship among all members of the Committee.

Papers on specific questions

A proposal for a study on disarmament and development²² was submitted at an early stage of the Committee's work by the Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The proposal was reflected in the Committee's report for 1977 with the recommendation that the General Assembly should initiate the proposed study (see also chapter XXIV below).

The working paper presented by Australia, Austria, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Venezuela²³ dealt with one specific measure of the programme of action: a comprehensive test ban treaty. Its submission was prompted by the feeling of the sponsors that the expectations expressed by the General Assembly that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban would be a major step towards controlling the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the opening of a treaty for signature at the special session would generate maximum pressure for its ratification, as had been reflected in resolution 32/78, were not sufficiently taken care of in any of the formulations of the programme of action submitted to the Committee as of that date. The proposed formulation, instead of implying that mere agreement on the text of a comprehensive test ban treaty was one of the objectives to be attained within the time-frame of the programme, insisted rather that the declared objective should be the ratification of a treaty by the maximum number of States and its entry into force at the earliest possible date.

²² *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. V, document A/AC.187/80.

²³ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. VI, document A/AC.187/102.

Another working paper dealt with the question of the disarmament machinery. The paper, submitted by the so-called group of 15 of the CCD,²⁴ concerned the organization and procedures of that negotiating body. The modifications which, according to that group, deserved the highest priority included: (a) strengthening of the existing link between the CCD and the General Assembly (for that purpose all Member States would have to be able to submit proposals on measures which were the subject of negotiations and participate in the proceedings, and that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Centre for Disarmament be assigned appropriate enhanced roles); (b) replacement of the system of co-chairmanship by a system to be agreed upon (for illustrative purposes, two proposals put forward were, first, rotation among all non-nuclear-weapon States members of the CCD and, secondly, the establishment of a bureau of four members to replace the co-chairmanship, two of which would be from the group of non-aligned and neutral States and the other two from States belonging to the military blocs, while the chairmanship of meetings would rotate on a monthly or sessional basis among all members); (c) adoption by the CCD of its own rules of procedure; (d) examination of relevant procedures to improve the effectiveness of the CCD including, *inter alia*, the establishment of a standby sub-committee of the whole; and (e) free access of the public to the plenary meetings.

The working paper submitted by Austria²⁵ dealt with the question of verification. In presenting its paper Austria pointed out that the successful implementation of arms limitation or disarmament agreements depended on the degree of confidence of each party that all other parties were complying with the agreement, and consequently that verification played an important role in the disarmament process.

Austria proposed, as a first step in arriving at some agreed understanding on an approach to verification, that the Secretariat might prepare a background paper which would help to pinpoint different problem areas and possible ways of approaching them. At the same time, it proposed specific formulations concerning the question of verification to be included in the draft declaration and the draft programme of action respectively. The former, *inter alia*, pointed out the importance of verification and insisted that, for each disarmament or arms limitation proposal, measures of verification, alone or in combination, should be devised in accordance with the requirement for a sufficient degree of confidence between the parties, while the latter requested the Secretary-General to carry out an in-depth study on all aspects of verification and control of arms limitation and disarmament measures. The requested background paper²⁶ was prepared by the Secretariat and presented to the Committee in the course of its last session.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/107. The 15 were: Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

²⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/101.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/109.

Another proposal, put forward by Japan,²⁷ concerned the conventional arms race including, in particular, the international transfer of conventional arms and mutual limitation of conventional armaments and armed forces on the regional level. In submitting its proposal, Japan pointed out that the international community was witnessing an increase in the arms build-up in many parts of the world, to which the growing international transfer of conventional arms was one of the major contributors, and noted that four fifths of the world's military expenditure was now being devoted to conventional armaments. Recognizing that nuclear disarmament should have the highest priority, Japan stated that it was, however, also evident that the goal of general and complete disarmament could not be achieved without curbing the conventional arms race. Accordingly, Japan proposed two lines of action: one, that principles emphasizing the relevance and importance of conventional arms control and disarmament be recognized in a declaration on disarmament for which Japan made specific suggestions; and the other, that in order to give effect to the principles, specific measures should be incorporated within the framework of the programme of action on disarmament. As initial and preliminary steps a qualified group of experts would prepare comprehensive studies of conventional arms control and disarmament from all aspects which would, *inter alia*, examine the international transfer of conventional weapons and the possibility of mutual limitation of the level and type of conventional armaments and the number of armed forces, according to regions. Parallel to the comprehensive studies other preliminary actions should be undertaken, such as a request by the General Assembly to the major suppliers to start consultations on voluntary measures of restraint with due regard to the security of recipient countries, and the convening of regional conferences where appropriate conditions existed for the prevention and limitation of armaments.

The paper submitted by the Netherlands²⁸ dealt with the question of the establishment of an international disarmament organization. A reconsideration of the idea, which had long been advocated by the Netherlands, was in its opinion warranted by a number of recent developments in the field of disarmament, the increasing complexity of multilateral disarmament treaties being of particular importance, all of which pointed to a need for a permanent organization to streamline the consultations and the implementation of measures. The Netherlands proposal envisaged such an organization as the operational framework for the implementation of international arms control and disarmament treaties, with functions mainly in the field of verification. The organization could also be instrumental in the preparation and organization of review conferences provided for in several disarmament treaties and serve as a clearing house for information on disarmament. Recognizing, however, that careful study and consideration of the idea was necessary before the decision on the establishment of a new international organ would be possible, the Netherlands suggested that, as a first step in the process which could ultimately lead to the establishment of such an organization, the Secretary-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1), vol. V, document A/AC.187/86.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1), vol. VI, document A/AC.187/108.

General should seek the views of Governments on the question, in particular on its functions and structure, and the link between the organization and the United Nations. With that in mind, the Netherlands proposed a draft wording to be included in the final document of the special session requesting the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States.

The final working paper, submitted by Venezuela,²⁹ dealt with the dissemination of information on the question of the armaments race and disarmament in general. Some of the measures proposed for that purpose in the working paper called upon governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to give priority to the preparation and distribution of printed and audio-visual materials dealing with those matters. The paper also suggested that encouragement should be given to the preparation by the United Nations of studies and reports, and that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of substantive information concerning the subject. There should also be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with disarmament in the process of dissemination of information through closer co-operation between them and the Centre for Disarmament.

Draft final document

The Committee examined the papers submitted most carefully in an attempt to consolidate the areas of agreement and resolve the areas of disagreement with the view to arriving at a generally acceptable text which would be submitted to the special session for consideration and adoption by all Member States. For that purpose an open-ended informal drafting group was established. Within that group two informal subgroups were set up, one entrusted with the drafting of the sections on the declaration and machinery, and the other one of the section on the programme of action. The task of setting out the areas of agreement proved relatively easy in contrast to that of resolving the various differences in substantive positions held by Member States, which the Committee could not fully accomplish even at the very end of its work. However, it was able to agree, at its fifth and last session, to recommend that the principle document to be adopted by the special session should be a single document consisting of four sections. That enabled the Committee to submit a unified draft final document³⁰ to the special session. The draft contained a number of agreed formulations, but it also included all unresolved issues, as worded by the original sponsors, in the respective sections of the document as possible alternatives. Square brackets placed around those alternatives indicated that final formulations would still have to be discussed and agreed upon. The differences reflected in the draft text concerned sometimes only nuances in certain phrases or different emphases of various aspects of the subject

²⁹ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/94.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. I (A/S-10/1)*, vol. I.

matters, but more often they indicated divergence of views on various areas of the arms race and disarmament.

(a) *Introduction*

The introduction of the draft final document, originally prepared by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee at the Committee's request, was officially submitted for inclusion in the draft by Mexico and Sweden,³¹ supported by many other members including non-aligned countries, Australia and France. In view of some objections expressed by the United States, the United Kingdom and Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, and the lack of adequate time for discussion necessary to resolve the differences, the whole section was placed in brackets.

The text of the introduction stated that the objectives established by the Disarmament Decade, declared in 1969 by General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), were as far away now as they were at that time, since neither effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament had materialized, nor had it been possible to free any amount of the enormous resources and energy squandered on the arms race for the purpose of development. It also noted that the accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons constituted much more a threat than a protection for the future of humanity, and concluded that such a situation had gradually led to the creation of a powerful current of opinion in favour of convening a special session of the General Assembly devoted entirely to disarmament. Then, in the remaining paragraphs, it briefly described the aims and purposes of the other three sections of the draft final document.

(b) *Declaration on disarmament*

The next section of the draft dealt with the declaration on disarmament, which covered three important areas: review and appraisal of the present international situation, goals and priorities of disarmament efforts, and principles which should guide negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament.

Concerning review and appraisal, the draft reflected a fairly large measure of agreement on a number of issues. Thus, it pointed to the danger to international peace and security arising from the destructive potential of the existing stocks of nuclear and conventional weapons and from their further development and accumulation. It also noted that the arms race impeded the realization of the purposes and was incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The draft further recognized a close relationship between disarmament and development and, in that connexion, stated that the arms race absorbed enormous material and human resources which could be used to advance the economic and social development of all coun-

³¹ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. VI, document A/AC.187/111.

tries, particularly the developing countries. Accordingly, the draft declared that disarmament had become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community whose solution required an active concern and contribution of all States. Although individual members of the Committee, or political groups as a whole, would have preferred a different phraseology for some of the problems involved, these were undoubtedly the areas in which the Committee could report a relatively high degree of consensus compared to some other basic areas where substantial differences remained.

Among unresolved issues there was the question of the causes of the arms race. The non-aligned countries attributed them primarily to great-Power rivalry. That view was shared by Pakistan. Eastern European countries ascribed the causes of the arms race to the enemies of détente and the interests of the military industrial complex, while Western countries attached importance to unresolved conflicts of national interest, including those among the developing countries. Substantial differences also emerged with regard to the assessment of the results achieved so far in the field of arms regulation and disarmament. Again, the non-aligned countries considered that no real progress had been made in this crucial field and that the agreements reached so far had not slowed down the pace of the arms race at all. Mauritius also emphasized that the thrust in disarmament efforts had been on regulating competition in armaments or proscribing certain developments deemed to be particularly disturbing, costly or otherwise unacceptable, rather than on attempting to reduce substantially important weapon systems. Romania, Mexico and Sweden believed results had been less than satisfactory in nuclear disarmament. Eastern European countries held that there had been achievements in curbing the arms race as evidenced by a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements recently concluded which were the first, but important, steps in that direction. Western countries also pointed to the agreements concluded in the field, noting, however, that they related only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continued. Another area of controversy concerned the question of nuclear disarmament. Thus, Pakistan attached great importance to what it considered the failure of nuclear powers to accompany efforts for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons by complementary steps to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and to provide adequate security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Together with the non-aligned countries, it expressed the view that failure to achieve concrete results in the field of nuclear disarmament increased the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the part of the draft declaration dealing with goals and priorities, there was complete unanimity of views on the principal goals of disarmament: the survival of mankind and the elimination of the danger of war, particularly nuclear war, including the elimination of the use and the threat of force in general from international life. In that context general and complete disarmament under effective international control was proclaimed as the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process. There was also a fairly large measure of agreement on the areas of the arms race which should be listed among priorities to be dealt with in disarmament negotiations: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction; conventional weapons,

including those which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and collateral measures. There was, however, disagreement with regard to the actual order for the priority areas, as well as on some of the measures to be considered within each area.

Concerning nuclear weapons, the positions diverged on whether "the highest priority must be given to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war", as proposed by the non-aligned countries, or whether "nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war are the highest priority"—the formulation preferred by Eastern European and Western countries. The latter group of countries considered that the non-aligned formulation was somewhat prejudicial as to the most appropriate steps, from the point of view of their feasibility, which should be undertaken to check the arms race. Within that area, the non-aligned and Eastern European countries considered that for the purpose of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race it was important, in addition to progressive reduction of nuclear weapons, to stop their production. Western countries, in contrast, were of the opinion that the formulation calling for progressive reduction of those weapons leading to their total elimination was more appropriate.

With regard to other weapons of mass destruction, there was general agreement that they should be considered a matter of high priority. That was not the case with regard to conventional weapons, where several differences still persisted. In general the non-aligned countries considered that the conduct of negotiations on armed forces and conventional weapons, important as they were, should nevertheless reflect the need to give the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. The Eastern European and Western States both preferred a stronger link between the two priority areas and therefore insisted on the formulation that measures of nuclear disarmament would require parallel progress in the regulation of the armed forces of States and of their conventional weapons. The compromise formula stated that negotiations on armed forces and conventional weapons should be "carried out together" with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, rather than that measures in one area would require progress in the other. The other positions on the order of priority of the two areas were based not only on the conviction of the non-aligned countries that the nuclear arms race was the single most dangerous peril jeopardizing the peace and security of all States, but were very much linked to the question of specific measures that should be considered within the area of conventional weapons. Western countries and, in particular, Japan, attached considerable importance to the regulation of the international transfer of conventional weapons and insisted that it should be included among the measures to check the conventional arms race. As the majority of the non-aligned and other developing countries had to rely on importation for the acquisition of weapons, they felt that such a measure, undertaken in isolation from other considerations, would adversely affect their security requirements. They insisted, therefore, that the question of transfer could only be meaningfully considered in conjunction with the regulation of production of conventional weapons. In view of opposition from the main arms producers, the issue remained unresolved.

Another controversial matter concerned the question of further international action to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons the use of some conventional weapons which might be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Sweden and the non-aligned countries favoured a formulation which would be more specific in determining the weapons to be dealt with in that context, having in mind the work that had previously been carried out in the field, while the Western countries preferred a more general statement which would not be prejudicial to the scope of the negotiations. Consequently, the different formulations proposed in this connexion were placed in brackets.

Finally, with regard to collateral measures, which were generally recognized as important for the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of disarmament measures and for the relaxation of international tension, the only difference in positions concerned some of the specific measures to be considered in that area. Thus, Mexico, Pakistan and Romania proposed that consideration should be given to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, to security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and to the conclusion of regional agreements on the reduction of armed forces and armaments, while the Eastern European countries in general attached particular importance to the conclusion of the treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. Both proposals remained in brackets.

The last part of the draft declaration listed a number of the fundamental principles that should guide negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament. The views of the members of the Committee again converged on some issues but diverged on one. The first principle exemplified the situation. It stated that all States Members of the United Nations reaffirmed their commitment to and strict observance of the principles of the Charter. That formulation was generally accepted. However, additional clarifications attached to it tended to stress somewhat different aspects of the issue. Some non-aligned countries emphasized in particular the provision of the Charter concerning the non-use of force or the threat of force, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. Other countries, mainly Western, tended to give greater emphasis to those provisions of the Charter which specified the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence. There were likewise differences in emphasis with regard to the second principle, which was devoted to the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Thus, the non-aligned countries considered that the United Nations had "the central role" in this field, while Western countries thought that it had "a central role" and Eastern European countries, "an important role". A similar difference was reflected in another matter—keeping the United Nations informed of steps in the field of disarmament. Mexico and other non-aligned countries, in line with their view of the central role of the United Nations, considered that the General Assembly should be appropriately informed of all steps, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral in this field. In contrast, the Eastern European countries considered that the United Nations, rather than the General Assembly, should be kept informed, but this on "a strictly voluntary basis, as arranged among parties

to the negotiations". The proposed alternative formulations were left in brackets.

One of the principles dealt with the question of the use or threat of use of force, including nuclear weapons. The central point of disagreement was the question of whether or not it was permissible to use force at all and, more specifically, to use nuclear weapons. The non-aligned countries were of the opinion that their use was "indefensible under any circumstances" and that any State "using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity, and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization". The Western countries, however, considered that the use of force, including the use of nuclear weapons, was indefensible only if it was "contrary to the Charter of the United Nations". That attitude was consistent with their proposal that the first principle should emphasize regard for the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence. A compromise formulation, proposed by the Soviet Union, which stated that "the renunciation of the use or threat of force is of great importance . . . and it should become a norm of international life" proved less acceptable to the non-aligned than to the Western countries because of the former's conviction that the Charter had already established that principle as the norm.

Similar differences arose in connexion with the principle concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Mexico, one of the main proponents of the principle, considered that such zones constituted one of the most effective disarmament measures and that the nuclear-weapon States, therefore, should undertake legally binding obligations to respect their status. All four nuclear Powers represented in the Committee sought additional qualification of the concept before they could agree to it. Thus, the Soviet Union was ready to respect zones provided they were genuinely free of nuclear weapons, and that the relevant agreements contained no loopholes and corresponded to the generally recognized norms of international law. The United States and the United Kingdom considered that both the creation of such zones and the obligations of the nuclear Powers to respect their status should be qualified by the phrases "where appropriate" and "where possible" respectively, since that would more adequately take into consideration the existing strategic realities in the world. France insisted that any obligations of the nuclear Powers with regard to such zones ought to be negotiated jointly between the non-nuclear and nuclear Powers.

With regard to the principle dealing with the relationship between disarmament and development, the non-aligned countries were of the opinion that there was a direct relationship between the two and insisted that a substantial part of the resources released as a result of disarmament measures should be used specifically to bridge the economic gap between developed and developing countries. Both Western and Eastern European countries, while acknowledging such a relationship, considered it a "close" rather than a "direct" one. They also expressed some reservations with regard to the phrase "a substantial part" which, in their opinion, might be somewhat prejudicial with regard

to the ways in which the resources might best be used to help the economic and social development of developing countries.

Another principle which caused considerable discussion concerned the question of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. There was no disagreement on the basic right of each State to develop, transfer, acquire or use nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes. However, there was a considerable divergence of views on the question of reconciling the exercise of that right with the objective of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Some Western countries considered that certain technologies which, in their opinion, were proliferation-prone, should be excluded from international transfer, but that view was opposed by the non-aligned countries and in particular Pakistan, on the ground that it would place unnecessary limitations on their fuel-cycle policies. There was also a difference in approach on safeguards. Again, some Western countries, suppliers of nuclear technology, considered that in certain instances it would be necessary to strengthen IAEA safeguards by additional measures to be agreed upon between the supplier and recipient countries. Most non-nuclear-weapon States were of the opinion that the IAEA safeguards system was adequate. Finally, there was the question of the scope of the safeguards. The Eastern European countries, as well as many Western countries, favoured the application of safeguards to all nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States. That view was also shared by Pakistan. In contrast, India maintained that only technology acquired through international co-operation and transfer should be subject to such safeguards. In addition, many non-aligned countries and Pakistan emphasized that the safeguards should be applied on universal, non-discriminatory bases which in practice would mean that the activities of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States would be subject to control.

Certain differences of greater or lesser degree persisted with regard to several other principles. One of them, concerning the priorities in disarmament measures and negotiations, reflected the same shades of opinion which were expressed on the subject in discussions with regard to goals and priorities. Another principle dealing with the presence of foreign military troops and bases proved controversial because the non-aligned countries considered that such presence represented a permanent threat to the strengthening of international peace and security, while Western countries thought that a differentiation should be made with regard to those forces and bases which were present or established with the consent of the host country. Equally contentious was the principle of strengthening confidence among States through universal application of existing disarmament agreements. The Eastern European countries put particular emphasis on accession to those treaties by all States, while the non-aligned countries stressed the need of full compliance with the provisions of those agreements by States parties. As to accession, they felt that many of the agreements were either discriminatory in their nature or negotiated between few States, and that, therefore, confidence could be strengthened by accession only to those future agreements which would be, as Mexico put it, "approved by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly". Yet another principle, on a balance of mutual responsibilities and

obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, remained bracketed due to different interpretations of its meaning.

There were, however, several principles which were generally acceptable and their formulations, with minor exceptions, were fully agreed upon. The first stressed the vital interest of all peoples in the success of disarmament negotiations, the duty of all States to contribute to disarmament efforts and their right to participate in disarmament negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States having the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. According to the next principle, the adoption of disarmament measures should not give advantage to any State or group of States over others at any stage. The third principle concerned the interrelationship between disarmament, relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of international peace, while the fourth referred to concurrent conduct of negotiations on partial measures and more comprehensive measures, as well as on general and complete disarmament. The next two principles dealt with the importance of both qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures, the need for display by States of a constructive approach to negotiations and the need for the political will to reach agreements.

The last paragraph of the draft declaration was intended to provide a lead into the programme of action, the next section of the draft final document. However, the non-aligned countries offered a formulation whereby Member States would declare to respect the objectives and principles stated in the declaration and "faithfully and thoroughly implement" the programme of action, while the United States preferred the phrase that States would "make every effort to carry out" the programme.

(c) *Programme of action*

The section of the draft final document entitled "Programme of action" was designed to give effect to the provisions set out in the respective parts of the declaration on disarmament. The various measures listed in the programme reflected the objectives and principles contained in the declaration in a co-ordinated manner. Because of this co-ordination, however, differences and unresolved issues that remained in the declaration were brought over into the programme of action.

The main characteristic of the programme, inferred from its opening part, was that its framers, while acknowledging the need for a comprehensive programme of disarmament and making provisions for its early elaboration, had concentrated on those measures in the field of disarmament that States should most urgently undertake and implement over the subsequent four years.

For the purpose of giving practical effect to that concept, the programme, in its second part, reaffirmed priorities in disarmament negotiations as nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction including chemical weapons, conventional weapons including any which may be deemed to be

excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, and reduction of armed forces. It was understood that the priorities were relevant with regard to both immediate measures and a comprehensive programme of action.

The next part of the draft programme was devoted to immediate and short-term measures to halt and reverse the arms race and dealt with each of the four priority areas separately.

With regard to the first area—nuclear weapons—differences persisted both of a general nature and concerning specific measures, notably the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The main problem in connexion with SALT was the desire of some countries, notably Pakistan, to have a more precise specification of what the projected third round of negotiations should bring about. The two negotiating powers—the USSR and the United States—preferred a rather general statement. Thus, while the two Powers could accept the formulation to the effect that further negotiations should follow, “leading to agreed reductions and qualitative limitations” (the United States proposal for inclusion of “significant” in connexion with reductions being bracketed by the USSR), Pakistan proposed that the reduction should be understood to range “from 10 up to 50 per cent in their deployments of strategic nuclear weapons” (figures mentioned on an earlier occasion by the United States), and that the qualitative limitations should be understood to include “a five-year moratorium on any improvements of their strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems”. Since the two Powers considered the Pakistani proposal as unnecessarily prejudicial to the scope of their negotiations, agreement could not be reached and all formulations were listed as possible alternatives to be agreed upon at the special session.

The problem with regard to a comprehensive test ban was somewhat different since strong objections were raised only by France. They stemmed from France’s approach to questions of nuclear disarmament, which emphasized that, whatever measures were pursued, due regard should be taken of the disparities that existed among the nuclear-weapon States concerning their nuclear forces. Thus, France could not agree to the formulation that “the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States would be in the supreme interest of mankind”, neither could it commit itself to accepting a treaty prohibiting such tests without being actively involved in the negotiations on such a treaty.

The next measure considered in the area of nuclear weapons concerned nuclear disarmament in general and referred to the timing of the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons in the process of nuclear disarmament. Eastern European countries maintained that the eventual agreements should provide for simultaneous cessation by all States of the production of nuclear weapons, including the development of new types, and the beginning of a gradual reduction of the stockpiles and their delivery systems. In contrast, Western countries emphasized the need to halt the build-up of nuclear arsenals and to begin the reduction of stockpiles, with the cessation of production of nuclear weapons to be agreed upon in the process. The non-aligned countries held that urgent steps should be directed, first, towards halting the qualitative

improvements of existing weapons and delivery systems, including the cessation of research and development of new types and systems, followed by the cessation of production. Concerning the reduction of stockpiles, including delivery systems, they insisted on a time-bound programme. Pakistan shared the same view but emphasized the particular responsibility of the two leading nuclear Powers in that regard. In addition, Mexico and Pakistan insisted on the withdrawal of nuclear arms deployments from the territory of other States.

Another measure considered was non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war. The non-aligned countries, in accordance with their basic attitude on the question expressed in the declaration, urged the conclusion of agreements on non-use of nuclear weapons, renunciation of use or threat of nuclear weapons against States which had no nuclear weapons on their territories, and non-first use of nuclear weapons. Similar proposals were made by Pakistan. Eastern European countries held a similar view but preferred to deal with the issue in the context of an agreement on the non-use of force in international relations in general. Western countries maintained that the principle of non-use of force, including the use of nuclear weapons, could be best upheld by full compliance with the provisions of the Charter. They suggested a number of measures designed to facilitate the avoidance of the risk of outbreak of nuclear war which included, *inter alia*, the improvement of organizational and technical arrangements for guarding against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, bilateral arrangements on the prevention of accidental nuclear war, and appropriate assurances to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular, that the Western Powers would not use nuclear weapons except in self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. Eastern European countries also proposed a number of measures aimed at preventing the danger of nuclear war. They recommended making full use of the Security Council and pointed to special responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council in exercising restraint. They called for the conclusion of further agreements concerning measures to diminish and avert the danger of nuclear war and to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Both Eastern and Western proposals were bracketed by the non-aligned countries, which believed that discussion of such measures might serve to divert attention from the basic task—the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The next measure concerned nuclear-weapon-free zones. An attempt was made to agree on general principles relevant to the establishment of such zones and then to review the situation with regard to specific geographical regions. No agreement was reached on either point. The consideration of the general principles in essence reflected the same conflicting viewpoints that appeared in the declaration. In addition, in the discussions of the applicability of such zones in various regions, differences between some countries within regions, such as India and Pakistan, appeared along with those between non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States.

Concerning zones of peace, the most important differences appeared in the positions held by the non-aligned and Western countries. The former group, in expressing its support for such zones, placed a particular emphasis

on the regulation of the presence of foreign forces in the regions where they would be established. Western countries, in supporting the idea in general, considered that such zones should first provide for mutual restraint on military activities of the States within the zones; thereafter the outside Powers could associate themselves with the zones. They also considered that zones of peace should not present obstacles to freedom of navigation on the high seas and in the air or conflict with the right of innocent passage under the Law of the Sea. The differences in approach were clearly reflected in the formulations proposed by the two groups of countries with regard to the Indian Ocean.

The final measure dealt with the question of non-proliferation. The main differences which stood in the way of reaching an agreed formulation evolved around three basic issues: horizontal versus vertical proliferation, safeguards, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As noted earlier, the non-aligned countries held that the best way of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons was to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament in general, starting with urgent application of measures to stop vertical proliferation. They also considered that an international consensus on ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be developed jointly by the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. This would include a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to stop the refinement of nuclear weapons and the production of new systems of such weapons as well as not to use nuclear weapons. Both Eastern European and Western countries, while acknowledging the desirability of halting the nuclear arms race, including vertical proliferation, expressed a particular concern for the prevention of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In their opinion attempts to reach an international consensus should concentrate on additional measures to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime established primarily under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex), to which all States should adhere. In the discussions on the elements of an international consensus on ways and means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, substantial differences also emerged with regard to the question of safeguards. The non-aligned countries and Pakistan proposed that the nuclear facilities of all States should be placed under international safeguards, but the proposal was unacceptable to Eastern European countries. Western countries, however, were ready to accept application of safeguards to all States on the understanding that it should be limited to peaceful nuclear activities. Finally, there were differences on the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which in essence represented the repetition of the same argument used in the consideration of the matter in the part of the declaration dealing with principles. Basically, many non-aligned and other non-nuclear-weapon countries insisted that non-proliferation measures should not impose any obstacles in the exercise of the right of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, while both Eastern European and Western countries considered that that exercise should be in conformity with article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty with additional safeguards measures as might be deemed necessary.

In the case of the next priority area—other weapons of mass destruction, as opposed to nuclear weapons—a considerable measure of unanimity was

attained. Thus, there was agreement that all States should adhere to the 1925 Geneva Protocol³² and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex), and on the urgency of concluding a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, and that a convention should be concluded on radiological weapons. While there was agreement that effective measures should be taken to prevent the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, the Western countries considered it desirable to identify and qualify the weapons to be regulated as being “based on new scientific principles”, while the Eastern European countries favoured a more general approach (see chapter XVII) below). Differences also persisted regarding the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (resolution 31/72, annex). The USSR and the United States emphasized “a further prohibition.” In contrast, Argentina favoured the phrase “a complete prohibition” while Mexico preferred that “steps should be taken to amend the Convention”. Concerning the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, France expressed reservations to the East-West proposal inviting all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to become parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (resolution 2660 (XXV), annex). There was, however, general agreement that negotiations should be held to consider further measures in that field, but views diverged on the objectives of such negotiations. Western countries were of the opinion that they should be linked to any relevant technological developments yet to be determined, while Eastern European countries considered that the existing situation already warranted an attempt at “working out a new agreement on complete demilitarization of that environment”. Finally, while there was agreement that measures should be taken to prevent an arms race in outer space in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex), Austria considered that the question should be examined by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, while other countries preferred a broader formulation, for example, that “appropriate international discussions may be held to this end”

In the third priority area—conventional weapons—in addition to differences pertaining to the international transfer of weapons, including particularly inhumane weapons, as reflected in the draft declaration, new ones emerged. The non-aligned countries insisted that measures of conventional disarmament should also include the prohibition of the development, production and deployment of new types and systems of conventional weapons, and

³² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

reiterated their views on the dismantling of foreign military bases and withdrawal of foreign troops.

In the fourth priority area—reduction of military budgets and armed forces—Eastern European and Western countries could accept a general statement that a freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets, particularly of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be one of the most effective means of curbing the arms race (see chapter XXIII below). However, Eastern European countries would not go along with proposals advanced either by Mexico or by Western countries, including Sweden, for the development of a system which would provide for “a minimum of uniformity in the measurement of military budgets” or “a standardized reporting instrument”. They maintained in general that the system of reductions of military expenditures on a percentage basis was preferable.

The next part of the draft programme of action dealt with the implementation of disarmament agreements. It listed three proposals in that regard on the need of adequate international verification in general and a related examination of all aspects of the problem of verification with the view to considering more efficient methods and procedures in the field (Austria, Netherlands, Sweden), on the establishment of an international observation satellite agency (France), and on the establishment of an international disarmament organization (Netherlands).

In the following part of the draft, devoted to other measures of strengthening international security and confidence-building, agreement was reached only on a broad statement to the effect that in general those measures would facilitate the process of disarmament. As to the specific measures, the views diverged. Thus, the non-aligned countries, *inter alia*, attached particular importance to the prohibition of the establishment of new foreign bases, while Romania added the dissolution of military blocs and an undertaking by States not to make a show of strength or concentrate armed forces near the frontiers of other States. Eastern European countries, for their part, *inter alia*, favoured early conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force and agreement on non-admission of new members to the existing military alliances. Finally, Western countries, *inter alia*, favoured publication by States of detailed information about their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and transfers to other countries. There were, however, two measures which acquired general support: one invited States to assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements and further efforts in the field of disarmament, and the other recommended the establishment of “hot lines” and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict. There was also an East-West proposal on prior notification of major military manoeuvres, exchanges of observers to military manoeuvres and other exchanges, on a reciprocal basis, of military personnel by invitation, to be made on a regional or bilateral basis. Egypt, however, was unable to support the formulation pending certain clarifications concerning the practical application of the proposal.

The sixth part of the draft programme was devoted to the question of disarmament and development. It listed two specific ideas designed to facili-

tate the release of resources for economic and social development. The first proposal was on the initiation of an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development and, except for certain remaining differences with regard to the terms of reference of the study, it was generally accepted. The second proposal, tabled by France, concerned the establishment of an international fund for disarmament and development to be financed on a voluntary basis by the most significant military Powers, and was regarded as requiring further detailed examination.

The following part of the draft dealt with studies and information. It appeared that there was wide agreement in the Committee on the need for bringing more expertise to bear on disarmament matters and on intensified dissemination of information about the questions involved in the arms race. Views diverged, however, on specific actions and steps to be undertaken. Thus, Western countries were interested in studies on the strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in peace-keeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes to enable it to anticipate and resolve international crises, and the possible contribution to confidence-building of technical measures such as demilitarized zones, zones of limited forces and surveillance and early warning systems. In addition, Austria was interested in a study on all aspects of verification and control of disarmament measures. Japan expressed special interest in a study on international transfer of conventional weapons. Pakistan also expressed interest in that subject, but proposed that some aspects of the production of conventional weapons should be considered in the same context. The proposed study on the international transfer of weapons met with objections from the non-aligned countries. There was, however, agreement regarding a study on the regional aspects of disarmament. Other proposals were placed in brackets at the initiative of Eastern European countries on the ground that it was the lack of political will rather than of studies which stood in the way of disarmament agreements.

Concerning the question of information, there was general agreement on the need for the preparation and distribution of printed and audio-visual material in the field, particularly on publicity for the Final Document, by governmental and non-governmental information organs, and by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. There was, however, reluctance on the part of Western countries to accept an Eastern European proposal on the institutionalization of a disarmament week. It appeared that further discussions were also necessary with regard to the activities of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament in the presentation of information concerning the arms race and disarmament, as well as on the question of closer liaison between non-governmental organizations and the United Nations in the dissemination of information.

For the part of the draft programme of action dealing with the comprehensive programme of disarmament, various proposals were merely listed as they were submitted. They tended to approach the problem from somewhat different standpoints. In general, the non-aligned countries favoured the establishment of a special United Nations committee for elaboration of such a programme, to be submitted to the General Assembly in 1980, while Mexico

considered that the task should be entrusted to the reorganized CCD, to be completed by 1981 at the latest so that it could be considered and adopted at the second special session on disarmament. Finally, Italy proposed the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with the Charter as measures which should accompany the process of moving towards general and complete disarmament.

The last part of the draft programme dealt with guidelines for implementation. The formulations were submitted by the non-aligned countries and Mexico. The main thrust of the non-aligned formulation was that implementation of the programme should be realized in an agreed sequence, by stages, with each measure and stage carried out within a specified time-limit, the entire process to be completed not later than the end of the following decade. The Mexican formulation was consistent with its basic concept that the programme of action should enumerate a series of measures which could be implemented by the time of the second special session, in 1981. Therefore, it placed emphasis on implementation of a "three-year disarmament plan", to be followed by a comprehensive disarmament programme which would be adopted by the second special session. Since the choice between the two formulations in the final analysis depended on the composition of the programme of action itself, which was still far from being finalized, both formulations were left in brackets, neither being thoroughly discussed.

(d) *Machinery*

The fourth section of the draft final document was devoted to the machinery for disarmament negotiations. At the preparatory stage there were few areas in which actual texts could be completely agreed upon. There was general understanding that changes in machinery might prove desirable. Views were divided, however, with regard to reasons for and the scope and objectives of such changes. Formulations giving effect to the various viewpoints were accordingly listed as possible alternatives. However, the section on the whole provided a useful and rather clear-cut picture of the positions held by various political groups or individual members of the Committee and helped to identify the main points of disagreement.

One difference in positions concerned the extent to which the existing machinery had been satisfactory. France and a number of non-aligned countries believed that the machinery in the final analysis had failed to produce tangible results. They therefore considered that it should be revitalized and new forums for disarmament deliberations and negotiations established with a better geographical and political representative character. Many Western and Eastern European countries, on the other hand, held the view that the same basic organizational set-up should be preserved with certain changes that would take care of the criticism expressed. On the latter point there were differences among those countries as to the extent of the changes that should be made. The Soviet Union, for instance, believed that it was the lack of political will rather than of disarmament machinery which was responsible for

insufficient results. The United Kingdom and some other Western countries were in favour of changes, particularly in the negotiating body. Several other countries, notably Mexico, believed that comprehensive changes in machinery would be desirable in view of "the very nature of international society and the uneven distribution of power among its members" but considered it more opportune at the time to seek improvements rather than a complete restructuring of disarmament machinery.

A second point at issue concerned the role of the United Nations in effecting the proposed changes in disarmament machinery. The specific proposals put forward in that respect reflected the differences in position which first emerged in connexion with the formulation of the general principle on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament in the draft declaration. As was noted earlier, those positions ranged from assertions that the United Nations had the primary role and responsibility in that field to acknowledgements that it had an important role.

Both points of disagreement influenced the actual drafting of the section in several basic areas. The first concerned the question of the deliberative body. It was widely felt that the General Assembly should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations and that its First Committee, in order to facilitate the carrying out of that function, should deal in the future only with disarmament and related international security questions. Views were divided, however, as to whether the General Assembly should also be responsible for facilitating the implementation of disarmament measures. The position that it should was taken by the non-aligned countries, but opposed by both the Eastern European and Western countries on the grounds that in their view such a function was not strictly within the scope of the Charter. There were other differences in connexion with the establishment of new subsidiary organs of the General Assembly. For the purpose of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the non-aligned countries and Romania proposed that the United Nations Disarmament Commission should be reconvened with appropriate terms of reference including, *inter alia*, the task of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Eastern European and Western countries had certain objections to that proposal, particularly with regard to the Commission's terms of reference, and which of its proposed functions might better be entrusted to a negotiating body. On the other hand, Italy felt that the implementation of the Security Council's responsibilities in the field of the regulation of armaments could be of particular importance for the over-all strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. From that viewpoint, Italy proposed that the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly, might consider the desirability of establishing subsidiary organs for specific disarmament purposes. All the foregoing proposals were reflected in the draft.

Certain clearly defined differences in approach could be identified in connexion with the negotiating body. They concerned specific issues such as the relationship to the United Nations, membership, terms of reference and rules of procedure. First, there was a French proposal for the establishment of a new negotiating body, entitled "Disarmament Committee", to replace the

existing Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The new body, unlike the previous one, would be attached to the deliberative organ of the United Nations—the Disarmament Commission—to which it would report. The main function of the Committee would be to negotiate disarmament agreements stemming from the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission, and its decisions would be taken by consensus. In contrast, the Eastern European and Western countries maintained the view that the CCD should continue to be the principal multilateral negotiating body retaining the existing link with the United Nations through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; there would also be certain procedural and organizational changes but basically the status and functions of the Committee would remain the same. Other views ranged between the two.

In principle, the non-aligned countries, Pakistan, Romania and some others preferred the French attitude but, in view of the opposition from the other three nuclear-weapon Powers, made a number of proposals designed to bridge the gap. Basically, their proposals aimed at the strengthening of the link between the negotiating body and the United Nations, an increase in the membership with such organizational and procedural changes as would enable participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers in its work and easier access of non-members to its proceedings, as well as a greater openness in the work of the body in general. There were nevertheless differences with regard to the formulation of the proposals. Thus, for example, both the Soviet Union and the United States opposed the non-aligned phrase that the body would be “under the auspices of and reporting to the United Nations”. They also suggested that the word “strengthened”, used with regard to the link between the body and the United Nations, should be replaced by the word “retained”.

The Eastern European countries proposed that the special representative of the Secretary-General should be assigned an enhanced role in the negotiating body, including authority to bring relevant matters to its attention, rather than confining such authority to the Secretary-General himself, as requested by the non-aligned countries.

The Soviet Union and the United States held the view that the limited size of the body should be maintained and that, in addition to annual reports to the General Assembly, occasional progress reports should be prepared for the information of non-members. Most of the non-aligned countries, on the other hand, considered that the body should be increased through nominations of members by the President of the General Assembly and that it should submit progress reports to the General Assembly more frequently. The non-aligned countries also proposed that all Member States of the United Nations should have the right to submit proposals and working documents on measures of disarmament that were the subject of negotiations directly to the body and to participate in its proceedings. The Western countries considered that non-members might be invited, at their request, to participate when their particular concerns were under discussion.

Substantial differences with regard to the system of co-chairmanship which existed in the CCD also persisted. Both the Soviet Union and the United States considered, in view of their particular responsibilities, that it

should be retained, while the non-aligned and some Western countries considered that it should be replaced by a system of rotation among all members (non-aligned countries), non-nuclear-weapon States (Mexico) or a bureau (Sweden).

The Soviet Union and the United States also expressed some reservation on the proposal of Romania that the negotiating body should negotiate concrete measures of disarmament on the basis of the recommendations of the General Assembly and proposals submitted by members of the body and other States Members of the United Nations, since in their opinion such a procedure would detract from the independent position of the negotiating body. Some Western countries also expressed reservations concerning the proposal of Mexico that the negotiating body should "undertake the preparation" of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be ready in time for the second special session. They preferred to indicate that that negotiating body should "continue discussion and development" of such a program and were in favour of a less specific timetable for the completion of that task. There were also some differences as to how the comprehensive programme would be prepared. The non-aligned countries insisted that the General Assembly should play an important role in the process through its Disarmament Commission while Eastern European, Western and some other countries considered that it should be the responsibility of the negotiating body.

There was also the question of the follow-up or of institutionalizing other forums for disarmament negotiations and reaching agreements on specific measures. The non-aligned countries, with a view to strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field, considered that an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament" should be included in the agenda of subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, culminating in the convening of the second special session on disarmament in 1981 (Mexico) or 1982 (Sweden). The United States accepted the idea in general but suggested 1983. Other Western countries, while not objecting to the idea as such, were, however, of the opinion that the question of the convening of a further special session should be considered at a later date. The Eastern European countries continued to favour the holding of a world disarmament conference. Such a conference was not envisaged strictly as a follow-up of the work of the special session, but rather as a conference in its own right with a certain institutionalized framework that would enable it to conduct active negotiations on all questions of disarmament, including ways and methods of achieving general and complete disarmament as well as partial measures, and to take appropriate decisions. To expedite its convening they proposed that a preparatory committee should be set up by the special session. That proposal was not supported by the Western countries for reasons that had been stated by them previously (see chapter VI below). The non-aligned countries, which in the past had advocated the convening of such a conference, believed that it could be convened at an appropriate time and after adequate preparation and with universal participation. Mexico put forward a specific proposal which involved the institutionalization of a world disarmament conference, on terms acceptable to all Member States, as reinforcement of the

deliberative machinery of the United Nations. The non-aligned concept of the conference was in certain respects somewhat different from that of the Eastern European countries which, for instance, envisaged that specific problems might be considered at the conference in the first place by States "whose interests were primarily affected".

The last part of the section on machinery dealt with the role of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament in carrying out the programme of action. Proposals in that regard were submitted both by Western countries, particularly Sweden, and by the non-aligned countries. Both favoured the strengthening of the Centre; the Western proposal enumerated the tasks that the Centre should carry out, especially in the field of expert studies, while the non-aligned proposal was more general in its formulation. France called for the establishment of an international institute for research on disarmament, responsible to the United Nations, which would make available to the international community technical studies of problems of disarmament. The United Nations would nominate its Governing Council and would provide its financing but it would have complete autonomy at the scientific level. All three proposals were left in brackets pending further consideration.

Organizational matters

As noted earlier, in the course of its 1978 sessions the Preparatory Committee also took up a few remaining organizational matters pertaining to the work of the special session. In that connexion the Committee made a number of recommendations which, *inter alia*, concerned the holding of a general debate, the work of a committee of the whole and composition of its bureau, allocation of time for hearing statements of non-governmental organizations and research institutes dealing with disarmament and the method of their selection, as well as an invitation to the Director-General of UNESCO to make a statement to the General Assembly in view of its special programme on disarmament. All the recommendations of the Committee were contained in its report to the special session.³³

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

As in the previous year,³⁴ the question of the special session of the General Assembly occupied a portion of the deliberations of the Committee during its spring session. The delegations of Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, Nigeria, Romania, the United Kingdom and the United States, in their general statements, expressed full support for the special session, pointed to its importance for the halting of the arms race and expressed the hope that its impact would soon be felt in the disarmament

³³ *Ibid.*, vol. I, paras. 45-54.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, paras. 279-285.

negotiations. Some other delegations, while welcoming the special session, also made remarks on the relationship between the CCD's efforts in the field of disarmament and the holding of the special session. Thus, the Soviet Union, noting that the forthcoming session placed a special responsibility and obligation on members of the Committee to exert the maximum efforts to achieve positive results, emphasized that "it would be wrong to link the solution of major and complicated problems of disarmament to the holding of any international conferences, or to set rigid time-limits. The essential thing, in our view, is to achieve agreement and to find a solution of a problem that will be visible and acceptable for all". A similar view was expressed by Bulgaria, which stated that it was not "correct to link up the work of the current session of the CCD with the special session—as far as timing, the programme or the place of our deliberations are concerned".

In addition to general statements, the Committee devoted considerable attention during the spring session to the preparation of a special report on the state of the various questions under its consideration to be submitted to the General Assembly at its special session on the basis of the recommendation contained in the report of the Preparatory Committee for the special session. The report prepared by the CCD³⁵ in response to that request consisted of two volumes. Volume I briefly presented the basic facts concerning the establishment, work and specific achievements of the Committee from its first meeting in early 1962 to the present date, and gave a description of the current state of questions under consideration in the Committee. Volume II provided additional details on more recent views of delegations on questions under consideration and relevant developments.

Conclusion

The work of the Preparatory Committee, after over one year of extensive examination of the most crucial aspects of the arms race and consideration of various ways of halting and reversing it, resulted in what might alone have been considered as a considerable achievement in the field of disarmament: awareness by the international community that the question must be approached henceforth in a more comprehensive manner. The deliberations in the Committee, the working papers submitted in the course of its work, and the draft final document prepared by the Committee all pointed in that direction. It became more than apparent in the process, however, that the views among individual States or groups of States diverged considerably on such basic questions as the essential elements of the comprehensive approach, the areas of the arms race which should be given priority, and the best methods for handling disarmament negotiations with a view to achieving genuine disarmament. Those differences were recognized as natural and expected in view of the prevailing political, economic and military realities in the present world.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-10/2), vols. I and II, and *ibid.*, Supplement No. 2A, (A/S-10/2/Add.1/Rev.1).

Nevertheless, the Committee was able, through an intensive process of negotiations, to bring together the various approaches to such an extent that they could all be placed within the general framework of one draft final document. By clear identification, if not resolution, of differences in the positions of Member States, the Committee contributed towards better understanding and appreciation of differing interests and objectives. This provided a basis from which to proceed to drawing up the Final Document and it thus appears that the Preparatory Committee successfully fulfilled the mandate given to it by General Assembly resolution 31/189 B of 21 December 1976.

Special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

THE TENTH SPECIAL SESSION of the General Assembly, the first devoted to disarmament, opened on 23 May 1978. After six weeks of intensive deliberations the General Assembly concluded its work on 30 June, adopting by consensus a single final document. Adoption of the document by consensus was considered a significant success, amplified by the fact that the session was by far the largest and most representative gathering in the history of the world Organization convened to consider disarmament issues. All Member States participated in the work of the special session and representatives of 123 States, including 20 heads of State or Government, 51 Ministers for Foreign Affairs and many other high-ranking officials, took part in the general debate and submitted views and ideas covering the whole range of disarmament matters. In addition, high officials of specialized agencies and other institutions within the United Nations system and spokesmen of 25 non-governmental organizations and six disarmament research institutes made a valuable contribution to the work of the special session.

General debate

The special session was opened by the Chairman of the delegation of Yugoslavia in his capacity as President of the thirty-second regular session. The General Assembly then decided that he should also serve as President of its tenth special session. In his statement to the Assembly the President recalled that the initiative for the convening of the session had come from the non-aligned countries, and emphasized that the special session must seek to replace the existing state of mistrust, tension and division in international relations with peaceful and constructive co-operation aimed at providing better conditions of living for all the peoples in the world and especially those of the developing countries. In that connexion, the President pointed out that military expenditures in the world now exceeded the aggregate sum of all financial resources which the world spent for all forms of education, and that shortly they would also exceed the total sum spent for health services. Such a

waste of resources was not only a burden; it meant that long-standing problems confronting all the countries of the world and international relations as a whole were being ignored. The situation was undoubtedly dramatic, for the stakes were very high in the modern world: not only was the general atmosphere of international relations bound to be affected but the impact would also be felt in areas of localized conflict and crisis. The essential thing was to stop the present escalation of the arms race and freeze and reduce the military budgets of the great Powers. In order to succeed in this, he considered that it was important to evolve new approaches, particularly within the United Nations framework, as a viable forum for the expression of all points of view. In other words it was necessary to establish a strategy for disarmament negotiations, charting ultimate goals as well as immediate tasks. The President concluded by emphasizing that the special session must demonstrate to the world at large that the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations continued to serve as a guiding light for the international community in its quest for a new economic, political and social order based on equality and justice for all.

The Secretary-General, in his statement at the opening meeting of the special session, acknowledged the results achieved so far in the field of arms regulation, but noted that they were dwarfed by the magnitude of what remained to be done. In recent years there had been a rapid emergence of new weapon systems, particularly in the nuclear field, which complicated current efforts to limit nuclear weapons and tended to undermine the results achieved. The Secretary-General welcomed the fact that Governments had begun to address themselves to the question of disarmament in terms of a comprehensive framework.

He also noted that if all efforts were to converge towards a common goal, principles and priorities ought to be outlined and long-term goals developed. In other words there was need for a strategy for disarmament. He considered that that process must involve the increasing participation of all nations and that the more active involvement in the field of disarmament of a large number of medium-sized and small nations would place increasing demands on the United Nations for research, information and documentation. In that connexion, he considered it important to develop a comprehensive approach to international study in the field of arms control and disarmament and suggested the appointment of an advisory board composed of eminent persons who would advise him on the studies which might be undertaken in the future with the view to facilitating consideration of the range of disarmament issues under negotiation in various disarmament forums. The Secretary-General further suggested in general terms as a purpose and goal that the world devote to national and international disarmament efforts one million dollars for every thousand million currently spent on arms.

The Secretary-General concluded his statement by pointing out that the extent to which the United Nations was effective in resolving conflicts, in alleviating economic inequities and human suffering and in building the elements of a consistent world order would determine the growth of trust essential for the success of a disarmament programme. He was convinced that in order to meet that challenge an effort of a totally new dimension was required:

it must encompass a broader and longer-range perspective than any previous effort; it must be more deeply rooted in the democratic involvement of peoples and all nations than any effort that had gone before; and it must rally an unprecedented measure of the world's reserves of talents and resources to the task.

At its opening meeting the General Assembly also received the report of the Preparatory Committee,¹ submitted by the Chairman (Argentina), and unanimously endorsed the recommendations it contained.

In the general debate that followed the opening of the session, the great majority of Member States reiterated support for the special session, expressed hope for its successful outcome, and pledged their full co-operation. They also pointed to the danger of the continuation of the arms race and to the need of halting and reversing it. In expressing their over-all views about the arms race and disarmament, many of them made specific references to particular issues and problems, urging their solution in the context of the proposals and suggestions which they had submitted or supported in the course of the preparatory work for the special session.

More specifically, the general debate provided an opportunity for a wide-ranging survey by States from their respective points of view of the major aspects of disarmament. Their comments included references to the principal topics under consideration or negotiation in the various disarmament forums. To place those comments in their proper substantive context, they are for the most part discussed in the relevant sections of the appropriate topical chapters in this volume. By way of illustration of the breadth and diversity of viewpoints, proposals and initiatives, however, highlights of a number of statements are outlined below. Although the nuclear-weapon States are included, the selection is intended to be illustrative and does not imply an assessment of the relative importance of particular statements made in the debate.

The United States placed emphasis on the programme of action to be developed by the special session. It proposed that there be substantial cuts in the number of strategic nuclear arms and increasingly stringent qualitative limitations on their further development; that there should be an end to explosions of nuclear devices and work in concert to ensure that no additional nuclear-weapon States emerged; that, as control was gained over the nuclear threat, mutual agreement must be sought to ban other weapons of mass destruction; that there be an immediate slow-down and then reversal in the sharp increase in conventional arms; that regional arms-control arrangements and capabilities be expanded and strengthened; that the institutions and expertise required for arms control be developed and that progress in arms control should release additional resources for economic and social development. Specific proposals included an offer of assistance with verification and stabilizing measures to assist regional arms control efforts, and a proposal for a United Nations Peace-keeping Reserve Force to be made up of national con-

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol I.

tingents earmarked by their Governments for United Nations duties for the purpose of the maintenance of international peace and security.

The President of France outlined his country's support of new deliberative and negotiating machinery to replace the CCD and the establishment of a world institute for disarmament studies under the aegis of the United Nations. He also proposed studies on the creation of a satellite monitoring agency. The establishment of a special disarmament fund for development was also suggested. With regard to regional disarmament, France recognized the value of nuclear-free zones and indicated that it hoped to become party to Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.² Finally, emphasizing in the context of regional possibilities that in Europe the threat was not only nuclear but also conventional, France proposed that all countries which had participated in the Helsinki Conference³ should meet to consider disarmament measures in Europe.

The USSR proposed cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, cessation of the production and prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and cessation of development of new conventional weapons of great destructive capability. It called on the permanent members of the Security Council and countries which had alliances with them to renounce the expansion of their armies and the build-up of conventional armaments. The USSR suggested setting up a preparatory committee for the preparation of an agenda for negotiations on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons. It also proposed for discussion the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present. In addition, it called for reductions in the military budgets of States, not in terms of percentage points but in absolute figures.

China, in its intervention, recalled its wish for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and for an agreement on their non-use and its promise never to be the first to use them. It also reiterated its support for the establishment of nuclear-free and peace zones, for the dismantling of military bases on foreign soil and for a prohibition of biological and chemical weapons. China proposed more specifically that once the super-Powers had made major progress in destroying their nuclear weapon stocks and reducing their conventional arsenals, other nuclear Powers should destroy their nuclear weapons.

The United Kingdom declared its readiness to participate with other nuclear-weapon States in firm, far-reaching and permanent assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons. It suggested that confidence-building measures envisaged in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference should be adopted in regions where confidence was needed and it referred favourably to modern means of verification installed in the Sinai. It proposed a United Nations study on ways of limiting the growth

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

³ Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held at Helsinki and Geneva between 3 July 1973 and 1 August 1975.

of conventional weapons throughout the world, urged that the Secretariat assume a more important role and suggested that the Centre for Disarmament become the repository of data on disarmament.

India reiterated its pledge not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons even if the rest of the world did so, and abjured nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes. It suggested the following steps toward global non-violence: (a) a declaration that would outlaw utilization of nuclear technology for military purposes; (b) qualitative and quantitative limitations on nuclear armaments and immediate freezing of present stockpiles under international inspection; (c) formulation of a time-bound programme—not exceeding a decade—for gradual reduction of stockpiles with a view to achieving total elimination of all nuclear weapons; and (d) a comprehensive test ban with provisions for safeguards through independent inspection.

Japan suggested that 6 August be proclaimed as Disarmament Day. It reiterated its commitment to the “three non-nuclear principles” of not possessing, not manufacturing, and not permitting the entry into Japan of nuclear weapons. It urged nuclear-weapon States to give positive support to nuclear-weapon-free zones, including security guarantees. Japan also noted its previous initiative advocating studies on the question of international transfers of conventional arms, and called on the special session to take the first step towards constraints upon such transfers.

Pakistan called on all nuclear-weapon States to accept the French proposal that nuclear-weapon States should perhaps preclude use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against nuclear-free zones. Pakistan was prepared to enter into a joint declaration with other South Asian States to renounce the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons. With regard to conventional arms transfers, it called for endorsement of regional meetings of arms-importing countries and supplier countries on the basis of specific principles which it elaborated.

Algeria stressed that peace could not be reduced to a matter of establishing trust between the Western and socialist worlds because the third world was a field of rivalry of the great Powers, a testing ground for arms and a repository of raw materials from which arms were manufactured. Accordingly, it stated that the extension of détente and balanced relations between North and South were prerequisites for peace and security; it attached particular importance to Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Indonesia, together with many other States, stressed that highest priority must be given to nuclear disarmament, and outlined its support of initiatives towards that end; it also expressed its support of other efforts aimed towards disarmament and enhancement of regional and global security. Finland, for its part, emphasized its reliance on political means for security and outlined its efforts in favour of disarmament. It regarded arms control and disarmament as imperative for security and social and economic development and any quest for security by means of arms as a hopeless endeavour.

Several States gave emphasis to more specific initiatives and proposals. The proposal of Canada was designed to arrest the momentum of the nuclear arms race by a “strategy of suffocation” consisting of a combination of four

measures: a comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear explosive devices, an agreement to stop the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles, an agreement to prohibit all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and an agreement to limit and then progressively reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems. The ultimate intent of the strategy would be to halt the arms race in the laboratory.

Several proposals dealt with the question of military expenditures and related matters. Thus, Ireland suggested voluntary adoption at the international level of a target figure setting a limit to the percentage of gross national product which each country would devote to national defence, while Senegal sought the establishment of a tax on military expenditures of 5 per cent, which would be paid to the United Nations solely for assistance to developing countries. A similar proposal was put forward by Mexico, which suggested that until an international fund for disarmament and development was established, an *ad hoc* account with the United Nations Development Programme should be opened on a provisional basis. Costa Rica, for its part, proposed that all States should at once reduce their military expenditures by at least 10 per cent and constitute with the resultant savings a fund, part of which would go to economic and social development assistance and part to recompensing those nations that reduced military expenditures by at least 1.5 per cent of their public budget and by at least 0.5 per cent of their national product concurrently, without taking into account their level of development.

Other proposals concerned various specific issues pertaining to confidence-building, verification and information and education on disarmament. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, offered to make available its experience and facilities with regard to both chemical verification and verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Uruguay, for its part, suggested consideration of the possibility of promoting the creation of an advisory polemological body that would work under the supervision and trusteeship of the United Nations with the task of providing a scientific study of war and peace, aimed at drawing conclusions in the interest of preservation of peace. Nigeria proposed the establishment of a programme of United Nations fellowships on disarmament designed to give in-depth knowledge on disarmament issues to public officials, mostly in developing countries. Sri Lanka proposed the setting up of a world disarmament authority which would have over-all competence in the field of disarmament. Cyprus proposed its own demilitarization and disarmament.

In the course of the general debate statements were also made by representatives of UNESCO and IAEA who spoke about the activities of their organizations pertaining to disarmament.

Work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee

Following the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee that the special session should establish a committee of the whole with as many open-ended

groups or subsidiary organs as might be necessary, the General Assembly, at its first plenary meeting, 23 May, decided to establish as its main organ an *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Tenth Special Session (decision S-10/21) and to leave it to the Committee to set up working groups as necessary. At the same meeting the Assembly elected (decision S-10/15) the Chairman (Argentina) of the Preparatory Committee as the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee began its substantive work on 1 June. It decided not to have a general debate, thus avoiding duplication of the debate in the General Assembly, but to proceed immediately to considering the draft final document. However, the Committee agreed that all delegations wishing to make statements on proposals contained in the draft final document or in respect of new proposals, particularly those delegations which had not participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee, could do so at the Committee's plenary meetings.

In order to expedite the carrying out of its task the Committee at the outset of its work established two open-ended working groups, each entrusted with the preparation of certain sections of the Final Document. Thus, Working Group A, chaired by New Zealand, was responsible for the sections entitled "Introduction", "Declaration" and "Machinery", while Working Group B, chaired by Poland, was requested to prepare the section entitled "Programme of action". To facilitate the process, each Working Group established two drafting groups which worked on specific parts of the respective sections of the draft final document.

In the course of the work of the Committee a number of States submitted documents elaborating the proposals that they had made in the general debate. Sri Lanka, for instance, spelled out in greater detail its proposal on a world disarmament authority.⁴ It suggested that the first task of the authority would be the collection and collation of existing information relating to armaments, their production, distribution, transfer and application. Another function could be the monitoring of disarmament measures. The authority might also be entrusted with the responsibility of controlling and regulating the production and distribution of armaments. Sri Lanka submitted a draft resolution⁵ requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the conditions under which such an institution might be established and to submit that report to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

In elaborating its proposal on a programme of fellowships on disarmament,⁶ Nigeria stated that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament would become increasingly significant as a result of the decisions which the special session would take. However, a wide participation of Member States in disarmament deliberations might not be as effective as it should be because of the lack of expertise in the field, particularly among the group of developing countries. In its opinion, the proposed programme of fellowships would largely promote greater awareness of and greater expertise

⁴ See A/S-10/AC.1/9 and Add.1, annexes.

⁵ A/S-10/AC.1/L.17.

⁶ See A/S-10/AC.1/11, annex.

in issues of disarmament in those Member States and thus greatly facilitate disarmament efforts. Sierra Leone, in supporting the Nigerian initiative, made its own proposal⁷ to the effect that disarmament-related subjects should be introduced in the educational institutions of all States.

The Federal Republic of Germany, after having indicated in the general debate its readiness to make available its experiences and facilities in the field of verification, made two specific proposals. It stated that it intended to make available a seismological observatory for an exchange of international seismic data to review the technical possibilities of monitoring a comprehensive test ban,⁸ and invited all Member States to send their appropriate experts to visit representative chemical plants in the Federal Republic to see that the international on-site inspections within the framework of a chemical-weapons ban could be carried out without prejudicing industrial secrets.⁹ It also indicated that the dates and further details of its invitation would be announced in due course.

The United States, for its part, specified that a United Nations Peace-keeping Reserve could be drawn upon by the Secretary-General whenever the Security Council decided to establish a United Nations force to maintain international peace and security. It also suggested that confidence-building and stabilizing measures in various regions, including notification of manoeuvres, invitations of observers to manoeuvres and United Nations machinery to promote such measures, should be encouraged.¹⁰

The document introduced in the Committee by Uruguay¹¹ provided details on the objectives of the proposed polemological agency. It would, *inter alia*, seek the promotion of multidisciplinary research on peace, its attainment and perfection, with all Member States collaborating in the endeavour through their scientific personnel. The agency would also conduct research on, and an analysis of, all conflicts occurring in the world and establish a network for the collection of data on conflict situations.

The document submitted by Austria, Egypt, India, Mexico, Norway and the United Kingdom¹² elaborated arguments in favour of the proposal first made by the Secretary-General for the establishment of an advisory board of eminent persons, and provided specific language to be included in the draft final document. According to the proposal, the board would be set up by the Secretary-General and it would advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, particularly to prepare and periodically review a programme of studies and give advice on the framework and content of subjects to be studied.

⁷ See A/S-10/AC.1/27, annex.

⁸ See A/S-10/AC.1/12 and Corr.1, annex.

⁹ See A/S-10/AC.1/13, annex.

¹⁰ See A/S-10/AC.1/24, annex.

¹¹ See A/S-10/AC.1/25, annex.

¹² See A/S-10/AC.1/29, annex.

The Canadian proposal,¹³ submitted in the form of amendments, contained the language to be included in various parts of the draft programme of action which would give practical effect to its "strategy of suffocation". Similarly, Ireland provided the specific language for its proposal concerning a voluntary ceiling on national defence expenditures,¹⁴ while Costa Rica submitted a formulation for its proposal regarding disarmament and development.¹⁵

In addition to the documents pertaining to new initiatives, the Committee had before it several other documents which elaborated the proposals originally submitted at the preparatory stage of the special session and reiterated at the session itself. Thus, France spelled out the scope and content of its proposals concerning an international satellite monitoring agency,¹⁶ an international institute for disarmament research¹⁷ and an international disarmament fund for development.¹⁸

In introducing its first proposal, France stated that the agency should be responsible for collecting, processing and disseminating information secured by means of earth observation satellites and its two main functions would concern participation in monitoring the implementation of international disarmament and security agreements and participation in the investigation of a specific situation such as an alleged infringement of an agreement. It should be constituted as a specialized agency of the United Nations which would in the initial stage of its work rely on the data collected by the satellites of those States which possessed them.

The proposed international institute would be essentially designed to pursue a permanent programme of conceptual and applied research on disarmament matters and questions of international security. Its work should be conducted in an independent manner, in conjunction with the Secretary-General and the organs linked to him, particularly the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. France also stressed that, to that end, the institute should be an autonomous entity within the United Nations, with an executive organ and a governing council appointed by the Secretary-General.

An international disarmament fund for development, as proposed by France, would have as its main goal the allocation of loans or grants to developing countries or appropriate intergovernmental organizations out of the resources released by disarmament. Its structure and rules for decision-making would be governed by a system in which a balance would be struck between beneficiary and contributing countries. Contributions would be based on objective data which might be, in the sphere of nuclear weapons, the numbers of vehicles; and in that of conventional weapons, the quantities of

¹³ A/S-10/AC.1/L.6.

¹⁴ See A/S-10/AC.1/21, annex.

¹⁵ See A/S-10/AC.1/40, annex.

¹⁶ See A/S-10/AC.1/7, annex.

¹⁷ See A/S-10/AC.1/8, annex.

¹⁸ See A/S-10/AC.1/28, annex.

certain war equipment, the possession of which could be considered as representative of military efforts.

In presenting those proposals, France pointed out that it was fully aware of their complexity and, consequently, of the need for additional time for their thorough appraisal. In that light, France also submitted three draft resolutions. The first two¹⁹ requested the Secretary-General respectively to gather the views of Member States on the feasibility of the establishment of a satellite monitoring agency and to transmit them to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and to appoint a group of governmental experts entrusted with the preparation of a report on the conditions under which an international institute for disarmament research might be established. The third draft²⁰ expressed the wish that the General Assembly at its thirty-third session should request the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, a study on the possible operating procedure and the nature of the resources of a disarmament fund for development.

The Soviet Union was also among the countries which provided additional details²¹ and arguments for their earlier proposals. In that connexion it again reiterated the idea of convening a world disarmament conference. In its opinion such a conference would respond to the need to accelerate the efforts of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States to resolve disarmament problems. The Soviet Union specified that an important task in the work of the conference would be to discuss ways and means to achieve general and complete disarmament, but that due attention should also be paid to elaborating separate partial measures, such as nuclear disarmament, banning new systems and types of weapons of mass destruction, reducing conventional weapons and renouncing the use of scientific achievements to make more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. It emphasized, in particular, that the whole thrust behind the idea of holding the conference would be to have all States gather together on an equal footing to adopt genuinely binding decisions oriented towards the future, since the conference would provide a decisive turning point in disarmament by moving from the adoption of recommendations and the expression of wishes to the achievement of real agreements. Proposals for other additions or changes in the draft final document, presented in another document,²² concerned mainly the question of the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. They also dealt with other weapons of mass destruction, in particular neutron weapons, military budgets, and other measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence.

A number of other countries submitted their own proposals or amendments to various parts of the draft final document. Thus, for instance, Viet Nam suggested the principles which should, in its opinion, serve as the basis

¹⁹ A/S-10/AC.1/L.14 and L.16.

²⁰ A/S-10/AC.1/L.15.

²¹ See A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex.

²² See A/S-10/AC.1/18, annex.

for working out the definition of a zone of peace in South-East Asia.²³ A Japanese proposal²⁴ concerned the proclamation of 6 August as Disarmament Day. Both Sweden and Norway in respective documents²⁵ expressed readiness to make available their seismological facilities and data for the purpose of verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty. A group of Western countries presented their views on the strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping²⁶ and made a specific recommendation in that regard for language to be included in the appropriate part of the draft final document.

In the course of the Committee's work, three draft resolutions were also submitted. One, sponsored by a large group of countries,²⁷ dealt with the question of military and nuclear collaboration with Israel. In connexion with the same subject matter Iraq also submitted a separate document²⁸ on Israeli armaments. The other two drafts concerned some of the crucial measures of arms regulation under discussion in the drafting groups. One of them, submitted by India and sponsored also by Cyprus and Ethiopia,²⁹ called for an urgent moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests, while the other, submitted by India and sponsored also by Ethiopia,³⁰ called for prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Their submission was prompted by the desire of the sponsors to give a more pronounced expression to the concerns of a number of countries over the lack of more substantive progress with regard to measures of nuclear disarmament. New Zealand and Australia³¹ and also Japan³² proposed some amendments to the draft resolution on nuclear tests.

As already pointed out, some of the States used the opportunity in the *Ad Hoc* Committee to express their over-all views on the arms race and disarmament and, in that connexion, to propose a number of amendments in the draft final document which they were not in the position to do earlier.

China, in describing the international situation from its viewpoint,³³ voiced particular concern for what it considered a visible growth of the factors of war, which was due to the two super-Powers' policies of stepping up the arms race in their contention for world hegemony. In its opinion the struggle for disarmament would play a positive rôle in safeguarding world peace if it was linked with the struggle to defend national independence, state sover-

²³ See A/S-10/AC.1/10, annex.

²⁴ See A/S-10/AC.1/14, annex.

²⁵ See A/S-10/AC.1/19 and 32, annexes.

²⁶ See A/S-10/AC.1/26 and Corr.1 and 2, annex.

²⁷ A/S-10/AC.1/L.Rev.1.

²⁸ See A/S-10/AC.1/3.

²⁹ A/S-10/AC.1/L.10.

³⁰ A/S-10/AC.1/L.11.

³¹ A/S-10/AC.1/L.12.

³² A/S-10/AC.1/L.13.

³³ See A/S-10/AC.1/17, annex.

eignty and territorial integrity against super-Power aggression, interference, subversion and control.

China further noted that at present the super-Power possessed the biggest arsenals in the world while many third-world and other small and medium-sized countries either lacked adequate means of self-defence or had no defence capabilities at all. Therefore, in its opinion, disarmament must start with the two super-Powers. That, it believed, was a fundamental principle on the question of disarmament and a yardstick of real progress in the field. As far as international peace and security in general were concerned, China considered that no country should be allowed to seek or establish hegemony in any form in any part of the world or pursue policies of aggression and war.

Speaking of nuclear weapons, China noted that, although they could not in its opinion annihilate mankind, they were highly destructive and therefore, in order truly to remove the threat of nuclear war, their complete prohibition and thorough destruction were imperative. But it also pointed out that only when major progress had been achieved in the destruction of Soviet and United States nuclear arsenals and in the reduction of their conventional armaments, should the other nuclear countries join them in destroying all nuclear weapons. For the present, however, China considered that all the nuclear countries, particularly the super-Powers, which possessed nuclear weapons in large quantities, should immediately undertake not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that connexion China declared that it was not only ready to undertake such a commitment but wished to reiterate that at no time and under no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons.

In China's opinion, equal importance should be attached to the reduction of conventional and nuclear armaments, and the two should proceed in conjunction. It stressed that the super-Powers must not be allowed to exploit demands for nuclear disarmament to delay the reduction of conventional arms or even to intensify their race in those arms. Further, China urged total prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical and biological weapons, incendiary weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It also expressed full support for the proposals calling for the channelling of resources released through the reduction of military expenditures towards the economic development of the developing countries and stressed that the two super-Powers should undertake to be the first to reduce their expenditures.

Finally, with regard to the disarmament machinery, China pointed out that since the question of disarmament and international security concerned the interests of all countries, it should be deliberated by an international organ with the participation of all countries under the auspices of the United Nations, with the reduction of the armaments of the super-Powers to have priority consideration. With regard to the negotiating body, it should be free of super-Power control and it should be organized through consultations by the deliberative organ and should be responsible to that organ. It should be composed on a fair and equitable basis, so that it could be fully representative, and the specific items and procedures for negotiations should be determined by the deliberative organ.

The basic views of China were expressed also in the form of specific amendments³⁴ to the relevant provisions of the draft final document, which were transmitted to the subsidiary organs for their consideration.

As noted earlier, the *Ad Hoc* Committee accorded an unprecedented role to non-governmental organizations and institutions and was addressed by 25 such organizations and research institutes. The decision in that regard was taken in recognition both of the fact that disarmament directly concerned all the peoples of the world and world public opinion, and of the role which those organizations have played in stimulating greater public interest in and awareness of the problems of the arms race and disarmament. Many of them gave their own accounts of the existing situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament, pointed to the danger of the continuation of the arms race for human survival and put forward a number of specific suggestions and proposals designed to facilitate disarmament efforts. Statements were also made by the representatives of the United Nations Environmental Programme and United Nations Development Programme, who drew the attention of Member States to the serious consequences of the arms race on the environment and development respectively. The statement received from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations³⁵ was transmitted to the Committee by the Secretary-General. In addition, two non-member States made their views known to the Committee: the Holy See made a statement, while Switzerland expressed its views in a separate document.³⁶

Although the activities in the *Ad Hoc* Committee ran parallel to the work carried out in its subsidiary organs, there was a close link and co-ordination between the two. Comments and proposals made in the Committee were passed on to the subsidiary organs for their consideration and possible incorporation in the draft final document. Those organs reported back to the Committee on several occasions in order to inform it about the progress achieved and to receive instructions how to proceed further. After three weeks of intensive and often extremely detailed negotiations, the subsidiary organs completed consideration of the tasks assigned to them. The drafting groups reported to their respective Working Groups A and B on 22 June and they, in turn, submitted the final reports to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on 23 June. In spite of the considerable progress achieved in the work of all subsidiary organs, the draft final document still was not completely free from brackets. The *Ad Hoc* Committee therefore urged the sponsors of the various proposals and other interested delegations to continue intensive consultations with a view to eliminating the remaining brackets. Most remaining differences at that stage concerned the issues which had been contentious not only throughout the work of the special session, but since the inception of the work of the Preparatory Committee.

Thus, in the paragraphs dealing with nuclear disarmament in the section entitled "Programme of action", differences persisted mainly with regard to

³⁴ A/S-10/AC.1/L.2, L.3, L.4, L.7 and L.8.

³⁵ See A/S-10/AC.1/15, annex.

³⁶ See A/S-10/AC.1/2, annex.

three issues: specific measures of nuclear disarmament which would require urgent negotiations with a view to reaching early agreements, non-use of nuclear weapons, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

With regard to specific measures, the United States maintained that the process of nuclear disarmament should start with measures designed to halt the build-up of nuclear weapons followed by measures for the reduction of stockpiles of those weapons. That being the general framework, all other specifics would be determined in the course of actual negotiations. The USSR continued to place the emphasis on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and on subsequent gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they were completely eliminated. Those measures, however, would be inseparable from the consolidation of political and international legal guarantees for the security of States, the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations being a major step in that direction. In the context of slowing down the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union also emphasized the need for prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons and for the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on territories of States where there were no such weapons at present. The non-aligned countries called for a number of very specific measures aimed, first, at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and then at the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons and the cessation of production of such weapons until they were completely eliminated.

The question of non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war, and the related problem of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, were also the subject of differences. Most non-nuclear-weapon States held that, in view of the devastating results that nuclear weapons would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the nuclear-weapon States had special responsibility for preventing the outbreak of nuclear war and for concluding agreements prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States, however, reiterated their earlier proposals on the issue, which were based on the differing concepts of their own requirements.

Such differences were also reflected with regard to the question of security guarantees. The non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon States maintained that the renunciation of the possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons entitled them to explicit guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear Powers were ready to consider such undertakings under certain conditions. The Soviet Union once again declared that it would not use nuclear weapons against those States which renounced the production and acquisition of such weapons and had no nuclear weapons on their territories, and to that end called for the conclusion of special bilateral agreements between nuclear and appropriate non-nuclear States. France reiterated that it was prepared to give such guarantees, in accordance with arrangements to be negotiated, to those States which would constitute among themselves nuclear-weapon-free zones. The United Kingdom confirmed its readiness to take part with other nuclear Powers in firm, far-reaching and permanent assurances to the non-nuclear States. The United States, for its part, further elaborated previously given assurances by stating that it would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State

except in the case of an attack on the United States or its allies by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State, or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack. China reiterated its commitment never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

Finally, with regard to non-proliferation, the remaining issues chiefly concerned the question of how to prevent proliferation without jeopardizing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Many non-nuclear-weapon States considered that, since horizontal proliferation had been largely precluded by means of safeguards agreements, vertical proliferation was the principal remaining danger and therefore efforts should be directed towards curbing the nuclear arms race. Further, they emphasized their inalienable rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and insisted that no restrictions should be imposed by the nuclear-weapon States in that regard. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union continued to express particular concern for preventing possible horizontal proliferation and, as an effective means to that end, urged adherence by all States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex) and the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or through bilateral arrangements between suppliers and recipients. In turn, it was argued, especially by India, Brazil and Pakistan, that the Treaty was discriminatory in nature and hence could not serve as a viable non-proliferation instrument. Strengthening the safeguard system would be acceptable only if it were to be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, in other words, if it covered all nuclear activities of all States, including the nuclear-weapon States.

The main differences in the area of conventional weapons were due to divergent approaches between the Western and many of the non-aligned countries. The Western group continued to express particular concern about the arms build-up in developing countries through the international transfer of arms and about the prevention of the outbreak of armed conflicts among such countries. Developing countries were more concerned about the improvements, by developed countries, of conventional weapons which, in their opinion, in some areas had attained such a high level of sophistication as seriously to affect the over-all situation in the field of armaments. They also held that the question of the regulation of the international transfer of arms should be dealt with in conjunction with the production of weapons so as to avoid discriminatory treatment of recipient States. Many of them, and in particular China, insisted that all States should have appropriate quantities of conventional armaments in order to be able to exercise their inherent right of self-defence.

With regard to the problem of military budgets, agreement was not reached because both the Eastern European and Western States adhered to their original positions. The first group, noting different economic, budgeting and accounting systems in the world, supported the principle of uniformity in the measurement of budgets, and felt that a system of "comparability" in measurements and of standardized reporting should be worked out through a pilot study to be prepared under United Nations auspices. The other group

advocated a system of figures expressed in absolute terms. Both groups, however, basically agreed that the reduction should apply, in the first place, to the budgets of permanent members of the Security Council as well as other States with a large military potential. Some other countries, notably China and Mexico, considered that the two major Powers should take the lead. In addition, many non-aligned countries insisted that the savings released through reductions of military budgets should be channelled through the United Nations as development assistance to developing countries.

In addition, there were differing views in connexion with the provisions dealing with the implementation of disarmament agreements, including the question of verification. Many States, particularly Pakistan, stressed that verification measures should be non-discriminatory and should not constitute undue interference in the internal affairs of States or impede their economic and social development programmes. Several countries, notably Austria and France, emphasized their specific proposals with regard to verification methods.

Other outstanding questions concerning measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence involved proposals such as the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, non-admission of new members to existing military alliances, non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of States in which there were none at present (advocated by Eastern European countries), the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping reserve (proposed by Western countries), withdrawal of foreign troops and military bases and the dissolution of military blocs (supported by the non-aligned countries and Romania).

The language of the last two sections of the draft programme of action, one dealing with a comprehensive programme for disarmament and the other with guidelines for implementation, were a continuing source of difficulty. Lack of progress in finalizing those provisions was due essentially to their close linkage with other provisions of the draft final document which remained unresolved.

A number of brackets also existed in the section entitled "Machinery". The main unresolved issue concerned the question of a negotiating body on disarmament. The existing negotiating body—the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—continued to be the subject of criticism by many countries who spoke of what they considered to be relative ineffectiveness, lack of openness and procedures which gave prominent roles to its co-chairmen, and who cited the absence of France and China from its work. Eastern European States, however, expressed the view that certain changes and improvements in the procedures would be sufficient and that the CCD, considering the important role it had played, should remain the principal negotiating body. That position was basically shared by the United States and a number of Western countries. The non-aligned countries considered that a more comprehensive reorganization was needed, including the establishment of a strong link with the United Nations. France and China believed that it should be a completely new body established within the framework of the United Nations, with its composition based on the principle of equitable geographical distribution.

Certain States, notably the United Kingdom and Mexico, believed that the Committee should be thoroughly reappraised rather than replaced by a new body.

Another important issue concerned a world disarmament conference. Eastern European States stressed the need of convening such a conference and proposed that the special session recommend the date for it and establish a preparatory committee which would submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session. The non-aligned countries supported, in principle, the holding of a world disarmament conference reiterating, however, that all nuclear-weapon Powers should participate in its work. Since those Powers continued to express different views on the conference, no agreement on the text was reached at that time.

The intensive negotiations which took place in the last few days of the special session eventually proved successful. All the remaining brackets were eliminated, either by leaving out contentious proposals or replacing them with compromise formulations. In addition, the sponsors of draft resolutions decided not to press them to the vote. Instead, they placed their proposals on record at the special session with the view to taking them up, as warranted, at the subsequent regular sessions of the General Assembly.

Due to the complexity of the unresolved issues and the prolonged negotiations required to resolve them, the closure of the special session had to be postponed for 24 hours in order to enable the *Ad Hoc* Committee to review and formally adopt the draft text before submitting it to the plenary meeting of the Assembly. At the last meeting of the Committee, on 29 June, the draft final document was adopted by consensus. In subsequent statements, however, a number of States indicated that their participation in the consensus should not be interpreted to mean complete approval of every provision of the document since they would have preferred different formulations for many of those provisions. Others stated they would have preferred to see additional elements included. But, in view of the extraordinary importance of the special session, those States decided to place on record their separate views on specific matters rather than to stand in the way of the adoption of the document by consensus. Their preliminary reactions to the final document were expressed at the same meeting of the Committee, but more elaborate statements were made in the subsequent plenary meeting.

Adoption of the Final Document of the special session

The *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted the report on its work to the General Assembly at the 27th plenary meeting on 30 June. The report contained two recommendations: one, that the General Assembly should adopt the draft resolution embodying the draft final document, and the other, that it should refer to its thirty-third session the consideration of the draft resolution on military and nuclear collaboration with Israel. Both recommendations were adopted by consensus. Israel stated, however, that if the latter recommendation had been put to the vote, it would have voted against it. Thus, the work of

the special session was finally brought to a successful conclusion. Before the session was formally closed, a number of statements were made, many of them by States wishing to give explanations of their positions on those provisions of the Final Document which were not to their full satisfaction.

Thus, Bolivia, which spoke first after the adoption of the Document, regretted the fact that the concept of preventive action for the strengthening of international peace and security had not been more explicitly and forcefully reflected in the Final Document of the special session. Canada noted that its deeply held convictions on the necessity of strengthening the international non-proliferation system and encouraging broader adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were not reflected in the terms in which it would have drafted them if it had not been loyal to the agreed objective of one consensus document. Additional comments were made by other countries. The United Kingdom, for instance, wished that the Final Document and the covering resolution were more balanced in the emphasis they placed on conventional and nuclear disarmament and on the measures to prevent nuclear proliferation; in addition, it pointed out that the references to the requirement of taking into account the right of peoples to self-determination in the provisions on the limitation of transfer of conventional arms did not in any way imply its acceptance of the desirability of using force to resolve conflicts arising from the search for self-determination. In its opinion, those matters should be resolved by peaceful means. Concerning the subject of non-proliferation, Belgium also regretted what it considered to be the inadequate nature of the reference to the non-proliferation Treaty. It stated also that it considered the non-use of force or the threat of force as an absolute principle which was not limited only to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as the language of the respective provisions of the Final Document might suggest. In Finland's view, the non-proliferation Treaty remained the best instrument to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It had hoped, therefore, that the Final Document would take due note of the fact that non-proliferation and increased international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy were not contradictory but complementary. Sweden, in its comments, made special mention of the important contribution a comprehensive test ban would make to the process of curbing the nuclear arms race, and stated that the special responsibility of the leading nuclear-weapon Powers was clearly expressed in the Programme of Action. With regard to nuclear measures, it also advocated the freezing of qualitative improvements; the cessation of research and development of new types and systems and means of delivery; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; the balanced reduction of stockpiles; and the prevention of proliferation. Austria, for its part, felt that the provision of the Programme of Action which stated that "Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States . . ." was rather unclear and would have preferred that provision if the measures had been specified.

Remarks made by Brazil also concerned nuclear disarmament. Regrets were expressed that the special session did not produce a true commitment to

nuclear disarmament on the part of the international community and, in particular, of the nuclear-weapon States. Pakistan made a formal reservation regarding the formulation of the principle on non-proliferation. In its opinion, while that provision recognized the inalienable right of States to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, it contained ambiguous language which was capable of being used to justify policies of restraint and restrictions, deprivation and discrimination. It also regretted that the security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States were not given in a binding form and within a universal framework.

Comments made by France concerned several issues. In the first place, France expressed its reservations with regard to the provisions on the non-use of nuclear weapons. In its opinion, those provisions, in effect, made reference to the limitation or the prohibition of nuclear weapons in a way which did not sufficiently take into consideration the need for equilibrium—the fundamental prerequisite for any undertaking concerning disarmament. With regard to assurances on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, France reiterated that it was prepared to give such assurances, in accordance with arrangements to be negotiated, only to those States which constituted among themselves non-nuclear zones. France also pointed out that the cessation of nuclear tests should be seen in the context of a genuine disarmament process. It would be erroneous to believe that a halt to testing would in fact produce a qualitative freeze in nuclear weapons since the two most heavily armed Powers had accumulated sufficient data by means of numerous tests which they had carried out to allow them to make any qualitative improvements they might desire without carrying out new tests. In its opinion, the cessation of tests in itself, therefore, would make no decisive contribution to preventing the production of new types of weapons or to non-proliferation. For those reasons France disassociated itself completely from the consensus on that particular provision.

Sri Lanka spoke on behalf of the non-aligned countries. It said that they would have preferred to have seen a somewhat different appraisal of the dangers resulting from the arms race and the accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, in aggravating tensions, intensifying conflicts and impeding détente. The non-aligned countries also regretted the absence of provisions on the principle of the incompatibility between the maintenance of military bases and the presence of foreign troops in foreign territories, on the one hand, and international peace and security, on the other. In addition, those countries were dissatisfied with the provisions with regard to the non-use of nuclear weapons since they contained no binding commitments or assurances from the nuclear-weapon States that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State. Finally, in the opinion of the non-aligned countries, provisions for nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace were qualified in such a way that they reduced the validity of such measures in the disarmament process. Similar comments were made by India. In particular, it considered that the Document did not reflect at all the sense of urgency to stop the nuclear arms race since it failed to formulate a time-bound programme for the implementation of measures pertaining to

nuclear disarmament. India also repeated its strong reservations on the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. In its opinion, the problem of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, could be solved only in a total manner, on a world-wide basis and not by compartmentalizing the world. Therefore, India maintained that the whole world should be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Finally, it expressed dissatisfaction with the casual manner in which the question of the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was dealt with in the Document. The same view was shared by Yugoslavia, which expressed additional regrets because no references regarding the Mediterranean were included in the Final Document. It pointed out that it would interpret the provisions for zones of peace as applying to the Mediterranean as well, and, therefore, as constituting a basis for further efforts that had to be exerted in order to transform that region into a zone of peace. Further, Yugoslavia reiterated its view that in the implementation of measures in the field of conventional disarmament there should always be full respect for the right of all peoples, in particular, of peoples under colonial rule and of liberation movements, to have at their disposal the means indispensable to their struggle for freedom and independence.

Comments made by China concerned all sections of the Final Document. In its opinion, the Introduction and Declaration "failed to pinpoint the intensifying rivalry between the two super-Powers for world hegemony as the source of a new world war and their stepped-up arms race as a threat to international peace and security". It further stated that the principle that disarmament must start with the two major Powers should have been explicitly written into the Document and embodied in the relevant sections, and reiterated its view that the other nuclear countries should join in destroying all nuclear weapons only when major progress had been achieved by those two Powers in both nuclear and conventional disarmament. With regard to the section on Machinery, China regretted that it failed to specify explicitly that the composition of the new negotiating body should be based on equitable geographical distribution. It further maintained that the body should have been made accountable to the deliberative organ and specific negotiable items determined by the same organ through consultations.

New Zealand referred, in particular, to the question of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. It stated that it would have preferred the text to have called for submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at its thirty-third regular session, rather than "at the earliest possible date". New Zealand also considered that the reform of the negotiating body did not go far enough. Cyprus, for its part, regretted that the Programme of Action did not define the means of stopping the arms race through compliance with essential provisions of the Charter, while Cuba expressed a strong dissatisfaction because no reference was made to the removal of military bases from foreign territories. The United Republic of Cameroon stated that it would have preferred clear, unambiguous guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States that they would refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In Albania's opinion, "the Final Document, like the proceed-

ings of the session, has shown that the tenth special session devoted to disarmament has failed to achieve any concrete results”.

Algeria stated that it could not accept the idea that the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would automatically be compromised by the dissemination of nuclear technology or allow that idea to serve as a pretext for restrictions on the transfer of that technology. It pointed out that not only the inalienable right to have free access to nuclear technology must be solemnly recognized and guaranteed for each and every country, but also that concrete measures must be taken to make access to nuclear technology effective and to facilitate such access for the developing countries. Algeria also repeated its regrets that consensus was not reached concerning the establishment of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean. That view was also expressed by Malta.

Both Italy and Australia made comments regarding the question of non-proliferation. In Italy's view, the Final Document did not recognize, as would have been appropriate, the central role that could be played by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, especially if fully and correctly implemented, in the efforts of the international community to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation. Australia stated that the Document did not give explicit recognition to the fact that the Treaty was the only comprehensive international instrument directed against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or to the fact that it was accepted by a substantial majority of the international community. Neither did it make clear that the right of all nations to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes called for a reciprocal obligation, a binding commitment, not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons; nor did it make explicit that international safeguards arrangements might need to be strengthened to provide the necessary climate of confidence that would foster stable nuclear trade and closer international co-operation in the peaceful development of nuclear energy. The comments of Jordan also concerned the question of non-proliferation, but more from the point of view of security guarantees. It felt that, due to what it described as “the nuclear activities of Israel in the Middle East in collaboration with a State in Africa, namely, South Africa”, the Final Document failed to call upon the nuclear Powers to give non-nuclear-weapon States in the Middle East and Africa, which were parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, assured guarantees against nuclear attack by a third party.

In its comments on the Final Document, the United States referred to two specific items. In the first place, it reiterated the view that the establishment of zones of peace must be consistent with, and could not abridge, the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence guaranteed in the Charter or other rights recognized under international law, including the right of innocent passage and historical high-seas freedoms. Secondly, it regretted that, with regard to the limitation or reduction of military budgets, it was not possible to reach a consensus on a wording identifying the essential first steps—standardized measurement and reporting, the development of techniques for international comparison, and verification—which must be taken if one were to advance towards negotiated reductions.

The last two countries to make reference to specific unsatisfactory provisions of the Final Document were Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Nigeria remarked that the placement in the Programme of Action of nuclear disarmament on the same level as conventional disarmament failed to reflect the urgency which most people in the world attached to the question of nuclear disarmament. The comments of Sierra Leone addressed two different issues. In its opinion, the Declaration lacked adequate provisions on the question of the strengthening of international peace and confidence among States. It also expressed the view that insufficient attention was devoted to the issue of disarmament and economic development in the light of the new international economic order and acknowledgement by all participants of the interdependence between disarmament and development.

In addition, a number of the Western countries, in explaining their positions after the adoption of the Document, indicated that one of their concerns, the area of conventional disarmament, revolved around the international transfer of arms to developing countries. A number of the non-aligned countries, for their part, were concerned that parallel treatment of nuclear and conventional weapons would detract from the urgency that should be given to efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament, and reiterated their view that the question of conventional disarmament should be addressed in the first place by military alliances.

In addition to those States which made statements in order to place on record their interpretation of some of the provisions or certain reservations or regrets that some provisions had not been drafted in a different way, many other States, namely, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Greece, Iran, Israel, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Somalia, Turkey and Viet Nam, spoke at the last plenary meeting of the General Assembly voicing their general satisfaction with the over-all outcome of the work of the special session and its Final Document.

Final Document of the special session

Despite the complexity of the problems that the special session dealt with, the Final Document provides a broad platform for further work and for additional efforts by the United Nations in the field of disarmament. For the full text of resolution S-10/2, which embodies the Final Document, see appendix I below.

Introduction and Declaration

The first two sections of the Final Document are mainly intended to establish a basic framework for further efforts in the field of disarmament. The provisions contained therein provide an assessment of the present international situation and of the dangers which the continuation of the arms race presents to the survival of mankind and, in view of that, the need to strengthen efforts to halt and reverse such a development. The Introduction describes the main

roots of the present arms race and the reasons for lack of more substantial results in the field of disarmament, i.e. of the situation which warranted the convening of the special session.

Against that background, the Declaration sets out the goals, priorities and principles which should guide further negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament. These goals, priorities and principles place disarmament issues in a more comprehensive perspective than has been the case so far and also reaffirm the basic importance for disarmament of international peace and security as provided in the Charter of the United Nations.

In the case of goals and priorities, for instance, general and complete disarmament is reaffirmed as the ultimate objective of the disarmament process, but it is clearly stated that in the process of attaining that objective effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. Similarly, the importance of conventional disarmament is recognized in the clear statement contained in the Declaration that negotiations in that area should be carried out together with those on nuclear disarmament measures. With regard to collateral measures, they are described in correlation with other measures of disarmament. Their importance is reaffirmed, mainly as a means of creating favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures.

The principles set out in the Declaration are designed to provide fundamental guidelines for negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament. Some of them are primarily of a political character while others are more of a technical or procedural nature. Several attempts are made to lay down the more conceptual principles relating to disarmament efforts. Disarmament is seen as the practical elaboration of the spirit and the letter of the Charter of the United Nations. Thus, the first principle reaffirms the full commitment of Member States to the purposes and principles of the Charter, and in particular, to the non-use or threat of use of force in international relations, while the second reasserts the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. By way of elaboration of the second principle, it is further stated that to discharge its role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in the field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations. It is stated that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations and the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. It is further provided that while disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

An important step is also made with regard to verification. The right of parties to agreements to participate in the verification process, directly or through the United Nations system, is explicitly recognized as one of the basic principles. That principle provides one of the guidelines for future agreements.

Other principles are set forth, relating, *inter alia*, to the right of each State to security, to the balance of responsibilities and obligations between non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States, to disarmament and relaxation of international tension, to disarmament and development, to nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to non-proliferation, with the objective of contributing to the creation of more favourable conditions for further disarmament efforts.

Programme of Action

The Programme of Action proved to be the most sensitive and difficult section. Substantive differences existed not only with regard to the specific measures to be included in the Programme, but also as to its general nature, including the question of the time-frame within which it should be carried out. In view of the extent of differences and pressure of time, a less ambitious approach than some had originally hoped for was agreed upon. As a result, the Programme concentrates on the measures of an immediate and short-term nature on which there are reasonable chances of agreement or, at least, on which negotiations could be initiated at an early date; other measures are dealt with in a rather general manner and their actual consideration is left for subsequent negotiations in the context of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Although that approach considerably facilitated negotiations and reduced the number of controversial issues, including the question of the time-frame, it did not entirely eliminate them. Substantial differences remained on a number of issues, in particular, that of nuclear disarmament.

Thus, in the area of nuclear disarmament, although some rather specific recommendations were developed, it was not possible to agree on any specific immediate action that would follow. With regard to the steps for halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and for the final elimination of nuclear weapons, for example, the text represents a step forward in determining the direction of further efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. It does not specifically commit the nuclear-weapon States to begin negotiations or to assume binding commitments for implementation of specific measures, but calls for urgent negotiations on agreements for the cessation of development and production of nuclear weapons and for their progressive and balanced reduction, "at appropriate stages", rather than at specific times. Recommendations with respect to the conclusion of ongoing negotiations on SALT and a comprehensive test ban treaty likewise provide no specific time schedules for action. The Programme takes implicit note of the "special responsibility" of the two leading nuclear Powers in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament by stating that in the process of nuclear disarmament account should be taken of the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. Those formulations were adopted with the agreement of both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Due to the differences in positions set forth in the consideration of the questions of non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war, no binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons was provided for in the Programme. The question of non-use of nuclear weapons was linked to the creation of conditions in international relations in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations could be agreed upon which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Due to the basic conceptual differences in the approaches of the nuclear-weapon States to the question of guarantees, it was not possible to agree on any single generally acceptable formulation whereby the nuclear-weapon States would explicitly undertake that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon States. Instead, note is taken of the declarations made by those States which set out the circumstances and conditions under which assurances would apply. In this area, some changes in the direction of more specific commitments were noticeable in the position of certain nuclear-weapon States on the question of security guarantees. The United States, for example, put forward a new formulation on the subject (see chapter XI below).

The text of the Final Document provides for continuation of the consideration of the subject matter by calling upon the nuclear-weapon States to take steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was encouraged in the formulation of the Programme as an important disarmament measure. Nuclear-weapon States are called upon to respect strictly the status and refrain from use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of such zones. Measures identified as especially desirable are the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), denuclearization of Africa, a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

In view of substantial differences in positions with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the relevant paragraphs of the Programme of Action were formulated in rather general terms. References to specific measures that might facilitate the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically are included in the Programme in the context of the full implementation of existing instruments such as the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Also, passages on peaceful uses repeat the consensus language of the relevant part of General Assembly resolution 32/50.³⁷ The Programme makes no specific reference to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

In the course of negotiations and consultations, other parts of the Programme underwent numerous changes. In the provisions on zones of peace,

³⁷ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), pp. 155-156.

for instance, no specific reference is made to the Mediterranean, and those regarding the Indian Ocean are formulated somewhat in rather general terms. In the discussions on other weapons of mass destruction, two issues were particularly controversial—neutron weapons and new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. In light of continuing differences, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States, the first issue is not covered in the final text. In the case of the other issue, a compromise formula was agreed upon which accommodated the Eastern European group by stating that efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such weapons, and the Western group by providing that specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified.

The provisions on conventional weapons, like the corresponding principle in the Declaration, were drafted in the light of differing approaches to the issues between, in this instance, the Western and many non-aligned countries. Texts were finally developed in the Declaration and in the Programme which met the concerns of both sides. The formulation states that negotiations on conventional disarmament should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. In addition, provision is made for negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons.

Concerning the question of military budgets, in view of the substantial differences between the Eastern European and Western States, the text adopted states that the General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate their reduction bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on the question.

With regard to provisions dealing with the problem of implementation of disarmament agreements and, in that context, with the question of verification, it was not possible to reach consensus on any specific proposal. The text adopted provides that, in the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification shall be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in the field considered.

The questions of the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, proposed by the Soviet Union, and the withdrawal of foreign troops and military bases and the dissolution of military blocs, advocated by the non-aligned countries and Romania, could not be agreed upon. Neither proposal was included in the text. References are made, however, to such measures as the prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communication between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict. The Document also invites States to assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements, as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.

With regard to the question of disarmament studies, their importance as a means of promoting international peace and security and of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament is recognized. Work on two specific

studies—one on disarmament and development and the other on disarmament and international security—was endorsed. The specific guidelines for carrying out other studies should be determined by the thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly, taking into account the proposals already submitted, as well as others which may be introduced later. In doing so, the Assembly would take into consideration a report on those matters prepared by the Secretary-General.

In order to mobilize disarmament forces and promote expertise in disarmament, particularly in the developing countries, the General Assembly took a decision to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, the basic details of which are outlined in the Document.

The last part of the section deals with a comprehensive programme for disarmament. The main characteristic of the text is that the Committee on Disarmament is entrusted to elaborate such a programme, and that it would encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament becomes a reality. It also states that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

Machinery

The section entitled “Machinery” contains a number of specific decisions. In the first place, it reaffirms that the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Several specific decisions relating to the fulfilment of that role are set forth. In order to permit more thorough consideration of disarmament issues, it was decided, on the one hand, that the First Committee should deal in the future only with disarmament and related international security questions and, on the other hand, to establish a Disarmament Commission composed of all Member States as a new deliberative body and subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. The Commission is entrusted with the function of considering and making recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and follow-up of the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session. It is provided that it should consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations through the General Assembly to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament, for elaboration. This concept provides an institutionalized framework through which the United Nations can influence and contribute to the over-all disarmament efforts, and to that extent it should strengthen its role in the field of disarmament.

Another important decision concerns the negotiating body on disarmament. Highly divergent views on that question were maintained until late in the session; however, the compromise formula adopted reflects many of the positions expressed with regard to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The negotiating body, now called the Committee on Disarmament,

is open to all nuclear-weapon States, all members of the CCD and a number of other States. Concerning its relation to the United Nations, it was agreed that members of the Committee are to be chosen in consultation with the President of the thirty-third session of the Assembly. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the Committee, is requested to appoint the Secretary of the Committee, who shall also act as his personal representative to assist the Committee and its Chairman in organizing its business and time-table. In drawing up its new agenda, the Committee will take into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly, to which it will regularly submit reports on its work. Other measures provide for the review of its membership at regular intervals, for rotation of the chairmanship, and for a greater possibility of participation by non-members in the work of the Committee. It was decided that the Committee would conduct its work by consensus.

The section entitled "Machinery" also deals with a number of other important issues, one of them being the question of a world disarmament conference. It states that at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

In connexion with the fulfilment of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the Document recognizes the special responsibilities of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, which, it states, should be strengthened adequately, and its research and information functions accordingly extended. In the field of studies, information, education and training provided for in the Programme of Action, the Centre is expected to undertake increased assignments. It will also provide more conference services. Finally, it is provided that its contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions should be increased.

The Secretary-General's proposal for the establishment of an advisory board was adopted with provision to ensure equitable geographical representation. The board will advise him on various aspects of disarmament studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies.

Finally, the Document contains provisions on the question of follow-up. As noted earlier, in the course of the session a number of proposals were advanced, many of them of a far-reaching nature. Since all of those proposals required detailed discussions concerning their organizational and functional aspects and financial arrangements, consideration of them was deferred; however, the Secretary-General is requested to transmit them, together with the Final Document, to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs for further consideration.

In addition, beginning with the thirty-third session, the General Assembly will have regularly on its agenda an item on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the special session. A further follow-up of the special session will be undertaken, however, by another special session, the date to be decided upon at the thirty-third session.

Conclusion

It is largely felt that the deliberations at the special session contributed substantially to a better understanding of the issues involved in the field of the arms race and disarmament. That understanding, in turn, generated an atmosphere characterized by the desire of the participants to move towards co-operation and mutual accommodation, thus providing the necessary impetus to further successful negotiations in the field. Consequently, in spite of the insistence by participants on particular positions and hard and prolonged discussion on almost every issue, a spirit of seeking mutually acceptable solutions prevailed at the crucial final stages of the session; moreover, there was an awareness among the participants that in the search for what each considered to be the optimum solution to the various matters under consideration, due account had to be taken of the views of other members and of existing realities in international relations. As a result, concessions were made by all parties.

At the closing of the special session on 30 June the Secretary-General made a statement in which, *inter alia*, he said:

When this Assembly convened on 23 May, I stated that this unprecedented special session would be the largest, most representative meeting ever convened to consider the problem of disarmament. I am now able to add that at this session there has been the most extensive and useful discussion of disarmament on a world-wide basis that has yet been held. The breadth and level of participation in this historic session have been remarkable. This fact has demonstrated clearly that Governments and peoples throughout the world are profoundly aware of the threat posed to their survival by ever-growing armaments and arms technology. As a result of your deliberations, this awareness has been further heightened.

Prior to this session, it was increasingly evident that the disarmament problem had become so complex that it had to be dealt with within a comprehensive framework. One of your great achievements has been the construction of such a framework, with agreement on the basic principles and priorities to which we must address ourselves in moving towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

In a relatively short period of time, there has been a thorough-going discussion of all major aspects of disarmament. New elements, both for study and negotiation, were introduced and a larger area of consensus among Member States has emerged.

. . . It is a source of satisfaction as well that the substantive advances in new ideas, new perspectives, and newly broadened areas of consensus have been matched in practical terms by improvements in disarmament machinery. A negotiating forum has now been agreed upon by consensus of the United Nations membership. This is a significant move, opening the possibility for participation by all nuclear-weapon States.

I should also like to express satisfaction that Member States have enabled the United Nations to continue to be actively involved in the disarmament process. A deliberative body, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, will follow this up by giving a meaningful role to all Member States in considering, on a continuing basis, the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament.

I am particularly gratified at the positive response of Member States to my proposal for establishment of an advisory board of eminent persons.

There has been progress in the direct involvement of peoples as well. An unprecedented role has been accorded to the non-governmental organizations. They have made a very meaningful contribution at this special session, and through their participation have stimulated the debate and enriched the exchange of ideas. I very much hope that their commitment to the cause of disarmament will ensure that the momentum that has been created by the special session will be sustained in the future.

These are tangible and specific accomplishments of the session. One senses here a climate of increased political commitment at the highest governmental level to achieve meaningful disarmament in the interest of practical security, in the interest of economic progress and development, and in the interest of human rights and social justice.

In the final statement of the session by the President of the General Assembly the following parts, among others, served to evaluate the special session:

The strengthening of the machinery, and especially of a negotiating body which will facilitate further deliberation, harmonization and the conclusion of a number of measures aimed at disarmament, was the central focus of this session. The focus was evident in statements made by many distinguished world statesmen. It is obvious that only through negotiations will it be possible in the coming years to make a more significant and substantial breakthrough in all aspects of the complex problem of disarmament which appeared on our agenda. There is no doubt that the decisions in the Final Document relating to this matter represent very important and, I may say, historic achievements of this session. The role of the United Nations and of the General Assembly in dealing with disarmament problems has been strengthened. The United Nations Disarmament Commission, a deliberative body, will make possible the continuation in the future of the dialogue initiated at this special session. In a few years from now we shall have another special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a session that will bring new decisions and measures. A negotiating body has been established which will work in the spirit of the proposals submitted during this session. The negotiating process will thus continue. Negotiations will be conducted on a number of measures in conformity with the decisions of the current session, and this negotiating body will become even more closely linked with the United Nations and its procedures. With respect to the agreement reached on the future of the negotiating body, I should like to state for the record that it was reached on the understanding that the members of the existing negotiating body are members of the Committee on Disarmament.

Many proposals submitted to this special session on which it was not possible to agree for various reasons will be the subject of further deliberations and decision-making within the framework of the United Nations and the bodies established for this purpose at this special session.

All that we have achieved merits the full attention of the international community. If we have not lived up to the most optimistic expectations, and if we have not achieved even more important results, this should not be taken as a reason for disillusionment or disappointment. We did not, obviously, make a major breakthrough towards halting the arms race. We were not able to agree on new and meaningful disarmament measures. What we have not accomplished now, we shall accomplish later. What we have done is finally to chart a new course and open new channels for further negotiations.

Accomplishments of the special session may be viewed as the beginning rather than the end of a process. Their potential is generally held to be considerable; a final evaluation may well depend upon the nature of the follow-up actions by both Governments and peoples. The new machinery provides a framework for such actions involving wider participation of Member States on a more continuous basis. To this extent the role of the United Nations has been strengthened in its capacity to advance important objectives and principles of its Charter.

Follow-up of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF FOLLOW-UP received a great deal of attention at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Adequate continuation of the work of the session is ensured in several different ways. Several provisions of the Final Document, in the section dealing with machinery, entrust both the deliberative and negotiating organs, each in its own sphere of competence, with the task of giving practical effect to the Programme of Action. The Final Document also provides for follow-up of those numerous proposals and suggestions submitted to the General Assembly at its special session which, due to their complexity, were not incorporated into the Programme of Action, but were listed in paragraph 125 of the Document as an integral part of the work of the special session which deserved to be studied further and more thoroughly. One of these provisions requests the Secretary-General to transmit those proposals, together with all the official records of the special session, to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs in accordance with recommendations which the Assembly may adopt at its thirty-third session. That provision facilitated the adoption of the Final Document by consensus, since the sponsors of various proposals were thus assured that their initiatives would be taken up again and therefore they did not press for definitive decisions on them at the special session. The Document also includes provision for periodic review of the realization of the goals and objectives set forth by the special session. In view of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the area of disarmament, that function was entrusted to the General Assembly which would include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third and subsequent sessions an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session".

Thus, the follow-up system envisaged in the Final Document rests upon three basic elements. The first deals with machinery for elaboration of specific measures outlined in the Programme of Action, the second with means to supplement the Programme with additional proposals and initiatives and the third provides for member States to observe and influence the process of implementation.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

The fact that the summer session was the last session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament was to begin early in 1979, influenced its work following the special session. In view of the relatively short time at its disposal, and the several issues on its agenda which were still awaiting solution, the Committee was not able to complete the work on the subjects under consideration or to initiate work on proposals or measures emanating from the Final Document. Member States did, however, make general statements reiterating their views on disarmament problems in general as well as on specific measures recalling, in particular, various proposals which they had put forward to promote solution of outstanding problems in the field of disarmament. In this context practically all members made reference to the special session and its achievements.¹ Most of them dealt with evaluation of the session, generally in accordance with views which a number of States had already expressed at the special session. Several members, however, referred specifically to those aspects of the Final Document which were of direct significance for the future work of the negotiating body. Thus, the United States pointed out that it was especially significant that the special session had recognized that there was an urgent need that existing international disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character. It welcomed in particular the participation of France in the new negotiating body and noted that the Committee on Disarmament would also be open to China. Similarly, the United Kingdom considered that the most tangible results of the session were the decisions taken regarding the restructuring of the deliberative and negotiating machinery.

The Soviet Union said that the special session had confirmed the interest of all the peoples of the world in putting an end to the arms race and in achieving real disarmament, and had also demonstrated that serious obstacles still remained to be overcome. The Eastern European States noted the positive results of the session, each emphasizing certain points, for example, the fact that it had been a reflection of the trend towards détente and the strengthening of confidence (Czechoslovakia); its value in helping to increase the awareness of world public opinion of the dangers of the arms race and necessity for meaningful disarmament (Hungary); the significant contribution of countries of the socialist community to the success of the work of the session (Mongolia); the forceful reaffirmation of the priorities to be applied in disarmament negotiations and the improvements in the negotiating body (Poland); and the creation of the possibility of a new approach to disarmament and the opening of new avenues for future negotiations in the light of its elaboration by consensus of principles for negotiations, revision of the machinery, and the rich heritage of ideas and proposals put forward (Romania). Romania also

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, particularly paras. 276-293.

felt, however, that the Programme of Action was not sufficiently detailed and would not compel States to adopt disarmament measures.

The Western representatives also stressed the positive outcome of the session, calling attention to such points as the participation of many world leaders and active involvement of all the nuclear-weapon States, and the solemn declarations by three of them—the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States—regarding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States (Canada); the recording in the Final Document of all the important disarmament objectives while at the same time making clear their interdependence and the close link between nuclear and conventional disarmament (Federal Republic of Germany); and the promoting of general awareness, among both Governments and peoples, of the need for disarmament and the difficulties involved, and the decisions taken regarding the restructuring of the deliberative and negotiating machinery (United Kingdom). The Netherlands, while welcoming the adoption by consensus of the Final Document, referred to what it felt was some regrettably ambiguous language and expressed disappointment that more had not been achieved with respect to the parts of the Document dealing with nuclear disarmament and trade in conventional weapons. The representative of Italy, while noting that the Final Document did not fully reflect his Government's views, none the less stated that the priorities in the Programme of Action would put pressure on States that were in a position to negotiate the realization of fresh achievements. The United Kingdom also included in its remarks that the true test of the session was a question for future historians dependent upon whether, assisted by the new machinery, it had given new impetus to the process of disarmament.

With regard to other members of the Committee, Egypt, for its part, noted with satisfaction that high priority had been given to nuclear disarmament. Nigeria emphasized that composing a declaration and negotiating a programme of action, as well as devising suitable machinery, were only indispensable means to an end and should not be given the attributes of the end itself. It expressed doubt as to early implementation of the Programme of Action since the Committee continued to spend time debating issues instead of negotiating them. Iran, while noting some positive results, expressed regret that the session had been unable to clear the obstacles which had thwarted all efforts to date to achieve real progress in disarmament or to offer any new solution. It held that the real breakthrough had yet to come, and would depend on the measures pursued by the major nuclear-weapon Powers.

Among those recalling their own proposals to the special session, Sweden, noting that those it had made concerning nuclear disarmament had included consideration of research and development activities, introduced a new element by suggesting the possibility of reorientation of such activities towards more arms-control-adapted projects. One idea was to have arms control assessments of planned new weapons which, it held, could facilitate the introduction of relevant weapons issues in the different negotiating contexts at research, development, production and deployment stages. The Netherlands stressed its intention to pursue its proposal for an international disarmament organization and expressed the view that, along with other valuable sugges-

tions, it had received insufficient attention at the special session due to the complexity and urgency of the central issues. It held that within a few years the indispensability of some form of international disarmament organization would be generally recognized. Italy, for its part, noted that the General Assembly, in the Final Document, had stated that disarmament agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification, the form of which would depend upon the nature of the agreement. It recalled its proposal on the subject, introduced also at the special session, and related it to the proposal of the Netherlands as well as that of France on verification by satellites, both of which, it said, contained valuable elements.

Several other member States expressed the hope that the Programme of Action would soon begin to be implemented and pledged to assist that process within the new machinery, in particular in the multilateral negotiating body.

Consideration by the General Assembly, 1978

In the General Assembly, consideration of the matter of follow-up to the special session was conducted under the item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" included in the agenda of the thirty-third regular session in pursuance of the provisions of the Final Document. The discussions took place both in the general debate and during the consideration of specific proposals emanating from the proceedings of the special session.²

In the course of general debates in plenary meetings and the First Committee, virtually all Member States expressed their views concerning the special session, its outcome and its follow-up. The views expressed indicated a guarded optimism that the session would mark a turning point in disarmament. However, many States emphasized that such an assessment in the final analysis could be confirmed or challenged only on the basis of how soon and how effectively the Programme of Action could be turned into concrete measures of disarmament. In that connexion many different views were expressed.

The Eastern European States expressed satisfaction that their proposals and ideas had become an organic part of the Final Document but regretted that so many important issues had been deferred for future consideration. They pledged their full support for the efforts to translate the provisions of the Final Document into practical deeds. The Soviet Union particularly emphasized its readiness to consider the whole broad range of questions connected with the problem of nuclear disarmament and stated that it would do everything to see that decisions of the special session proved to be a real contribution to solving the problem of disarmament. Other Eastern European States, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, recalled various proposals and

² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, particularly 6th to 34th and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 19th and 29th to 53rd meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

initiatives of the Soviet Union³ or of the group as a whole, stating that they contained viable solutions for various problems and therefore deserved further study. They also referred to the Final Document as having set out realistic areas of focus and goals providing hope for tangible progress.

The Western countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, welcomed the setting out of the major issues in the Final Document and expressed hope that the momentum generated by the special session would be maintained. At the same time, they noted remaining problems and the continuing need for development of practical measures and voiced some concern as to whether the measures outlined and agreed upon in the Final Document would be implemented promptly in the light of already noticeable attempts by groups of States or even individual States to give particular interpretations to the provisions of the Final Document and to seek solutions for outstanding problems according to their own proposals. In that context, the United States noted that while the Final Document had been agreed to by consensus, many specific proposals of individual nations had not, and therefore it called for a willingness on the part of all concerned to forgo polarizing proposals during the session which would undermine the consensus achieved in the Declaration and Programme of Action. The United Kingdom placed particular emphasis on the short-term proposals which, in its opinion, demanded urgent action, while France emphasized its gratification concerning the revision of the disarmament machinery.

The non-aligned countries in general considered that, in spite of all shortcomings, the Programme of Action had established a reasonable basis for further specific disarmament efforts. They were much more concerned with what they considered the lack of more precise commitment on the part of the great Powers, a situation which was bound, in their opinion, to affect adversely the realization of the Programme. A number of them, including Brazil, Cyprus, Egypt, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Cameroon, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire, drew attention to what they regarded as certain disappointing aspects of the results of the session or its Final Document. Several stressed the danger posed by nuclear armaments and the importance to the world of finding a solution to the nuclear question and some also noted the need for something to be done about conventional armaments. Jordan and Mauritius were among those emphasizing the more positive aspects, with Jordan expressing "deep satisfaction" that a consensus was expressed in several important areas and Mauritius stating that, despite its limited success, the session had laid the foundations for an international disarmament strategy.

China, for its part, stated that at the special session many countries had condemned imperialist and hegemonist policies. It reiterated its view that super-Power rivalry was the cause of the arms race between those two Powers, and felt that it would remain difficult for the new negotiating body to free itself completely from super-Power control.

³ See A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex.

In the First Committee, the discussion on the agenda item concerning the implementation of results of the special session largely took the form of a general debate in which over-all views on the achievements of the session were further elaborated. In the course of those discussions, the Committee devoted considerable attention to a number of issues brought to its attention in pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 125 of the Final Document concerning the proposals and suggestions initiated at the special session which deserved further study, as well as to specific proposals for the implementation of other provisions of the Final Document.

With regard to the specific actions which the First Committee recommended in connexion with the agenda item, 14 draft resolutions were submitted during the 4th to 19th meetings, all of which were later adopted by the General Assembly as resolutions 33/71 A to 33/71 N. The events leading to the adoption of six of these resolutions are dealt with in the appropriate topical chapters of this volume as follows:

- Resolution 31/71 B (prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons)—chapter VII;
- Resolution 31/71 C (cessation of nuclear-weapon testing)—chapter IX;
- Resolution 33/71 E (fellowships on disarmament)—chapter XXV;
- Resolution 33/71 G (dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament)—chapter XXV;
- Resolution 33/71 I (disarmament and development)—chapter XXIV; and
- Resolution 33/71 M (study on the relationship between disarmament and development)—chapter XXIV.

The discussion of the other eight draft resolutions, which relate most directly to the follow-up of the session, as well as that of the pertinent part of one disarmament-related resolution assigned to the Committee, are described in the present chapter. With regard to resolution 33/71 H, parts I and III only (measures of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States and the convening of a further special session on disarmament) are dealt with in this chapter, while parts II and IV (mandates of the Disarmament Commission and of the Committee on Disarmament) are discussed in chapter IV below.

The first draft resolution, on the matter of military and nuclear collaboration with Israel, was one of those deferred from the special session. It was sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, Viet Nam and Yemen, and was introduced in the First Committee on 23 October by Iraq, which had first initiated the proposal at the special session. After prolonged debates in the Committee, it was adopted at the 51st meeting on 27 November by 68 votes to 24 with 33 abstentions. Most Western countries, including the United

States, voted against the draft which, in their opinion, was prejudicial with regard to the ways and means of strengthening peace and security in the region of the Middle East. In plenary, at the 84th meeting, on 14 December, in the light of Article 18 of the Charter and rules 83 and 85 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly, as well as the controversial nature of the draft resolution, the President of the Assembly put to the vote the question as to whether its adoption required a two-thirds majority. After considerable discussion, it was decided by a recorded vote of 70 to 38 with 26 abstentions that a two-thirds majority was not required. The draft resolution was then adopted by a recorded vote of 72 to 30 with 37 abstentions as resolution 33/71 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the continued and rapid Israeli military build-up,

Alarmed by the increasing evidence regarding Israeli attempts to acquire nuclear weapons,

Expressing its alarm over the use by Israel of cluster bombs against refugee camps and civilian targets in southern Lebanon,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976 and 32/82 of 12 December 1977 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recognizing that the continued escalation of Israeli armament constitutes a threat to international peace and security and underlies Israel's persistent defiance of General Assembly resolutions and its policy of expansion, occupation and denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people,

Further recalling its repeated condemnations of the intensification of military collaboration between Israel and South Africa and its resolution 32/105 F of 14 December 1977, entitled "Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa",

1. *Calls upon* all States to co-operate fully in effective international action, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to avert this grave menace to international peace and security;

2. *Requests* the Security Council, in particular, to call upon all States, under Chapter VII of the Charter and irrespective of any existing contracts:

(a) To refrain from any supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles, or spare parts therefor, to Israel, without any exception;

(b) To ensure that such supplies do not reach Israel through other parties;

(c) To end all transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material or technology to Israel;

3. *Further requests* the Security Council to establish machinery for supervising the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 above;

4. *Invites* all Governments and organizations to take all appropriate actions to promote the purposes of the present resolution.

A draft resolution, introduced on 23 October by Mongolia, dealt with the international week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament which had been proclaimed by the Assembly at its special session and inscribed in paragraph 102 of the Final Document. It was also sponsored, in its final form, by Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burundi, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, India, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia. In introducing the draft, Mongolia stated that its purpose was to promote the efforts being made by Governments and various international organizations to mobilize

public opinion to create an international atmosphere conducive to the implementation of further practical measures on the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. It noted also that the draft provided for the United Nations and its relevant bodies to assist in the holding of the Disarmament Week. The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee at its 52nd meeting, on 27 November, by consensus and by the General Assembly at its 84th meeting, on 14 December, also by consensus, as resolution 31/71 D. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the continued arms race,

Emphasizing the urgent need for and the importance of wide and continued mobilization of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race in all its aspects,

Recalling that, in paragraph 102 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, it proclaimed the week starting on 24 October, the day of the founding of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament,

Desirous of promoting broad measures on the mobilization of world public opinion in the celebration of such a week in order to create an international atmosphere conducive to the implementation of further practical measures with regard to the cessation of the arms race and disarmament,

1. *Invites* all States to carry out, through dissemination of information and organization of symposiums, meetings, conferences and other national and international forums, effective measures to expose the danger of the arms race, propagate the need for its cessation and increase public understanding of the urgent tasks in the field of disarmament and in particular of the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a model programme which may assist States that so desire in developing their local programmes for Disarmament Week;

3. *Invites* governmental as well as non-governmental organizations to undertake annual activities to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week and invites Governments to inform the Secretary-General of such activities not later than 30 April of each following year;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth and subsequent sessions on the information obtained by him in accordance with paragraph 3 above.

A draft resolution on the implementation of various provisions of the Final Document of the special session, sponsored by Afghanistan, Argentina, Bangladesh, Colombia, the Congo, Cuba, Iran, Jordan, Mexico, Peru, Sweden, Venezuela and Zaire, was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the 36th meeting, on 13 November. Mexico stated that the aim was to contribute to that implementation which would, in the final analysis, be the touchstone of success or failure of the special session. The procedure employed in the draft was twofold: to reaffirm some of the assertions of the special session which the sponsors regarded as fundamental, and to stress the fact that many of the provisions of the Final Document entailed obligations which for fulfilment would require mandatory and effective international agreements. Mexico added that care had been taken in preparation of the draft to ensure that it would command general support and thus strengthen rather than weaken the consensus achieved in the Final Document. It also dispelled any doubt that there could be an implication in operative paragraph 2 that the Committee on Disarmament might decide to change the basic rule that the negotiating body should conduct its work and take its decisions by consensus. Finally, Mexico called attention to paragraphs 6 and 7, stating that publication of the informa-

tion referred to would constitute the most trustworthy testimony to the seriousness with which States were complying with the commitment set out in the Final Document.

The draft resolution was adopted by the Committee at its 52nd meeting, on 27 November, and by the Assembly at its 84th meeting, on 14 December, as resolution 33/71 F, on both occasions by consensus. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered its resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978 and the Final Document embodied therein, with a view to examining the present status of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session, the first which the United Nations has devoted entirely to disarmament,

Reaffirming the alarm expressed in that resolution regarding the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation inflicted by all wars,

Convinced that the provisions of the Final Document constitute a consistent and articulated whole which provides a solid basis to set in motion an international disarmament strategy that makes it possible at the same time:

(a) To carry out what is the most acute and urgent task of the present day, namely, the removal of the threat of a world war, which would inevitably be a nuclear war,

(b) To channel the negotiations among States towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, on the understanding that such negotiations shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament,

(c) To strengthen international peace and security and to promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order,

Noting that the recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session regarding the multilateral disarmament machinery, both negotiating as well as deliberative, have already resulted, or will do so soon, in a considerable revitalization of that machinery,

Noting also that various measures have been or are about to be adopted which will turn into reality several recommendations and decisions regarding studies, information, teaching and training on disarmament included in the Final Document,

Having concluded that the situation is quite different with regard to the numerous other recommendations and decisions contained in the Programme of Action of the Final Document,

Recalling the consensus that, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, which has maximum priority, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility,

Bearing in mind that, in adopting the Final Document, Member States solemnly proclaimed in the Declaration contained therein that they would respect the objectives and principles stated in it and would make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action,

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the measures adopted, or about to be adopted, to revitalize the multilateral disarmament machinery available to the United Nations, in particular the fact that the Disarmament Commission has just held its first session on organizational matters and that the Committee on Disarmament is already properly constituted in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Final Document embodied in General Assembly resolution S-10/2;

2. *Expresses the hope* that all nuclear-weapon States will participate in the Committee on Disarmament, and is confident that the Committee will include in its rules of procedure provisions to ensure that it may function effectively as a multilateral negotiating disarmament body;

3. *Notes with satisfaction* that progress has been, or is being, made in the adoption of measures aimed at promoting studies, information, teaching and training on disarmament;

4. *Regrets*, however, that with regard to the Programme of Action it has not yet been possible to achieve any of the priority agreements mentioned therein, in particular the agreement

for a comprehensive test ban and the agreement pursued in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks;

5. *Urgently calls upon* all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to make every effort to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament, in accordance with what was approved at the tenth special session, in order to translate into practical terms the measures called for in the Programme of Action;

6. *Invites* all States to communicate, as appropriate, to the Secretary-General all those measures adopted outside the aegis of the United Nations regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit periodically the above information, together with any reports he may prepare on similar measures taken within the framework of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission.

Another draft resolution concerning a broad range of questions was sponsored, as revised, by Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Burundi, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Romania, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia. It was introduced at the 50th meeting, on 24 November, by Yugoslavia. The four-part draft dealt with certain measures of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States, the convening of a further special session on disarmament and two procedural questions regarding the mandates of the Disarmament Commission and Committee on Disarmament (for discussion of the latter, see chapter IV below).

In introducing the draft resolution, Yugoslavia said that the preamble was intended to draw attention to the contribution of the special session in highlighting international problems and identifying steps conducive to elimination of the danger posed by the arms race, and to stress the need to preserve the momentum initiated by the session and to implement its recommendations and decisions, particularly with a view to halting the nuclear arms race. Regarding part I of the draft, concerned with nuclear weapons, Yugoslavia stated that it underlined the danger arising from their very existence, and summarized the three substantive operative paragraphs. The first called on the three nuclear-weapon States involved in the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban to submit the draft of such a treaty to the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1979 session; the second called on the Soviet Union and the United States to speed up their negotiations on SALT II, and the third urged the initiation of negotiations among all the nuclear-weapon States with a view to halting the nuclear arms race and progressively reducing stockpiles and delivery means. Yugoslavia pointed out that there were no new elements in the draft; agreement on the questions it covered had been reached at the special session. In respect of part III of the resolution, Yugoslavia noted that it endorsed the decision of the special session concerning the convening of a second special session, proposing that it be held in 1982, with a preparatory committee to be set up at the thirty-fifth session.

The revised draft resolution was adopted by the Committee at the 52nd meeting, on 27 November, by a recorded vote of 120 to none with 10 abstentions. Most of the delegations which abstained stated that it was because the

resolution dealt with a number of matters and that they had reservations concerning one or more of them. The Netherlands, however, voted in favour but said that it would have abstained on the first two parts had they been voted upon separately.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly at its 84th meeting, on 14 December, by a recorded vote of 129 to none with 13 abstentions, as resolution 33/71 H. The preamble and parts I and III read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Having in mind the contribution of its tenth special session towards highlighting the gravity of the problems facing the international community in the field of disarmament and identifying the steps conducive to their solution,

Convinced of the need to broaden and deepen the degree of agreement reached and to preserve the momentum initiated at its tenth special session,

Conscious of the widely expressed interest of Member States in an urgent implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session, which found expression in the course of the consideration of this item at the thirty-third session,

Determined to encourage the taking of urgent measures in order to secure the implementation of the recommendations and decisions endorsed by Member States in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and aimed at halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and to proceed to disarmament,

I

Reaffirming that nuclear weapons pose the most serious threat to mankind and its survival and that it is therefore essential to proceed to nuclear disarmament and to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming also that all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Expressing the deep concern and disappointment of the international community over the fact that the ongoing negotiations have not yet been successfully concluded and that urgent negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States have not yet been initiated,

1. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States involved in the negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests to submit to the Committee on Disarmament a draft treaty at the beginning of its 1979 session;

2. *Calls upon* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to speed up their negotiations on the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks and to transmit the text of their agreement to the General Assembly in accordance with resolution 33/91 C;

3. *Urges* all nuclear-weapon States to proceed, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, to consultations regarding an early initiation of urgent negotiations on the halting of the nuclear arms race and on a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery within a comprehensive phased programme with agreed time-frames, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination;

4. *Requests* the nuclear-weapon States to inform the General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session, of the results of their consultations and eventual negotiations;

III

Bearing in mind the decision adopted at its tenth special session to fix, during its thirty-third session, the date of the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the furthering and broadening of positive processes initiated through the laying down of the foundations of an international disarmament strategy at its tenth special session,

1. *Decides* to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

2. *Decides also* to set up, at its thirty-fifth session, a preparatory committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The three draft resolutions introduced in the Committee by France, and sponsored by a number of additional States, dealt with specific French proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document. One of them, sponsored also by Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, the Central African Empire, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy, Liberia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia, concerned the question of the monitoring of disarmament agreements and the strengthening of security. In introducing the draft on 21 November, the representative of France, noting that the concept of an international satellite agency had already been put forward by his country at the special session, stated that the proposal would require consideration at two levels: the political level, whereby the views of Governments would be requested and assembled, and at the expert level, where a group would undertake a feasibility study bearing in mind the legal, economic, financial and technical implications of establishing such an agency. It then reviewed various indications that such an agency might in the future prove to be beneficial. France also acknowledged that the proposal pursued ambitious aims, but at the same time provided for realistic and progressive implementation procedures.

The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee at its 53rd meeting, on 28 November, by a recorded vote of 107 to none with 18 abstentions.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States explained their abstentions in advance. The Soviet Union, while recognizing the need for assured compliance with agreements, questioned whether a universal instrument for monitoring should be sought or was possible in view of the individual nature of disarmament agreements. It also suggested that monitoring organs not connected with practical measures might simply create the appearance of doing something or lead to a heightening of mutual suspicions. The United States said that it had concluded that the project endorsed by the draft resolution was not feasible, necessary or desirable in the foreseeable future, and that the cost of developing such an agency would be enormous. It also held that developing capabilities to verify agreements not yet in existence would be premature and could prove ill-suited to their tasks. The United States added that certain factors in the operation of such an agency would inevitably be affected by political considerations.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly at its 84th meeting, on 14 December, by a vote of 121 to none with 18 abstentions, as resolution 33/71 J. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Aware of the essential role to be played by appropriate international monitoring measures, satisfactory to all interested parties, in establishing and implementing disarmament agreements, and in strengthening international security and confidence,

Considering the progress made in the field of earth observation satellite technology,

Convinced of the important contribution which such technology can make to the solution of monitoring problems, taking into account, in particular, the need to provide for international measures which are non-discriminatory and do not constitute interference in the internal affairs of States,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to obtain, not later than 31 March 1979, the views of Member States on the proposal to establish an international satellite monitoring agency, as explained in a memorandum dated 30 May 1978 submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake, as from 1 May 1979, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a study on the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the replies received from Governments and the preliminary conclusions of the group of experts.

The second French draft resolution, also sponsored by Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, the Central African Empire, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, India, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Liberia, Mali, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zambia, dealt with the establishment of an international institute for disarmament research, which had been the subject of a memorandum submitted by France⁴ at the special session. It was also introduced on 21 November by France. It reiterated its previously held position that while the Centre for Disarmament provided the support for disarmament negotiations, there were no means of pursuing a permanent programme of conceptual and applied research on all questions of disarmament and security, which deserved a continued approach. In France's view, there was justification for an international institute where, in complete independence, the different views, depending on military systems or regional conditions, could be compared. Therefore the draft resolution requested the Secretary General to report to the Assembly at its next session on possible ways of establishing, operating and financing such an institute. For his report on the question, the Secretary-General would have the benefit of the opinion of the Advisory Board. The First Committee adopted the draft at its 52nd meeting, on 27 November, by consensus and the Assembly adopted it, also by consensus, at its 84th meeting, on 14 December, as resolution 33/71 K. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced that negotiations on disarmament and the continuing effort to ensure greater security must be based on objective in-depth technical studies,

Convinced also that sustained research and study activity by the United Nations in the field of disarmament would promote informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts,

⁴ See A/S-10/AC.1/8, annex.

Considering that, in addition to the work being done in this field by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, with a view to gathering basic data on disarmament problems and, in particular, facilitating the negotiations currently in progress, it is advisable to undertake more forward-looking research, within the framework of the United Nations,

Noting that various proposals that studies of this type should be carried out have been put forward at the tenth special session and the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, thus reflecting the need of the international community to be provided with more diversified and complete information on problems relating to disarmament,

Aware of the importance of ensuring that such studies should be conducted in accordance with the criteria of scientific independence,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on possible ways of establishing, operating and financing an international institute for disarmament research, under the auspices of the United Nations;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek in this regard, *inter alia*, the advice of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, established in implementation of paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in view of the competence to be assigned to that body in respect of a programme of studies on disarmament.

As stated above, the remaining French proposal on disarmament and development is discussed in chapter XXIV.

In connexion with the provision of paragraph 125 of the Final Document, which invited the Secretary-General to transmit the proposals it listed to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs in accordance with recommendations which the Assembly might adopt at its thirty-third session, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Liberia, Mauritius, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay and Yugoslavia sponsored a draft resolution which dealt with the disposition of those proposals. The draft, in a revised form, was introduced in the First Committee on 17 November by Sri Lanka, which pointed out that it was merely a procedural draft carrying forward ideas introduced at the special session which were not examined because of lack of time. Sri Lanka also noted that the draft did not refer to those items which were the subject of separate resolutions, and accordingly expressed the hope of the sponsors that it would be adopted without a vote.

The draft resolution generated extensive discussion, however, particularly concerning oral amendments proposed by Nigeria and Mexico as to whether the words "as well as studying" should be retained in operative paragraph 1, and other points of clarification. In the end, it was decided in two separate recorded votes to retain those words as well as to add the words "together with all the official records of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" to the same operative paragraph (see paragraph 1 below). Thereupon, at the 53rd meeting, on 28 November, the Committee adopted by consensus the revised draft resolution, as orally amended, and, at its 84th meeting, on 14 December, the Assembly adopted it, also by consensus, as resolution 33/71 L. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, to request the Secretary-General to transmit to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with the questions of disarmament all the official records of the special session devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the recommendations which the General Assembly may adopt at its thirty-third session,

Commending the active participation of Member States in the consideration of the agenda items of its tenth special session and the proposals and suggestions which they submitted,

Noting the valuable contribution such proposals and suggestions have made to the work of the special session and its eventual outcome,

Considering that further and more thorough study of the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document than was possible at the special session is essential,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the deliberative and negotiating as well as the studying organs dealing with the question of disarmament all the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document, together with all the official records of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, as well as information and comments made by Member States at the thirty-third session of the Assembly on those proposals and suggestions, except those covered by separate resolutions;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament to report on the state of the consideration of those proposals and suggestions to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

The last draft resolution under the item was submitted by Liberia. It concerned a new philosophy on disarmament to be formulated from the new ideas, proposals and strategies set forth at the special session and incorporated in a comprehensive and co-ordinated system which could mobilize world public opinion behind the United Nations goals on disarmament and a new order of national and international security. In introducing the draft at the 39th meeting, on 15 November, Liberia pointed out that the United Nations had come to a turning point which established a complex linkage of factors which together constituted a revolution in thinking on welfare and security and the very survival of the international community. Thus, Liberia held that the mobilization of world public opinion must be based on a clearly understandable strategy of information intended to make possible a popular grasp of the nature of the problem, rather than a fragmented list of proposals. By the draft resolution, in its final form, the Assembly would request the Secretary-General with the assistance of the Advisory Board to study the ways and means to accomplish such a strategy for the effective mobilization of world public opinion.

The draft resolution was adopted by the Committee at its 53rd meeting, on 28 November, and by the Assembly at its 84th meeting, on 14 December, by consensus. The resolution, 33/71 N, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, as stated in the Programme of Action adopted at its tenth special session, an essential condition for halting the arms race and an indispensable step towards the goal of disarmament is the mobilization of world public opinion in support of this effort,

Noting the enormous expansion of concepts of disarmament as developed at the tenth special session and in the First Committee at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly,

Noting, in particular, the many new concepts developed as a result of advances in science and technology with respect to the growth of entirely new generations of weaponry, and their impact on changing strategies with their proliferation of military and defence alliances,

Noting also the changing concepts of disarmament in the light of its relation to the economies of nations, especially its effect on the global dimensions of development,

Aware of the growing realization that the old balance-of-power approach to security is being radically altered by the rapid qualitative changes in the ever-increasing complexity and proliferation of "surprise" and "secret" weapons,

Taking into account the pervading conviction that, in the light of the increasing uncontrollability of the new weapons, the old concept of armed national security to which the peoples of the world are conditioned has become obsolete,

Observing with interest the tendency to brand the arms race in terms of moral and ethical strictures,

Convinced that the world is in fact witnessing a revolution in its mode of thinking as regards the historic legacy of armed national security and giving way to new concepts in a manner that will require the full partnership of peoples,

Confronted by an explosion of new ideas, new theories, new proposals and new strategies in an effort to cope with the short- and long-term plans submitted by statesmen and Governments in intolerable fragmentation and which need to be formulated, as a fused and organized departure from past outmoded premises, into a new philosophy on disarmament,

1. *Considers* it necessary that all the new ideas, new proposals, new thinking and new strategies set forth in the broad range of general debates preceding and following the adoption of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session be formulated into a single comprehensive and co-ordinated system, into a new philosophy on disarmament, in a message that can effectively reach the minds of men in a mobilization of world public opinion in support of the United Nations goal for the halting of the present arms race and eventually for complete and general disarmament centred on a new order of national and international security;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, to study ways and means whereby the objectives in paragraph 1 above can be accomplished and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

3. *Expresses the hope* that the Advisory Board may be able to report results, as appropriate, in time for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

The First Committee was also assigned by the General Assembly the agenda item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security". The Assembly, on the Committee's recommendation, adopted four draft resolutions under the item, one of which contained a number of paragraphs relating to disarmament issues. It was sponsored by the Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guyana, India, Iraq, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Republic of Cameroon, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

The draft resolution was introduced by Sri Lanka, as Chairman of the Group of Non-Aligned States, at the 65th meeting, on 7 December. Regarding disarmament, *inter alia*, operative paragraph 6 comprised a commendation of the special session on disarmament and an invitation to all Member States to take effective measures as agreed upon at the session. The draft was adopted at the 67th meeting, on 8 December, by a vote of 96 to 2 with 20 abstentions. Before the vote, the United States stated that it would vote against the draft because there were many resolutions on the subject of peace and security and the problem lay in the failure of States and certain political groups to observe the existing rules; it held that various aspects of the draft were misleading. Israel explained that it voted against the draft resolution because it introduced no new constructive idea towards strengthening of security and enumerated resolutions adopted at conferences where, in its opinion, anti-Israeli resolutions were perennially taken. Australia, Austria, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the European Economic Community, New Zealand, Sweden and Turkey explained their abstentions while Finland and Greece explained their affirmative votes.

The Assembly adopted the draft resolution at its 85th meeting, on 15 December, by a recorded vote of 119 to 2 (Israel and United States) with 19 abstentions, as resolution 33/75. The disarmament-related parts of the preamble and paragraph 6 read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security",

Noting with profound concern . . . the continuation and escalation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, . . .

Reaffirming the close link between the strengthening of international peace and security, disarmament, decolonization, and development and stressing the need for concerted action to achieve progress in those areas . . .

Taking note of the actions of the international community aimed at strengthening international security, in particular the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, . . .

. . .
6. *Commends* the holding of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, with the active participation of all Member States, particularly its decisions aimed at strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, including those relating to effective machinery for deliberation on, and negotiation of, disarmament measures, and, in this connexion, invites all Member States to take effective measures for halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and for disarmament, in accordance with the priorities agreed to during the tenth special session;

. . .
In connexion with the agenda item on the special session, the Assembly also had before it a number of documents which have not heretofore been mentioned as such. They were:

(a) Report of the Disarmament Commission (see chapter IV below);⁵

(b) Report of the Secretary-General dated 17 October 1978, entitled "Guidelines for the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament" (see chapter XXV below);⁶

(c) Report of the Secretary-General dated 16 October 1978, entitled "United Nations studies on disarmament" (see chapter XXV below);⁷

(d) Report of the Secretary-General dated 18 October 1978, comprising the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development on the organization of its work (see chapter XXIV below);⁸ and

(e) Letter dated 2 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmit-

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement, No. 42 (A/33/42).*

⁶ A/33/305.

⁷ A/33/312 and Add. 1.

⁸ A/33/317.

ting the text of the communiqué issued at the Extraordinary Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at the United Nations on 2 October 1978.⁹

Conclusion

The relatively short period of time available after the special session of the General Assembly did not permit achievement of tangible results with regard to the transformation of the Programme of Action into specific measures of disarmament.

However, on the whole, that part of 1978 following the special session was a relatively active period during which emphasis was placed on the setting up of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament.

An exceptionally large number of disarmament resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly. They fulfilled two general types of function. One was to give practical effect to those provisions of the Final Document which required such immediate specific actions as the establishment of Disarmament Week and of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament (for discussion of the latter, see chapter XXV below). The other concerned, on the one hand, the initiation of consideration of various new proposals and suggestions which were designed to facilitate the disarmament process, such as a satellite monitoring agency and an institute for disarmament research and, on the other, the identification of areas of particular concern and the urging of early conclusion of agreements in those areas, such as a SALT II agreement and a comprehensive test ban.

From the point of view of follow-up, an important development at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly was the decision on convening a second special session devoted to disarmament.

In view of the transitional period required for carrying out organizational changes and innovations, the General Assembly at its next regular session may well be in a better position to assess the effectiveness of the system of follow-up set up by the Final Document of the special session.

⁹ See A/33/279.

PART TWO

Other comprehensive approaches to disarmament

Consideration of general and complete disarmament

Introduction

THE VERY FIRST RESOLUTION adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, resolution 1 (I), dealt with disarmament. Since then there have been over 300 resolutions of the Assembly on disarmament and related matters, and through the years many of them have been implemented. This is reflected in various achievements, such as the establishment from time to time of bodies to deal, in one manner or another, with the question of disarmament; the convening of various conferences, committees and study groups on particular aspects of the over-all question; and the conclusion and bringing into effect of a number of significant international treaties and conventions providing for various measures of arms control and limitation. However, many of the resolutions did not result in any concrete action. Moreover, the international instruments so far achieved have been largely in the area of the regulation of arms rather than of their reduction or elimination. Thus the arms race, which has gone on during three decades, continues to be a cause of grave and growing concern.

The concept of dealing with the problem of disarmament on a comprehensive basis has been given considerable attention in the United Nations. In 1959 the General Assembly, with the adoption of resolution 1378 (XIV), for the first time expressly stated its hope for the early achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Since that time the United Nations has repeatedly used that reference point in reaffirming general and complete disarmament as the necessary and ultimate goal towards which all its disarmament efforts must be directed. In the early 1960s, as a consequence of resolution 1378 (XIV), several attempts were made to achieve disarmament through an all-inclusive process. The Soviet Union and the United States, as a result of bilateral consultations, issued on 20 September 1961 a joint statement of agreed principles¹ as the basis for future disarmament negotiations. The eight principles embraced in the joint statement clearly set out general and complete disarmament as the desired goal. The same year the General Assembly agreed, in its resolution 1722 (XVI), that an

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

eighteen-nation negotiating body should undertake, as a matter of the utmost urgency, negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on "general and complete disarmament under effective international control". The following year the USSR submitted a draft treaty,² and the United States submitted an outline of the basic provisions of a treaty,³ both aimed towards general and complete disarmament, to the new negotiating body, known as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC). Difficulties were encountered, however, in attempting to reach agreement on initial measures and on procedures for their implementation and verification, even in the first phases of a disarmament process. Within a few years the emphasis shifted from efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament through staged implementation of an all-encompassing international instrument to efforts to deal with specific measures giving promise of earlier results. Thus, by the mid-1960s, the ENDC began to turn its attention towards important partial measures, such as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

None the less, the goal of general and complete disarmament has been kept in view by the United Nations and an item on general and complete disarmament has appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly each year. The item has provided a useful medium for dealing with questions which, for one reason or another, could not appropriately be handled as separate agenda items. In addition, and of central importance in the context of general and complete disarmament, the item has enabled the Assembly readily to deal with several initiatives designed to renew efforts leading towards the goal. They have included, particularly, proposals designed for the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme which would place partial measures into a carefully considered plan, setting out priorities and enabling disarmament to be achieved progressively. Among such proposals was one by Romania whereby the United Nations would proclaim a disarmament decade. It culminated with the adoption of resolution 2602 E (XXIV) by which the Assembly reaffirmed resolution 1378 (XIV), declared the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade, called upon Governments to intensify their efforts for measures relating to nuclear disarmament and for a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (the successor body to ENDC), while continuing intensive negotiations concerning collateral measures, "to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control . . .". The idea of elaborating such a programme, both as a framework and a catalyst to promote progress in disarmament, has remained active and been the subject of many initiatives throughout the Disarmament Decade.⁴

² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. C and document DC/205, annex 1, sect. D.

³ *Ibid.*, document DC/203, annex 1, sect. F and document DC/205, annex 1, sects. E and F.

⁴ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), chapter III.

The most recent impetus to the concept of a comprehensive approach aimed towards eventual achievement of the ultimate goal, however, has stemmed from the work of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament during 1977 and 1978 and from the special session itself. In his opening statement to the Preparatory Committee⁵ on 28 March 1977, the Secretary-General, expressing grave concern about the continuing arms race and the modest results which disarmament efforts had produced since the Second World War, said that what was needed was a comprehensive approach aimed at real disarmament that was realistic concerning both the possibilities of disarmament and the dangers if decisive progress was not achieved. In the course of its work, the Preparatory Committee once again reaffirmed general and complete disarmament as the necessary goal of all disarmament efforts and, as described in detail in the preceding chapters, affirmed the adoption of a programme of action on disarmament as one of the most important objectives to be sought by the Assembly at its special session.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

General and complete disarmament under effective international control was referred to repeatedly during the special session in one context or another as the essential goal to strive towards. References to the goal were made by many Heads of State, foreign ministers, and other representatives in plenary meetings,⁶ and by some delegations in the deliberations of the main *Ad Hoc* Committee⁷ and in its sub-committees.

A number of the references could be assessed merely as acknowledgements of recognition of the long-term goal; many others, however, suggested that any slackening off of disarmament efforts before that goal was achieved might result in some form of continuation or resurgence of an armaments psychology with consequent deleterious social and economic effects as well as inevitable negative effects on peace and on security.

Among those expressing themselves on the over-all question were the five nuclear-weapon States. Although their views differed on many details, they contained two common threads, first, that the best hope for progress towards the final goal lay in pursuing it on a step-by-step basis, working for specific concrete measures in the shorter term and building upon successful achievements and, second, that the process had been and would continue to be a very complex and difficult one intertwined with legitimate security and other questions, both world-wide and regional, along the way.

⁵ See A/31/475.

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum (deliberations of sub-committees are not recorded).

The President of France, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, noted that the world was in a state of over-armament and specifically cautioned that progress could not be made in disarmament unless it was accompanied by progress towards improvement of international relations. He emphasized that if the ultimate goal was to be real general and controlled disarmament, the means to achieve it had to be sought in an analysis of the concrete conditions of our times. In that regard, France could make its contribution by proposing an approach based on three fundamental ideas which would lead to a revision of the aims and methods of disarmament: the legitimate right of every State to security; that disarmament could not be exclusive to a few countries, but had to become the business of all; and that regional situations had to be taken into account. President Giscard d'Estaing stated, in respect of the right to security, that the immediate goal could not be to achieve a zero level of armaments the world over—that would not further the cause of disarmament, and the world, he held, could do better than to repeat the mistake of plans which could not be implemented because they were unrealistic and could be used as excuses for inaction. While recognizing the responsibility of the super-Powers, President Giscard d'Estaing held that most of the disarmament forums were dominated by confrontation between blocs, and that the possibility for all States to take part had to be created. Finally, the analysis of regional threats, as they are perceived by the States involved, would offer the hope of finding both the measures needed and the consensus necessary to apply them. In conclusion, he explained that the French proposal consisted in reconciling step by step the dialectics of security and disarmament in order to implement a process of nuclear disarmament in stages while maintaining balanced deterrence, and to begin a regional debate on security levels and limitation of arms sales. He emphasized that there should be no illusions; that if the concrete approach he had proposed could be undertaken and achieved by the present generation, then trust would begin to take root and the stage of general disarmament could be usefully discussed.

Prime Minister Callaghan of the United Kingdom stated that Britain's was a persevering, step-by-step approach, placing the building blocks of peace one upon the other. In his country's view, it was over-ambitious and would lead to disillusion to make general and complete disarmament an immediate objective. Equally, however, he did not believe that the activities in the various fields should be disconnected. Rather, the building blocks should strengthen each other and provide for further advance. He hoped that the special session would provide a clear framework on which to build. In this regard, he called attention to the draft programme of action which had been submitted by the United Kingdom and other Western countries,⁸ and emphasized that first of all renewed efforts should be made to bring existing negotiations to fruitful conclusions.

The representative of China maintained his country's established position that the major nuclear Powers showed duplicity in the disarmament field,

⁸ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1) vol. VI, document A/C.187/96.

saying one thing and doing another. He specifically recalled their joint statement of agreed principles for negotiations towards general and complete disarmament of 1961 and, noting that 17 years had passed, claimed that they had not put even one of the eight principles into practice. Noting the preponderance of arms of the super-Powers, he emphasized, as a fundamental principle, that disarmament must start with those Powers. Stating that China had no choice but to strengthen its preparedness in the light of outside threats, he emphasized that, for its part, the Chinese Government and people had always stood for genuine disarmament and had taken positive steps towards it, supporting all rational proposals of disarmament and putting forward a number of suggestions of its own, including proposals for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the dismantling of all foreign military bases and withdrawal of armed forces stationed abroad, and the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological and chemical weapons. Later, in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, China held that while imperialism and social-imperialism existed, it would be difficult to realize general and complete disarmament.

The Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, said that there was no problem in international politics more important than the halting of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament. It was his country's firm conviction that the core of the problem lay in moving from good intentions and non-committal recommendations to concrete steps. Noting that the need was for disarmament and not just arms control, he none the less said that his country realized full well how many complications and obstacles there were on the road to disarmament. In conclusion, Mr. Gromyko emphasized that the Soviet Union would do everything in its power to enable the decisions of the special session to serve as real guidelines for States in their advance towards solution of the problem of disarmament, up to general and complete disarmament.

Vice-President Mondale of the United States, noting the material and human resource costs of military expenditures, said that the special session offered hope of greater progress towards disarmament and a world in which the threat of war would be vastly diminished and the security of each nation enhanced. He recalled President Carter's statement to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session in which he had emphasized America's strong commitment to arms control and disarmament, the willingness of the United States to work towards a world truly free of nuclear weapons, and its total commitment to reversing the build-up of armaments and reducing the trade in them. The Vice-President said that since that time the United States had been engaged in the broadest arms control negotiations in history, embracing 10 different areas.

Among the non-nuclear-weapon States, many Western States which included general and complete disarmament, including Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Ireland, Italy and New Zealand, stressed in one way or another the distance to the ideal goal, and the need for step-by-step achievements in the field of disarmament and the building of confidence. The Belgian representative, for instance, spoke of the danger of

wanting to accomplish too much, and said that general and complete disarmament was not, in fact, a reality within close reach; at the same time he warned against the danger of scepticism and said that security lay in a continuous but gradual process of disarmament. Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada said that the notion of general and complete disarmament had proved to be unrealistic in all its expectations, but that the goal need not be abandoned; rather, the world should first aim at a less lofty goal, and seek to bring about a disarmed world by building it brick by brick. Japan held that in order to move towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament, there was no way open other than to keep that ideal always in mind and proceed step by step with concrete and feasible measures. The representative of New Zealand said that his country looked forward to the day when general and complete disarmament was a realizable objective and security alliances were no longer required. He said that it was important to keep that concept in view as the ultimate stage of a long-term programme, and that signs would be welcomed that the major Powers were reviving their interest in the blueprints that had been discussed in the early 1960s; meanwhile, his country would focus on more immediately attainable goals.

Several Eastern European States, including the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Ukrainian SSR, referred to the question of disarmament as the most important problem facing the world. Like many Western States, they acknowledged the ultimate goal as attainable only in the distant future; they were strong, however, in their conviction that it should be kept constantly in view. While encouraged by achievements towards détente and supporting renewed efforts to broaden and deepen its development, they referred to difficulties posed by the military-industrial complex, military blocs and balances, or other forces advocating militaristic policies. Thus the representative of the Byelorussian SSR stated that the arms race was not an endless labyrinth, and that new political and material conditions propitious for further progress towards the cessation of the arms race and disarmament had come into being. He noted the consistent policy of the socialist community towards those ends. The representative of Poland referred to disarmament problems as being of primary importance, and expressed his delegation's determination, together with others at the special session, to attack those problems more vigorously. But he added that in certain countries military-industrial complexes sought to subordinate the policies of their Governments to their own selfish interests, and that certain Western quarters considered it necessary to give more creditability to deterrence. The Hungarian representative noted that co-operation among countries with different social systems was gaining momentum, but added that some circles were trying to block the way to such positive changes, thus slowing the process of détente the success of which was bound up with the achievement of effective measures in the field of disarmament. He added that it was because of the opposition of the Western Powers that the ultimate aim of general and complete disarmament could not be achieved immediately; this had led to initiatives on partial measures in order to promote progress. The Prime Minister of the Government of Romania, Mr. Manea Manescu, in his address to the

Assembly, recalled the document on disarmament⁹ which his country had submitted to the United Nations on the initiative of its President in 1975. He expressed anxiety about deterioration of the international situation, including the appearance of new zones of conflict and rivalries between various States and military groupings. On the basis of the realistic understanding that disarmament could not be achieved overnight, he then set out in detail the proposals of his country through which the final objectives might gradually be attained. The programme was comprised of 10 major components, including the freezing of military budgets, the reduction of activities of military blocs leading to their dissolution, the strengthening of the United Nations role and the establishment of appropriate international control during the disarmament process.

Many of the non-aligned and developing Member States referred to the question of general and complete disarmament, and a number of them, including Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, India, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, elaborated their particular views concerning its achievement. Those views contained common elements: that nuclear disarmament must be given first priority; that the major Powers bore a particular responsibility; that disarmament was linked to development; and, in agreement with all groupings of States, that the ultimate goal could be reached some time in the future. Some of them also felt that the goal was only attainable in an atmosphere of improved trust and political will, and stressed development of better international relationships or of an international system for maintenance of security.

Among those which addressed the question in the context of an international security system, the representative of Bangladesh particularly emphasized that considerations of national security would remain incompatible with disarmament as long as there was no viable international security system based on law and order and on the collective responsibility of all nations for maintaining peace. Accordingly, attention should be focused on a phased programme for the substantive reduction and limitation of arms towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, and on simultaneous progress towards creation of an adequate world security system. The representative of Mauritius, taking the view that work should be resumed on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and that this should be reflected in the Final Document, stated that during and after the implementation of the programme, measures should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations the manpower agreed to be necessary for an international peace force equipped with agreed types of armaments. The representative of the Philippines, speaking in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, said that it was his delegation's view that disarmament should be considered not as a process by itself but, in

⁹ A/C.1/1066.

the context of unavoidable reality, in conjunction with such equally important subjects as international security arrangements, peace-making and peace-keeping procedures and institutions and the peaceful settlement of disputes; otherwise all efforts towards disarmament might prove futile.

The contribution of Argentina emphasized the historic significance of the special session, noting it as the first time that the United Nations had decided to devote its undivided attention to a comprehensive consideration of all the aspects of the problem of disarmament, and the first time that such high level political representation, including so many Heads of State or Government, had been brought together to evaluate the grave situation created by the arms race and to lay the foundations for negotiations towards halting it and initiating a process of genuine disarmament. As well, the session would examine the significance which disarmament might have in the maintenance of international peace and security and economic development. The speaker for Argentina added that we should avoid arousing false hopes by shutting our eyes to the facts to be faced, but that did not mean allowing those facts to feed a paralyzing scepticism.

The representative of Costa Rica, after describing his country as a special nation whose military forces were eliminated by a constitutional prohibition and whose Civil Guard and the costs attached thereto were very small, said that immediate achievement of total nuclear disarmament was not possible in the present state of the world, and would be "Utopian" until there were means of effective international control and complementary means such as a genuine, recognized international authority and an established international executive power.

Prime Minister Desai of India called for a move towards disarmament through a solemn resolve to outlaw war and settle disputes through negotiations. Noting that attempts to build structures of peace had so far failed because of involvements in power politics, competition for spheres of influence, promotion of sales of armaments and the like, he held that the difficulties experienced in coming to agreements on various disarmament questions over the last 30 years indicated the futility of trying to achieve even partial disarmament through a policy of balancing of forces rooted in mutual suspicion and fear. Therefore, he said, the commitment to disarmament must be total and without any reservation. Having regard to the hard realities of the situation, the principle of gradual disarmament within a time-bound programme might be accepted, but the final objective must be kept in view and a non-discriminatory programme, based on universal application and shorn of any monopolistic feature, worked out.

Jordan stressed that the special session could not be expected to achieve either the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament or the short-term measure of halting and reversing the arms race. Rather, its objective was to bring to the surface the deep-seated concern about the situation, and create the momentum for a world-wide and massive grass roots movement in support of disarmament and doing something about it. It held that the deliberations were not designed to cut across the delicate and all-important bilateral and multilateral negotiations in progress, but to highlight the lam-

table fact that the arms race had been accelerating and to reinforce all current efforts to reverse that trend.

The Mexican representative reviewed briefly some of the highlights of the disarmament history of the United Nations and contrasted various statements of good intention with the unimagined momentum of the nuclear arms race and the fact that general and complete disarmament had been virtually ignored in all negotiations over the past ten years. He held that a forum was needed—which the special session should provide—which could command a level of representation as high as that demanded by the importance of the subject, and wherein all States Members of the United Nations would participate in debate. He said that the adoption of disarmament measures was an overridingly urgent task. In concluding, he cited in part a recent statement of his President, José López Portillo, in which the latter had said “. . . in order to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control we shall have to go through various stages; but we are serenely optimistic. Positive signs can be detected which should lead us to the adoption of concrete measures . . . ”.

Noting dissatisfaction with the impasse in negotiations, the representative of Pakistan emphasized the importance of a disarmament strategy. In that context, he felt that the approach suggested by the President of France offered the possibility of clarifying a confusing picture, and emphasized that the goals set by the special session must take into account the present state of international relations and the security interests of all States without losing sight of the goal of general and complete disarmament.

Sri Lanka introduced a proposal for the establishment of a world disarmament authority which would function as a permanent institution of the United Nations system, and in the *Ad Hoc* Committee its representative submitted a working paper¹⁰ on the subject and outlined in some detail his country's views on the tasks expected of such an authority, stressing that it might make a significant contribution to the development of realistic proposals and programmes for disarmament.

The President of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia, Mr. Djuranović, noting the special responsibilities of the major military Powers in the field of disarmament, said that there should be a balanced and mutually acceptable sharing of responsibilities among nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of disarmament. He said that the efforts since the Second World War had not yielded positive results and that the special session would not fulfill the expectations of the international community and world public opinion if it failed to adopt a programme of action containing specific measures aimed at halting the arms race and initiating the process of genuine disarmament. It should also specify the long-term tasks of the United Nations leading to realization of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

¹⁰ See A/S-10/AC.1/9 and Add.1.

In addition to the many references by States to general and complete disarmament, of the 25 non-governmental organizations and six peace research institutes which addressed the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Assembly, 19 of the non-governmental organizations and three of the institutes, in one context or another, made specific reference to general and complete disarmament as the ultimate goal.

The concept of general and complete disarmament as the desired goal and the difficulty of its attainment are both reflected in resolution S-10/2, the Final Document of the special session. References to the urgency of the question, lack of progress, the threat to security posed by the arms race and the need for renewed efforts and goodwill appear throughout the Document (see appendix I for the complete text). Some paragraphs in the Programme of Action which refer to the over-all question read as follows:

43. Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of action on disarmament, in accordance with the goals and principles established in the Declaration on disarmament. The present Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to giving the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

44. The present Programme of Action enumerates the specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress towards general and complete disarmament.

45. Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

...

83. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States . .

...

93. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament . . .

...

111. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

The final paragraph of the Document reads as follows:

129. The General Assembly is convinced that the discussions of the disarmament problems at the special session and its Final Document will attract the attention of all peoples, further mobilize world public opinion and provide a powerful impetus for the cause of disarmament.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

As they had done since the 1st meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 14 March 1962, most States represented in the principal disarmament negotiating body in 1978 continued to refer to general and complete disarmament as the final goal of their efforts. Virtually all of the 30 delegations taking an active part in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament made some reference to the goal, most of them in the context of the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme or of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,¹¹ both before and after the session. In its special report to the special session,¹² however, the Committee noted that since 1965 it had devoted the greater part of its attention to collateral measures.¹³ A number of Western States, for example, had put forward suggestions concerning the international transfer of conventional weapons and the possibility of achieving regional agreements, while the Eastern European States had emphasized more the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. Others in the Committee had generally maintained that conventional weapons should be considered only in the context of general and complete disarmament, while priority consideration should be given to the questions of nuclear disarmament and chemical weapons.

The Committee, in accordance with a decision it had taken in 1977, established an *ad hoc* working group early in the session to deal with the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament called for in connexion with the Disarmament Decade. The group used as its basic working texts all its documents related to the subject, beginning with the 1961 joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations.¹⁴ The proceedings of the *ad hoc* working group on the subject are covered in chapter V below.

In a general context, the United States stated that the employment of nuclear weapons was most likely to result from escalation of a military conflict initiated with conventional weapons. Acknowledging that it was a major supplier of conventional arms but that responsibility for restraint could not rest on suppliers alone, it pointed to the danger of the build-up of conventional forces exceeding legitimate defence needs. The United States believed that it was of the utmost importance that efforts in nuclear disarmament should be placed in the context of a broader disarmament effort. Thus the Committee, without detracting from its efforts aimed at reducing the danger of nuclear war, could and should also devote its energies to solving the problem of

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 248-253.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-10/2)*, vols. I and II, and *ibid.*, *Supplement No. 2A (A/S-10/2/Add.1/Rev.1)*.

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 2 (A/S-10/2)*, vol. I, para. 81. The term "collateral measures" refers to questions other than those on nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction or general and complete disarmament.

¹⁴ See foot-note ¹ above.

conventional arms. With the expertise and the representation to develop measures that would increase regional stability through arms restraint, it could thus contribute significantly to the advancement of ultimate disarmament objectives.

The Soviet Union, in introducing a new working paper¹⁵ on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament on behalf of the Eastern European group, stressed the continued relevance of its earlier memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and achieving disarmament,¹⁶ and added that the new working paper was based on proposals that the same sponsors had submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the special session as well as recent proposals, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament. Among the sponsors, Mongolia stressed the importance of defining the fundamental solution to questions relating to curbing the arms race and to disarmament.

India took the position that although not opposed to the discussions on conventional weapons, it would oppose any diversion of attention from the highest priority items which could only be discussed on a global basis. Ethiopia also maintained that conventional arms control should not divert attention from nuclear disarmament and should be carried out in the context of general and complete disarmament, and added that too many resources needed in development were diverted to the arms race.

The question of an international disarmament organization, which had been raised previously, received further attention in the CCD in 1978, and on 30 March the Netherlands submitted a working paper entitled "Study on the establishment of an international disarmament agency".¹⁷ The proposal of the Netherlands was aimed towards creation of an agency to streamline consultations and implementation of measures because it could see a requirement for elaborate permanent machinery for consultation between parties, implementation and verification in respect of future agreements. In introducing its paper, the Netherlands noted that in the case of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) annex), the International Atomic Energy Agency had been used to carry out verification requirements, but such an agency did not exist to carry out such needs in the case, for example, of a chemical weapons ban. Such an organization might also set up review conferences on treaties and adopt other functions as experience was gained. For such purposes, an impartial body under United Nations auspices would be increasingly important as more disarmament measures were achieved. Because careful consideration of the matter would be required, the current proposal was only that views of States be sought—the General Assembly, at its special session, might invite all Member States to provide such views. Also prior to the special session, Italy submitted a working paper,¹⁸ in which it suggested the establishment of machinery to verify

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/552.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/522.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/565.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, document CCD/568.

multilateral disarmament agreements. In introducing its paper, it took the view that the proposal of the Netherlands should be studied in depth, and added that the verification problem as a whole should be reconsidered with a view to solving it under uniform criteria in an appropriate international context, employing whatever technological means could be effectively applied.

As in 1977, the question of the organization and procedures of the Committee was also discussed; the discussions took place prior to the special session. Among the non-aligned countries, Mexico particularly emphasized the widespread support for improving both structure and working methods, and recalled the working paper on the subject submitted in 1977 by the members known as the group of 15. On 17 March 1978 they submitted a further working paper¹⁹ in which five specific changes were listed as deserving highest priority. The discussions on the new working paper reflected the same positions as had previous discussions on the question²⁰ with Romania supporting the position of the non-aligned countries, and calling attention to the working paper which it had submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the special session.²¹

In the summer session the United States again addressed the disarmament question in general terms, noting that the Assembly at its special session had agreed that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures, and the Final Document included a recommendation that the Committee on Disarmament should undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The United States held that the CCD had already begun that task by compiling the necessary documentation to facilitate future work on the programme. Similarly, the Soviet Union regarded as important the provision of the Final Document emphasizing the link between nuclear disarmament and the limiting and reducing of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned, as well as the link between nuclear disarmament and the measures to strengthen the security of States. The Soviet Union also noted the connexion between achievement of general and complete disarmament, peace and security, and strengthening and consolidation of a new international economic order. It also emphasized the proposals it had put forward in various forums, stating that they concerned all aspects of the disarmament problem, encompassing measures relating to both nuclear disarmament and conventional armaments and armed forces, and taking into account present realities in the world.

Mexico referred to the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the special session, and said that the measures it included could be grouped into various categories, depending on what aspects of disarmament they dealt with. Noting that the basic agenda of the CCD had not been

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, document CCD/563.

²⁰ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), p.31.

²¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. IV, document A/AC.187/79.

changed since 1968, it held that the areas of greatest competence of the present Conference were those concerning nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Many delegations made reference to the achievements of the special session. The United States noted particularly the recommendations of the session regarding the revitalization of the international disarmament machinery to provide it with a better representative character. The representative of Mexico referred to the Final Document as unprecedented in the disarmament annals of the United Nations and said that it contained many objectives and principles whose mandatory nature none could call into doubt since the document had been approved by a consensus to which China and France had subscribed. Sweden regarded the special session as a fresh starting point from which the nations must move on towards concrete disarmament on the basis of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document.

Several members also referred to the new organization and procedures for negotiations. The representative of the United States, among others, called attention to the consensus agreement which had been reached at the session that the Committee on Disarmament would be opened to the nuclear-weapon States, the 27 non-nuclear-weapon States currently members of the CCD, and five to eight additional members. In fact, following the special session, virtually all comments made by representatives concerning the negotiating body expressed support of the changes to be made and indicated hope for greater success in the future. For instance, Yugoslavia pointed out that the increased membership would make the Committee on Disarmament a more representative body, and also welcomed the rotation of the chairmanship on a monthly basis among all its members. It stated that the basic assumption for efficient work of the Committee was to make it, from the very beginning, a negotiating body in the real sense of the word, as opposed to one which would wait for agreements from among individual members, or one which acted as an intermediary transmitting agreements reached outside its framework to the General Assembly. The United Kingdom noted that the Committee on Disarmament would be, in many ways, a new body, and was particularly pleased at the improved opportunities that would be afforded to non-members to participate in its work.

Poland, as well as other Eastern European members, including Bulgaria and Romania, referred, however, in one way or another to the need for improved political will if concrete progress was to be made in achieving real disarmament agreements. Italy held that the Committee on Disarmament should consider adoption of methods of work which, while reflecting the essential rule of consensus, would inject more energy into the negotiations, for instance by reaching broad agreement on the work to be accomplished, establishing methodical schedules and creating functional working groups when appropriate.

Delegations of all regions and groups in the CCD expressed satisfaction at the prospect that France would take its seat in the Committee on Disarmament, and several, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mongolia and Nigeria, expressed hope for the early participation of all

the nuclear-weapon States or mentioned China specifically, with Mongolia referring to that country's "negative attitude" but adding that the hopes and concerns of those wishing its participation were understandable.

At the last meeting of the session, the United States reviewed some aspects of the history of disarmament negotiations and stressed that most which had been successfully completed had required several years from their conception to the elaboration of international conventions, and that this was not surprising in view of their complexity and that they dealt with vital security interests of States. Noting some impatience about the pace of current negotiations and lack of action on measures called for in the Final Document of the special session, it held that in the short time involved it would have been unrealistic to expect measurable progress. Its representative, noting the many tasks to which the negotiating body should turn its attention and anticipating a busy future, said that the United States would continue to search for mutually acceptable solutions.

The Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly, in its resolution 502 (VI), of 11 January 1952, created the United Nations Disarmament Commission under the Security Council. Its membership embraced both that of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, that is, the members of the Security Council and Canada. It was given a general mandate on disarmament questions. On 19 April 1954, the Disarmament Commission established a five-Power Sub-Committee consisting of Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the task of searching for agreement on a comprehensive and co-ordinated plan of disarmament.²² The Sub-Committee met from 1954 to 1957 and reported periodically to both the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly.

By General Assembly resolution 1150 (XII), of 19 November 1957, the membership of the Disarmament Commission was expanded by an additional 14 States. At its thirteenth session, in 1958, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1252 D (XIII) by which it reaffirmed the responsibility of the United Nations in seeking a solution of the disarmament problem and decided that the Disarmament Commission should, for 1959 and on an *ad hoc* basis, be composed of all States Members of the United Nations.

Since its establishment in 1952, however, the Disarmament Commission convened only occasionally. In fact, following the universalization of its membership in 1959, it met only twice—in 1960 and in 1965. Since that time deliberations and negotiations in the field of disarmament have been largely assumed by the First Committee and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962 to 1969) and Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

²² See *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 70.IX.1), chap. 3, pp. 50-51.

(1969 to 1978). The new Disarmament Commission, composed of all Members of the United Nations, was established as a successor to the original body in accordance with resolution S-10/2, the Final Document of the General Assembly adopted by consensus at its tenth special session²³ on 30 June 1978.

At the special session many statements were made, both in plenary meetings and in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, on the role of machinery in the field of disarmament and the need for it to be strengthened. The general view was that two types of organs were required: a deliberative body of universal membership to formulate concrete guidelines and make recommendations on various disarmament issues, and a negotiating body of limited size for the negotiation process. During the course of discussion, a majority view favoured the reconvening or reinstatement of the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body entrusted with a new mandate.

Yugoslavia supported reaffirmation of the General Assembly as the highest political organ responsible for the adoption of decisions by the United Nations in the field of disarmament and, with a view to strengthening its role in that sphere, believed that it was necessary to reconvene the Disarmament Commission as soon as possible and to specify the character and contents of its terms of reference. Many other countries, including Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Madagascar, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the USSR, also reacted positively. A number of delegations, including those of Belgium, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Nigeria, attached particular importance to the principle of universal membership for the deliberative body. Nigeria, for example, stressed that such a forum should necessarily allow the participation of all Member States in conditions of sovereign equality and take account of the abiding interest of all in disarmament, which was intimately linked to their security and well-being. Among the States supporting the position that the Disarmament Commission be entrusted with a new mandate, several, particularly among the non-aligned, including India, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia, attached great importance to the inclusion of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament in its terms of reference.

The part of the Final Document establishing the Disarmament Commission reads as follows:

118. The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission originally established by resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, a Disarmament Commission, composed of all States Members of the United Nations, and decides that:

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission should, *inter alia*, consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament;

(b) The Disarmament Commission shall function under the rules of procedure relating to the committees of the General Assembly with such modifications as the Commission may deem

²³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*.

necessary and shall make every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on substantive issues be adopted by consensus;

(c) The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly and will submit for consideration by the Assembly at its thirty-third session a report on organizational matters; in 1979, the Disarmament Commission will meet for a period not exceeding four weeks, the dates to be decided at the thirty-third session of the Assembly;

(d) The Secretary-General shall furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the effective accomplishment of the Commission's functions.

Pursuant to paragraph 118 (c) above, the Disarmament Commission convened at United Nations Headquarters from 9 to 13 October 1978 to consider the organization of its work and report thereon to the Assembly at its thirty-third session. Its 1st meeting was opened by the Secretary-General. In his opening statement, the Secretary-General expressed confidence that, aware of its mandate, the Disarmament Commission would be one of the principal international bodies to accelerate progress towards disarmament and tackle the problem of an unceasing and ever-increasing arms race. He stressed, *inter alia*, that the Commission represented the entire membership of the United Nations and thus brought to bear on the consideration of the question of disarmament the collective political awareness of the world community.

At the same meeting, the Commission elected by acclamation Mr. M. A. Vellodi of India as Chairman. In his statement, the Chairman stressed that the special session had decided, without reservation on the part of any Member State, to establish a Disarmament Commission as successor to the Commission originally established by resolution 502 (VI). This reflected the unanimous view that there was need to have the two bodies, one deliberative and one for negotiations, which could and should function in a complementary and co-ordinated manner without giving rise to confrontation on jurisdictional and other issues. At its 2nd meeting, the Commission, on the basis of nominations received from regional groups, elected the rest of its bureau of eight vice-chairmen (Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Ghana, Madagascar, Mexico and Yugoslavia) and a rapporteur (Argentina).

At its 3rd to 5th meetings, the Commission discussed the organization of its work. Among the matters considered were the appropriate date for its first substantive session, the question of its rules of procedure and the agenda for its substantive work in 1979. The Chairman at this stage emphasized the Commission's mandate, namely, to consider and make recommendations on questions concerning disarmament; to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the tenth special session; and to consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body.

Regarding the date of the first substantive session of the Commission, it recommended in its report²⁴ that "a period of four weeks beginning 14 May should be provided for its session to be convened at Headquarters in New York" and stated that: "The Disarmament Commission considers that at that

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/33/42).

session it might become necessary to set up a committee of the whole and proposes that preliminary arrangements be made to allow both the Disarmament Commission and the committee of the whole, should one be set up, to meet simultaneously.”

In light of the disarmament deliberations of the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, many delegations, including Canada and Madagascar, believed that a short session of the Disarmament Commission should be held before the end of the session so that a draft programme of work for 1979 could be formulated.

Accordingly, the Disarmament Commission met again on 11 and 12 December, primarily on the question of a provisional agenda for its substantive session in 1979. The Commission noted that five draft resolutions had been adopted by the First Committee which had a bearing on its future work.²⁵

After an extensive exchange of views and consultations, the Disarmament Commission reached general agreement on the following terms concerning the provisional agenda for its 1979 session:

In conformity with its mandate contained in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Special Session and taking into account the resolutions adopted by the First Committee at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission tentatively agreed that, subject to the General Assembly, in plenary, approving the [above-mentioned] resolutions already adopted by the First Committee,²⁶ the provisional agenda of its first substantive session, to be held in May/June 1979, should include the following:

1. Opening of the session.
2. Adoption of the agenda.
3. Consideration of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.
4. Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war.
5. Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.
6. Any other business.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

At the regular session of the General Assembly in 1978 many States made reference to general and complete disarmament in the general debates in the plenary or in the First Committee.²⁷ While many of the references were of a

²⁵ All were subsequently adopted by the General Assembly as resolutions 33/71 F (see chapter III above), 33/71 H (see pages 124-125 below), 33/71 L (see chapter III above), 33/91 A (see pages 119-120 below) and 33/62 (see chapter V below).

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 34th and 84th to 86th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th, 52nd, 56th and 60th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

broad general nature, others arose in discussions on questions previously established within the agenda item on general and complete disarmament such as consideration of regional disarmament, negotiations outside of the aegis of the United Nations (limitation of strategic arms), or procedural matters. Still others involved formulation of new initiatives, including one on confidence-building measures and one on prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. In plenary meetings, the speakers who referred to the over-all subject did so in the context of the results of the special session.

Foreign Minister Gromyko of the USSR stated that the most crucial problem affecting all countries was that of the ending of the arms race and disarmament, but, taking a sober view, one had to recognize that the arms race had not diminished one whit. He went on to note the approximate parity in weapons between the West and the Soviet Union and reaffirmed that his country did not intend to change that correlation in its favour. He then quoted Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as having said that there was no type of armaments that the Soviet Union would not be prepared to see limited and banned reciprocally in agreement with other States, and then eliminated from the arsenals. The United Kingdom recalled that four-fifths of military expenditure was on conventional forces and weapons, and that while nuclear deterrence had helped maintain peace for over 30 years, there had been over 120 wars since 1945 with tens of millions of casualties, all caused by conventional weapons; therefore, more attention should be given to conventional arms control. The representative of France, noting that the Final Document bore witness to a remarkable consensus on a number of key points, emphasized that a realistic approach to disarmament would lead his country to recommend the study of measures of a regional nature, and in that context it had proposed a European disarmament conference.

China restated its view that the arms race was caused by the super-Powers, and said that the special session had exposed their arms expansion, but they were very obdurate and rejected any genuine nuclear or conventional disarmament, while, under the pressure of the people, they had been playing the tricks of sham disarmament to deceive the public. In contrast, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic held that the actions of China were fraught with serious danger and that it was absolutely essential to counteract any attempts to undermine the process of détente; it called particular attention to the paper of the USSR entitled "Practical measures for ending the arms race".²⁸

Angola mentioned various factors contributing to the continuing arms race and emphasized the praiseworthy efforts made by the socialist countries aimed at preserving mankind from its disastrous consequences.

Sweden, in its general reference, noted the continuing serious concern caused by the arms race, and held that the new machinery deriving from the

²⁸See A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex.

special session could not replace decisive efforts for disarmament by the two leading military Powers. It also advocated measures to increase confidence among States, holding that this would improve prospects for real reductions of their enormous military arsenals.

The President of Cyprus said that it had emerged, almost imperceptibly, from the special session that there was hardly any prospect of halting the arms race as long as the security of nations continued to be dependent upon the concept of balance of power or balance of weapons, and he reiterated his country's position that the prerequisite was to provide for the security of nations by other means—which could come only through effective application of the relevant provisions of the Charter.

India, for its part, stressed that the final objective had to be general and complete disarmament as subscribed to in the "historic resolution" of 1959—general in the sense of its universal application and complete in the sense of its covering all weapon systems—and it expressed satisfaction that the special session had succeeded in bringing disarmament deliberations and negotiations squarely within the United Nations.

In the First Committee the general debate dealt with both the special session and the usual disarmament agenda, and views on the over-all question were heard in both connexions. Most States emphasized the urgent need for a turning-point finally to curb the arms race and enter into an era in which implementation of concrete measures of disarmament would displace continuing debate on the matter and achievement only of modest arms control agreements. Most also felt that the special session, despite its shortcomings, offered hope of providing that turning-point. While there were differences of emphasis as to how best to capitalize on that hope, virtually all speakers welcomed the changes underway in the disarmament negotiating machinery and called for systematic implementation of the Programme of Action which had emerged from the special session.

On 24 October, the inaugural day of the first Disarmament Week proclaimed by the Assembly at its special session, the Secretary-General, in a message to the First Committee, referred to the acceleration of the arms race and said that the unbearable economic, social and political toll expressed only part of the phenomenon because the past concept of war had been rendered obsolete and life on the planet itself was at stake. He said that the effort must be scaled to the magnitude of the challenge, that political will as well as expertise were necessary, and that a mobilized public opinion could unite to help determine a new course away from the agglomeration of armaments and away from war. In closing, he called for assurance that the impetus created by the special session would be maintained and intensified and said it was not too late to initiate the process which would transform the direction in which human destiny was moving.

At the same meeting, representatives of the various regional groupings of States also spoke. On behalf of the Eastern European States, the representative of Hungary referred to the halting and reversing of the arms race as the most urgent task facing humanity, and called disarmament an absolute necessity. Speaking for the Asian group of States, the representative of Indonesia

said that the greatest challenge today was to stop the arms race, and that the future of mankind would very much depend on curbing that race, reducing existing arms arsenals, and finally eliminating them. For the African States, the representative of Burundi stressed the importance of the decision of the Assembly to inaugurate a Disarmament Week, and of the genuine commitment to general and complete disarmament; he said that the present uncurbed arms race constituted a genuine threat to the security of all peoples and a considerable obstacle to development. The representative of Malta spoke on behalf of the group of Western European and other States, and referred to the dilemma facing the world whereby, on the one hand, technology can be used to nullify the gravitational pull of our planet and, on the other, to cause incalculable damage to it and practically cripple civilization as it is known today. He noted that disarmament efforts predated even the establishment of the League of Nations, and called attention to the renewed impetus which the special session had provided for the complex negotiations and tasks which were still ahead. The speaker for the nine States members of the European Community referred to Disarmament Week not only as an incentive to Governments, but above all as being meant to enhance the awareness of public opinion to the vital necessity as well as the problems of disarmament, and he avowed the commitment of the Community to peace and disarmament. For the Group of Non-Aligned States, the representative of Sri Lanka noted that that group had long sought to make the United Nations the main forum vested with primary responsibility for disarmament, and said that the immediate purpose of the ceremony was to focus the attention of people everywhere on the grave issues and on the fact that they were not only the concern of the Organization or of a few Governments, but that the arms race was a threat to mankind and had a continuing impact on the day-to-day lives of people.

The representative of Mexico specifically mentioned in the First Committee that general and complete disarmament under effective international control must continue to be the final objective, stressed that the stockpiling of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping strengthen international security, in fact weakened it, and that it was necessary to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race until its total elimination was achieved. He went on to refer to the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt genuine disarmament measures of any kind, and emphasized the need for complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests and conclusion of an agreement on the limitation of strategic weapons (SALT II) which should be followed by further negotiations on that subject (SALT III). Mexico subsequently spoke in support of prohibitions or limitations on weapons with indiscriminate or cruel effects, regional efforts on limitations on the use and transfer of conventional weapons, and global measures on the transfer of certain types of weapons. Nigeria held that the success or failure of the special session would be determined by the extent of the implementation of the Programme of Action. It emphasized that progress towards the ultimate objective required the conclusion and implementation of agreements on the cessation of the arms race, some of which were so ripe for implementation that its delegation had expected them already to have been carried out. The Philippines regarded the Declaration and the Programme of Action in the Final Document of the

session as historic and comprehensive statements, but would have preferred a stronger reiteration of the goal of general and complete disarmament. The representative of Kuwait spoke of measures endorsed at the special session to enhance progress in disarmament and, emphasizing the importance of a comprehensive programme and integrated approach, stated that hitherto arms control agreements had not halted the arms race, and that the choice of measures had been haphazard, covering, in many cases, weapons of little military importance or activities not seriously contemplated as methods of war. Singapore provided its analysis of the causes of the arms race by examining five issues, namely, perception of and threats to national security, enhancement of a State's power and status, the advance of technology, vested interests, and public understanding and response; Ireland held that the special session had reaffirmed the importance attached by nations and peoples to the concept of general and complete disarmament, and that the 10 points which its Prime Minister had suggested at the session²⁹ provided realistic priorities for a comprehensive programme; and Albania, for its part, noting real disarmament as a great aspiration and legitimate demand of peoples, held that the United States imperialists, the Soviet social-imperialists and other imperialists and social-imperialists who talked about disarmament were in fact against it in their competition for hegemony and zones of influence.

Among the Eastern European States speaking in the First Committee, the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Hungary stressed the urgent necessity of dealing on a priority basis with nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, but also supported dealing systematically with other aspects of the arms race and the implementation of concrete measures basically in accordance with the outline which had been placed before the Assembly by the Soviet Union.³⁰ Among the Western States, Italy stressed its continuing support for the elaboration of a comprehensive programme towards general and complete disarmament, and the necessity for both regional and global approaches in working to that end, and Belgium saw disarmament as a global responsibility of all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, whose respective responsibilities should be exercised in parallel, and equally as a regional responsibility.

In the course of the debate, nine separate draft resolutions were submitted under the agenda item "General and complete disarmament", and all were adopted by the Committee and the General Assembly (resolutions 33/91 A to 33/91 I); in addition those bodies took a decision to produce a United Nations film on wars and their consequences.³¹ To avoid duplication and provide the full context of each resolution they are discussed in appropriate topical chapters of this volume or in the present chapter as applicable.

The first draft resolution, on the report of the Disarmament Commission, and the second, on confidence-building measures, are discussed in the present

²⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th meeting.

³⁰ See foot-note ²⁸

³¹ For background see document A/33/389 and *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2) p. 37.

chapter. The draft resolution on SALT is considered in chapter VIII. The fourth, sixth and eighth, concerning respectively a study on nuclear weapons, non-stationing of nuclear weapons in additional areas, and prohibition of production of fissionable materials, are covered in chapter VII entitled "Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament". The fifth draft resolution, concerning regional disarmament, is dealt with in chapter XX. The seventh, concerning the Committee on Disarmament, is discussed in this chapter, as well as in chapter III above. The last draft resolution, on a study on disarmament and international security, is discussed in detail in chapter XXV. The decision on the production of the film is dealt with in the present chapter. Finally, one of the draft resolutions introduced under the agenda item on the special session (resolution 33/71 H), insofar as it concerns the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, and another under the item on the strengthening of international security (resolution 33/75), insofar as it concerns disarmament, are referred to in this chapter.

The draft resolution on the report of the Disarmament Commission was sponsored by Argentina, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Ghana, India, Madagascar, Mexico and Yugoslavia. It was subsequently also sponsored by Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Mauritius, Romania and Uruguay and introduced by Argentina at the 49th meeting of the First Committee. In his introduction, the representative of Argentina pointed out that the language, content and provisions of the draft were substantially identical to the decisions adopted by the Assembly at its special session and the consensus reached in the Disarmament Commission itself. Thus, he hoped that the First Committee could adopt it by consensus, which it did at its 56th meeting, on 29 November. The General Assembly also adopted it by consensus, at its 86th meeting, on 16 December, as resolution 33/91 A. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having resolved to lay the foundations of an international disarmament strategy which aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations should play a more effective role,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in which it decided to establish the Disarmament Commission,

Emphasizing the importance of an effective follow-up of the relevant recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Having considered the report of the Disarmament Commission,

1. *Endorses* the report of the Disarmament Commission and the recommendations contained therein;

2. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set down in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, as well as the recommendations contained in its report and the decisions that the General Assembly has taken at its current session and which have a bearing on the Commission's programme of work in 1979;

3. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a report on its work, including any recommendations and observations it may deem appropriate;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the Final Document, together with all the official records of the tenth special session, so that the views and proposals presented by States during the session will be available for the implementation of the Commission's programme of work;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render to the Disarmament Commission all the necessary assistance that it may require for implementing the present resolution;

6. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to invite Member States to communicate to him, by 31 March 1979, their views and suggestions on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, for transmission to the Disarmament Commission;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

Three other resolutions adopted by the Assembly also partly concern the Disarmament Commission. They are resolutions 33/71 F and 33/71 L, which came under the item on the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the special session (see chapter III above), and resolution 33/62 concerning the Disarmament Decade (see chapter V below).

The draft resolution on confidence-building measures was introduced by the Federal Republic of Germany at the 40th meeting of the First Committee. With regard to the initial version, the Federal Republic of Germany said that the measures listed therein had been intended only as examples, that it encouraged regional consideration of appropriate measures and that it invited the transmittal of the views and experiences of Member States to the Secretary-General leading to further consideration of the subject by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. The illustrative list of measures included improved communication, information or military expenditures, notification of and observers at manoeuvres, exchange and visits of military personnel, and internationally-staffed observation posts. After revision, the draft was also sponsored by Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zaire. In the amended draft the list of examples was removed in the light of suggestions to its authors. It was held, when the revised draft was being introduced, that better knowledge and understanding among States could diminish anxiety and contribute to the climate of mutual confidence necessary for real progress in disarmament. It was also noted that the contribution which confidence-building measures could make towards disarmament had been reflected by consensus in the Final Document of the special session. Finally, it was noted that certain initial measures had been adopted and implemented as a result of the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

A final version of the draft resolution, which attempted to accommodate further revisions by Pakistan and Jordan, was introduced at the 55th meeting, on 29 November, with the expressed hope that it would receive the broadest possible acceptance; Jordan and Pakistan did not press their amendments to the vote and the draft was adopted by the Committee at its 56th meeting, on 29 November, by a recorded vote of 119 to none with 6 abstentions, and by the Assembly on 16 December, at its 86th meeting, by a recorded vote of 132 to none with 2 abstentions, as resolutions 33/91 B. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Concerned at the fact that the arms race is accelerating and that the world figure for expenditures on armaments continues to increase,

Convinced that it is possible to develop effective international methods and procedures to promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Desiring to eliminate the sources of tension by peaceful means and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in the world,

Stressing the importance of the statement in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session that it is necessary, in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, to take measures and to pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that strict compliance by all States with the purposes and principles of the Charter is essential to ease international tensions and to create mutual confidence among States,

Recognizing the need and urgency of first steps to diminish the danger of armed conflicts resulting from misunderstandings or from misinterpretations of military activities,

Aware that there are situations peculiar to specific regions, which have a bearing on the nature of the confidence-building measures feasible in those regions,

Expressing its conviction that commitment to confidence-building measures could contribute to strengthening the security of States,

Noting the fact that at its tenth special session a number of proposals for such measures were submitted to that effect which deserve due consideration,

1. *Recommends* to all States to consider on a regional basis arrangements for specific confidence-building measures, taking into account the specific conditions and requirements of each region;

2. *Invites* all States to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of their views and experiences of those confidence-building measures they consider appropriate and feasible;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the views of Member States on this question to the General Assembly during its thirty-fourth session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Confidence-building measures"

The seventh draft resolution, entitled "Committee on Disarmament", first submitted on 22 November, was twice revised by the original and additional sponsors. The final sponsors were: Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, New Zealand, Niger, Oman, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay and Zambia.

In introducing the draft resolution as first revised, Tunisia, at the 55th meeting of the First Committee, noting the widely-expressed view that all States should take part in the negotiations on disarmament, said that the draft resolution contained recommendations made by the special session relating to the Committee on Disarmament, whereby membership, for reasons of efficiency, would be restricted, while non-member States would have the possibility of expressing their views. The draft resolution also took into account the question of review of the composition of the negotiating body, a concept which had been accepted in principle at the special session in order to allow all States eventually to participate. The sponsors had attempted to take into account the various views that had been expressed, and hoped that the draft would be adopted by consensus. In introducing the second revision, Tunisia

explained that it had further taken into account the results of further consultations with delegations, including that of Mexico, which was one of the sponsors of draft amendments. It stated that the compromise text seemed likely to be acceptable to a large majority of the Committee.

Before the vote, considerable discussion surrounded the partial rejection and withdrawal of the amendments, however, and Nigeria orally suggested further minor amendments to the twice-revised draft, which were accepted by its sponsors. Thereupon, the draft resolution was adopted by the Committee on 1 December at its 60th meeting by a non-recorded vote of 110 to 9, with 4 abstentions.

In explanation of vote, the United States noted that in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document, the Committee on Disarmament would adopt its own rules of procedure, taking into account the recommendations of the General Assembly, and report to the Assembly annually. Since those reports would include any consideration of the review of membership, it believed that the report on that question requested of the Committee in the draft resolution should be incorporated in its regular reports.

The Soviet Union made the point that it and others, having agreed at the special session that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament would be reviewed at regular intervals, saw no need, since the Committee would soon meet and would undertake work on its own rules of procedure, to adopt an additional resolution at the thirty-third session, before it had even met; it regretted that the sponsors of the draft resolution did not heed their appeal to defer the question.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany in his explanation, took the view that the draft resolution reflected the agreement reached at the special session, while that of Nigeria advised caution since the concept of laying down principles for periodic changes of membership of the Committee on Disarmament could snowball, possibly creating instability in not only that Committee but also in others.

The draft was adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December at its 86th meeting by a vote of 106 to 9 (the Eastern European States) with 1 abstention, as resolution 33/91 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Recognizing also that in accordance with paragraph 28 of its resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations,

Recalling that in paragraph 113 of the same resolution it declared that, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness in the sphere of disarmament, two kinds of bodies were required: deliberative, in which all Member States should be represented, and negotiating, which for the sake of convenience should have a relatively small membership,

Recalling that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament is to be reviewed at regular intervals in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. *Recommends* that the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed, following appropriate consultations among Member States, during the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to consider the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee and to report on this subject to the General Assembly during its thirty-fifth session;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to make arrangements for interested States not members of the Committee, to submit to it written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents;

4. *Reaffirms* that States not members of the Committee, upon their request, should be invited by it to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item relating to a review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament.

The question of the production of the United Nations film on wars and their consequences was discussed on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General.³² In introducing the report, the Under-Secretary General for Public Information stated that the history of war and anti-war films had been thoroughly considered in consultation with film producers. It had been concluded that it would be feasible to produce a one-hour documentary, intended primarily for television, based on footage held in film archives around the world.

The proposal evoked considerable debate in the Committee, particularly as to whether it should take a decision directly or refer the matter to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies for further consideration, with France, the Soviet Union and the United States all supporting the latter procedure, and others, including Saudi Arabia as the original sponsor, Argentina and Mexico, questioning both the need for and appropriateness of such a procedure in the light of the mandate of the Advisory Board (see chapter XXV below). The Committee recommended and, by a recorded vote of 100 to none with 23 abstentions, the Assembly adopted the decision to proceed with production of the film. General Assembly decision 33/422 reads as follows:

At its 86th plenary meeting, on 16 December 1978, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, decided to request the Secretary-General to proceed with the production of a United Nations film on wars and their consequences at the cost of approximately \$200,000.³³

The debate on two procedural matters, the mandates of the Disarmament Commission and of the Committee on Disarmament, occurred primarily in the context of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the special session. On 2 November, 25 States, mainly non-aligned, submitted a four-part draft resolution encompassing the question of those mandates as well as two other issues. Later, on 24 November, 35 States sponsored a revised version; they were: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Burundi, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Romania, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

³² See foot-note ³¹.

³³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda item 47, document A/33/435, para. 25.

In introducing the revised draft at the 50th meeting, the representative of Yugoslavia drew attention first to the preamble, which noted the contribution of the special session towards highlighting the problems facing the international community and identifying steps conducive to eliminating the arms race. He said that the purpose of the second part³⁴ of the resolution was to provide a precise formulation of the questions which the Disarmament Commission should consider at its forthcoming session in May 1979; it was intended mainly to indicate the areas wherein useful discussions could be held provided the Commission had sufficient time, and for which States Members would prepare themselves. The fourth part, he said, laid stress on the priorities determined at the special session and recommended that the Committee on Disarmament should first deal with a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and secondly with a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons—two questions which had been the object of multilateral negotiations for several years.

The revised draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee at its 52nd meeting on 27 November by a recorded vote of 120 to none with 10 abstentions, including a number of Western States. In explanation of their votes, most of the delegations which abstained stated that it was because the resolution dealt with a number of matters, and they had reservations concerning the phraseology or emphasis in one or some of its parts. France, for instance, said that it would have voted for some parts of it, had they been voted on separately. Belgium abstained because it had difficulty finding in the second part, which concerned the Disarmament Commission, the concept of a balance between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. The Netherlands, which voted in favour, said that it would have abstained on the first two parts had they been voted upon separately. The USSR voted in favour, but, *inter alia*, reserved its right to redefine its position in respect of paragraph 1 of the second part.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly at its 84th plenary meeting on 14 December by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 13 abstentions, as resolution 33/71 H. The preambular and second and fourth parts read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at its tenth special session,

Having in mind the contribution of its tenth special session towards highlighting the gravity of the problems facing the international community in the field of disarmament and identifying the steps conducive to their solution,

Convinced of the need to broaden and deepen the degree of agreement reached and to preserve the momentum initiated at its tenth special session,

Conscious of the widely expressed interest of Member States in an urgent implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session, which found expression in the course of the consideration of this item at the thirty-third session,

³⁴ The first part, dealing with nuclear weapons, and the third part, dealing with a further special session on disarmament, are discussed in chapter III above.

Determined to encourage the taking of urgent measures in order to secure the implementation of the recommendations and decisions endorsed by Member States in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and aimed at halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and to proceed to disarmament,

II

Recalling with satisfaction the decision adopted at its tenth special session on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament,

Recalling also with satisfaction its decision to establish the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body of the General Assembly with the function of considering, in addition to the specific tasks deriving from the decisions and recommendations adopted at the tenth special session of the Assembly, various problems in the field of disarmament and to make recommendations thereon,

1. *Invites* the Disarmament Commission, taking into account General Assembly resolution 33/91 A, to consider on a regular basis the reports and other documents of the Committee on Disarmament submitted by the Secretary-General through the General Assembly;

2. *Recommends* the inclusion in the agenda of the forthcoming session of the Disarmament Commission, apart from the consideration of elements of a comprehensive programme on disarmament as a priority item, the following questions related to disarmament:

(a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;

(b) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

IV

Welcoming the agreement reached at its tenth special session on the constitution of the Committee on Disarmament,

Bearing in mind that the Committee on Disarmament will meet at Geneva in January 1979,

1. *Invites* the Committee on Disarmament to take into account, when determining its priorities and programme of work, the priorities established in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the present resolution;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to undertake on a priority basis, at its first session in January 1979, negotiations concerning:

(a) A treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests;

(b) A treaty or convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit reports to the General Assembly annually or more frequently, as appropriate, and provide its formal and other relevant documents to Member States on a regular basis;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Consideration of the report of the Committee on Disarmament"

As a result of its consideration of a disarmament-related agenda item entitled "Implementation of the declaration on the strengthening of international security" the First Committee and the General Assembly adopted four draft resolutions dealing with various security questions. One of them, resolution 33/75, adopted on 15 December by a vote of 114 to 2 with 19 abstentions,

is related to disarmament in various areas, among them the question of the dismantling of foreign military bases. The disarmament-related parts of the preamble and paragraph 12 read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security",

...

Noting with profound concern . . . the continuation and escalation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, . . .

Reaffirming the close link between the strengthening of international peace and security, disarmament, decolonization and development and stressing the need for concerted action to achieve progress in those areas . . .

...

Taking note of the actions of the international community aimed at strengthening international security, in particular the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, . . .

...

12. *Considers* that dismantling of foreign military bases would contribute to the strengthening of international security;

...

The items placed before the Assembly in 1978 in connexion with its consideration of the global question of disarmament—either in accordance with usual practice or because of other conferences and meetings which took place—and not so far mentioned, were the following:

(a) Annual report for 1977 of the International Atomic Energy Agency;³⁵

(b) Note verbale, dated 2 June 1978, from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the Final Communiqué adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 15 to 20 May 1978;³⁶

(c) Letter dated 14 June 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the resolutions of the Ninth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Dakar from 24 to 28 April 1978;³⁷

(d) Letter dated 6 September 1978 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978;³⁸

³⁵ Circulated under a note by the Secretary-General, document A/33/145.

³⁶ A/33/118.

³⁷ See A/33/151.

³⁸ See A/33/206.

(e) Letter dated 16 October 1978 from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.³⁹

Conclusion

In 1959, the General Assembly set out, as a clear goal, “general and complete disarmament under effective international control”. That goal has been reaffirmed for almost two decades. By applying flexible methods of working towards it, however, the Member States have given the Assembly and negotiating bodies the scope needed to deal effectively with new problems and specific proposals as they have arisen. Thus, a wide variety of issues have been debated and many and varied resolutions passed under the general agenda item. But a number of times it has also been used more or less directly, in the hope of giving the work towards the defined goal a fresh impetus, for instance, at the beginning of the Disarmament Decade and, most recently, in connexion with the special session on disarmament. This is illustrated by the greatly increased expression during and since the session of the urgent need to proceed with concrete measures of actual disarmament within a planned, comprehensive programme—and indeed of the urgency of elaborating such a programme.

Thus the special session reaffirmed the validity of the goal, and at the same time recognized the practical necessity of seeking it on a step-by-step basis within a comprehensive framework over a period of time. The degree to which this fresh impetus will be translated into effective action in the light of the many still-remaining political and technical difficulties will lend itself to assessment over the course of several years.

³⁹ See A/33/319.

Disarmament Decade

Introduction

THE CONCEPT OF A DISARMAMENT DECADE first gained attention during the 1969 session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, when Romania suggested that consideration be given to the proclamation of such a decade. Romania's suggestion led to the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969. By that resolution the Assembly declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade; requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while continuing negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on collateral measures, to work out at the same time a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Committee with a guideline to chart the course of its work and negotiations; and recommended that consideration be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed by disarmament measures to promote economic development of developing countries. Throughout the Disarmament Decade, various proposals have been advanced for the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the decade. The question of disarmament and development and related matters has been the subject of various studies and is discussed in chapter XXIV below. Many ideas have had particular reference to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme for disarmament. Such proposals have been discussed each year at the sessions of the General Assembly and the CCD. The most recent consideration of the achievements of the Disarmament Decade and approaches towards the preparation of a comprehensive disarmament programme, as envisaged in the original declaration took place at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, at the 1978 session of the CCD and in the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.¹

¹ See also chapter IV above, particularly the section on the Disarmament Commission, pages 111-114.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Virtually all speakers who referred to the question at the special session² regretted that the hopes and expectations which inspired the General Assembly to proclaim the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade had not been realized, even though that decade was coming to an end.

Among those expressing such feelings, several, including Albania, Argentina, Jamaica, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mauritius, Nepal and the Syrian Arab Republic called attention to the spiralling increases during the decade either in armaments or military expenditures, or in both. In a similar vein, Ethiopia stated that each year marked the addition of new cataclysmic dimensions to an already dangerous situation which people were compelled to watch, more and more helplessly, as human beings continued to act as though the chief purpose of the human race was to prepare its own annihilation.

Others, including Chad, the Congo, Morocco and Qatar, referred to the continuing effect of the continuing arms race on economic development. The representative of Chad, for instance, noting that the 1969 resolution had highlighted the heavy and unproductive outlay involved in the arms race for the peoples and countries of the north as well as the south, said that the international community continued to suffer from famine and the persistence of unprecedented poverty. Morocco attached significance to the coincidence of the special session with the Disarmament Decade and the Second Development Decade and, noting the link between disarmament and development, referred specifically to the provision of resolution 2602 E (XXIV) which recommended that resources freed by disarmament be channelled to economic development of the third world, particularly in the field of technological progress. Similarly, Qatar, also noting the link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second Development Decade, stated that among other positive effects, cessation of the arms race and reallocation of resources would enable developing countries to put their economic and social development plans into effect.

China, for its part, called attention to the disarmament negotiations during the Decade and the number of statements, declarations, agreements, resolutions and treaties which had come out, and blamed the still growing arms race and danger of war on the duplicity of the super-Powers.

The representative of Kuwait held that, despite discouraging signs, it was still too early to call the Disarmament Decade a complete failure, and expressed the hope that the special session would shatter inaction and impart new momentum to efforts towards general and complete disarmament.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

The introduction to the Final Document,³ adopted at the conclusion of the special session, includes the following statement concerning the Disarmament Decade:

4. The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further because the arms race is not diminishing but increasing and outstrips by far the efforts to curb it. While it is true that some limited agreements have been reached, "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" continue to elude man's grasp. Yet the implementation of such measures is urgently required. There has not been any real progress either that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Furthermore, it has not been possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and human, which are wasted on the unproductive and spiralling arms race and which should be made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a race "places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries"

Several States particularly emphasized the objective of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the disarmament problem.

Nigeria regretted that the CCD had not as yet elaborated a comprehensive programme of disarmament despite repeated requests by the General Assembly. The delegation referred to the special report of the CCD to the special session⁴ which showed that the *Ad Hoc* Working Group of the CCD on a comprehensive programme had done no more than hold preliminary meetings. It stressed that the special session should correct this by establishing a programme of action in two parts—measures immediately ripe and urgent, and measures of a long-term nature. The time lapse since the General Assembly first called upon the CCD to elaborate such a programme in 1969 had served to further emphasize the importance of such a programme as an essential element in the disarmament process. Nigeria suggested that the scope of a comprehensive programme of disarmament would have to be broadened beyond the original perspective of the General Assembly reflected in resolution 2602 E (XXIV). Such a programme should be a reference point not only for the CCD but also for disarmament negotiations conducted in all other forums, so that, taken together, those negotiations would form a co-ordinated effort that would permit discernible progress in the over-all objective of general and complete disarmament. It urged that elaboration of the comprehensive programme on disarmament proceed without any further delay.

The USSR said that participants in the work of the special session had thoroughly discussed the bold and realistic programme for the total cessation of the arms race and practical measures in the field of disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union⁵ and other socialist countries—a programme which embraced a broad range of both nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventional weapons. The Byelorussian SSR wholly

³ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4), sect. III.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 2, (A/S-10/2), vol. I, paras. 84-88.

⁵ See A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex.

supported the proposals contained in that programme. The delegation of Poland recalled that the socialist countries had submitted a long-term disarmament programme to the CCD in February 1978,⁶ and drew attention to some of the essential questions in that programme, namely: agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; prohibition of the development and production of weapons of mass destruction; elimination of chemical weapons; total demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor; and reduction of military budgets. Bulgaria supported the broad programme of measures put forward by the USSR and noted particularly the measures aimed at the cessation of the manufacture of any type of nuclear weapons, cessation of the production and prohibition of all other types of weapons of mass destruction, cessation of the development of new types of conventional weapons of great destructive force, and renunciation by the States which are permanent members of the Security Council and the countries linked to them by military treaties of the expansion of armies and the increase of conventional weapons.

India stated that it understood from the Final Document of the special session that the Committee on Disarmament would take up the elaboration of the comprehensive programme after it had received, through the General Assembly, the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission, once that Commission had completed consideration of the elements of the programme. Sri Lanka, agreeing with India, urged that the Committee on Disarmament consider the comprehensive programme for disarmament after the Disarmament Commission had considered the subject.

Italy recalled the working paper which it had submitted to the CCD in 1970⁷ containing the outline of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and, referring to such a programme in the context of the Programme of Action in the Final Document, said that the negotiating body—the Committee on Disarmament—should undertake, with fresh impetus, the elaboration of such a programme. Italy maintained that even in a Programme of Action contemplating short-term measures, the long-term perspective must be borne in mind in order that the short-term efforts might be infused with a sense of purpose and direction.

In the Programme of Action the mandate given to the CCD in connexion with the Disarmament Decade to work out a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem was effectively transferred to the Committee on Disarmament in the context of the over-all implementation of the priorities set out in that Programme. It is stated in the following terms:

109. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/552.

⁷ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/309, annex C, sect. 38.

concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme.

In the section entitled "Machinery", the Disarmament Commission is given the specific task of considering the elements of the comprehensive programme, as follows:

118. The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission originally established by resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, a Disarmament Commission, composed of all States Members of the United Nations, and decides that:

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission should, *inter alia*, consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament; . . .

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

During the 1978 meetings of the CCD, the Disarmament Decade was considered mainly in connexion with the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament⁸ and the implications of the special session.

At the spring session, the representative of Mexico quoted from a statement made at the opening meeting of the Committee in 1962 in which "the need for concrete achievements" had been stressed; he further quoted the opening paragraphs of a draft introduction which his country, together with Sweden, had proposed⁹ for the draft final document of the special session as follows:

The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 is coming to an end.

Unfortunately the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further. No "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" have materialized, and still less has there been any progress that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Neither has it been possible to free, for the purposes of economic development, any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources and energy, both material and human, that are squandered on the unproductive and wasteful arms race, which "places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries".

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, particularly vol. I, paras. 251-275.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/111.

He held that those quotes provided a balanced and objective idea of what the CCD had achieved and what the special session should accomplish.

Work on the comprehensive programme was undertaken pursuant to the General Assembly resolution 32/80 on "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade". By that resolution, the Assembly, as well as calling for intensified efforts on economic, social and technical questions, specifically noted the decision of the CCD to set up an *Ad Hoc* working group to elaborate a comprehensive programme for disarmament and requested it to continue its work on that subject. The Committee established the *Ad Hoc* Working Group to Discuss and Elaborate a Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament early in the session and decided that the Group would use as its basic working texts all CCD documents on the subject, beginning with the 1961 joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations and taking into account all other documents relating to the matter which had been submitted to the Committee during the course of its work by members or non-members of the Committee.

The *Ad Hoc* Working Group held three meetings on 20 and 22 March and 3 May 1978. It considered matters relating to procedures, organization of work, and papers prepared by the Secretariat; the latter included a tabulation of the working papers and proposals on a comprehensive programme of disarmament which had been submitted to the CCD over the years. On 10 May 1978, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group submitted a report¹⁰ to the Committee. In the report, the Group, *inter alia*, took note of the documents prepared by the Secretariat, and decided to recommend to the CCD that the tabulation of working papers¹¹ should be annexed to the Committee's special report to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.¹²

During the spring session, new working papers on the subject were submitted to the Committee by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, Nigeria, Poland, Romania and the USSR. In addition, a number of delegations, individually or with multiple sponsorship, submitted documents reproducing or referring to working papers or other views on the same general subject which they had already submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In introducing its new working paper,¹³ the delegation of Italy pointed out that the first part dealt with basic principles for negotiations such as the observance of a degree of flexibility, the maintenance of a balance between nuclear and conventional measures and the co-ordination of global and regional initiatives; the second part offered a suggested set of priority measures, involving in the first instance nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but including conventional weapons.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session*, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27), vol. II, document CCD/571.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, document CCD/567 and Add.1.

¹² *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session*, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-10/2/Add.1/Rev.1), annex I.

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session*, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27), vol. II, document CCD/548.

The Soviet Union confirmed the continued relevance to the problem of its 1977 memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament¹⁴ and noted that its new working paper¹⁵ was based on proposals presented to the Preparatory Committee by the same sponsors as well as proposals, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, that had recently been put forward. The sponsors of the paper, the delegation added, had proceeded from the premise that a comprehensive disarmament programme should define fundamental purposes and principles, which should include such principles as not impairing the interests of any of the parties to an agreement, abandonment of attempts to obtain unilateral advantages, universal affirmation and development of the principle of non-use of force in international relations, the principle that negotiations and agreements should involve the largest possible number of States, particularly the nuclear Powers and States possessing the most powerful weapons and armed forces, together with such other principles as should be used for guidance in matters of disarmament. Mongolia and the German Democratic Republic made similar statements in explanation of the document.

The delegation of Romania introduced a working paper¹⁶ in which it held that the need for a comprehensive disarmament programme arose from the growing anxiety of the international community concerning the unprecedented accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. Arms control measures achieved so far, the delegation held, had had no perceptible impact on the dynamics of the arms race and, accordingly, one of the basic objectives of the special session was the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament capable of leading to general disarmament. Such a programme (a) must place disarmament negotiations in perspective once again, creating a real impetus to reverse the escalation of arms and gradually to reduce and eliminate the factors responsible for such escalation; (b) must consist of a systematically organized combination of measures leading up to major objectives and to the final goal of general and complete disarmament; (c) must be comprehensive in order to mobilize the political will of States, with the various measures in the programme negotiated concurrently as organic parts of a single effort; (d) must meet the interests of all States and have global, regional and bilateral measures all incorporated into a unitary concept; and (e) must not simply represent a plan but also suggest ways and means of achieving the desired goal.

The new paper submitted by Nigeria¹⁷ expounded on the history of negotiations in the CCD and the aim and principles of disarmament negotiations, and then listed the elements of the comprehensive programme, according the utmost priority to measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and including suggestions on prohibition of weapons of mass destruction,

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/522.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/552.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, document CCD/553.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, document CCD/555.

collateral measures, conventional weapons and armed forces, general and complete disarmament, and machinery.

The major documents submitted to the CCD reproducing or referring to submissions to the Preparatory Committee for the special session (see chapter I above) were: a paper containing a draft programme of action submitted by Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom,¹⁸ a paper on the main aspects and considerations involved in a disarmament programme submitted by the non-aligned countries, sponsored in the CCD by Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaire;¹⁹ a paper by Sweden²⁰ which proposed key elements of a programme of action for disarmament and the machinery for negotiations which focused on subjects in which Sweden had special interest, such as nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of particularly inhumane weapons and the reduction of military budgets; two papers by Pakistan²¹ which, it held, represented an attempt to focus on issues which deserved increasing attention and were of particular concern to developing countries; and two papers submitted by Mexico, the first of which²² contained a section defining the fundamental principles for implementation of a programme and set forth 25 such principles, and the second of which²³ advocated that the Committee undertake preparation of a comprehensive programme as soon as it had undergone the reforms envisaged in the draft final document of the special session of the Assembly and in an addendum containing 15 illustrative measures which might be included in a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In general discussion of the question, the delegation of Iran, stating that consideration of a comprehensive disarmament programme was especially appropriate now in order to plan future disarmament measures, held that such a programme need in no way depend on or conflict with the programme of action to be decided upon by the Assembly at its special session, as the latter would presumably focus on more immediately achievable goals while the former would fit those goals into the framework of a larger process to extend over a longer time period. The delegation commented, however, that discussion of a comprehensive programme could not be a substitute for the negotiation of actual disarmament measures.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, document CCD/549 (reproducing document A/AC.187/96).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, document CCD/550 (for the text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. IV, document A/AC.187/55/Add.1 and Corr.1 and 2).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, document CCD/554 (for the text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/95).

²¹ *Ibid.*, documents CCD/556 and CCD/557 (for the texts, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. V, documents A/AC.187/91 and A/AC.187/92).

²² *Ibid.*, document CCD/560 (for the text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. IV, document A/AC.187/56).

²³ *Ibid.*, document CCD/561 and Add.1 (for the texts, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. V, document A/AC.187/89 and Add.1).

The United States pointed out that there were limitations to what could be accomplished by a comprehensive programme, particularly since it was not possible to set binding deadlines for negotiations that were, by their very nature, consensual. The delegation also hoped that the working group would consider not only proposals now before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, but also those that might be submitted in the future.

Following the special session on disarmament, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on a comprehensive disarmament programme was not reconvened since the General Assembly had recommended that the Disarmament Commission should consider the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the Committee on Disarmament (see pages 131-132 above).

At the opening of the summer session of the CCD, the United States noted that the special session had agreed that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures and drew attention to the recommendation contained in paragraph 109 of the Final Document that the Committee on Disarmament should undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme "encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality . . .". Similarly, the Soviet Union noted that an important provision of the Final Document was the one which emphasized the link between nuclear disarmament and the parallel adoption of measures to strengthen the security of States, as well as the link between nuclear disarmament and progress in the field of limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional armaments. The delegation stressed the importance of the proposals put forward by its Government at the special session on disarmament, the recent proposals which it and a number of other socialist countries had made at the Vienna negotiations on the mutual limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and the proposals on confidence-building measures put forward at the follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held at Belgrade from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978. It recalled the establishment of the *Ad Hoc* Working Group for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive programme and added that the special session had confirmed the requirement for that task.

Referring specifically to the Programme of Action included in the Final Document, Mexico said that the measures included therein could be grouped into various categories and added that, of all the categories of measures, it would seem that those which were at the moment most directly within the competence of the Committee were those concerning nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany referred to paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the special session, noting that the Committee on Disarmament was called upon to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament and that the Disarmament Commission would first consider elements of such a programme. The Federal Republic would have liked the *Ad*

Hoc Working Group to have resumed its work at the summer session in order to continue its exchange of views. It held that that would have been useful in order to clear up some questions which, at a later stage, could speed up deliberations in the Disarmament Commission, the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament. Unfortunately, such an exchange of views had not taken place, which meant, in practice, that the Committee on Disarmament would probably not be able to take up that task before the spring of 1980.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

Many delegations, both in plenary meetings and in the First Committee,²⁴ pointed out that the Disarmament Decade was drawing to a close and the original hope expressed for concrete and measurable progress towards general and complete disarmament remained unfulfilled. This meant that one objective of the Disarmament Decade, the channelling of resources freed by disarmament measures to promote the economic, scientific and technological advancement of developing countries, had not been attained.

Speaking in plenary, the representative of Zaire, for instance, recalled that when the Disarmament Decade was declared, the major objective was the release of resources devoted to the arms race and their channelling for economic and social development, but that since then a reverse trend had been witnessed. Similarly, Guinea-Bissau, holding that the Disarmament Decade and second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development had provided for the transfer of resources to developing countries, noted with alarm that vast human and material resources were being diverted from economic and social activities to a senseless arms race. Jordan said that world-wide consciousness of the absence of progress in disarmament placed the world in jeopardy and the failure of the Disarmament Decade had prompted the convening of the special session.

The representatives of a number of States in the general debate also referred specifically to the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The USSR said that it had already put forward proposals relating to a comprehensive programme for curtailing the arms race. In circumstances where the arms race was being stepped up and the world was sliding downhill in this respect, the first thing to do was to stop completely any further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms. The USSR urged the discussion of a set of sweeping measures which could be carried out within a specified limited period.

India considered that the following six steps should be taken: first, cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons,

²⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 54th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

accompanied by the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and, in the meantime, a moratorium on further testing of nuclear weapons; secondly, cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for nuclear purposes; thirdly, reduction and eventual elimination of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons within an agreed time-frame; fourthly, conclusion of a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances; fifthly, elimination of all other weapons of mass destruction; and sixthly, limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Mexico was of the view that disarmament measures, together with a reduction in military budgets and the reallocation of such resources to meet the developmental and nutritional needs of the people, would have to be included in a comprehensive disarmament programme, the negotiation of which should now begin and on which Mexico had already made a proposal.

In the First Committee debate Venezuela noted that the Final Document of the special session had stressed that the objectives of the Decade seemed today even further away than when it was so solemnly proclaimed in 1969; similarly, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya referred to those objectives as having become more remote, and Indonesia said they were still far from realization. Colombia stated that only acceptance of the failure so far of the Disarmament Decade would enable a realistic approach to what remained to be done.

Nigeria believed that the results of the special session might accelerate action for the implementation of some of the measures envisaged in the programme for the Disarmament Decade in three particular areas: first, on the comprehensive programme for disarmament, the Disarmament Commission should consider elements of the programme and submit its recommendations thereon to the Committee on Disarmament through the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. This would give the Committee on Disarmament an opportunity to undertake negotiations on the comprehensive programme during 1980. Secondly, the General Assembly should call on the group of experts working on disarmament and development to expedite its work and to submit concrete recommendations that could form the basis for action. Thirdly, progress should be made in efforts to achieve a reduction of military budgets and the diversion of the savings to economic and social programmes. In conclusion, Nigeria said that as the preparations were made for the strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, the United Nations should launch another disarmament decade.

The delegation of Ecuador also supported the plan to launch a second United Nations disarmament decade. The delegation said that during that period an attempt should be made to implement the recommendations of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. Chile stated that preparations should be made for a second disarmament decade bearing in mind the important proposals and resolutions on disarmament adopted by consensus at the tenth special session.

With regard to the comprehensive programme, Burma, noting that serious efforts were being made to elaborate such a programme, said that no

agreement had so far been possible as to the structure, elements, balances and priorities to be incorporated therein. The delegation of Burma believed that this was not a programme in the ordinary sense, but a grave political document having far-reaching political and security implications, and carrying short-, medium- and long-term commitments for countries, large and small, aligned and non-aligned.

Italy reiterated the views it put forward at the special session and referred to the working papers presented on the subject of a comprehensive programme at the special session and to the CCD. The delegation was convinced that the long-term perspective must never fade from view if the short-term efforts were to be infused with a sense of purpose and direction. Moreover, each stage of disarmament should be accompanied by progress towards methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes, peace-building and the organization of international security forces.

Spain hoped that the Committee on Disarmament would pay the closest attention to the question of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, and that at the forthcoming meeting of the Disarmament Commission and at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly it might be possible for all Member States to consider the progress achieved in that area.

On 16 October 1978, Ethiopia, India, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Sweden and Venezuela submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently also sponsored by Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Ecuador, Egypt, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritius, Niger, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Nigeria on 21 November. He said, in the introduction, that it was designed to promote as much as possible future efforts to implement the elements of the Disarmament Decade, to make it possible to continue action beyond the end of the present decade, and to call on the Disarmament Commission—which should have the first say—to give priority consideration to the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament at its 1979 session and transmit its recommendations through the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament, and to make provision for the consideration of the declaration of the 1980s as a disarmament decade. Concluding, the representative of Nigeria stated that there was a widely-held view that the comprehensive programme of disarmament ought to be ready for adoption by the next special session devoted to disarmament in 1982. If that target date was to be met, then the negotiations on the comprehensive programme in the Committee on Disarmament would have to start by 1980.

On 28 November, the draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee by consensus. It was adopted, also by consensus, by the General Assembly on 14 December as resolution 33/62. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it declared the decade of the 1970s the Disarmament Decade,

Reaffirming the purposes and objectives of the Decade,

Recalling its assessment in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly that the objectives established for the Decade appeared to be as far away as they had

been or even further because the arms race was not diminishing but increasing and outstripping efforts to curb it,

Deeply concerned at the continued wastage of resources on armaments and the consequent detrimental effect on international security and the achievement of the new international economic order,

Recalling the decision taken at its tenth special session concerning a comprehensive programme of disarmament,

Recalling also its decision that the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development in view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the need to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly of the developing countries,

Affirming the urgent need for the promotion of negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, for the reduction of military expenditures and for general and complete disarmament,

1. *Calls upon* the Disarmament Commission to give priority consideration to the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament in its session to be held in 1979 and to exert its best endeavours to transmit its recommendations thereon, through the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, to the Committee on Disarmament;

2. *Expresses its satisfaction* that the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development has been convened by the Secretary-General to commence its study and looks forward to receiving an interim report on the study at its thirty-fourth session;

3. *Takes note* of the preparations for the strategy for the third United Nations development decade and stresses the need to continue to promote the link between the strategy for disarmament and the strategy for development in view of the close relationship between disarmament and development affirmed by the General Assembly at its tenth special session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Consideration of the declaration of the 1980s as a disarmament decade"

Conclusion

In 1978, considerable disappointment was expressed in various forums concerning lack of results in fulfilment of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade, both in the area of channelling resources freed by disarmament measures to promote economic development of developing countries and that of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the disarmament problem.

The General Assembly, at its special session, reaffirmed that the elaboration of a comprehensive programme was a necessary element in future disarmament efforts and recommended in paragraph 118 of its Final Document that the Disarmament Commission should consider the elements of such a programme, to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament.

The Disarmament Commission will consider elements of the programme at its session in New York from 14 May to 8 June 1979, and will submit its recommendations to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session. Thus, the Committee on Disarmament may be in position to resume work on the comprehensive programme during 1980.

Another development was the possibility of declaring the 1980s as a second disarmament decade. That idea was put forward by several States and the matter was opened, by resolution 33/62, for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

World disarmament conference

Introduction

THE IDEA OF CONVENING a world disarmament conference was initiated at the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961. In the Declaration¹ adopted by that Conference the non-aligned countries recommended, *inter alia*, that the General Assembly should take a decision with respect to convening either a special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament or a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in motion the process of general disarmament. They considered that the convening of a world disarmament conference at an appropriate time, with the participation of all States, would be useful. They reiterated this view at subsequent summit conferences—Cairo, 1964; Lusaka, 1970; Algeria, 1973; and Colombo, 1976.

In 1965 a group of non-aligned countries at the twentieth session of the General Assembly took the initiative which led to adoption of resolution 2030 (XX) by which the Assembly endorsed the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference which had been suggested by the second summit conference of non-aligned countries. The proposal did not materialize, however, and at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly in 1971, the USSR revived the idea. On the Soviet proposal to convene a world disarmament conference, France and the United Kingdom took a positive attitude with certain qualifications. The United States expressed a reserved attitude. China stated that the proposal had neither set out a clear aim nor put forward practical steps for its attainment. At the same session, the Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 2833 (XXVI), in which it expressed the conviction that it was most desirable to take immediate steps in order that careful consideration be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all States.

In 1972 the General Assembly adopted at its twenty-seventh session resolution 2930 (XXVII), in which it set up a special committee which held an informal exchange of views on the question of convening a world disarma-

¹ For an extract from the Declaration see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. III, document A/AC.187/30 and Corr.1.

ment conference. In 1973 the General Assembly adopted at its twenty-eighth session resolution 3183 (XXVIII) in which it, *inter alia*, established an *ad hoc* committee to examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference, including conditions for the realization of such a conference. In 1974 and 1975 the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference submitted reports² to the General Assembly in which, while stating problems preventing further progress towards the convening of a world disarmament conference, it noted also that there was a widespread view that such a conference would be a useful forum for disarmament efforts.

In 1976 the *Ad Hoc* Committee submitted a report³ to the General Assembly containing the following analysis of the conclusions contained in its report to the previous session of the Assembly: (a) the concept of a world disarmament conference enjoyed wide support, but many Governments believed universal participation and adequate preparation to be necessary for the realization of such a conference; (b) the basic divergence of opinion which had emerged among the nuclear-weapon States concerning the timing and conditions for the convening of such a conference still persisted; (c) the objectives envisaged for a world disarmament conference ranged between two specific conference models, namely: (1) a conference aimed at arriving, during its course, at agreements on concrete measures of disarmament in both the nuclear and conventional fields; or (2) a conference that would undertake the task of streamlining the machinery, proposing guidelines and providing impetus to disarmament negotiations; (d) the scope and nature of the conference would vary according to the function that would be assigned to it; and (e) the political conditions that might be applicable to a conference aiming at actual measures of disarmament might not necessarily be essential for the convening of a conference with more limited goals.

In the same report the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended that efforts towards the creation of appropriate conditions for the convening of such a conference should continue. At the thirty-first session the General Assembly adopted resolution 31/190 in which it requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to maintain close contact with the States possessing nuclear weapons to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee and to submit a report to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly.

In 1977 the question of a world disarmament conference received attention in the context of preparations for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers, at its meeting held at New Delhi in April 1977, recommended in its final communiqué⁴ that the special session should, *inter alia*, consider the question of convening a world disarmament conference. In

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/9628) and ibid., Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/10028).*

³ *Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/3128).*

⁴ See A/32/74, annex I.

the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, the Eastern European States expressed the view that the special session should constitute an important step in the process leading to a world disarmament conference.

The report of the Preparatory Committee to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session⁵ recommended that the provisional agenda for the special session on the review of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament should cover the question of convening a world disarmament conference and that the General Assembly at its thirty-second session should request the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to submit a special report to the special session on the state of its work and deliberations. Also, the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference⁶ stated, in its conclusion, that the General Assembly might wish to bear in mind the recommendation made to it by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/89, in which it requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to submit to the Assembly at its tenth special session a special report on the state of its work and deliberations, to maintain close contact with the States possessing nuclear weapons, to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee and to report to the Assembly at its thirty-third session.

Consideration by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, 1978

During the two sessions of the Preparatory Committee in 1978⁷ the USSR and other Eastern European States stressed that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and a world disarmament conference should be complementary, and that a world disarmament conference should become such a forum that would make it possible to proceed from the declarations and recommendations adopted by the General Assembly to practical action leading to agreed disarmament measures and meaningful decisions.

For the part on the disarmament machinery in the draft final document of the tenth special session,⁸ the USSR and other Eastern European States proposed that the General Assembly set up a date for a world disarmament conference, and that the conference should consider the questions of disarma-

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 41 (A/32/41)*, paras. 17 and 18.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 28 (A/32/28).

⁷ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1), vol. V, document A/AC.187/114, para. 3 and vol. VII, 21st to 42nd meetings.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. I, para. 54, sect. IV.

ment in their entirety, including ways of achieving general and complete disarmament and partial measures. The conference should be organized in such a manner that specific problems would be considered in the first instance by States whose interests were primarily affected. It could give instructions to its specific working bodies designed to conduct actual negotiations. The conference should be duly prepared, and a preparatory committee established, composed of nuclear-weapon States, members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and a number of other States on the basis of balanced political and geographical representation. The Preparatory Committee would draw up an agenda for the conference and its work programme, and submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.⁹

Many Western States maintained that a world disarmament conference should only be held with the participation of all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, and with adequate preparation. The Group of Non-Aligned States proposed that at the appropriate time, a world disarmament conference could be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation. Mexico proposed that the deliberative machinery of the United Nations should be reinforced through the institutionalization of a world disarmament conference on terms acceptable to all Member States. All those ideas were included as options in the draft final document contained in the report of the Preparatory Committee.¹⁰

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Pursuant to the mandate entrusted to it by General Assembly resolution 32/89, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference held two sessions in 1978. The first session, between 13 March and 8 May, was devoted to the preparation and adoption of its special report to the General Assembly at its tenth special session,¹¹ which included five sections entitled "Introduction", "Work of the Committee", "Summaries of the positions of Governments on various aspects of a world disarmament conference", "Conclusions, observations and recommendations made from 1975 to 1977 by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including those relating to its mandate", and "Conclusions of the special report made by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference", and an annex entitled "Comprehensive review of the positions of States as presented to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and to other forums".

In the conclusions of the special report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee reiterated that the idea of a world disarmament conference had received wide support by the membership of the United Nations, however, with varying degrees of emphasis and differences as to conditions and certain aspects related to the

⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 54, sect. IV, para. 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-10/3 and Corr.1).

question of its convening, upon which no consensus had yet been reached among the nuclear-weapon States. The *Ad Hoc* Committee further considered in its conclusions that the Assembly, at its special session devoted to disarmament, might wish to draw conclusions on the subject in the light of the Committee's special report and the relevant sections of the report of its Preparatory Committee.

At the special session of the General Assembly¹² the representative of Iran, in his capacity as Chairman, introduced the special report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee by emphasizing that in preparing the report the Committee had been conscious of the need to be guided in its work by a realistic and balanced approach. Also at the session, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty submitted the final communiqué of the Committee of their Foreign Ministers held at Sofia on 24 and 25 April 1978,¹³ in which they stated, *inter alia*, that they supported the convening of a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States of the world. Further, the USSR submitted a document entitled "Practical measures for ending the arms race"¹⁴ in which, *inter alia*, it stated that the General Assembly at its tenth special session had the necessary authority to make a real contribution towards progress in ending the arms race, and, in discharging its task, would lay the foundation for the convening and success of a world disarmament conference.

In the debate, numerous Eastern European States and others, including Cuba, Mongolia and Viet Nam, emphasized the need to convene a world disarmament conference to halt the continuing arms race, and urged that the General Assembly take a decision on a date for the conference and its preparation, following the ideas indicated by brackets in the draft final document submitted to the special session by the Preparatory Committee for the special session.¹⁵

A number of non-aligned States recalled their initiative to hold a special session on disarmament as a contribution towards the convening of a world disarmament conference, and supported the convening of such a conference with adequate preparation and with the participation of all States, particularly all nuclear-weapon States. Ethiopia held that a world disarmament conference would be a logical follow-up of the tenth special session and called upon it to take necessary decisions towards the convening of a world disarmament conference. Afghanistan favoured the convening of a world disarmament conference shortly after the special session, and the Congo supported an "international disarmament conference" for 1980. Bangladesh and the Lao People's Democratic Republic considered that pending the world disarmament conference another special session on disarmament should be convened. Mexico also believed that until there was general acceptance of the idea of convening

¹² *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, 3rd to 16th meetings, and *ibid.*, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

¹³ See A/S-10/13, annex.

¹⁴ See A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex.

¹⁵ See foot-note 9.

and institutionalizing a world disarmament conference, which should play a role in the disarmament field similar to that which the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development plays in the economic and social field, special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament must be held. Liberia stated that a world disarmament conference might be institutionalized, not merely as a deliberative forum, but essentially as a decision-making and an appraisal body. Such a conference could convene periodically, perhaps once every three or four years.

Several Western States reiterated their positions on the question of a world disarmament conference and, while somewhat sceptical as to the value of such a forum, continued to attach importance to the participation of all States and its adequate preparation.

China expressed its support for the establishment by the special session of the General Assembly of new deliberative and negotiating bodies for disarmament which, it held, should be fully representative and able to reflect the views of all countries, and stated that, accordingly, there would be no need for the world disarmament conference which the Soviet Union had been advocating over the years.

In the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Tenth Special Session on 12 and 13 June, when a selection of non-governmental organizations and institutes in the field of disarmament was given an opportunity to address it, a number of them, including the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and the International Institute for Peace, expressed particular support for the convening of a world disarmament conference.

In its Final Document,¹⁶ the Assembly included the following paragraph:

122. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

Following the special session the subject was raised again at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978. In the Final Document of that Conference the Ministers noted with approval the idea of convening a world disarmament conference at an appropriate time with universal participation and adequate preparation.¹⁷

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

At the 1978 session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the question of convening a world disarmament conference was discussed mainly in connexion with the tenth special session of the General Assembly.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4).

¹⁷ See A/33/206, annex I, para. 148.

¹⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, para. 293.

During the spring session several Eastern European States expressed support for the convening of a world disarmament conference. Czechoslovakia stated that the special session should devote particular attention to the question of a world disarmament conference and adopt all necessary measures for a practical preparation of the conference. Poland expected that the special session would be followed by the world disarmament conference. Bulgaria held that the CCD should devote efforts to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, to be adopted at the future world disarmament conference. On the other hand, Italy stated that a world disarmament conference might be appropriately regarded as a further supplement to existing initiatives and organs only with the essential prerequisites of adequate preparation and the participation, from the preparatory stage, of all States with significant military capability, including all nuclear-weapon States.

During the summer session, after the special session, a number of Eastern European States drew attention to paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the special session concerning a world disarmament conference. Hungary noted that an important result of the special session was its support for the idea of convening a world disarmament conference at the earliest appropriate time. Czechoslovakia urged that the conference be convened as soon as possible. Mongolia held that the special session had made an important contribution to the preparations for the conference. The German Democratic Republic believed that only a world disarmament conference could be a forum where, given appropriate powers, existing proposals could be translated into concrete and binding legal agreements and urged greater efforts to prepare such a conference.

***Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, 1978**

The *Ad Hoc* Committee held a second series of meetings from 11 to 15 September to review the proceedings of the special session and prepare its report for the regular session of the General Assembly. The work required two formal meetings and four meetings of the Working Group.

At those meetings, the USSR and other Eastern European States drew attention to paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the tenth special session and to the Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries¹⁹ held at Belgrade in July 1978. They noted that there was general support among all Member States for convening a world disarmament conference, and proposed that the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommend in its report that the General Assembly at its thirty-third session consider the question of determining the date of a world disarmament conference and of establishing a preparatory body for it. Some other members of the Committee stressed the importance of ensuring the participation of all States and, taking into account

¹⁹ See foot-note 17.

continuing divergence of views among most nuclear-weapon States, suggested that the Assembly be requested to consider the possibility of renewing the mandate of the Committee.

At its final meeting, on 15 September 1978, the *Ad Hoc* Committee unanimously adopted its report to the General Assembly²⁰ as drafted by the Working Group. The report noted that the Committee had maintained, through its Chairman, close contact with the representatives of States possessing nuclear weapons, in order to remain currently informed of their respective attitudes towards the convening of a world disarmament conference. Information regarding those contacts was included in the report, which made it evident that, in essential aspects, the positions of the five nuclear Powers concerning the holding of a world disarmament conference remained unaltered.

In this regard, China reiterated that the convening of a world disarmament conference, or preparation for such a conference, could only be acceptable if all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two major nuclear-weapon Powers, would undertake (a) not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, particularly against the non-nuclear-weapon States; and (b) to end all forms of military presence on the territory of other countries by those concerned. If such preconditions were met, a world disarmament conference could be convened with a clear aim, namely, to consider the question of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons.

France reiterated that the holding of a special session on disarmament, the main objectives of which would be to define the general principles applicable in the matter of disarmament, to determine the main foci of efforts in that regard and to enhance the effectiveness of the existing negotiating machinery, did not in any way lessen the interest of France in the convening of a world disarmament conference. It hoped that the necessary prerequisites for such a gathering—in particular, endorsement by all the nuclear Powers—could be met in the near future.

The Soviet Union stated that the time had come to take new steps to expedite a decision on the question of convening a world disarmament conference. The *Ad Hoc* Committee could proceed at once to include in its report a recommendation to the General Assembly to consider at its thirty-third session the question of setting a date for convening a world disarmament conference and establishing a preparatory committee for the conference. Such a recommendation would be particularly appropriate and necessary in the light of the fact that the Assembly, at its special session devoted to disarmament, proposed the inclusion in the agenda of the thirty-third session of an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session". It was obvious that that also implied consideration by the Assembly of the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

²⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/33/28)*.

The United Kingdom reiterated that there was no change in the position it had expressed on many occasions in the past. In its view, the participation of all militarily significant States, including all nuclear-weapon States, remained an essential element in convening a world disarmament conference.

The United States reiterated that its position had not changed. According to that position, the General Assembly could note by consensus that a world disarmament conference could play a role in the disarmament process at an appropriate time. However, under the circumstances, it was not the lack of a suitable forum, but the lack of political agreement that constituted the principal obstacle to progress in disarmament. A world disarmament conference would be unlikely to overcome that lack of agreement and thus would more probably hinder, rather than assist, efforts to reach concrete arms control agreements. It would, therefore, be premature at this time to convene, to set a date for or to start preparations for a world disarmament conference.

As conclusions and recommendations,²¹ the report stated that in the light of the conclusions contained in paragraphs 95 and 96 of its special report to the special session and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, including, in particular, paragraphs 115, 122 and 126, the Assembly might wish to consider taking any possible steps thereon, pursuant to the above paragraphs, as well as the renewal of the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

In its consideration of the question of a world disarmament conference at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly,²² the First Committee had before it the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee²³ and the documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978.²⁴ The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was introduced by the representative of Iran, in his capacity as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, who noted that the conclusion in the report was the product of protracted and delicate negotiations among all States concerned.

In the First Committee, Member States considered the question under two agenda items—the world disarmament conference and the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the special session on disarmament. Many of them referred to paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the special session which was formulated as an acceptable approach to the question of a world disarmament conference.

²¹ *Ibid.*, para. 13.

²² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 59th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²³ See foot-note 20.

²⁴ See A/33/206.

Several Eastern European States, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR and the USSR reiterated their support for the convening of a world disarmament conference, pointing out that paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the special session reflected broad support for the holding of such a conference. They considered it encouraging that the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade had reaffirmed the need to convene a world disarmament conference. The USSR believed that the time had come to set a time-table for a world disarmament conference and the creation of an organ to make practical preparations for it. The German Democratic Republic and the Ukrainian SSR held that the present session of the General Assembly should decide on the date for the convening of the conference and also set up its preparatory committee. Ethiopia and Democratic Yemen expressed similar views. The Ukrainian SSR added that while a world disarmament conference would be a universal forum, the work of the conference could be organized in such a way that those States which were primarily concerned would be the ones to take part in the consideration of a given problem. Hungary held that the conference should have the power to adopt binding decisions.

As to the relationship between a world disarmament conference and special sessions of the General Assembly on disarmament, the German Democratic Republic emphasized that the holding of further special sessions on disarmament could not be a substitute for a world disarmament conference. Zaire stated that a world conference could be held one or two years after a second special session. China, while agreeing on a second special session on disarmament, noted that all views and proposals concerning disarmament could be considered at the special session and other appropriate meetings under United Nations auspices, and denounced the need to hold a world disarmament conference. China also stated that the purpose of the USSR to hold such a conference was none other than to use propaganda tactics to cover up its activities of frenzied arms expansion and war preparations and offset the demand of the people of the world that it be the first to carry out disarmament together with the other super-Power.

On 21 November, Burundi, Iran, Peru, Poland and Spain submitted a draft resolution, which was subsequently also sponsored by Bolivia, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Jordan, Mongolia, Morocco, the Ukrainian SSR and Uruguay. The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 1 December by consensus, and by the General Assembly on 14 December, also without a vote, as resolution 33/69. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2833 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2930 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3183 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3260 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3469 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/190 of 21 December 1976 and 32/89 of 12 December 1977,

Reiterating its conviction that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and that all States should be in a position to contribute to the adoption of measures for the achievement of this goal,

Stressing anew its belief that a world disarmament conference, adequately prepared and

convened at an appropriate time, could promote the realization of such an aim and that the co-operation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would considerably facilitate its attainment,

Taking note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference,

Recalling that, in paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, it decided that, at the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation,

1. *Renews* the mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference;
2. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their attitudes as well as with all other States, and to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee, especially having in mind paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;
3. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;
4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "World Disarmament Conference"

In the explanation of vote following the adoption of the draft resolution in the First Committee, China stated that, in view of the fact that the special session on disarmament had been convened, all the deliberations and considerations with regard to questions of disarmament should be conducted under the direct auspices of the United Nations, and, noting that a second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament was to be held in due course, expressed reservations about the holding of a world disarmament conference outside the United Nations. The United States believed that a premature world disarmament conference held without an adequate basis for agreement on questions of substance would probably hinder rather than advance efforts to reach arms control agreements and did not foresee appropriate conditions for a world disarmament conference emerging in the near future. On that basis the United States questioned the desirability of continuing the activity of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on an annual basis.

Conclusion

In 1978 the question of a world disarmament conference was considered largely in connexion with the preparations for the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and its results. The special report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the World Disarmament Conference indicated both the past developments of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the state of its present work.

During the special session, the different positions among the nuclear-weapon States continued to be in evidence and most non-nuclear-weapon States maintained generally positive but cautious attitudes on the question. The USSR and other Eastern European States continued to urge the preparation and early convening of a world disarmament conference at which actual disarmament agreements might be reached, while most Western States continued to hold restrained attitudes towards such a conference under current conditions and some even questioned the desirability or practicality of the

concept. The non-aligned countries generally supported the idea with the proviso, however, that all nuclear-weapon States should participate. The pertinent paragraph of the Final Document of the special session reflects the degree of common understanding on the question among Member States.

Following the general guideline as established by the special session, the *Ad Hoc* Committee is expected to maintain close contact with the nuclear-weapon States and others, and to continue its consideration of the question in 1979.

PART THREE

Nuclear disarmament

Nuclear arms limitation and disarmament

Introduction

FOR A LONG TIME, the attention of the international community has been focused on the danger posed by nuclear weapons to the very survival of mankind and the consequent pressing need to adopt effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. A number of agreements have been reached, within and outside the framework of the United Nations, to diminish that danger, but, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons has continued, leading to a staggering growth in the number of nuclear weapons and the development and deployment of ever more complex and destructive weapons systems.

In that light, many States have criticized the tendency to direct international efforts to secondary issues rather than to nuclear disarmament—a tendency which in their eyes is particularly notable in the work of the negotiating body. In addition, it has been generally emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the two major ones, have the primary responsibility to take the steps needed for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. For their part, the Soviet Union and the United States have time and again affirmed their commitment to those objectives as evidenced by their persistent efforts in the context of the SALT negotiations.

Over the years, a broad range of measures has been advanced covering the entire spectrum of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament problems. Concrete discussions and negotiations have concentrated on certain specific questions which are examined in various chapters of the present *Yearbook*, such as the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. This chapter is designed to provide an overview of the question, including an examination of various approaches and measures in respect to specific aspects of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament¹ which are not covered in other chapters of the *Yearbook*, and which have been discussed

¹ A detailed account of such initiatives may be found in *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1) and its supplement, *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1).

from time to time, singly, in various combinations, or as part of comprehensive proposals aimed at general and complete disarmament.

A wide range of measures has been put forward aiming at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and involving, in one form or another, limitations, reductions and/or the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. The measures proposed have included the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, the destruction of existing stockpiles and the cut-off of the further production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the transfer of stocks of such material to peaceful uses. There have also been proposals for restrictions or prohibitions on the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of other States. The bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in which the Soviet Union and the United States have been involved since 1969 may also be mentioned in the same context.

Many initiatives have been taken concerning the prohibition or limitation of the use of nuclear weapons. Proposals on the subject have been discussed at different times and in different contexts and have ranged from unconditional prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons to prohibition of first use and conditional prohibitions.²

Measures to avert or reduce the danger of nuclear war have been the subject of discussions in bilateral negotiations and a number of agreements have been reached, such as the "hot line" agreements³ and the agreement of 30 September 1971 on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States; the agreement on the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, concluded by France and the Soviet Union on 16 July 1976; and the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on the prevention of the accidental outbreak of nuclear war, concluded on 10 October 1977.

In addition to substantive measures relating to nuclear weapons, the topic of a suitable framework for discussions on nuclear disarmament has merited attention. The evolution of the negotiating machinery, particularly in the 1950s, has reflected the special role that the major military powers play in that area. Thus, it may be recalled that the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (the predecessor of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament) was established by a decision of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in 1959. In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the idea of negotiations among all the nuclear-weapon States to deal with the problem of nuclear disarmament. Such proposals have been advanced by the Soviet Union. The position of China has consistently been that all countries in the world, big or small, should be equal and that matters affecting various countries in the world should be jointly

² See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), pp. 68-69.

³ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.76.IX.1), p. 130; see also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), p. 71.

discussed and settled by all of them and permit of no monopoly by a few big Powers. France has repeatedly held that the successful pursuit of nuclear disarmament required the participation and active co-operation of all the nuclear Powers and, in turn, that required the establishment of new mechanisms.

While it is generally acknowledged that the nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility for finding solutions to the problem of nuclear disarmament, there is recognition that the international community as a whole is also vitally affected and, hence, has a legitimate interest in the search, as evidenced by the General Assembly resolutions adopted on the subject of the SALT negotiations.

Most of the ideas outlined above were reactivated in 1977 and 1978 in the context of preparations for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

In 1978, the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament provided an opportunity for stock-taking and thorough discussion of both old and new ideas in the area of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament.

With respect to specific measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, a number of proposals were put forward in the context of preparations for the special session.⁴ The draft final document contained in the report of the Preparatory Committee⁵ clearly indicated the existence of divergent views regarding the manner in which the process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out and the specific measures that should be adopted. In addition, various initiatives were taken at the special session itself.

In the course of the deliberations,⁶ many statements drew attention to the gravity of the threat inherent in nuclear weapons and the consequent urgency of early and effective measures of nuclear disarmament, an overwhelming majority of countries variously emphasizing the primacy of the task of halting the nuclear arms race and moving towards nuclear disarmament, with some, notably Western countries, also stressing the need to tackle problems relating to conventional weapons, particularly the question of the international transfer of such weapons.

A large number of countries once again stressed that the primary responsibility for arresting the nuclear arms race and initiating the process of nuclear disarmament lay with the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two major

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. I.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

ones. For their part, the Soviet Union and the United States underlined the importance of the agreements already reached in the SALT negotiations and of the measures currently envisaged in that context and reiterated their commitment to halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, pointing to their continued efforts and initiatives to achieve that objective.

Various countries dwelt on the need to constrain qualitative developments in nuclear weaponry which in their view constituted an increasingly dominant and ominous feature of the arms race. In his address to the General Assembly, Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada, discussing the nuclear arms race, said that what particularly concerned him was the technological impulse that continued to lie behind the development of strategic nuclear weaponry, for it was, after all, in the laboratories that the nuclear arms race began. He pointed out that the new technology could require a decade or more to take a weapons system from research and development to production and eventual deployment, which meant that national policies were pre-empted for long periods in advance. It also complicated the task of the foreign-policy maker because of the difficulty of inferring current intentions from military postures that may be the result of decisions taken a decade earlier. Thus, however much Governments declared that they intended to pursue a policy of peace, their declarations could not help but be called into question, for they had allowed the blind and unchecked momentum of the arms race to create and put at their disposal military capabilities of an order of magnitude that other Governments could not prudently ignore. Prime Minister Trudeau added that there was also a high risk that new weapons systems would revive concerns about a disarming first-strike capability; or that they would tend to blur the difference between nuclear and conventional warfare; or that they would increase problems of verification. In his opinion all that suggested that stable deterrence remained an inadequate concept and was a poor substitute for genuine world security.

He considered that the best way of arresting the momentum of the nuclear arms race might be by a "strategy of suffocation", which could be effected by a combination of four measures. The Prime Minister acknowledged that, individually, each of the measures had been part of the arms control dialogue for many years, but pointed out that in combination they represented a more coherent, more efficient and more promising approach to curbing the nuclear arms race. The measures he had in mind were a comprehensive test ban to impede the further development of nuclear explosive devices; an agreement to stop the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; an agreement to prohibit all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapon systems. In his view, a "strategy of suffocation" whose ultimate intent was to halt the arms race in the laboratory had a number of advantages. It would have a real and progressive impact on the development of new strategic weapons systems by (a) freezing the available amount of fissionable material; (b) preventing any technology that might be developed in the laboratory from being tested; and (c) reducing the funds devoted to military expenditure. It was also a realistic

strategy because it assumed that, for some time to come at least, total nuclear disarmament was probably unattainable in practice. He held that it avoided some of the problems encountered in the negotiations currently under way in that it did not involve complex calculations of balance, but left the nuclear-weapon States some flexibility in adjusting their force levels by using existing weapons technology. Finally, the strategy had at least the potential of reducing the risks of conflict that were inherent in the technological momentum of strategic competition.

The Soviet Union called for discussion of a programme aimed at the complete cessation of any further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces of States with a large military potential and which, among other measures to be implemented within a specified limited period, included the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons with a view to their gradual reduction until their complete destruction. The Soviet Union considered that a start should be made in that area because the main danger stemmed from the accelerating nuclear weapons race and proposed that negotiations get under way with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers. In its opinion it would also be useful to have a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States involved in those negotiations. The specific formula for participation in the negotiations could be agreed upon through diplomatic channels, or within the framework of an appropriate preparatory committee. The same procedure could be applied in order to reach agreement on the agenda for the negotiations and to determine the items to be considered and acted upon. The USSR believed that the formulation and implementation of measures to end the production of nuclear weapons and gradually destroy their stockpiles should run parallel to, and be inseparable from, the consolidation of political and international legal guarantees for the security of States. It also held that the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations would be a major step in that direction. The Soviet Union acknowledged that talks on those subjects would require much effort and hard work, but held that what was needed first of all was to start the negotiations and put the matter on a practical plane. To that end, it proposed⁷ that the special session of the General Assembly adopt a decision of principle on the need to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the non-use of force, determine the procedure for their preparation, and set a specific date for their beginning. Setting the date, in its view, would emphasize that States were firm in their intent to relieve mankind once and for all from the threat of nuclear war.

Austria found the Soviet proposal for a general cessation of the production of nuclear weapons highly interesting and most desirable and commented that should it prove feasible to solve the question of inspection and control of all nuclear installations of the great Powers in a satisfactory manner—possibly through the International Atomic Energy Agency—that would certainly constitute a breakthrough for nuclear arms limitation and non-proliferation.

⁷ See A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex.

Romania, maintaining that priority should be given to nuclear disarmament, advocated, *inter alia*, the following measures: the cessation of the refinement and production of nuclear weapons; the gradual reduction of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery systems until their complete liquidation; and the undertaking by the States participating in the session of a solemn commitment to move on to the negotiation of an agreement on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Many other countries, particularly the non-aligned, called in one form or another for the halting of the production and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and for the gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery with a view to their complete elimination. India, for instance, considered that the first step towards the solution of disarmament problems should consist, among other things, of: (a) a declaration that the utilization of nuclear technology for military purposes, including research in weapon technology, must be outlawed; (b) qualitative and quantitative limitations on nuclear armaments and the immediate freezing of present stockpiles under international inspection; (c) formulation of a time-bound programme—not exceeding a decade—for the gradual reduction of the stockpiles with a view to achieving the total elimination of all nuclear weapons; and (d) a comprehensive test-ban treaty with provision for safeguards based on universality and non-discrimination, to prevent breaches of the treaty, which, in India's view, could only be done by independent inspection.

Canada, as noted earlier, proposed a combination of measures. In its related submission⁸ it considered that an agreement by the two major nuclear-weapon Powers banning the flight testing of new strategic delivery vehicles could serve as one means to curb the qualitative dimension of the strategic arms race. With regard to the term "new", Canada pointed out that what it had in mind was a functional definition relating to the observable performance of strategic delivery vehicles when being flight-tested—that is, whether they were significantly different in such performance characteristics from those flight-tested previously. The specific scope of such a measure would be a subject of negotiation and should be related to verification capabilities. Another measure proposed by Canada called for limiting and then progressively reducing, on an agreed and verifiable basis, spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems, including their research and development, by the major nuclear-weapon Powers. Such agreements on restraint or reduction would require full openness in reporting and full effectiveness in authenticating military budgets. The Canadian proposal also called for an agreement by the two major nuclear-weapon Powers to cease production of additional fissionable material for nuclear-weapon purposes. In the Canadian view, in order to be effective, such an agreement would require agreement on adequate verification arrangements, including the acceptance of full-scope safeguards, that is, comprehensive safeguards. Such a measure could be pursued initially between the two major nuclear-weapon Powers to curb the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and could also, as a multilateral treaty open to accession

⁸ A/S-10/AC.1/L.6.

by all States, strengthen the existing system to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

The idea of a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes attracted considerable additional interest at the special session. Various countries, such as Italy, the Philippines, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia, declared themselves in favour of such a step.

Attention also focused on restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of other States. The Soviet Union submitted for discussion⁹ at the special session the question of non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, which in its view was directly linked to the problem of strengthening the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In practical terms, the proposal meant that no nuclear weapons should be stationed in the future, either in the form of deployed combat nuclear systems or in the form of stockpiles of nuclear warheads, bombs, shells and mines, on the territories of those States where there were no nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union considered that once agreement was reached on that matter, a process that could have dangerous consequences would be halted. It seemed obvious to the Soviet Union that the solution of the problem depended to a large degree on those non-nuclear-weapon States where there were at present no nuclear weapons. It noted that some of them had already made statements to the effect that they would not allow nuclear weapons on their territories and said it would be desirable for other non-nuclear-weapon States to adopt the same attitude. The Soviet Union considered, however, that, as in the case of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, a great deal depended also on the nuclear-weapon Powers, especially taking into account the means at their disposal for exerting political influence through allied and other channels. They could take a major positive step if they assumed a clear and plain obligation not to station nuclear weapons in those countries where there were no such weapons at present which should be applicable to any non-nuclear-weapon State on whose territory there were no nuclear weapons, regardless of whether any particular nuclear-weapon Power was or was not an ally of that State. The Soviet Union declared its readiness to assume such an obligation and called upon all the other nuclear-weapon Powers to follow suit and said that agreement in principle among nuclear-weapon Powers in that regard would make it possible for them to hold an exchange of views on the form that such an obligation should take. In a similar general area, Romania submitted a document¹⁰ in which it advocated the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the placing of new nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries.

A large number of countries directed attention to the question of non-use of nuclear weapons, which was also considered in the context of the question of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States (see chapter XI below). Algeria, like many non-aligned countries, called for a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, particularly against States that did not possess such

⁹ See foot-note 7.

¹⁰ See A/S-10/AC.1/23, annex.

weapons. Similarly, China, recalling that on many occasions it had stated that it would at no time and in no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons, reiterated its proposal for the holding of a conference of the heads of all countries to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and, first of all, to conclude an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. It pointed out that the super-Powers had not responded to its proposals, and held that in order to reduce the threat of nuclear war to the small and medium-sized countries in the absence of an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons, it was a matter of urgency for all nuclear countries to undertake not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon countries and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Referring to the question of undertakings to limit the use of nuclear weapons, Prime Minister Callaghan of the United Kingdom reaffirmed his country's long-established policy that nuclear weapons should never be used except in self-defence under the most extreme circumstances and recalled that President Carter's statement to that effect at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly had been endorsed by the United Kingdom at the time. Foreign Minister Gromyko brought to the attention of the Assembly the recent declaration of President Leonid I. Brezhnev,¹¹ that the Soviet Union was against the use of nuclear weapons and that only extraordinary circumstances—aggression against itself or its allies by another nuclear-weapon Power—could compel it to resort to that extreme means of self-defence. He added that if that attitude met with the support of all the other nuclear-weapon Powers, the situation in the world would become much calmer and recalled in that connexion that the socialist countries of Europe had addressed a proposal to all participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to sign a treaty on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other, a proposal that still stood awaited implementation.

Close to the end of the special session India submitted a draft resolution¹² by which the General Assembly would (a) declare that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity and should, therefore, be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament; and (b) request all States to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session proposals concerning non-use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters in order that an international convention on the subject might be formulated through further discussion and agreement. In introducing its proposal, India recalled that the Bandung Conference in April 1955 had called for the non-use of nuclear weapons and that the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries held at Lusaka in 1970 had suggested the formulation of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons. It also noted that there had been growing awareness of the common danger to all from the use of nuclear weapons and that even nuclear-weapon States had given various kinds of pledges on the

¹¹ See foot-note 7.

¹² A/S-10/AC.1/L.11.

non-use of nuclear weapons conditioned by their own specific circumstances, which in India's view clearly needed to be studied because in essence they could form the foundations of confidence on which the edifice of nuclear disarmament could be built. As explained by India, the main thrust of its draft resolution was in the operative paragraph calling for the study of ways and means of avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, of preventing nuclear war, and related matters. India expected such matters to be studied in depth by any deliberative body that might be established by the special session, so that in the light of those studies, the question of formulating an international agreement could be examined by the negotiating body. It felt that negotiations towards nuclear disarmament would be facilitated if the international community, at the same time, were to undertake the study of ways and means of saving the world from a nuclear holocaust.

In view of the differences underlying the host of formal and informal proposals that had been put forward in the drafting of the final document to be adopted at the special session, the task of arriving at a generally acceptable wording of the texts relating to the whole complex of problems regarding the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament demanded painstaking and laborious efforts.

The relevant paragraphs of the Declaration ultimately included in the Final Document read as follows:

20. Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.

32. All States, and in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

The relevant paragraphs of the Programme of Action read as follows:

45. Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

46. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

47. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

48. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

49. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

50. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

53. The process of nuclear disarmament described in the paragraph on this subject should be expedited by the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations and the urgent initiation of further negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States.

54. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

55. Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis.

56. The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

57. Pending the achievement of this goal, for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and of the use of force in international relations, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including the use of nuclear weapons.

58. In this context all States, and in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. All States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

It should be noted that, in a spirit of co-operation, India agreed not to press to a vote its draft resolution on the non-use of nuclear weapons. However, it pointed out that if no action was taken in response to the recommendation contained in paragraph 58 of the Final Document dealing with that issue, it intended to reactivate its proposal at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

In appraising the results achieved at the special session, Member States, at the last meeting, expressed various views. The United Kingdom said that it would have wished the Final Document and the covering resolution to be more balanced in the emphasis they placed on conventional and nuclear disarmament and on the measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. With respect to paragraph 50 of the Final Document on measures of nuclear disarmament, the United Kingdom was glad that the paragraph recognized that negotiations must take place at appropriate stages of progress towards the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, and with adequate verification.

The United States called attention to some instances where the consensus wording of the Final Document was not what it would have preferred. Thus, in the nuclear field, it explained its position with regard to its support of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and suspension of nuclear tests. Japan noted that at the special session it had expressed the belief that progress in negotiations for nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, was the task to which the highest priority should be given and had called upon all the nuclear-weapon States urgently to take the necessary steps to halt the nuclear arms race. It was pleased that all the participating countries had responded to its appeal which was reflected in the Final Document, and that the concrete and feasible measures that it had suggested to achieve nuclear disarmament were made a part of the Programme of Action of the Final Document.

Sweden considered that the particular responsibility of the leading nuclear-weapon Powers for undertaking the measures required to achieve nuclear disarmament was clearly expressed in the Programme of Action and held that concrete negotiations should be undertaken on the following measures: the freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems; the cessation of research and development of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance; the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapons purposes; the balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their delivery systems; and the prevention of the proliferation of such weapons and systems. Sweden had not proposed a time schedule for negotiations. In its view, however, substantial results at an early date were necessary because the nuclear build-up accelerated the whole arms race and, furthermore, undermined the potential of détente, both globally and in sensitive regions. It made clear, in that context, that the necessity of early action did not refer solely to strategic weapons. It considered that great risks were also inherent in a continued development of the large group of non-strategic nuclear weapons not included in SALT and that adequate attention should be focused on those weapons in the negotiating process.

Sri Lanka stated that the non-aligned countries had been able to secure agreement on objectives and an order of priorities and to focus attention on the need for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, but that, in return, they had had to accept as a principle the parallel treatment of nuclear and conventional disarmament. It further pointed out that in the Programme of Action the non-aligned countries had received only limited satisfaction on the subject of nuclear disarmament. While the steps they had recommended for the halting and reversal of the arms race, and the final elimination of nuclear-weapon stockpiles, had found a place in the Programme, they had been opposed to the very end when they had asked for urgent negotiations and binding commitments for implementing those necessary measures. They had met the same resistance when they had asked for a reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles and their delivery systems, leading to their complete elimination. India noted that the Final Document had some positive elements

but was weak in several areas. It acknowledged that the measures to which Prime Minister Desai had referred in his address to the Assembly with regard to qualitative and quantitative limitations on nuclear weapons, the freezing of present stockpiles, and the gradual reduction of stockpiles with a view to achieving the total elimination of all nuclear weapons were included in the Final Document, but said that the document did not at all reflect a sense of urgency and, therefore, the need to formulate a time-bound programme for the implementation of those measures. The document, nevertheless, did call for urgent negotiations and agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament, and India expected the nuclear-weapon States to act promptly in that regard. Yugoslavia commented that, although the primary importance of nuclear disarmament had been generally recognized, it could not be fully satisfied with the measures that had been taken in that connexion. Nigeria was of the view that the formulations in the Programme of Action did not reflect the urgency that most peoples in the world attached to nuclear disarmament. Brazil recalled that during the thirty-second session of the General Assembly it had stated that the special session would more than fulfil its expectations if the Assembly were just to produce a true commitment to nuclear disarmament by the international community, and in particular, by the nuclear-weapon States. Most unfortunately, in the view of Brazil, it had not.

A number of statements were made with respect to the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons. Various Western countries expressed reservations on the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document. Belgium, for instance, said that any form of recourse to force must be condemned if it occurred in contravention of the prescriptions of the United Nations Charter and that the non-use of force or the threat of force was an absolute principle that was not limited to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as the language of those paragraphs might suggest. France stated that the texts were incompatible with the position it had frequently made publicly clear and that therefore it could not go along with those formulations. The United Kingdom, for its part, noted that, under the United Nations Charter, Member States are, in their international relations, obliged to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and that the Charter also maintained the right of States to individual or collective self-defence. It recalled having made it clear that it would not use nuclear weapons except in self-defence as provided for in the Charter—that is, in the case of an actual armed attack on its territory, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies—and stated that it could not renounce or circumscribe in principle its right to use, if necessary, any of the means available for defence. Sri Lanka considered that for the nuclear-weapon States security was still based on the theory of mutual nuclear deterrence and that the survival of mankind was subordinated to their security, and commented that at least four of the five nuclear-weapon States would not agree to a renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

In 1978, questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament continued to figure prominently in the deliberations of the CCD.¹³ It may be noted that as the Committee's spring session had been held just prior to the tenth special session of the General Assembly and the summer session in the wake of it, Member States for the most part addressed themselves to those questions in the context of statements on preparations for the special session or on its results and, in so doing, reiterated views and proposals set forth in connexion therewith. As in previous years, the statements generally stressed the overriding importance and urgency of early and substantial progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

The United States stressed that it was not seeking agreements that merely channelled competition in convenient directions, as had sometimes been alleged, but significant disarmament, and recalled President Carter's statement of October 1977 to the effect that, on a reciprocal basis, the United States was now willing to reduce nuclear weapons by 10 per cent, by 20 per cent, even by 50 per cent. Later, with particular regard to strategic arms limitation, it noted that the bilateral talks and the CCD negotiations were part of a coherent whole and pointed out that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to extend their first arms limitation agreements until a second accord could be achieved. It added that the latter was taking shape. The United States hoped that it would impose both quantitative and qualitative constraints and set the stage for even more substantial limitations in a third agreement.

During both the spring and the summer sessions, the Soviet Union, underlining the prime importance it attached to nuclear disarmament, brought to the attention of the Committee the measures for ending the arms race put forward by President L. I. Brezhnev, including prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the proposed ban on the production of nuclear weapons with a view to the gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of such weapons, a proposal that was supported by other socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and Poland. The Soviet Union reiterated its readiness to sit down, at any time, at the negotiating table together with all other nuclear Powers in order to examine comprehensively the problem of nuclear disarmament in all its scope and to elaborate, jointly with others, specific ways for its practical solution. It favoured the participation of non-nuclear-weapon States in such negotiations, since all countries—large and small, developed and developing—were interested in nuclear disarmament. It suggested that the process of disarmament could start with the cessation of the production of nuclear arms. In its view, measures of nuclear disarmament should be adopted concurrently with international political and

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 20-156.

legal measures aimed at strengthening the security of all States. The Soviet Union also declared its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons and that it was doing its utmost to prevent an atomic war. Regarding the limitation of strategic arms, the USSR stressed that it desired an agreement without delay, and proceeded from the premise that such an agreement could be reached, provided it took security interests into account in a balanced manner.

The United Kingdom felt that the strategic arms limitation agreement, as it seemed to be emerging, would have its Government's full support and that it was already looking forward to a third agreement.

India, noting there was wide agreement among the international community that nuclear disarmament needed to be tackled as a matter of the foremost priority, commented that the threat of nuclear war had increased. It added that development of nuclear weapons was continuing at an alarming rate, and stocks of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States, particularly those of the biggest two, were being augmented. It was therefore imperative, in India's view, that at least the major nuclear-weapon States agree on some immediate steps. It considered that the other nuclear-weapon States should also join in such steps as early as possible. It pointed out that India had set an example by unilaterally renouncing the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It had not and did not intend to carry out any nuclear-weapon tests. At the same time, it was India's firm policy to continue to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Sweden dwelt in particular on the qualitative aspects of the arms race which were growing more and more important, but were largely left out of disarmament negotiations, a tendency which could mean that an important element of the security equation might not be weighted sufficiently in the negotiations. Sweden pointed out that new technologies move increasingly towards multipurpose and multimission systems, which make disarmament negotiations and verification a more complex and difficult task. Thus there were hybrid arms which straddled the demarcation line between different categories of weapons, both from the military and arms control perspectives, the same weapon systems often covering a wide spectrum of operational characteristics with respect to range, warhead, launcher and platform. Such weapons systems offered a variety of "strategic" and "tactical" options since they may be deployed and used in various combinations. In Sweden's view, the technological arms race made it important to keep in mind that new weapon systems may result from reactions to both real and imaginary threats. Seeing the possibility of another new round of the arms race, Sweden underlined the importance of agreements on qualitative restraints and directed attention to certain short-term measures, which, in its view, appeared necessary in Europe, and methods that might be explored to promote such measures. It placed special emphasis on non-strategic nuclear weapons—meaning all nuclear weapon systems other than strategic bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and inter-continental ballistic missiles—and confidence-building measures. It advocated the selective inclusion in the framework of existing negotiations of "grey-area" systems of nuclear weapons, i.e. theatre nuclear weapons, intermediate range missiles, etc., which were outside the

SALT negotiations and had been insufficiently dealt with in other multilateral arms control forums, including the Vienna talks on the mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe. In its opinion, it had become more and more obvious that all nuclear weapons and their development must be covered by the negotiating processes wherever the possibility of progress was within the closest reach. It further noted that those nuclear weapons which fell outside the SALT and Vienna talks represented a broad sector of weapons and had close links with strategic weapons in military doctrine. Still, an apparently unhindered arms race continued as far as such weapons were concerned, both in the case of tactical nuclear including so-called mini-nuclear weapons, and of intermediate and medium range missiles. In that connexion, Sweden posed questions to the nuclear Powers about further development and deployment of such weapons. In subsequent reference to those questions, the United Kingdom stated that it had no plans and had taken no decisions requiring an affirmative reply regarding the eventualities about which Sweden had asked.

Reviewing with concern the present state of affairs in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, Romania held that any genuine disarmament effort must start with an examination of the motive factor of the present arms race and, in particular, with nuclear weapons, since the accumulation and continuous technological refinement of nuclear weapons lay at the root of the insecurity existing in the world today. As in the past, Romania would continue to urge that problems of nuclear disarmament be placed at the centre of the Committee's activities. It considered that the proposals it had previously made should be given priority in the discussions.

Canada noted that, along with almost all other participants, it had seized the opportunity of the special session to reiterate its long-standing belief that the need to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race was the highest priority and had called for a "strategy of suffocation" (pages 160 and 162 above). Canada readily acknowledged that some of the measures involved in its proposed strategy had been around for years but, as Prime Minister Trudeau had pointed out at the special session, the important new consideration was that in their combination those measures could contribute significantly to eliminating the nuclear arms race.

Canada and other Western countries expressed particular support for a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Pointing to the importance of the recommendation in the Final Document of the special session concerning the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, the Netherlands said the Committee on Disarmament should be involved in talks related to such matters, including verification, and reminded the Committee of the detailed statement it had made in 1973 on the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons. In the view of Japan, such a cut-off constituted another realistic step to be considered by the negotiating body. Recalling that it had promoted the idea since 1969, Japan urged the nuclear-weapon States to halt the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapons purposes as the first step towards the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. It also urged the United

States and the Soviet Union to start exploratory talks on the question and held that, in order to assure compliance, the nuclear-weapon States should accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards similar to those which were applied to the non-nuclear-weapon States under the non-proliferation Treaty and other international agreements.

The Soviet Union discussed its proposal for a ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present. It reiterated the views it had expressed at the special session, stressing that such a measure by itself would be an important measure preventing any possible destabilization of the strategic situation, provided it was universally applied. It suggested that agreement in principle among the nuclear-weapon Powers on the proposal would enable them to exchange views on the form of such an obligation.

With respect to the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons, India considered that, pending total elimination of such weapons, an important measure could be the outlawing of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It recalled that the General Assembly, in its resolution 1653 (XVI), had declared, *inter alia*, that the use of nuclear weapons was contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity and that any State using nuclear weapons was to be considered as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. India was of the opinion that the declaration should be reaffirmed, made applicable also to threats, and made to apply without distinction regarding the intended victims in the case of inter-continental weapons, and without distinction as to whether or not a particular region had been solemnly declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

India would even go a step further and propose that the very possession of nuclear weapons should be declared unlawful.

The Soviet Union touched upon the same question, bringing to the attention of the Committee President L. I. Brezhnev's declaration that the Soviet Union was against the use of nuclear weapons and that only extraordinary circumstances, such as aggression against itself or its allies by another nuclear-weapon Power, could force it to resort to that extreme means of self-defence.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

Consideration of problems of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament was resumed at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, both during the general debate and in the First Committee.¹⁴

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th, 84th and 86th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 51st, 55th and 57th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

Statements of delegations generally reaffirmed the priority of nuclear disarmament, as established in the Final Document of the special session.

Beyond comments of a general nature, there was a discussion of specific questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament—including the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear-weapon systems and their gradual reduction with a view to their elimination, the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war and the question of a suitable framework for negotiations on nuclear disarmament—with States reiterating the views and proposals set forth in the course of the special session and its preparation.

A number of those proposals, including several which had been submitted to the special session and identified in paragraph 125 of the Final Document as deserving further and more thorough study, found expression as draft resolutions submitted to the First Committee for its consideration.

One was a Soviet initiative concerning the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present which was among the measures it had proposed at the special session¹⁵ for ending the arms race. The draft resolution was also sponsored by Afghanistan, Benin, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Ukrainian SSR.

In introducing the proposal, the Soviet Union said it attached very great significance to the appeal to nuclear-weapon States and to non-nuclear-weapon States contained in the draft resolution and observed that if the political will of States, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon, existed to put an end to the process of transferring nuclear weapons to new regions and territories, then the practical realization of the proposal would not give rise to major difficulties. Noting that certain States, on whose territories there were no nuclear weapons, had already made statements to the effect that they would not permit the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory, the Soviet Union commented that, of course, a great deal depended on nuclear-weapon States and pointed out that it had already stated that it was ready to assume the obligation not to station nuclear weapons in those countries where they were not currently to be found. It considered it to be extremely important for other nuclear-weapon States to follow that example. The Soviet Union explained that it had held consultations with a broad range of delegations with regard to the content of the draft resolution, had taken into account the viewpoints expressed and reflected them in the draft resolution.

In the First Committee, the draft resolution was adopted at the 57th meeting by a non-recorded vote of 87 to 19, with 11 abstentions.

Explaining its objections to the draft resolution, the United States said that in its view the issue of stationing nuclear weapons in the territories of States concerned mutual security interests and could not be properly dealt

¹⁵ See foot-note 7.

with through blanket and universal measures. It maintained that the issue should be addressed in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones so that it could be decided on a case-by-case basis and added that if a non-nuclear-weapon State or group of States should decide they would not allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, the United States would respect such an action. In the case of alliances to which the United States was a party, it believed that the stationing of United States nuclear weapons was an issue which must be decided between the United States and its allies in the context of bilateral and multilateral security arrangements. The United States also pointed out that the verification of a global ban of the kind proposed by the resolution would require extremely elaborate measures of inspection of a kind which would be unlikely to be negotiable and noted that the resolution contained no provision for verification whatsoever.

China, explaining its position, said that the demand of many countries that called on the nuclear-weapon States not to station nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States was reasonable and pointed out that it had consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and for the dismantling of all military bases stationed abroad, including nuclear bases. At the same time, noting that the two super-Powers possessed nuclear arsenals on an unprecedented scale and that the Soviet Union, in particular, possessed a vast conventional superiority in Europe, China held that under such circumstances, the mere restriction of the stationing of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States on the territories of other States could not eliminate the danger of war. It was of the view that pending the attainment of the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the imperative task at present in safeguarding international peace and security was to call on the super-Powers to undertake unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries and nuclear-weapon-free zones and to dismantle all their military bases stationed abroad, as well as to demand that they take effective measures to reduce substantially their nuclear arsenals and conventional armaments.

Japan, for its part, said that the international community, particularly in the European region, currently relied upon a regional framework for the maintenance of security and that that framework was based on the principle of a balance between the totals of nuclear and conventional weapons held by the parties concerned, as well as of mutual deterrents. Considering that such a framework constituted an important basis for maintaining international peace, it held that, in the circumstances, a measure imposing certain restrictions on the deployment of nuclear weapons, as proposed in the resolution, would not only be of doubtful effectiveness, but might even destabilize the international military balance, and thereby bring about results directly contrary to the strengthening of the maintenance of peace. Japan believed it to be quite important that the nuclear-weapon States proceed step by step to realize concrete and effective nuclear disarmament measures and once again appealed to those States to adopt such an approach. Japan explained that as a matter of national policy, it had consistently upheld the three non-nuclear principles, namely, of not possessing, not manufacturing and not permitting the entry into

Japan of nuclear weapons, but from a global perspective it was unable to support the prohibition envisaged in the resolution.

Other countries, while supporting the resolution, raised certain questions. For instance, in the view of Singapore, the reality of the situation in one region was such that the application of the principle of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons to that region was a matter that should be negotiated among the parties concerned. Sweden commented that the matter was a complex one that touched upon the general military situation in the world and the doctrines and force postures of the leading military Powers, and was also related to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; it held that a United Nations resolution on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons should not and would not be a substitute for real disarmament. Egypt stated two reservations to the resolution. First, it believed that the concept of not stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present would freeze the military situation and acknowledge the doctrine of nuclear strategic superiority. Secondly, it would have preferred to see operative paragraph 2 reflect a universal concept of the non-stationing and total elimination of nuclear weapons. Nigeria considered that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present was a desirable step, but would have liked to see that step reflected in the broader perspective of the non-use of nuclear weapons and the dismantling of nuclear arsenals. Specifically, Nigeria believed that the operative part of the resolution should have contained a provision requiring the nuclear-weapon States that have stationed nuclear weapons on the territories of other States to consider steps for the withdrawal of such weapons, and another one requiring the non-nuclear-weapon States on whose territories nuclear weapons were stationed to take steps to ensure that such weapons were not used against other non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the Assembly, the draft resolution was adopted on 16 December as resolution 33/91 F by 105 votes in favour to 18 against (among them France, the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western countries), with 12 abstentions. China did not participate in the vote.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Conscious that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind,

Desiring to promote the halting of the nuclear arms race,

Bearing in mind the clearly expressed intention of many States to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories,

Considering that the territorial limitation of the stationing of nuclear weapons is a measure closely related to the maintenance of peace and security in various regions and to the prevention of nuclear war,

Considering that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States,

Bearing in mind the desire to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, on the initiative of the States of the region,

1. *Calls upon* all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present;
2. *Calls upon* all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territory to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories.

Another draft resolution, initiated by Canada, on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, was sponsored also by Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Romania and Sweden. Canada, in introducing the proposal at the 55th meeting, noted that the non-proliferation Treaty had been and continued to be the object of criticism on the grounds that in some aspects it was inequitable and discriminatory. It added that while any non-proliferation system, in the absence of complete nuclear disarmament, contained some inherent aspects that could be regarded as discriminatory, it was both possible and desirable to conceive of a broader approach to the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons on both the "vertical" and "horizontal" dimensions. Canada recalled that at various times, and particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, proposals had been put forward for an agreed cessation of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes by nuclear-weapon States, and noted that such an agreement, if adequately verified, would set a finite limit on the availability of fissionable material for such purposes. Canada held that the merits of the concept would be significantly enhanced if it were to be pursued as a prohibition of such production in a multilateral treaty to which both non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States might adhere, for such a measure would have the advantage of focusing, in the same instrument, on both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the problem. Canada observed that the acceptance by both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States of essentially the same obligations regarding the non-production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the acceptance of full-scope safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency would be most important features of such an agreement. In its view, if it were deemed desirable or necessary to have supplementary verification procedures involving nuclear-weapon States parties to such an agreement, such additional arrangements would not detract from the essential equity of the treaty, provided that the undertakings by nuclear-weapon States were no less than those of non-nuclear-weapon States. It believed that, taking into account its other priorities, the Committee on Disarmament should consider, at an appropriate stage, the question of the cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, Pakistan suggested certain changes in its preambular part. Most notably, it considered that in the second paragraph of the preamble, which expressed the conviction that the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was closely linked to efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race had been reflected in an obverted manner.

It was not that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was linked to the nuclear arms race, but the other way around, namely, that the nuclear arms race led to or facilitated or made possible the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pakistan therefore believed that the statements in that paragraph had to be turned around and suggested precise language for the change. In addition, Pakistan had difficulties with the third preambular paragraph because it referred to acceptance by all States of "full scope safeguards" and seemingly contemplated the application of such safeguards to limit further production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The draft resolution was voted on in the First Committee as originally submitted, and adopted, at the 57th meeting, by a non-recorded vote of 94 to 10, with 19 abstentions.

Various objections were raised to the resolution. India and the Soviet Union considered that a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes could not be divorced from the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and both countries noted that the link between the two questions was already established in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session. India further commented that the reference to the concept of full scope safeguards would be meaningful only if the cut-off in the production of fissionable material were linked to the prohibition of further production of nuclear weapons. Beyond that, it deemed unacceptable the reference to the concept of the limitation of further production of nuclear weapons, since it would in fact legitimize the production of nuclear weapons, a view that was shared by Algeria. In addition, in the opinion of Algeria, the second and third paragraphs as worded could be construed as implying a special responsibility of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of disarmament, a criticism also voiced by Egypt and Yugoslavia. France was well aware that nuclear disarmament would one day have to pass by way of the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, or at least a limitation of that production, accompanied by appropriate verification systems, but had reservations concerning the resolution to the extent that the text did not bring out sufficiently the fact that the appropriate stage for an international negotiation on the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes could only be the period subsequent to the conclusion and implementation by the two principal nuclear-weapon Powers of agreements leading to substantial reduction of their nuclear arsenals, as well as to the cessation of qualitative progress of those arsenals.

At the 86th plenary meeting, the sponsors presented an amendment to the second preambular paragraph along the lines suggested by Pakistan. The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted at the same meeting as resolution 33/91 H by a recorded vote of 108 in favour to 10 against (the Soviet Union, other eastern European countries and Cuba), with 16 abstentions (including Algeria, Argentina, Egypt, France and India).

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Conscious that effective measures on a universal basis are necessary in order to facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament and the eventual complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race will facilitate the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

Considering that the acceptance by all States of binding and verifiable controls in the form of full scope safeguards, on a non-discriminatory basis, on all production of fissionable material, so as to ensure that it is not used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, would contribute towards the efforts to promote non-proliferation, limit further production of nuclear weapons and facilitate nuclear disarmament,

Recalling with satisfaction that, in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, it recognized that the achievement of nuclear disarmament would require, *inter alia*, the urgent negotiation of an agreement, at an appropriate stage and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned, on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes,

Requests the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its implementation of the proposals set forth in the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, to consider urgently the question of an adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

Another initiative pursued during the thirty-third session of the Assembly was India's proposal on the non-use of force and the prevention of nuclear war. In introducing the draft resolution, sponsored also by Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burundi, Colombia, the Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire, India recalled that the General Assembly at its special session had unambiguously and unanimously reiterated the fact that nuclear weapons posed the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization and that the Final Document of the special session had also recognized that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons was nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Noting that there was no indication whatsoever of an early halt to the nuclear arms race, let alone the commencement of a process of nuclear disarmament leading to the final elimination of nuclear weapons, India saw no reason why mankind should not be given credible and binding assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. It pointed out that both during the special session and in the general debate in the First Committee arguments had been put forward by some nuclear-weapon States, as well as by some of their allies, to the effect that they were obliged to retain nuclear arsenals in the interests of their security and held that those Powers had an equal obligation not to endanger the rest of mankind by the use or threat of nuclear weapons. India explained that that draft resolution reiterated the provisions of the declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) of November 1961 as well as the position of the non-aligned countries adopted since the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1961, and noted that the recent Belgrade Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries¹⁶ indicated regret that the negative attitude of some nuclear-weapon States had

¹⁶ See A/33/206, annex I.

prevented the special session from adopting measures necessary to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. It pointed out that in the draft resolution the sponsors were not asking for the immediate conclusion of a convention on non-use of nuclear weapons but merely calling upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to submit proposals on arrangements for the conclusion of a convention or any other agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons so that the subject could be studied at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

Before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, India orally made a drafting change in operative paragraph 2. The draft resolution, as revised, was adopted on 27 November by a recorded vote of 84 to 16, with 18 abstentions.

A number of countries made statements to explain their positions and, in doing so, reiterated long-held views on the question of non-use of nuclear weapons. For instance, the United States pointed out that its negative vote was based, in large part, on operative paragraph 1 of the resolution which purported to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons, under any circumstances, as a violation of the Charter. The United States could not find the basis for this in the Charter, for the Charter provided that all States must not use or threaten to use force in their relations with other States except in self-defence or in other situations permitted under the Charter; it did not outlaw nuclear means for deterrence or defence against attack. The United States commented that while the facts of nuclear deterrence were not pleasant, it could not be overlooked that in many areas of the world nuclear weapons were part of the security arrangements that had kept the peace. The United States was aware of the necessity of reducing the problem caused by the vast accumulation of nuclear weapons, a problem which must be dealt with by nuclear disarmament carried out in carefully conceived and implemented stages. It was also aware that even prior to the completion of this process the nuclear-weapon States should give appropriate attention to the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States for assurances as to the non-use of nuclear weapons, which the United States had done in the presidential declaration read out by Secretary of State Vance during the special session on disarmament. The United States believed that this approach was more realistic, and more apt to preserve the peace, than a generalized but ineffective declaration purporting to outlaw nuclear weapons forever.

The United Kingdom while agreeing on the supreme importance of ensuring that nuclear weapons never needed to be used, said that a ban on use was not a practical measure for Western countries in an area where nuclear weapons existed in large numbers and where there was a heavy conventional imbalance, so that security for the present rested on nuclear deterrence. In its view, deterrence of aggression was essential to international security until nuclear disarmament had been achieved and any non-use pledge would weaken the credibility of deterrence and increase the chances of aggression.

China considered that the desire of many countries for the non-use of nuclear weapons was just and noted that it had consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and had

repeatedly declared that China would at no time and under no circumstances use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. In its opinion, the most effective way to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war was the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, pending the realization of that objective, the two super-Powers possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should be the first to undertake unconditionally that at no time and under no circumstances would they use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and should proceed forthwith to reduce substantially their nuclear weapons. In conclusion, China observed that the resolution made no reference to that fundamental question.

In the view of the Soviet Union the question of prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be considered and decided upon in connexion with the non-use of force in international relations and the strengthening of international legal guarantees of the security of States. It considered that such an approach was in accord with the decisions of the United Nations, and in particular with General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) on the non-use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and was reflected as well in a number of provisions of the Final Document of the special session. In its opinion, the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force, as proposed by the Soviet Union, would be a major step towards the solution of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, in the resolution the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons was artificially divorced from the question of the adoption of international political and legal measures to strengthen security for all States and from the question of the non-use of force by States in international relations.

In the plenary meeting, on 14 December, the draft was adopted as resolution 33/71 B by a recorded vote of 103 to 18 (including France, the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western countries), with 18 abstentions (including the Soviet Union, Eastern European and various other countries). China did not participate in the vote.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the survival of mankind and to the life-sustaining system posed by nuclear weapons and by their use inherent in concepts of deterrence,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Recalling its declaration contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session that "all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons",

1. *Declares* that:

(a) The use of nuclear weapons will be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity;

(b) The use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited, pending nuclear disarmament;

2. *Requests* all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to submit to the Secretary-General, before the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, proposals concerning the non-

use of nuclear weapons, avoidance of nuclear war and related matters, in order that the question of an international convention or some other agreement on the subject may be discussed at that session.

Sweden introduced another element in the consideration of problems of nuclear disarmament, namely, a proposal for a new, thorough United Nations study of nuclear weapons. In general debate in the Assembly, Sweden reiterated the views it had expressed in the CCD concerning the need to deal with the qualitative aspects of the arms race in ongoing disarmament negotiations and to bring "grey-area" nuclear-weapon systems within the scope of those negotiations. In the First Committee, it explained that the proposed study would aim at providing factual information concerning present nuclear arsenals, development trends, effects of the use of nuclear weapons and the implications for security as well as for negotiations on disarmament and arms control of a continued qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arms. The study should concern all nuclear arms, that is, both those presently subject to negotiations in SALT and those which are not, and could comprise, first, three descriptive chapters dealing with the present status of arsenals, conceivable technological trends and effects of the use of nuclear weapons; and secondly, one chapter analysing implications of the nuclear arms race in terms relevant to the disarmament efforts. Sweden noted that the United Nations study that was available had been published more than 10 years ago and needed to be updated and broadened. Sweden expected that a new and more comprehensive study would register relevant negotiation efforts in the sector of nuclear arms and would provide support to future deliberations and increase their impact. The work, in the opinion of Sweden, could be based on open, non-classified information generally available as well as on any additional information furnished by Governments for the purpose of the study. It considered that compiling that information would have an informative value in itself and that a general description of arsenals and technological trends could probably in substantial parts be carried out without relying on absolute figures. Noting that the study would take more than one year, Sweden said that it imagined that the Secretary-General would keep the General Assembly informed at its thirty-fourth session of the progress made in a form he found appropriate and that it also believed that it would be useful for the Secretary-General to avail himself, without causing delay, of the advice of the Advisory Board in the carrying out of the study.

The draft resolution on the study was sponsored by Sweden, together with Australia, Austria, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. In the First Committee, the draft resolution was adopted on 30 November by a non-recorded vote of 89 to none, with 19 abstentions.

The United States, in explaining its position, questioned the wisdom and value of a new study on nuclear weapons and said that if one was to be mandated by the General Assembly, it was important that the terms of reference should be carefully designed to ensure the most objective and useful product possible. It found the terms of reference in the resolution inadequate in that no provision was made for consideration of the progress already made

and the experience gained in negotiating measures of nuclear arms control, or for analysis of obstacles to achieving balanced, verifiable agreements to limit nuclear weapons or of the conditions which must be satisfied if such agreements are to be achieved. It questioned also the need for a fresh review of the effects of nuclear weapons, which were examined in the 1968 United Nations study. The United States considered that elaborating satisfactory terms of reference was a task for experts, not one that could be satisfactorily performed by the General Assembly, and that the most reasonable approach would be for the Assembly to mandate the Secretary-General, with the assistance of competent government experts, to develop terms of reference for a possible study of nuclear weapons and to report back to the Assembly at its thirty-fourth session for consideration of the possibility of mandating a study along the lines proposed.

The Soviet Union noted that its doubts concerning the increase in the number of studies on questions of disarmament to be carried out within the United Nations fully applied to the proposal for the establishment of a group of experts to carry out a study on nuclear weapons. It considered that its proposal for negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States, with the participation of a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States, concerning the cessation of production of nuclear weapons of all kinds and the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, leading to their total liquidation, would be a practical step in the field of nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, in its view, a study of the doctrines of deterrence, present nuclear arsenals, trends in the technological development of nuclear weapons, and so on, would not bring the world any closer to the solution of the problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race by a single step.

France stated that it had no objection in principle to an initiative aimed at increasing the volume of basic information in the field of disarmament and observed that it had insisted on the need to increase research in order to improve available data for the discussion and negotiation of questions of disarmament within the framework of the United Nations. Nevertheless, in its opinion, a study of such a complex and sensitive matter as that of nuclear weapons required a particularly cautious, well-balanced and objective approach and, in that spirit, France, together with other countries, had sought some changes in the text of the resolution which were not accepted by the sponsors. However, it would not refuse to co-operate actively with the Secretary-General in carrying out the study, providing that all nuclear-weapon States did the same.

The German Democratic Republic and Poland explained their abstentions on the ground of the questionable utility of such an additional United Nations study, especially without examination of the proposal by the Advisory Board. Canada pointed out that it had voted for the resolution because it believed that a more central role should be played by the United Nations in disarmament and that research on disarmament ought to be improved and made more widely known. At the same time, Canada had reservations about the terms of reference of the study. It considered that such a study, even though based on public sources, would be less credible if the major nuclear

Powers did not co-operate in its design and formulation. Therefore, in its view, the mandate was of critical importance and ought to be considered at greater length and with more expert scrutiny than had been possible at the Assembly's present session. Noting that one of the functions of the Advisory Board to the Secretary-General was to make that kind of appraisal, and welcoming Sweden's proposal to that effect, Canada said that it would consider whether and how it could co-operate with the study in the light of the conclusions of the Board.

In the Assembly, the draft resolution was adopted 16 December as resolution 33/91 D by 117 votes in favour to none, with 21 abstentions (including France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States).

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the preservation of peace,

Mindful of the important task of the First Committee, to evaluate the state of the arms race and to deliberate on the issues of disarmament,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session in which it was underlined that the most immediate goal of disarmament is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war,

Recalling also that, in the same document, it was recommended that the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information concerning the arms race and disarmament with the full co-operation of its Member States,

Noting that the only study on nuclear weapons carried out by the United Nations, entitled *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons*, was published more than 10 years ago,

Noting also that since then many important developments have taken place in the nuclear arms sector,

Convinced that a broad study on various aspects of nuclear weapons carried out by the United Nations would make a valuable contribution to the dissemination of factual information and to international understanding of the issues involved,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to carry out a comprehensive study providing factual information on present nuclear arsenals, trends in the technological development of nuclear-weapon systems, the effects of their use and the implications for international security as well as for negotiations on disarmament of:

(a) The doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons;

(b) The continued quantitative increase and qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

2. *Recommends* that the study, while aiming at being as comprehensive as possible, should be based on open material and such further information that Member States may wish to make available for the purpose of the study;

3. *Invites* all Governments to co-operate with the Secretary-General so that the objectives of the study may be achieved;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit the final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

It should be noted here that under the item "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session," the Assembly adopted resolution 33/71 H on nuclear disarmament negotiations and disarmament machinery which, in its

preamble, underlined the danger arising out of the very existence of nuclear weapons, pointed to the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States, particularly those possessing the largest arsenals of such weapons, and expressed the dissatisfaction of the international community at the slow progress of ongoing negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In its operative part it, *inter alia*, urged all nuclear-weapon States to proceed, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session, to consultations regarding an early initiation or urgent negotiations on the halting of the nuclear arms race and on a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles and means of delivery within a comprehensive phased programme with agreed time-frames, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination (see chapter III, page 86).

Conclusion

In 1978, the convening of the tenth special session of the General Assembly enabled the international community to undertake a thorough review of problems of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament and to focus attention anew on old approaches to the solution of such problems as well as to examine new ideas.

The deliberations were marked by a sense of increasing urgency about the need to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race and revealed growing concern about the qualitative dimension of the competition in nuclear weaponry.

The Final Document adopted at the session confirmed that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization, that effective measures of nuclear disarmament have the highest priority, that the ultimate goal in that context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and that all the nuclear-weapon States, particularly those that possess the largest nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility in the task of achieving nuclear disarmament. The Final Document indicated the direction in which the process of nuclear disarmament should move but allowed for flexibility in the implementation of specific measures given the limits of consensus on such matters.

The consideration of specific measures proposed at the special session continued during the regular session of the General Assembly and some of them became the subject of Assembly resolutions. It can be expected that renewed attempts will be made to promote the adoption and implementation of these and other measures that have been recently advanced and that they will, therefore, remain under active consideration. However, serious differences exist, notably among the nuclear-weapon States, and consequently the search for agreement will require much time and effort.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Introduction

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States were initiated in 1969. The first phase of the negotiations (SALT I) ended with the signing in Moscow on 26 May 1972 of two agreements: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), subsequently amended by a Protocol of 3 July 1974,¹ and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, with a Protocol attached.² Both agreements entered into force on 3 October 1972.

The second phase of the negotiations (SALT II), which formally began in November 1972, is still under way. By the end of 1974 the two sides had reached understandings as to the scope of the eventual agreement and the principles upon which it should be based. First, at the Washington summit meeting in June 1973 an Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms³ was signed, by which the two sides agreed that the limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons would apply to both quantitative aspects and qualitative improvements, and also that the limitations must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means. The second understanding, of July 1974, signed in Moscow,⁴ reflected the decision of the two Governments to seek an agreement covering the period up to 1985, rather than a permanent one as envisaged in the 1973 Agreement on Basic Principles. Finally, a joint statement of 24 November 1974, issued after the Vladivostok summit meeting, further specified the provisions upon which the negotiations and the subsequent agreement would be based.⁵

During the negotiations to translate the Vladivostok guidelines into a specific agreement, which commenced in January 1975, differences arose

¹ See A/9698.

² See A/C.1/1026.

³ See A/9293.

⁴ See *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and History of Negotiations* (Washington, D.C., US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975), p. 129.

⁵ See *Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 1974*, vol. 10, No. 49 (Washington, 1975), pp. 1514-1517.

with regard to substantive issues, particularly the scope of the eventual agreement. The question was whether certain new weapons should or should not be counted against the numerical ceiling for strategic delivery vehicles agreed upon by the two sides. Specifically, the controversy concerned a new supersonic Soviet bomber and the American cruise missile. The issue was still unresolved in the autumn of 1976 when in view of the change of the United States Administration, the negotiations were recessed.

The negotiations were resumed in March 1977 when the United States Secretary of State visited the Soviet Union. On that occasion the American side put forward two alternative proposals.⁶ One of them, called a "deferral option", in fact repeated the proposal of the previous Administration whereby the two sides would immediately conclude an agreement on the basis of the Vladivostok ceilings, not counting against the total either the cruise missile or the supersonic bomber, the two weapons to be dealt with in negotiations subsequent to the conclusion of the agreement (SALT III). The other proposal, called a "comprehensive option", provided for a substantial lowering of the Vladivostok ceilings and for certain qualitative limitations.

The Soviet Union considered both proposals unacceptable. The "deferral option" was objected to on the grounds that such an agreement would substantially depart from the Vladivostok guidelines which were carefully worked out to provide for an over-all balance between the two sides. In its opinion, that balance would be jeopardized if the cruise missile were not to be counted against the total number of strategic delivery vehicles agreed upon. The Soviet Union maintained that the guidelines also referred to the cruise missile and that it was therefore subject to the limitations.

The "comprehensive option" was rejected for two basic reasons. First, in the Soviet view, any substantial reductions in the numbers agreed upon at Vladivostok would have to be based on due considerations of the security needs of both parties and their allies, and take into account the different strategic options available to each side. Secondly, the Soviet Union considered that the option would require it to cut its launchers for heavy missiles by half and freeze its land-based multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) while not affecting the United States "Trident" submarine armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or its cruise missiles with a range of under 1,500 miles.

The Soviet Union, nevertheless, reiterated its readiness to continue the negotiations, but only on the basis of proposals which would take into consideration more adequately its security needs and interests. Consequently, it repeated its earlier proposal for immediate conclusion of an agreement which would, in its view, strictly observe the Vladivostok agreement, including counting the cruise missile against the agreed ceiling.

The whole issue was taken up again at the meeting of the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State which took place at Geneva in May and during the visit of the Soviet Minister for Foreign

⁶ See *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. LXXVI, No. 1974 (April 25, 1977), pp. 400-401 and 409-414.

Affairs to Washington in September 1977. After those meetings, both sides confirmed that their positions had been brought closer together and that they were within sight of significant agreement in limiting the total numbers of weapons and in restricting certain categories of weapons of special concern to each of them. Intensive bilateral negotiations continued thereafter at Geneva until late in the year.

During the Washington meeting the status of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which provides for a five-year review of its operation, was also considered. In a Joint Statement issued on 24 September 1977 both sides, *inter alia*, agreed that the ABM Treaty had operated effectively. Accordingly, they reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty and agreed that the review would be conducted in the Standing Consultative Committee after its regular autumn meeting.⁷

The 1977 round of the SALT negotiations was particularly important in view of the fact that the provisions of the Interim Agreement of 1972 stipulated that it would expire after five years on 3 October 1977, if not replaced with a new one. In spite of progress made, there remained issues which could not be worked out before the given deadline. Subsequently, the two sides issued a declaration pledging to observe the provisions of the Interim Agreement while the negotiations on a new agreement continued.⁸

Bilateral negotiations, 1978

The negotiations were resumed in January and continued throughout the year, often at the highest levels. Although no public statement has been made regarding the specifics of the negotiations, both sides, separately or jointly, have provided information on numerous occasions on the state of the negotiations in general as well as on the objectives they wished to achieve. Thus, for instance, the United States Secretary of State stated on 10 April⁹ that any SALT agreement must be measured against the yardstick of national security. He said that the United States' objective in the negotiations was to reach an agreement which would clearly maintain or improve its own over-all security and that of its allies, as compared to the situation that would probably arise without an agreement. In view of this, there would have to be provision for verification that the other nation was carrying out the terms of the agreement. He further noted that substantial progress in the negotiations had been made but that several items remained unresolved, two or three of which were very difficult.

Following the exchange of views held in Moscow during the Secretary of State's visit to the Soviet Union in April, the two sides stated in a joint communiqué¹⁰ that as a result of thorough discussions there had been a

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. LXXVII, No. 2002 (November 7, 1977), p. 644.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 642.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. 78, No. 2014 (May 1978), pp. 20-25.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 78, No. 2015 (June 1978), p. 26, and *Pravda*, 29 April 1978.

narrowing of the differences in the parties' positions on some of the remaining unresolved issues. At the same time, they reaffirmed their intention to work intensively to conclude an agreement at the earliest possible time.

Further discussions were held between the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State of the respective countries at Geneva in July. In that connexion the Soviet Minister confirmed at a press conference that both sides considered that the exchange of views had provided a basis for bringing their positions on the outstanding questions closer together. Both Ministers also indicated that in the course of that exchange new ideas had been put forward which might facilitate progress in the negotiations.¹¹ Such progress was reported, both after the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to the United States in September and October and after the United States Secretary of State's visit to the Soviet Union in October. Finally, the two Ministers met once again at Geneva in December. Following that meeting both sides reiterated their hopes that the agreement would be finalized soon. Thus, for instance, Soviet President L. I. Brezhnev summarized in the following manner the state of the negotiations at the time:

Work on a new agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic arms is drawing to a close, although it will obviously take some more time for the positions to be finally agreed. We trust that the principle of equality and equal security, which the USSR and the United States recognize as the starting point, will prompt correct decisions and that President Carter and I will be able in the near future to affix our signatures to the accord.¹²

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The SALT negotiations were one of the issues which received the greatest attention in the course of the special session of the General Assembly,¹³ both in the context of nuclear disarmament in general and specific measures of the Programme of Action which required urgent implementation. The statements made in that regard ranged from those expressing confidence in the rapid and successful conclusion of the ongoing bilateral negotiations to those which voiced certain dissatisfaction and disappointment that agreement had not yet been reached. Many of them also indicated that the eventual agreement should provide for substantial reduction of the numbers of strategic weapons systems and limitation of their qualitative improvements. Most of them, however, acknowledged in one way or another the rather delicate nature of the negotiations, as well as their over-all importance for the strengthening of international peace and security and facilitating disarmament efforts in general.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. 78, No. 2018 (September 1978), pp. 31-32.

¹² See press release No. 2 of 17 January 1979, issued by the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations.

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings, and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

Referring to the SALT negotiations, the United States recognized that it bore, together with the Soviet Union and other nuclear-weapons States, a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament. It also stressed that there should be a substantial cut in the number of strategic nuclear arms and that increasingly stringent qualitative limitations should be placed on their further development. In that connexion, the United States pointed out that the SALT II agreement, which, according to its statement, was at the time rapidly taking shape, would reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles now in existence and put a ceiling on the remainder, establish sublimits on those systems which were most threatening and destabilizing, and impose restraints on the improvement of existing weapons and the development of new and more sophisticated systems. In addition, the United States firmly pointed out that it was committed to a further substantial reduction in nuclear weapons and to still stricter limitations on modernization and new types of delivery vehicles in the context of the SALT III negotiations.

For its part, the Soviet Union also pointed out that many of the difficulties in the talks had been overcome and that possibilities existed for resolving the remaining issues as well. In that respect the Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that mutual efforts could make it possible to arrive at an agreement which would accommodate the security interests of both sides equally and serve the broad interests of a stronger peace. The Soviet Union emphasized, in particular, that immediately after signing the agreement it would be ready to enter into negotiations which, with all the necessary factors being taken into account, should lead to a substantial reduction of the levels of strategic arms and to a further limitation of their qualitative improvement.

The statements made by the two sides involved in the negotiations were welcomed in general. Thus, the United Kingdom noted that early agreement in the negotiations was in the interest of all since it was within the context of the SALT negotiations that the two foremost nuclear Powers could best slow down and then reverse the nuclear arms race. It also pointed out that once a SALT II agreement had been reached the two sides should initiate new talks with a view to reducing significantly the numbers of strategic systems and constraining the development and refinement of such systems. Similar views were expressed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway. In addition, Australia and Belgium expressed the hope that SALT would, ultimately, open the way for negotiations involving all nuclear-weapon States. France expressed its support for the negotiations, noted that their results would only be translated into reality slowly and by stages and hoped that these stages would begin in the near future and would be substantial.

Eastern European States also attached considerable importance to the SALT negotiations. Thus, Poland considered that the Soviet-American dialogue being held within the framework of SALT II and in other key areas was of major importance for the whole process of détente in Europe and throughout the world. A similar view was expressed by Hungary. Bulgaria, for its part, noted with particular satisfaction the progress achieved in the Soviet-American negotiations, including the negotiations within the framework of SALT II, while Czechoslovakia pointed out that the special session offered an

exceptional opportunity to create a favourable and constructive atmosphere for the successful culmination of such important negotiations as SALT II. The German Democratic Republic considered that the progress achieved in the current negotiations on the SALT II agreement furnished evidence that the restriction and elimination of material means of warfare were possible. In addition, Mongolia hoped that the successful completion of the SALT II negotiations would lead to the next stage of efforts to lower substantially the level of strategic armaments and to limit further their qualitative improvement.

A number of neutral and non-aligned countries also made references to the SALT II negotiations and, while critical in some aspects, also expressed the hope of a successful outcome. Sweden, for instance, felt that SALT II seemed likely to result in only minor reductions in the number of weapon carriers and warheads and that the qualitative development of nuclear arms did not seem to have come to a standstill. However, it noted that the agreement might contain a provision whereby the parties would wait for a few years before deploying certain new types of strategic weapons, which could be considered a positive element. In its opinion even a limited agreement of that nature would be of value. But it pointed out that the negotiations must be accelerated if a halt to the arms race was to be achieved. Yugoslavia, for its part, hoped that the SALT II negotiations would result in an agreement which would mark a step forward in the efforts aimed at halting the nuclear arms race and that the two sides would proceed immediately, after the conclusion of SALT II, to negotiations for the conclusion of a new agreement for a more resolute limitation of the production and reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. India noted with satisfaction the determination expressed by the super-Powers to finalize expeditiously the negotiations on a SALT II agreement, while Austria welcomed their declaration that they were now willing to strive for substantial reductions in delivery systems for nuclear weapons. Cuba also attached great importance to the SALT II negotiations and urged that both weapons reduction and qualitative limits be determined. In addition, Egypt noted that the degree of success achieved by the nuclear-weapon States in halting vertical proliferation was linked to the success of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in halting horizontal proliferation.

Several other countries commented on the negotiations as well. Pakistan, for instance, hoped that subsequent negotiations would lead to a substantial reduction and stricter limitations on the qualitative development of strategic nuclear weapons. China, for its part, expressed the view that any forthcoming agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States would at best be one with quantitative but no qualitative limits and envisaged continued "upward equilibrium" in respect of MIRVs. It therefore considered that there would be nothing much in the SALT II agreement to boast about.

The positions of various Member States with regard to the SALT II negotiations were also fully reflected in the deliberations on the programme of action of the draft final document of the special session which, in the section dealing with immediate and short-term measures to halt and reverse the arms race, contained specific formulations on SALT. After prolonged negotiations

a text on SALT was agreed upon and incorporated into the Final Document. It reads as follows:

52. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks. They are invited to transmit in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly. It should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms. It should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, of establishment of a world free of such weapons.

A more detailed account of the negotiations leading to the adoption of the text on SALT is provided in chapters I and II above.

Of course, a number of other paragraphs, particularly among those in the Programme of Action which pertain to nuclear disarmament, bear a less direct relationship to the question of strategic arms limitation (see appendix I below).

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

As in previous years, a number of members of the Committee made specific references to the SALT negotiations in the context of the debate on measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.¹⁴ Thus, the United States announced that the parties had recently agreed to extend the validity of the SALT I agreement until a second accord could be achieved. It added that the latter agreement was taking shape, and that it would lower the level of strategic arms, impose certain qualitative restraints on potentially destabilizing weapons development, and set the stage for more substantial limitations in the context of a SALT III agreement. Similarly, the Soviet Union stated that the interests of strengthening peace and security would be served by the conclusion, as quickly as possible, of a SALT II agreement which should take into account the security interests of both sides in a balanced manner.

The United Kingdom noted that it was already beginning to look ahead to a third agreement which should aim to reduce significantly the number of strategic systems, and to limit their development and refinement.

Several members, notably the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland expressed satisfaction with the favourable prospects for the successful conclusion of the talks and their over-all importance for the international situation and the disarmament process.

Mexico, for its part, stressed the importance of General Assembly resolution 32/87 G of 12 December 1977 which, *inter alia*, urged the two Powers to implement their declarations favouring broader nuclear disarmament as soon as possible. The Federal Republic of Germany expressed the hope that both qualitative and quantitative limitations would soon be incorporated into a

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. 1, paras. 20-53.

second agreement. Similar views were expressed by Iran and the Netherlands. Italy believed that a positive outcome of the negotiations could significantly contribute to the lessening of distrust and criticism of the international community regarding the non-proliferation régime established under the non-proliferation Treaty.

Finally, Sweden emphasized that a second agreement was needed without delay and hoped that it would go beyond a modest time-limited qualitative restraint and very limited reductions of existing arsenals. It held that a second agreement should be followed by a third which, in its view, should result in substantial quantitative and qualitative reductions and limitations. Sweden also argued in favour of a gradual and, if necessary, selective inclusion in the framework of existing negotiations of those "grey-area systems of nuclear weapons" (theatre nuclear weapons, intermediate range missiles, etc.), which in fact had been kept outside the first round of negotiations and continued to stay outside the second round.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

At the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, the SALT II negotiations again attracted considerable attention in the general debate as well as in the First Committee.¹⁵ The debate reflected the concern of many Member States at the lack of definite results in the bilateral negotiations between the two sides. This concern was also expressed in a draft resolution on the subject.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States reconfirmed their resolution to achieve agreement on this important subject and reiterated the hope that it would be accomplished quickly. Their statements once again emphasized not only the importance of the negotiations but also their delicate nature. Thus, the Soviet Union stressed that an early conclusion of the talks was of particular importance. It noted that the essence of the problem lay in setting limits for the development of the most dangerous and destructive types of armaments, and then negotiating a substantial decrease in their level. In that connexion it also expressed the hope that a sober-minded and well-considered line in United States policy with regard to that extremely important matter would prevail, because a new agreement was needed equally by the Soviet Union, the United States and the world at large. The United States, too, pointed out that the conclusion of the agreement was its fundamental goal and hoped it would be concluded before the end of the year. Later in the session the United States again emphasized that it looked upon the SALT negotiations as vital steps in the process of mastering the problem of controlling the accumulation of nuclear arms. It noted that the negotiations were at the centre of that process since they dealt with both the most dangerous weapons and with the most

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 34th and 86th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 56th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

important implements of deterrence. The United States once again reiterated its expectations that agreement would emerge soon.

In the course of the general debate many Member States, including Australia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Italy and the United Kingdom, expressed hope for an early agreement. Some of them also noted with satisfaction that that prospect existed. Several others, notably the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland, pointed out also that such an agreement would significantly promote other disarmament negotiations, halt the arms race, improve the international climate and strengthen détente in general. Australia, in addition, noted that it continued to believe that the SALT process offered the best prospects for substantial measures of arms control between the super-Powers and ultimately among all nuclear-weapon States.

The Netherlands, for its part, noted, however, that much remained to be done to make the world a safer place and pointed out that nuclear disarmament was of primary and vital importance. It expressed concern about the lack of progress in that field and noted that the international community was still waiting, among other things, for a new SALT agreement. In spite of the assurances given time and again that progress was being made, regrettably there was still no sign that substantive steps were being taken to curb the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race. Similar views were expressed by Austria which was greatly concerned that, several months after the conclusion of the special session devoted to disarmament, a SALT agreement still had not been achieved. Finally, Sweden urged the two sides to reach agreement without further delay and to follow it up rapidly with a substantial SALT III agreement.

The debate on the SALT negotiations in the First Committee followed much the same basic pattern as that in the General Assembly. This time, however, concern about the lack of definitive results was much more pronounced. The debate took place mainly under two agenda items: review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the special session and general and complete disarmament.

Under the first item, Mexico pointed out that conclusion of a SALT agreement along with the complete cessation of nuclear tests had been given the highest priority in the Programme of Action in the Final Document of the special session, but it had not yet been possible to achieve the expected results. In its opinion the fact that only three months had elapsed since the special session could not be used as an excuse because neither subject was new. Mexico deeply regretted that state of affairs and expressed sincere hope that the nuclear-weapon States would lend every effort to achieve a positive change in the situation before the end of the current year. Nigeria also recalled that the Programme of Action called upon the two sides to conclude a SALT II agreement at the earliest possible date and to transmit its text to the General Assembly. It further noted that the two negotiators should inform the General Assembly of the status of their negotiations and the time when they expected to conclude them, since such information would greatly assist the General Assembly in taking a decision on the question. Similarly, Yugoslavia voiced

its concern over the fact that the expected results had not been achieved with regard to some issues, including a SALT II agreement, despite promises made at the special session to the effect that agreements were to be reached soon. It also expected that the two sides would keep the General Assembly informed of the course of their negotiations and the results achieved, and stated that all Member States had assumed such obligation in the Final Document. Peru, for its part, noted that promising announcements on the conclusion of the SALT and other negotiations had been made on past occasions, but that they had not materialized. Consequently, Peru was of the opinion that the present session should speak out clearly on all those matters. Similar views were expressed by Algeria, Kenya and Sri Lanka.

A number of other States placed emphasis in their statements on the promising prospects for the completion of the SALT II agreement. Thus, Australia welcomed the statements made by both sides that it might be completed before the end of the year and noted that that would be a welcome implementation of one of the urgent measures of the Final Document. It also looked forward to being informed, through the Secretary-General, of the terms of the agreement consistent with the spirit of the Assembly's request to that effect in resolution 32/87 G. Similar statements were made by Austria, Denmark, Liberia, New Zealand and Portugal.

In a similar context, Australia, Austria, Denmark and the United Kingdom made reference also to the next phase of SALT, pointing out that it should lead to a marked reduction of and qualitative restrictions on strategic arms. Thus, Australia specifically stated that the SALT III phase must signal the end of qualitative development of new strategic weapons systems, require significant reductions in existing arsenals and address the question of the so-called grey area nuclear-weapon systems.

France, for its part, hoped that the two parties would come to a mutually satisfactory understanding that could be a step forward from previous agreements. It also hoped that that stage would be followed by others which would open the door to significant quantitative reductions and would put a brake on, and possibly end, their technological competition, the effects of which it held were particularly disturbing.

Several other States, notably Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary, maintained their previously stated view that the early and successful conclusion of the SALT agreement would be an important contribution to international peace and security and disarmament efforts in general.

In the course of the work of the First Committee Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zaire submitted a draft resolution on SALT under the agenda item "General and complete disarmament". In introducing the draft on 22 November, Mexico pointed out that the preamble, as a new element, included the text of paragraph 52 of the Final Document of the special session which dealt with the SALT negotiations. With regard to the operative part of the draft, it contained only three paragraphs. The first of them expressed deep regret that in spite of all that had

been declared, resolved or reiterated over the last decade, it had not yet been possible to achieve definitive results on SALT II. The second paragraph consisted essentially of the reaffirmation, brought up to date with the addition of a reference to paragraph 52 of the Final Document, of one of the paragraphs of resolution 32/87 G on the same subject, which stressed the necessity that the two sides strive to implement as soon as possible the declarations of their respective heads of State; it also renewed the invitation to both Governments to adopt without delay all relevant measures to achieve that objective. The third paragraph, in essence, reiterated the trust of the General Assembly that the two Governments would transmit to it in good time the text of the agreement.

At its 56th meeting on 29 November, the First Committee adopted the draft resolution by 115 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions. Albania voted against, while Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR abstained. China did not participate in the vote.

In explanation of vote the Soviet Union recalled its constant efforts to achieve successful and rapid completion of negotiations to limit strategic weapons and stated that, in view of those efforts it could not accept operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. Consequently, it decided to abstain in the vote. The United States, for its part, stated that while supporting the draft it, too, shared some of the concerns regarding its tone, particularly the tone of paragraph 1. The United States also reiterated its intention to provide appropriate information on a timely basis with respect to the SALT negotiations.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December as resolution 33/91 C by a recorded vote of 127 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2932 B (XXVII), of 29 November 1972, 3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975 and 31/189 A of 21 December 1976,

Reaffirming its resolution 32/87 G of 12 December 1977, in which, *inter alia*, it noted with satisfaction:

(a) The declaration made by the President of the United States of America on 4 October 1977 in these terms:

“The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interests, in limiting and reducing our nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis we are willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent. Then we will work for further reductions with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons.”

(b) The declaration made by the President of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 2 November 1977 in these terms:

“Today we are proposing a radical step: that agreement be reached on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all States. This would apply to all such weapons — whether atomic, hydrogen or neutron bombs or missiles. At the same time, the nuclear Powers could undertake to start the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons and move towards their complete, total destruction.”

Bearing in mind that the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session included among those measures which deserve the highest priority the one which is set forth in these terms:

“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks. They are invited to transmit in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly. It should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms. It should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, of establishment of a world free of such weapons.”

Noting that in the Programme of Action it was established that in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility,

1. *Deeply regrets* that, in spite of all that has been declared, resolved or reiterated over the last decade, it has not yet been possible for the talks on the limitation of strategic weapons, known as SALT, to achieve even the immediate results envisaged in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first devoted to disarmament,

2. *Stresses once again with the greatest emphasis* the necessity that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America strive to implement as soon as possible the declarations made in 1977 by their respective heads of State and reiterates its invitation to the Governments of both countries to adopt without delay all relevant measures to achieve that objective, which coincides in essence with the one defined in this regard in paragraph 52 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3. *Trusts* that the two Governments will fulfil the invitation which the General Assembly addressed to them in paragraph 52 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in order that they may transmit to it in good time the text of the agreement which over the last four years has been pursued in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks.

Conclusion

Although the two parties engaged in the negotiations had not been able to complete a SALT II agreement by the end of the year, as they had hoped, they reported that in the course of the intensive bilateral negotiations considerable progress towards that end had been achieved. The remaining unresolved questions pertained, according to them, to a relatively few technical issues which, given additional time for the consultation, they felt confident that they could settle relatively soon. In addition, they reiterated on numerous occasions, both outside the United Nations and in the context of the debate on the subject in the General Assembly, their determination to embark on the third phase of the negotiations as soon as possible with a view to reaching agreement on substantial reductions in their strategic nuclear-weapon systems and limitations on their qualitative improvement.

The General Assembly once again confirmed the world-wide interest in the subject and its importance for world peace and security by adopting a resolution concerning SALT. This time, however, the resolution expressed stronger regrets about the lack of definitive results in the negotiations and placed greater emphasis on the necessity of achieving the declared objective of the negotiations as an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, of establishment of a world free of such weapons.

Cessation of nuclear-weapon tests

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF THE CESSATION of nuclear-weapon tests independent of agreement on other disarmament measures was considered by the General Assembly as early as 1954, during its ninth session. After the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1962, and as a result of negotiations in that body and elsewhere, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States signed, on 5 August 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.¹ That Treaty, known as the partial test-ban Treaty, which entered into force on 10 October 1963, did not cover underground tests. Consequently, the General Assembly in 1963, by its resolution 1910 (XVIII), called upon all States to become parties to the Treaty and requested the CCD to continue negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test ban. Since that time, the Assembly has repeatedly called for suspension of all nuclear-weapon tests and for continued work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

On 3 July 1974, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests,² commonly referred to as the threshold test-ban Treaty, under which the size of such tests was limited to a yield of 150 kilotons, and under which each party undertook to limit its underground tests to a minimum. The Treaty was not in force by 31 March 1976, the agreed cut-off date for explosions above the threshold established therein. The parties have stated, however, that they will observe the limitation during the pre-ratification period. As at the end of 1978 the Treaty had not yet entered into force.

In May 1975, the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration,³ expressed the hope that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p.43; text and current status are also given in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2); see also appendix II to the present volume.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/431.

³ NPT/CONF/35/I, annex I.

take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties relating to the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test-ban agreement and appealed to them to make every effort to reach that goal. The Review Conference called upon the nuclear-weapon States signatories to the threshold test-ban Treaty meanwhile to limit the number of their underground nuclear-weapon tests to a minimum, and expressed the belief that such a step would constitute an incentive of particular value to the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon test explosions for all time.

On 28 May 1976 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.⁴ By that Treaty the two nations agreed not to carry out any individual nuclear explosions having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons; not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. A protocol to the Treaty set forth specific agreed arrangements for assuring that no weapon-related benefits precluded by the threshold test-ban Treaty would be derived from a peaceful nuclear explosion, including arrangements for the provision of detailed information and concerning the rights and functions of observers. As at the end of 1978 the Treaty had not entered into force.

Also in 1976, the CCD, on the initiative of Sweden, decided to establish the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

In 1977 the Soviet Union and the United States informed the CCD that they had held useful bilateral consultations on the subject of a comprehensive test ban and that they would be joined by the United Kingdom, in July of that year, to begin negotiations which they hoped would result in agreement among them.

Later in the same year, at its thirty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/78, by which it reiterated its grave concern that in spite of the repeated resolutions of the Assembly related to nuclear-weapon testing in all environments, adopted by very large majorities, such testing had continued unabated during the previous year; noted with satisfaction that negotiations had begun among three nuclear-weapon States with a view to the drafting of an agreement on the subject; declared that the conclusion of such an agreement and its opening for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the tenth special session; urged the three nuclear-weapon States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible and to use their best endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the CCD by the beginning of its spring session in 1978; and requested the CCD to take up with the utmost urgency the agreed text resulting from the negotiations referred to, with a view to the submission

⁴ Text transmitted to the Secretary-General by the parties in a letter dated 7 July 1976, (A/31/125, annex).

of a draft treaty to the Assembly at its tenth special session. The resolution was adopted with wide support, including that of the parties to the trilateral negotiations but not that of the other nuclear-weapon States.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The General Assembly, at its special session, had before it a special report prepared by the CCD⁵ in response to the request of the Assembly in resolution 32/88 B. In the report, the Committee referred to resolution 32/78 which, as noted above, had envisaged possible submission of a draft treaty to the Assembly at its special session. The Committee stated that its highest priority remained the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. It indicated that the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States had informed the Committee that they were continuing tripartite negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the provisions of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty. In reporting to the Committee on 16 March 1978, the three parties had stated that they shared the widely-held view that an international exchange of seismic data would play a major role in verification of compliance with the treaty. The three parties were also keenly aware of the great importance that the members of the General Assembly and of the CCD attached to the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty and would continue their best efforts to complete the tripartite negotiations as soon as possible. The Committee was also informed that, following a brief recess for consultations in capitals, the tripartite negotiations had been resumed on 4 May 1978.

The Committee indicated in its special report that at the spring session a number of delegations had expressed regret that the talks had not yet produced the desired results, while other delegations had expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved. In a matter related to a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the Committee stated that the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events had submitted a report⁶ to the Committee recommending the establishment of a global network of seismological stations and the carrying out of a practical exercise. The Committee, after considering the report, had decided⁷ that the *Ad Hoc* Group should continue its work by studying the scientific and methodological principles of a possible experimental test of a global network of seismological stations of the kind which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, as well as under a protocol covering nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of that treaty.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 and corrigendum (A/S-10/2 and Corr.1).*

⁶ *Ibid., Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27), vol. II, document CCD/558 and Add.1.*

⁷ *Ibid., document CCD/570.*

In the debate at the special session⁸ most speakers expressed or implied agreement with the assessment set out by the CCD in its special report that a comprehensive test ban was a question of highest priority on the disarmament agenda. Among the many States stressing the inadequacy of the partial test-ban Treaty, Burundi, for example, said that the Treaty, while reducing the danger of radioactive contamination, did not really represent a movement towards reduction of the arms race; even less could it lead to disarmament. Similarly, with reference to that Treaty, Nigeria stated that the era of concentration on collateral measures should be considered at an end. It held that all were now aware, if ever there had been any doubt, that disarmament would not be achieved by talking about "convenient" measures while the real issues were left virtually untouched.

On the other hand, it was also recognized in the debate that the Treaty had not been without value. In that connexion, the Soviet Union asked why almost one third of the States Members of the United Nations were not parties to the Treaty.

In assessing the current state of the trilateral negotiations, a number of speakers expressed regret that they had not yet produced a draft treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Among them were Argentina, Cyprus, Finland and Mexico. The participants in the negotiations, however, tended to give hopeful assessments. To the Soviet Union there seemed to be grounds for expecting successful completion of the efforts to bring about a complete and general prohibition of tests. It was also the view of the United States that important progress had been made towards an adequately verifiable agreement. The United Kingdom, for its part, gave assurance that differences had been narrowed in the tripartite talks, and stated that it was ready to put forward new proposals in the negotiations.

The relationship of a comprehensive test ban to non-proliferation was frequently mentioned. Ethiopia believed that such a ban would strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty and make the halting of the arms race in the nuclear field all the more feasible. Australia stated that such an agreement would be a barrier to the further spread of nuclear weapons since such a treaty would put any country initiating or continuing nuclear testing at the risk of isolation or international censure.

Several offers of co-operation in the field of seismic data were made. Australia stated that in view of its geographical position and expertise it would be well placed to participate in monitoring such a treaty by seismic means. Denmark said that its experts and Danish installations in Greenland, for example, might be useful in connexion with an international seismic system, thereby helping to solve the problem of verification of a comprehensive test ban. The Federal Republic of Germany indicated its readiness to participate in the seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban and to make its institutions available for that purpose. Norway stated that it was prepared to

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 27th meetings.

make its contribution to the establishment of a verification system through NORSAR, the Norwegian seismic array.

China questioned the value and priority accorded by the super-Powers to a nuclear test ban. It stated that the Soviet Union and the United States had conducted hundreds of nuclear tests, both in the atmosphere and underground, which constituted about 90 percent of all the nuclear explosions carried out in the world. A complete test ban now would not in the least touch their nuclear arsenals or restrict their continuing the production, development or stockpiling, or their use, of nuclear weapons.

In the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, adopted by consensus, the General Assembly states:

51. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the above aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context the negotiations now in progress on "a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty," should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date. All efforts should be made by the negotiating parties to achieve an agreement which, following endorsement by the General Assembly, could attract the widest possible adherence. In this context, various views were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States that, pending the conclusion of this treaty, the world community would be encouraged if all the nuclear-weapon States refrained from testing nuclear weapons. In this connexion, some nuclear-weapon States expressed different views.

In a statement made after the adoption of the Final Document, India recalled that it had submitted a draft resolution⁹ to the effect that, pending conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, all nuclear-weapon Powers should refrain from further testing of nuclear weapons. In keeping with its desire to co-operate fully in the work of the special session, it stated that it had decided not to press its proposal to a vote, but to reserve the right to return to the subject at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly if the nuclear-weapon States did not respond positively to the view held by all the non-nuclear-weapon States, and reflected in paragraph 51 of the Final Document, on the need for an immediate moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. The delegation of the United States stated that an early suspension of all nuclear tests was a goal it could fully share. However, in the view of the delegation, an immediate moratorium on nuclear testing was not a good idea because a comprehensive test ban, in order to promote stability and mutual confidence among its participants, had to be based on adequate measures of verification. An immediate cessation of nuclear testing could, in its view, seriously complicate efforts to elaborate such verification measures.

China stated by way of clarification that it found those parts of the Final Document dealing with the "so-called total prohibition of nuclear tests" totally unacceptable.

⁹ A/S-10/AC.1/L.10.

Likewise, by way of clarification, the delegation of France wished to dissociate itself from the idea, expressed in the Final Document, that the cessation of nuclear tests would make a significant contribution to the aim of preventing the production of new types of weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The two most heavily armed Powers had, the delegation stated, by means of the numerous tests which they had carried out, accumulated data adequate to allow them to make any qualitative improvements they might desire without carrying out new tests.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

In addition to its consideration of the comprehensive test ban as outlined in its special report to the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the CCD continued consideration of the matter after the session and reported to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session¹⁰ on its work for the year.

On 8 August the delegation of the United Kingdom, speaking for the parties to the trilateral negotiations, recalled the joint statement of 16 March 1978 and in reviewing the progress made in recent months stated that it had been agreed that the treaty should establish a ban on any nuclear-weapon-test explosion in any environment, and that the provisions of a protocol, which would be an integral part of the treaty, would apply to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The three believed that after a certain period the parties to the treaty would wish to review its operation. They were making every effort to achieve an agreement which would attract the widest possible international adherence. The delegation added that reaching agreement on effective measures of verification was a complex process involving many technical issues. The current phase of the negotiations was, however, producing results and the three parties were pressing ahead as fast as they could.

Ethiopia made a statement on behalf of the members known as the group of 15 in which it expressed the group's deep concern and disappointment. The group believed that the CCD should be informed about the details of the substantive problems facing the negotiations and thus be in a position to participate on an equal footing in the negotiating process, including technical aspects. That would, among other things, ensure the widest possible support for the draft treaty.

The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Mongolia, the Netherlands and Nigeria also addressed the general question of the status of the negotiations and expressed hope for early progress.

The questions of verification, participation in an agreement and peaceful nuclear explosions also received attention.

With regard to the issue of verification, the discussion in the Committee centered on the reports of the *Ad Hoc* Group of seismological experts of 9 March and 15 August 1978.¹¹ India expressed the view that verification

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 54-115.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, documents CCD/558 and Add. 1 and CCD/576.

should be effected by a judicious combination of national and international means. The Swedish delegation believed that verification by non-seismic means, such as on-site inspection or satellite observation, should also be carried out with genuine international participation, for instance through a consultative committee such as that proposed in the Swedish draft treaty on the subject. Sweden reminded the Committee of its willingness to finance, establish and operate in Sweden an international data centre of the type proposed by the *Ad Hoc* Group. Japan offered to act as host to informal technical meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Group of experts. The Netherlands delegation hoped that more countries in the southern hemisphere would participate in the seismic monitoring system and wondered what kind of arrangements might be made with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to make use of its telecommunications system.

The delegation of the United Kingdom, still speaking for the three participants in the trilateral negotiations, said they considered that all parties to the treaty should have the right to participate in the international exchange of seismic data and to receive such data whether or not they contributed seismic stations to the global network. They agreed that the guidelines for setting up and running the international seismic exchange should be laid down in an annex to the treaty, and that detailed organizational and procedural arrangements should be worked out after the entry into force of the treaty, drawing on the recommendations contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group.

The Soviet Union considered that the exercise of the network recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Group could in practice be carried out only after the treaty had been concluded and when it was known which principal States parties would decide to participate and place their seismographic stations at the disposal of the global network. Japan considered that the experimental exercise should be executed as soon as the preparatory work of the *Ad Hoc* Group was completed, regardless of whether a comprehensive test ban had already come into force.

In its report of 15 August, the *Ad Hoc* Group suggested, *inter alia*, that a representative of WMO should be invited to participate informally in the work of the Group in relation to the transmission of data through the WMO communications network. The CCD agreed subsequently that the work of the Group should be continued, and expressed the hope that the arrangements recommended in the report would be continued under the Committee on Disarmament.

With regard to the question of participation of nuclear-weapon States in a future treaty, the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland expressed the view that, whereas the prospective agreement of the three nuclear-weapon States was of considerable significance, such an agreement would, in fact, constitute only a further step towards a general and complete test ban with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States. India believed that a ban could not be truly effective without the participation of China and France.

As to the question of the treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of a nuclear-weapon test ban, Japan proposed inclusion of provisions

in the treaty to the effect that any State party to the treaty should not conduct any nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes unless agreement was reached on appropriate international supervision and procedures which would ensure that no weapons testing could be carried out under the guise of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and that the States parties to the treaty should undertake to continue in good faith negotiations on the appropriate international supervision and procedures referred to above and should make a periodic review of their achievements.

The United States and the Netherlands continued to advocate the prohibition of the explosion of all nuclear-explosive devices.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

In their opening statements at the thirty-third session¹² the three parties concerned referred to the trilateral negotiations. The Soviet Union said that some progress had been achieved of late but said its negotiating partners were stalling; the United States hoped early progress could be made; the United Kingdom said that it was involved in the negotiations. In subsequent discussions it became clear that there were still differences of view on a number of specific points. Several delegations, including India, the Netherlands and Nigeria, expressed disappointment that, as a result of those differences, the CCD had been unable to begin substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and that no draft treaty had been submitted to the General Assembly at its special session as called for in resolution 32/78. Nigeria believed that a clear political directive was required from the General Assembly embodying, *inter alia*, an immediate moratorium on all nuclear tests and concrete arrangements to ensure commencement of substantive work on a draft treaty by the Committee on Disarmament during its first session in 1979.

Under the agenda item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", Cyprus, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution on the urgent need for the cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons, which was introduced by the representative of India on 27 October. Subsequently, Australia, Barbados, Bolivia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic of Cameroon, Yugoslavia and Zaire submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later also sponsored by Liberia, Togo and Tunisia. The revised draft resolution, which was intended by its sponsors to take into account a number of comments which had been

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 4th to 34th and 84th meetings, particularly 8th, 10th and 14th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 4th to 50th, 52nd and 57th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

made on the original text was adopted by the First Committee at its 52nd meeting by a vote of 89 to 2 (China and France), with 9 abstentions (including the United Kingdom and the United States).

In explaining its vote against the draft resolution in the First Committee, the delegation of China held that the super-Powers were in a position to develop and improve nuclear weapons even without tests. It also stated that it wished to reserve its position on references to a complete nuclear-test ban in other draft resolutions. The delegation of France restated the position it had taken at the special session, namely, that it could associate itself with the idea of the cessation of nuclear testing by all States only within the framework of an effective process of nuclear disarmament.

In explaining the reasons for its abstention, the delegation of the United States expressed the view that a comprehensive test ban, in order to promote stability and mutual confidence among its participants, must be based on adequate measures of verification. An immediate cessation of nuclear testing could, in the opinion of that delegation, seriously complicate the efforts to elaborate measures of verification underway in the tripartite negotiations.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December by a vote of 130 to 2, with 8 abstentions, as resolution 33/71 C. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned that continued testing of nuclear weapons exacerbates the arms race and constitutes a serious hazard to the environment and the health of present and future generations of mankind,

Reiterating its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments would be a major step towards controlling the development of nuclear weapons and an important contribution to the prevention of nuclear-weapon proliferation,

Recalling the determination of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, expressed in that Treaty, to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Recalling its resolutions on the question of nuclear-weapon testing adopted each year since 1958 by very large majorities and, in particular, resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977,

Reaffirming that a comprehensive test ban is a matter of the highest priority,

Recalling the various views expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States during the tenth special session of the General Assembly that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the world community would be encouraged if all the nuclear-weapon States refrained from testing nuclear weapons,

Regretting that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to commence negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty owing to the non-submission of the joint draft treaty expected from the three nuclear-weapon States involved,

Calls upon all States, in particular all the nuclear-weapon States, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, to refrain from conducting any testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

With regard to the agenda item on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/78, concerning the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear testing and conclusion of a treaty on the matter, a draft resolution, revised from an earlier version, was introduced in the First Committee by New Zealand on 16 November. The revised draft was sponsored by Australia,

Austria, Canada, Colombia, the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Singapore, Sweden and Venezuela and later also the Philippines.

The representative of New Zealand, in introducing the draft resolution, said that the conclusion of a draft treaty was no nearer than it had been at the same time the previous year. He added that in those 12 months nuclear testing had continued both in the atmosphere and underground. The principal purpose of the sponsors, he said, was to spur the speedy conclusion of the negotiations, a purpose which would not be advanced by a resolution from which the negotiating nuclear-weapon States could easily dissociate themselves, but rather by one to which the overwhelming majority in the Assembly, including those three States, would be obliged to subscribe. The delegation said the draft resolution should be seen as complementing, not contradicting, the call in another resolution for a moratorium on nuclear testing.

At its 57th meeting, on 30 November, the First Committee adopted the revised draft resolution by a recorded vote of 122 to 1 (China), with 6 abstentions (Argentina, Cuba, Ethiopia, Fiji, France and Gambia). The General Assembly, at its 84th meeting on 14 December 1978, adopted the draft resolution by a recorded vote of 134 to 1 (China), with 5 abstentions (Argentina, Cuba, Ethiopia, Fiji and France), as resolution 33/60. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments would be in the interest of all mankind, both as a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a means of relieving the deep apprehension concerning the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination for the health of present and future generations,

Recalling the determination of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressed in those Treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolution 32/78 of 12 December 1977 and paragraph 51 of resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978,

Recognizing the importance to a treaty prohibiting nuclear testing of the study being carried out by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on a global network of stations for the exchange of seismological data,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

1. *Reiterates its grave concern* over the fact that nuclear-weapon testing has continued unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. *Reaffirms its conviction* that a treaty on the subject of the present resolution is a matter of the highest priority;

3. *Regrets* that a draft treaty has not been concluded during the past year;

4. *Notes* that the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States acknowledge the need to bring their negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion;

5. *Urges* those three States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency and to use their utmost endeavours to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament before the beginning of its 1979 session for full consideration;

6. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to take up immediately the agreed text resulting from the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5 above with a view to the submission as soon as possible of a draft treaty, which will attract the widest possible adherence, to a resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item relating to the implementation of the present resolution.

Conclusion

At the beginning of 1978, the prevailing mood of Member States appeared to be one of hope and expectation in respect of the relatively early achievement in the trilateral negotiations of a draft agreement on a comprehensive test ban which could be submitted to the CCD in accordance with the time-table which had been urged by the Assembly in resolution 32/78. That attitude had been brought about not only by indications of substantive progress on specific issues, but also by the fact that the sponsors of two draft resolutions in the General Assembly had agreed on a common text, thus making possible the adoption of a single resolution on the test-ban question at the thirty-second session.

That optimism served to moderate criticism and reduce the time allotted to discussion of the question at the special session, and served also to reduce emphasis on an immediate moratorium on nuclear testing pending the conclusion of an agreement. At the thirty-third session of the Assembly the spirit of hopefulness had turned to disappointment. One result was that two resolutions were adopted, one relating specifically to a moratorium on nuclear tests. Progress reports of the participants in the trilateral negotiations continued throughout the year, however, and they were generally welcomed, as they indicated a hopeful atmosphere and continued progress in the talks.

Nuclear neutron weapon or reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon

Introduction

THE REDUCED BLAST AND ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON, often referred to as the neutron bomb, has become a highly debated issue since June 1977 when information appeared in the press regarding such an item in the American procurement and defence budget.¹ Although only a part of the over-all programme under consideration in recent years for the modernization of theatre nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the neutron bomb has been a matter of considerable political discussion within the United States and Western European countries, between the United States and Eastern European countries, and in the General Assembly at its thirty-second regular session and its tenth special session, as well as among the general public.

In the General Assembly, the question of the neutron bomb was raised first by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries at the thirty-second session in 1977. The consideration of the question took place mostly in the context of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union considered the neutron bomb an inhumane type of weapon and called upon the United Nations to demand that plans for production of all new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the neutron bomb, be discontinued.

Other statements condemning in one way or another the deployment of the neutron bomb were made by Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR, but no draft resolution was submitted on the subject.

On 24 December 1977, in an interview with a Pravda correspondent, Leonid I. Brezhnev, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, made a proposal on the mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb. He said, in particular:

The Soviet Union is firmly opposed to the development of the neutron bomb. We understand and fully support the voice of millions of people in all corners of the world who are

¹ *Washington Post*, 6 June 1977.

protesting against it. But if this bomb is developed in the West—developed for use against us, which nobody even tries to conceal—it should be fully realized there that the USSR will not remain a passive observer. We will face the need to meet this challenge in order to ensure the security of the Soviet people and their allies and friends. In the final analysis, it will escalate the arms race to an even more dangerous level.

We do not wish this to happen and therefore we propose to reach agreement on the mutual renunciation of the production of a neutron bomb so as to deliver the world from the emergence of new weapons of mass annihilation of people. Such is our sincere desire, such is our proposal to Western Powers.²

Commenting to the press at Warsaw on 30 December 1977 on President L. I. Brezhnev's proposal, President Carter expressed his hope that "as a result of the SALT II talks, we might agree with the Soviets to start addressing the question of the so-called tactical (or theatre) nuclear weapons, of which the enhanced radiation or neutron bomb would be one". Another, he went on, would be the Soviet SS-20 missile, which was much more destructive than any weapon possessed by the Western European members of the North Atlantic Alliance—a weapon much more destabilizing, he noted, than the so-called neutron bomb. Summarizing the problem, President Carter stated, "there are now several thousand tactical nuclear weapons already deployed on both sides in the European theatre, and the whole matter must be addressed in its entirety rather than one weapon at a time."³

On 7 April 1978 President Carter announced:

I have decided to defer production of weapons with enhanced radiation effects. The ultimate decision regarding the incorporation of enhanced radiation features into our modernized battlefield weapons will be made later, and will be influenced by the degree to which the Soviet Union shows restraint in its conventional and nuclear arms programs and force deployments affecting the security of the United States and Western Europe.

...

The United States is consulting with its partners in the North Atlantic Alliance on this decision and will continue to discuss with them appropriate arms control measures to be pursued with the Soviet Union.⁴

In a decision of 18 October 1978 President Carter kept open the option of deploying neutron weapons in connection with a decision to begin production of a new nuclear 8-inch artillery shell and Lance missile warhead. The weapons to be built would be the same nuclear fission type as now deployed in Europe, according to press reports, but with the ability to be converted to neutron, or enhanced radiation, effect with the insertion of a special component. As part of the decision, President Carter ordered that some but not all the elements that make up the insertable neutron component be produced.⁵

² *Pravda*, 25 December 1977.

³ See CCD/PV.778, p.29.

⁴ See *Presidential Documents: Jimmy Carter, 1978*. vol. 14, No. 14 (Washington, 1978), p. 702.

⁵ *Washington Post*, 19 October 1978.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

Early in the Committee's 1978 session, and prior to the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the USSR and other Eastern European States members proposed the specific prohibition of the neutron bomb⁶ as a particularly inhumane weapon of mass destruction. The United States and some Western countries members did not accept the definition of that weapon as a new weapon of mass destruction.

In proposing the mutual renunciation of production of the neutron bomb, the delegation of the Soviet Union held that the cause of world peace was threatened by the emergence of the new and inhumane weapon and that it was particularly dangerous because it was being described as a "tactical" and "harmless" weapon. Such a position tended to efface the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons, making use of the latter more likely. The delegation urged the Western countries to treat the Soviet proposal with all seriousness and responsibility. The Soviet position on banning the neutron bomb was specifically supported by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland.

India believed it was equally urgent to ban development and deployment of new weapons of mass destruction or systems based on existing and available knowledge and principles of science and technology. Thus it believed that the development and deployment of the new weapon called the neutron bomb should be banned. The delegation of Ethiopia thought that unless measures were taken to avert the trend towards production and deployment of the neutron bomb, the arms race might be intensified and the ongoing disarmament negotiations jeopardized. It was in that vein that the delegation viewed the concern expressed by many delegations in connexion with the production and deployment of the neutron bomb.

Mongolia spoke of the special responsibility of all members of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and called for more action in the matter of the neutron bomb by certain States of Western Europe so as not to violate the principle of equal security and alter the existing military balance.

On 9 March 1978, the Soviet Union submitted a draft convention,⁷ sponsored also by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Romania, on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. The text of the draft convention is reproduced in appendix VIII below. In introducing the draft, the delegation of the Soviet Union stressed the view that the neutron bomb was on a par with such cruel and barbaric weapons as biological and chemical weapons, but that its true nature was being concealed. The delegation again emphasized that it was easier to prevent emergence of a new

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-10/2)*, vol. II, paras. 177-190; and *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 116-135.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/559.

weapon than to ban it once it was in the arsenals of States. With regard to the draft convention, the delegation urged immediate joint work on the preparation of an agreed text as another major contribution towards limiting nuclear arms.

The delegation of the United States stated that the Soviet Union was diverting attention from serious attempts to develop arms control agreements that would contribute to international security and engaging in a propaganda exercise focusing on only one aspect of a dangerous confrontation of conventional forces and nuclear weapons deployed by both sides in Europe. The Soviet proposal did not, in its view, deal with the major aspects of the danger caused by that confrontation. The United States delegation explained that the reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon was a nuclear weapon and, as such, a weapon of mass destruction specifically mentioned in the United Nations 1948 definition of mass destruction weapons.⁸ Neither the scientific principles underlying the reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon nor the concepts of their application were new, the delegation held, and therefore it should be discussed in the context of limitations on nuclear weapons. The delegation added that, in the light of the three-to-one tank advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Treaty organization in Central Europe, the weapon was being considered as defence against a possible massive tank attack in that theatre. A one-kiloton reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon would have the same anti-tank capability as a 10-kiloton fission warhead but would reduce by 90 per cent the damage to nearby civilians and urban rural areas. The risk from fall-out would also be similarly reduced. The United States rejected categorically the argument that deployment of the weapon would make it easier to cross the threshold into nuclear war, indicating that the possibility of indiscriminately destructive responses from the other side would remain high, as would the potential for nuclear escalation. The delegation stated that no decision had yet been made regarding either production or deployment of the weapon. Finally, it reiterated the hope expressed by President Carter that the Soviet Union would agree to begin addressing the whole question of tactical, or theatre, nuclear weapons in Europe, including reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapons and the SS-20. Several thousand tactical nuclear weapons were already deployed in Central Europe on both sides, the delegation said, and it was only appropriate to address the issue in its entirety rather than to deal with one weapon at a time.

The delegation of the United Kingdom stated that the highest priority should be given to nuclear disarmament and regretted that the Soviet Union had made a one-sided attack on enhanced radiation weapons whilst going ahead with the deployment of devastating new weapons systems of its own. The delegation considered that the reputation of the CCD as a serious expert body should be carefully preserved, and that the Committee should be obtaining serious proposals from the USSR and Eastern European States for balanced and realistic steps towards the control of the nuclear arms race. The

⁸ For details see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2.

delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany expressed similar views and held that the new bomb had been developed for defensive use against military targets, such as tank forces.

The draft convention on prohibition of the neutron bomb was supported by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland.

Bulgaria held that the draft convention was in accordance with the spirit of General Assembly decisions on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction and with world opinion. The German Democratic Republic held that the draft convention provided for equal obligations for all parties with no unilateral advantages for anyone. The delegation maintained that there was an approximate military balance in Europe and the deployment of the neutron bomb represented an attempt to upset that balance to the unilateral advantage of the West. It also stressed that the deploying of such weapons in the Western European States would constitute an open threat to the existence of the people of the German Democratic Republic. Mongolia emphasized that in submitting the draft convention, the socialist States members of the CCD were guided by a sincere desire to contribute to the halting of the arms race, particularly in the field of means of mass destruction of people.

Hungary held that the declared aim of deployment of the bomb was to change the balance of conventional forces in Europe and that the deployment would be an attempt to create a direct link between the conventional and the nuclear phases of military conflict. It believed that criticism of the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, as envisaged in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, might become more severe if the neutron bomb were deployed and that near-nuclear States might be tempted to develop such a usable nuclear weapon. Poland agreed that such deployment might have an impact on the non-proliferation régime. It stressed that the Committee was the appropriate place to discuss the problem, and added that the neutron bomb could not be considered as a "bargaining chip" in another disarmament forum. In a similar vein, Hungary expressed the view that it had become clear that the weapon would not offer lasting advantages for those who were pressing for its production and deployment and, therefore, an attempt would be made to use the weapon as a "bargaining chip" at arms limitation and disarmament talks and to increase economic and political pressure on other countries. For those reasons, the CCD should conduct urgent negotiations on the mutual prohibition of the neutron bomb. Czechoslovakia, for its part, pointed out several characteristics of the neutron weapon, clearly regarding it as a new weapon of mass destruction and an offensive weapon that might be used for the suppression of national liberation movements.

The delegation of Egypt also referred favourably to the draft convention of the socialist States, holding that recent developments in the production of new weapons of mass destruction had already cast a shadow over the Committee's present session as well as over arms control negotiations outside the CCD. The delegation considered those developments particularly alarming since they had taken place after the CCD had begun serious efforts to achieve a ban on all weapons of mass destruction.

The delegation of the Netherlands said that its Government shared many concerns and doubts which had been expressed with respect to the reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon. The debate on the weapon could be welcomed insofar as it focused the Committee's attention again on the place and role of nuclear weapons in the security system. The Committee should, however, accept the facts as they really were and not indulge in disregarding the complexities of the problems involved. The Netherlands would wholeheartedly welcome a situation in which it would be possible to prevent the introduction of the neutron weapon.

Yugoslavia stressed that it had always upheld the prohibition of all types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear neutron weapon. The production of such weapons could only give added impetus to the nuclear arms race and thus take the world even further from the ultimate goal it was striving for—general and complete disarmament.

In the course of the spring session of the CCD, the delegation of the Soviet Union further stated that, should this new major initiative be implemented, all States of the world would be on the winning side. The delegation rejected attempts which sought to justify the development and deployment of neutron bombs based on references to changes in the military balance of forces in Europe. Having noted the statement by the United States to the effect that it had postponed a decision on the manufacture of nuclear neutron weapons, the Soviet delegation noted that, in that connexion, the Soviet Union had also expressed its intention not to begin production of neutron weapons if the United States did not do so. It also held that this created the necessary prerequisites for the fruitful examination of the question of the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons in the Committee.

In the course of the summer session of the CCD, the delegation of the Soviet Union again touched upon the question and the draft convention presented by the Eastern European States and called upon the United States and other Western countries to proceed, without delay, with the negotiations for the purpose of a complete and unconditional renunciation of the development and deployment of nuclear neutron weapons.

During the session, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland also renewed their call for the conclusion of a convention on the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron nuclear weapons.

Sweden stated that the neutron weapon was a sophisticated nuclear weapon which might very well lower the nuclear threshold and that a decision to refrain from its production should be welcomed as an important unilateral contribution to the constraining of the qualitative arms race. In the same context, Sweden referred to the Soviet SS-20 missile as an example of the apparently continuing development of nuclear intermediate and medium-range missiles, which caused deep international concern because, if deterrence failed, those missiles would be as lethal a threat to Europe as the strategic intercontinental weapons were to the territories of the super-Powers. Both the neutron weapon and the SS-20, Sweden said, formed concrete arms

race factors because of the nature of the political and military interaction between the leading Powers and the military blocs.

The United Kingdom observed that nuclear warheads with yields of less than one kiloton had been known about for years, as had the principles of nuclear warheads with tailored effects, including enhanced radiation warheads. None of them represented a radically new or futuristic weapon. They produced the same destructive results as other nuclear weapons, the delegation pointed out. In its view, the value of nuclear weapons would continue to be assessed primarily with regard to their utility, unused, as instruments of deterrence and not of fighting wars.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

At the tenth special session of the General Assembly the question of the reduced blast and enhanced radiation weapon or neutron bomb was dealt with mostly in general statements in the debate at the plenary meetings.⁹

In the discussions, the USSR and the other Eastern European countries continued to stress the necessity of complete prohibition of the production, deployment and use of the neutron weapon and called particular attention to the draft convention on the subject which they had submitted to the CCD in March 1978.

The Soviet Union once again stated that it did not intend to begin the production of neutron weapons unless the United States or any other State did so. It called for banning of the neutron weapon once and for all.

In the text transmitted by the letter dated 26 May 1978 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed to the Secretary-General,¹⁰ the Soviet Union, *inter alia*, stressed that (a) neutron weapons were especially inhumane means of mass destruction of people; (b) neutron weapons would inevitably lower the threshold of a nuclear war and consequently increase the probability of such a war; (c) the introduction of neutron weapons by one group of States would inevitably lead to similar action on the part of another group of countries, and open up a new channel for the nuclear arms race; and (d) the emergence of any type of neutron weapon could mark but a start of that race since a first type would inevitably be followed by others with even greater destructive capabilities designed to attain broader objectives than currently conceived. It further stated that, in view of the United States postponement of its decision to begin production of neutron weapons, the Soviet Union would not begin their production as long as the United States did the same. However, the Soviet Union stated that it remained an advocate of complete prohibition of such weapons. It suggested that, taking the interests of the security of peoples into account, consideration of the proposal concerning the prohibition of neutron weapons should be accorded high priority in the work

⁹ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings.

¹⁰ See A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex.

of the Committee on Disarmament, while the General Assembly at its thirty-third session could sum up the results of the work accomplished.

Poland stressed that it attached particular importance to the draft convention banning the production, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons and said that it had taken note of the decision of the United States to postpone production of that weapon. The delegation nevertheless noted that, in Poland's opinion, that decision should be followed up by another totally to renounce its manufacture, as the Soviet Union had announced that it was ready to do on reciprocal basis. It expressed the hope that the United States and other members of NATO would agree to a convention on the total prohibition of the neutron weapon.

Bulgaria held that the events relating to the neutron weapon had revealed the sinister prospect of involving peoples in a new and more intensive phase of the arms race and creating conditions in which any international conflict could easily develop into a nuclear-missile war. Considering President Carter's statement on a postponement of a definite decision to start production of the neutron bomb as a positive and encouraging development, Bulgaria noted, however, that the issue was still on the agenda as could be seen from some attempts to connect it with other problems. It stressed that the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries provided the basis for an agreement to remove the threat which the weapon represented.

Czechoslovakia expressed the view that the question of the complete prohibition of the production, deployment and use of neutron weapons must be specifically stressed in the programme of action on disarmament to be adopted by the session. In its view the best way to solve the issue was to conclude the agreements for which concrete proposals had been submitted by the socialist countries.

Hungary, holding that the production and deployment of the neutron bomb would start a new spiral in the arms race, would regard it as a highly important step if the Government of the United States were to renounce once and for all the production of the neutron bomb.

Sweden, considering the development of the neutron weapon as an extremely worrying example of the continuing development of all types of nuclear weapons, noted that the neutron weapon was a specialized nuclear weapon that might lower the nuclear threshold. Sweden stressed that that was one of the unacceptable properties of the weapon and the reason why the Government of Sweden equated it with the so-called "mini-nuclear" weapons, against which Sweden had previously raised strong objections in various forums. Norway referred to the statement of the Norwegian Prime Minister made at the concurrent NATO meeting at Washington concerning the particular responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to exercise restraint and to seize upon all opportunities to prevent the further development and deployment of nuclear weapons. In that context, Norway welcomed the action of the President of the United States in postponing the decision regarding the production of the neutron weapon. The urgent necessity of the abandonment of neutron weapons was also mentioned in the general debate by Cyprus and Romania.

On 7 June 1978, in the course of the discussions in the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the special session, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal¹¹ for inclusion in the text of the draft final document which, *inter alia*, required insertion in the programme of action, under the section on other weapons of mass destruction, of a paragraph dealing with the prohibition of the emergence and deployment of neutron weapons. The special session of the General Assembly, however, confined its consideration of the question only to the discussion on it, and no specific paragraph or mention of the neutron weapon was included in the Final Document.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

The consideration of the question of the neutron weapon at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly was undertaken in the general debates at the plenary meetings and in the First Committee¹² in the more general context of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction (see chapter XVII).

The Soviet Union, in reiterating its readiness to reach agreement on preventing the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and step up the preparation of special agreements on individual types of weapons, stressed that that readiness applied first and foremost to neutron weapons. The Soviet Union held that the situation would become more dangerous if the plans for their production, stockpiling and deployment materialized.

Referring to the banning of the development of new types and systems of mass destruction, Bulgaria considered the preparation of a treaty banning the manufacture and the use of the neutron bomb as a priority subject of the Committee on Disarmament. The German Democratic Republic also called for irrevocable prohibition of the manufacture and deployment of the neutron bomb and held that its introduction would cause the arms race to spiral again. Czechoslovakia called upon the General Assembly to encourage the initiation of constructive negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement to prohibit the development, manufacture and deployment of neutron weapons. Poland reiterated its deep concern over the plans and concrete preparations for the production of neutron weapons, which, if put into effect, would have extremely grave consequences for international peace and security by increasing the level of military confrontation, triggering a new spiral of the arms race undermining the régime of non-proliferation, hampering the process of détente and lowering the threshold of a nuclear war. Poland considered it

¹¹ See A/S-10/AC.1/18, annex.

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

imperative to bring about a joint renunciation of neutron weapons without further delay and urged that the Committee on Disarmament take up the question on consideration of a draft convention on the matter submitted by the socialist countries with all the urgency it deserved.

The Lao People's Democratic Republic considered the production of the neutron bomb as contrary to the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. Nigeria considered the neutron bomb as a weapon likely to blur the demarcation line between conventional war and nuclear war and, therefore, as a particularly dangerous weapon, not because it was more inhumane than nuclear weapons of greater blast capacity, but because it might well bring a nuclear war nearer to reality. It believed that the development of the neutron weapon would open the road to an escalation of the arms race.

In reviewing the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament efforts, Sweden again expressed its concern about the neutron bomb and the SS-20 missile, and noted that continuing preparations for the actual production of the neutron weapon kept that option open. India also expressed its concern about development of new nuclear weapons such as backfire bombers, the cruise missile, the neutron bomb, SS-20 missiles and MX missiles.

The United Kingdom articulated the general Western view. Noting that several delegations, particularly those of the Eastern European countries, claimed that the enhanced radiation weapon was a new weapon of mass destruction, it stated that by no possible definition could it be considered as anything other than a nuclear weapon. It added that the States dwelling on that particular weapon were showing a curious discrimination in that there were many horrific weapons in the armories of both East and West which both sides hoped would never be used. It noted the neutron weapon as being particularly designed to reduce collateral damage and concentrate efforts on its military target, and that it was specifically intended to counter an attack by massed armour—a possibility which the Governments of the Warsaw Treaty did not have to fear or prepare against. It added that real weapons of mass destruction were already deployed and targeted on Western European cities while the enhanced radiation weapon system—because of Western hopes for an arrangement of balanced restraint—was not even being produced, let alone deployed.

Conclusion

There exist two main approaches to the question of the nuclear neutron weapon. The Eastern European States and a number of non-aligned countries regard the weapon as a separate issue, while the Western States treat it in the context of the general question of nuclear disarmament. The discussions on the issue with regard to the first approach have acquired a more concrete character because of the submission of the draft convention in the CCD by the Eastern European group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

In view of President Carter's statement, in October 1978, regarding continuation of manufacture of certain components of the neutron weapon while delaying a decision concerning its possible deployment, the Eastern European States will probably continue to consider the question on the basis of their approach and draft convention.

Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF STRENGTHENING of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States has been discussed at the United Nations and other international forums mainly in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968.¹

In 1968, in the course of the debates on the non-proliferation Treaty in ENDC, several non-nuclear-weapon States made interventions regarding the steps to be taken by the nuclear Powers in the field of security assurances to be given to States not possessing nuclear weapons.

During subsequent negotiations on the non-proliferation Treaty in ENDC and the General Assembly the non-nuclear-weapon States took the attitude that, given the obligations they were to assume pursuant to the Treaty, it should be expected that the nuclear-weapon States would take steps to assure their security. Consequently, there were several proposals that the nuclear Powers should commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and a number of arguments towards that end were advanced and used repeatedly in various forums. Some non-nuclear-weapon States were apprehensive about such assurances because of the possibility that permanent members of the Security Council might use their veto. Others expressed support for the "negative assurances".² Some States pointed out that the draft resolution on the non-proliferation Treaty contained no new commitment beyond that contained in the Charter; others held that under the Charter the nuclear Powers were obligated to defend any non-nuclear-weapon State, and not only the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

¹For details see *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 13, and *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 78.IX.4), chap. VIII. See also chapter XII below.

²Under a "negative assurance" nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This is in contrast to a "positive assurance", whereby nuclear-weapon States commit themselves to come to the defence of non-nuclear-weapon States, under specified circumstances, as envisaged by the draft resolution on the non-proliferation Treaty subsequently referred to.

Following the adoption of the Treaty by General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States sponsored a draft resolution on security assurances in the Security Council, as a matter outside, but closely connected with, the Treaty. By that draft the Security Council would recognize that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat thereof, against a non-nuclear-weapon State would call for immediate action by the Council, and above all by the permanent members, in accordance with their obligations under the Charter. It would also, *inter alia*, reaffirm the inherent right under the Charter of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurred. The Security Council adopted the draft resolution on 19 June 1968, as submitted by the three sponsors, as resolution 255 (1968). Thereafter, the sponsoring nuclear-weapon States made declarations, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the resolution, which contained a warning that any State which committed aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatened such aggression must be aware that its actions would be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the Charter to suppress aggression or remove the threat of aggression. The three Powers affirmed their intention as permanent members of the Security Council to seek immediate Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that was a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were involved.

At the initiative of a group of mainly non-aligned countries, the General Assembly decided, by its resolutions 2153 B (XXI) and 2346 B (XXII), to convene the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, which took place at Geneva in August 1968, after the approval of the non-proliferation Treaty by the General Assembly.

Among the principal agenda items of the Conference were security guarantees as well as other questions which had been important in the negotiations on the Treaty. The Conference adopted a Declaration which embodied the principal conclusions of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding those questions.³ In the view of many non-nuclear-weapon States, the Security Council resolution and associated declarations fell short of the credible and effective guarantees that they felt were necessary, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, to induce confidence in States that had renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, in recent years, various proposals have been made seeking to obtain stronger guarantees. They have been put forward in various forums, including the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1975 and at meetings of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. In one form or another all the proposals would involve a commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States not to

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr. 1 and 2.

resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons (“negative guarantees”).

In 1978, at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States made statements with regard to negative security assurances, and an item entitled “Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States” was included in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, following the transmission by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko, of a letter to the Secretary-General, to which a draft international agreement⁴ on the question was attached.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

At the tenth special session of the General Assembly the question of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was mostly dealt with in statements⁵ on the questions of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Soviet Union, in emphasizing the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, declared that it would never use nuclear weapons against those countries where there were no such weapons at present and called upon the other nuclear Powers to do the same. The Soviet representative also recalled that, at the very highest level, President L. I. Brezhnev had quite recently declared: “We are against the use of nuclear weapons; only extraordinary circumstances—aggression against our country or its allies by another nuclear Power—could compel us to resort to this extreme means of self-defense.”

The United Kingdom, recognizing that States which had renounced nuclear weapons were entitled to have more specific assurance of their security, stated that it would be prepared to take part with other nuclear Powers in firm, far-reaching and permanent assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. Late in the session the representative of the United Kingdom stated on behalf of his Government that it formally gave the assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices, that it would not use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an actual attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.

⁴ See A/33/241, annex.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

The United States representative called attention to President Carter's declaration which had been announced by the Secretary of State on 12 June 1978. He noted that after reviewing the status of the discussions at the special session, and consulting with the United States' principal allies, the President had decided to elaborate the United States position to encourage support for non-proliferation, increase security, and create a more positive environment for the session. Accordingly, the President had declared that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty or to any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces or its allies by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack,

France, in stressing the right of non-nuclear States to be assured that there would be no discrimination against them in terms of their security, said that a decision by the States of a region to preserve a nuclear-free status should entail an obligation for nuclear-weapon States not to seek a military advantage from the situation and in particular preclude any use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against States that were part of nuclear-free zones.

China, reiterating its position never to be the first to use nuclear weapons and in favour of a non-use agreement, said that, in the absence of such an agreement, a measure of urgency was for all nuclear countries to undertake not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.

Pakistan stated that security assurances were an integral part of the conditions designed to strengthen the non-proliferation régime by promoting the climate of confidence. To be credible it held that unilateral declarations eschewing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be incorporated in a Security Council resolution and invested with binding force under a legal instrument.

Egypt called for more credible and far-reaching security assurances for countries that pledged to renounce the nuclear option and pointed out that the definitions of the scope of such security assurances would have to take into consideration the security requirements of and the conditions prevailing in each region. In its view, security could be insured by an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States ("negative guarantees"); however, such a guarantee could not be considered as the maximum possible security guarantee that could be offered to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Romania emphasized its understanding that States of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be given real guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States that never in any circumstances would nuclear arms be used against States belonging to such zones.

Mongolia said that an undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons against States which renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which did not have them on their territory would serve the purpose of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and

represent an important factor for strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Japan, supporting the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where conditions were suitable, expressed its hope that international endeavours to establish such zones would be continued and that nuclear-weapon States would give their positive support, including assurances, that they would not attack such zones with nuclear weapons.

Belgium, in supporting the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, emphasized the necessity of the granting, by nuclear military Powers, of guarantees of security to States which had renounced nuclear weapons.

Two paragraphs of the Final Document of the special session, one in the Declaration and the other in the Programme of Action, contain provisions, agreed to by consensus, which call for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The paragraph in the Declaration reads as follows:

32. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

The paragraph in the Programme of Action follows those on prevention of nuclear war and avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. It reads:

59. In the same context, the nuclear weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

The item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States", proposed by the Soviet Union,⁶ received considerable attention from Member States both during the general debate in the Assembly and in the First Committee.⁷ Many non-aligned, Eastern European and Western States held that the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was an important issue for all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear, and was closely connected with crucial questions of international security and disarmament.

In advocating its proposal, the representative of the Soviet Union said that the objective of strengthening the security of non-nuclear States could

⁶ See A/33/241, annex.

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 20th to 28th and 58th to 61st meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

best be served by the conclusion of an international convention the parties to which would be the nuclear States prepared to grant appropriate guarantees of security to non-nuclear States, and the non-nuclear States concerned, which would renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and had no nuclear weapons on their territory. While the Soviet Union expressed its readiness to enter into special bilateral agreements on security guarantees, it held that the most comprehensive and effective solution to the problem would be for the nuclear States to assume obligations under agreed guarantees embodied in an international agreement. Its proposal had annexed to it a draft international convention on the subject.

Poland, among other delegations, believed that the conclusion of the convention as proposed by the USSR would secure more active participation by the non-nuclear-weapon States in the consolidation of the non-proliferation régime, and further promote the universalization of the non-proliferation Treaty and enhance its effectiveness. In its opinion, it would also give strong impetus to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and have a beneficial effect on the general international political climate.

Welcoming the draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union, Romania emphasized that the conclusion of a convention designed to protect non-nuclear States from the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons had to be integrated in an organic manner with those legal instruments which were intended to make effective the non-recourse to force or the threat of the use of force in international relations.

Expressing its satisfaction at the Soviet initiative, Pakistan considered it as a response to the recommendation of the special session contained in paragraph 59 of the Final Document, and shared the view that an international convention was the best way in which the guarantees of non-use could be extended to the non-nuclear-weapon States and that such a convention should be elaborated as soon as possible.

Referring to the fact that the gravest threat to international peace and security came from the existence of the arsenals of nuclear weapons in the hands of nuclear-weapon States, India held that it continued to believe that negative assurances would only create an illusion of security and distract countries from the overriding goal of nuclear disarmament.

Other statements supporting the Soviet proposal were made by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR, among the Eastern European group, and also by Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Madagascar and Viet Nam.

The Federal Republic of Germany considered the Soviet proposal as a contribution to the discussion on the question of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on the basis of the Charter and said that the proposal, together with the assurances given by nuclear-weapon States, formed a solid basis for further discussion. It expressed its readiness to participate in working out a solution on the question which could take place in the Committee on Disarmament.

The United Kingdom pointed out that it saw no need to negotiate an international convention embodying the assurances of the nuclear-weapon States and recalled its readiness to give unilateral security assurance, and thus to join other nuclear-weapon States which had made or were soon to make unilateral declarations.

The United States, while regarding the concept of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States both as a means of strengthening the security of those States and of strengthening the non-proliferation régime, affirmed its position that it would be unrealistic to anticipate that a single formulation could be found which would be generally acceptable and meet the diverse security requirements not only of each of the nuclear Powers but also of the non-nuclear-weapon States, for many of which relationships with specific nuclear States were an essential ingredient in their national security. The United States stressed the importance of the non-use pledges given by the nuclear Powers during the special session, considering them as an important measure of security for the non-nuclear-weapon States and suggested that the Security Council should take formal note of them.

On 27 October 1978 the USSR submitted a draft resolution on the question which it introduced at the 20th meeting of the First Committee on 30 October. The draft contained the same draft international convention which had been attached to its original proposal, also as an annex. Two revised versions were later submitted, both without the annex but referring to the draft international conventions on the subject. The second revised version, submitted on 1 December, was sponsored by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Poland, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam, and later by Iraq. By that revised draft resolution, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, request the Committee on Disarmament to consider at the earliest possible date the drafts of an international convention on the subject submitted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, as well as all proposals and suggestions on effective political and legal measures at the international level to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would also request the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all the documents relating to the discussion on the item by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

On 6 November 1978, Pakistan submitted an alternative draft resolution, also with a draft international convention annexed. It subsequently revised the draft, deleting the annex in the revised version, but again referring to the proposals submitted and views expressed at the ongoing session. By that revised draft resolution, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, urge that efforts be made to conclude effective arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons including consideration of an international convention and of alternative ways and means of achieving this objective; the Assembly would also take note of the

proposals submitted and views expressed on the subject at the thirty-third regular session and recommend that the Committee on Disarmament consider them and report on progress to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

Both revised draft resolutions called for the item to be included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly for its thirty-fourth session.

The United States, for its part, sent a letter dated 17 November 1978⁸ to the Secretary of the First Committee, containing an annex entitled "Proposal of the United States of America for strengthening the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", in which it was emphasized that, in view of diverse interests, an effective and practical way of enhancing the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was by individual declaration by nuclear-weapon States on this subject rather than by a single world-wide treaty on the subject.

The representative of the USSR, in introducing the twice-revised draft resolution on 1 December, again stressed that the objective of strengthening the security of non-nuclear States could best be served by the conclusion of an international convention which was the most comprehensive and effective solution to the problem of protecting non-nuclear States. In the process of negotiating the text of such a convention, the States parties would inevitably have to carry out the necessary work of finding a solution to the problem generally acceptable to both the nuclear and the non-nuclear States. In the opinion of the USSR, unilateral declarations did not impose obligations upon States in terms of legal validity which they would assume by entering into an international agreement. The Soviet Union called for constructive concrete negotiations with a view to co-ordinating the various positions and believed that the situation in that regard was conducive to the success of the endeavour.

In introducing its revised draft resolution, the representative of Pakistan emphasized once again that the concept of negative security guarantees must be seen as an interim measure to provide some assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States against the nuclear threat until nuclear disarmament and the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons were achieved. Pakistan believed, like the Soviet Union, that the effective arrangements which should be adopted could be in the form of an international convention, although it had different views about the substance of the convention. The delegation of Pakistan also believed that the text of its draft resolution reflected the positions of all States equitably, that it met the genuine concerns of all countries and that it could form the basis for a consensus on the question.

On 1 December, before the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolutions, India, supported by Brazil, orally proposed a further revision to the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution initiated by the Soviet Union, namely, to add after the words "establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones" the words "on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at

⁸ A/C.1/33/7.

among the States of the region concerned". Australia, at the same meeting, proposed that the ninth preambular paragraph of the Pakistani draft resolution, concerning implementation of the provisions of the Final Document of the tenth special session, be incorporated into the preambular part of the Soviet draft. The representative of the Soviet Union, on behalf of the sponsors, accepted the two oral amendments.

The First Committee on the same date adopted the draft resolution initiated by the USSR by a recorded vote of 117 to 2, with 6 abstentions, and the General Assembly adopted it on 14 December as resolution 33/72 A by 137 votes to 2 (Albania and China), with 4 abstentions (France, Pakistan, Somalia and Turkey). It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced of the need to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of States and prompted by the desire shared by all nations to eliminate war and prevent a nuclear holocaust,

Noting that the non-use of force or threat of force in international relations is one of the fundamental principles enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed in a number of United Nations declarations and resolutions,

Noting with satisfaction the desire of States in various regions to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced into their territories through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and being anxious to contribute to this objective,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Welcoming the determination of States in various regions of the world to keep their territories free from nuclear weapons,

Mindful of the statements and observations made by various States on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Desiring to promote the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. *Considers* it necessary to take effective measures for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States through appropriate international arrangements;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to consider, to that end, at the earliest possible date, the drafts of an international convention on the subject, submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, as well as all proposals and suggestions concerning effective political and legal measures at the international level to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all the documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session of the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States";

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States"

The draft resolution of Pakistan was adopted by the First Committee, also on 1 December, by 108 votes to none, with 12 abstentions, and by the Assembly, also on 14 December, as resolution 33/72 B by 124 votes to none, with 14 abstentions (Afghanistan, Bhutan, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Mongolia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR and United States). It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the threat to mankind due to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about any possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop, as appropriate, effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing that effective measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolution 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

Further recalling its resolution 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, in which it requested the nuclear-weapon States urgently to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Taking into consideration the views and proposals submitted on this subject at its thirty-third session,

1. *Urges* that urgent efforts should be made to conclude effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including consideration of an international convention and of alternative ways and means of achieving this objective;

2. *Takes note* of the proposals submitted and views expressed on this subject at its thirty-third session and recommends that the Committee on Disarmament should consider them and submit a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

The substantive documents submitted relating to the discussion on the matter, namely, the drafts of an international convention submitted by the USSR and by Pakistan and the annex to the letter sent by the United States to the First Committee, are reproduced in appendix IX below.

Conclusion

The question of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and particularly of the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States as it was

proposed by the Soviet Union at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly evoked great interest both at the special session and in the course of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. The discussions on the question during 1978 revealed continued and broad support of the majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States for measures aimed at strengthening the guarantees of their security. Moreover, some non-nuclear-weapon States continued to express their doubt concerning the effectiveness of negative security assurances which in their view could divert attention of States from nuclear disarmament negotiations and create only an illusion of security.

Meanwhile, some nuclear-weapon States continued to believe in the effectiveness of unilateral declarations on security arrangements for non-nuclear-weapon States rather than multilateral agreements.

The adoption by the General Assembly of two resolutions dealing at least with consideration of the conclusion of an international convention on the subject indicates a degree of understanding among both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States on the need for further consideration of the question in order to promote a satisfactory solution. The question will, no doubt, be given further attention in the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly and could also become an issue at the second Review Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty in 1980.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Introduction

THE DANGER OF THE PROLIFERATION of nuclear weapons was recognized from the beginning of the nuclear era. In 1946, by its very first resolution, resolution 1 (I), the General Assembly addressed itself to the need to ensure that nuclear energy would be used solely for peaceful purposes and even in that early period one of the aims of the initiatives taken was to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy began to expand, the possible emergence of additional nuclear-weapon States became a matter of particular concern and, at the initiative of Ireland, the General Assembly adopted resolutions calling for consideration of measures to ward off that danger, including an international agreement under which States possessing nuclear weapons would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of them and from transmitting information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and States not possessing nuclear weapons would commit themselves not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of them.¹

Thereafter, the conclusion of such an agreement became the focus of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and, in 1968, following years of arduous discussions and negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature and ratification. The Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970 upon its ratification by the three nuclear-weapon States designated as its depositaries—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America—and 40 non-nuclear-weapon States. By the end of 1978, 61 more non-nuclear-weapon States had become parties to the Treaty, including a number of non-nuclear-weapon States having the most advanced nuclear industry, such as Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland. On the other hand,

¹ See resolutions 1380 (XIV) of 20 November 1959; 1576 (XV) of 20 December 1960; and 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961.

several non-nuclear-weapon States with significant peaceful nuclear programmes had not done so, among them Argentina, Brazil, India (which carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion experiment in May 1974), Israel, South Africa and Spain.

The two nuclear-weapon States not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, China and France, have stated their positions in the context of General Assembly resolutions relating to it. In 1968, upon the adoption of resolution 2373 (XXII), France stated that, while it would not sign the non-proliferation Treaty, it would behave in the future in that field exactly as did the States adhering to the Treaty.² In 1973, when resolution 3184 B (XXVIII) was adopted, China stated that it had been compelled to develop a few nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defence and of breaking the nuclear monopoly and blackmail of the super-Powers. It added that it was firmly against using the non-proliferation Treaty to deprive non-nuclear-weapon countries or countries with few nuclear weapons of their sovereignty and to damage the interest of the people of various countries.³

Over the years, States parties have repeatedly affirmed the importance of the non-proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the international régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, indicating continued and broad support for the Treaty. Many of them, particularly the three nuclear-weapon States and other Eastern European and Western countries, have also stressed that in view of the rapid growth of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy there is an increasingly urgent need for measures to consolidate and strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty; hence, the reiterated calls for universal adherence to the Treaty and the improvement of its safeguards system.

At the same time, it is clear that, from the point of view of many States parties, the emphasis in the implementation of the Treaty has been placed on the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States, while scant attention has been paid to their rights or to the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States. The need for an equitable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States has been a constant concern of the latter. It was uppermost in their minds throughout the negotiations on the Treaty and became manifest with varying emphasis with regard to three questions: nuclear disarmament, security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. During the negotiations, non-nuclear-weapon States held that their renunciation of nuclear weapons should be compensated by a commitment on the part of nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals and move towards their elimination. The link between vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons was explicitly recognized by the undertaking of the States parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, 1672nd meeting.*

³ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Session, First Committee, 1969th meeting.*

the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty.

Another element of the demand of non-nuclear-weapon States for a balance of obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty was the provision of reliable guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The question was not, however, dealt with in the Treaty but in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), adopted on 19 June 1968 at the initiative of the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States. By that resolution, the Council welcomed the intention expressed by the three nuclear-weapon States that they would provide support or immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the non-proliferation Treaty that was a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used.

With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-nuclear-weapon States sought to ensure that notwithstanding the built-in distinction between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the Treaty would not deprive them of the benefits that could be derived from existing or future civilian applications of nuclear technology. For the developing countries, in particular, it was most important that the Treaty should not contribute to widening the technological and economic gap between them and the more developed countries, especially the nuclear-weapon States. To allay fears about the possible discriminatory effect of the Treaty in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, article IV recognized the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Under the same article, all parties undertook to facilitate, and were recognized to have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. In addition, article V contemplated the elaboration of a special international agreement to ensure that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis.

From the perspective of many non-nuclear-weapon States, the way in which the Treaty was being implemented tended to upset, to their detriment, the balance of mutual rights and obligations originally envisaged. The nuclear arms race continued. Security Council resolution 255 and associated declarations fell short of the credible and effective guarantees that many non-nuclear-weapon States felt were necessary pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Finally, in the view of many non-nuclear-weapon States, the provisions designed to ensure that all States would be able to share equally in the benefits of nuclear energy acquired little, if any, substance.

The frustrations of non-nuclear-weapon States were made abundantly clear at the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, held at Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975, which, in its Final Declaration confirmed that

articles I and II, relating specifically to the objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, had been faithfully observed by all parties to the treaty. The views of many non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to nuclear disarmament, security guarantees and peaceful uses of nuclear energy were reflected in various proposals they submitted in the course of the Review Conference and were included in the Final Document of the Conference immediately following the text of the Final Declaration.

Since the first Review Conference, many non-nuclear-weapon States, witnessing the continuing increase in numbers and qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons, have time and again pointed out that the failure of the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race could not but have adverse effects on attitudes towards the Treaty, reinforcing the reservations of some and inducing disillusion in others. The repeated demands of many non-nuclear-weapon States for effective guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, they feel, have gone unanswered. Adding further to their grievances, in recent years, non-nuclear-weapon States have been faced with the imposition of additional constraints on their peaceful nuclear activities while the development of nuclear weapons has proceeded apace. In this respect, however, it should be noted that the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, launched in 1977, represents an effort to reconcile the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons with the right of all States to enjoy, without discrimination, the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy (see chapter XIII below).

These three questions—the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, security assurances⁴ and international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy⁵—have thus continued to dominate the consideration of issues relating to the international régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The different views held by the Member States with respect to the nature and source of the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and the measures needed to avert that threat, including the role of the non-proliferation Treaty, were reflected in the draft final document contained in the report of the Preparatory

⁴ Since chapter XI is devoted to the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, this question will not be dealt with in the present chapter. It should be borne in mind, however, that it was a prominent subject of discussion, at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, in the CCD and at the regular session of the General Assembly, in the context of the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

⁵ International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is the subject of chapter XIII below. Consequently, the presentation of this question in the present chapter will be limited to aspects of particular relevance in the context of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Committee for the Special Session⁶ and in the statements⁷ and proposals made at the special session itself.⁸

A number of Member States, notably the Eastern European and Western countries, drew attention to the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and to the urgency of achieving universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty which, in their eyes, constituted the main international instrument that the international community had forged to forestall an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. For example, Norway, believing that efforts must be initiated to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, based primarily on the existing Treaty, held that it was essential that all States ratify the non-proliferation Treaty, or at least abide by its provisions. For Norway, this applied particularly to countries having nuclear-weapon capabilities or on the threshold of acquiring them. In spite of the criticism raised, it still regarded the non-proliferation Treaty as the major international instrument in force today that could effectively play a part in international efforts to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Turkey, while conscious of the imperfections of the Treaty, pointed out that the Turkish Government would nevertheless promptly request approval from Parliament of its ratification. It would do so in the hope of doing its part in encouraging all countries to accede to the Treaty and thereby give more vigour to the appeal directed to nuclear-weapon States for quick and effective progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. For its part, Indonesia, noting that the Treaty had been submitted to the Indonesian Parliament for ratification, stated that that action had been taken in the hope that the nuclear-weapon Powers would comply with their obligations under article IV of the Treaty, dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It added that even more urgent was that the nuclear-weapon States comply with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and achieve progress in nuclear disarmament.

Several States not parties to the Treaty, among them Algeria, Argentina, China, India, and the United Republic of Tanzania, reiterated their long-standing objections to the non-proliferation Treaty—the general criticism being that the Treaty was inherently discriminatory and that its operation in practice had accentuated the inequality between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States since the former had continued their qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons, while the latter faced restrictions on the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The question of an acceptable balance of mutual rights and obligations dominated the comments of a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which considered that such a balance constituted the basis for strengthening the international régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Switzerland, a recent adherent to the non-proliferation

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. I.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, *Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

⁸ See, for instance, A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex, A/S-10/AC.1/L.6 and A/S-10/AC.1/L.4.

Treaty, while not a member of the United Nations, presented its views on problems of disarmament on the occasion of the special session,⁹ offering extensive comments on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It said that by virtue of the Treaty, States had been divided into two categories: a minority of States which were granted the right to possess nuclear weapons and which sometimes derived important political and military advantages therefrom and all the remaining States, which had renounced that right. In ratifying the Treaty, as nearly 100 other States had done, Switzerland had shown its willingness unilaterally to limit its sovereignty in order to diminish the dangers caused by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it considered that such discriminatory measures were contrary to the principle of the equality of all States. Recalling that the Treaty contains certain provisions concerning nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy which should help to mitigate that discrimination, Switzerland noted that it was generally recognized that the measures taken thus far had not come up to the legitimate expectations of those States parties to the Treaty which did not possess nuclear weapons. In its view, all the achievements of the past 10 years in the field of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could be nullified if, in the coming years, the discrimination stemming from the Treaty was not offset by corresponding disarmament measures. The same would be true, in its opinion, if the recent tendency to restrict the freedom to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were to take firm hold, for such a development was likely to discourage all States which were previously prepared to make sacrifices in order to support efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would also have the effect of providing justification for those States which so far had refused to sign the Treaty or unilaterally give the undertakings which it entailed.

Australia, urging universal acceptance of the non-proliferation Treaty, noted that it rested on a three-way bargain and that each element of the bargain must be honoured—by nuclear-weapon Powers making progress towards nuclear disarmament; by non-nuclear-weapon Powers not acquiring nuclear weapons; and by all countries co-operating in the peaceful development of nuclear energy under effective safeguards. At the same time, in its view, those States renouncing nuclear weapons needed assurances that such a renunciation would not jeopardize their security. Austria held that only if the nuclear-weapon Powers recognized the interrelations between their own obligations and those of the non-nuclear-weapon States would the Treaty have a chance of survival. In its opinion, only under those conditions would it be possible to persuade those countries that had so far preferred to remain aloof to accede to the Treaty.

Many non-nuclear-weapon States focused on the link between vertical and horizontal proliferation, considering, with varying degrees of emphasis, that the credibility and effectiveness of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons were tied to the achievement of progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. The Netherlands noted that the matter of inequality

⁹ See A/S-10/AC.1/2, annex.

between nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States lay at the heart of the discussion on the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and, while recognizing that the whole world had an interest in halting the emergence of more nuclear-weapon States, held that, clearly, non-proliferation efforts could not succeed in the long run if the present nuclear-weapon States did not accept substantial net reductions and manifestly set out upon the road towards nuclear disarmament. In its view, a fundamental inequality between “haves” and “have nots” cannot be stabilized forever. In the view of Japan, international efforts to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States could achieve little without the efforts of the countries which currently possessed nuclear weapons to achieve nuclear disarmament. It considered that positive contributions by all the nuclear-weapon States were indispensable if the ultimate goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons was to be attained and noted that there had been little progress in the efforts made so far by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear armaments. Japan requested that the United States and the Soviet Union, mindful of their particularly heavy responsibilities in that regard, work for the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement in the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and promptly follow it with further talks on the substantial reduction of their strategic arms. Furthermore, it urged China and France to become parties to such existing treaties as the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty and to participate in disarmament negotiations, beginning with the negotiations on the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The United States, after referring to the efforts that were being made in the negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic weapons and in the trilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, noted that at times it had been argued that the nuclear-weapon Powers had not acted promptly enough or strongly enough to discharge their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, and that dissatisfaction with the implementation of that provision had even been cited as casting doubt on the equity of the Treaty or providing a rationale for non-adherence. While recognizing that the pace of nuclear arms control had, beyond doubt, been painfully slow and that every effort must be made to accelerate the movement towards sound and effective measures to limit nuclear arms, the United States held that the world community could not accept dissatisfaction with the action thus far taken by the existing nuclear-weapon States as an excuse for other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. The United States further argued that the risk to world peace and to human survival created by the existence of five nuclear-weapon States could not be diminished if more such weapons were acquired by additional States. Indeed, in its view, such proliferation would only reduce the pressures and the incentives and the prospect that the existing nuclear-weapon States would move towards nuclear arms control. For its part, the Soviet Union reiterated its commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and called for talks among all the nuclear-weapon States and a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to the elaboration and implementation of measures to end the production of nuclear weapons and gradually reduce existing stockpiles until their complete destruction. Referring to the Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks, the Soviet Union said that after the conclusion of the SALT II agreement it would be ready to enter into negotiations which should lead, with all the necessary factors being taken into account, to a substantial reduction of the levels of strategic arms and to a further limitation of their qualitative improvement.

With respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, many non-nuclear-weapon States, developed as well as developing, once again affirmed their right to share equally with nuclear-weapon States in the benefits offered by the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and held that the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should not become a hindrance to the exercise of that right. In the view of Switzerland,¹⁰ an unsatisfactory, and even disturbing, development was discernible in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It recognized that the danger of proliferation had unquestionably grown during recent years as a result of the spread of certain technologies which, although required for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, also made it possible to develop nuclear weapons and pointed out that the Swiss Government was eager to study, together with all States interested in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, any additional measure that might reduce the danger of proliferation. In its view, solutions could no doubt be found, but there could be no question of prohibiting such technologies outright or restricting their use to a small circle of selected States. Switzerland considered that measures that still needed to be taken in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in order to reduce the danger of proliferation should fulfil two conditions: they should not restrict the freedom to use nuclear energy provided for in the non-proliferation Treaty and they should distribute the burden equitably among all States, whether or not they possessed nuclear weapons. Beyond that, there was a need to provide for compensation for States that accept a restriction on their sovereignty in order to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which could take the form of a fully reliable guarantee to provide fissionable material and access to complete fuel cycle services. Yugoslavia, pointing out that it adhered strictly to the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, stated that it rejected the attempts aimed at the establishment of a complete monopoly by a small group of nuclear-weapon Powers over the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology and energy for peaceful purposes under the pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation. In its view there should be a joint effort to find solutions ensuring, without any discrimination, an unhindered transfer of nuclear technology and fuel and their utilization for the accelerated development of non-nuclear-weapon countries, primarily developing countries. Yugoslavia considered that access to such technology and nuclear materials should be subject to universal international control on a non-discriminatory basis and that disarmament measures should be conceived in such a way as to ensure respect for the principle that the achievements of technology and science constituted the common heritage of the whole of mankind and could not be the privilege of one country or a group of countries only. It concluded that broad international co-operation was the best way to halt the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Agency (IAEA) considered that the question of technology transfer went right to the very roots of co-operation between the industrial countries and the third world, the industrial development of the latter being predicated on the free and full transfer of advanced technology. He added that it was also, in a sense, a bargain struck in the non-proliferation Treaty: in return for accepting full-scope safeguards the non-nuclear-weapon States were assured of access to peaceful nuclear technology.

Several countries, chiefly Eastern European and Western, stressing the dangers associated with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy reiterated their view that the Treaty provided the most suitable basis for strengthening international co-operation in the field. Australia, recognizing the need to assure non-nuclear-weapon States of access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, said that the challenge was to find ways in which nuclear energy could be further developed without compromising non-proliferation objectives and stated that it was closely involved in that search. Recalling its decision to proceed with the further mining and export of Australian uranium to provide, at reasonable prices, supplies of uranium fuel to countries that needed them, Australia explained that, because of its concern for non-proliferation, it had decided to limit its uranium exports to non-nuclear-weapon States to those which were parties to the Treaty and therefore complied with requirements set by IAEA and which abided by the terms of special bilateral treaties. The United States, referring to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (see pages 251-253, chapter XIII below), said that that legislation provided a framework for making the United States a reliable nuclear supplier by bringing more stability and predictability into the nuclear export licensing process and thus would help it to discharge its obligations in pursuance of article IV of the Treaty to facilitate peaceful nuclear co-operation with due consideration for the developing countries. It considered that recipient States should understand the heavy responsibility of the United States as a supplier State in ensuring that its exports were not misused. In its view, the very real contribution of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy to human development would be severely damaged by instances of diversion to military uses and supplier and recipient States alike would suffer as a result. The United States believed that there was no incompatibility between its efforts to restrain the spread of certain sensitive nuclear technologies and its continued willingness to contribute to the peaceful nuclear development of other countries. As evidence of its willingness to assist actively in sharing the peaceful uses of the atom, the United States announced at the special session that it intended to expand its assistance to other countries through a number of specific programmes designed to strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty by granting preference to its parties, to enhance the role of IAEA in peaceful nuclear co-operation and to provide incentives to minimize the export of weapons-grade uranium for use in research reactors. Congressional approval would be sought for the following measures: (a) the establishment of a "trust" programme under IAEA that would authorize up to \$1 million annually for five years and be exclusively for developing countries parties to the Treaty; (b) similar authorization of \$5 million over five years to provide 20 per cent enriched uranium fuel for research reactors through IAEA, with a preference given to developing coun-

tries parties to the Treaty; and (c) provision of up to \$1 million annually in fuel cycle services for research reactors, principally for the purpose of fuel fabrication services where this sum would assist countries in the use of lower enrichment levels in research reactors. In addition, the United States reaffirmed its willingness to finance, through the Export-Import Bank, appropriate projects in the nuclear field, while limiting such financing to those countries which met its non-proliferation requirements, with preference given to the parties to the Treaty.

In the Final Document of the special session, in view of the divergent positions of Member States, matters relating to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the role of the non-proliferation Treaty, were treated in such a way as would permit the adoption of the Document by consensus.

The relevant paragraphs of the Final Document read as follows:¹¹

65. It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of this Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

67. Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

In the view of a number of Western countries—among them, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom—the manner in which the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was treated in the Final Document was less than satisfactory, the general criticism being that the Document did not adequately reflect the significance of the non-proliferation Treaty and the importance of universal adherence to it.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

In 1978, the discussion in the CCD regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons¹² followed the pattern of previous deliberations in the Committee.

Several Eastern European and Western countries again called attention to the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons and the urgent need for efforts to prevent that danger, attached singular importance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and urged States not parties to adhere to the

¹¹ See also chapter XIII below.

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras, 136-151.

Treaty. The Soviet Union, noting that the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons occupied an important place in the halting of the nuclear arms race, said that the non-proliferation Treaty had played and continued to play a positive role in the solution of that problem and should be constantly strengthened and made truly universal in order to block avenues for the emergence of nuclear weapons in those States which did not yet possess them. Poland found it particularly disturbing that only about two-thirds of the States Members of the United Nations had so far deemed it in their best national interest to become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and hoped that that situation would not continue indefinitely. In its view, the universalization of the Treaty as well as enhanced efficacy of the IAEA safeguards system were important prerequisites for the setting up of a workable barrier against the spread of military nuclear potential, especially to some of the world's most troubled areas. The United Kingdom considered that it was essential that the growing international transfer of civil nuclear technology, which it supported as a contribution to energy development, should not create new dangers by resulting in the spread of nuclear weapons and that, to that end, it was necessary to make generally acceptable arrangements which would strengthen the barriers against the spread of nuclear arms while making it possible for all countries which need nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to have access to the necessary technology. Regarding the Treaty as the keystone of efforts in that area, the United Kingdom hoped that more States would seriously and urgently consider acceding to it and at the same time urged those States that had reasons of their own for not doing so to renounce nuclear weapons in other ways—in particular by accepting IAEA full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities. Italy, firmly convinced that the non-proliferation Treaty represented the basic instrument upon which to base efforts to halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, regretted that the Final Document of the special session had not placed enough emphasis on the importance and role of that instrument, to which a large majority of States were already committed. It recalled that it had repeatedly indicated that universal adherence to the Treaty should be actively encouraged: all States should be urged to ratify the Treaty or at least to abide by its provisions and objectives and parallel efforts should be undertaken by nuclear-weapon States, with a view to honouring their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

Various non-nuclear-weapon States highlighted the interrelation between nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Sweden regarded nuclear disarmament as crucial in the battle against proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional States and argued that one reason why the non-proliferation Treaty was still not universally adhered to was the fact that the major nuclear-weapon Powers had not accepted what the non-nuclear-weapon States saw as the full consequences of their accession to the Treaty. In the same vein, Nigeria, discussing the need for effective measures of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, said that a comprehensive test ban would represent the first positive measure indicating that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty intended to implement article VI concerning the adoption of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms

race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; it would thus provide a more persuasive argument for wider adherence to the Treaty than verbal appeals and would do more for non-proliferation than unilateral conditions imposed by the cartel of suppliers of nuclear materials. Japan, commenting on the delay in the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban, feared that there was a danger that the delay would lead to the erosion of the non-proliferation régime and thus might encourage further horizontal nuclear proliferation.

With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, various Eastern European and Western countries continued to emphasize the need for measures against diversion to military purposes. Thus Czechoslovakia considered it was urgently necessary that the basis of the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—the non-proliferation Treaty—should become truly universal and held that for that reason, additional measures to strengthen it were fully justified, particularly on the part of the suppliers of nuclear material and equipment. In its view, those measures, together with the activities of IAEA, played an important role in the process of the creation of conditions ensuring an exclusively peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy. Canada recalled that at the special session it had stressed that the international non-proliferation system should be strengthened. At the same time, subject to the conditions of that objective, Canada made it abundantly clear that it accepted its share of responsibility to ensure that nuclear energy would increasingly help to satisfy the international community's insatiable hunger for energy.

A number of other countries deemed it particularly important that all States be able to profit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Italy stressed that substantive and timely measures should be devised in order to guarantee to all States—as provided for by article IV of the Treaty—the exercise of their inalienable right to develop, under appropriate internationally agreed safeguards and through increased international co-operation, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and to enjoy the benefits thereof. Iran, recalling that the resolution adopted at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly on the IAEA report (resolution 32/87 F) focused attention on the non-proliferation issue, stated that it strongly supported the appeal for adherence to and especially implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty contained therein and pointed out that, while favouring increased effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, it also recognized the need for all countries to be able to develop their peaceful nuclear-energy programmes in a context of accelerated economic development.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

At the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, in the plenary and in the First Committee,¹³ a number of States parties to the Treaty, especially the

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 59th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

nuclear-weapon States and other Eastern European and Western countries, once more stressed the critical importance and urgency of the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in view of the increasingly prominent role that nuclear power development was assuming throughout the world as an alternative source of energy. They reiterated that the non-proliferation Treaty, as the central element of the international régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, should be strengthened through the adherence of States not yet parties to it and the technical improvement of its safeguards systems, and be supplemented by measures to assure that the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes did not add to the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation. On the other hand, for many non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly developing countries, the key to strengthening the Treaty lay in the maintenance of an equitable balance of rights and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. From that perspective, they emphasized anew the link between the problems of vertical and horizontal proliferation and the need for security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States and for measures to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to enable all States to enjoy the benefits of such uses.

Much of the discussion took place in connexion with the consideration of preparations for the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in light of the recommendation of the first Review Conference held in 1975, which proposed to the depositary Governments that another conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1980. In that context, attention also focused on the specific objectives and tasks of the next Review Conference and those questions were approached from the differing perspectives outlined above, as they had been at the first Review Conference.

The Soviet Union, for instance, recalling that in 1980 a conference was to be held to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, said that as a depositary of that international instrument, it attached serious importance to a very careful preparation for the conference and that, as experience of similar conferences had shown, such events could and should be an important way to strengthen the effectiveness of agreements and to raise their universality. It considered that during that preparation full use should be made of the useful experience of holding such conferences that had been accumulated and hoped that the conference would serve to strengthen further the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that States which were not yet parties would adhere to it as soon as possible, thereby making their contribution to the cause of the adoption of further measures in the field of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. Czechoslovakia considered that in disarmament deliberations the closest attention should be devoted to the potential danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and commented that it could not reconcile itself to the fact that almost 50 States Members of the United Nations, including two nuclear-weapon Powers, had not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that connexion it stressed the importance it attached to a careful discussion of the question at the second Review Conference to be held in 1980, believing that

one of the main objectives of the Conference should be effective international measures to achieve the earliest possible universality of the Treaty.

There was, however, some recognition of the interrelation between the strengthening of the Treaty and the adoption of measures to meet the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to nuclear disarmament, security guarantees and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, Canada, saying that unless the nuclear arms race was brought under control it would be increasingly difficult to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other States, observed that that consideration was of particular importance as the international community approached the next non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference. While the statement on non-proliferation in the Final Document of the special session did not go as far as it would have liked, it recognized that there was a balance of obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States which was a matter of legitimate concern. Bulgaria, which looked forward to working with all interested parties for the success of the 1980 nuclear non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference, for the strengthening of the Treaty and for its full universalization, mentioned, among other possibilities, the Soviet proposals to consolidate the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the initiative relating to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States (see chapters VII and XI above) and pointed to their relevance in view of the forthcoming non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Denmark considered that the second Review Conference might turn out to be of critical importance for the future of efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear capabilities and that when the time came for substantive discussion in the Preparatory Committee and later at the Conference, the crux of the matter would be how to reconcile the overriding need to preserve and strengthen the present non-proliferation régime with the legitimate interests of nations which wished to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In that connexion, the United Kingdom referred to the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), saying that the study was an open-minded attempt to produce an objective evaluation of fuel cycles to which the developing countries had an important contribution to make. It hoped the results would be significant and useful, particularly in the development of ideas regarding non-proliferation which were generally acceptable to all States with civil nuclear industries, and noted that the results were due to appear in February 1980, before the date envisaged for the second non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference, and would thus form part of the background to what the United Kingdom hoped would be a comprehensive and thorough discussion of the whole field of non-proliferation at that Conference.

Romania, commenting at length on the subject, placed its examination within the range of the over-all preoccupations concerning nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, a field which called for the highest priority in international efforts. Reviewing the work of the first Review Conference, to which Romania had devoted particular attention because it had seen in it an opportunity for a collective review, with the participation of all States, of the way in which the provisions of the Treaty were being applied, it noted with regret that the deliberations and negotiations that had taken place

had not led to any practical results, the debates revealing the shortcomings of the Treaty and a certain absence of communication between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, in its view, the Conference had provided a good opportunity to emphasize the principal fields of vital interest to States parties to the Treaty and problems whose solution called for the continuation of common efforts in the future. As Romania had observed at the time, at the end of the five years during which the Treaty had been in effect, whereas the States that did not possess nuclear weapons had complied strictly with the commitment not to acquire or to produce nuclear weapons, vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the arms race had continued and had even accelerated—a situation that still persisted at present. Moreover, in spite of the commitments envisaged in the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular the developing countries, were still far from having received the assistance they had been relying upon to make nuclear power an instrument that could contribute to their economic development.

The States members of the Group of 77, parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Romania recalled, had agreed not to oppose the consensus adoption of a final document of the Conference, but they made it clear that the agreement they had given to the final declaration of the Conference was governed by the introduction, as an integral part of the final document, of proposals presented by them at the Conference, which had not been accepted. Those proposals were essentially expressed as draft additional protocols to the Treaty, which were intended to establish a balance that was lacking in the Treaty by supplementing the obligation undertaken by non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce the nuclear option with equally binding commitments on the part of the States possessing nuclear weapons. That involved a firm commitment to put an end to nuclear-weapon tests, to stop the production of such weapons and to reduce existing stockpiles in proportion to the increase in the number of non-nuclear-weapon States which became parties to the Treaty. It also involved a commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which in turn had undertaken not to acquire or emplace nuclear weapons on their territory. Noting that no significant progress had been made towards the solution of the problems the Group had mentioned. Romania said that the requests of non-nuclear-weapon States at the first Review Conference remained in substance just as valid as ever and pointed to the fact that similar requests, indeed identical ones, appeared among the proposals put forward by a number of States at the special session. It therefore felt that a series of priority actions was absolutely necessary in order to establish a balance in obligations which underlay the very idea upon which the Treaty on non-proliferation was based, mentioning the following measures: the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the transition to the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles of such weapons; the assumption by nuclear Powers, under an international instrument, of a commitment not to use or threaten to use under any circumstances nuclear weapons against States which do not possess them; and abstention from placing new nuclear weapons on the territory of other States and the withdrawal of those already there. The adoption of such measures was, in its view, the only course that would make it possible to

strengthen the non-proliferation régime. It was along the same lines that Romania supported and attached particular importance to the convening, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international conference to promote international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the unfettered access of developing countries to nuclear technology on a preferential basis so that their lag in development could be eliminated (see chapter XIII below). In conclusion, Romania considered that the next Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty should be oriented towards the settlement of problems which remained pending at the time of the negotiation of the Treaty and which had not subsequently been resolved.

Nigeria held that if the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was to gain more significant adherence, then positive steps would have to be taken to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty were ready to fulfil the obligation they had assumed to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. In its view, the second Review Conference would show how far those obligations had been discharged. It pointed out that the non-nuclear-weapon States that had renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons would surely demand the concomitant assurance of positive steps to relieve them from the fear of having to live under a nuclear cloud. In addition, the non-nuclear-weapon States would certainly wish to enjoy the benefits envisaged in the peaceful use of nuclear energy—a promise contained in the non-proliferation Treaty but which had remained largely unfulfilled. For Nigeria, the unenthusiastic reception by the nuclear-weapon States of General Assembly resolution 32/50 on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, adopted at the thirty-second session, seemed to give the impression that the nuclear-weapon States, once they had persuaded the non-nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves to the non-proliferation Treaty, could not be hurried into taking steps to ensure that the benefits promised by that Treaty would become a reality.

Bangladesh commented that fear of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons continued to remain a predominant concern of the developed countries as a problem essentially separate from the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the established nuclear club and that smaller nations would continue to be slow to give up their access to nuclear weapons without reciprocal prohibition against the right of nuclear-weapon States to retain them indefinitely. It believed that despite the patently unbalanced obligations of the non-proliferation Treaty, the overriding importance of discouraging nuclear wars by intent or accident was sufficient to justify a more positive appraisal of the potential benefits of the non-proliferation Treaty régime. It considered that guarantees ensuring broad availability of peaceful nuclear technology under safe, economic and equitable conditions to non-nuclear-weapon States constituted a crucial incentive towards adherence and that, therefore, it was imperative to encourage arrangements for closer co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the transfer of nuclear technology, under adequate, international and non-discriminatory safeguards, to the developing world. Bangladesh hoped that the second Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty in 1980 would see the

resolution of some of the outstanding differences that existed between the nuclear-weapon States and their allies and the non-nuclear-weapon States. In a similar vein, Yugoslavia held that it would be very difficult to achieve universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty if no adequate measures for the implementation of its provisions concerning nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes were taken. The régime of non-proliferation, which for Yugoslavia was based essentially on inequality and discrimination, would not be strengthened, in its opinion, unless its essential provisions were respected and applied, and not used for perpetuating the monopoly of a small group of nuclear-weapon States over the transfer and use of nuclear technology and energy for peaceful purposes. In that connexion, Yugoslavia emphasized the importance of an urgent search for a solution of the question of the unhindered transfer of nuclear technology and its use for the accelerated development of developing countries, believing that the continuance and even the worsening of discrimination with regard to the use of technology was becoming a lever for maintaining unequal international relations.

There was general agreement that the Review Conference should be carefully prepared so that it might successfully discharge its task of reviewing the operation of the Treaty with a view to ensuring implementation of its provisions, with Romania saying that, towards that end, the Conference should be prepared on a democratic basis, with extensive consultation among all countries, taking into account the views, positions and interests of all concerned.

In that connexion, the three depositaries and a number of other States parties to the Treaty sponsored a draft resolution which was introduced by the United Kingdom on their behalf. In the First Committee, the draft resolution was adopted on 1 December, by a vote of 74 to 1, with 12 abstentions. In the General Assembly it was adopted on 14 December, as resolution 33/57, by 122 votes in favour to 1 against (Albania), with 16 abstentions (including Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Spain and several other States not parties). China did not participate in the vote.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, the annex of which contains the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the provisions of article VIII, paragraph 3, of that Treaty concerning the holding of successive review conferences,

Noting that in the Final Document of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975, a majority of the States parties to the Treaty proposed to the depositary Governments that a second conference should be convened in 1980,

Recalling its resolution 31/75 of 10 December 1976, in which it decided to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session an item entitled "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference",

1. *Notes* that, following appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee has been

formed of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serving on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or represented on the Committee on Disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its preparation.

Conclusion

In 1978, attention began to focus on the next Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to be held in 1980. It is already apparent that, as in the case of the first Review Conference, its task of reviewing the operation of the Treaty to ensure the realization of its provisions is being approached from differing perspectives. For the three nuclear-weapon States and other Eastern European and Western States parties, the task that lies ahead is to strengthen the Treaty by achieving universal adherence and to continue efforts to ensure that nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes are not diverted to military uses. On the other hand, many non-nuclear-weapon States parties, while agreeing on the need to strengthen the Treaty and encourage universal adherence, see the matter as a problem of establishing a mutually satisfactory balance between the rights and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. In that light, they placed emphasis on (a) the implementation of article VI relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; (b) the provision of reliable security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and (c) the need to ensure that measures adopted to minimize the weapons proliferation risks associated with the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes do not prejudice the right of all States to exploit, without discrimination, the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and to promote international co-operation towards that end.

Those questions will obviously come to the fore during the preparations for the second Review Conference and at the Conference itself. In this respect, it should be noted that while divergent approaches to the Conference are discernible, there have been initiatives that may assist in the task of reconciling existing differences. For example, proposals have been made for the consideration of measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States (see chapter XI above). With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) should be completed early in 1980 before the convening of the Review Conference and its results should provide technical data and alternatives that might facilitate the harmonization of views in that area.

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons

Introduction

WITH THE GROWING IMPORTANCE of nuclear power in energy programmes around the world, the matter of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons have become the subject of intense international debate within and outside the United Nations. Although many variations may be discerned on matters of substance and emphasis, essentially two currents of opinion shape the debate, one emphasizing the link between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the further spread of nuclear weapons, and the other stressing the benefits offered by the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and the consequent need to promote international co-operation in the field.

Concern about the nuclear-weapon-proliferation risks attendant on the dissemination of nuclear technology, equipment and materials, particularly those related to what are considered the “sensitive” stages of the nuclear fuel cycle¹ which would provide ready access to materials usable in nuclear-weapons—plutonium 239 and uranium highly enriched in the isotope 235—is reflected in the changes that nuclear export policies have undergone in recent years. In varying degrees, the major nuclear suppliers have established additional conditions and restrictions on their transfers of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, the extent of consensus achieved being embodied in the common principles and guidelines that 15 nuclear suppliers adopted in 1977 as a result of consultations carried out within the framework of a “Nuclear Suppliers Conference” (also known as the London Club).

The nuclear exporters’ stress on the connexion between peaceful nuclear programmes and the risk of nuclear-weapons proliferation and on the need for

¹ The nuclear fuel cycle may be defined as the series of processes that certain minerals suitable for nuclear use undergo from the moment they are exploited as raw materials to the moment they are disposed of or recycled for further use—this includes ore processing, conversion, enrichment (unless natural uranium is to be used in the reactor), fabrication, use in reactor, reprocessing, disposal of part of the reprocessed material and reconversion, enrichment and refabrication of part of the reprocessed material.

measures to sever that link has tended to polarize views in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as evidenced by the strong opposition to the suppliers' policies being voiced by recipient countries in various forums, such as the Conference on the Transfer of Nuclear Technology, held at Persepolis in April 1977, and the Conference on Nuclear Energy and its Fuel Cycle, held at Salzburg in May 1977, as well as in the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That reaction reflects different interests and concerns, the chief among them being the significance of access to modern science and technology as a vehicle of economic and social advancement and self-reliance; the growing importance of nuclear power in the face of increasing energy demands and uncertainty in the supply and prices of conventional energy sources; and, related to that, the need for reliable and secure supplies of nuclear fuel. From that perspective, peaceful nuclear technology should be made widely available and the fear of misuse for military purposes should not be used as justification for measures that impede or restrict full access to such technology on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international safeguards. Such a viewpoint, particularly prominent in the outlook of developing countries, is reinforced by the widely-held belief that it is not the peaceful applications of nuclear energy that are endangering the survival of mankind, but, rather, existing nuclear arsenals and their continuous quantitative and qualitative development. In that light, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons are two aspects of the same problem and, consequently, the non-proliferation régime must entail restraints on vertical as well as on horizontal proliferation. In addition, the theme of self-reliance and co-operation among developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is being increasingly emphasized, particularly by the non-aligned countries, as a means of countering the suppliers' restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology.

The trends discussed above have made the problems posed by the dual nature of nuclear power more acute and heightened their saliency in international discussions. The debate has highlighted the different ways in which nations, having reached different stages of economic development, being differently endowed and, consequently, having different needs and concerns, approach their solution. At the same time, in recognition of the fact that the development of nuclear energy appears to an increasing number of countries as a compelling requirement to further national independence and economic and social progress, there are signs of growing awareness that it is essential to achieve an international consensus in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would permit more harmonious relations between suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology and, concomitantly, the strengthening of international co-operation. Thus, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), launched in 1977, at the initiative of the United States for the stated purpose of minimizing the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, has opened a dialogue at a technical level which is expected to provide technical data and alternatives that may assist the search for solutions that reconcile the various interests and needs that are at stake to the satisfaction of all concerned.

The international transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes

As noted above, in 1977 consultations were initiated in London among 15 nuclear supplier countries² which resulted in a consensus on a set of principles and guidelines to govern the transfer of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.³ The main features of those principles and guidelines are briefly described below.⁴

The suppliers' policies are based on a common "Trigger List" of nuclear and other materials, equipment and facilities that are to be exported on certain conditions, including the following:

(a) Formal assurance from the recipient government explicitly excluding uses that would result in any nuclear explosive device;

(b) Effective physical protection by the importing country to prevent any unauthorized use and handling of the materials and facilities;

(c) Application of IAEA safeguards with duration and coverage provisions conforming to the guidelines established by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1974.⁵

The guidelines call for restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities and technology—meaning those involved in reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water production—and weapons-grade materials. IAEA safeguards would apply to sensitive facilities utilizing transferred technology or technology derived from transferred facilities. In addition, the transfer of sensitive facilities would trigger the application of IAEA safeguards to any facility of the same type constructed during an agreed period in the recipient country. In addition to safeguards, the guidelines include, among other things, restrictions on re-exports from the importing country and on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

Several individual suppliers have indicated that they will impose additional requirements with regard to their nuclear exports. For instance, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union, in communicating their common export guidelines to the Director General of IAEA, stated that they supported the principle that "Trigger List" items should not be exported unless all nuclear activities in the recipient non-nuclear-weapon States were under IAEA safeguards. In its communication to the Director General of IAEA, Canada stated that it might apply additional controls and safeguards requirements, and it may be noted that Canadian

² The 15 countries taking part in the consultations are: Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

³ See IAEA document INFCIRC/254, appendix.

⁴ A more detailed discussion may be found in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), pp. 132-134.

⁵ See IAEA document GOV/DEC/79 (XVII). By this decision the Board of Governors approved the guidelines concerning duration and coverage provisions of safeguards agreements recommended by the IAEA Director General in 1973.

nuclear exports were already restricted to States that were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or had otherwise accepted full-scope safeguards. Similarly, Australia, while not a participant in the London Suppliers Conference, advised IAEA⁶ that it would apply export criteria satisfying the common export guidelines and would have certain additional requirements. For instance, Australian uranium exports to non-nuclear-weapon States are limited to those that are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and abide by the terms of special bilateral treaties. Some suppliers have imposed an embargo or moratorium on the transfer of certain sensitive facilities and technology. Thus, France and the Federal Republic of Germany no longer authorize the export of reprocessing plants. The United States has embargoed the export of equipment or technology for uranium enrichment as well as chemical reprocessing.

One of the main developments during 1978 was the enactment of legislation in the United States designed to strengthen measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and any other explosive device: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, signed into law on 10 March 1978.⁷

The Act outlines a number of initiatives to be taken by the United States to provide adequate nuclear fuel supplies, combining action at the national and international levels. For instance, the United States is to take action to ensure its capacity to provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel and to initiate international discussions to develop international approaches for meeting future world-wide nuclear fuel needs. In particular, negotiations are to be undertaken with a view to the establishment of:

(a) An international fuel authority (INFA) to provide nuclear fuel services (as an interim measure, the Act envisages the creation of a stockpile of low-enriched uranium);

(b) Repositories for the storage of spent fuel under effective international auspices and inspection, including arrangements under which nations placing spent fuel in such repositories would receive compensation for the energy content of the spent fuel.

Pursuant to the Act, the benefits of such international undertakings should be available to non-nuclear-weapon States only if such States accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, do not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device, do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing facilities, and place any such existing facilities under effective international auspices and inspection.

The act gives statutory recognition to INFCE, stipulating that the emphasis of the nuclear fuel cycle evaluation should be on alternatives to an economy based on the separation of pure plutonium or the presence of highly enriched uranium, methods to deal with spent fuel storage, and methods to improve the safeguards for existing nuclear technology.

In line with the United States interest in the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, the Act sets forth actions to be taken together with other nations to

⁶ IAEA document INF/CIRC/254/Add.1.

⁷ Public Law 95-242, 92 Stat. 120.

improve the IAEA safeguards system and to assist IAEA in its effective implementation.

The Act defines the criteria governing the issuance of export licenses for individual items and stipulates a set of nearly identical requirements for newly negotiated agreements for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, existing agreements are to be renegotiated to conform to the same requirements as new agreements. Various provisions of the Act give the United States rights of approval under export licenses and co-operation agreements which are to be exercised through the conclusion of "subsequent arrangements" Such arrangements would cover such matters as reprocessing, retransfer to third parties for reprocessing or retransfer of significant quantities of separated plutonium, enrichment, retransfer of material or equipment supplied by the United States, and storage or disposition of spent fuel.

Briefly, the export criteria applicable to export licenses and agreements for co-operation, which for the most part coincide with those agreed in the London consultations, are the following:

- (a) Application of safeguards to exported items;
- (b) Prohibition of uses for explosive devices;
- (c) Provision of adequate physical security;
- (d) Application of all statutory requirements to any material or facility derived from exported sensitive technology;
- (e) Prohibition of reprocessing or alteration of material exported by the United States or material produced through the use of such exported material without United States approval;
- (f) Prohibition of retransfer to a third party without United States approval.

As an additional export criterion, the Act requires that IAEA safeguards be maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities of the recipient non-nuclear-weapon State at the time of the export. That requirement, which is to be included in new agreements for co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States and renegotiated agreements, will apply to export licenses covering shipments taking place two years after the date of the enactment of the law and to any export license application filed 18 months after that date. The President, however, can waive the requirement from year to year provided Congress does not adopt a concurrent resolution disapproving the authorization of further exports. Similarly, the requirement of United States permission for reprocessing and retransfer is not to prevent the continuation of co-operation under an existing agreement for a two-year period in the case of nations that receive United States exports through IAEA or EURATOM if the nations concerned have agreed to renegotiate the agreement. Thereafter, the President, with Congressional concurrence, may waive the requirements on an annual basis. United States-supplied uranium may not be enriched without United States approval, except as otherwise provided in a co-operation agreement. Co-operation agreements are to stipulate that no plutonium, uranium 233 or uranium enriched to greater than 20 per cent in the isotope 235, supplied by the United States or derived from materials or facilities supplied

by the United States, may be stored in any facility which it has not approved in advance. The United States is also to have the right to require the return of transferred material and equipment if the other party detonates a nuclear explosive device or terminates or abrogates a safeguards agreement.

The President is required to take "immediate and vigorous steps" to obtain the adherence of other nations to export criteria similar to those adopted by the United States as well as their agreement to certain conditions regarding their peaceful nuclear programmes, including commitments to refrain from enrichment or reprocessing and to limit the fabrication or stockpiling of plutonium, uranium 233 or highly enriched uranium to facilities under effective international auspices and inspection. Such facilities should be few in number, carefully sited and managed so as to minimize proliferation and environmental risks, and conditions should be established to limit the access of non-nuclear-weapon States to sensitive technology. International agreements should also be sought concerning general principles and procedures, including common sanctions, to be followed in cases of violations of obligations with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear materials, equipment or technology or violations of the principles of the non-proliferation Treaty, such as the detonation of a nuclear explosive device by a non-nuclear-weapon State.

The importance assumed by questions related to the transfer of nuclear technology may be gauged by the special attention that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes received at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978.⁸ Speaking of the significance of nuclear energy for faster economic development of the non-aligned and other developing countries, the Foreign Ministers regretted the unacceptable monopolistic policies of the nuclear countries, demanded that conditions be created for the unhindered transfer of nuclear technology and stressed the necessity for observance of the principles of free access and non-discrimination, and the right of each country to develop programmes for the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with its requirements for economic and social development.

In addition, attention was focused on the possibilities offered by co-operation and mutual assistance among developing countries in the sphere of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Foreign Ministers considered that the non-aligned countries should draw up and adopt programmes for future joint action within the United Nations and other international bodies, to co-ordinate their action in them and to promote mutual co-operation. In view of the need to explore the question of mutual co-operation among non-aligned countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and of the complexities involved, the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries was formed to give detailed examination to the matter. The Bureau, whose members include Algeria, Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria and Yugoslavia, held its preparatory meeting at Belgrade on 4 and 5 December 1978. It identified a number of areas in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy

⁸ See A/33/206.

offering possibilities for fruitful co-operation among non-aligned and other developing countries which should be further explored. In addition, the Bureau made a number of recommendations to guide the action of non-aligned countries in the United Nations and other international forums, such as IAEA, the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and INFCE. One of the conclusions reached was that since problems in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy were of a political nature, they could not be solved by technical means alone and, therefore, the Co-ordinating Bureau proposed that all non-aligned countries should support the convening of an international conference on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development under the auspices of the United Nations system.

Worth noticing in the same context is the co-operative arrangement between Argentina and Peru covering the supply by Argentina of a research reactor and the fuel for its operation for the training of personnel at the Peruvian Nuclear Research Centre. The fuel elements for the reactor are manufactured in Argentina and contain enriched uranium of United States origin. Relevant safeguards agreements have been concluded with IAEA.

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

In 1977, the United States launched the idea of an international evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle to explore ways in which increasing interest in the development of nuclear energy could be met while minimizing the danger of nuclear-weapons proliferation. Underlying the United States initiative was concern about the prospective dangers of the "plutonium economy". On 7 April 1977, President Carter announced that the United States would defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium and the commercial use of breeder reactors. In addition, he pointed to the need for international discussion and consideration of alternative nuclear fuel cycles that do not involve direct access to weapons-grade materials. For other countries, closing the uranium-plutonium cycle by reprocessing spent fuel and recycling plutonium in light water or breeder reactors appears as a compelling need in light of their energy requirements and options given their natural resources, geography, economy, ecology and other relevant factors. Thus countries such as France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the USSR and the United Kingdom have demonstrated a strong commitment to the commercial use of plutonium in thermal and breeder reactors.

The proliferation resistance of alternative nuclear fuel cycles and related questions are now being explored by the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation which was set up in October 1977, with the participation of 40 countries, nuclear suppliers and recipients, developed and developing.⁹

INFCE is open to all interested States; 53 are now participating in working groups and 56 attended the First Plenary Conference held at Vienna from 27 to 29 November 1978.

⁹ For the final communiqué of the Organizing Conference of INFCE, see A/C.1/32/7.

It has been agreed that INFCE is a technical study, not a negotiation, and Governments are in no way committed to accept its results. The evaluation is to be carried out in a spirit of objectivity, with mutual respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field, without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, provided that agreed safeguards measures are applied.

The evaluation is expected to be completed in two years, and eight working groups have been established to examine the following topics: fuel and heavy water availability, including uranium and thorium supply; enrichment availability, including comparison of the proliferation risks of various enrichment techniques; assurances of long-term supply of technology, fuel and heavy water and services in the interest of national needs consistent with non-proliferation; reprocessing, plutonium management and plutonium recycling; fast breeder reactors; spent fuel management; waste management and disposal; improved once-through fuel utilization in present thermal reactors; and advanced reactor and fuel cycle concepts. A Technical Co-ordinating Committee composed of the Co-Chairmen of the working groups acts as a steering group. That Committee has emphasized that the evaluation of different elements of the nuclear fuel cycle should be done with reference to a number of factors, including technical feasibility, economics, resource utilization, health and safety, the environment and non-proliferation, so that Governments, when they come to making decisions, will have an extensive basis of agreed assessments to work from.

It is expected that the reports of the working groups will be transmitted to the Technical Co-ordinating Committee for consideration at a meeting to be held in November 1979. The Committee will prepare a summary of the results of the studies of the working groups, which will not introduce any data, analyses or views not found in the working group reports. The summary will be submitted to the final Plenary Conference, which will take place in February 1980, for consideration and appropriate action.

International arrangements for nuclear fuel cycle services

Heightened concern about the spread of nationally-owned facilities to service what are deemed to be "sensitive" stages of the nuclear fuel cycle has directed attention to international approaches to the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services and supplies.

(a) *Assurances of nuclear fuel supply*

The United States has suggested the development of international mechanisms to ensure the reliability of nuclear fuel supplies to consumer nations, the idea being that this approach to meeting nuclear energy needs would offer those nations sufficient inducement to accept restraints on their peaceful nuclear programmes with regard to the acquisition of reprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities. At the Organizing Conference of INFCE, the

United States proposed the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank to provide assurances against the interruption of bilateral supplies and indicated that it was willing to contribute its technical capability and a part of its own enriched uranium. As noted above, the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act contemplates the establishment of an international nuclear fuel authority and, pending that, the creation of an interim stockpile of low-enriched uranium to which the United States and other supplier nations would make contributions for the purpose of assuring the continuity of nuclear fuel supplies to nations that "adhere to strict policies designed to prevent proliferation", meaning in the case of non-nuclear-weapon States, those that accept full-scope safeguards, do not acquire any nuclear explosive device, do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing facilities, and place existing ones under effective international auspices and inspection.

(b) *Regional nuclear fuel cycle centres*

The potential for misuse of plutonium recovered from spent fuel is one of the chief factors underlying interest in the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres. The concept envisages a multi-national approach to the planning, establishment and operation of facilities necessary to service what is often referred to as the "back end" of the nuclear fuel cycle covering transport, storage, processing and recycle activities starting from the time the spent fuel leaves the reactor until the recycled fuel is returned to the reactor.

IAEA presented its study on regional nuclear fuel cycle centres¹⁰ at the Salzburg Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle. Although no specific proposals for the establishment of such centres have yet emerged, it is understood that the concept is under consideration by the Commission of the European Communities and there have been informal discussions with a Western European utilities group on the subject.¹¹ The idea of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres is also being examined by INFCE.

(c) *International storage of spent reactor fuel*

In October 1977, in connexion with the Organizing Conference of INFCE, the United States announced its willingness to assume the responsibility for the storage and ultimate disposal of spent nuclear fuel from foreign as well as domestic reactors. At the same time, the United States urged other nations to enlarge their own storage capacity and pledged active support for the study of regional or international storage sites. In addition, as noted above, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act envisages the establishment of repositories for the storage of spent fuel under effective international auspices and inspection.

Currently, the matter is being examined by IAEA as part of its study on plutonium management and by INFCE.

¹⁰ *Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centres* (International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1977) STI/PUB/445.

¹¹ IAEA. *The Annual Report for 1977* (GC(XXII)/597), para. 18.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons received considerable attention at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament¹²—albeit from different perspectives and with different emphases, as evidenced by the profusion of brackets and alternative texts that characterized the relevant sections of the draft final document contained in the report of the Preparatory Committee.¹³

The risk of nuclear-weapon proliferation and the attendant need for effective measures to ensure that the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes did not contribute to that risk were stressed by various nuclear suppliers, such as Australia, Canada, Sweden, the USSR,¹⁴ and the United States.

Other States, particularly developing countries, reiterated the importance of access to peaceful nuclear technology for the scientific, technological and economic advancement of nations, and were critical of nuclear suppliers for placing restrictions on the transfer of such technology under the guise of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, restrictions which only served to preserve and consolidate the scientific and technological predominance of a few nations and condemned the majority to a position of dependency.

In his address to the special session, the Director General of IAEA expressed the conviction that, in the long term, policies aimed at restraining and denying the transfer of nuclear or any other technology could not be successful and could in the end prove to be counter-productive. He held that what was needed was to consolidate the consensus that the transfer of technology should take place within the framework of comprehensive and effective safeguards against misuse.

Some countries also specifically advocated the application of IAEA safeguards to the full range of peaceful nuclear programmes. Among them, the Netherlands and Sweden considered that all States should accept such safeguards. In the view of other countries, such as Brazil and India, the system of safeguards should be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

With respect to INFCE, different countries focused attention on different aspects of the programme. Some countries highlighted the contribution that INFCE could make to minimizing nuclear-weapon-proliferation risks. Australia, for instance, noted that the study dealt specifically with the problem of developing nuclear energy in ways consistent with non-proliferation objec-

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. I, para. 54.

¹⁴ See A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex.

tives and that it could result, among other things, in the international control of sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. The Netherlands, considering that movement towards a plutonium economy together with increased use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes required a new international consensus on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to strengthen the present non-proliferation régime, believed that such a consensus could develop only on the basis of non-discriminatory access and self-restraint by all concerned. It felt that INFCE constituted a most welcome contribution towards solving the problem of giving adequate access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while minimizing the risk of a further spread of nuclear weapons. Pointing out that the aim of INFCE was finding a universally acceptable solution, the Netherlands concluded that to solve the long-term problems in the field of nuclear co-operation it was necessary to look for safer methods of nuclear energy production so as to avoid as much as possible the dangers associated with a further spread of nuclear materials and technologies. In a similar vein, Norway held that pending the outcome of the nuclear fuel cycle evaluation, all States should restrain further development towards a plutonium economy and that non-proliferation considerations had to take precedence over commercial interests whenever there was conflict.

Other countries saw a link between INFCE and the strengthening of international co-operation in the field. Thus, Bangladesh expressed support for the work of INFCE, believing that the evaluation should pave the way for the adoption of a special programme to promote nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in line with General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977.

Multinational arrangements for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services also received attention at the special session. The Director General of IAEA, noting that the Agency's comprehensive study of the ways of establishing regional or multinational fuel cycle centres responded to concern about the risks of proliferation of small and uneconomic reprocessing plants, pointed out that three full-scale commercial reprocessing plants would probably be sufficient to take care of the whole world's present needs for the reprocessing of spent fuel and held that that was a compelling argument for limiting and concentrating such facilities. In addition, he noted that IAEA was also pursuing studies on other means to supplement the non-proliferation Treaty régime, such as the international management of separated plutonium to prevent national stockpiling and to ensure that plutonium was only distributed to meet legitimate energy or research requirements. Canada considered that since the world was hovering on the threshold of a plutonium economy, it was necessary to make sure that the vulnerable points in the fuel cycle were capable of being adequately safeguarded by technical means and that, where that could not be effectively done, institutional arrangements for international management were devised. The Netherlands considered that the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres with comprehensive facilities constituted an immediately available instrument to improve safeguards and to make nuclear energy production inherently safe; it expressed full support for the activities of IAEA in that field. Believing that another field of action would be

the establishment of an international plutonium storage régime, the Netherlands said it would actively co-operate in initiatives to develop further and to put into effect current ideas on those matters in the various INFCE working groups or in any other context and pointed out that the basic rationale of such ideas was not to be found in hampering access to much needed nuclear energy supplies but in making them accessible under circumstances of international trust and co-operation. The United States, in expressing its views on the regional aspects of disarmament,¹⁵ stated that regional arrangements with respect to the nuclear fuel cycle might prove desirable in that such arrangements could ensure appropriate access to nuclear material for use in power-generating reactors, and could also be effective in alleviating the concerns of the international community with regard to the possible proliferation of nuclear arms to additional countries. It, therefore, hoped that those possibilities would receive appropriate consideration in the studies conducted as part of INFCE. In the same context, Iran suggested¹⁶ that the value of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a step towards disarmament would be heightened and the creation of such zones facilitated if more active regional co-operation in the development of peaceful nuclear energy could be encouraged, and that it would be particularly fruitful to initiate such regional co-operation in areas where nuclear energy was still in its nascent form. In its opinion, various degrees of collaboration could be envisaged in providing a more logical basis for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy within the zone by facilitating the establishment of regional fuel cycle centres, with their attendant economic and physical security benefits, for extracting uranium, fabricating nuclear fuel, reprocessing plutonium and handling nuclear waste. Iran considered that the concept of a declaration of peaceful intent upon the introduction of nuclear installations might be pursued as a first step in bilateral consultations or regional conferences, depending upon the degree of cohesion in the area. Finally, noting that many countries were already working together at the international level on INFCE and many had participated in the IAEA study on regional nuclear fuel cycle centres, Iran expressed the view that such studies could set the stage for further communication and consultation between States in regions about the advent of peaceful nuclear energy and its non-proliferation aspects.

The above examination of the proceedings of the special session indicates no basic change in the positions of States with respect to questions related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Hence, to arrive at a consensus in the text of the Final Document, it became necessary to formulate the relevant paragraphs in general terms and to draw to a certain extent on texts on which a consensus had been achieved in the past, namely, General Assembly resolution 32/50 and the final communiqué of the Organizing Conference of INFCE.¹⁷

The paragraph in the Declaration reads as follows:

¹⁵ See A/S-10/8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ See foot-note 9.

36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

The relevant paragraphs in the Programme of Action read as follows:¹⁸

66. Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

68. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

69. Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

70. In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

71. Efforts should be made to conclude the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation strictly in accordance with the objectives set out in the final communiqué of its Organizing Conference.

The assessments of the results achieved varied. Sri Lanka stated that the non-aligned countries had been able to secure the reassertion of the right of all countries to develop, acquire and use without discrimination nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Pakistan, on the other hand, felt obliged to enter a formal reservation on the relevant paragraph of the Declaration which, in its view, even though it recognized the inalienable right of States to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, contained language which because of its ambiguity was capable of being used to justify policies of restraint and restriction, deprivation and discrimination. At the same time, Pakistan was pleased that the Programme of Action did acknowledge the necessity of developing an international consensus on universal and non-discriminatory ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a provision that was based on the assumption that the negative and discriminatory features of the current policies of some States in the field of non-proliferation would be reversed. It earnestly hoped that that view would

¹⁸ See also chapter XI above on the non-proliferation Treaty.

come to prevail over the present policies of some supplier States which, to say the least, were based on subjective considerations. The United States, for its part, said that the text of paragraph 66 of the Programme of Action did not adequately reflect its view on the relationship between the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the right of all States to have access to technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Those views were more accurately reflected in the paragraph appearing in the Declaration, which the United States regarded as a more balanced expression of the relevant principle. It would have preferred the use of that paragraph in the Programme of Action in place of paragraph 66, which was in fact another statement of principle rather than a call for action. Australia regretted that its hope that the special session might have extended the basis for agreement on measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons had not been fully realized in the Final Document. In its view, the Final Document, apart from failing to give explicit recognition to the significance of the non-proliferation Treaty, did not make sufficiently clear that the right of all nations to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes called for a reciprocal obligation not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and did not make explicit that international safeguards arrangements might need to be strengthened to provide the necessary climate of confidence that would foster stable nuclear trade and closer international co-operation in the peaceful development of nuclear energy.

Consideration by the CCD and IAEA, 1978

The dissemination of nuclear technology and related questions were also major topics of discussion at the 1978 sessions of the CCD¹⁹ and at the twenty-second session of the General Conference of IAEA,²⁰ held from 20 September to 6 October 1978.

Emphasis on the potential dangers posed by the peaceful uses of nuclear energy marked the comments of Eastern European and Western countries which variously pointed to the need for measures to guard against possible misuse of nuclear energy for military purposes. The Soviet Union, stating its support for broad international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and its readiness to share experience and scientific and technological knowledge in the field of modern nuclear technology, considered it important to prevent nuclear exports from becoming a channel for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Poland, welcoming the agreement reached by 15 States, itself included, which had established strict guidelines on nuclear export safeguards and imposed important limitations on the transfer of nuclear materials and technology, noted with satisfaction the positive assessment of those guidelines by many non-nuclear-weapon States and hoped that

¹⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 136-156.

²⁰ See IAEA documents GC (XXII)/OR.200-208.

the arrangement would soon gain wide support as another step towards consolidation of the non-proliferation régime and increased and equal security for all. The United States, commenting on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, said that the law was an attempt to balance concern over the dangers of nuclear proliferation with the important need for nuclear power to meet energy demands throughout the world and, to that end, it provided for a system of controls and incentives to give the world time to improve and strengthen mechanisms which would be a safeguard against misuse of nuclear energy technology. The Act did so by emphasizing the importance of fuel cycle safeguards as a condition for continued United States co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States and, among other things, by exercising positive control on the retransfer and reprocessing of materials produced through any transferred sensitive nuclear exports from the United States. It was pointed out that an important incentive implied in the Act and in United States policy was the continued and re-emphasized commitment of the United States to make every reasonable effort to assure that the benefits of nuclear energy were available to all. Australia said that, in common with other nuclear suppliers,²¹ it had a responsibility to ensure that adequate safeguards were applied in respect of any nuclear material it exported, that the action taken in January 1978 by major nuclear supplier countries in notifying the Director General of IAEA of common guidelines for their nuclear exports was a significant and welcome development, and that its own nuclear export policy encompassed, among other things, all of the elements comprising those common guidelines. It also stated that, in accordance with its approach to the matter of risk of nuclear-weapon proliferation, it would continue to strive vigorously for a workable international régime and that its exports were directed towards countries that were signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

France pointed to the urgency of determining and applying appropriate non-proliferation measures.²² At the same time, it held that even total renunciation of the potential benefits of nuclear energy would not eliminate the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation because other methods of producing nuclear arms existed which were faster and less costly than the building of electric power stations with their associated fuel cycle. It was, therefore, necessary to face up to the prospect of developments in the nuclear sector throughout the world, while at the same time endeavouring to minimize the risk of a conflagration. In addition, it considered that any policy of non-proliferation should avoid creating a condition of segregation by reserving the benefits of nuclear energy for a few developed countries because nuclear energy constituted a great hope in the medium term and a vital hope in the long run for developing countries. In France's view, a middle way should be found to (a) promote the development of nuclear energy, allowing all to benefit therefrom in a manner and according to a time schedule which suited their economic development; and (b) limit the risks of proliferation by applying a flexible policy, based on certain restrictions and safeguards, while respecting the legitimate opinions of the countries concerned. Commenting on its nuclear export policy, France

²¹ See GC(XXII)/OR.204, paras. 66 and 73.

²² See GC(XXII)/OR.201, para. 33.

noted that it realized the essential contribution that nuclear energy could make to development and confirmed its intention of promoting peaceful nuclear applications in fulfilment of its international engagements. On the other hand, France did not want to intensify the threat represented by the proliferation of atomic weapons.

Developing countries continued to lay stress on the need to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to view the application of restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and materials as an obstacle to development and a misguided approach to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. India²³ noted that there appeared to be a growing obsession with hypothetical proliferation involving quantities of nuclear material that were being used peacefully and were tiny compared to the vast amounts of nuclear material deployed in continuing weapons programmes. It hoped that a more balanced view would prevail so that the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes would not be unduly hampered.

Romania, for its part, considered that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons could be achieved only by eliminating the cause of the danger of proliferation and, in particular, by destroying existing nuclear weapons and at the same time taking decisive measures for nuclear disarmament. It attached particular importance to the question, both because it understood the risks involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and because measures were being adopted, in the name of preventing the danger of proliferation, which impeded the free access of States to the use of nuclear technology for development.

Considerable attention was devoted in the General Conference of IAEA to the question of safeguards. Eastern European and Western countries dwelt once again on the need for the technical improvement of IAEA safeguards and called for their application to all peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. For their part, developing countries, while recognizing the need and importance of safeguards, continued to insist that too much emphasis was being placed on the Agency's regulatory activities to the detriment of its role in the promotion of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and that the imbalance had to be redressed.

The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation was another matter that figured prominently in the debate at the General Conference of IAEA. The programme was generally viewed with favour for the contribution it could make to the emergence of a broad consensus on questions related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some countries laid emphasis on the value of INFCE's technical work for the development of such a consensus, although they made different assessments of the risks and benefits of different nuclear fuel cycles and technologies.

The United States²⁴ hoped that INFCE would produce a comprehensive analysis of the situation which would guide decision-makers and make new

²³ See GC(XXII)/OR.202, para. 11.

²⁴ See GC(XXII)/OR.201, para. 14.

institutional arrangements possible and, while noting that the countries that had taken part in the Evaluation had often expressed different views, said that the dialogue that had been started should lead to common principles. In its view, countries seemed even more concerned to avoid premature plutonium production and widespread national control of separated plutonium and were realizing that there was no economic urgency for recycling plutonium in thermal reactors. For its part, the United States, and other countries as well, were perfecting techniques by which the highly enriched fuel of many research reactors might soon be replaced by low-enriched uranium.

France²⁵ considered that the technical files prepared on an international basis by the different INFCE working groups, by evaluating the proliferating nature of the technologies envisaged, should provide a common technical basis which would facilitate the necessary consensus on the political measures to be taken. With regard to non-proliferation, it had been possible in two areas to give concrete form to France's philosophical approach, thanks to the development of technologies equivalent in terms of efficiency to those at present in use or under development, but much more satisfactory from the point of view of non-proliferation. For example, the process of uranium enrichment by chemical treatment reported at the Salzburg Conference, a process which virtually excluded the attainment of high isotope concentrations, embodied intrinsic non-proliferation safeguards which were unique in that particularly sensitive area. In addition, the development of "caramel" fuels combining the conventional plate structure with the use of uranium oxide instead of mechanical alloying meant that only slightly enriched uranium could be utilized without adversely affecting reactor performance. In France's opinion, it was still necessary to determine a suitable policy for the management of plutonium, which constituted no special risk except when it was separated and free from fission products, which was not the case with reactors, even fast breeders. The crux of the plutonium cycle problem was therefore the management of stocks between output from the reprocessing plant and return to the reactors, a problem that was by no means insoluble but constituted an essential component in the making of a satisfactory non-proliferation policy. France also elaborated on the implementation of its nuclear programme, describing the options it had selected to close the nuclear fuel cycle, namely, reprocessing of irradiated fuels and plutonium recycling in fast breeder reactors. Noting that uranium resources were of limited accessibility and were also unequally distributed, it held that while it was possible to improve the utilization of uranium by thermal reactors, such improvements could hardly change the order of magnitude of the problem. On the other hand, with fast breeders, a country could have access to an energy potential which was independent of natural geographical differences and several factors of 10 greater than the world's prospective oil resources; the use of fast breeders therefore seemed essential.

In the view of the Soviet Union,²⁶ national programmes for development of nuclear power and international efforts to evaluate the nuclear fuel cycle

²⁵ *Ibid.*, paras. 38-40.

²⁶ See GC(XXII)/OR.202, paras. 71-72.

had an important role to play in the solution of the problem of determining how nuclear power could be introduced in such a way as to protect the environment and prevent any danger of weapon proliferation. With reference to its own programme of nuclear power development, it stated that it combined power stations using thermal and fast reactors, and radiochemical reprocessing of the fuel with extraction of plutonium and unspent uranium for reuse.

Other States, particularly developing countries, stressed that the problems arising from the existence of differing approaches in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy required political solutions. Thus Yugoslavia,²⁷ expressing support for the idea of convening an international conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, held that the problems related to the use of nuclear energy in general and to safeguards in particular could only be resolved by political means. At the same time, it recognized that the results from scientific meetings could be very useful in providing the technical data necessary for arriving at political solutions. Pakistan,²⁸ while fully supporting INFCE as a potentially valuable exercise to help establish technical options for facilitating peaceful applications of nuclear power, was convinced that proliferation was essentially a political problem. It considered that a serious dialogue should be initiated between the supplier States and the recipient States of the third world in order to reach an understanding on the norms and rules which should govern the supply and use of nuclear technology. Pakistan further held that the real tasks were to develop a global policy for optimal utilization of world energy resources and available technologies, to meet the needs of the industrialized countries and the projected requirements of the developing countries, to transfer technology to the third world and satisfy the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon countries. To deal with such broad issues, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 32/50 to consider convening an international conference on the economic, political, social and technical problems of promoting international co-operation on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In Pakistan's opinion, such a conference could be held after the completion of the INFCE study and the non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

The Director General of IAEA²⁹ also believed that proliferation was a political problem to be dealt with by political, not technical means, and that, rather than denying sensitive technologies on a selective basis, a serious effort should be made to set up joint regional or international ventures, under IAEA safeguards, in which any interested country could participate. In his view, regional nuclear fuel cycle centres and international plutonium storage sites should be given priority consideration and countries should be encouraged to accept full fuel cycle safeguards and then given full access to peaceful nuclear technology. He also stated that after the INFCE final Conference and the second non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference, both to be held in 1980,

²⁷ See GC(XXII)/OR.203, para. 66.

²⁸ See GC(XXII)/OR.202, paras. 117 and 119-120.

²⁹ See GC(XXII)/OR.200, paras. 51-52.

IAEA planned to organize a second major conference in 1981 or 1982 on nuclear energy and its fuel cycle and that an international conference had also been suggested by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Still another matter of interest at the General Conference of IAEA was the development of multinational arrangements for nuclear fuel cycle services. Several countries, mainly developed ones, welcomed efforts in that direction which, in their view, were necessary to lessen nuclear-weapon proliferation risks while assuring the reliability of the supply of nuclear fuel and services required by the increased use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. France³⁰ pointed out that its policy aimed at an international organization for the marketing of materials and services, which would (a) guarantee and control their peaceful utilization; (b) give consumers the certainty of being able to obtain them when required, without excessive restrictions; (c) guarantee that international techniques were developed satisfactorily from the point of view of proliferation risks; and (d) ensure due respect for national options, in so far as the latter conformed to clear economic objectives and were not systematically directed towards techniques of doubtful utilization. France believed that it was possible to reconcile all those objectives and was willing to co-operate in the establishment of a system of technical procedures corresponding to those criteria. The Netherlands,³¹ considering that the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres would strengthen the non-proliferation régime and welcoming the study which the Agency had completed on the subject, expressed confidence that the Director General would once again show his innovative spirit in giving practical shape to the results of the study and thereby make a concrete and effective contribution to non-proliferation. It also expressed the hope that the subject would receive due attention by INFCE.

Italy³² stated it was ready to contribute to the study of any initiative, such as the creation of regional fuel cycle and excess plutonium storage centres, which might truly contribute to halting proliferation while guaranteeing rapid supply at competitive prices of the fuel required by countries undergoing nuclear development. It pointed out that some of those initiatives raised considerable political, legal and economic difficulties whose solution required the maximum goodwill and collaboration from all concerned and held that if a price had to be paid for reducing the risk of proliferation, that price must be equally divided because peace and security were assets which belonged to the whole international community. The United Kingdom³³ referring to the IAEA study on the international management and storage of plutonium and spent fuel, welcomed the opportunity provided by the study for discussing various schemes aimed at increasing the proliferation resistance of the nuclear fuel cycle. In its opinion, any scheme for international plutonium storage, to achieve general acceptability, would have to be non-discriminatory and recog-

³⁰ See GC(XXII)/OR.201, para. 36.

³¹ See GC(XXII)/OR.204, para. 4.

³² *Ibid.*, para. 56.

³³ See GC(XXII)/OR.202, paras. 44-45.

nize the need of States to have properly safeguarded access to plutonium supplies. The United Kingdom considered that the establishment of such a scheme would make a significant contribution to reducing proliferation risks and therefore attached high priority to the matter. Poland³⁴ also supported the action taken by the Agency to set up an international plutonium handling system and thought that the subject should be included on the agenda of the second non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

As in previous years, the deliberations on questions related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, in the plenary and in the First Committee,³⁵ reflected the divergent perspectives from which such questions were being approached. Some States, particularly Eastern European and Western countries, continued to view the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the context of the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and once again stressed the need to improve the technical effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, advocating universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty, or, failing that, the application of such safeguards to all the peaceful activities of non-nuclear-weapon States. A number of those countries referred in particular to the responsibilities of nuclear suppliers to ensure that transferred materials, equipment and technology did not increase the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation. Bulgaria, for instance, noting that time was pressing for efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, said that the fight against their dissemination had proved complex and difficult and in view of that it had consistently supported all additional measures which had been adopted or proposed so far in the field, such as the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system and the guidelines adopted by the exporting countries in London (see pages 250-251 above). The United Kingdom, observing that the need for action to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was recognized but that the dilemma of how to make the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to all without the risk of weapon proliferation was not being squarely faced, said that for some years it had made a financial sacrifice in not exporting some civilian nuclear equipment, materials and technology because of a fear of adding to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It further noted that the existence of adequate safeguards against that risk was also an essential condition governing its nuclear exports, but that sophisticated countries still competed ruthlessly in the nuclear market place, and nuclear installations had become symbols of national sovereignty, with the result that any unwillingness to supply was wrongly seen as a political act.

³⁴ See GC(XXII)/OR.203, para. 74.

³⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 41st and 42nd meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

The Netherlands, setting forth the position it had taken with regard to nuclear exports, stated that it considered the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, when effectively applied, as corner-stones for nuclear co-operation. In its view, those treaties could be usefully complemented when necessary by other international arrangements, such as the guidelines of the nuclear suppliers' group aimed at the prevention of nuclear proliferation. For the Netherlands, a responsible nuclear-export policy should imply the world-wide application of safeguards on a non-discriminatory basis and it supported continuing efforts to refine and strengthen the safeguards system of IAEA.

The starting point for other States, developing countries in particular, was the significance of peaceful nuclear technology, equipment and materials for social and economic development. In that context, they continued to insist that international co-operation should be promoted with a view to permitting all countries to share equally in the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to criticize the restrictions applied by suppliers to the transfer of nuclear technology, under the guise of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and the emphasis being placed on the safeguarding activities of IAEA to the detriment of its promotional role.

Yugoslavia said that, unfortunately, the call of the non-aligned and other developing countries for broad action by the international community for the purpose of ensuring the free and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology had not met with a satisfactory response from the majority of the developed countries, especially those that were members of the so-called London Club. It noted that there was a tendency among some nuclear-weapon Powers to impose new restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology under the pretext of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Also noticeable, in its view, was a tendency to bypass the policy role of IAEA in the field of the transfer of nuclear technology, while over-emphasizing the safeguarding role entrusted to it under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Pakistan considered that the availability of adequate sources of energy was a prerequisite for the development of all countries, particularly of the developing countries, and that the rapid development of nuclear power must therefore be a priority objective for the third world. It commented that that objective was today threatened by the trend towards greater restrictions on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Pakistan observed that the thesis now propounded was that the development of nuclear energy in the third world posed a special danger of nuclear proliferation; that not only international safeguards but also restraints should be applied against developing countries in the transfer of nuclear technology; and that certain sensitive technologies should not be transferred to them at all, even under international safeguards. It regretted the policies of certain suppliers which increasingly had exhibited a tendency during the last few years to associate the spread of nuclear weapons with nuclear power and held that the imposition of discriminatory restrictions on the developing countries, instead of helping non-proliferation, would merely erode the vital element of consent on which

all non-proliferation efforts must, in the ultimate analysis, rest. It also considered unfortunate that, over the years, the work of IAEA had shown a marked preference for the Agency's safeguards activities, rather than for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Romania stated that as a developing socialist country it was determined to use nuclear energy in implementing its economic and social development programmes and was firmly in favour of guaranteeing to all States, under advantageous conditions, extensive and unhindered access to the latest technology on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It could not subscribe to the trend which had become more and more obvious in recent years of directing an ever greater part of the activities of IAEA to its control function at the cost of its basic function of providing technical assistance for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all peoples. It considered that another extremely important function of the Agency was the promotion of the full and unhindered access of all countries, especially the developing countries, to nuclear technology, materials and equipment, especially in relation to the introduction of nuclear energy. In its view it was a serious anomaly that a whole series of scientific discoveries, especially in the nuclear field, should be reserved for the benefit of certain countries only or that they should be the object of monopoly politics. It believed that in spite of the reasons invoked—the most frequent being the pretext concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—such a policy could only damage the legitimate interests of other countries and international co-operation in general. For Romania, the time had come for the Agency to occupy itself more resolutely with the creation of better conditions for equitable international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

With regard to INFCE, various Eastern European and Western countries attached importance to the Evaluation from a non-proliferation perspective. The German Democratic Republic said that it was participating in INFCE to promote a strengthening of the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Australia, noting that it was taking an active part in the Evaluation, pointed out that the study was specifically addressed to the problem of developing nuclear energy in ways consistent with non-proliferation objectives and could result in the international control of sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. Some countries underlined the contribution that INFCE could make to the effort to develop a consensus in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, the Netherlands, hoping that the present phase of insufficient understanding between supplier and recipient countries was only a transitory situation and that a new international consensus would be achieved in the near future on conditions under which peaceful uses of nuclear energy could proceed without undue hindrance, considered that the results of the International Evaluation might well be instrumental in bringing about a universally accepted code of conduct in that regard. On the other hand, Yugoslavia, reflecting the views of many developing countries, particularly the non-aligned, held that while there was no doubt that the conferences held at Persepolis and Salzburg in 1977 and the INFCE studies greatly contributed towards reaching agreement on a number of scientific and technical matters

relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, political means and the broadest political agreement were needed for the resolution of the whole of this complex question.

A number of Eastern European and Western countries, in line with their concern about the potential dangers attendant on the widening use of nuclear technology, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes, continued to view with favour the development of multinational arrangements for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services and supplies. For instance, the German Democratic Republic commented that the establishment of multinational regional centres for the full nuclear fuel cycle would lessen the danger of any individual State's using uranium for the production of weapons. The Netherlands, considering that a non-proliferation policy that effectively contributed towards making this world a safer and more prosperous place to live in was a goal worth fighting for and, in the interest of all, said that countries must be prepared to consider making sacrifices in terms of unrestricted freedom of access to all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. It held that the unrestricted application of nuclear energy in all its forms was by itself a proliferation hazard and, in addition, was quite often uneconomical if pursued on a small scale. In its opinion, if after having considered all the pros and cons of engaging in the sensitive activities of the fuel cycle, it was deemed unavoidable to do so, then at least it should be done on a multinational or regional basis. Regarding the IAEA study on regional nuclear fuel cycle centres as a helpful incentive towards establishing such centres, it observed that regional co-operation by countries in the sensitive phases of the fuel cycle could actually diminish the potential for horizontal proliferation and should, consequently, be actively pursued. For the Netherlands, the alleged disadvantages of such a course, in terms of autarchy, sovereignty or energy, were clearly balanced by the gains in mutual trust, reduction of proliferation dangers, and international nuclear co-operation for economic and social advancement.

Under the item "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency" the General Assembly had before it two draft resolutions. The first was the one adopted annually to take note of the Agency's report and was sponsored by Saudi Arabia as Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors. In the course of its consideration by the Assembly, the draft resolution underwent two revisions. In the first, two changes were made: (a) a reference to resolution 32/87 F, adopted on the recommendation of the First Committee on 12 December 1977, under the item "General and complete disarmament", was added in a preambular paragraph that mentioned resolution 32/50 on the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development, adopted on 8 December 1977;³⁶ and (b) the words "requests the Agency to consider broadening the scope . . ." replaced the relevant wording in operative paragraph 4 that noted the intention of IAEA to hold another major international conference on nuclear power and its fuel cycle and recommended that the scope of the

³⁶ A discussion of these two resolutions may be found in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol.2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), pp.149-157.

conference be broadened to include the consideration of measures to promote international co-operation in the field.

Addressing itself to the change in the preambular paragraph, Pakistan objected to the addition of a reference to resolution 32/87 F on the following grounds: (a) the resolution did not relate to the subject of the draft resolution under consideration but dealt with nuclear proliferation, and its inclusion made the draft entirely unbalanced; (b) the resolution was considered in 1977, not in connexion with the discussion of the IAEA report, but in the First Committee in the context of the disarmament items and, therefore, it had no place in the draft resolution which dealt with the report of IAEA; and (c) the resolution in question, unlike resolution 32/50, was adopted by a vote, not by consensus. In this connection Pakistan pointed out that numerous developing countries had abstained in the vote on the resolution because of its endorsement of a discriminatory approach to the questions of non-proliferation and peaceful nuclear technology and many important developing countries had even refused to participate in the vote as a mark of protest against the imposition of that discriminatory approach in the First Committee. Considering that the inclusion of a reference to resolution 32/87 had introduced an element of controversy in the draft resolution, Pakistan expressed the hope that Saudi Arabia would agree to maintain the original text.

In the second revision of the draft resolution the preambular paragraph in question was eliminated and a reference to resolution 32/50 was included in operative paragraph 4. Another change concerned the question of an increase in the representation of the areas of Africa, the Middle East and South Asia on the Board of Governors of the IAEA, which had also created some difficulty. In operative paragraph 5, which invited the Agency to give further consideration to proposals for such an increase, the word "further" was replaced by the words "thorough, prompt and fair". The revised text was adopted by the Assembly by consensus on 2 November as resolution 33/3. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1977,

Noting that the statement of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 2 November 1978 provides additional information on the main developments in the Agency's activities,

Considering the important role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which is at present the main alternative source of energy readily available, and therefore the increasing tasks which the Agency will be called upon to undertake,

Appreciating the contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the assessment of uranium resources, its current study on the international management of plutonium and spent fuel, its assistance in the negotiation of a text for a convention on the physical protection of nuclear material, its technical and administrative support to the ongoing nuclear fuel cycle evaluation and its important work in nuclear safety and environmental protection,

Bearing in mind the intention of the International Atomic Energy Agency to convene in 1981 or 1982 a second major international conference on nuclear power and its fuel cycle, similar to the one held at Salzburg from 2 to 13 May 1977,

Noting with satisfaction the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the realization of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other

international treaties, conventions and agreements designed to protect mankind from the misuse of nuclear energy,

Bearing in mind the special needs of the developing countries for technical assistance by the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to benefit from the contribution of nuclear energy to their economic development,

Noting with appreciation the inclusion in the statement of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the substance of the discussion which took place at the twenty-second regular session of the General Conference of the Agency, held in September 1978, concerning the proposed increase in the representation of the areas of Africa and of the Middle East and South Asia on the Board of Governors,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
2. *Urges* all States to support the endeavours of the International Atomic Energy Agency in furthering, pursuant to its statute, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in developing and applying safeguards and in assisting Member States, particularly developing countries, to plan and carry out programmes in the field of energy and various applications of nuclear techniques;
3. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen its activities in the field of technical assistance to developing countries and urges Member States to help the Agency to achieve this goal by increasing their voluntary contributions;
4. *Notes with interest* the intention of the International Atomic Energy Agency to hold another major international conference on nuclear power and its fuel cycle, similar to the one held at Salzburg in May 1977, and requests the Agency, bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, to consider broadening the scope of the conference to include the consideration of measures to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries;
5. *Invites* the International Atomic Energy Agency to give thorough, prompt and fair consideration to the proposals for an increase in the representation of the areas of Africa and of the Middle East and South Asia on the Board of Governors, with a view to reaching an early decision;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the records of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's activities.

A group of developing countries, notably the sponsors of resolution 32/50 and a few others, sponsored the other draft resolution which concerned the question of peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development. In connexion therewith, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to resolution 32/50³⁷ which had requested the Secretary-General to invite all States to communicate to him their views, observations and suggestions on the convening, at an appropriate stage, of an international conference or conferences, under the auspices of the United Nations system, aimed at promoting international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the objectives of that resolution, and to report thereon to the Assembly at its thirty-third session. A limited number of replies were received for inclusion in the report, mainly from developed countries. In general, the developed countries either did not see the need to convene such a conference in view of the many on-going or planned activities in the field, or considered that a decision on the matter should be taken in light of the results of those activities. Among the former was the United States, which considered that the second non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference, INFCE, the United Nations Conference on Sci-

³⁷ A/33/332.

ence and Technology and the proposed IAEA conference on nuclear power and its fuel cycle as well as the annual General Conference of IAEA and its other meetings and programmes, provided adequate opportunity to promote discussion of the subject matter of resolution 32/50 and that another meeting would be an unnecessary duplication of work. Among the latter was the Soviet Union which held that, in considering the question of the desirability of convening, at some particular stage, a conference devoted to international co-operation in the peaceful use of atomic energy, account should be taken of the fact that work was currently being done on an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation. In its view, the recommendations and conclusions that might be formulated upon the completion of that Evaluation should be analysed and carefully studied with a view to finding optimal ways for co-operation in the nuclear field. Those countries were for the most part also of the opinion that if an international conference were to take place pursuant to resolution 32/50, it should be organized by IAEA.

Developing countries, on the other hand, tended to support the convening of a conference. Romania, for instance, expressed the belief that a United Nations conference for the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy should contribute to the reaffirmation and encouragement of the political will of States to take action so as to ensure that the peaceful applications of nuclear energy become essential components of programmes designed to raise the economic and social levels of peoples and gradually reduce and progressively eliminate gaps and underdevelopment. In its opinion such a conference was all the more necessary since there was an increasing trend to limit the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology on the pretext of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Romania also made detailed suggestions regarding the agenda, date and duration of the conference and the procedures to be adopted for carrying out the preparatory work. Yugoslavia noted that the question of the peaceful use of nuclear energy had recently been examined by several international scientific gatherings and that INFCE was still under way, and held that a conference aimed at promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, proposed at the previous session of the General Assembly, could make use of the results of that work. In its view the Conference should consider such topics as: (a) economic and political aspects of nuclear energy in the world; (b) nuclear technology and the possibility of transferring it; (c) nuclear raw materials and their use; (d) problems of the possible abuse of nuclear energy; (e) legal aspects of the development of nuclear technology and the utilization of nuclear energy; (f) problems of the human environment in connexion with the transfer of nuclear technology; (g) scientific and technical co-operation; (h) the role of international organizations; and (i) contributions by international gatherings to the development of nuclear technology.

The draft resolution on the question was adopted in a revised form by consensus, also on 2 November, as resolution 33/4. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the General Assembly for the year 1977,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977,

Recognizing the importance of enhancing the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the promotion of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and of augmenting its resources for technical assistance to the developing countries in this field,

Having in mind the significance of nuclear energy for economic development and, in particular, its important role in accelerating the development of developing countries,

Recalling the principles and provisions of its resolution 32/50 concerning international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries,

Recalling also the contents of the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

1. *Invites* all States to continue to consider the convening, at an appropriate stage, of an international conference or conferences, under the auspices of the United Nations system, aimed at promoting international co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 32/50;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to urge all States to communicate to him their views, observations and suggestions on such a conference and requests him to submit a report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

Explaining its position, the United States reaffirmed its support for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in the developing countries, and the importance it attached to IAEA as a valuable mechanism for extending such assistance and noted that for those reasons it had joined in the support of the resolution. At the same time, it was of the view that the resolution could have been strengthened by the inclusion of language which specifically acknowledged the important relationship between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the need to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, it pointed out that its support for the resolution should not be interpreted as altering its position regarding the need for the conference referred to in paragraph 1 and questioned whether States' views on such a conference should again be sought.

Conclusion

The consideration in 1978 of the question of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons once more brought to the fore the differences between, and within, the two main trends of thought that have emerged in the area. The discussions indicate that the positions of the States concerned with those matters remain unchanged.

The differing approaches were evident not only in the proceedings of the United Nations and IAEA, but also in developments outside those organizations. Individual nuclear suppliers adopted export criteria going beyond the requirements contained in the common guidelines agreed upon in the London consultations. Developing countries, notably the non-aligned, largely reacting to the prevailing trend on the supply side, began to explore the possibilities offered by co-operation and mutual assistance among themselves in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

At the same time, the search for a widely acceptable consensus continues. INFCE is expected to conclude its work early in 1980. In addition, the matter of peaceful uses of nuclear energy will be examined, albeit in different contexts, at various meetings in the next two years, *inter alia*, the second non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference to be held in 1980 (see chapter XII above) and a conference similar to the 1977 Salzburg Conference on Nuclear Power and its Fuel Cycle, to be organized by IAEA in 1981. Furthermore, the possibility of convening a United Nations conference with a view to promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development is under discussion.

Thus, while the difficulty of arriving at generally acceptable solutions remains formidable, there will be a number of opportunities in the next few years to try to develop an international consensus.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Introduction

THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING nuclear-weapon-free zones continues to be considered one of the most practical means of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and banning such weapons from areas where such zones may be established. Furthermore, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is considered as an effective means of assuring the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons, thus enhancing their security.

Several proposals have been made for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones since 1957; the concept was given particular impetus in 1975 when, pursuant to resolution 3261 F (XXIX), a comprehensive study of the question, carried out by an *ad hoc* group of governmental experts, was transmitted as a special report of the CCD to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.¹ The experts reached consensus on certain principles governing the creation of such zones wherever appropriate conditions existed.

The concept was further enhanced in 1978 by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, in the Final Document of which it considered the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a desirable over-all objective and an important disarmament measure, and noted the proposals for the establishment of such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. The action of the Assembly at its special session provided another strong reason to support, at the thirty-third session, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Thus the agenda of the thirty-third session, like those of several previous sessions, included items concerning the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the establishment of such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.

In brief, there is now wide recognition of the desirability of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and a growing argument that such zones and other regional approaches to disarmament can be regarded as interim steps towards general and complete disarmament.

¹ For an account of early initiatives, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), pp.159-160; and *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/10027/Add.1)*.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

During the general debate in the plenary meetings of the tenth special session,² there was a unanimous expression of support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Many speakers considered that their establishment was an effective means of preventing horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that the elimination of nuclear weapons from such zones enhanced the security of States in the area. The concept was favoured by some delegations as an aspect of their support of the regional approach to disarmament. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were also considered by many non-nuclear-weapon States to be a reasonable channel through which guarantees by nuclear Powers to non-nuclear States could be obtained.

In various ways the nuclear-weapon States supported the idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones. China, for example, stated that it had always firmly supported the demands of small and medium-sized countries for the establishment of such zones and had undertaken a due commitment towards the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. President Giscard d'Estaing of France, in his address, held that, in terms of their security, the decisions by the States of a region to preserve a nuclear-weapon-free status should entail an obligation for the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from seeking a military advantage from that situation. He stressed that nuclear-weapon States should in particular preclude any use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against States that were part of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Prime Minister Callaghan of the United Kingdom, expressing his country's readiness to participate in granting assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and recalled that the United Kingdom was the first nuclear-weapon State to adhere to the Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Soviet Foreign Minister, A. A. Gromyko, fearing that nuclear weapons could trigger an all-out nuclear conflagration should they fall into the hands of States in conflict with their neighbours, supported the desire of States to see certain geographical areas free of nuclear weapons. Vice-President Mondale of the United States referred to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as Latin America's bold initiative and called for expansion of the regions of the earth where nuclear weapons would be banned.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was considered also by many spokesmen to be an effective means of progressing towards disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular. Chile, for example, thought that a plan of action on disarmament must include a strengthening and extension of denuclearized zones, and Ecuador considered that the establishment of such zones represented a valuable contribution towards general and complete disarmament. Taking a slightly different view, Bangladesh noted that nuclear-weapon-free zones enhanced the momentum towards regional approaches to disarmament. Indonesia considered that, pending disarmament

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings.

on a global scale, the establishment of denuclearized zones or zones of peace could be a significant contribution towards attainment of the ultimate goal.

The representatives of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia and many others considered that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones was an accepted means to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The concept that nuclear-weapon-free zones could not be established without assurances from nuclear-weapon States to respect their status and refrain from use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them was put forward by the delegations of Chile, Egypt, Finland, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Thailand, which hoped that voluntary assurances would be forthcoming, as well as by Yugoslavia, which called for the creation of such zones with the consent of the States concerned and with obligations assumed by nuclear-weapon States to respect the status of those zones (see chapter XI above).

Unlike the above spokesmen, the representative of Albania held that the creation of such zones would not make the danger of war a distant thing. The fact that the imperialist super-Powers expressed their support for or even encouraged the establishment of such zones, he said, showed that in that way they intended to lull to sleep the people's vigilance. The representative of India said that it was idle to talk of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones if there were still zones which could continue to be endangered by nuclear weapons. Those which had such weapons lost nothing if some distant area was declared non-nuclear. Also the nations without nuclear capacity which imagined that their inclusion in such zones afforded them security were under a delusion. In his view, there could be no limited approach to the question of freedom from nuclear threats and dangers; the whole world should be declared a nuclear-free zone.

In addition to the conceptual consideration of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the plenary debates as well as in the *Ad Hoc* Committee,³ the various proposals which had been under consideration before the General Assembly at previous sessions were addressed, namely, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, and the proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and in South Asia.

With regard to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) most Latin American speakers, including the representatives of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama, expressed pride and satisfaction at the fact that, of all the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones, theirs was the only functioning one. They also felt that the zone was a positive contribution to the cause of disarmament. Their satisfaction was further increased by the signing by the Government of

³ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

the USSR, on 18 May 1978, of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, during the visit to Moscow of President López Portillo of Mexico. The announcement of that event was made by the representatives of Mexico and the Soviet Union. The latter said that his Government, though aware of the shortcomings and weak points in that Treaty, had decided to assume the obligation to respect the denuclearized status of the Latin American continent, on the understanding that it would remain valid as long as the other nuclear Powers respected the status of that zone and its participants ensured a truly nuclear-free régime. Argentina announced that it had initiated procedures necessary for the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and France expressed the hope that it would be able to sign Additional Protocol I and announced that it would enter into contact with the appropriate authorities to examine the conditions under which its signature might be effected.

Although recognizing the importance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in implementing regional arrangements designed to advance security, the representative of Guyana felt that such arrangements would not secure their primary objective if they were conceived as or served as instruments for the perpetuation of controversies and disputes which originated in colonialism. He regretted what he regarded as the discriminatory character of a provision in the Treaty against his country, and felt that it should be excised from the Treaty. The representative of Cuba said that his country was not able to accept the unilateral renunciation of its right to possess any types of arms while a part of its national territory continued to be illegally occupied in Guantánamo by a United States base.

With regard to the denuclearization of Africa, the General Assembly had at several of its past sessions adopted resolutions in which it, *inter alia*, called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone; at the special session many delegations, speaking within the context of nuclear disarmament, expressed alarm at the nuclear developments in South Africa, and many African delegations pointed to the danger their countries were facing as a result of those developments. Algeria, the Bahamas, Egypt, Jamaica, Nigeria, the United Republic of Tanzania and many others, fearing the acquisition by South Africa of nuclear capability, invited all States to end any assistance to South Africa so as to stop all transfers of nuclear weapons, fissionable material or nuclear technology to that country. Algeria felt that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa would help remove the additional threat of nuclear programmes, such as that of South Africa, in which the Western Powers bore a historical responsibility by having deliberately become accomplices of a policy of aggression, domination and racial discrimination. The representative of Jamaica added the view that the planned acquisition by South Africa of nuclear weapons not only endangered Africa's efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the continent, but also constituted a dangerous acceleration in the arms race, because it compelled neighbouring countries to increase their defence capabilities. In order to reverse that trend, the international community must remove the South African threat. In view of what it regarded as a grave situation, Nigeria called for the matter to be dealt with in the programme of action to be adopted

at the special session and warned that South Africa was on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons as a result of assistance received from some Western countries.

The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was discussed also within the context of such ramifications as the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and regional approaches to disarmament.

Recalling that the wars suffered by the Middle East areas had made the international community appreciate the advantages to be derived from conditions conducive to a just and lasting peace in the region, the representative of Egypt said that that rationale was behind the proposal, made four years before by his country and Iran, to declare the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Israel, however, had sounded a dissenting note and to date had refused to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and to subject its nuclear activities to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He warned that if Israel continued to hamper the attainment of the goal, the United Nations was duty bound to take the necessary measures in accordance with the Charter.

The representative of Israel reviewed his country's policy on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, stating in particular that Israel considered negotiations among all the States of the region on that subject to be an indispensable requirement. Israel was of the view that such negotiations should lead to the conclusion of a formal contractual, multi-lateral convention by all the States of the region. The representative affirmed his country's readiness to participate in a regional conference and such negotiations.

Iran, as a sponsor of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, had actively sought the establishment of such a zone in order to avert the dangers of rapid and uncontrolled diffusion of nuclear technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the light of the dangerous atmosphere there. It believed that additional efforts should be made, at regional and international levels, both to facilitate the rational use of nuclear energy and to allay reasonable fears of nuclear arms proliferation.

The representative of Qatar deplored the unlimited economic and military support which, it held, Israel received from certain States. He warned that Israel's approach not only contributed to its policy of occupation and expansion, contrary to the aims of disarmament and the declaration of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but also increased the danger of military confrontation among the great Powers. He stressed that in order to reassure non-nuclear States regarding their security, it was necessary that the States concerned should declare that they would refrain, *inter alia*, from producing or possessing nuclear weapons and from helping the States in that region to develop or produce nuclear weapons, and that all States in the region which possessed nuclear weapons should accede to the non-proliferation Treaty as it applied to the Middle East. Other delegations from the Middle East, including Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman and the United Arab Emir-

ates, also expressed concern at Israel's nuclear potential and supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area.

With regard to the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, the Secretary-General, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 32/83, submitted a report⁴ to the Assembly at its special session, on 24 May 1978. In his report, the Secretary-General indicated that he had been in contact with the States of the South Asian region with regard to paragraph 4 of that resolution, and that there had been no requests for his assistance in connexion with the proposal. He also indicated that, during those contacts, the view had been expressed that he should continue to be available for that purpose.

The main parties, India and Pakistan, reiterated their established positions. The representative of Pakistan, whose country has been the main proponent of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, stressed that the conditions now existed for the creation of such a zone, as each South Asian State had unilaterally pledged not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. He argued that the region was a large enough geographical area to qualify for the status of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Furthermore, his country had every reason to believe that nuclear-weapon Powers, whether near or far from the region, would be prepared to respect the nuclear free status of a South Asian zone once it was established. The doubts and reservations that might be held by one or two of the States of the region could be set at rest through mutual consultations. Pakistan was ready to consider entering into a joint declaration, with the Governments of the South Asian States, renouncing the production or acquisition otherwise of nuclear weapons. Taking a different attitude, the representative of India reiterated his country's position as formulated by Prime Minister Desai who, in addressing the special session, had said that total nuclear disarmament could be achieved only by keeping in view the whole of the globe and not the regions, into which presumably, as a matter of political convenience or strategy, some countries sought to compartmentalize the world. India was convinced that there could not be a limited approach to the question of freedom from nuclear danger, but that the whole world should be declared a nuclear-free zone.

The representative of Bangladesh welcomed such initiatives as the creation of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Admitting the need to iron out difficulties with regard to definitions, concepts and geographical locations, as well as the obligations incumbent upon nuclear Powers towards such zones, he concurred with the Secretary-General's conclusion that nuclear-weapon-free zones would in no way compete or conflict with the non-proliferation Treaty and could indeed provide a means of extending and reinforcing the objectives of that Treaty, thus helping to strengthen and promote the non-proliferation régime. He reiterated that his country was fully aware of the constraints governing the realization of that objective in South Asia and declared its commitment to promote the necessary co-operation and mutual consultation that could pave the way for the denuclearization of the region.

⁴ A/S-10/5.

The representatives of Democratic Kampuchea, Qatar, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and the United Republic of Tanzania supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia, within the framework of their general support of regional denuclearization measures. The representative of Singapore urged that countries of Asia and Africa should consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones either on a regional basis or, where appropriate, on a subregional basis.

Denuclearization in other parts of the world was mentioned by some speakers in relation to their respective regions.

The representative of Romania, after expressing support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in central Europe, northern Europe, the Mediterranean area, the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean, reiterated his country's proposal to make the Balkans an area of good neighbourliness, peace and broad-based co-operation without nuclear weapons, in response to the interest of all Balkan peoples and in the interest of security in Europe and the world. The representative of Poland referred to the Rapacki plan, submitted by his country in October 1957, to create a denuclearized zone in central Europe,⁵ and stressed that the idea of denuclearized zones had now found a permanent place among achievements in the consolidation of peace and become a reality in certain parts of the world.

Albania, Algeria and the Syrian Arab Republic urged the transformation of the Mediterranean area into a zone of peace and co-operation on the basis of solidarity among the coastal States, the furtherance of their common interests, the elimination of causes of tension and the dismantling of foreign military bases. More specifically, the representative of Albania indicated that, as a condition for disarmament, the military blocs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty should be eliminated, that American and Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Europe and other regions, and that American and Soviet war fleets should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and other areas. However, the Final Document of the session, despite support by non-aligned countries, omitted reference to the Mediterranean because of differences among countries concerned.

Finland, recalling that it had put forward the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in northern Europe originally in 1963, suggested a Nordic arms control agreement to isolate the Nordic countries as completely as possible from the effects of nuclear strategy in general and new nuclear weapons technology in particular. Papua New Guinea recalled that during the South Pacific discussions the desire had always been expressed for the Pacific Ocean to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Finally, the Soviet Union proposed that nuclear-weapon-free zones should be created in territories of States where there were currently no nuclear weapons. It pointed out that some non-nuclear countries had already declared that they would not condone the emplacement of nuclear charges on their territories, and hoped that that practice could become universal.

⁵ See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), pp. 328-329.

The Final Document of the tenth special session made reference to nuclear-weapon-free zones within the general framework of nuclear disarmament both in the Declaration and the Programme of Action.

In the Declaration, the General Assembly included the following:

33. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned, and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

In the Programme of Action, the General Assembly spelled out the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, and to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Thereafter the Assembly stated:

60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure.

61. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

62. With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:

- (a) To respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;
- (b) To refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

63. In the light of existing conditions, and without prejudice to other measures which may be considered in other regions, the following measures are especially desirable:

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed at the tenth special session on the adherence to it;

(b) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so;

(c) In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the Security Council of the United Nations shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(d) The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps, as described in the paragraphs above, required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions, where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation exists. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic

Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

(e) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

As at previous sessions, the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones was discussed within the framework of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.⁶

The delegation of Mexico welcomed the Soviet Union's announcement of 25 April that it would adhere to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The representative of the Soviet Union subsequently stressed that it was essential to support in every way the desire of States not to allow the emplacement of nuclear weapons in certain geographical areas and in accordance with that principle the USSR had signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 18 May. The Soviet Union would henceforth take a similar position with regard to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world.

Mexico recalled the provisions relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Final Document of the tenth special session and stressed that it was the first time that the Assembly had found it possible to adopt such unrestricted provisions by consensus.

Egypt stated that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was a matter of special concern to it and regretted that that goal was frustrated by the dissenting position of Israel, which not only blocked the establishment of the zone but also refused to be bound by the non-proliferation Treaty or to subject its nuclear activities to the IAEA safeguards system. It recalled that at its special session, the Assembly had recommended that, pending the establishment of such a zone, the States of the region should solemnly declare that they would refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

Iran observed that one of the positive elements of the Programme of Action in the Final Document was the agreement that nuclear-weapon-free zones were an important measure of nuclear disarmament. In view of the position which the delegations had consistently taken regarding the obliga-

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 152-156.

tions of the nuclear-weapon States, it was satisfied with the undertakings the nuclear Powers were asked to give. The specific reference to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was particularly gratifying, the delegation of Iran noted, as was the endorsement of the proposed preliminary declarations which the States of the area should make. Furthermore, Iran held that the suggestion that the Security Council might be given a role in its implementation might contribute to the success of such an initiative.

The delegation of Ethiopia stressed its support for the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and for the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and urged the nuclear States to refrain from assisting South Africa.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones continued to be supported, as in previous sessions, by a large number of delegations who discussed the subject during the general debate in plenary meetings and in the First Committee.⁷ The discussion was similar to that at the special session, but took account of some elements which added new dimensions to the issue, including the signing by the Soviet Union of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on 18 May 1978, the request by Egypt to involve the Security Council in the issue of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and the statement by Pakistan, already made at the special session, that it was willing to consider entering into a joint declaration with the Governments of South Asia to renounce the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons. There was also a renewed call for the nuclear Powers, in the process of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, to give guarantees that they would respect the status of such zones and refrain from the introduction of nuclear weapons into them and from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them.

A large number of speakers from various groups reiterated their support for nuclear-weapon-free zones, including among the non-aligned countries, Afghanistan, Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Peru, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yugoslavia.

China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States also reiterated their support of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, with particular regard to the guarantees they had given, under the terms of establishment of such zones, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

In expressing its support of medium-sized and small countries seeking the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. China indicated that it had undertaken a specific obligation

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 4th to 50th, 54th and 55th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

with regard to the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, and that it sympathized with and supported the demands of the countries concerned for the establishment of such zones in South Asia, South-East Asia, the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean region.

The Soviet Union emphasized that its proposal concerning the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were currently no such weapons was a reliable way of preventing nuclear weapons from spreading all over the globe. Moreover, it held that its proposals in the nuclear disarmament area were consonant with the idea of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones and, if accepted, would result in a much stronger non-proliferation régime.

Yugoslavia attached great importance to the promotion of measures to build confidence among peoples and States, including the establishment of zones of peace and co-operation and nuclear-weapon-free zones, but it felt that as long as the nuclear arms race was not halted and no effective measures were taken to reduce nuclear armaments, not only would the credibility of some existing agreements be constantly brought into question, but the chances of the conclusion of new ones would be considerably reduced.

Albania and India reiterated doubts about the regional denuclearization approach. For India, partial measures such as the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones comprising the nuclear have-nots were not likely to generate any genuine feeling of security unless there was significant progress towards nuclear disarmament on a global rather than regional basis. The representative of Albania held the view that initiatives for creating nuclear-weapon-free zones did not diminish the danger of war and the threat that nuclear weapons presented as long as the imperialist super-Powers kept intact and enlarged their arsenals of such weapons.

The following pages give a summary of the discussion concerning the zones which were considered under separate agenda items.

A. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 32/76 and 32/79, the agenda of the thirty-third session included two items concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

In the general debate, the Secretary for External Relations of Mexico, having referred to the signing by the Soviet Union of Additional Protocol II earlier in the year, and France's declaration of its intention soon to sign Additional Protocol I, said that the Treaty was an example to the rest of the world, and made an appeal to the remaining country in Latin America, which by its express political will had neither signed nor ratified the Treaty yet, and to the nation which had signed but not ratified it, to re-examine their positions and allow the second stage of the Treaty to begin, namely, the development of regional nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. In that connexion, he announced that the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in

Latin America (OPANAL) had already requested an inventory of the nuclear technology needs of Latin American countries.

The delegations of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Suriname again expressed satisfaction with the success of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, particularly with the announcements of the nuclear Powers and the Latin American countries which were still not parties to the Treaty regarding their intention to adhere to that instrument as appropriate.

On the other hand, Cuba, noting that the provisions of paragraph 61 of the Final Document were not being fully applied, said that that was not the fault of the Latin American States, but that the existence of several military bases belonging to a nuclear Power was prejudicial to the self-declared nuclear-weapon-free zone. Foreign bases in the zone should be dismantled and there should be an undertaking by all nuclear-weapon States not to subject any State of the region to acts of hostility or aggression.

Two draft resolutions were submitted in connexion with Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

On 28 November, Mexico, on behalf of 22 Latin American countries, submitted a draft resolution regarding Additional Protocol I, which was adopted by the First Committee by consensus at the same meeting, and by the General Assembly on 14 December 1978, also without a vote, as resolution 33/58. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 and 32/76 of 12 December 1977 concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol I,

Taking into account that certain territories lying within the zone of application of that Treaty which are not sovereign political entities are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the States that *de jure* or *de facto* are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands became parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971, respectively,

Recalling also with satisfaction that the United States of America signed Additional Protocol I in 1977 and that the Government of that country has decided to take the necessary steps for its ratification,

Taking note of the declaration made on 25 May 1978 by the President of the French Republic before the General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, regarding the adherence of his country to Additional Protocol I,

1. *Invites* the United States of America to make every effort to ratify as soon as possible Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

2. *Welcomes with satisfaction* the declaration made by the President of the French Republic on 25 May 1978 regarding the adherence of his country to Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and invites the Government of that country to make every effort to adhere as soon as possible to that Protocol;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/58 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"

A draft resolution dealing with Additional Protocol II of the Treaty was introduced also by Mexico on 28 November on behalf of 21 Latin American countries. At the same meeting, the draft resolution was adopted by consensus. It was subsequently adopted without a vote by the General Assembly on 14 December 1978, as resolution 33/61. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2830 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2935 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3079 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3258 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3467 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/67 of 10 December 1976 and 32/79 of 12 December 1977, ten of which contain appeals to the nuclear-weapon States regarding the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

Reiterating its firm conviction that, for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol,

Recalling with satisfaction that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France and the People's Republic of China are already parties to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),

1. *Takes note with satisfaction* that Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1978 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that the Government of that country has officially announced that it intends to ratify that Protocol in the nearest future;

2. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/61 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"

The subsequent action taken by the Soviet Union on Additional Protocol II of the treaty is included in appendix II below.

B. Denuclearization of Africa

The item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa" was included in the agenda of the thirty-third session pursuant to General Assembly resolution 32/81. A number of the views expressed on the item were dominated by a sense of urgency in view of nuclear developments in South Africa. Most African countries expressed fear for their security, denounced the technological and military assistance accorded by certain great Powers to help South Africa develop its nuclear capabilities, and appealed to Governments concerned to stop their assistance to South Africa. They also called on the international community and the United Nations to take adequate and effective measures to put an end to that imminent nuclear danger. They believed that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa would contribute to the strengthening of the security of the countries of the region and to international peace and security.

The United Republic of Cameroon referred to paragraph 63 (c) of the Final Document, in which the Assembly called upon the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the objective of

the denuclearization of Africa. It recalled the Security Council's declaration of an arms embargo against South Africa but deplored the ineffectiveness of that measure, since certain countries, in violation of the resolution of the Security Council, continued their military and nuclear co-operation with that country. Accordingly, it recommended that the Security Council should impose strict economic sanctions against South Africa, beginning with an oil embargo. Similarly, the United Republic of Tanzania called upon the nuclear-weapon States, through the Security Council, to take the necessary measures to prevent South Africa from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. Madagascar, reaffirming its adherence to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, indicated that the failure to implement the Declaration should be attributed to South Africa's persistence in continuing its nuclear programme and stressed that States bore a heavy responsibility if they assisted Pretoria in its nuclear activities.

Benin, Cuba and Ethiopia pointed out that the existence of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa was not only a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but also represented an imminent danger to peace and security, in view of South Africa's acquiring the ability to produce nuclear weapons through the complicity and co-operation of certain Powers. Benin held that the role of one of the great Powers had resulted in a nuclear test being conducted by South Africa in the Kalahari desert. It hoped that the international community would unreservedly condemn that co-operation and would obtain a commitment by the great Powers to do what they could to compel South Africa to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons.

On 17 November, 34 African States submitted a draft resolution which was revised and reissued on 21 November. The revised draft was subsequently sponsored by seven additional countries.

It was introduced by the representative of Nigeria. By the draft, the General Assembly, noting Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, would, *inter alia*, have the Security Council exercise a close watch on South Africa and take appropriate effective steps to prevent it from developing and acquiring nuclear weapons, demand that South Africa submit all its nuclear facilities to inspection by IAEA, and appeal to all States to refrain from all co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field.

The revised draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 28 November by 114 votes to none, with 3 abstentions, and by the General Assembly on 14 December by 136 votes to none, again with 3 abstentions (France, United Kingdom, United States); resolution 33/63 reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/81 of 12 December 1977, in which it requested all States to refrain from co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field so as not to enable the aggressive and racist régime of that country to acquire nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolutions 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 3261 E (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3471 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/69 of 10 December

1976 and 32/81 of 12 December 1977, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Taking note of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, in which the Council, *inter alia*, decided that all States should refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons,

Gravely concerned that South Africa has not renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and therefore may still detonate a nuclear explosion and acquire nuclear-weapon capability in contravention of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Organization of African Unity and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council,

Convinced that this situation constitutes a grave danger to international peace and security and a permanent challenge to the efforts of the international community to establish Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Reiterating its decision, taken at the tenth special session, that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa,

1. *Strongly reiterates* its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa, comprising the continental African States, Madagascar and other islands surrounding Africa, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. *Vigorously condemns* any attempt by South Africa to introduce in any way whatsoever nuclear weapons into the African continent;

3. *Demands* that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent of Africa or elsewhere;

4. *Requests* the Security Council to exercise a close watch on South Africa and to take appropriate effective steps to prevent South Africa from developing and acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby endangering international peace and security;

5. *Condemns* any nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime which could frustrate the objective of the Organization of African Unity to keep Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

6. *Demands* that South Africa submit all its nuclear facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

7. *Appeals* to all States to refrain from all co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field so as not to enable the racist régime to acquire nuclear weapons, and to dissuade corporations, institutions and individuals within their jurisdiction from any co-operation with South Africa in this field;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of its solemn Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"

C. Proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

The item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" was included in the agenda of the thirty-third session pursuant to General Assembly resolution 32/82.

During the debate on the item a large number of the countries of the region expressed support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, both in the context of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and of keeping the region free of nuclear weapons. Representatives of many countries called attention to nuclear developments in Israel and

held that, because of those developments, the region faced a great danger. Such views were expressed by the delegations of Bahrain, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. Similar views were expressed by Algeria, Burundi, the Congo, Mali and Uganda, which drew a comparison between nuclear developments in South Africa and Israel.

The representative of Egypt, as well as many other speakers, referred to paragraph 63 of the Final Document of the special session. Egypt felt that the role of the Security Council was essential in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and in dealing with any violations of such zones, with due regard for Security Council resolution 255 (1968). It stressed that Israel had not acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, continued to strengthen and develop its nuclear capacity, had refused to submit its nuclear activities to the control of IAEA and refused over the past few sessions to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. That situation required the United Nations to take an energetic stand. Egypt would revise its own policy if Israel continued a policy which sought to prevent the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Israel, for its part, again stated that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and stressed that that was an official Government statement and an official undertaking of which responsible quarters the world over had taken note.

On 17 November, Egypt and Iran submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently also sponsored by Bahrain, Jordan and Oman.

In introducing the draft resolution, Iran pointed out that the operative paragraphs followed the pattern of thought in previous resolutions on the question; it made clear that the notable substantive change was the one inviting the parties directly concerned to declare their support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council. Elaborating on that new provision, it noted that the idea emanated from paragraph 63 (*d*) of the Final Document and involved the elaboration of a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area. The process of depositing declarations with the Security Council would put the whole undertaking on a more solid foundation. The Security Council role was perceived in a flexible manner as applying both to the methods by which the purport of the paragraph would be implemented and to the time frame and necessary stages towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

India requested separate votes in the First Committee on operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of the draft resolution. Paragraph 1, dealing with accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, was adopted by 103 votes to none, with 15 abstentions (Algeria, Angola, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cape Verde, Cuba, France, Guyana, India, Israel, Mozambique, Spain and the United Republic of Tanzania). Paragraph 3, concerning non-stationing of nuclear weapons by third parties and placement of nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards, was adopted by 114 votes to none, with 7 abstentions (Angola,

Bhutan, Brazil, India, Israel, Turkey and the United Republic of Tanzania). The draft resolution was adopted by the First Committee on 28 November by 119 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Israel).

In explaining its vote in the First Committee, Israel reiterated its support, in principle, for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East but believed that such a zone should be established through negotiations among the States concerned. It had frequently called on its Arab neighbours to join it in direct negotiations with a view to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, by concluding a formal contractual, multilateral convention by all the States of the region, on the lines of such precedents as the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. However, there had as yet been no response to that particular offer. With regard to the provision in the draft resolution regarding declarations deposited with the Security Council, Israel did not believe in unilateral depositions of declaratory statements of intent.

In explaining its vote on operative paragraphs 1 and 3, India recalled its position of principle on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and indicated that operative paragraph 3 did not adequately reflect its position on the need for non-discriminatory and universal safeguards on all nuclear activities of all States.

The General Assembly adopted the draft on 14 December 1978, as resolution 33/64, by 138 votes to none, with 1 abstention (Israel). It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also its resolution 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it recognized that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East enjoyed wide support in the region,

Bearing in mind its resolution 31/71 of 10 December 1976, in which it expressed the conviction that progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance the cause of peace in the region and in the world,

Considering its resolution 32/82 of 12 December 1977, in which it expressed conviction that the development of nuclear capability would further complicate the situation and immensely damage the efforts to create an atmosphere of confidence in the Middle East,

Guided by its relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recognizing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Invites* these countries, pending the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare solemnly that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices;

3. *Calls upon* these countries to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. *Further invites* these countries, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and during the process of its establishment, to declare, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, their support for the establishing of such a zone in the region and to deposit these declarations with the Security Council;

5. *Reaffirms again* its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the spirit and purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing in the region of the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote these objectives;

6. *Renews* its invitation to the Secretary-General to continue to explore the possibilities of making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"

D. Proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General" was included in the agenda of the thirty-third session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/83.

In his report,⁸ the Secretary-General stated that he had been in contact with the States of the South Asian region and informed the General Assembly that there had been no request on behalf of the States concerned for his assistance in connexion with the subject. He also noted that in the course of his contacts the view had been expressed that he should continue to be available for such assistance.

During the debate a number of delegations, including those of Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and Viet Nam, expressed support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

On 17 November, Pakistan submitted a draft resolution which was introduced by its representative on 24 November. For the present, Pakistan considered that the regional approach was the best and most effective means of preventing proliferation in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, because the non-proliferation régime as represented by the non-proliferation Treaty had certain inherent shortcomings and did not enjoy universal support. It believed that all the necessary conditions for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone existed in South Asia. The countries of the region had unilaterally renounced the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons, and all that Pakistan was proposing was to give binding multilateral form to those declarations. Furthermore, the majority of the regional States supported the creation of such a zone in South Asia and there was a common desire on the part of all

⁸ A/33/360.

the States in the region to extend the arrangements for denuclearization to as many neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested. In addition, all the nuclear-weapon States were favourably inclined to undertake the obligation entailed by the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

The First Committee adopted the draft resolution on 29 November by 93 votes to 2 (Bhutan and India) with 31 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted the recommendation of the First Committee on 14 December 1978 as resolution 33/65 by 97 votes to 2 (again, Bhutan and India) with 37 abstentions.

The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976 and 32/83 of 12 December 1977 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will strengthen the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the declarations issued at the highest level by Governments of South Asian States reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Recalling that in the above-mentioned resolutions it called upon the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective,

Further recalling that, in its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX), 31/73 and 32/83, it requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations mentioned therein and to render such assistance as might be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

1. *Reaffirms* its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

2. *Urges once again* the States of South Asia and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the meantime, from any action contrary to this objective;

3. *Calls upon* those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be required to promote the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

5. *Decides* to consider this item at its thirty-fourth session.

India explained its negative vote before the vote in the First Committee, stating that it believed, in accordance with Assembly resolutions 3265 (XXIX) and 3472 (XXX), that a proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region, taking into account the special features and geographical extent of that region, might be initiated by the States of that region, and that their participation should be voluntary and based on arrangements freely arrived at by them. In South Asia, there was disagreement about setting up a nuclear-weapon-free zone. India was opposed to it because it did not regard the region of South Asia as either appropriate or adequate for that purpose, and believed that it was incorrect to equate South Asia with Latin America, Africa or the Middle East, as the circumstances prevailing in those regions and the situations of the countries within them were different. India had solemnly pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons but that did not mean that it would either join a nuclear-weapon-free zone or accept full-scope safeguards. For those reasons, India had decided to vote against the draft resolution on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

The United States said that its support for the zone reflected its continued support for the concept of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world; it said that they could enhance the security of the parties and reinforce non-proliferation on a regional basis. The United States also recognized the responsibilities of all nuclear-weapon States in connexion with the establishment of such zones, and believed that the provisions governing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in any other area, must be negotiated and agreed on among the appropriate parties before States could be expected to undertake commitments regarding it.

France stated that while it generally favoured a regional approach to disarmament and supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, it would have to abstain on the draft resolution because the establishment of such zones could be supported only if the States of the region concerned gave their agreement to such initiatives. Italy also had abstained owing to the lack of agreement among the countries directly concerned.

Mauritius stated that it would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution because it was not clear what area was covered by the words "South Asia".

After the vote, Malaysia indicated that it had voted for the draft resolution because it was in line with the objectives of its proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia, but it considered that consultations should be held by the States directly concerned in the zone so as to ensure unanimous support and approval for it.

The Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom explained their support for the draft resolution on the grounds that under appropriate circumstances they believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones could make a positive contribution to regional security, to the cause of non-proliferation and to the reduction of the risk of nuclear war. Japan added that any such zone should be accompanied by an effective safeguards system and be consistent with the principles of international law, including the principle of the freedom of the high seas.

Conclusion

The General Assembly, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, defined the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an effective disarmament measure, thus demonstrating the support of Member States for that measure and their acceptance of such zones as a suitable framework to help ensure that the rights and obligations of States would be respected with regard to international peace and security in specific regions.

During 1978, there was a positive development regarding the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in that the Soviet Union signed and, at the end of the year (see appendix II below for details), ratified Additional Protocol II of the Treaty. The denuclearization of Africa remained the object of widespread support, with African and some other States pointing out the dangers of nuclear developments in South Africa. Regarding the Middle East, it was suggested that the Security Council might be the recipient of declarations by States of the region that they would not acquire, possess or manufacture nuclear weapons pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region with the consent and participation of all States concerned. In South Asia a similar approach was suggested. However, the negative vote of India on the draft resolution proposed by Pakistan pointed to the difficulties which must be overcome before a zone in that area could materialize.

The developments during 1978 regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the five specific resolutions adopted on the question, could further enhance the concept, and might lead to consideration of the possibility of establishing zones in other areas where proposals have been put forward but held in abeyance for a considerable period of time.

IAEA safeguards

Introduction

THIS CHAPTER HAS BEEN PROVIDED by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and deals with the safeguards being applied by the Agency at the end of 1978. Although it describes the situation as of that time, it should be noted that safeguards have been evolving practically since the establishment of the Agency in 1956. Therefore it has been necessary in some cases to refer to earlier events to provide background information useful for an understanding of the safeguards régime as it exists today.

Thus, unlike other chapters of the *Yearbook*, which record events of the year 1978, this chapter provides an up-to-date status report. As a result of this differing purpose, the chapter is a revision and follow-on of that which appeared in 1977, rather than a new narrative.

Scope of IAEA safeguards

International safeguards are one of the important aspects of the activities of IAEA. They are designed to ensure that any diversion of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices for prohibited activities, or for unknown purposes, is promptly detected.

As a result of safeguards agreements concluded with States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII)), and with States not parties to that Treaty, the Agency's safeguards coverage today is very extensive. According to the best information officially available to the Agency, there are at present only five non-nuclear-weapon States with significant nuclear activities that are not covered by Agency safeguards. It is therefore apparent that the Agency applies safeguards to most significant nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. The numbers and types of nuclear facilities subject to safeguards and those not safeguarded as of 31 December 1978 are shown in annex I to this chapter. Nevertheless, any State that is not a party to the non-proliferation Treaty or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is free, in the absence of other obligations, to build or otherwise acquire unsafeguarded nuclear plants.

Safeguards agreements not concluded under the non-proliferation Treaty

The basic provision related to the Agency safeguards is contained in article III A.5 of the statute of IAEA, under which the Agency is authorized to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy. The Agency's rights and responsibilities related to safeguards application are laid down in article XII.

Safeguards first developed on a bilateral basis. Nations advanced in nuclear science used to attach safeguards to their exports of nuclear material and plants to other countries in order to verify that the material supplied served only peaceful purposes. Early in the 1960s the United States began to transfer the administration of those bilateral safeguards to IAEA. Other supplier countries followed suit. At the same time some member States unilaterally submitted nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards. In accordance with its statute, IAEA also commenced to apply safeguards to material and facilities provided by it under the section entitled "Agency projects", by which it provides assistance to States in the area of the peaceful application of nuclear energy.

Thus three categories of agreements were created under which international safeguards were applied by the Agency:

(a) Bilateral, so-called transfer agreements, under which IAEA assumed from the two States parties to an initial bilateral agreement for co-operation the responsibility to apply its safeguards. Later most of the nuclear co-operation agreements between States provided for immediate application of Agency safeguards rather than going through the stage of bilateral safeguards;

(b) Unilateral submission agreements. These agreements may cover imports or indigenous activities in the State concerned;

(c) Agency project agreements.

All three categories of agreements have a basic element in common: they essentially address the application of safeguards in respect of individual or otherwise limited supplies and to some extent also the fruits of such supplies, in the form of produced special fissionable material or facilities making use of supplied items.

The scope of safeguards, i.e., the items to be subject to the Agency safeguards, is defined in each specific case in the safeguards agreement covering the case. Items to be safeguarded are included in a list referred to as "inventory". These safeguards agreements constitute the legal basis for the application of safeguards; they specify the rights and obligations of the parties and the conditions under which Agency safeguards shall be applied as well as

the technical procedures for such safeguards. The Safeguards Document (the Agency's Safeguards System, 1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968)¹ serves as general guidance when drawing up the agreements. This has resulted in a standardization of the technical content of the non-Treaty safeguards agreements.

In an attempt to introduce standardization in respect to the duration of the agreements, the IAEA Board of Governors decided in February 1974 that application of safeguards and therefore the duration of the agreements should continue until the Agency had terminated the application of safeguards, according to the provisions of the agreement, to supplied nuclear material and to special fissionable material produced, processed or used in or in connexion with supplied nuclear material, equipment, facilities or non-nuclear material.

The Agency statute provides that Agency safeguards are designed to ensure that items subject to safeguards do not serve any military purpose. The Agency interprets the military purpose concept to include the use of special fissionable and other nuclear material for the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive device. All recent safeguards agreements contain an express provision to that effect.

The Agency applies safeguards in the following 12 States that are not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain and Turkey. In eight of those States all significant nuclear activities in the State are under safeguards, while in India, Israel, South Africa and Spain some of these activities are covered by safeguards and others are not. The only non-nuclear-weapon State which has significant nuclear activity and where safeguards are not applied by the Agency is Egypt which, however, has signed the Treaty.

Safeguards agreements concluded under the non-proliferation Treaty

In 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature. It entered into force on 5 March 1970. Under article III, paragraphs 1 and 4, of the Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty undertook to conclude with IAEA agreements whereby they submitted all their peaceful nuclear activities to the Agency's safeguards. A Safeguards Committee was set up in IAEA to advise the Board of Governors of the Agency's responsibilities in relation to safeguards in connexion with the Treaty, in particular about the content of the agreements which would be required in connexion with that Treaty. The Committee, composed of 48 member States, completed its work on 10 March 1971. It produced a set of recommendations for the content of the relevant safeguards agreements in the form of a draft agreement designed to enable the Agency to apply safeguards

¹ INFCIRC/66/Rev.2.

pursuant to the Treaty, particularly meeting the requirement that safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities as distinct from safeguards agreements not concluded under the Treaty. These recommendations form the substance of all of the safeguards agreements under the Treaty, which are all, therefore, practically identical.²

About half of the States having such safeguards agreements in force do not have nuclear material in quantities which, according to the agreement, require the application of safeguards. For such States the agreement is held in abeyance until the State acquires such quantities and a protocol to that effect is concluded with the State concerned.³

Since all safeguards work is based on agreements concluded between the Government of a State and IAEA, it was felt necessary to lay down the essential points for co-operation between the States and the Agency. As a result, the safeguards agreements under the non-proliferation Treaty require that the State establish and maintain a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) and lay down the types of measures to be provided by the SSAC. In this way, the SSAC becomes an essential link between the operator of a nuclear facility and the Agency. In some States the national verification of the operator's nuclear material accountancy at the plant is carried out in a way similar to that of the Agency. In these cases, a special protocol has been attached to the safeguards agreements regulating the co-ordination of both verification activities, those of the States and those of the Agency. Such are the cases of the safeguards agreements with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Japan.⁴

A list of States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements under the Treaty is shown in annex II to this chapter. There are 38 States parties that have not yet concluded the required safeguards agreement in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. However, those among them having significant nuclear activities are under safeguards as a consequence of other agreements. Of the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, the United Kingdom and the United States have negotiated agreements pursuant to voluntary offers made by them. Those agreements will enable IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear installations except those related to national security. France has negotiated a similar agreement. The three agreements have been approved by the Board of Governors and the agreement concluded with the United Kingdom entered into force on 14 August 1978 while that concluded with France was signed on 27 July 1978. At present safeguards are applied in France, the United Kingdom and the United States under trilateral agreements (not of the non-proliferation Treaty type), such as agreements to cover reprocessing of irradiated fuel shipped from other States.

² For the structure and content of such agreements, see INFCIRC/153.

³ See, for example, the agreement between Cyprus and IAEA (INFCIRC/189).

⁴ See INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/255 respectively.

Safeguards agreements concluded under the Treaty of Tlatelolco

According to article 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), each State for which the Treaty is in force is required to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency covering its nuclear activities. Safeguards agreements have been concluded or are being negotiated. All of them relate to both the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, therefore, they apply to all nuclear activities of the States concerned.⁵

Recent developments in the application of safeguards

Article III, paragraph 2, of the non-proliferation Treaty stipulates that nuclear supplies to any non-nuclear-weapon State from a State party to the Treaty should be subject to Agency safeguards.

To reach a general agreement on the implementation of this provision a group of exporting countries deliberated for several years and in 1974 informed the Director General of IAEA that they would require, as a pre-condition for the export of source or special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State, that such material should not be diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. IAEA safeguards to that end would have to be applied to the nuclear supply. They also informed the Agency that when making such exports they would require assurances that the material would not be re-exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the Treaty unless arrangements for Agency safeguards were made by the State receiving such re-exported material. Furthermore the group drew up a list designating the categories of equipment and other material, such as heavy water, the export of which would necessitate the application of safeguards to the nuclear material produced, processed or used in the facility for which these items were to be supplied⁶ (see also chapter XIII above).

At the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Geneva in May 1975, several States stressed their view that the extension of the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States, even if not parties to the Treaty, should be a pre-condition for any nuclear imports into those States. The Board of Governors of IAEA adopted a draft resolution, submitted jointly by Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela, in which it requested the Director General to prepare a document setting out the possible content of an agreement for application of Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the State party to

⁵ See, for example, the agreement between Ecuador and IAEA (INFCIRC/231).

⁶ See INFCIRC/209 and Add.1-9.

the agreement. The Agency's secretariat has prepared a draft for such a "full-scope agreement" but so far no State has communicated the wish to conclude such an agreement. In this context, when the guidelines for nuclear transfers established during meetings of nuclear suppliers in London were communicated to the Agency on 11 January 1978, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the USSR declared in separate letters their determination that their nuclear exports would go to a non-nuclear-weapon State only in case the whole nuclear activity of that State was subject to Agency safeguards.⁷

The Agency's Safeguards System does not provide specific procedures for safeguards connected with the transfer of technological information and until a few years ago that matter had not been covered in any safeguards agreement to which the Agency is a party. However, in the trilateral agreements concluded between IAEA and: the Republic of Korea and France; Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany; Pakistan and France; South Africa and France; and Spain and Canada,⁸ and in two agreements with Argentina⁹ covering a fuel fabrication plant supplied in connexion with a co-operation agreement between Argentina and Canada, provision is made for the application of safeguards in connexion with the supply of technological information. Any facility, equipment or material benefitting from the transfer of such information will be subject to safeguards. Those agreements further provide that any nuclear facility or specified equipment will be deemed to derive from the transferred information if the chemical or physical process which characterizes the operation of the nuclear facility or equipment is the same or essentially the same as the one to which the information relates.

IAEA safeguards in practice

When applying safeguards, IAEA makes use of material accountancy with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures. The plant operator is required to determine the qualities and composition of nuclear material kept in the plant and changes in those amounts. The operator must keep records of those determinations and report them to IAEA through the national authority. By balancing nuclear material on hand and recorded data it can be ascertained that no material has escaped the operator's control.

Containment and surveillance techniques are being increasingly employed by the Agency. Photographic equipment is one of these and for some years now cameras have been successfully employed in some countries to provide confirmation that no undeclared fuel movements have taken place. Seals also have been used, and adequate seals which can be checked in the field are under development. Optical surveillance is currently being boosted

⁷ See INFCIRC/254.

⁸ See INFCIRC/233, INFCIRC/237, INFCIRC/239, INFCIRC/244 and INFCIRC/247.

⁹ See INFCIRC/250 and INFCIRC/251 respectively.

powerfully by the introduction of closed circuit television recorders in place of the present film system.

Material accountancy is applied to provide information which is to be verified in the course of IAEA inspections. IAEA inspectors check the operator's records against reports sent to IAEA, verify that seals have not been tampered with, and analyse films or video tapes in surveillance equipment. And, most important, the inspectors verify quantity, composition and location of nuclear material by making independent measurements and taking samples of material which are analysed in IAEA laboratories. All checks and analyses done, IAEA can conclude whether all nuclear material under safeguards is satisfactorily accounted for or not.

In a Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) covering 1977, the IAEA secretariat reported in detail on the quantification of the terms "timely detection" and "significant quantities" and the values presently used by the inspectorate. Those values are not considered as requirements, but rather as guidelines for planning safeguards implementation approaches. The Agency was able to show that the inspection goals could be reached at various types of facilities without an undue burden on the operators. In some cases inspection goals could not be fully attained but that was chiefly due to the limitations of resources available to the inspectorate and to the fact that development of necessary equipment had not yet been completed.

In the report the secretariat also presented preliminary findings and recommendations on the effectiveness of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material. Bearing in mind the importance of SSAC work as a fundamental part of the Agency's verification activity, the secretariat placed special emphasis on the problem. Two actions were taken. First, attempts were made to secure agreement on the content of a document containing recommendations for State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, which was intended to apply to all types of safeguards agreements. The secretariat expects endorsement of the document by the competent Advisory Group in autumn 1979. Secondly, the secretariat analyzed in detail the effectiveness of SSAC and equivalent systems in those States in which safeguards were implemented. The secretariat intends to enter into bilateral consultations with individual States to verify the results of this analysis and to discuss what measures need to be taken. Several measures are already under consideration, such as the training support offered by some member States.

The Agency experienced difficulties with the reliability of certain surveillance equipment and in the development of some new equipment. Special measures have been undertaken to remedy those situations.

The Agency concluded in the SIR that its safeguards operation had not detected any diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material. It further concluded that in all 40 States where safeguards agreements were in full implementation, all safeguarded nuclear material remained in the declared peaceful nuclear activity or was otherwise adequately accounted for.

As a result of recent agreements, an end to the negotiations between EURATOM and the Agency for the completion of the subsidiary arrange-

ments to the safeguards agreement was in sight at the end of 1978. More than two-thirds of the plant in the countries concerned were covered by facility attachments. The only other safeguards agreement with a non-nuclear-weapon State which contains provisions similar to those in the IAEA/EURATOM agreement is that with Japan. The subsidiary arrangements for the latter were completed and entered into force on 1 December 1978. No other non-nuclear-weapon State has proposed the conclusion of a safeguards agreement resembling the EURATOM and Japanese agreements to take account of their advanced SSAC. It should be borne in mind, moreover, that the arrangements agreed to in the last two years for implementing the EURATOM agreement have considerably reduced the differentiation of approach foreseen when the agreement was negotiated in 1972.

As a result of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) project (see chapter XIII above), the existing Safeguards System may be supplemented by the development of an international plutonium storage system, thereby implementing the special safeguards provision in article XII.A.5 of the Statute, which authorizes IAEA

. . . to approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of irradiated materials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will not lend itself to diversion of materials for military purposes and will comply with applicable health and safety standards; to require that special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product be used for peaceful purposes under continuing Agency safeguards for research or in reactors, existing or under construction, specified by the member or members concerned; *and to require deposit with the Agency of any excess of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product over what is needed for the above-stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of these materials*, provided that thereafter at the request of the member or members concerned special fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency shall be returned promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the same provisions as stated above.

ANNEX I

Nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States

The table below shows the number of nuclear facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States subject to safeguards, and also gives an estimate of the number of facilities which are not safeguarded. Of the facilities currently under non-NPT (non-proliferation Treaty) safeguards, one in Peru, one in Portugal and one in Venezuela will come under NPT safeguards upon entry into force of safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the Treaty.

NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES SUBJECT TO
IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1978

	<i>NPT safeguards^a</i>	<i>Non-NPT safeguards</i>	<i>Non- safeguarded^b</i>
Power reactors	88	21	1
Conversion fuel fabrication	19	2	2
Enrichment	1	0	1
Reprocessing	3	0	2
Pilot fuel fabrication	10	2	
Pilot enrichment	2	0	
Pilot reprocessing	1	1	1
Research reactors and critical facilities	134	29	
Subcritical facilities	4	1	
Research and development facilities	25	0	5
Separate storage and other locations	236	10	
TOTAL	523	66	12

^a Facilities covered by a non-proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement which is now in force.

^b According to the best information available to the Agency.

[Annex II overleaf]

ANNEX II

States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty having safeguards agreements in force under the Treaty

The following 60 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have concluded safeguards agreements—now in force—pursuant to the Treaty:^a

Afghanistan	Holy See	Morocco
Australia	Honduras	Nepal
Austria	Hungary	Netherlands
Belgium	Iceland	New Zealand
Bulgaria	Iran	Nicaragua
Canada	Iraq	Norway
Cyprus	Ireland	Philippines
Czechoslovakia	Italy	Poland
Denmark	Japan	Republic of Korea
Dominican Republic	Jamaica	Romania
Ecuador	Jordan	Singapore
El Salvador	Lebanon	Sudan
Ethiopia	Lesotho	Surinam
Fiji	Luxembourg	Swaziland
Finland	Madagascar	Sweden
Gambia	Malaysia	Switzerland
German Democratic Republic	Maldives	Thailand
Germany, Federal Republic of	Mauritius	Uruguay
Ghana	Mexico	Yugoslavia
Greece	Mongolia	Zaire

The non-proliferation Treaty requires each non-nuclear-weapon State party to it to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA covering all of the State's peaceful nuclear activities. Seven of the States listed above (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands) have concluded the safeguards agreement jointly with IAEA and EURATOM, in accordance with article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty.

Although safeguards agreements, under the Treaty, with Peru, Portugal and Venezuela are not yet in force, all nuclear activities in those States are already under safeguards as a result of the operation of other agreements. Negotiations are under way with most of the parties to the Treaty that have not yet concluded their safeguards agreements.

Except in the three cases mentioned, the safeguards agreements under the Treaty that have not yet entered into force are solely with States that do not yet have any significant nuclear activity, that is, an activity involving nuclear material in an amount that would call for the application of safeguards under the Treaty.

^a In 29 cases, the application of safeguards has been held in abeyance because the State concerned does not yet have any significant nuclear activities. Full application will begin as soon as the State concerned acquires nuclear material or plant requiring the application of safeguards.

PART FOUR

Prohibition of other weapons

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

Introduction

THROUGH THE AGES, no form of warfare has been more condemned than the use of poisonous and toxic agents. And scientific and technological advances of the past few decades have increased the potential of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to such an extent that one can conceive of their causing casualties on a vast scale, much greater than would be associated with conventional warfare.

The question of chemical and biological warfare was discussed intermittently in the 1950s and early 1960s as one aspect of various comprehensive disarmament proposals. In 1968, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) placed the question on its agenda under the heading "Non-nuclear measures" and ENDC agreed to recommend that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare.

At its twenty-third session, the Assembly adopted resolution 2454 A (XXIII) in which it requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified experts, a concise report on the subject. Accordingly, in 1969, a unanimous report, entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*,¹ was submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and discussed by ENDC (later the CCD) during its session that same year.

One of the issues that long impeded progress was whether chemical and biological weapons should be considered jointly. A draft convention submitted to ENDC by the United Kingdom² in 1969 dealt with the elimination of biological weapons, as distinct from chemical weapons. A draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries and Mongolia³ on 19 September 1969 dealt with both chemical and biological weapons and

¹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

² *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232, annex C, section 20.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

was considered by the General Assembly. The Soviet Union contended that both types of weapons had been treated together in the Geneva Protocol, General Assembly resolutions and the report of the Secretary-General, and that they should continue to be considered jointly. A separate biological weapons convention, it argued, might only result in an intensification of the chemical arms race. The United States, supporting the United Kingdom's position, stressed the difference between the two kinds of weapons. The United States maintained that while it did not consider prohibition of one of those categories of weapons less urgent than the other, it held that biological weapons presented less intractable problems, and therefore an agreement on banning them should not be delayed pending an agreement on reliable prohibition of chemical weapons.

Agreement on separating the two issues was first reached in 1971, when the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States consented in the CCD to the conclusion, as a first step, of a separate convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Separate but identical drafts of such a convention were submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the USSR and by the United States. After considerable discussion in the Committee, consensus was reached on a revised text, which was annexed to the report of the CCD.⁴ On 16 December 1971, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2826 (XXVI), in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and to which the Convention was annexed. The Convention was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.

From 1971 onward, the question of a ban on chemical weapons has been discussed as a separate issue. In the preamble of the Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, the States parties recognize that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and express their determination to continue negotiations to that end. In article IX, moreover, each State party affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to that end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

The discussions that have taken place since 1971 on a ban on chemical weapons have involved a number of highly complex and closely interrelated issues. Briefly, the principal questions have been the scope of a prohibition,

⁴ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1971*, document DC/234.

i.e., whether it should be comprehensive or initially of a partial nature; the activities that should be banned and the agents that would be subject to a prohibition; and the way in which compliance with the convention should be verified.

In respect of the scope of a prohibition, the proposals for a comprehensive approach imply that a convention should, from the moment of its conclusion, extend to all chemical means of warfare from the stage of their development up to their use. Furthermore, in the comprehensive approach, not only chemical weapons themselves would be banned, but also the chemical agents they make use of and their means of delivery. In the gradual approach, the ban would initially be limited, for instance, to those lethal chemical agents that can be identified on the basis of specific agreed criteria. The coverage of the ban would subsequently be extended, by a series of carefully defined steps, so as to achieve eventually a comprehensive prohibition. Generally speaking, the Eastern European States and the non-aligned countries have called for a comprehensive way of dealing with the subject, while the gradual approach has been advocated by the Western States, which have tended to see the scope of a prohibition in the light of the means available to verify compliance.

The second main issue is the question of the activities which should be banned, i.e., whether the scope of the ban should extend to development, production and stockpiling or only to one or another of those activities. It has also involved the question of whether one or more of those activities should be banned with respect only to the weapons themselves or also with respect to the chemical warfare agents used in them.

The determination of the activities and the substances subject to the prohibition is obviously essential in setting the exact scope of an agreement. A major problem is posed by the fact that chemical substances, as well as the facilities in which they are produced, may serve more than one purpose. In this context, it is highly important to agree on criteria that would determine which activities and substances should come under the scope of a prohibition. One such criterion is that of purpose or intention, meaning that a lethal chemical agent that has no peaceful use should be banned. Another possible criterion is that of quantity, by which substances produced in amounts having no justification for peaceful purposes should come under the prohibition. Other proposals made in the discussions refer to certain properties which would make chemical substances warfare agents; these include their toxic effects, degree of toxicity, suitability for weapons use, chemical structure and whether the chemical agent is amenable to verification.

The third main subject of discussion is the question of the assurance of compliance with a prohibition of chemical weapons. Various modes of verification have been proposed, in particular the use of national means, combined with international monitoring measures of various degrees of intensity, including on-site inspection.

Over the past eight years, a number of proposals and working papers have been submitted to the CCD, among which are the following: a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling

of chemical weapons and on their destruction⁵ by the Eastern European members of the CCD in 1972; a working paper calling for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons,⁶ by 10 non-aligned States members of the CCD in 1973; a draft convention⁷ in 1974 and a working paper⁸ in 1976, both by Japan; and a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction⁹ by the United Kingdom, also in 1976.

In a joint communiqué issued on 3 July 1974,¹⁰ the Soviet Union and the United States announced that they had agreed in principle to consider a joint initiative with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. Since then, bilateral consultations have been held between the two Powers for the purpose of agreeing on the text of that initiative for its submission to the CCD.

The General Assembly, meanwhile, since its twenty-sixth session in 1971, has each year adopted a resolution¹¹ in which it has expressed the need to continue negotiations as a matter of high priority with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

The remaining treatment of the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in this chapter is divided into its two main aspects, each under its separate heading.

A. Chemical weapons

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Proposals concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons were included in a large number of the working papers¹² which were submitted by delegations

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Supplement for 1972*, document CCD/361.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 31 (A/9141)*, document CCD/400.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/420.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27)*, annex III, document CCD/515.

⁹ *Ibid.*, document CCD/512.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627)*, annex II, document CCD/431.

¹¹ Resolutions 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972; 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973; 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974; 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; 31/65 of 10 December 1976; and 32/77 of 12 December 1977.

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vols. III-VI, for example, documents A/AC.187/30/Add.1; A/AC.187/55/Add.1 and Corr.1 and 2; A/AC.187/56; A/AC.187/78; A/AC.187/79; A/AC.187/81; A/AC.187/82; A/AC.187/87; A/AC.187/91; A/AC.187/92; A/AC.187/96; A/AC.187/97; A/AC.187/108 and A/AC.187/112. For a detailed review of these documents, see chapter 1 above, pp. 7-25.

during the course of the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

Almost all of the papers which addressed themselves to the issue took the position that an early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons was a most urgent matter which the international community must attend to in an expeditious manner. In fact, the view was consistently reflected that an order of priority for consideration of this subject should be second only to that of the question of nuclear weapons in the over-all efforts directed to the banning of all types of weapons of mass destruction.

The outcome of the deliberations and negotiations during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee were reflected in the draft final document¹³ by the incorporation of a paragraph dealing with the subject in the section entitled "Declaration" and another in the section on the proposed programme of action.

In the course of the debate at the tenth special session itself,¹⁴ a number of delegations, including Denmark, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Peru, Romania, Somalia and Thailand, underlined the urgent need for greater efforts towards an early achievement of a ban on chemical weapons. In that connexion, Somalia stated that a disarmament priority which its Government considered to be second only to that of ending the nuclear arms race was the banning of the use of chemical weapons. Ireland, while emphasizing the need for a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons at the earliest possible date, suggested that in the interim period there should be a voluntary moratorium on the development and production of such weapons. Echoing similar ideas, the representatives of some of the non-governmental organizations which addressed the *Ad Hoc* Committee also called for a moratorium on production of chemical weapons, including nerve gases.

Several delegations, among them those of Bulgaria, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, welcomed the ongoing bilateral negotiations on the subject between the United States and the Soviet Union. Portugal stated that, after lengthy negotiations, it appeared that at long last the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and providing for the elimination of the existing stockpiles was imminent. Finland also observed that it might not be unwarranted optimism to look forward to successful results in the near future. In a similar context, Poland noted that it had been possible to narrow appreciably the differences in positions in the course of the bilateral talks intended to produce a relevant agreement. Nepal, on the other hand, deplored the fact that although such negotiations had been conducted for many years, they had not come to fruition.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. I.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

The subject of prohibition of chemical weapons was also referred to in connexion with the development of the programme of action to be included in the Final Document of the session. Addressing itself to that question, the United States noted that judging from the programme of action that had been emerging from the deliberations during the session itself, as well as during the work of the Preparatory Committee, it had become apparent that the arms control negotiations in which the United States Government was engaged coincided to a remarkable extent with that programme. In reviewing the status of those negotiations, the delegation noted that as far as the section in the programme of action dealing with other weapons of mass destruction was concerned, the United States was, *inter alia*, actively engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to banning the production of chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. Noting that the programme of action should essentially be based on measures to be implemented within a few years, the delegation of Belgium stated that the programme should as a matter of priority comprise the conclusion of agreements which had already been under negotiation for many years, including a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Nigeria stated that a programme of action would have to be in two parts, namely, the conclusion of agreements on measures that were urgent and of immediate concern and those of a long-term nature. Among the former category should be a treaty banning the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and providing for their destruction.

There was no extensive discussion during the special session on the main substantive issues such as questions related to the scope of a ban and verification of compliance with a prohibition on chemical weapons. A number of delegations, however, commented briefly on matters concerning verification. Thus, the Soviet Union reiterated its view that the problem of control could be resolved on the basis of national means of verification supplemented by well-considered international procedures. The sole reference that the United States made to the subject was to point out that problems of verification, as could be imagined, were extremely difficult and complex, but that significant progress on that question was, nevertheless, being made. The Federal Republic of Germany underscored the feasibility of evolving an international verification system, including on-site inspection, which would not prejudice the legitimate interests of civilian industry and research. In that respect, it cited its own experience whereby it had renounced the production of chemical weapons and submitted to international controls. The United Kingdom expressed its willingness to accept inspection of its relevant chemical manufacturing plants as a measure of compliance with any chemical weapons convention to which it might become a party.

The absence of any major areas of disagreement with respect to the issues raised on the subject during the special session was reflected in the fact that the paragraphs which formed part of the draft final document emerged intact for incorporation into the Final Document. The two paragraphs, under the sections entitled "Declaration" and "Programme of Action" respectively, read as follows:

21. Along with these measures, agreements or other effective measures should be adopted to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority.

75. The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

In 1978, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continued its consideration of the prohibition of chemical weapons in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 32/77, and in the course of the session most members stressed the importance and urgency they attached to the matter as a priority issue before the Committee.

Compared to some previous years, the discussion on chemical weapons¹⁵ was rather truncated due to the feeling on the part of most members that further progress in the area depended on the outcome of the bilateral negotiations taking place outside the framework of the Committee between the United States and the Soviet Union. A major part of the Committee's discussion, consequently, was devoted to an assessment of the status of those bilateral talks, although, in consideration of the subject, statements were also made regarding the three major issues of the scope of a ban, the definition of agents to be included and the question of verification. During the session Sweden submitted a working paper¹⁶ on the scanning of chemical literature by computer, and other working papers concerning the disarmament programme in general included consideration of the question of chemical weapons.

At the outset of the session, the Soviet Union and the United States informed the Committee that bilateral negotiations on the subject were continuing and that some progress had been registered, both with regard to the scope of the agreement and to its verification, but that several important questions still remained to be resolved. The Soviet Union stressed that the problem was complex and that adequate time would be needed for its solution, while the United States conceded that it could not predict with certainty when the joint initiative might be completed.

A number of delegations, among them those of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Iran, Mongolia and Poland, welcomed the information on the progress of the bilateral talks and hoped for an early agreement on the remaining points of the joint draft to be submitted to the Committee for elaboration.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 157-187.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CCD/569.

Several delegations, while welcoming the continuation of the bilateral talks, expressed the view that pending the successful conclusion of those negotiations, the United States and the USSR should apprise the Committee of the specific articles on which agreement had been reached by the two parties so as to enable the Committee to proceed to further concrete discussions on the subject. Thus Japan maintained that if general agreement had already been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on the scope of the chemical agents to be included in an agreement, they should present those key elements of agreement to the Committee. Furthermore, if no agreement had been reached, at least the basic positions of the two States should be explained to the Committee. The delegation of Mexico also recommended that if there was no early prospect of a joint agreement between the two countries, the best course of action might be for them to present a progress report on the subject so as to enable the Committee to take cognizance of those articles which had already been completed in the preliminary draft, provided that the remaining articles were also submitted to the Committee as and when they were ready. Egypt too was of the opinion that it was essential that the Committee be informed of the stage of the bilateral talks on chemical weapons and expressed its preference for scheduling informal meetings of the Committee to receive and consider such a report. The delegation of the Netherlands, addressing itself to the same matter, stated that there was no valid reason to wait until the United States and the Soviet Union had completed their negotiations on all aspects of a treaty on chemical weapons since there were many detailed questions which could already be discussed in the Committee, thus saving time for later consideration of the treaty as a whole.

Later during the session, in a statement informing the Committee of the resumption of their bilateral talks, the United States and the Soviet Union affirmed that their earlier statement on the subject still accurately reflected the status of the negotiations. The statement noted that the issues involved in complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons were extremely complex. The political and technical issues involved were directly linked and thus must be dealt with at the same time. Developing an adequately verifiable disarmament measure which was designed to eliminate an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of States and which also affected one of the major industries in many countries was a task which required great care. The statement concluded by noting that the two sides would exert additional effort in order to complete the elaboration of a joint initiative on the question as soon as possible.

In response to the progress report on the Soviet-American bilateral talks, the delegation of Iran, in a statement on behalf of the members known as the group of 15, pointed out that the group found it most regrettable that seven years after the conclusion of the negotiations on a biological weapons convention, multilateral negotiations on the complete elimination of chemical weapons had not yet started, in spite of valuable contributions made by the Member States.

With regard to the specific issue of the scope of a possible agreement, those delegations which addressed themselves to the subject, including the

Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and India, continued to favour a comprehensive approach to any prohibition of chemical means of warfare and a number of them welcomed indications that a broad or comprehensive agreement might be possible. Hungary, noting that its basic position was still that reflected in the socialist draft of 1972, expressed gratification that the joint draft under preparation provided for the broadest possible ban.

Japan stated that, judging from the recent deliberations in the CCD and the Soviet-American progress report, the main thoughts on how the question of banning chemical weapons should be treated appeared to be the following: (a) all chemical warfare agents to be banned should be divided into three categories, namely, single-purpose agents (used solely for warfare purposes), dual-purpose agents (used for both warfare and peaceful purposes), and the precursors; (b) the chemical warfare agents to be banned should be all lethal chemical agents, including incapacitating agents, and their scope should be specified by a general purpose criterion supplemented by a toxicity criterion; (c) the scope of agents to be banned should include precursors and should exclude agents for riot control such as tear gases; (d) the listing of the chemical warfare agents to be banned could not be exhaustive, but it was desirable that they should be amply illustrated in a positive or a negative list; (e) all lethal chemical warfare agents should be banned both with respect to their production and to stockpiling, and the destruction of existing stockpiles in arsenals should be executed step by step; and (f) no treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons should obtrude upon the activities of chemical industries for peaceful purposes.

With respect to the question of verification of compliance, there were indications that a narrowing of divergent viewpoints might be in the offing. Reflecting that apparent trend, the Soviet Union observed that in the course of its negotiations with the United States, the area of mutual understanding had become broader on verification problems, a subject that was immensely difficult, complex and of great sensitivity for the interests of the States concerned.

The United States declared that a chemical weapons convention would directly engage any country with a modern chemical industry and pose new challenges in the area of verification. Those challenges, the delegation stated, created an opportunity to work out innovative forms of international co-operation which, in turn, could enhance the confidence of States parties that the future convention was being fully complied with by others.

Commenting on the question of verification, the Federal Republic of Germany emphasized that the experience it had gained with international controls, in connexion with the ban it had accepted on the production of chemical weapons, had not hampered development of the German chemical industry and said that it wished to share that experience to help develop a control system for a multilateral chemical weapons ban.

The delegation of the United Kingdom pointed out that, apart from ensuring that testing or field trials were no longer taking place, the two main verification problems to be overcome in concluding any effective chemical weapons convention were to ensure that production of chemical weapons had

ceased and that existing stocks had been destroyed. The delegation noted that the Federal Republic of Germany had taken a major step forward in the former area in June 1978 when it had invited States Members of the United Nations to send experts to visit representative German chemical plants. Clearly, visits such as those could have a major confidence-building effect and would help achieve progress in realizing a ban on chemical weapons. The Government of the United Kingdom was focusing attention on how best to reinforce those useful steps, and hoped that other Governments would follow such a path.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

In its consideration of the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons at its thirty-third session, the Assembly had before it the report of the CCD.¹⁷ In the course of the debates, especially in the First Committee,¹⁸ many delegations once again underscored the urgent need for an early realization of a ban on chemical weapons. In emphasizing the vital importance of making rapid progress towards the achievement of a ban on chemical weapons, a number of countries, including Austria, Cuba, India, the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR and Yugoslavia, recalled that in the Final Document, the special session on disarmament had regarded the question of prohibition of chemical weapons as representing one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Czechoslovakia stressed that the necessity for a convention on such weapons was justified by the appearance of successive generations of increasingly dangerous chemical weapons that had resulted from intensive research during the past decades. China pointed out that over the years world public opinion had strongly condemned "imperialism" for using ghastly chemical weapons to massacre people fighting for national liberation and defending their national independence and that there had been repeated demands for a complete prohibition and destruction of such weapons. The delegation emphasized that China fully supported such a stand and urged the super-Powers to undertake, without delay, practical measures for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons and all other conventional arms of mass destruction.

Several Eastern European countries, including the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Cuba, expressed grave concern over what they described as a recent statement by the Commander-in-Chief of NATO forces according to which NATO might be contemplating a considerable reinforcement of its offensive chemical potential. Furthermore, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR stated that even during the special session on disarmament, at which there had been a loud clamour for the prohibition of chemical weapons, the press media in the United States had indicated that the Pentagon was striving to obtain further appropriations for the development and production

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 58th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

of such weapons, basing itself, in that connexion, on the mythical Soviet threat. The same States felt that such developments illustrated the dangerous situation that could arise if no agreement were reached on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the foreseeable future and that therefore efforts must be intensified in order to resolve the outstanding differences.

As in the CCD and at the special session on disarmament, substantial discussion once again revolved around the question of the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. At an early stage of the debate, the Soviet Union affirmed that, notwithstanding the great amount of attention and effort required by an important measure such as a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, it would continue to work, as expeditiously as possible, towards the eventual realization of a joint Soviet-American initiative on the subject.

Subsequent to that statement, a number of delegations, among them those of Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran and Nigeria, voiced the hope that the promised joint initiative would soon be forthcoming so as to enable the Committee on Disarmament to prepare a draft treaty for submission to the United Nations, while others, including those of Austria, New Zealand and Venezuela, expressed disappointment that the Soviet Union and the United States were not yet in a position to put forward an initiative which might form the basis of a multilateral treaty. Austria noted that seven years after the conclusion of the negotiations on the biological weapons convention, the negotiations on chemical weapons still remained within the domain of the United States and the Soviet Union and that multilateral negotiations on the question had not yet begun. The delegation urged that negotiations should start immediately within a multilateral framework.

Japan reiterated a suggestion it had made in the CCD that in order to give the negotiating body sufficient time for discussion, the United States and the Soviet Union, in the event that there were some technical points blocking a comprehensive agreement between the two countries, submit to the CCD those points on which they had already agreed. The delegation expressed the hope that since differences pertaining to the scope of a ban appeared to be almost entirely resolved, the two parties should at least submit a draft on that point to the Committee for its early consideration. Kuwait, similarly, expressed the view that negotiations on all aspects of a treaty on chemical weapons should not be confined to the two super-Powers, but that the stage had been reached when both the CCD and the General Assembly should be informed of the outcome of the negotiations. Canada expressed the hope that at its next session the negotiating body would start work on areas where there was already a large measure of agreement, such as on the question of the scope of a treaty, whether or not the bilateral negotiations had been completed by then.

On the explicit question of scope, the delegation of Poland maintained that a total ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction would render irrelevant the distrust which had led many States parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to make reservations with respect to the right to retaliate in kind. That, according to the delegation,

had been precisely the underlying premise behind the comprehensive ban first proposed by the socialist countries in their 1972 draft convention submitted to the CCD.

With respect to the question of verification, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, although believing that control might be ensured through national means, agreed that the problem could be resolved on the basis of national means of verification supplemented by well thought out international procedures. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR pointed out that the Soviet Union had expressed its readiness to discuss methodology for monitoring the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles to be excluded from the arsenals of States. Czechoslovakia emphasized that verification measures safeguarding the effective observance of the treaty must not, at the same time, infringe on the sovereignty of parties or lead to the disclosure of State, industrial or other secrets on which their security depended.

The Federal Republic of Germany noted that it took seriously the concerns frequently voiced that international verification of an agreed ban on the development and production of chemical weapons might violate commercial secrets of chemical plants and thus place them at a competitive disadvantage. In that regard, it referred to the importance of its chemical industry and the need for its manufacturing processes and patents to be protected against industrial espionage and imitation. It had renounced the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in 1954 and had agreed that the observance of that pledge should be subject to international verification. Since then, a verification system had been developed, in co-operation with the verifying agency and the chemical industry, which permitted on-site inspections, but was, nevertheless, acceptable to the industry because it did not entail any economic disadvantages. In the same connexion, the delegation recalled that a workshop for experts was scheduled to be held in the Federal Republic of Germany during the summer of 1979, with a view to demonstrating that it was possible to adequately verify a ban on chemical weapons.

The Netherlands, elaborating on its earlier proposal for creation of an international disarmament organization,¹⁹ emphasized that such an institution might be able to serve the need for an autonomous international organization to provide the operational framework for a number of functions relating to verification and implementation, including those in connexion with a treaty on chemical weapons.

The delegation of Finland stated that in order to elucidate the verification problem its Government had decided in 1972 to develop, on a national basis, a chemical-warfare control capacity for possible future international use. Since 1973, a working group of chemists had been employed in studying the matter and the results of their study²⁰ had been transmitted to the CCD.

¹⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/565; and *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/108.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/501.

A draft resolution on the item, submitted on 22 November, was sponsored by 31 Member States from all regional groups: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. The draft was subsequently also sponsored by Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Liberia, Mali, Mauritius, Pakistan, Spain, the Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Uruguay and Zaire.

The draft resolution was introduced by Poland, which, after briefly reviewing the negotiating background to a possible treaty on chemical weapons, stated that the essential message that the sponsors wished to convey through the text of the draft resolution was that the time was now opportune for the effective elaboration of an agreement on the prohibition of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

The draft resolution was adopted by consensus in the First Committee. Subsequently, the delegation of China pointed out that it had not participated in the decision.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly without a vote, at its 84th meeting on 14 December 1978, as resolution 33/59 A. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2827 A (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, 2933 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972, 3077 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3256 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3465 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/65 of 10 December 1976, 32/77 of 12 December 1977 and S-10/2 of 30 June 1978,

Recalling that in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session it affirmed that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represented one of the most urgent measures of disarmament, which should be accorded high priority in disarmament negotiations,

Regretting that agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons has not been reached despite its numerous appeals,

Convinced that the continuing arms race calls for urgent disarmament measures and that the process of international détente is conducive to the achievement of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Reaffirming the necessity of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Convinced that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction constitutes an important step towards early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States,

Recalling in that connexion the undertaking contained in article IX of the Convention to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction,

Stressing the importance of early agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, which would contribute to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Noting the risk of continued development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons in the absence of such agreement,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

Noting that drafts of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, as well as other working documents, proposals and suggestions, have been submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and constitute valuable contributions to reaching agreement,

Taking into account the comments made on this item and relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session,

Noting also that sustained and intensive efforts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have led to increased understanding in identifying practical approaches towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and towards their destruction,

Believing that future agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons should meet the objective of complete, effective and verifiable prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as providing adequate methods of verification for the destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons, and recognizing that arrangements for verification should be based on a combination of national and international arrangements,

Having in mind that agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction should not impede the utilization of science and technology for the economic development of States,

Desiring to contribute to an early and successful conclusion of the negotiations on effective and strict measures for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction,

1. *Urges* all States to reach early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

2. *Urges* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to submit their joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament in order to assist it in achieving early agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to undertake, at the beginning of its 1979 session, negotiations with a view to elaborating an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and for their destruction, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives;

4. *Invites* all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as to accede to or ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and calls again for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of those instruments;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly relating to chemical weapons and to chemical means of warfare;

6. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to report on the results of its negotiations to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

The question of chemical weapons was also dealt with in the context of resolution 33/71 H, section IV, by which, *inter alia*, the Committee on Disarmament was requested to undertake on a priority basis, at its first session in January 1979, negotiations concerning a treaty or convention on the complete

and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and on their destruction (see chapter IV, page 125, above).

B. *Bacteriological (biological) weapons*

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

A number of the working papers²¹ that were submitted by various delegations to the Preparatory Committee of the special session contained references to the question of bacteriological (biological) weapons. Several papers mentioned the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction in the context of the results achieved so far in the field of disarmament which constitute only partial or collateral measures. Other references alluded to the fact that the biological weapons Convention represented the only measure of genuine disarmament so far achieved, and one working paper delineating a proposed programme of action for disarmament urged that the biological weapons Convention should be ratified by all States.

The draft final document,²² embodying the results of the deliberations and negotiations conducted during the preparatory stage, contained two separate paragraphs—under the sections entitled “Declaration” and “Programme of action” respectively—on the question of bacteriological (biological) weapons.

The discussion on this subject at the special session itself was confined mainly to comments of a general nature. In the first place, a number of States referred to the question of biological weapons in conjunction with the consideration of the subject of prohibition of chemical weapons. Thus, Japan advocated that with the Convention banning biological weapons already in force, multilateral negotiations on a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons should be promptly undertaken. Kuwait, elaborating on some of the deficiencies and shortcomings in several disarmament agreements already concluded, noted that the biological weapons Convention had backed away from a ban on chemical weapons and prohibited only those bacteriological agents and toxins which were so dangerous and noxious that even the countries which produced them had come to doubt their value and wanted them destroyed. The delegation stressed that in underlining that point its aim was not to disparage the Convention but merely to emphasize the need for the reinforcement of that agreement through a ban on chemical weapons.

²¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vols. III-V, for example, documents A/AC.187/30 and Corr. 1; A/AC.187/55 and Add. 1 and Corr. 1 and 2; A/AC.187/81; and A/AC.187/92.

²² *Ibid.*, vol. I.

Several delegations, including those of Ghana, Kuwait and Mongolia, pointed out that the 1975 Convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and calling for the early destruction of existing stocks of such weapons, was the first and only international instrument in modern times to include actual disarmament measures.

The Final Document which emerged from the session included two paragraphs dealing with the question of bacteriological (biological) weapons, again one in the section entitled "Declaration" and the other in the section entitled "Programme of action", and their formulation was the same as in the draft final document. They read as follows:

17. Disarmament has thus become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community. No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of reduction of armaments. However, certain positive changes in international relations in some areas of the world provide some encouragement. Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and excluding particular areas from the arms race. The fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. For more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament.

...
73. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

The major part of the debate during the General Assembly session²³ revolved around the question of holding a review conference for the biological weapons Convention. According to article XII of the Convention, five years after its entry into force, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to that effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. The article further provides that such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.²⁴ The Convention will have been in force for five years on 26 March 1980.

²³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, First Committee, 4th to 50th and 59th meetings*; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²⁴ See resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

A number of delegations, including those of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States, expressed the hope, during the course of the session, that the General Assembly would give appropriate recognition and endorsement to preparations for a review conference, as stipulated in the Convention.

Commenting on the subject, Czechoslovakia affirmed that the General Assembly must contribute to the thorough preparation of the forthcoming First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention, which was to be held in 1980. In that connexion, the delegation declared that the significance of the Convention was all the greater since, to date, it was the only international agreement committing all the parties to it to eliminate from their arsenals and liquidate completely certain types of weapons of mass destruction. The delegation appealed to all States that had not yet done so to consider acceding to the Convention. The United Kingdom pointed out that some concern had been expressed about developments in genetic engineering in recent years, which might permit laboratory culture of new organisms dangerous to mankind. That would be a perversion of scientific knowledge attended by incalculable consequences. Hence, the delegation stressed it would be appropriate for the forthcoming Review Conference to examine such developments so that the world could be assured that none were being used for military purposes.

The draft resolution on the item, submitted on 22 November, was sponsored by Australia, Bolivia, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the Ukrainian SSR, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States. It was introduced by the United Kingdom, which drew attention to article XII of the Convention, which provided for the holding of a review conference five years after the entry into force of the Convention. Since the Convention had come into force on 26 March 1975, the review conference was due to be held in 1980. During the course of the thirty-third session, the co-depositaries of the Convention, namely, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, had accordingly set the preparation of the Conference in motion. A meeting of the States parties to the Convention had been held and the decision had been taken to establish a preparatory committee to make the necessary arrangements. The delegation went on to explain that the draft resolution was a purely procedural one in that it simply took note of the initiation of the preparatory process. The delegation further noted that the biological weapons Convention was generally agreed to be one of the few measures of actual disarmament and therefore occupied a special place in the disarmament process.

The draft resolution was adopted in the First Committee by consensus. However, prior to the vote, the delegation of China declared its intention not to participate.

The draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the General Assembly on 14 December 1979 as resolution 33/59 B, and reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to that Convention,

Noting that article XII of the Convention provides as follows:

“Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a Conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention”.

Believing that the availability of information as appropriate on any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention could contribute to the work of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention,

Bearing in mind that the Convention will have been in force for five years on 26 March 1980 and expecting that the Review Conference called for in the Convention will take place near that date,

1. *Notes* that, after appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee of parties to the Convention is to be arranged;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Review Conference and its preparation.

Conclusion

With respect to the question of a chemical weapons ban, the year 1978 was characterized both by expectations that a breakthrough was imminent and that resolution of the problem only required the political will of the two major protagonists, as well as by a sense of impatience that the long-awaited joint initiative of the Soviet Union and the United States, first announced in 1974, had not yet materialized. Prior to the special session, there was a guarded sense of optimism on the part of many delegations that a draft agreement would be forthcoming at the special session. But, as the session progressed, delegations became increasingly concerned about a deterioration of the international political situation which had evidently occurred since the end of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. Such concern was reinforced because it had previously seemed that a consensus had emerged with regard to the scope of a ban on chemical weapons and that only minor problems remained on the question of verification.

Hence, the constraints imposed by a situation in which progress depended on the outcome of bilateral talks taking place outside the multilateral negotiating framework did not allow for any appreciable progress to be registered during 1978.

Given the difficulties of the situation, a number of delegations expressed the view that there was no valid reason to wait until the United States and the Soviet Union had completed their negotiations and that the matter should be

taken up multilaterally. In that connexion, it was pointed out that a chemical weapons ban was not a typical bilateral question, as it involved other countries and regions and affected the chemical industries on all continents. Nevertheless, despite the different shades of opinion and expressions of disappointment, the prevailing sentiment appeared to be one of hope that the materialization of a draft agreement on the subject was attainable.

No major controversies surrounded the question of bacteriological (biological) weapons. Most delegations which addressed themselves to the subject emphasized the importance of the biological weapons Convention as constituting the only genuine disarmament measure in existence and appealed to all States which had not yet done so to accede to it as expeditiously as possible.

Following the initiative of the Depositary Governments, the General Assembly decided that, after appropriate consultations, a preparatory committee of parties to the Convention was to be arranged with a view to undertaking preparations for the Review Conference to be held in 1980.

New weapons of mass destruction

Introduction

THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction has long figured prominently among disarmament questions.

In 1948, the Commission for Conventional Armaments established by the Security Council adopted a resolution which stated that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future with characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.

At a later stage, in 1969, as the result of an initiative of Malta, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions related to possible new weapons of mass destruction, resolutions 2602 C and D (XXIV), by which the CCD was asked to consider certain implications of radiological warfare and laser technology. It did not, at that time, find them to be of immediate concern.¹

The question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was first included as an item of the agenda of the General Assembly in 1975, on the basis of a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko, to the Secretary-General.² The letter included, as an annex, a draft international agreement on the question. The draft treaty did not contain a definition of new types of weapons of mass destruction or new systems of such weapons, but indicated that the weapons and systems to be included would be specified through negotiations on the subject. It also provided that new areas of weapons development not covered by the agreement which might emerge after its entry into force would be the subject of negotiations to extend the prohibition, so that such potential weapons would be covered. As a result of its consideration of the proposals, resolution 3479 (XXX) was adopted by the General Assembly. By that resolution the Assembly asked the CCD to proceed on the matter.

¹ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), chap. XV; see also chap. XVIII, below.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 31, 34-48, 120, 122 and 126, document A/10243.

In 1976 in the CCD, the USSR and the other Eastern European countries advanced the view that it was essential to work out a general prohibition of the development of new types and systems of mass destruction since it was more difficult to eliminate weapons once they were deployed than to stop their development while they were still at a stage of research or experiment.

Western States, on the other hand, held that new scientific developments should be dealt with as they arose and that some new weapons of mass destruction fell within existing categories and should be covered in that context.

During the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, Western States sought clarification in respect of the question of the definition of the weapons to be covered in the draft treaty submitted by the USSR. The Eastern European and a number of non-aligned States stressed the importance of banning new weapons of mass destruction in general and called for negotiations on a treaty to that end. The USSR stated that it was ready to propose an approach that would include any type of weapons of mass destruction based on qualitatively new principles of action according to the method of use, the target to be attacked and the nature of their impact. The Assembly adopted resolution 31/74 in which it called upon the CCD to continue negotiations with a view to working out the text of an agreement on the subject.

At the 1977 session of the CCD, the discussions centered on the draft treaty submitted by the USSR and on a revised version of the draft presented on 9 August.³ The most important issues were the priority to be given to the matter, the scope of a convention on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, the definition of such weapons and the verification aspects of such a convention, and the question of how to avoid hampering technological and scientific research for peaceful purposes. In connexion with the revised draft, the Soviet Union noted particularly the provision whereby, parallel to a general agreement, special agreements could be concluded on the prohibition of particular types of weapons, and that a list of types and systems of weapons to be prohibited would be annexed to the agreement and could be supplemented if new areas of development emerged.

Together with other Eastern European States the USSR continued to call for early agreement on a general prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and the Western States, while supporting efforts to ban particular weapons of mass destruction, objected to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning unspecified future weapons.

Discussion of the question at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly reflected the same trends and centered around the same main issues as in the CCD. Eastern European States and some non-aligned countries emphasized the necessity of a treaty on prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and called for renewed efforts towards the achievement of an international agreement in the field. The Western States

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/511/Rev.1; also reproduced in *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), appendix X.

generally adhered to their view that it was not possible to deal with new weapons of mass destruction in a single international convention before each such weapon had been defined. They advocated specific agreements prohibiting certain categories of new weapons of mass destruction as soon as such weapons could be identified, and generally expressed the view that the CCD should keep the question under close review.

Thus, during 1977 the two basic approaches to the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons were greatly clarified. On the one hand, there was the call by the USSR, other Eastern European States and a number of non-aligned countries to conclude, as soon as possible, a prohibition of such weapons in the form of an all-encompassing agreement. On the other hand, Western States opposed such a general agreement and advocated the conclusion of separate conventions regarding specific weapons.

Despite concerted effort to reconcile the two approaches, they were reflected separately in resolutions 32/84 A and B, both adopted by the General Assembly.⁴

In its resolution 32/84 A, the General Assembly requested the CCD to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and, when necessary, specific agreements on the subject. In its resolution 32/84 B, the Assembly requested the Committee, while taking into account its existing priorities, to keep under review the question of the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which might be identified. Both resolutions requested the Committee to report to the Assembly on the subject at its thirty-third session.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

During the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons was considered among the whole complex of disarmament issues, both at the plenary meetings⁵ and the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.⁶ In fact, more than 60 States and 17 non-governmental organizations expressed their views on the issue, thus reflecting the importance with which it was regarded.

⁴ For details, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), chap. XIII.

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 4th to 9th and 13th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

The Soviet Union, other Eastern European States and a number of non-aligned countries emphasized the urgent necessity of the conclusion in the nearest future of a treaty on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Such a prohibition would have to prevent, in their opinion, the diversion of the latest scientific and technological advances to military purposes, and once carried out it would constitute an important contribution to the consolidation of international peace and security.

Stressing the importance of the cessation of the production and prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction, the USSR proposed that such a measure of disarmament would be placed among the most important measures urgently awaiting implementation. Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, and Viet Nam came out in their statements in support of the Soviet position on the subject. Czechoslovakia, for instance, held that the question of a total ban on development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction was a question of exceptional urgency, and expressed concern about evidence that qualitatively innovative weapons were now becoming a reality. Mongolia stated that it stood for the prohibition of the development and production of such weapons and indicated concern that in certain countries scientific and technical progress was being diverted to those ends. Viet Nam believed that, among other measures, one to prohibit the production of new conventional weapons having great destructive power would constitute an important contribution to peace and security.

The urgent need for the conclusion of such an agreement and banning of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction was also stressed by Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Panama, Sierra Leone, Venezuela and Zaire.

The delegation of Nigeria, considering the need for an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction to be among the ripe and urgent priorities, called for the inclusion of the conclusion of such an agreement in the list of the urgent measures of a programme of action to be adopted by the General Assembly. Recognizing the urgent need for preventing the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, Jamaica, for its part, called for such a meaningful approach in the process of disarmament which should embrace both the dismantling of nuclear arsenals and the halting of the manufacture and development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. And China held that the proposal on prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction was among the many advanced by the Soviet Union which were hollow talk or full of loopholes, and again cited lack of sincere desire on the part of the super-Powers as the key reason why there had been no progress in disarmament.

The Western States generally emphasized their adherence to the view that the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons had to be prevented by specific agreements on each identifiable weapon. While continuing to advocate such an approach to the solution of the problem, Belgium, Italy, and the United

Kingdom reaffirmed their suggestion that the matter be kept under consideration. Belgium stated that the development of such weapons had to be prevented by specific agreements on each weapon which could and should be identified, while Italy suggested specific agreements on clearly identifiable weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles as one of a series of measures to be implemented within a continuous process. At the end of the session, commenting on the Final Document with regard to the main paragraph on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, the United Kingdom simply noted that the British Government's position remained in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/84 B, that is, in effect, it welcomed the continuation of negotiations relating to the prohibition and limitation of identified weapons of mass destruction, and wished the negotiating body to keep the question of new weapons based on new scientific principles under review and to consider the desirability of formulating agreements on such specific weapons which might be identified.

Norway, for its part, took a different approach on the over-all question of new weapons. It called for the continuous assessment of the impact of new weapons on arms control and disarmament negotiations and for stringent political control of military research and development. Thus it held that budget requests for new weapons should be accompanied by an evaluation of their arms control impact. It submitted its proposal⁷ to the *Ad Hoc* Committee and sought its inclusion in the Final Document as a confidence-building measure. Reference to it was included among the items listed in paragraph 125 of the Document as deserving further study.

The Final Document contains three paragraphs, two in the Declaration and one in the Programme of Action, dealing specifically with the question of weapons of mass destruction. In the Declaration, the first paragraph follows the one pointing to nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war as having highest priority and calling for measures towards those ends. It reads:

21. Along with these measures, agreements or other effective measures should be adopted to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority.

The wording of the other paragraph was changed from that used in the draft final document in that the word "prevention" was replaced by "cessation". The rewording was insisted upon by the Western States to better reflect their approach to the question. The paragraph reads:

39. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

The paragraph in the Programme of Action also reflects compromise

⁷ See A/S-10/AC.1/31.

wording embracing both the idea of efforts towards a general prohibition and specific agreements. It reads as follows:

77. In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

During its 1978 session, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continued to give considerable attention to the subject.⁸

From the beginning of the session the Soviet Union urged a comprehensive ban on all new weapons and systems of mass destruction on the basis of its revised draft agreement which it had submitted to the Committee on 9 August 1977.⁹

The position of the USSR was strongly supported by Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland. Those States held that the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, which were likely to be misused as an instrument to change the military balance, must be prohibited from the very beginning by a comprehensive and preventive agreement.

Also favouring a prohibition, Romania held that the time had come for the Committee to proceed forthwith to the negotiation of the text of an agreement within the framework of adequate structures. Egypt stressed that it looked forward to meaningful discussion of the problem in the CCD, and India called upon the CCD to lend its support to all efforts which would nip in the bud the development of future generations of weapons and systems of mass destruction.

The USSR, in response to the Western view that it was difficult to reach a comprehensive agreement on the matter because the possible areas of development of new weapons of mass destruction could not be foreseen, emphasized that it was precisely an agreement in principle that was needed, which could be followed, when necessary, by additional specific agreements to ban particular types of weapons. Hungary and Poland also stressed that a comprehensive agreement would not preclude the possibility of future agreements to ban specific types of weapons. Emphasizing that it would continue to urge achievement of a comprehensive agreement, the USSR advocated the conclusion also of specific agreements in the field. In that connexion, it drew

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 188-211.

⁹ See foot-note 3.

attention to the new initiative of the Eastern European countries concerning the conclusion of a convention on a prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (see chapter X above).

In order to make the Committee's work of developing an agreed text of a comprehensive agreement and, particularly, its work on the definition of the scope of the prohibition more purposeful, the Soviet Union held that a group of qualified governmental experts should be established under the auspices of the Committee to consider the question of possible areas of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the initial list of the types of such weapons to be prohibited under a comprehensive agreement. To that end the Soviet Union submitted on 28 March 1978 a draft decision¹⁰ for the Committee's consideration, noting its belief that the setting up of such a group would meet the wishes of the General Assembly in the matter and also narrow the divergence of views on the subject in the Committee. The Soviet proposal was supported by Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland.

In the course of the discussion, the United States reiterated its conviction that the most effective approach to the issue of new weapons of mass destruction would be by negotiating individual agreements on specific new types of such weapons as they were identified. The United States delegation emphasized that dealing in a loose way with principles not clearly understood or relationships among known principles that had not yet been conceived would merely create the illusion of having dealt with the problem of new weapons of mass destruction. It pointed out that the omnibus treaty approach supported by some members of the Committee would inevitably lead to continuing haggling over the designation of new weapons as weapons of mass destruction. The United States believed the CCD should keep the issue under continuing review in the course of its informal meetings on the subject and opposed establishment of a group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question as proposed by the Soviet Union.

The United Kingdom declared that its determination that new scientific discoveries should not be used to create new weapons as terrible as those already recognized as weapons of mass destruction was demonstrated by its sponsorship of General Assembly resolution 32/84 B. It believed that the best way to achieve that aim was for the Committee on Disarmament to remain vigilant so that appropriate conventions could be negotiated if any potential new weapon of mass destruction based on a new scientific principle should be identified. The United Kingdom observed that it had not yet been persuaded that to draft a comprehensive treaty would be helpful. Nor was it prepared to confuse the discussion of the priority items, namely, the weapons of mass destruction defined in 1948, with the discussion of new weapons. The United Kingdom delegation emphasized that the comprehensive approach carried such a danger.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/564.

In the view of Italy, the debate held so far on the question had shown and confirmed the existence of different approaches to it. The Italian delegation noted that at the present stage it believed that the most appropriate course was to keep the issue under constant review in order to be ready to negotiate specific agreements dealing with specific categories of weapons as soon as they might be identified. A positive step in such a direction might be the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons (see chapter XVIII below).

During the summer session, the USSR again reiterated its view that the present level of science and technology created the danger that in a number of areas of military technology, new and even more sophisticated and destructive types and systems of weapons of mass destruction would emerge. The emergence of every such new type and every such new system made the arms race more dangerous, raising it to ever higher qualitative levels. As a result, the USSR delegation stressed that the arms race might reach a point beyond which it would be impossible to conclude agreements for its limitation based on reciprocal control. Thus it stressed the importance of its proposal to establish an *ad hoc* group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction under the auspices of the CCD, holding that it would facilitate achievement of an agreement. The Soviet Union called upon all the members of the Committee to exert efforts in order that such a group could begin its work in the immediate future and was again supported by Eastern European members of the Committee.

On 14 August 1978, Hungary submitted a working paper on infrasound weapons.¹¹ In introducing the paper, the delegation of Hungary stated that the development of infrasonic weapons was within reach of technological and scientific capabilities, and expressed the hope that the working paper would facilitate further study of that subject within the Committee and would promote the preparation of a preventive international agreement to preclude the possible emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The German Democratic Republic stated that the conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction would ensure that new achievements in science and technology were used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The delegation stressed that there were sufficient reasons for the Committee to redouble its efforts with a view to reaching such an agreement.

Mongolia welcomed the results of the informal meetings held in the Committee on the subject and stressed that they had reaffirmed the importance and urgency of preparing an international agreement on the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. The delegation considered that the discussion of the problem in its entirety, or the examination of its individual aspects, should be directed towards concluding agreements which would reliably block the path to a further technological arms race.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. II, document CCD/575.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

The debates at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly on the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons displayed the same approaches and positions of States as had the CCD and the special session.

During the general debate and in the First Committee¹², Eastern European States and some non-aligned countries continued to emphasize the urgency of concluding a treaty on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and called for the Committee on Disarmament to activate the negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on a draft text.

Most of those countries favoured the proposal of the Soviet Union and referred to the decisions on the subject adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

The Western States, in general, restated their view that it was not possible to foresee the development of modern sciences and technology which would lead to the emergence of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons comparable in effect to the weapons identified in the 1948 definition of weapons of mass destruction. They advocated the conclusion of specific agreements prohibiting particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which might be identified, and stressed that the new Committee on Disarmament should keep the question under continuing review.

The USSR, considering the problem to be of great significance from the standpoint of restraining the arms race, called for the earliest possible attainment of the necessary agreements on the subject. Noting the slowness of the talks on the question in the CCD, the delegation urged the United Nations to take into account the prospect of emergence of a greater variety of refined and sophisticated means of mass destruction; that was why it was necessary to draw attention to the problem. The Byelorussian SSR stressed the need for collective efforts by many States to solve the problem of banning the development and manufacture of new types and systems of mass destruction and called upon the General Assembly to speak out in favour of speeding up the solution of the question. The German Democratic Republic said that it understood the difficulties connected with the appraisal of phenomena the use of which would lead to the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction for military purposes, since it involved very complex scientific and technological problems. It particularly welcomed the Soviet proposal to entrust the consideration of that matter to a special group of qualified governmental experts. Seeing no insurmountable difficulties in concluding an appropriate comprehensive agreement as well as specific agreements on particular

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 55th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, Poland urged that the Committee on Disarmament accord high priority to the question. Hungary stressed that the problem of prohibiting new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should not only be kept under review but should also be followed up by concrete measures conducive to a solution. It urged the starting of negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement on that problem as proposed by the Soviet Union. While urging the necessity to undertake effective action to put an end to developing new types and systems of even more frightening weapons of destruction, Romania believed that it was useful to reach an agreement of principle proclaiming the political will of States to refrain from using scientific research to produce new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction which could be supplemented by protocols containing more specific provisions in various fields. Statements backing the Soviet proposal were also made by Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR.

Emphasizing the importance of the problem, the Indian delegation called for the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction whether they were based on existing or new principles of science. Calling for a collective effort to take preventive action to contain the growth of weapons of mass destruction, Jamaica welcomed the proposal of the Soviet Union for a convention banning the development and manufacture of such weapons. Among the non-aligned and other countries, the urgent necessity of a comprehensive prohibition of new types and weapons of mass destruction was stressed by Angola, Bangladesh, the Congo, El Salvador, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nigeria, Somalia, the United Republic of Cameroon, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

The United Kingdom reiterated its opposition to a general ban on the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction maintaining that to be effective such an agreement had to deal with something specific and identifiable. From its view, a general convention on that subject, if concluded, could in practice be no more than a declaration of intent, vague in scope and unverifiable in implementation. The United Kingdom further indicated that it would be premature to establish an *ad hoc* group to examine the subject of weapons of mass destruction as proposed by the Eastern European countries. It agreed, however, that there was a need to keep the issue under permanent and serious consideration in the Committee on Disarmament and for the prompt conclusion of conventions preventing the emergence of weapons of mass destruction, "whenever such a possibility should be identified".

With regard to the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the Italian delegation stated that the most appropriate course of action would be for the Committee on Disarmament to keep the issue under constant review in order to be ready to negotiate a specific agreement for each specific category of weapons as soon as such categories had been identified on the basis of new scientific principles.

On 16 November 1978, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom submitted a draft resolution which was subsequently sponsored also by Japan and Uruguay and introduced by the United Kingdom at the 49th meeting, on 24 November. By that draft resolution the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, request the Committee on Disarmament to pursue its examination of the subject, with any appropriate expert assistance, with a view to reaching agreement on the prevention of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements and to the speedy preparation of specific agreements on individual types of weapons which might be identified.

In introducing the draft resolution the representative of the United Kingdom repeated his opposition to a general "umbrella" convention on new weapons of mass destruction and noted that such a ban would inevitably be vague in its scope because it could not define its target with clarity.

On 17 November, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the USSR submitted an alternative draft resolution which was subsequently sponsored also by Mongolia and the Ukrainian SSR. It was introduced by the representative of the German Democratic Republic at the 50th meeting, on 24 November. On 28 November, the original sponsors of the draft resolution, together with the Byelorussian SSR, submitted a revised version which was subsequently sponsored also by Czechoslovakia and introduced by the representative of the German Democratic Republic at the 55th meeting. By that draft resolution, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, request the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, actively to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to agreeing on the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to expedite the preparation of specific agreements on particular types of such weapons; it would also urge all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks.

In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the German Democratic Republic stressed that it aimed particularly at the prohibition of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons for it was only through the explicit prohibition of the development of such weapons that the emergence of further dangerous types and systems of weapons could be stopped. Noting that it was not enough to continue consideration of the problem or to keep it under constant review, he urged serious negotiations with a view to agreeing on binding obligations putting an end to the development of new and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction. The German Democratic Republic believed that the Committee on Disarmament presently met all requirements for tackling even the most complicated questions relating to the preparation of such an agreement and that further progress depended solely on the political will and preparedness of all parties concerned.

Substantial effort was made by the two sponsoring groups to come to an agreement on a joint text of a draft resolution. However, their detailed discus-

sions did not result in a generally acceptable formula and such agreement was not achieved.

On 29 November, the First Committee adopted the first draft resolution by a vote of 94 to none, with 25 abstentions, and on 14 December the General Assembly adopted it as resolution 33/66 A by a vote of 117 to none, with 24 abstentions, including the Eastern European States except Romania. China did not participate in the vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976 and 32/84 A and B of 12 December 1977 on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Recalling also paragraph 77 of its resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, by which it decided that, in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements,

Concerned that the development of modern science and technology should not lead to the emergence of new, still more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, comparable in effect to those particular weapons identified in the 1948 definition of weapons of mass destruction,

Restating its view that specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified, and that this question should be kept under continuing review,

Taking into account the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with regard to this question,

1. *Welcomes* the active continuation of negotiations relating to the prohibition and limitation of identified weapons of mass destruction;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament, while taking account of its existing priorities, to pursue its examination of the subject, with any appropriate expert assistance, with a view to reaching agreement on the prevention of the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements and to the speedy preparation of specific agreements on individual types of weapons which may be identified;

3. *Urges* all States to refrain from actions which might adversely affect the efforts referred to in paragraph 2 above;

4. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to report on its consideration of the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

On 29 November, the First Committee also adopted the second draft resolution, as revised, by a vote of 95 to none, with 27 abstentions. The General Assembly adopted it, also on 14 December, as resolution 33/66 B by 118 votes to none, with 24 abstentions, mainly Western States. China did not participate in the vote. The resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3479 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/74 of 10 December 1976 and 32/84 A of 12 December 1977 on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Bearing in mind the provision contained in paragraph 39 of its resolution S-10/12 of 30 June 1978 to the effect that qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race and that efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare,

Recalling the decision contained in paragraph 77 of the same resolution to the effect that in order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements might ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, and that efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction,

Expressing once again, in the light of the decisions adopted at its tenth special session, its firm belief in the importance of concluding an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Noting, in this connexion, that in the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America the sides have made headway in reaching agreement on some basic provisions of the convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons which is being prepared,

Taking note of the discussion at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons,

Taking into account the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with regard to this question,

1. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, actively to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to agreeing on the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to expedite the preparation of specific agreements on particular types of such weapons;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-fourth session;

3. *Once again urges* all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion of this item by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Committee on Disarmament"

Conclusion

In the course of consideration of the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons in 1978 at the tenth special session, in the CCD, and at the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly, the necessity for action aimed at prohibition of such weapons received wide recognition.

At the tenth special session, an agreed formulation on new weapons of mass destruction was worked out for the Final Document and accepted by consensus by all participating countries.

On the other hand, the two divergent approaches on the issue were once again confirmed and even became more distinct. The Soviet Union, other Eastern European States and a number of non-aligned countries continued to call for conclusion of a general agreement banning the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of

such weapons. The Western countries continued to oppose a general agreement and to advocate conclusion of separate conventions concerning specific new types of weapons of mass destruction which might emerge on the basis of new scientific principles and achievements.

It is clear that further consideration of the issue, at least in the near future, will continue to reflect the two approaches.

Radiological weapons

Introduction

THE WEAPONS UNDER CONSIDERATION in the present chapter would make use of radioactive substances which would be dispersed at the target area independently of nuclear explosions to cause injury to personnel.

The question of controlling the use of radiological weapons has been considered by the United Nations since 1969, when the General Assembly adopted resolution 2602 C (XXIV) concerning radiological warfare.¹ By that resolution the Assembly recommended that the CCD consider the need for effective methods of control of nuclear weapons that maximize radioactive effects and invited the Committee to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare conducted independently of nuclear explosions. The following year the Committee reported,² on the basis of a paper prepared by the Netherlands,³ that possibilities of radiological warfare existed theoretically, but did not seem to be of much practical significance, and therefore discussion of measures did not appear to be useful.

The question of radiological weapons as such was not considered in the General Assembly again until 1976, when it was raised by the United States. The American delegation at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly suggested that an agreement should be concluded prohibiting the use of radioactive materials for weapons purposes. The discussion in the General Assembly on the proposal was limited, however, and no draft resolution was submitted.

Shortly thereafter, the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons became the subject of bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States. A working group on the subject was established during the meeting which took place from 28 to 30 March 1977 between Leonid I. Brezhnev, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the

¹ For details, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), chap. XIV.

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, document DC/233, para. 26.

³ *Ibid.*, annex C, document CCD/291.

Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, and the United States Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance.⁴

In 1977 the question of prohibition of radiological weapons was considered in the CCD in the general context of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons (see chapter XVII above). A number of references were made to the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States and several delegations referred to an agreement on the question as an example of possible specific agreements on particular new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The USSR informed the CCD that the two sides had agreed to continue their work. In discussing its version of a draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons submitted in 1976,⁵ the Soviet delegation mentioned “radiological means of the non-explosive type acting with the aid of radioactive materials”, as one of the types of weapons listed in an annex to the draft.

The United Kingdom referred to the discussions on radiological weapons in progress between the USSR and the United States and said it believed that they might lead to the need for the CCD to negotiate a specific agreement. The United States delegation also stated that it felt that radioactive material weapons should be subject to an appropriate agreement.

At the thirty-second session of the General Assembly the question of radiological weapons was referred to either in statements dealing with various areas of disarmament or in the context of discussions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.⁶

Although the subject of the prohibition of radiological weapons has not been among the main topics of discussion either in the General Assembly or in the CCD, numerous States regard the conclusion of a convention on the subject to be of importance. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have indicated the wish to conclude such an agreement and reports on the bilateral talks indicate that progress is being made.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

As during the previous year, the question of a prohibition of radiological weapons was considered by the CCD in 1978 in the more general context of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons

⁴ See *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. LXXVI, No. 1974 (April 25, 1977), pp. 401, 404 and 410.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/511/Rev. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-second Session, First Committee*, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.⁷ The Soviet Union referred to the fact that the general question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, as well as that of radiological weapons, were being examined bilaterally by the Soviet Union and the United States.

The USSR emphasized the possibility and need for concluding agreements on the prohibition of specific types of weapons which were not yet in the arsenals of States, but which could be developed and produced, in those cases where the danger of the development of such weapons had become clear, and pointed out that development of radiological weapons was precisely such a specific case.

The delegation of the United States stated that considerable progress had been made towards a joint initiative on radiological weapons, holding that such a ban, while relatively less significant than a comprehensive test ban or a chemical weapons convention, would be a logical step to fill a gap in the panoply of existing arms control measures and to head off possible development of hitherto untried weapons of mass destruction. The delegation believed that the CCD could consider a comprehensive prohibition on radiological weapons without interfering with higher priority issues before it, and thus effectively guard against the potential threat by acting promptly and dealing with such weapons before rather than after they were in the arsenals of States. The negotiation of such a ban would be an appropriate task for the Committee.

On 11 May 1978, the delegation of the United States reported that the two sides were close to full agreement on a possible joint initiative for the CCD, but stressed again that the United States shared the view that work on a possible radiological weapons convention should in no way interfere with the work of the Committee on other tasks.

During the summer session of the CCD, the delegation of the Soviet Union informed the Committee that the two sides had begun another round of negotiations on radiological weapons. The delegation further stated that as a result of the exchange of views, the two sides had succeeded in bringing their approaches to that problem closer and had practically reached an agreement on the provisions of a possible instrument on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

Hungary welcomed the information on the new round of bilateral talks and said that it looked forward to completion of those negotiations. It pointed out that while the subject had already been discussed several years before, the necessity for action had not generally been felt at that time. In the meantime, conditions had changed from both the technological and arms limitation points of view and, owing to various developments, the need for a preventive measure was clearly evident.

The German Democratic Republic also welcomed the fact that the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the prohibition

⁷ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-10/2), vol. II, paras. 244-246; and *ibid.*, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27), vol. I, paras. 212-217.

of radiological weapons were being carried on intensively, and stated that their early successful conclusion could also positively influence the solution of other questions related to the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany considered a complete ban on radiological weapons important and also possible and hoped for an early joint Soviet-American initiative which could be dealt with further in the Committee. It had therefore been encouraged by the statement of the Soviet Union.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

At the tenth special session of the General Assembly the question of radiological weapons was considered mostly in the context of discussions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.⁸

In the plenary debates, the Soviet Union stressed the necessity of banning radiological weapons and informed the General Assembly that a relevant draft convention had already been partly agreed upon.

The United States delegation stated that the USSR and the United States were moving closer to an agreement on banning radiological weapons, an agreement which would subsequently be put before the CCD.

The desirability of early results from the bilateral Soviet-American talks on the banning of radiological weapons as well as progress achieved in those negotiations was noted in one way or another by representatives of Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mali, Nepal, Oman, Romania, Singapore, the Ukrainian SSR and Viet Nam.

In the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, the General Assembly included a paragraph reflecting, by consensus, its support of a convention on the subject. It reads as follows:

76. A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

At the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, the question of radiological weapons was mentioned principally in the First Committee, either in

⁸ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Plenary meetings, 2nd to 24th meetings; *ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, 6th and 13th meetings; and *ibid.*, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.

statements dealing with consideration of various aspects of disarmament and arms limitation during the general debate, or in the context of the discussions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons⁹ (see chapter XVII above).

The German Democratic Republic welcomed the fact that in the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States on the prohibition of radiological weapons it had been possible to achieve some success and expressed its hope that those talks would be swiftly and successfully concluded. Czechoslovakia called for creation in the nearest future of the necessary conditions for the conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition and elimination of the stockpiles of radiological weapons. The Byelorussian SSR referred to the past work of the CCD in connexion with new weapons of mass destruction and noted with satisfaction that in the negotiations between the USSR and the United States the two sides had succeeded in bringing their approaches to the problem of a ban on radiological weapons closer. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR clearly indicated that it regarded radiological weapons as an example of a new weapon of mass destruction.

Mongolia, pointing out the flexibility of the socialist countries' position on the question of banning new types of weapons of mass destruction, stressed the importance of concluding a convention which would ban radiological weapons in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly.

The delegation of the United Kingdom said that it could not accept the suggestion made by the Byelorussian SSR that radiological weapons provided an example of a new weapon of mass destruction, and noted that as far back as 1948 radiological weapons had been listed as potential weapons requiring restraint, hence the negotiation of a ban to prevent their emergence. That was why negotiations on their prohibition were already in progress between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Italy, in discussing the question of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, stated that it believed the most appropriate course of action was for the CCD to keep the issue under constant review in order to be ready to negotiate a separate agreement for each specific category of weapons, and added that conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons might be a positive step in that direction.

Somalia, mentioning its support for the initiatives which would establish in principle the prohibition of all new weapons of mass destruction and which would also take account of new weapons of a kind which had been identified or considered for possible development, expressed hope for speedy progress by the United States and the Soviet Union in their joint initiative on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

Although no draft resolution was submitted on the question of radiological weapons, it should be noted that, in the two resolutions adopted on the

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 29th to 50th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons (see chapter XVII above, pages 339 and 340) the Assembly made reference to the negotiations on the subject. In paragraph 1 of resolution 33/66 A, initiated by the United Kingdom, the General Assembly welcomed the active continuation of negotiations relating to the prohibition and limitation of identified weapons of mass destruction. In the fifth preambular paragraph of resolution 33/66 B, initiated by the German Democratic Republic, the Assembly noted that in the negotiations between the USSR and the United States the sides had made headway in reaching agreement on some basic provisions of the convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons which was being prepared.

Conclusion

The conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons has continued to be considered an attainable measure among disarmament issues, different approaches to the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction notwithstanding. Such a convention could be achieved either within the approach inherent in the Soviet draft agreement or as a specific agreement under the Western approach, although the latter does not regard radiological weapons as a new type of weapon. Both the USSR and the United States have indicated the desire to conclude a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons and reports on the progress in their negotiations on the subject suggest the possibility of a concrete outcome.

Certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF PROHIBITIONS, or restrictions of the use, of certain conventional weapons that may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects has long been considered by the international community. At the United Nations, the matter has been discussed by the General Assembly under various topics. For instance, at its twenty-seventh session in 1972, the Assembly considered the question under general and complete disarmament. At that session it had before it a report of the Secretary-General entitled *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*¹ which revealed that incendiary weapons caused widespread and largely uncontrollable conflagrations and concluded that there was a need for measures prohibiting their use, production, development and stockpiling. The General Assembly adopted resolution 2392 A (XXVII), by which it deplored the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons in all armed conflicts and commended the report to the attention of all Governments and peoples. The following year, the Assembly discussed the question as a separate agenda item entitled "Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use", and adopted resolution 3076 (XXVIII) by which it invited the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which held four sessions from 1974 to 1977, to consider the question of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons, as well as other specific conventional weapons which might be deemed to cause unnecessary suffering or to have indiscriminate effects, and to seek agreement on rules prohibiting or restricting the use of such weapons. The Diplomatic Conference established an *Ad Hoc* Committee on Conventional Weapons for that purpose. A notable contribution to the study of the question was also made at the expert level by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) between 1973 and 1976.²

¹ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.I.3.

² See, for instance, the report entitled *Weapons That May Cause Unnecessary Sufferings or Have Indiscriminate Effects* (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1973) and the reports entitled *Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons* (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1975 and 1976).

The General Assembly has reiterated its general position on the issue and its concern a number of times.³ In fact, the work on the question was kept under review by the Assembly in both its First and Sixth Committees, with regard to its disarmament and legal aspects, respectively. At its thirty-second session, the General Assembly, having considered the reports of the Secretary-General⁴ on the work of the Diplomatic Conference, noted resolution 22 (IV) of 7 June 1977 of that Conference⁵ concerning follow-up regarding prohibitions, or restrictions of the use, of certain conventional weapons. The Diplomatic Conference recommended, *inter alia*, that a conference should be convened not later than 1979, with a view to reaching agreement on prohibitions or restrictions of use of such weapons. By its resolution 22 (IV) the Diplomatic Conference also urged that consultations be undertaken, prior to the consideration of the question by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session, for the purpose of reaching agreement on the steps to be taken in preparation for such a conference. Following such consultations, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/152 by which it decided to convene in 1979 a United Nations conference, with a view to reaching agreements on prohibitions or restrictions of use of the conventional weapons under discussion; decided to convene a preparatory conference for that conference; requested the Secretary-General to transmit invitations to all States and parties invited to attend the Diplomatic Conference; recommended that the Preparatory Conference should meet once in 1978 for organizational purposes and, subsequently, with the task of establishing the best possible substantive basis for the achievement of agreements at the United Nations conference; and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-third session an item entitled, "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Preparatory Conference".

The extensive consideration given both within and outside the United Nations to prohibitions, or restrictions of the use, of the types of conventional weapons in question has made it possible to identify a number of technical and legal aspects, increased understanding of the issues involved, and revealed the need for further consideration of various problems arising in the negotiations. Among such problems are the scope of possible agreements, the weapons to be included, and other complex matters. Differences have also emerged on such matters as the choice of forum for future efforts and the question of decision-making.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The question of prohibitions, or restrictions of the use, of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indis-

³ See resolutions 3255 A (XXIX), 3464 (XXX), 31/64 and 32/152.

⁴ A/9726, A/10222, A/31/146, A/32/124 and Corr. 1.

⁵ A/32/124, annex II.

criminate effects was mentioned by a number of representatives during the tenth special session of the General Assembly, particularly in the plenary meetings.⁶

Reflecting the views of a number of states, Sweden stated that rapid advances in military technology had led to the emergence of weapons that inflicted great and unnecessary suffering, often with indiscriminate effects, striking military personnel and civilians alike. It noted that Sweden and several neutral and non-aligned States had demanded the prohibition of or restrictions of the use of a number of such weapons, first of all incendiary weapons, and that an overwhelming majority of nations wanted those weapons banned. It recalled that discussions had also taken place on other weapons such as small-calibre projectiles, fragmentation bombs and fuel-air explosives. It appealed to all States, including those of the two major military alliances, to make full use of the 1979 United Nations Conference to bring about effective agreements on such categories of weapons.

A number of countries stated that such weapons were being used. Algeria, for instance, considered that the third world had become the testing ground for new techniques of mass destruction and spoke of the growing use of chemical, incendiary and other particularly inhumane weapons. In the view of Somalia, weapons which were particularly inhumane and which had indiscriminate effects were the typical weapons employed by racist, colonialist régimes to suppress the liberation struggles of peoples in Africa and the Middle East for the realization of their just aspirations for self-determination and independence. A number of Arab States, including Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and others, stated that Israel used napalm, fragmentation and cluster bombs against civilian targets in the Middle East. Cyprus also said that napalm bombs, which were given by the United States to Turkey for defence purposes, were used by Turkey against Cyprus in 1974 in violation of American law.

A variety of views was expressed regarding the scope of prohibition or restrictions in the field. Nepal, for instance, felt that inhumane weapons such as napalm and incendiary weapons must be totally prohibited; New Zealand affirmed its support for sustained efforts to prohibit the use of inhumane weapons; and Egypt called for efforts to halt the use, acquisition and development of such weapons under binding agreements. Other States which expressed concern about the weapons in question or support of action to restrict or eliminate them included Brazil, Colombia, Qatar, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay.

A number of countries from all continents welcomed the decision of the General Assembly to convene in 1979 a special United Nations conference on the categories of conventional weapons concerned. As a result of the deliberations at the special session, the General Assembly agreed on the following provisions, which were included in the Programme of Action in the Final Document:

⁶ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2nd to 23rd and 27th meetings.

86. The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, to be held in 1979, should seek agreement, in the light of humanitarian and military considerations, on the prohibition or restriction of use of certain conventional weapons including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. The Conference should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which were the subject-matter of previously conducted discussions.

87. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task.

88. The result of the Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.

The Preparatory Conference

The Preparatory Conference for the 1979 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, called for in resolution 32/152 of the General Assembly, was convened on 28 August 1978 at the Palais des Nations at Geneva for a three-week session. At the opening of the session a message from the Secretary-General was read to the participants. In his message, the Secretary-General noted that the international community's concern with the topic dated back to the late 1960s, when a series of discussions had been initiated both within and outside the United Nations. Action by the international community had been prompted by an increasing awareness that rapid advances in military technology had led to the development of various weapons which, because of their extremely harmful effects, could be considered to be incompatible with the humanitarian considerations that had traditionally been part of the law concerning armed conflicts. The Secretary-General went on to state that that was why the matter had first been approached within the context of humanitarian law, notably at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: Those deliberations had shown that considerations of security must also be taken into account. The striking of a judicious balance between humanitarian concerns and the requirements of national security was a delicate task that raised issues relating not only to the conventional weapons whose use might be prohibited or restricted but also to the technical characteristics and effects of such weapons. The earlier discussions provided a very useful basis for further work; much valuable knowledge had been accumulated, many complex issues clarified and certain areas of common ground identified. The Secretary-General stated that the Preparatory Conference had been entrusted with the task of establishing the best possible substantive basis for the achievement of agreements at the proposed United Nations Conference. Its task would be of particular importance because, unless action was taken, modern weapons technology might create a situation in which military considerations outweighed other concerns, while international agreement on prohibition or restriction of the use of certain weapons would not only strengthen international law pertaining to armed conflicts, but would also serve as encouragement in the broader field of disarmament.

The Secretary-General noted that the Preparatory Conference was the first United Nations conference on disarmament since the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Final Document adopted at that session had stressed that disarmament had become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community. Thus, in his view, there was a pressing need to translate into practical terms the provisions of the Final Document by means of effective international agreements. The holding of the Preparatory Conference under United Nations auspices was an encouraging step in that direction and the successful outcome of its work would be an important contribution to the cause of disarmament, world peace and security.

At its meeting, the Preparatory Conference elected the representative of Nigeria as its President and also elected 13 Vice-Presidents from the following Member States: Bulgaria, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Panama, Peru, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Zaire. It also elected a Rapporteur (Netherlands). In all, representatives of 74 states⁷ participated in the Preparatory Conference.

In addition, in accordance with the criteria established in resolution 32/152, which took into account the participation in the Diplomatic Conference, representatives of four national liberation movements participated in the Preparatory Conference: African National Congress (South Africa), Palestine Liberation Organization, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa), and Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia). Further, representatives of the following five organizations attended the Preparatory Conference as observers: (a) International Committee of the Red Cross; (b) International Civil Defense Organization; (c) Sovereign Military Order of Malta; (d) Organization of American States; and (e) United Nations Environment Programme. Finally, several non-governmental organizations attended.

The Preparatory Conference had before it certain relevant documents of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International and Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, in particular the reports of the Diplomatic Conference's *Ad Hoc* Committee on Conventional Weapons on each of its four sessions.⁸

The Preparatory Conference adopted its rules of procedure with the exception of those pertaining to decision taking and interrelated rules, on which two viewpoints were expressed: one, that the rules of procedure of the General Assembly should apply (mainly non-aligned and developing States) and, the other, that decisions on substantive matters should be adopted by

⁷ Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

⁸ For a list of these reports, see the report of the Preparatory Conference (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/33/44)*), para. 17.

consensus (mainly the United States, the USSR and their close allies). Various ways of reconciling the two approaches were discussed, but it was recognized that those questions would require further examination at the next session of the Preparatory Conference. In the discussions, Romania stressed that the rules of the Preparatory Conference should be based on the absolute equality of all participating States, respect for their legitimate interests and the right of every State to submit proposals and uphold its views at all levels of negotiation.

In the general debate at the Preparatory Conference, many speakers stressed the importance of the gathering. The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, speaking on behalf of the States members of the European Economic Community, said that those States regarded the Preparatory Conference as an important stage in international efforts to limit arms and develop rules to ensure more humane conduct in the event of failure to prevent armed conflict, and particularly welcomed the fact that such efforts were being made under United Nations auspices, thus emphasizing the Organization's role in the field of arms limitation in accordance with the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Mexico stressed the relevance of the objectives of the Conference by referring to the fact that physical force was still being used as a method of solving conflict between individuals and between nations and quoted the 1976 yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to the effect that 119 wars had taken place between 1945 and 1975, despite the complete prohibition of the threat or use of force. Those wars, it noted, had taken place on the territory of 69 countries and had involved the armed forces of 81 States; they had together caused more loss of life than the Second World War. With regard to the civilian casualties, Mexico mentioned that of the 10 million dead in the First World War, 500,000 had been civilians; but civilians had accounted for 24 million of the 50 million victims of the Second World War and for over 50 percent of the victims in the Indo-China conflict.

The need for action was emphasized by a number of delegations. Switzerland, for instance, held that the formulation of an international convention was indispensable, since no appreciable progress had been made since the adoption of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in adapting the legal instruments to the realities of modern warfare. It was also essential to supplement and make effective the international humanitarian law reaffirmed in the two additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, all of whose provisions regarding methods of warfare and the protection of the civilian population were challenged by the use of weapons with indiscriminate effects which produced devastation in modern conflicts. Lastly, an international convention would have considerable repercussions on the disarmament negotiations by creating an atmosphere of confidence in that field.

The discussions on the objectives to be achieved by the Preparatory Conference revealed a number of differences in views. The majority considered that its task was to prepare the way, with regard to both substance and procedure, for a plenipotentiary conference which could adopt generally ac-

ceptable treaties on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of certain conventional weapons. The German Democratic Republic, however, said that it would be a cause for gratification if, after a further short preparatory conference early in 1979, the main Conference was able to draw up one or more draft agreements concerning specific types of conventional weapons for submission to, and finalization by, the Committee on Disarmament. Sweden emphasized the complexity of the issues before the Preparatory Conference and, noting that its task was not simply to agree on a time and place, agenda and rules of procedure, said that the General Assembly probably would have to defer the plenipotentiary conference until 1980. Zaire welcomed the fact that the Preparatory Conference appeared as an extension of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and, in the context of the Disarmament Decade, was inaugurating the implementation of the provisions of the Final Document adopted at the session.

While most of the countries agreed with the objectives of the forthcoming United Nations Conference, a number of delegations expressed reservations with regard to the adequacy of that forum to discuss disarmament matters. The Soviet delegation, for instance, reflecting the view of some other Eastern European States, held that the most appropriate forum for consideration of prohibition of the use of certain types of conventional weapons was the Committee on Disarmament since its members had the requisite experience and qualifications to deal with the problems involved. Some countries, for example, Hungary, felt that the most urgent disarmament task concerned the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction, since they posed the greatest threat to the balance of forces in the world while weapons of the types to be considered by the forthcoming Conference were of lower priority, but it nevertheless appreciated the importance of efforts to prohibit or limit their use. Yugoslavia, reflecting the viewpoint held by a number of States, had no doubt about the competence of the 1979 Conference to deal with the matters in question and was surprised that it had been suggested that substantive issues should be referred to the Committee on Disarmament.

States which recognized the plenipotentiary character of the 1979 United Nations Conference—again the majority of participants in the Preparatory Conference—held that any restrictions or prohibitions of conventional weapons accepted by the Conference should be embodied in treaties. Mexico was more precise and indicated its preference for world-wide prohibitions and limitations, preferably embodied in a convention establishing general guidelines and in optional protocols on specific types of conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or indiscriminate in their effects.

As to the types of weapons to be considered, many countries felt that the 1979 Conference had a broad mandate from the General Assembly, even though consideration had in the past focused on a number of fairly well-defined categories, namely, mines and booby-traps, fragments not detectable by X-rays, incendiary weapons, some blast and fragmentation weapons and certain types of automatic rifles and their projectiles. Sweden suggested that only weapons now known could be dealt with and, consequently, felt that a system of periodic review of innovations in weapons could be envisaged.

Egypt considered that the conference should deal with incendiary weapons, small-calibre projectiles, and delayed action and treacherous weapons, including land-mines, booby-traps, remote-delivery weapons, fuel-air explosives and fragmentation weapons. The United States felt that there were three kinds of agreement that might emerge from the Conference: an agreement prohibiting the use of munitions designed to produce fragments not detectable by X-rays; an agreement to restrict the use of land-mines and booby-traps; and an agreement to restrict the use of incendiary weapons. On fragments not detectable by X-rays, general agreement already existed and only final drafting remained. On mines and booby-traps, considerable progress had been made and the differences could undoubtedly be resolved. An early agreement on incendiaries, however, was less likely and continued insistence on the total prohibition of such weapons or prohibition of their use against people would preclude the possibility of agreement.

Divergent views were also expressed with regard to the actions to be taken subsequent to the 1979 Conference. Syria, for instance, considered that it would be unwise to assume that the conclusion of agreements prohibiting or restricting the use of the types of weapons in question would in itself achieve the objectives of the Conference. It considered the establishment of a controlling body, responsible for ensuring observance and implementation of the agreements and preventing fraudulence, to be indispensable. Such a body, it felt, would have to have the necessary powers to undertake investigations or to adopt the appropriate decisions. In addition, a system of sanctions would have to be instituted to punish violations, since provisions unaccompanied by sanctions would come within the sphere of morality rather than law. The German Democratic Republic, on the other hand, felt that there was no need to create special machinery to follow up the decisions of the Conference in that the institutions for which the General Assembly had made provision at its special session devoted to disarmament were already sufficient.

A number of countries referred to regional measures relevant to the objectives of the Preparatory Conference. Venezuela, for instance, noted that in 1974 it had signed the Declaration of Ayacucho⁹ under which a number of Latin American countries had undertaken to seek ways and means to effectively restrict weapons and put an end to their purchase for offensive purposes so as to devote the maximum resources to the economic and social development in Latin America. At a recent informal meeting at Mexico City, the Latin American countries had also agreed to consultation with a view to recommending measures for restricting trade with Latin America and between countries of the region in certain types of conventional weapons, and for restricting or prohibiting the use of certain types of conventional weapons considered to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. The Sudan stated that the African countries wished to restrict the use of conventional weapons and to put an end to armed conflict; they had given evidence of that desire by organizing in the United Republic of Cameroon, in December 1977, under the aegis of the Institute for International Studies at Yaoundé and of the Geneva

⁹ A/10044, annex.

Institute, the first seminar on international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. In the Declaration of Yaoundé, reflecting the results of the seminar, the African countries had been invited to accede to the additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and to ensure that international humanitarian law was taught in all their universities. It also noted that at the Diplomatic Conference the countries of the third world had made an unsuccessful attempt to establish in the First Protocol a link between the objectives of the Declaration and the prohibition or restriction of the use of certain conventional weapons.

Finally, several delegations addressed the question of existing rules applicable in armed conflict. Ghana, for example, took pride in having been the first State to ratify, as early as 20 February 1978, the two protocols adopted by the Diplomatic Conference. Mexico, on the other hand, stated that it had not yet signed the two protocols because of its view that the development of the law applicable in armed conflict could not be deemed final until measures to limit or prohibit the use and transfer of certain types of weapons had been adopted. It held that, at the Diplomatic Conference, the Mexican proposal that international machinery should be established for periodic revision of future prohibitions or limitations of the use of certain weapons had been narrowly defeated chiefly on account of the intransigence of two important groups of countries and the failure of many developing countries to grasp the nature of the problem.

Documents submitted to the Preparatory Conference

In the course of the work of the Preparatory Conference, 12 documents dealing with substantive issues were submitted. The subjects covered by the documents and the main elements of discussion on them are considered briefly in this section.

DRAFT PROPOSAL ON INCENDIARY WEAPONS, SUBMITTED BY AUSTRIA, EGYPT, GHANA, JAMAICA, MEXICO, ROMANIA, THE SUDAN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TOGO, VENEZUELA, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE¹⁰

On behalf of the sponsors, Sweden stated that the time might well be ripe for an agreement to prohibit or restrict the use of incendiary weapons on humanitarian grounds, especially since such weapons had aroused particular revulsion among public opinion. The draft proposal was the same as one submitted at the Diplomatic Conference and the sponsors had explained the reasoning behind it on many occasions. The Swedish representative held that a comprehensive ban on the weapons in question would be easy to implement because, with no scope for misunderstanding, it could hardly be misinterpre-

¹⁰ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/33/44)*, annex, sect. A. For other proposals concerning incendiary weapons see p. 362 below.

ted or abused in battle. Although some important countries and groups advocated a more limited approach on grounds of military security, the vast majority of States had called repeatedly for a far-reaching ban on incendiary weapons, particularly napalm.

The United States, the only participant to comment substantively on any of the papers, said that a viable compromise on the question of incendiary weapons could be reached only if humanitarian concerns and military requirements were taken into consideration and if careful attention was given both to incendiaries and to the effects of alternative weapons used to perform the same military missions. Incendiary weapons were in many situations more effective than any alternative weapons, at a lower cost in life. Since the area of effect of napalm was fairly precise, as compared with fragmentation munitions, it could be used to break up an enemy attack without endangering friendly personnel. Flame throwers and incendiary rockets were also very useful against fortifications and reduced the dangers in neutralizing enemy strong points. Incendiary munitions were also particularly effective in destroying certain material targets, such as stocks of fuel and ammunition, or military convoys. To prohibit their use could result in an increase in the volume of fragmentation munitions which would be delivered on the target, with a corresponding increase in casualties. From the humanitarian point of view, the use of napalm against troops produced painful and disabling injuries. According to the United States, however, the evidence available showed that napalm caused fewer deaths than conventional weapons and that the use of the latter, when troops were in close contact, resulted in a higher number of losses and consequently, greater suffering. The use of flame weapons against fortifications could cause fatalities or serious injuries to the occupants; on the other hand, the positions attacked were more quickly abandoned as a result and there would, therefore, be fewer casualties. The United States, accordingly, could not accept any proposal which would have the effect of precluding the use of flame weapons in close combat situations. It could accept neither a total prohibition of the weapons themselves, nor a ban on their anti-personnel use. It recognized, however, that the limitation of their use was appropriate in areas populated by civilians and it appreciated the efforts made by several delegations to formulate reasonable proposals on that point, in particular the proposal introduced by the Netherlands delegation (see page 362 below). The representative stated that the United States was prepared to give consideration to all proposals for protecting the civilian population from the effects of incendiary weapons.

DRAFT PROPOSAL ON FUEL-AIR EXPLOSIVES, SUBMITTED BY
MEXICO, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND¹¹

In introducing the draft proposal on behalf of the sponsors, Sweden noted that fuel-air explosives were a relatively new weapon. They utilized a

¹¹ *Ibid.*, sect. B.

cloud of volatile and inflammable fuel which, having been thoroughly mixed with air, was then detonated. Within the fuel-cloud, high over-pressures were reached, diminishing rapidly outside it. Such weapons could be used to clear areas sown with mines and booby-traps and also against personnel in light fortifications or material with low resistance. They could be delivered by various means such as aircraft, helicopter or rocket launchers. Because of the severity of the blast, the death rate among casualties was very high and medical resources available were unlikely to be adequate to deal with the injuries of the survivors, the most common of which were embolisms, rupture of organs, and massive bleeding as a result of pressure. Many of the immediate survivors died in extreme agony. Although only limited information was available about the effects of such weapons, Sweden was ready to provide the limited information available to any State which requested it.

It noted that the draft proposal dealt only with fuel-air explosives, excluding other blast weapons, and made an exception in the case of fuel-air explosives when the aim was "exclusively to destroy material objects" because it was thought that the use of such weapons against targets such as mine fields might have unique military value and, if there were no personnel in the target area, would not conflict with the principles of humanitarian law. Although a total prohibition of the use of such weapons might be easier to apply, it would be less easy to agree on. To permit the use of such weapons against material targets would certainly entail some risk of a complete breakdown of the restriction; however, material targets were, in general, fairly easy to distinguish. Implementation of the proposal would create a need for adequate intelligence information, which, in turn, should reduce the risk of involuntary indiscriminate use of fuel-air explosives.

The United States said that it would be premature to consider restrictions or prohibitions of the use of fuel-air weapons, which were of great military importance, unless such measures could be supported by scientific conclusions. It was quite likely that the medical effects of those weapons were less severe than those of current conventional munitions. As far as the medical aspects of fuel-air explosives were concerned, there were few studies and limited data. According to the United States, it was known, first of all, that the medical effects of fuel-air explosives were produced by blast; that type of explosive could be viewed as a new weapon only to the extent that the detonating mechanism and the comparative distribution of yield per weight of the explosive were new. In fact, blast over-pressures resulting from conventional high explosive munitions far exceeded those produced by current fuel-air explosives. Secondly, the blast effects from any weapon might approach 100 per cent lethality if a person was close to the centre of the blast; the United States had already presented technical and medical data which clearly refuted the general allegation of 100 per cent lethality of fuel-air explosives. Artillery shells and fuel-air devices were both lethal near the centre of blast. While it might be argued that at between 7 and 10 metres a particular artillery shell would be likely to cause only injury, it also had to be borne in mind that its fragmentation had wounding effects up to at least 30 metres, well beyond the significant range of the fuel-air explosive. Further, within the 10-metre

range, the artillery munition had very high lethality. The United States delegation held that the ratio of killed to wounded for fuel-air explosives was very similar to that for standard high explosives. Thirdly, while it had been claimed that death from blast effects was particularly painful, it was well known that in the lethal area death was very rapid. While it had been claimed that the NATO handbook on emergency war surgery stated that blast injuries produced unnecessary suffering, there was no such statement in that NATO handbook.

WORKING PAPER ON CERTAIN SMALL-CALIBRE WEAPONS AND PROJECTILES
SUBMITTED BY MEXICO, SWEDEN AND ZAIRE¹²

In introducing the working paper, Sweden said that it contained the basic facts on small-calibre weapons and projectiles, but no proposed rules, and that certain details still to be negotiated had been omitted. It was a working paper not intended to supersede proposals made on the question earlier.

Small-calibre projectiles, however, were a very important subject for the deliberations of the Conference. Any measure which would prevent escalation of their injurious effect, or even decrease it, would be of direct advantage to those who in future might be wounded by them, since small-calibre weapons were always among the first to be used in any conflict. Although such weapons might appear simple, they were in reality highly complex from a technical as well as a medical point of view. In the current state of knowledge, Sweden held, it was certainly possible to establish the main criteria for a rule intended to prevent escalation of the injuring power of small-calibre projectiles. It noted that the working paper submitted could not cover all problems relating to small-calibre weapons, and added that it could make additional information available.

The working paper was intended as a general introduction, to facilitate discussion and research and enable the Preparatory Conference and the plenipotentiary Conference to draft new rules or a new agreement under which weapons in that category would in future not cause more severe injuries than conventional weapons of the same type.

The United States, in its comment, recalled that since 1974 the American delegation had presented data showing that the wounding effects of small-calibre munitions could not be directly related to their velocity. It had consistently indicated the complexity of the research required to define the parameters of the ballistic effects and to relate those parameters to the effects upon living tissue. It was gratifying to see that the majority of experts recognized that wounding effects could not be related to a single simplistic criterion like velocity, and that considerably more research would have to be done before any objective criteria for measuring the wounding effects of small-calibre projectiles could be identified.

¹² *Ibid.*, sect. C.

DRAFT CLAUSES RELATING TO THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF
INCENDIARY WEAPONS, SUBMITTED BY MEXICO¹³

DRAFT CLAUSES RELATING TO THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF ESPECIALLY
INJURIOUS SMALL-CALIBRE PROJECTILES, SUBMITTED BY MEXICO¹⁴

DRAFT CLAUSE RELATING TO THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF ANTI-
PERSONNEL FRAGMENTATION WEAPONS, SUBMITTED BY MEXICO¹⁵

DRAFT CLAUSE RELATING TO THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF FLECHETTES,
SUBMITTED BY MEXICO¹⁶

In introducing the four documents, Mexico noted that they had originally been submitted at the Diplomatic Conference between 1974 and 1977. Basically, they suggested phraseology which might be used to define prohibitions on the use of the types of weapons mentioned in their titles.

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE OF A TREATY, SUBMITTED BY MEXICO¹⁷

In introducing the document, the representative of Mexico, after calling attention to the introductory note, stressed that the proposed international instrument would consist of a general agreement and a series of optional protocols on specific weapons. That structure offered a number of advantages. He held, *inter alia*, that it provided the opportunity for as many States as possible to give tangible proof of their desire to contribute to the development of international humanitarian law. It would also enable States which were in a position to enter into undertakings concerning prohibitions and restrictions of the use of certain weapons to subscribe to a large number of international agreements. The instrument also provided for the establishment of machinery to ensure periodic review of evolutions and innovations in the technology of war and thus the continued development of international humanitarian law. Mexico stressed the preliminary nature of its initiative.

PROPOSAL ON THE REGULATION ON THE USE OF LAND-MINES AND OTHER DEVICES:
DRAFT ARTICLES FOR A TREATY, SUBMITTED BY AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA,
DENMARK, FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, MEXICO, THE
NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, SPAIN AND THE UNITED
KINGDOM¹⁸

In introducing the proposal on behalf of the sponsors, the representative of the United Kingdom said that it was not a new proposal since it had already

¹³ *Ibid.*, sect. D.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, sect. E.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, sect. F.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, sect. G.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, sect. H.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, sect. I.

been considered in various forums, but was a text which, to a substantial extent, represented expert opinion. For some time it had been the view of the United Kingdom that the placing of restrictions on the use of mines and booby-traps would offer an opportunity for an advance in the humanitarian protection which ought to be afforded to civilian populations, and it had tried to strike a balance between humanitarian considerations and the security requirements of States. The proposal contained, *inter alia*, articles relating to the recording of the location of minefields and other devices; restrictions on the use of remotely-delivered mines and on mines and other devices in populated areas; and prohibitions on the use of certain booby-traps and other devices.

DRAFT PROPOSAL CONCERNING NON-DETECTABLE FRAGMENTS, SUBMITTED BY AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREECE, IRELAND, ITALY, JAMAICA, MEXICO, MOROCCO, THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, PANAMA, THE PHILIPPINES, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SPAIN, THE SUDAN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, TOGO, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES, VENEZUELA, YUGOSLAVIA AND ZAIRE¹⁹

In introducing the draft proposal on fragments which, in the human body, escape detection by X-rays, the representative of Switzerland, on behalf of the sponsors, stated that unanimous agreement had been reached on the proposal at the fourth session of the Diplomatic Conference. The purpose of the proposal was not to prohibit a particular category of weapons but to eliminate certain effects of their use in order to prevent suffering for which there was no military justification. The fragments in question were produced mainly by plastic materials. There was no intention of prohibiting the general use of plastic casings on certain shells or mines unless the primary effect sought was to cause injuries through the fragmentation of the casing rather than the blast of the weapons themselves. The proposal was therefore not aimed at components which, as a side-effect, penetrated the human body without being detectable in it by X-rays. Such secondary effects could in any case be avoided by adding heavy atoms to the plastic materials to make them detectable by X-rays. He noted that the proposal submitted earlier by his delegation to the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, held at Lugano in 1976, had sought to achieve the prohibition of all weapons producing fragments that were not detectable by X-rays, including fragments produced as a side-effect. It had subsequently amended its proposal in order to take a large number of views into account.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, sect. J.

DRAFT PROPOSAL ON INCENDIARY WEAPONS, SUBMITTED BY
AUSTRALIA AND THE NETHERLANDS²⁰

In introducing the proposal, the Netherlands representative stated that incendiary weapons posed one of the most complex problems because of the humanitarian and military factors involved in prohibiting or restricting their use. In order to stimulate discussion, it submitted, together with Australia, the proposal originally submitted to the Conference of Government Experts at Lugano, on the grounds that it would be useful for the participants in the Preparatory Conference to have a full range of proposals before them for study and comparison.

DRAFT PROPOSAL ON INCENDIARY WEAPONS, SUBMITTED BY
DENMARK AND NORWAY²¹

In introducing the draft proposal, the Norwegian representative said that the two delegations had considered it useful to put forward new ideas and concepts to stimulate the debate on incendiary weapons. He stated that the draft proposal contained rules which were as simple and as straightforward as possible, due consideration being given to the necessary balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate and security needs. Those rules stemmed from two main aims, namely, to give the best possible protection to the civilian population, and to define situations in which military personnel should also be protected.

Closing of the Preparatory Conference

During the course of the Preparatory Conference, a number of speakers called generally on States to demonstrate their political will to contribute constructively to its success and to that of the 1979 Conference. With regard to the substantive questions to be dealt with at the 1979 Conference, Romania held that the Preparatory Conference should develop that work as much as possible, with regard both to the scope of the negotiations and the drawing up of specific texts for agreement.

At its closing meeting, the Preparatory Conference decided to hold another session, during which the work would be completed with regard to the remaining organizational matters. The President suggested that, for the second session, delegations should include the experts they would require. He expressed the hope that the second session would be a fruitful one.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, sect. K.

²¹ *Ibid.*, sect. L.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

At its thirty-third session, the General Assembly had on its agenda an item entitled, "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Preparatory Conference". In connexion with the item, the Assembly had before it the report of the Preparatory Conference²² and the final documents of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978.²³

During the discussions, both in plenary meetings and in the First Committee,²⁴ many delegations stressed the importance of the Conference, and affirmed the support of their Governments for its objectives. Several speakers said that weapons to be considered by the Conference were actually used. Iraq and Qatar, for instance, said that Israel had used cluster bombs against refugee camps and civilian targets in southern Lebanon. Nigeria and Zambia said that weapons of the categories in question were used by the racist régimes in southern Africa indiscriminately, and often in the territories of other sovereign States, against innocent civilians and refugees.

A limited number of delegations referred to the substance of the work of the Preparatory Conference. Mexico, for example, referred to its proposal concerning the concept of a global agreement with optional protocols covering specific weapons. Uruguay expressed satisfaction concerning the organizational achievements of the Preparatory Conference. The Netherlands expressed confidence that the Preparatory Conference could, at its second session, complete its organizational work and simultaneously deal with substantive issues, while Peru merely hoped that the Preparatory Conference would be able to overcome its difficulties and find the means to deal with the important substantive matters entrusted to it. Egypt felt that rules of procedure of the General Assembly provided the necessary framework for the success of the main Conference, and did not favour consideration of the concept of consensus. Finland, on the other hand, felt that every effort should be made to obtain results by consensus to ensure that prohibitions and restrictions of use would be acceptable to the greatest possible number of States and thus be meaningful and effective.

Sweden, for its part, noting that Governments seemed prepared to come to certain agreements in the area in question, urged that the opportunity offered by the 1979 Conference not be missed. Its representative held that, first, the Conference must agree on a ban or far-reaching restrictions on the

²² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 44 (A/33/44)*.

²³ See A/33/206.

²⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 33rd and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 57th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

use of incendiary weapons and, secondly, take action to ensure that the new generation of automatic rifle would not result in escalation of injury as compared with the traditional 7.62 mm. rifle. While there were good prospects for international agreement in other areas, such as mines and booby-traps, he held that it would be impossible to qualify the Conference as successful unless there were workable results in the first two areas. Thus the Preparatory Conference in the limited time available, as well as the main Conference, should be used to tackle substantive rather than procedural questions. He recalled the difficulty encountered by the Preparatory Conference at its first session in attempting to bridge the gap between the two major positions on decision taking. There were, first, those—mainly the members of the two military alliances—who insisted on decision taking by consensus in matters involving military security and, secondly, the majority—non-aligned, neutral, and some alliance members—who would adhere to the rule of simple majority used in the General Assembly or a modification thereof, as had been the case at previous United Nations conferences. He held that the possibility of the vote must be kept intact with the hope that it would not have to be resorted to; every effort should be made to reach results which had the widest possible backing. Otherwise, agreements, though formally adopted by vote, might not be signed and ratified. In closing, the Swedish representative suggested that, rather than adoption of a consensus rule, self-restraint should be exercised by a possible majority.

On 17 November, the representative of Sweden introduced in the First Committee a draft resolution sponsored also by Austria, Bangladesh, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Honduras, Iceland, India, Mauritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. In the introduction, Sweden expressed the hope, on behalf of the sponsors, that the draft would be adopted by consensus. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted it by consensus.

In explanation of vote, the United States stated that while it had joined in the consensus it had not received assurances as to how decisions would be taken at the Conference. It emphasized that it was not committed to participation unless and until an adequate basis was laid with regard to both substance and procedure. Italy emphasized that, while it had joined in the consensus, it regarded the rule of consensus as an essential condition for the achievement of acceptable results on substantive disarmament matters.

At its 84th meeting, on 14 December, the General Assembly also adopted the draft resolution by consensus, as resolution 33/70. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the suffering of civilian populations and combatants could be significantly reduced if general agreement could be attained on the prohibition or restriction for humanitarian reasons of the use of specific conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects,

Mindful that positive results as regards the non-use or restriction of use for humanitarian reasons of specific conventional weapons would serve, in addition, as encouragement in the broader field of disarmament,

Recalling its resolution 32/152 of 19 December 1977, in which it decided to convene in 1979 a United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Reiterating the task entrusted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session to the Conference, namely, that it should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which had been the subject-matter of previously conducted discussions, as well as the appeal addressed by the Assembly at its special session to all States to contribute towards carrying out this task,

Recalling its decision to convene a Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference with the task of establishing the best possible substantive basis for the achievement at the United Nations Conference of agreements on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons and of considering organizational matters relating to the holding of the United Nations Conference,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects on its first session and of the progress made with regard to organizational aspects;

2. *Notes* that a number of proposals on the substantive work of the United Nations Conference were introduced and views exchanged on them;

3. *Reaffirms* its belief that the United Nations Conference should strive to reach agreement on specific instruments in the field of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;

4. *Endorses* the decision of the Preparatory Conference to hold another session from 19 March to 12 April 1979 with a view to continuing its preparatory work in respect of both the organizational and the substantive aspects of the United Nations Conference;

5. *Reaffirms* its decision that the United Nations Conference should be held in 1979 and endorses the recommendation of the Preparatory Conference that it should be held at Geneva from 10 to 28 September 1979;

6. *Invites* States to participate actively in the further work of the Preparatory Conference and in the United Nations Conference itself and to be represented, in so far as possible, by the required legal, military and medical expertise;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide continued assistance to the Preparatory Conference in its work and to undertake the necessary preparations for the holding of the United Nations Conference;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Conference"

Conclusion

It appears from the activities relating to the question during 1978 that most countries support the concept of prohibitions or limitations on the use of certain conventional weapons because of their excessively injurious or indiscriminate effects. The possible areas of agreement and the scope of agreements which may be reached, however, remain in doubt. In addition, the time which may be required to finalize and bring agreements into effect and the extent of acceptance of such agreements remains unknown. At the time of writing, the method by which substantive decisions will be taken at the 1979 United Nations Conference has not been decided upon by the Preparatory Conference.

All of these questions will no doubt become clearer in the course of 1979 as a result of the work of the Preparatory Conference at its second session, and during and following the United Nations Conference which is expected to take place in September 1979.

PART FIVE

Other approaches to disarmament and arms limitation

The regional approach

Introduction

THE IDEA THAT REGIONAL ARMS LIMITATION and disarmament measures—both in the nuclear and conventional fields—can make significant contributions towards the improvement of international relations in general and the achievement of world-wide disarmament in particular continued to receive increasing attention during 1978. This trend reflected growing appreciation of the view that the regional approach, not as a final goal in itself but as an aspect of the step-by-step process towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament on a global basis, could serve as an important complement to wider multilateral efforts to realize that objective. Moreover, in view of the complex nature of the disarmament problem and the varying political and security considerations and arrangements in different regions, it has appeared, increasingly, that in some cases questions of arms limitation and disarmament might be handled more easily within a regional framework than by attempting to apply broad concepts to widely differing situations.

Several Member States have, especially in recent years, made a variety of efforts to promote both the general concept and various specific aspects of the regional approach. One of the earlier such efforts was made by the United States on 19 April 1966 in the then Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC)¹ when, in elaborating for the first time in a multilateral disarmament negotiating body its approach to the problem of controlling conventional armaments, it stressed the view that the regional approach presented attractive opportunities for the limitation of such weapons, and suggested the following six principles which might serve as a guide for regional co-operation in this field: (a) arrangements should contain an undertaking by the countries concerned not to acquire from any source, whether through indigenous production or by importation, those types of military equipment which they agreed to regulate; (b) the initiative for an arrangement should come from within the region concerned; (c) arrangements should include all States in the region whose participation was deemed important by the other participants; (d) potential suppliers should undertake to respect the regional arrangement by not supplying the proscribed types of equipment to the affected countries;

¹ 257th meeting.

(e) arrangements should contribute to the security of the States concerned and to the maintenance of a stable military balance; and (f) provision should be made to satisfy all interested parties that the arrangement was being observed.

Four years later, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which replaced ENDC in 1969, the United States continued to demonstrate great interest in the regional approach to disarmament, especially in the conventional field, when it submitted, on 12 August 1970, a working paper on conventional arms limitation.² In that working paper, the United States, after reaffirming the above-mentioned six principles, suggested the following three additional guidelines which also sought to promote and enhance regional efforts to limit conventional armaments: (a) one or more countries in a region might unilaterally undertake not to acquire certain types of sophisticated combat equipment; (b) in response to the initiative of countries in that region which had taken such unilateral steps, extra-regional States capable of supplying the equipment in question might, after consultations with the countries that had taken the initiative, similarly undertake not to turn over the specified types of equipment to other countries of the region; and (c) countries might unilaterally undertake to make available to others in the region information regarding national policies as to the production, purchase or supply of arms. Such steps, it was explained, were meant to allay suspicions by other States and to build mutual confidence among regional States.

At the thirtieth session of the General Assembly in 1975, Ghana considered that conventional disarmament might best be achieved on a regional basis and, to that end, suggested the establishment of regional conventional disarmament committees. The following year, in the CCD, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States referred to the regional approach and regarded its potential value as promising, especially in the conventional field.³ Also in 1976, at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, Belgium commented extensively on the regional aspects of disarmament and arms limitation. Contending that the Assembly had not given sufficient attention to the subject in the past, the Belgian delegation cited as examples regional arms limitation efforts in Latin America as envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho,⁴ and the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in central Europe, and expressed the view that security requirements were more easily perceived among States of the same region. Holding, furthermore, that regional and global disarmament approaches were complementary, and that each could contribute to the strengthening of international security which could be endangered by military imbalances or conflicts at the regional level, Belgium suggested that, as a first step, the General Assembly could call for a comprehensive study of all the disarmament and arms limitation measures lending themselves to a regional or subregional negotiating approach. It circu-

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, annex C, sect. 36 (CCD/307).

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27)*, paras. 209-213.

⁴ A/10044, annex.

lated an aide-memoire⁵ containing its views on the regional aspects of disarmament and relating in particular to the proposed study.

In 1977, also on a Belgian initiative, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/87 D, by which, *inter alia*, it invited all States to send their views and suggestions on the regional approach, including measures to increase confidence and stability, to the Secretary-General for transmission, as official documents, to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978, and decided to consider, at its thirty-third session, the desirability of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a comprehensive study of all the regional aspects of disarmament.

At the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, a large number of delegations commented on the regional aspects of arms limitation and disarmament.⁶ Many States, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Portugal, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States, supported the regional approach, regarding it mainly as a step towards a wider and more comprehensive global scheme to limit the supply and accumulation of conventional weapons. With regard to questions of regional security and co-operation in specific regions, several delegations, representing all geographical and political groupings, called for and stressed the value of strengthening and expanding political and military détente in and beyond Europe, and a number of delegations specifically emphasized the need to rid Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the Middle East regions of war and conflict, including great-Power military rivalries in those areas.

In the CCD in 1977,⁷ Romania urged the Committee to devote special attention to Europe, and Pakistan suggested that the non-nuclear-weapon States, especially those of the third world, should contribute to the advancement of the disarmament process by their own collective and regional initiatives. Also in 1977, during the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, several delegations communicated their views and suggestions to the Secretary-General concerning the special session and urged consideration of the question of the regional approach at that session.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Although the primacy of the goal of general and complete disarmament over partial or collateral measures continued to be stressed at the special session,

⁵ A/C.1/31/10.

⁶ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78. IX.4), pp. 244-247.

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/32/27)*, vol. I, paras. 245-247.

extensive reference was also made to the potentially valuable contribution that a regional approach could make to the attainment of that objective. In its consideration of such an approach, the General Assembly had before it, in addition to the report of its Preparatory Committee,⁸ a report on the regional aspects of disarmament⁹ prepared by the Secretary-General in accordance with the relevant provision of resolution 32/87 D by which the Assembly had invited all States to inform the Secretary-General of their views and suggestions concerning the regional aspects of disarmament, including measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis. The communications included in the Secretary-General's report came from the Governments of 28 States.

In their communications, most Governments expressed in one form or another the view that all approaches and avenues to disarmament, including the regional approach, should be explored. They believed that partial measures, including those undertaken at a regional level, could make significant contributions and complete world-wide efforts towards the realization of the goal of general and complete disarmament. The Governments also made a variety of suggestions on how the regional approach might be used to promote general progress in disarmament. A number of the Governments, including those of Canada, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, specifically supported, in principle, the Belgian proposal for a comprehensive study by the United Nations of the regional aspects of disarmament and arms limitation.

During the meetings of the special session, from 23 May to 30 June, a large number of delegations from all regions, representing a broad spectrum of political and socio-economic orientations, referred to and generally supported the regional approach, not as an end in itself but as a complementary measure to wider efforts towards world-wide disarmament.¹⁰ Speaking on 24 May, Vice-President Mondale of the United States held that the regional approach was still at a primitive stage and called for expanding and strengthening regional arms regulation arrangements and capabilities, for example, within the framework of such regional institutions as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS). Malta, holding that the regional approach deserved particular attention, expressed the view that the escalation of a regional armed conflict with the great Powers supporting opposite sides, rather than a direct nuclear attack by one major Power against the other, probably posed the greatest danger of a great-Power nuclear confrontation. Ecuador shared the view that regional disarmament was an important step towards world-wide disarmament and urged all States to adopt, together with global disarmament measures, those regional measures which effectively promoted the reduction of tensions and the peace-

⁸ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1)*, vol. I.

⁹ A/S-10/8 and Add.1 and 2.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings.

ful settlement of disputes, and consequently to agree to the limitation of military expenditures. Ecuador stated further that it would support the proposal for a study on the regional aspects of disarmament and would also support negotiations towards the realization of regional disarmament measures. Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey, in an address before the special session on 2 June, urged the world community to support regional efforts to promote stability and the gradual reduction of armed forces and stressed the view that the question of regional balance was acquiring increased significance for world peace. Indonesia emphasized the point that questions of regional stability and security depended primarily on the States of the region concerned. Singapore shared the Indonesian view while some States, among them Oman and Tunisia, held that the regional approach should take into account changing conditions as well as the special conditions of each region. Zambia expressed the view that the disarmament problem required global solutions and was linked to the strengthening of international security.

The regional approach was also considered at the special session within the context of specific regions—in particular Europe—and specific measures, such as the curbing of the international conventional arms trade, the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the promotion of confidence-building and stabilizing measures.

Europe, with the largest concentration of arms and armed forces in the world today, continued to be viewed by many delegations as the region where arms regulation negotiations, under appropriate conditions, might have special significance and relevance. In that connexion, reference was made to the importance of the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in central Europe and to the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and speakers generally urged the expansion and further strengthening of the process of détente in that continent. President Giscard d'Estaing of France formally proposed that all countries which had participated in the Helsinki Conference should meet to discuss disarmament in Europe with the step-by-step objective of achieving a genuine reduction of armaments, nuclear and conventional, within the European geo-strategic theatre. In addition, both Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany and Foreign Minister Gromyko of the Soviet Union, in their speeches before the special session on 26 May, attached major arms limitation and disarmament significance to the joint East-West declaration¹¹ adopted at the end of President Brezhnev's visit to the Federal Republic of Germany from 4 to 7 May 1978. In that declaration, both sides stated that they deemed it most important that neither side should seek military superiority and that approximate equality and parity sufficed to safeguard defence.

Several other regions were also mentioned, mainly by the countries of the regions concerned, as presenting possibilities for regional security initiatives. In that regard, a number of African countries, expressing concern over incidents of armed conflict in their continent, strongly urged regional efforts to promote stability and security, as well as disarmament, in Africa. Some

¹¹ See *New Times*, No. 20 (May 1978), pp. 26-27.

States, including the Congo and Nigeria, emphasized the position that regional security arrangements for Africa must be at the initiative of African countries and within the framework of OAU, and Morocco expressed the view that complete decolonization in Africa was the first pre-condition for arms regulation in that continent. In addition, a large number of States continued to point to the potentially destabilizing consequences for the peace and security of Africa if the racist South African régime acquired a nuclear-weapon capability. They therefore called upon the international community, in particular the Western Powers, to cease all aspects of nuclear and military collaboration with South Africa.

Significant reference was also made to regional conventional arms limitation efforts in Latin America in addition to general references to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which continued to generate praise as a major regional example (see chapter XIV above and chapter XXII below).

Concerning the Middle East, the complex security and political problems of the area continued to determine, to a large extent, the arms limitation and disarmament policies of the States of the area. Egypt re-emphasized that its objective was to keep the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and, in that connexion, reiterated its 1974 proposal, made jointly with Iran, which sought to accomplish that goal.¹² Israel, for its part, expressed its support for the regional approach to arms limitation and disarmament and reiterated its call for direct negotiations among all the States of the region on the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It maintained that such negotiations were an indispensable requirement for progress on that subject and called further on all States in the Middle East to negotiate a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in the region.

The Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and South-East Asia were also mentioned as possible areas for regional arms limitation and disarmament initiatives with the co-operative involvement of countries outside those areas, in particular the major Powers. In those cases, the regional States emphasized that their ultimate objective was to turn those regions into zones of peace. Regarding the Mediterranean area, Malta expressed strong regret that the special session had not adopted its proposal to declare the region a zone of peace. It noted further its efforts to encourage and promote peaceful co-operation in the Mediterranean and pointed out that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from Maltese territory by March 1979. The United States, while expressing support for the general concept of zones of peace as a measure that could promote international peace and security, considered that the establishment of such zones must be consistent with, and must not abridge, what the United States viewed as the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence or other rights recognized under international law, including the right of innocent passage and freedom of passage on the high seas.

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 24, 27-31, 34, 35, 100, 101, 103 and 107, documents A/9693 and Add.1-3.

Other specific disarmament-related measures suggested for consideration within a regional framework included conventional arms regulation and the general subject of promoting confidence-building measures.

Several States, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia, supported the regional approach as a means of curbing the conventional arms race.

Because of the actual and potential value of mutual trust and confidence in promoting disarmament efforts, many States have suggested that confidence-building and stabilization measures among States, especially in troubled regions, should be actively encouraged. In this connexion, for example, both Vice-President Mondale of the United States and Prime Minister Callaghan of the United Kingdom, in their speeches before the special session on disarmament on 24 May and 2 June respectively, referred to the experience of the use of technical expertise in verification and stabilizing measures in the volatile Middle East region and suggested that similar means could be applied in other regions to help build confidence and verify agreements. Mr. Callaghan suggested further that confidence-building measures envisaged in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should be adopted in regions where confidence needed to be fostered, and Mr. Mondale stated that the United States was prepared to offer technical assistance to help States find ways of using confidence-building and stabilizing measures to promote regional military restraint.

In another statement at the special session on 14 June, the United States delegation, after stressing the view that regional arms control also had global significance because of the constant possibility of local conflicts escalating into broader hostilities, said that the United States would be prepared to consider providing specific technical services to promote regional confidence-building and stabilizing measures, namely, land-based sensors to monitor movements in potential invasion routes and staging areas, as well as across borders; and assistance with photo-reconnaissance aircraft and associated photo-interpretation. The United States went on to suggest that regional arms regulation might also involve exchanges of information to enhance openness about military developments to contribute to building mutual confidence, and measures to increase stability by restricting the activity or disposition of forces in a given region.

In the Final Document of the special session, adopted by consensus on 30 June, the General Assembly included the following paragraph in the section entitled "Programme of Action":

93. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following, and other measures yet to be agreed upon, should be undertaken:

(a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(b) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament;

(c) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

Although other paragraphs noted regional possibilities within the context of conventional disarmament, confidence-building, and peace zones, the special session took no concrete decision on the specific Belgian proposal for a United Nations study on the regional aspects of disarmament and arms limitation. It recommended, however, that at its thirty-third and subsequent sessions the General Assembly should determine the specific guidelines for carrying out studies on disarmament-related subjects, taking into account the proposals already submitted as well as those that might be submitted later. Belgium indicated that it would raise its proposal again at the thirty-third session.

Consideration at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries

In the political declaration¹³ adopted at their conference, held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the non-aligned countries dealt with the question of regional military restraint mainly within the context of their stated positions on international issues concerning specific regions. In that connexion the non-aligned countries reaffirmed their dedication to the objective of transforming the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean regions into zones of peace and, after welcoming the efforts by European countries to normalize their mutual relations and consolidate security and co-operation, emphasized the view that détente could not be durable in Europe unless it was extended to other regions, especially in view of the special interrelationship between the problems of security in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The non-aligned States further condemned the military activities of the *apartheid* régime in South Africa and considered those activities a threat to the peace, not only of Africa but also of the world as a whole.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

While the general concept of a regional approach to arms limitation and disarmament was not specifically discussed in the CCD in 1978,¹⁴ a number of speakers referred to various related aspects of that approach, pertaining in particular to developments in Europe. In that connexion, the delegations of Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union referred to and reaffirmed the June 1978 proposals put forward at the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in

¹³ A/33/206, annex I.

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 224-247.

central Europe by the participating socialist countries, and expressed the hope that the Western participants in those talks would respond positively and rapidly to those proposals in order to strengthen and advance détente as well as promote arms reduction efforts in Europe. The Soviet Union also pointed to the confidence-building measures proposed by the Eastern European States at the follow-up Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe, held at Belgrade in late 1977 and early 1978.

Commenting on the Vienna force reduction talks, the United Kingdom pointed out that the Western participants in those talks had welcomed the June 1978 proposals by their Eastern European counterparts and that they were still examining those proposals and seeking clarifications on various aspects. The United Kingdom added that the Western participants would continue to work towards the conclusion of a mutually satisfactory agreement.

The Federal Republic of Germany recalled the text, which it had helped to draft, of paragraph 82 of the Final Document (see appendix I) adopted at the special session devoted to disarmament. That paragraph stated that the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of all States with full respect for security interests and independence of States outside military alliances, by agreement on appropriate mutual reductions and limitations, would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security. The Federal Republic of Germany stated that it would participate in all activities that could help achieve that goal.

The Federal Republic of Germany and Japan also emphasized the view that confidence-building measures played a great role in supporting disarmament efforts. In that regard, the Federal Republic of Germany referred to its Chancellor's statement at the special session that the confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe had proved to be successful. It was that delegation's view that confidence-building measures could be further developed, in particular on a regional basis and, subsequently, perhaps also on a world-wide basis.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

The discussions at the thirty-third session were viewed essentially as a follow-up to the extensive treatment accorded the subject of regional disarmament by the Assembly at its special session just some three months earlier.

Both during the general debate and in the First Committee,¹⁵ most delegations which referred to the regional approach considered it mainly within

¹⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 86th meetings; *ibid.*, *First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 59th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

the context of specific proposals such as Belgium's proposal for a comprehensive study of the question, proposals concerning specific regions, in particular Europe and Latin America, and specific disarmament measures such as conventional arms restraint, the creation of denuclearized and peace zones, and the promotion of confidence-building measures (see also chapters IV and XIV above and chapter XXII below).

Several States, among them Australia, Chile, Hungary, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Tunisia and the United States, joined Belgium, which was in the forefront of recent General Assembly activities on regional disarmament, in supporting the general concept of such an approach. Chile expressed its belief in the effectiveness of regional disarmament as a valuable contribution to halting the arms race and noted Latin America's efforts in that direction as represented in the Declaration of Ayacucho which sought to limit conventional armaments in the region. Chile also felt that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be strengthened in order to enable it, *inter alia*, to assist in matters relating to regional disarmament agreements, including verification tasks. Hungary held that regional disarmament measures could have special significance, sometimes beyond regional boundaries, in reducing political tension and military confrontation and mentioned, in that context, the pioneering position of the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in central Europe. The Netherlands expressed its view that regional arms limitation and disarmament measures could positively contribute to regional and international security if the following conditions were met: (a) the initiative for a regional arrangement should come from within the region concerned; (b) the initiative should be sufficiently supported by the States in the region; and (c) States outside the region should not in any way contravene the objectives of any such regional arrangement.

The United States urged that further attention and impetus should be given to regional approaches to arms control and disarmament, particularly to confidence-building and stabilizing measures. Tunisia, observing that conflicts erupted mainly at the regional level, stressed its conviction that, particularly in the conventional field, regional measures of disarmament such as the establishment of zones of peace constituted a realistic approach to general and complete disarmament. Tunisia was therefore prepared to consider any realistic and equitable proposal aimed at regional disarmament, without prejudice to the right of States to safeguard their national defence and security.

Pakistan, for its part, while sharing the view that disarmament goals should be pursued both globally and regionally, particularly since most current conflicts were occurring at the regional level, emphasized, at the same time, that the regional approach should not become an excuse for delaying global disarmament, both nuclear and conventional. It further asserted that one of the greatest impediments to regional arms control was the existence of mutual disputes and tensions in the various regions and suggested that regional arms control efforts should address themselves to that fundamental situation and seek the resolution of those disputes and tensions on the basis of the principles of justice and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations. Brazil, after referring to the disarmament objectives and

principles contained in the Final Document of the special session, re-emphasized its view that disarmament should be promoted more on a universal and integrated basis than on a regional basis.

During the debates, there was increased discussion of the potential role of confidence-building measures in facilitating the attainment of disarmament and arms limitation objectives, especially at the regional level. In that connexion, the General Assembly, on an initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany, adopted resolution 33/91 B (see chapter IV above, pages 120-121). By that resolution, the Assembly recommended that States should consider regional arrangements for confidence-building measures taking into account the particular conditions in each region.

As in previous years when the subject was considered in the General Assembly, the regional approach was also referred to within the context of conventional arms limitation efforts. Among others, Tunisia expressed its special interest in regional disarmament measures relating to the transfer of and trade in conventional weapons in the developing countries, and France considered that regional consultation could also bolster efforts to limit conventional arms transfers. Pakistan, stating its view that regional measures should promote peace and security globally as well as in the regional context, held that such measures must recognize the need to maintain a military balance among the regional States and take into account the levels of transfer and of indigenous production of armaments, as well as the technological quality of the arms possessed by the States concerned.

While Europe continued to be referred to as the area where important regional confidence-building and other measures related to arms control were being developed and promoted, for instance, within the framework of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in central Europe, increasing attention was also being devoted to regional initiatives in Latin America. In that connexion, several States, including in particular the Latin American States concerned and a number of other States, among them Canada, France, the Netherlands and the United States, commended and further supported Latin America's regional disarmament and arms limitation efforts in both the nuclear and conventional fields. Specific reference was made to Latin America's pioneering and still unique position as the first and only existing nuclear-weapon-free zone and to ongoing efforts within the framework of the Declaration of Ayacucho to restrict conventional armaments in the region.

For its part, Mexico stressed its view that regional efforts at self-restraint did not in any way imply disarming the disarmed but should be part of a global programme for the adoption of universal measures concerning the non-transfer of conventional weapons and the non-use of others with excessively cruel and indiscriminate effects, bearing in mind the need to reduce armaments to the level necessary for a State's internal security. Regarding the Declaration of Ayacucho, Mexico informed the General Assembly that 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries had met at Mexico City from 21 to 24 August 1978 and had decided to recommend to their respective Governments, among other measures, the establishment of flexible consultative machinery

open to the participation of all States in the region, for the purpose of undertaking, *inter alia*, studies and recommendations on the possible limitation of the transfer of certain types of conventional weapons to Latin America or the Caribbean, as well as among the countries of the area.

Several other States, including in particular the States of the various regions concerned, also emphasized the need for military restraint in Africa, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, South Asia and South-East Asia (see chapter XIV above).

On 22 November 1978 Belgium submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee which was subsequently also sponsored by the Bahamas, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Ivory Coast, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Venezuela and Zaire. A number of other States, among them France and the Netherlands, also supported the proposal for a study of the regional approach and the Netherlands, in addition, specifically supported the Belgian draft resolution towards that end.

In introducing its draft resolution in the First Committee on 24 November, Belgium explained, in the first place, that the draft was the result of a continuing process which formally began during the thirty-second session in 1977, when the Assembly adopted resolution 32/87 D concerning the regional aspects of disarmament. Turning to the substance of the draft, the Belgian delegation held that although the link between regional measures and general and complete disarmament was obvious, it was nevertheless also complex and might vary depending on the regions and the nature of the measures envisaged. Moreover, the delegation added, the more one proceeded with regional disarmament, the closer became the link with global disarmament. Furthermore, both approaches, in Belgium's view, should be pursued in a parallel manner, as indeed one could not conceive of a region being totally disarmed while the rest of the world continued to arm. The disarmament process therefore should be based on horizontal and vertical progression.

Noting the concern expressed by some delegations that the thrust of the Belgian initiative appeared to be directed mainly at conventional disarmament, Belgium explained that the study which it proposed would cover both nuclear and conventional disarmament and would, for example, provide an opportunity to update the 1975 comprehensive study of nuclear-weapon-free zones. India, among those which considered the formulation of the draft resolution as being directed mainly at conventional disarmament, suggested the incorporation of the words "in particular the nuclear armaments race" in the first preambular paragraph, an amendment which it felt would render the text more consistent with the position of the General Assembly as to which sphere of the disarmament effort, nuclear or conventional, deserved priority attention.

Before the First Committee voted on the draft resolution at its 59th meeting on 1 December, Pakistan orally proposed an amendment, which was accepted, to add at the end of the fifth preambular paragraph the words "and the views expressed by Member States at its thirty-third session". Jordan, in explaining its position on the Belgian draft, said that it would abstain in the vote partly because the draft resolution did not distinguish between one region

and another in terms of the tensions in the region, and cited the Middle East region as an example. The Syrian Arab Republic, which also said it would abstain in the vote, shared Jordan's explanation and expressed further its view that the text of the draft resolution was general and its scope unclear and that the terminology used was vague and opened itself up to possible misunderstanding.

The First Committee adopted the draft resolution, as amended by Pakistan, by a vote of 79 (including France, the United Kingdom and the United States) to none, with 40 abstentions (including the Soviet Union). Most of the other abstentions involved mainly non-aligned and Eastern European countries. China did not participate in the vote.

At its 86th plenary meeting on 16 December, the General Assembly, by a vote of 93 to none, with 40 abstentions, adopted the draft resolution as resolution 33/91 E. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Concerned about the armaments race and the continued increase in expenditures on armaments,

Recognizing the importance of pursuing every effort which might contribute to progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Mindful of the importance of the regional measures already adopted, of studies already carried out, notably in the field of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and of regional efforts undertaken on the nuclear and conventional levels, both in the field of measures designed to increase confidence and in that of disarmament and arms control,

Recalling its resolution 32/87 D of 12 December 1977, on the regional aspects of disarmament,

Taking note of national contributions made in accordance with the aforementioned resolution,

Taking fully into account the decisions and recommendations contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and the views expressed by Member States at its thirty-third session,

1. *Decides* to undertake a systematic study of all the aspects of regional disarmament;
2. *Specifies* in that connexion that the study shall cover, *inter alia*, the following subjects:
 - (a) Basic conditions governing the regional approach, particularly from the standpoint of security requirements;
 - (b) Definition of measures which, on the initiative of the States concerned, may lend themselves to a regional approach;
 - (c) Link between regional measures and the process of general and complete disarmament;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis, and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a progress report on the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Regional Disarmament.

Conclusion

During 1978, there was little discernible change from the situation that prevailed in 1977 in terms of the attitudes or views of States regarding the

regional approach to disarmament. In fact, even the result of the General Assembly's vote on the draft resolution relating to the question was almost the same as that of 1977: in 1978, the Assembly adopted resolution 33/91 E by a vote of 93 to none, with 40 abstentions, while at its thirty-second session it adopted resolution 32/87 D, on the same subject, by 91 votes to none, with 40 abstentions.

While no States formally opposed further United Nations action on the question, a large number of countries, mainly non-aligned, continued to express reservations about the concept of regional disarmament. However, by not opposing the proposal, those countries appeared to be demonstrating their readiness to give any idea that could advance the disarmament objective a chance to prove its usefulness.

Moreover, the preparation of the comprehensive study on the question, as called for in resolution 33/91 E, may assist in clarifying further, as well as enhance and widen the understanding of some of the basic considerations of the concept.

Following the submission to the General Assembly of the completed study and its consideration by Member States, it may then be more propitious to assess future prospects for regional arms control and disarmament measures.

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Introduction

AFTER RECEIVING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION in various forums for a number of years, the question of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly for the first time at the twenty-sixth session in 1971, under an item entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", at the request of Sri Lanka, later joined by the United Republic of Tanzania. At that session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2832 (XXVI) in which it solemnly declared that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, was designated for all time as a zone of peace. The Assembly also called upon the great Powers, in conformity with the Declaration, to enter into consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to halting the further expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean and eliminating from the area all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. Further, the Assembly called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of the Declaration and such action as might be necessary to ensure that: (a) warships and military aircraft might not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral and hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (b) subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations was unaffected; and (c) appropriate arrangements were made to give effect to any international agreement that might ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

Subsequently, at its twenty-seventh session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2992 (XXVII) by which it, *inter alia*, decided to establish

a 15-member *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean, consisting of Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia. The *Ad Hoc* Committee was to study the implications of the proposal that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace, with special reference to the practical measures that might be taken in furtherance of the objectives of resolution 2832 (XXVI), having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

At its twenty-eighth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 3080 (XXVIII), by which it, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified experts and competent bodies selected by him, a factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean, in all its aspects, with special reference to their naval deployments conceived in the context of great Power rivalry. The statement was completed in 1974 and annexed to the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report to the General Assembly at its following session.¹

In 1974, the General Assembly, by its resolution 3259 A (XXIX), called upon the great Powers to refrain from increasing their military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean; requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean and invited all States, especially the great Powers, to co-operate with the *Ad Hoc* Committee in the discharge of its functions. And by resolution 3259 B (XXIX), the *Ad Hoc* Committee was enlarged by the addition of three new members—Bangladesh, Kenya and Somalia.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee, in its report to the Assembly at the thirtieth session,² recommended for adoption a draft resolution by which, *inter alia*, the Assembly would note that an agreement in principle on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean had emerged among the littoral and hinterland States and would request them to continue their consultations to that end, with particular attention to the purposes of the conference, its date and duration, its venue, the provisional agenda, participation and level of participation. The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 3468 (XXX).

At its thirty-first session, by its resolution 31/88, the General Assembly took note of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean,³ in particular section two thereof concerning the consultations entered into by the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in pursuance of resolution 3468 (XXX), and invited once again all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in a practical manner with the *Ad Hoc* Committee in the discharge of its functions.

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 29* and addendum (A/9629 and Add.1).

² *Ibid., Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/10029)*.

³ *Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 29* and corrigenda (A/31/29 and Corr.1 and 2).

In 1977, at its thirty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 32/86 by which, among other things, it renewed its invitation to the great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean that had not so far seen their way to co-operating effectively with the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean and the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter with the least possible delay into consultations with those States in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3468 (XXX). The Assembly also decided that, as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean would be convened in New York at a suitable date, which other States not falling within that category, but which had participated or had expressed their willingness to participate in the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, could attend. It requested the *Ad Hoc* Committee to make the necessary preparations for that meeting. Further, the Assembly decided to enlarge the *Ad Hoc* Committee by the addition of Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Greece, Mozambique and Oman.

Besides appearing on the agenda of the General Assembly since 1971, the proposal to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean has also received consideration at other international conferences. In particular, the conferences of the Islamic and the non-aligned States have dealt with the question for a number of years and both groups of States have consistently supported the concept of the zone of peace and the implementation of the Declaration.

Consideration by the *Ad Hoc* Committee, 1978

Pursuant to resolution 32/86, the *Ad Hoc* Committee resumed its deliberations and accomplished its work in the course of eight formal as well as a number of informal meetings, held between April and September 1978, and concluded its work by adopting its report to the General Assembly.⁴ The report contained, *inter alia*, a draft resolution unanimously recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee for adoption by the Assembly.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee reconvened amid the general expectation that further progress, however gradual, could be registered, based on the previous year's developments, which included bilateral talks begun by the United States and the USSR as well as the decision of the General Assembly to hold a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean.

In accordance with the practice established in 1977, the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee continued his consultations with the great Powers principally concerned, the Soviet Union and the United States, with a view to ascertaining the status of their bilateral talks regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean and in order to discuss with them the co-operation they would give the Committee in the discharge of its functions. The text of the

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 29* and corrigendum (A/33/29 and Corr.1).

Chairman's report on those consultations⁵ was included in the Committee's report to the General Assembly.

The Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee reported that a note was delivered to him by the deputy permanent representative of the United States on 1 March 1978, containing a text agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union concerning their bilateral talks held at Bern from 7 to 17 February 1978.⁶ The communication stated, *inter alia*, that to date there had been a certain measure of agreement on a number of questions, including the desirability of a staged approach, beginning with an agreement not to increase current military presence, then moving on promptly to negotiations on reductions.

Later in the year, on 14 September, a note was transmitted to the Chairman by deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union which conveyed the following views of his Government:

In continuation of the talk which we had in August we would like to point out the following:

As long as bilateral United States-USSR talks followed their normal course, a certain progress was achieved and there were reasons to look forward to further constructive development of this matter. Despite the fact that many questions remained unresolved, the degree of progress made at the talks attested to the feasibility of an agreement on:

(a) The "freezing" of military presence of the USSR and the United States in the Indian Ocean at the level of recent years;

(b) Refraining from the deployment of strategic forces in the Indian Ocean;

(c) Negotiations on reduction of military presence and military activities of non-littoral States upon coming into force of the agreement on the "freezing"

This was worthwhile progress. And only due to the position taken by the United States, which one-sidedly suspended the talks and refused to fix even an approximate date for their resumption, further progress was not possible until now.

Subsequently, on 22 September, the Permanent Mission of the United States to the United Nations informed the Chairman of its position in the following terms:

President Carter has recently reiterated United States interest in an Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement.

The United States continues to believe that such an agreement would promote peace and stability in the region and would be in the interest of all States concerned. We believe this view is shared by many members of the Committee.

Unfortunately recent events in the region, not caused by the United States, have resulted in a slowdown in the course of the negotiations.

The United States believes it important that while the talks are in progress both the United States and the Soviet Union exercise restraint in their military activities in the region. This would have a positive impact on the course of the negotiations.

For its part the United States remains committed to the goals of the negotiations. We are keeping the situation under careful consideration and will seek to resume the talks when the circumstances are appropriate.

⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 7.

⁶ An earlier series of meetings was also held at Bern from 6 to 12 December 1977 to discuss proposals put forward by both sides for an agreement on the limitation of their military activities in the Indian Ocean.

The Chairman's report on his consultations elicited varied comments from the members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, ranging from the positive to those which pointed out certain limitations in the undertaking. Australia welcomed the initiation of the talks as a major step forward and expressed the hope that they could lead to measures contributing ultimately to the realization of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The delegation also regretted the circumstances which had led to the suspension of those talks. On the other hand, China stated that the so-called bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States on limiting their military forces in the Indian Ocean region were just another form of intense rivalry and a fraud aimed at deceiving and diverting world public opinion. In particular, the Soviet Union had greatly accelerated its pace in carrying out aggression and expansion in the region. It had resorted to both hard and soft tactics, using every possible trick to infiltrate, subvert, interfere in and control the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf areas, seriously threatening the sovereignty, independence, peace and security of the countries concerned. The delegation emphasized that the realization of the goal of establishing the Indian Ocean peace zone required condemnation of and opposition to the rivalry and expansion of the two super-Powers in the region. India was of the opinion that the talks between the two great Powers could be attributed, at least in part, to the pressure exerted on them and the climate created following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) and subsequent resolutions. Unfortunately, those talks had been suspended and had not been conducted in a manner best calculated to achieve their purpose. If the littoral and hinterland States were not involved, the full weight of their opinion could not be brought to bear on the negotiations. Another limitation, the delegation pointed out, was that the *inter se* concerns of the countries involved in the talks had had more influence than the concerns of the Indian Ocean States.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee also reported to the General Assembly on its ongoing preparations for the meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean requested in resolution 32/86. The Committee noted that, with regard to the date of the proposed meeting, the majority preferred to hold the meeting in 1979, although a number of delegations emphasized that in taking a decision regarding the date, it was necessary to ensure that sufficient time would be available for adequate preparations.

With respect to the purpose of the meeting, there appeared to be a wide measure of agreement that the primary purpose of such a meeting should be to harmonize the views and positions of the littoral and hinterland States and to obtain a common understanding on the course of action to be followed in implementing the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

A number of delegations addressed themselves to the question of the agenda for the forthcoming meeting in only general terms. Some delegations, however, elaborated specific views on the subject, which were contained in the report in the following terms:

One delegation stated that the preliminary meeting of the littoral and hinterland States should endeavour to secure the acceptance of the Declaration by all nuclear Powers and all major

maritime users of the Indian Ocean and that, to that end, the *Ad Hoc* Committee should explore the possibilities of drawing up in outline form a programme of action to serve as a working paper of the preparatory meeting with a view to eventual endorsement by the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

Another delegation observed that the agenda of the meeting should include a review of the main developments of the proposal to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace since it was first mooted at the United Nations in 1971. In addition, there should be a discussion of a programme of action to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, including the special obligations of the littoral and hinterland States. Furthermore, the meeting should decide on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean not later than 1980.

One member envisaged that the preliminary meeting would have to devote itself, among other things, to defining in more precise terms the Indian Ocean zone of peace concept, its scope and delimitation, the obligations and responsibilities of the littoral and hinterland States as well as those of the great Powers and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean and to considering ways and means to promote conditions of security so as to strengthen the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States in the area.

In another section of its report, the *Ad Hoc* Committee noted that at the initiative of Indonesia it had decided to expand its Bureau by the appointment of an additional Vice-Chairman, with a view to ensuring the smoother functioning of the Committee. On a suggestion from Pakistan the *Ad Hoc* Committee, further, endorsed the proposal that the additional post should be filled from among the African States members, and requested that the Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Committee consult with the Chairman of the African Group regarding a candidate for the post and report back to the Committee accordingly. Subsequently, the *Ad Hoc* Committee decided to defer that question until such time as a decision on the matter was communicated to it by the African Group.

Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries

The non-aligned States met at the level of Foreign Ministers at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July and among the subjects they deliberated upon were the situation in the Indian Ocean and the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. In its Declaration,⁷ the Conference, *inter alia*, confirmed its complete dedication to the objective of transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace with a view to protecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States in the region and demanded the elimination of all foreign military bases, military installations and other logistical supply facilities, the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and every manifestation of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalries.

The Conference also reviewed the state of the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and, in its Declaration, while noting that talks aimed at the limitation of their military presence in the Indian Ocean had

⁷ See A/33/206, annex I, para. 139.

been initiated by the great Powers, emphasized their limited scope and nature as they did not go far enough towards meeting the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The Conference also expressed disappointment over the fact that even in those limited talks there was an apparent lack of progress and called upon the great Powers to enlarge the scope of their talks and to enter into negotiations with the littoral and hinterland States with a view to fulfilling the objectives embodied in the Declaration.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Various proposals on the subject of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace were submitted during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

The proposals ranged over a number of issues which have revolved around the question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace during the past several years. Among the issues raised were those concerning the need for prompt measures to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace; the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Indian Ocean; the necessity, within the zonal peace concept, for mutual restraint on the part of the littoral and hinterland States as well as the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among themselves; and the need for an early convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean.⁸

Despite the protracted nature of the discussions and negotiations during the sessions of the Preparatory Committee, it proved impossible for a consensus text to emerge for incorporation in the draft final document which was submitted by the Preparatory Committee to the General Assembly at its special session. As a result, the draft final document⁹ embodied a text on the subject of zones of peace in the section entitled "Declaration", as well as a number of alternative texts in the section entitled "Programme of Action".

As expected, the unresolved issues emerged once again during the deliberations and negotiations at the special session itself.¹⁰ The many statements made on the subject of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace once again reflected the preoccupations of Governments with various issues which they considered to be vital in the formulation to be included in the Final Document of the special session.

⁸ See, for example, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. IV, documents A/AC.187/55/Add.1 and Corr.1 and 2 and A/AC.187/56, and vol. V, documents A/AC.187/82, A/AC.187/89/Add.1, A/AC.187/91 and A/AC.187/92.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. I, para. 54.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; ibid., Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, 3rd to 16th meetings; and ibid., Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum.*

During the course of the debate, several delegations underlined the increasing strategic significance of the Indian Ocean and attached great importance to the initiative aimed at creating a zone of peace there. Indonesia pointed out that it was only in recent years, in particular subsequent to the energy crisis, that the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean had come to the attention of the international community, and urged the big military Powers to exercise the utmost restraint in an area beset by manifold problems, since an escalation of their military presence there could only exacerbate the existing and potential conflicts and instability prevalent in that part of the world.

Mozambique stated that its commitment to strive towards the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, free of nuclear arms, was enshrined as one of the principles in the country's constitution. It further noted that the increasing military tension in that ocean was an infringement of the sovereignty of countries in the region, which could lead to the escalation of armed conflicts on a much wider scale.

Sri Lanka noted the importance of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and expressed serious disappointment at the slow progress towards its implementation, despite the fact that the Declaration had been reiterated annually at successive sessions of the General Assembly. The United Republic of Tanzania too deplored the fact that efforts by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean to involve major Powers in consultations on establishing the area as a zone of peace had been frustrated, and called upon those States to respect and implement the Declaration.

Addressing themselves to what they considered to be some of the prerequisites and dominant elements involved in turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, several delegations condemned the presence of foreign military bases in the region. Democratic Yemen held that the Indian Ocean region should be free of any military bases, whether American or other, and strongly criticized the presence of bases such as that on Diego Garcia, as well as any other military bases in the region. Madagascar reminded the Assembly that foreign military bases were still being maintained in zones of influence, notwithstanding the repeated appeals of the international community, in particular the non-aligned countries, and called for the dismantling of the Anglo-American nuclear base at Diego Garcia and of those used by intervention troops for purposes of military communication. The establishment of military bases in the Indian Ocean was also specifically denounced by Mongolia, Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania, Mongolia emphasizing that it considered the liquidation of existing foreign military bases and the prevention of new ones to be among the prime factors to be taken into account in any attempt to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and co-operation.

A substantial part of the debate on the Indian Ocean concerned various regional aspects in the context of the security of the area in general and the littoral and hinterland States in particular. A number of countries, including Australia, Nepal and Romania, emphasized the feasibility of regional approaches to arms control and disarmament and in that connexion recognized the value of such an approach with respect to the Indian Ocean region. Nepal,

for example, held that regional arms control measures complemented multi-lateral disarmament efforts and should, therefore, be encouraged by the international community. Several delegations, including those of Guyana, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates, expressed the opinion that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would be conducive to the prevention of potential regional conflicts and the promotion of economic and social development of countries in the area. Guyana further advocated that the countries of the region should institute among themselves mechanisms for regular consultation and programmes of co-operation to bridge divisions which had been inherited from the past.

Referring to another regional aspect, Bangladesh and Pakistan stressed the dual objective involved in the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, namely, to exclude great Power rivalry and competition as well as to strengthen regional co-operation and security. The former expressed its belief that the disappearance of great Power presence or rivalry from the Indian Ocean need not automatically ensure peace and tranquility in the area for, while it would complement such a process, it could not be a substitute for obligations contracted by the countries of the region themselves to assure their security. Similarly, Pakistan stated that it envisaged the goal of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean as a measure which had interrelated implications for regional as well as global peace and security, and that both those aspects needed to be addressed simultaneously. According to that delegation, there was no doubt that the limitation and eventual elimination of the military presence and rivalry of the super-Powers from the Indian Ocean was central to the concept of a zone of peace. At the same time, however, peace could not be ensured unless the littoral and hinterland States also exercised restraint and undertook the necessary measures to create conditions of security in the region. Integral to peace and security, it added, was a commitment to peaceful coexistence, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and an agreement on the levels of the naval forces of the littoral and hinterland States as well as the denuclearization of the entire Indian Ocean region.

Although much time and effort was devoted in both formal and informal discussions in the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the drafting group that dealt with the subject matter, most of the outstanding issues concerning the Indian Ocean zone of peace remained unresolved. Consequently, the limited consensus formula that emerged for incorporation into the Programme of Action in the Final Document reads as follows:

64. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In this regard, the General Assembly notes the proposals for the establishment of zones of peace, *inter alia*, in:

(b) The Indian Ocean, taking into account the deliberations of the General Assembly and its relevant resolutions and the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

At the final meeting of the special session, a number of delegations spoke of what they considered to be the meagre outcome of negotiations on

the question of zones of peace in general and the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace in particular, as reflected in the language of the Final Document. India stated that it was extremely unhappy with the casual and summary manner in which the Final Document had dealt with the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, which continued to be an issue of the greatest importance to the States of the region. The delegation stressed that the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was clear and unambiguous with regard to the objective of achieving demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and that there would be no departure from that objective. In its assessment of the same subject, Sri Lanka stated that on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, the proposals which had been advanced were incorporated into the Final Document with qualifications that reduced the validity of such measures in the process of disarmament. The delegation noted that such qualifications had been incorporated with regard to the Indian Ocean area, and added that it was particularly regrettable that the proposal to declare the Mediterranean a zone of peace had been summarily rejected even after the offer of every conceivable qualification. Yugoslavia expressed the opinion that resistance at the special session to the endeavours of non-aligned countries to ensure the adoption of clearly defined recommendations on the establishment of zones of peace in various regions was an expression of a bloc policy and of the tendency of certain States and military alliances to leave the door open to the policy of spheres of influence. The delegation stated that it was particularly surprised by the opposition in the case of the Indian Ocean, since the General Assembly had repeatedly endorsed and supported the concept of the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

In its consideration of the question of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the General Assembly had before it the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean,¹¹ containing, *inter alia*, a draft resolution unanimously recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee for adoption by the Assembly; the document containing the resolutions adopted by the Ninth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers,¹² and the relevant documents of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries.¹³

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee was introduced at the 36th meeting of the First Committee by its Chairman, the representative of Sri Lanka. In his statement, the Chairman emphasized that the importance of the vital goal embodied in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, although first enunciated in 1971, had in no way diminished over the years. If anything, developments in the region during the preceding year had once again

¹¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 29 and corrigendum (A/33/29 and Corr.1).*

¹² A/33/151.

¹³ A/33/206.

underlined the crucial significance of the subject, not only for the regional countries involved, but for the international community as a whole.

By the draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee in its report, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, urge that the talks on the Indian Ocean between the Soviet Union and the United States be resumed without delay; renew its invitation to the great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to enter into consultations with the Committee regarding implementation of the Declaration; decide to convene a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in New York from 2 to 13 July 1979, as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean; decide that the *Ad Hoc* Committee, performing the functions of a preparatory committee, would make the necessary preparations for convening the meeting of the littoral and hinterland States; and renew the general mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions.

In the debate that took place on the question, many delegations reiterated their firm commitment to the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and called upon all States, and in particular the great Powers, to take early and effective steps towards implementation of the goals and objectives embodied in the Declaration.¹⁴ A number of delegations, including those of Ethiopia, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Seychelles and the Sudan, pointed out, however, that despite consistent reaffirmation of those objectives in subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, no tangible advance had been made with regard to their implementation. Several delegations felt that a major contributing factor towards the lack of any significant progress was the intransigence of the major Powers in refusing to accord greater co-operation to the *Ad Hoc* Committee in the discharge of its functions. Seychelles, for example, stated that while the Committee had persevered admirably in its difficult task, its problems had been compounded by the lack of fuller and more prompt co-operation on the part of certain States whose immediate interests were not tied to its work. Madagascar pointed out that proposals by countries which really desired to establish the Indian Ocean region as a zone of peace were not always received with the best will in the world, and urged the great Powers and other major maritime users to reconsider their reluctance to join the effort to make the Indian Ocean a true zone of peace.

Various delegations cited the military presence of the two major Powers as constituting a prime obstacle to the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. Kenya observed that the escalation and expansion of great Power military and naval presence in the Indian Ocean was a flagrant disregard of the fears and sentiments expressed by all the littoral States, which had solemnly declared that they would like the Indian Ocean to be designated for all time as a zone of peace free from great Power rivalry. The delegation of China noted that the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean had condemned the super-Powers for their rivalry and expansion in the Indian

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 58th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

Ocean and had vehemently demanded the removal from the area of all forms of their military presence. However, instead of withdrawing their military forces from the Indian Ocean, the super-Powers had intensified their rivalry and expansion in the region. Elaborating more specifically on the question of great Power military presence, other delegations, including those of Afghanistan, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic, expressed the view that the fundamental obstacle to the existence of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was the system of foreign military bases which threatened the security of countries in the region. The Syrian Arab Republic, noting the vital geographical importance of the Indian Ocean, stressed that if peace were to prevail in that ocean and that part of Asia, measures which violated peace and security should be eliminated, including the establishment of military bases with all their sophisticated weaponry and equipment. Democratic Yemen felt that such bases infringed on the independence of peoples and their right to self-determination as well as the full exercise of national sovereignty over their territories, natural wealth and resources. Afghanistan, Democratic Yemen and Ethiopia criticized the presence of military bases on Diego Garcia and asked for their immediate liquidation. On the subject of military bases, the delegation of the Sudan called upon States to express concern also about military presence in the form of mobile naval units that were self-sufficient or nearly so, as well as about a fixed foreign military presence that depended on bases.

A large number of delegations also addressed themselves to various aspects of the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. A note of dissatisfaction with the scope, substance and outcome of those talks was evident in many of the views expressed on the subject.

A number of delegations, among them those of Bangladesh and Indonesia, while welcoming the initiation of the bilateral talks, felt it was unfortunate that they had not led to any perceptible movement towards the goal of implementing the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Delegations also expressed regret at the suspension of the talks and urged the two parties to resume their negotiations at an early date. The representative of Sri Lanka, introducing the *Ad Hoc* Committee's report, noted that there had been an obvious set-back in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that the interruption in the talks would prove to be of only temporary duration.

Furthermore, India, Seychelles and the United Republic of Tanzania voiced scepticism regarding the adequacy of the talks, in view of the fact that the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, which were the parties directly concerned, had not been involved in them. In that context, Bangladesh stated that a prime factor in registering any substantive progress would be for the two major Powers to establish direct contact with the littoral and hinterland States with a view to adopting measures to terminate great-Power rivalry and military presence in the Indian Ocean.

On the subject of the bilateral negotiations, the Soviet Union emphasized that it had expressed its readiness to seek ways to limit and progressively decrease military activity in the Indian Ocean, including the liquidation of

foreign military bases. However, according to the delegation, through no fault of the Soviet Union, the talks had been halted since February 1978 "because of an artificial excuse". Moreover, the Soviet side was ready, as before, to be party to a responsible and constructive series of talks with the United States.

The Australian delegation stated that it had welcomed the commencement of super-Power discussions on mutual military limitations as institutionalizing balance and restraint in the area. It hoped that the talks would lead to measures which would contribute to the ultimate realization of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The delegation also noted that the suspension of talks had been linked to developments in the area and expressed the hope that the necessary steps to enable the earliest resumption of the talks would be taken soon.

During the course of the thirty-third session, a number of States also commented on various regional aspects related to the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan reiterated the significance they attached to what they considered to be the interrelationship between the twin objectives of eliminating the military rivalry and competition of external powers and the strengthening of regional co-operation and security. Presenting its observation on the regional factors involved, the delegation of the Sudan similarly underlined that, if the Declaration were to be effectively implemented, the littoral and hinterland States should focus their attention not only on removing the military presence of the super-Powers, but also on measures necessary to produce an atmosphere conducive to peace and security within the region. Such a topic could be discussed at the proposed meeting of the littoral and hinterland States in July 1979.

On another regional aspect, the delegation of Iran underlined the importance it attached to the Persian Gulf, which extended through the narrow straits of Hormuz into the Indian Ocean. In fact, the delegation noted, all the States bordering the Persian Gulf attached singular importance to its security. Since that strategic waterway represented a major lifeline to the area, it was imperative that the maintenance of its security remain solely with those States. It was, therefore, most fortunate that the Persian Gulf States were bound together not only by such an important common interest but also by bonds of fraternity which had been formed and cemented through centuries of cultural, religious and historical ties.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee's recommendation for convening a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in July 1979 as the next step towards the holding of an international conference on the Indian Ocean received a wide range of support, especially from the littoral and hinterland States themselves. Affirming the importance of the *Ad Hoc* Committee's proposal, Iraq expressed the hope that the meeting would be a constructive step towards mobilizing and co-ordinating efforts designed to promote the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The delegation of Bahrain also welcomed the recommendation and maintained that the convening of such a meeting would be a constructive and positive step towards the implementation of the provisions contained in paragraph 64 of the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its

special session devoted to disarmament, and that it would open the way for the proclamation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Australia characterized the proposed meeting of the littoral and hinterland States as the next logical step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean but noted that the meeting could not be considered a substitute for a full-scale Indian Ocean conference. In respect of the full-scale conference, the delegation reaffirmed its position that a condition for its success, and therefore its convening, must be participation by the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean. The delegation further held that the forthcoming meeting would need to arrive at a consensus on essential issues if a comprehensive basis for agreement with the great Powers and major maritime users was to be reached at a future conference on the Indian Ocean.

The draft resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee in its report, as amended, was adopted in the First Committee on 30 November by a recorded vote of 112 to none, with 14 abstentions. Among those abstaining were the United States and other Western countries as well as Israel.

While the Soviet Union voted in favour of the draft resolution, it nevertheless felt it necessary to provide an explanation concerning some of the provisions in the preambular part. Referring to the formulation regarding the military presence and military rivalry of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean region, the delegation stated that the Soviet Union bore no responsibility whatsoever for military tension and the activation of the military presence in that area. The basic premise for the establishment of a genuine zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was the elimination from the region of foreign military bases and the prohibition of the establishment of new ones. As for the appeal contained in the draft that the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States be resumed, the delegation held that the talks had been suspended by the American side and said that the Soviet Union was ready to resume them.

Speaking on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany observed that while the members shared the desire of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean for peace and stability in their region and wished to work with them towards that end, they had, however, been unable to respond positively to the draft resolution for two main reasons. First, there had been no precise internationally negotiated definition of either the area or the activities to be excluded from it. Secondly, the draft resolution covered a major ocean area which was subject to international jurisdiction and therefore it was imperative to have assurance that the provision of international law concerning freedom of movement by sea and air for all nations would not be contravened. But despite their abstention, the policy of the nine members would be kept under constant review in the light of the outcome of the bilateral talks and the proposals emerging from the meeting of the littoral and hinterland States.

Explaining its abstention, the delegation of Israel declared that the draft resolution included certain provisions the language of which it could not support. In addition, the delegation objected to the wording of operative

paragraph 4 relating to the category of countries to be invited to the meeting of the littoral and hinterland States.

The draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1978 by a vote of 130 to none, with 14 abstentions, including the United States and other Western countries, as resolution 33/68. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977 and S-10/2 of 30 June 1978,

Encouraged by the continued support extended to the Declaration by the Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 15 to 20 May 1978, and by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978,

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action in furtherance of the objectives of the Declaration would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security,

Deeply concerned at the intensification of great Power military presence, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry, leading to an increase of tension in the area,

Considering that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry, with the danger of a competitive escalation of such a military presence, gives greater urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace,

Considering also that the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean requires co-operation among the regional States to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region, as envisaged in the Declaration, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland States,

Further considering that, at its tenth special session devoted to disarmament, it noted the proposal for establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, taking into account its deliberations and its relevant resolutions, as well as the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region,

Noting that talks were initiated between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean, and that the two countries have kept the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean informed of the current situation concerning these talks,

Regretting, however, that the talks are suspended,

Recalling its resolution 32/86, in which it decided that a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should be convened in New York on a suitable date,

1. *Urges* that the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America regarding their military presence in the Indian Ocean be resumed without delay;

2. *Renews* its invitation to the great Powers and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean that have not so far seen their way to co-operating effectively with the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean to enter with the least possible delay into consultations with the Committee regarding the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace;

3. *Takes note* of the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee and in particular section III concerning the steps taken towards making the necessary preparations for holding a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean;

4. *Decides* to convene a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in New York from 2 to 13 July 1979, as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), such States being listed in the reports of

the *Ad Hoc* Committee to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth, thirtieth, and thirty-third sessions, and decides that other States not falling within this category, but which have participated or have expressed their willingness to participate in the work of the Committee, could attend upon the invitation of the Committee;

5. *Decides* that the *Ad Hoc* Committee, performing the functions of a preparatory committee, will make the necessary preparations for convening the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and that the Committee will set up informal working groups for this purpose when necessary;

6. *Requests* the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to submit its report to the General Assembly at the thirty-fourth session;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary provision for the Meeting, including the essential background information, relevant documentation and summary records, and to continue to render all necessary assistance to the *Ad Hoc* Committee, including the provision of summary records;

8. *Renews* the general mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions;

9. *Requests* the *Ad Hoc* Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a full report on its work.

It may also be noted that the General Assembly, in paragraph 11 of resolution 33/75, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security", reaffirmed once again the provisions of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and called upon the great Powers to co-operate in its implementation.¹⁵

Conclusion

Developments during 1977 once more brought to the fore the obstacles that still needed to be overcome to implement the goals proclaimed in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Divergent interests and diverse interpretations, not only on the part of the Powers external to the region but among the regional States themselves, militated against any meaningful progress on this question during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In addition, the bilateral talks initiated during the previous year between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning their military presence in the Indian Ocean seem to have run into an at least temporary impasse. The situation has become further exacerbated as a result of certain developments which unfolded during the year in the region.

Nevertheless, there were a number of significant developments which could portend the ultimate realization of the goal of creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

Among the most outstanding developments during the year was the General Assembly's decision to convene the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in 1979, as the next step towards the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. During the course of deliberations in the *Ad Hoc* Committee as well as in the

¹⁵ See also chapter IV, pp. 125-126, above.

General Assembly, it became increasingly evident that the littoral and hinterland States were determined to utilize that forum to harmonize their views on various aspects of the question, with a view to presenting a common front at a future conference on the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, following the trend of recent years, the proposal for establishing a zone of peace in the region continued to gain support. In that context, it may be noted that the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States, for the second consecutive year, voted in favour of the resolution on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Finally, whereas the Western States, for the most part, abstained in the voting as they had done in previous years, the nine members of the European Economic Community stated that they were willing to reconsider the question in the light of further developments, especially with respect to the outcome of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States.

The build-up and transfer of conventional arms

Introduction

SPECTACULAR WORLD-WIDE MILITARY GROWTH, both quantitative and qualitative, nuclear and conventional, has been one of the most constant and disquieting hallmarks of the post-war era. Nuclear weapons, by their sheer destructive potential, remain the central concern of international disarmament efforts. But the quantitative and qualitative growth and expansion of conventional armed forces and armaments, which consume the bulk of spiralling world military expenditures, have also been a source of growing international concern.

In this connexion, it is noteworthy that the current global stockpile and flow of conventional weapons is considerably larger than at any other peacetime period in history, and continues to expand. Moreover, practically all the conflicts and wars fought during the post-war period have been fought with conventional arms and outside the areas of the alliances which have nuclear weapons, and the constant technological improvement of the fire-power of conventional weapons tends to increase international concern over the socio-economic, political and military ramifications of their production, transfer and use.

The issue of international transfers of conventional arms represents just one of the many complex factors related to the wider problems of armaments and disarmament. The discussions within and outside the United Nations on how to achieve conventional arms limitation have continued alongside a qualitative and quantitative advance in the production, transfer and accumulation of such weapons. It is estimated that the total value of the global arms trade increased about 60 per cent between 1967 and 1976, to some 20 billion dollars per annum, while the value of arms transfers to developing countries rose an estimated 75 per cent during the same period.¹

Since 1965 when the General Assembly, at Malta's initiative, first considered the question of conventional arms transfers,² the United Nations has,

¹ See *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1967-1976* (Washington, D.C., United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, July 1978), p. 7.

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 28, document A/C.1/L.347; see also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), p. 263.

especially in recent years, increasingly considered the problem. Debates on the question have largely been initiated by Western industrialized countries and, in recent years, also by Japan. For example, such important Western arms suppliers as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Canada and, most recently, France have shown increasing interest in the need to restrain the arms trade, as has the Soviet Union, the world's second largest supplier of conventional armaments after the United States. In fact, the Soviet Union and the United States, which together account for approximately three quarters of total world arms sales, have since 1977 established a joint working group on the problem of conventional arms transfers and have so far held four rounds of bilateral talks—in December 1977, May 1978, July 1978 and December 1978—aimed at restricting the international transfers of such arms.

The question of conventional arms limitation involves a number of complex factors. A large number of non-aligned and developing States, for instance, support what they regard as the commanding priority for global disarmament, namely nuclear disarmament, but also emphasize the incontestability of the right of States to legitimate defence and national security as well as the right of peoples under colonial domination to use the means available to them, including arms, to achieve and secure their freedom and independence. The improvement in the international political climate over the past two decades, including the gains registered in the decolonization process as well as the efforts to control the nuclear arms race, have, to a certain degree, contributed to the expansion of efforts within the United Nations in search of progress on the conventional arms race issue. No resolution has been adopted, however, specifically on conventional arms limitation or transfers.

So far, three attempts to have the General Assembly adopt a resolution on the subject have been unsuccessful. The first one was the 1965 Maltese initiative mentioned above by which the Assembly would have invited the then Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) to consider the question of arms transfers between States. The Maltese draft resolution was rejected in the First Committee. The second attempt was made at the twenty-third session in 1968 when Denmark, Iceland, Malta, and Norway, supported by Canada, the United States and other, predominantly Western, States, submitted a draft resolution³ which sought to ascertain the views of Governments on the undertaking of an obligation to register with the Secretary-General all trade in armaments. The draft resolution was not pressed to a vote, in part because of opposition from a number of non-aligned and Eastern European States. The third initiative took place at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly in 1976 when Japan submitted a draft resolution,⁴ also sponsored by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Denmark, Ghana, Iceland, Ireland, Liberia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, the Philip-

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96, document A/7441, para. 5(d).

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda items 34 to 50 and 116, document A/31/386, para. 6.

piners, Singapore, the United Republic of Cameroon and Venezuela, aimed at controlling international transfers of conventional armaments by, *inter alia*, requesting the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive expert study on the problem. The Japanese draft was not voted upon because of a procedural motion, initiated by India and adopted by the First Committee, by which the debate on the question was adjourned.⁵

From 1962 to 1978, in the two successive negotiating bodies dealing with United Nations disarmament efforts, namely, ENDC and the CCD, discussions were held and working papers submitted from time to time on the problems of the build-up and transfer of conventional armaments, but no concrete negotiations developed nor has there been an apparent consensus regarding any specific measure of restraint.

In ENDC, in 1966, the United States first elaborated, in a multilateral forum, its approach to the conventional arms race problem. At that time, it emphasized the regional approach in dealing with the problem. In August 1970, it submitted a working paper⁶ in the CCD in which it again emphasized the potential role of regional measures to curb the conventional arms race. It held that such measures might prohibit the acquisition by States of the region concerned of certain types of conventional weapons and require potential suppliers to undertake not to transfer the proscribed equipment to countries of the affected region. Sweden and the United Kingdom also referred to the conventional arms trade question in the CCD in 1970⁷ and both also proposed regional action in that regard. The United Kingdom considered further that the active support of the major supplier countries was the primary requirement for progress, though the attitude of recipient countries was also a key factor. In 1973 in the CCD,⁸ the United Kingdom again emphasized its view, while Czechoslovakia asserted that conventional arms limitation could be achieved only through the realization of an agreement on the renunciation of the use of force in international relations, and Morocco believed that a final solution to the conventional arms problem could be found only within the framework of general and complete disarmament.

In the CCD in 1975, the United States⁹ again advocated the regional approach to conventional arms restraint. It cited the Vienna talks on mutual force reductions in central Europe and the 1974 Latin American Declaration of Ayacucho as examples, and urged the consideration of broader and more world-wide approaches that could complement regional efforts. It suggested that the CCD might consider principles of conduct that could be applicable on a world-wide basis to the acquisition or transfer of conventional arms.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, First Committee*, 49th meeting. See also *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 1: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), pp. 231-232.

⁶ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970*, annex C, sect. 36 (CCD/307).

⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/8059)*, para. 39.

⁸ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 31 (A/9141)*, paras. 107-113.

⁹ *Ibid.*, *Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/10027)*, para. 37.

Again in the CCD in 1976,¹⁰ the United States stressed its view that constructive constraints on the arms trade would enhance the security of all countries and might permit States to shift resources from military to development uses. It also pointed out that it was undertaking some unilateral measures of self-restraint including restrictions on the transfer of missiles and high performance aircraft to most regions. Nigeria also referred to the subject. It said that suppliers were primarily responsible for the arms trade and cautioned against any attempt to divert emphasis in the CCD from the priority concerns of nuclear and general and complete disarmament to such issues as the conventional arms trade.

During 1977, the international debate on the problem continued to widen.¹¹ On 19 May, the United States Government announced its conventional arms transfer policy¹² which it said was aimed, *inter alia*, at imposing unilateral restraints on United States arms sales under certain specified conditions, and at promoting co-operation between supplier and recipient nations as well as encouraging regional co-operation among the latter towards curtailing the arms trade. On the bilateral front, the Soviet Union and the United States held their first round of talks on the arms transfer question in December, in Washington, D.C.

In the CCD, the United Kingdom welcomed the arms restraint policy announced by the United States in May, and Italy suggested a number of measures which it said might contribute to reductions in expenditures on conventional weapons and their uncontrolled transfer.

Multilateral consideration of the arms transfer problem also continued in 1977 at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly¹³ where a number of developing and arms-recipient States, among them Colombia, Nepal, the Philippines, Singapore and the United Republic of Tanzania, joined such developed and major military Powers as France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as Japan, in urging major action to regulate conventional armaments. Others expressed views to the effect that while conventional arms limitation was an important objective, it could not be allowed to divert attention from the priority objective of nuclear disarmament.

Despite the intensification of the debate on the problems of conventional weapons in the General Assembly in 1977, no concrete proposal or draft resolution was submitted. Several delegations acknowledged that the issues were complex and would require further consideration and elaboration at the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27)*, paras. 209-213.

¹¹ See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 78.IX.4), chap. XVIII.

¹² *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 13, No. 21 (May 23, 1977), p. 756.

¹³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, First Committee*, 7th to 38th, 40th and 44th meetings, and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

At the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the question of conventional arms limitation was accorded its widest and most extensive consideration to date within the United Nations framework. A large number of States, developing and developed, Eastern and Western, referred to the question either directly or within the broader context of general and complete disarmament¹⁴ and, in general, expressed the view that the escalating arms race, both nuclear and conventional, had to be restrained. While several, mainly Western, States called for parallel and simultaneous consideration of nuclear and conventional disarmament, another group, mostly non-aligned countries, emphasized their position that equal treatment of nuclear and conventional matters would detract from the urgency that should be devoted to the consideration of nuclear disarmament. Madagascar, for example, explained a developing country's view that while no one could remain indifferent to reports concerning the growing role of third world countries in the trade in conventional weapons, that did not mean that the order of priorities already agreed upon should be altered. In Canada's view, there could be no first and second priorities regarding the nuclear and a whole series of conventional arms races: both were relevant to the maintenance of world security and both were the legitimate business of the United Nations.

Apart from the disagreement over the order of priorities between nuclear and conventional disarmament, some basic differences of opinion continued to be voiced, especially between a number of Western and developing countries, regarding the nature of and the approach to the problem of the conventional arms race.

Several developed Western countries, among them Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, pointed to the transfer of arms and, in particular, their importation as the cause of the conventional arms race. On the other hand, a large number, mostly developing countries, including Barbados, Colombia, Ecuador, Maldives, Pakistan, Tunisia and Venezuela, treated the question of conventional arms transfers in conjunction with that of the production of those weapons, and most of them held that the ever-increasing qualitative and quantitative arms traffic was promoted by the producers and suppliers in order to maximize their commercial and foreign policy advantages.

Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada, speaking before the special session on 26 May, acknowledged that the question of sales could not be divorced from the question of production, and explained that almost every arms producer, including Canada, was, to a greater or lesser degree, caught in the dilemma where, in producing weapons to meet its defence needs, it was

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum*.

tempted to try to achieve lower unit costs and other economic benefits by extending production runs and then selling such weapons abroad. At the same time, he held that there was no particular moral merit in a country that was buying arms but not producing them, since so long as arms were being bought, arms would be produced.

A number of other developed Western States also acknowledged, in varying degrees, the role of the production factor in promoting the conventional arms race. For example, Prime Minister Lynch of Ireland pointed to the damaging consequences of the world-wide spread of conventional weapons in a speech before the special session on 25 May, and held that the problem involved all countries great and small, rich and poor. He shared the view that commercial and political advantages in the producer countries encouraged arms sales abroad. For its part, Norway specifically called for international agreements, binding on all parties concerned, to limit not only the transfer but also the production and acquisition of conventional armaments. Japan also referred to the production factor when it stated that the enormous build-up of such weapons, resulting from their production and international transfer, was fraught with the danger of inducing or exacerbating incidents of armed conflict, especially in troubled areas.

The Eastern European countries, including, in particular, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union, called for agreements leading to the cessation of the development and production of new types of conventional weapons of great destructive capability and the renunciation, by the permanent members of the Security Council and by those countries which had military agreements with them, of the expansion of their conventional armaments and armed forces.

In calling for the simultaneous regulation of the production and transfer of conventional weapons, many developing countries emphasized the view that the development and production, by the developed countries, of increasingly sophisticated and destructive types of such weapons tended, in some cases, to blur the difference between nuclear and conventional arms and thus added a new and troubling dimension to the already disconcerting over-all situation in the armaments field.

In the search for effective solutions to the problem of escalating conventional arms transfers, a number of approaches were suggested, including, in particular, the regional approach (see chapter XX above). Among the States which supported such an approach were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela. Denmark considered that regional co-operation was, in the long run, the most propitious way to check the conventional arms race and in that connection called upon regional organizations to play a major role in the effort. President Giscard d'Estaing of France suggested that the holding of a combined meeting of arms-importing countries in the same region with all supplier countries would be the most realistic approach towards limiting arms sales and purchases, and he stated, further, that in the event of the realization of regional

conventional arms limitation agreements on such a basis, France would adjust its arms sales policy accordingly. Pakistan believed the French suggestion would be useful in evolving measures to limit the acquisition of conventional arms. The Federal Republic of Germany, for its part, urged efforts in all regions towards regional agreements to limit conventional forces and armaments on a par and simultaneously with similar efforts in the nuclear field. Canada suggested that the incentives for buying arms could be reduced through collective regional arrangements, with sanctions for excessive weapons acquisition or force build-ups by any State in the region concerned. The United States encouraged strong and prominent roles for regional bodies like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) whose role the United States considered to be critical in minimizing intrusion into those areas by outsiders, and whose peace-keeping and peace-making activities, it believed, should be an integral part of arms reduction efforts. In recommending the regional approach towards limiting conventional arms transfers, the Netherlands explained its view that for such an approach to succeed, it must take into account all aspects of the arms flow problem and also make full use of United Nations studies on the question. Ecuador stated that it would consider the possibility of holding regional conferences, at the initiative of the States of each region concerned, in an effort to limit conventional weapons, as long as appropriate conditions existed.

The 1974 Declaration of Ayacucho,¹⁵ which represents continuing efforts by its eight Latin American Signatory States—Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela—to limit conventional armaments in their region, continued to attract attention and was regarded by many as an important and promising example of the regional approach to regulate conventional arms acquisition.

Singapore, which urged developing countries to take constructive steps to reduce the conventional arms race taking place amongst them, referred to the Latin American initiative as an example worthy of study. Several States, in particular the Latin American countries directly concerned, pointed to and stressed the importance of the joint communiqué of 22 June 1978¹⁶ issued by the Foreign Ministers of the eight signatories of the Declaration of Ayacucho, in which they, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the principles of that 1974 Declaration and expressed their countries' willingness to explore, together with the other Latin American countries, possibilities for reaching an agreement on limiting conventional weapons in the region.

Some delegations held that with regard to the problem of the conventional arms race, as in other aspects of the disarmament question, primary responsibility rested with the major military Powers. In that connexion, China called on the two super-Powers to take the lead in reducing their conventional weapons. Ecuador, holding that the United States and the Soviet Union had, in recent years, exported weapons with a total value of about 55 billion dollars, said that those two Powers bore primary responsibility for the conven-

¹⁵ A/10044, annex.

¹⁶ A/S-10/AC.1/34.

tional arms trade. Iran stated that any meaningful disarmament efforts should begin with those countries capable of producing and increasing, quantitatively and qualitatively, nuclear and conventional weapons. Norway felt that substantial conventional arms reductions could not be undertaken unless the major military Powers reached mutual understanding on the question, and in that connexion welcomed the initiation of the bilateral talks on the arms transfer issue and hoped they would achieve positive results. A number of other delegations, including those of the Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Finland and Japan, also referred to and welcomed the joint initiative of the Soviet Union and the United States. For its part, El Salvador suggested that, while a negotiating body such as the CCD should deal with nuclear disarmament problems, negotiations on the balanced limitation of conventional weapons should take place in a broader body where the various regions and trends of thought could also be appropriately represented.

Referring to its bilateral effort with the United States on the limitation of the international trade in and transfer of conventional armaments, the Soviet Union stated that a clear-cut political approach, which did not place an aggressor and his victim on the same footing and which did not allow any infringement of the rights of peoples waging legitimate struggles for their liberation from colonial and racist oppression, must underlie the solution of the problem. Several non-aligned countries shared the view that the right of peoples under colonial or racist rule to have at their disposal means for their struggle for freedom and self-determination should be respected.

Although they recognized that a special responsibility rested on the suppliers, some supplier States, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, stressed the ineffectiveness of the unilateral approach by suppliers to curb arms transfers. The United Kingdom explained that such an approach could itself be a potential threat to peace and the United States pointed out that it would be increasingly difficult for it to sustain its arms restraint policy unilaterally; both countries shared the view that the arms transfer problem required multilateral action by all suppliers. Canada, for its part, explaining that it was not a major arms exporter as it supplied only about one per cent of world sales, said that it could accept any consensus among arms suppliers to cut back on military exports.

A number of other concrete suggestions aimed at curbing the international transfer of arms were also advanced at the special session. Turkey, for example, called for effective measures to prevent the smuggling of, or illegal trade in, arms and in that regard suggested that the Secretary-General should request Governments to provide the United Nations with detailed information regarding their legislative and judicial measures to regulate their arms sales and purchases, including measures enacted and implemented to prohibit and impose penalties for contraband and the smuggling of weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany, in supporting the idea of a study of the question of arms transfers, suggested that such a study should also cover the possibilities of controlling non-governmental or private trade in military equipment. A number of other States, among them Colombia, Denmark, Japan and the United Kingdom, urged the special session to launch such a study as a first step

towards limiting the world-wide growth of conventional weapons. In addition, some speakers, including the representatives of Norway and Turkey, called for an international registration of arms sales and transfers. Norway suggested that such a register should be established under United Nations auspices. Turkey considered that such an international system would, *inter alia*, create an atmosphere of confidence, focus world public opinion on the issue and enable the international community to preserve and bolster regional balance and stability.

In the Final Document adopted at the conclusion of the special session on 30 June, the Assembly dealt with two major aspects of the conventional weapons issue, namely, the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, especially those of the major military Powers, and the limitation of the international transfer of such weapons. In the Declaration, it included the following paragraph:

22. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the same principle, and taking into account the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, as well as the need of recipient States to protect their security.

Elaborating on both aspects of the question, in two paragraphs of the Programme of Action it stated the following:

81. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.

85. Consultations should be carried out among major arms supplier and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

Following the adoption of the Final Document, a number of States referred to the manner in which the conventional arms race problem had been considered at the special session. Sweden stated that this was the first time that the United Nations had considered the question in a constructive way and expressed the view that the question had been firmly established as one of the priority disarmament items for deliberation in the United Nations.

Referring specifically to paragraphs 22 and 85 of the Final Document, the United Kingdom explained that references in those paragraphs to the requirement of taking into account the right of peoples to self-determination when considering the limitation of international conventional arms transfers did not in any way imply its acceptance of the desirability of using force to resolve conflicts arising from the search for self-determination. The United Kingdom maintained the view that such matters should be resolved by peaceful means.

China, while noting positively that the Final Document had listed both nuclear and conventional arms reduction as priority disarmament items, stated that the Document had not laid enough stress on the reduction of the super-Powers' conventional armaments. Japan expressed its gratification at the inclusion in the Final Document of paragraphs 22 and 85 dealing with the limitation of arms transfers, and expressed the view that the General Assembly, by reaching a consensus on those two paragraphs, had provided an excellent beginning for further United Nations action on the problem of conventional arms transfers. Colombia, for its part, stated that it had hoped to see precise rules for the limitation of the international transfer of arms of all types and a denunciation of international weapons consortia embodied in the Final Document.

While no concrete recommendation was made at the special session regarding the suggestion for a study of the international conventional arms transfer question, it was recommended in paragraph 98 of the Final Document that the General Assembly at its thirty-third and subsequent sessions should determine the specific guidelines for carrying out disarmament-related studies, taking into consideration the proposals already submitted as well as those that might be submitted later.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

During the 1978 meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, a number of States, among them Canada, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States, commented on the problem of the conventional arms build-up and the trade in conventional weapons.¹⁷

While there was general agreement that nuclear disarmament, as confirmed by the General Assembly at its special session, remained the priority disarmament concern, the view was also expressed that, in order to promote and realize the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, action was also needed to restrain the increasing qualitative and quantitative arms race in the conventional field. In that connexion, the United States felt that the danger

¹⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 225-233.

posed by nuclear weapons was likely to result from the escalation of a military conflict initiated with conventional weapons. Canada, Hungary and Japan emphasized the point that the predominant portion of world military expenditures, about 80 per cent, was spent on conventional weapons and armed forces, and Hungary said that the technological advance in the conventional armaments field was no less intense than that in the nuclear field and that such increasing technological sophistication was blurring the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. In addition, Hungary decried the worldwide proliferation of conventional weapons production capabilities.

Japan, the Netherlands and the United States specifically called upon the CCD to discuss and possibly negotiate agreements to limit conventional arms, including the international transfer of such weapons. The United States believed, in that connexion, that the Committee possessed both the expertise and the political representation to consider and develop measures on the question which would, *inter alia*, increase stability in various regions.

Japan said that it had taken the following steps to advance the cause of limiting the arms spread: (a) it had prohibited its nationals from exporting arms, particularly to parties in international disputes or to countries which might become involved in such disputes; (b) it had discouraged arms exports in general; and (c) it had taken the initiative in calling for international studies, within the United Nations framework, on the problem of international transfers of conventional arms with the aim of restraining such transfers, while appealing to the major arms suppliers to undertake voluntary restraints on arms exports. In the latter regard, Japan expressed its appreciation to the Soviet Union and the United States for starting bilateral consultations towards curbing their arms exports. It expressed the hope that the studies it had proposed would be started as soon as possible, taking into account all relevant factors, including that of the security of individual States.

Italy reiterated its view that conventional arms limitation efforts should be undertaken in parallel with efforts in the nuclear field and suggested, as it had the previous year, that, in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, a commission divided into regional sub-commissions should be established and entrusted with the task of controlling the international transfer of conventional weapons.

India, on the other hand, took the position that while it was not opposed to a discussion of the question of conventional weapons within the context of general and complete disarmament, it would oppose any attempt to divert attention from the highest priority items of global concern such as nuclear disarmament. It explained further that it could not accept the proposition that nuclear weapons and conventional weapons should be treated in the same manner or weighed on the same scale.

The delegation of Ethiopia also shared the view that conventional arms limitation should be carried out in the framework of general and complete disarmament and that action in that field should not divert the attention of the CCD from the urgent and priority issues of nuclear disarmament.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

The heightened attention being paid to the problem of the escalating conventional arms race in recent years was again evident at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. Although no concrete action was taken and no new initiatives were begun at that session towards dealing with the problem, there were nevertheless increasing expressions of support for effective action to restrain the conventional arms race in general, and the international transfer of such arms in particular.¹⁸ A large number of States, among them Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian SSR, the United Kingdom and Zaire, while agreeing that general and complete disarmament remained the objective and that nuclear disarmament was the highest priority concern in that direction, noted, *inter alia*, that world-wide expenditures on conventional arms and armed forces constituted the largest portion of military expenditures and that, while nuclear weapons had not been used since the end of the Second World War, conventional arms, which were constantly being improved, had killed millions of persons in warfare during the same period. They therefore urged the taking of greater efforts towards conventional disarmament concurrently with efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

Several other States, while generally supporting the concept of conventional disarmament, approached the problem from varying perspectives. For instance, some States, among them India and Iran, expressed the view that in order to advance towards world-wide conventional disarmament, genuine progress in the field of nuclear disarmament would be essential. In Iran's view, once real progress in nuclear disarmament occurred, confidence would be generated globally, to be followed by certain conventional arms limitation measures. Iran added, however, that conventional arms control and disarmament should not await the elimination of nuclear weapons. India, in emphasizing that priority attention should be directed at promoting nuclear disarmament, referred to paragraph 55 of the Final Document adopted at the special session, in which it was stated that real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis. India stated further that it would be prepared to consider proposals on the limitation and gradual reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces within the framework of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

China expressed the view that the two super-Powers bore primary responsibility for the arms race in both the nuclear and conventional fields and stressed that conventional disarmament should be pursued simultaneously with nuclear disarmament, beginning with the super-Powers. Pakistan, which

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

believed that the primary responsibility for both nuclear and conventional disarmament rested with the major military Powers, held that the vast arsenals of conventional arms possessed by those Powers constituted an impediment to nuclear disarmament.

Ghana, for its part, while cognizant of the socio-economic consequences of the conventional arms race, especially for the developing countries, stressed that, confronted with the situation where the *apartheid* régime in South Africa had been aided by some States Members of the United Nations in building up an enormous military arsenal, African States might find it difficult to accept restraints on the acquisition of conventional weapons which they needed to defend themselves against military attacks by the racist régimes in southern Africa. Algeria hoped that the problem of conventional arms limitation would be placed in its true perspective. It further referred to the recognition in the Final Document of the legitimate right of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to armed struggle to secure their self-determination and independence and said that no limitation that might impede such struggles could be justified as it was inadmissible, in Algeria's view, to place the aggressor and the victim of aggression on the same footing. The Sudan emphasized its view that conventional disarmament should be considered within the over-all context of general and complete disarmament.

Several States, including Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Sudan and Sweden, said that while conventional arms limitation should be promoted, due consideration should also be taken of the legitimate right of all States to protect their national security. A number of other, largely developing, countries, among them Barbados, Burundi, Ghana, Madagascar, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, emphasized their concern at what they regarded as the particularly disquieting conventional arms race in the developing countries. In that connexion, Barbados saw the arms race in the developing world as a tool used by the developed countries with which to treat the developing countries as their spheres of influence. Burundi, Ghana, Madagascar and Venezuela decried the diversion, in the less developed countries, of vital resources from socio-economic development programmes to military purposes, a situation which Ghana termed ironic, since, in its view, the socio-economic needs of the developing countries were so much more urgent. Yugoslavia stated that under conditions where developing countries were constantly facing dangers posed by aggression, colonialism, bloc rivalry and expansionism, an essential premise for conventional disarmament was the elimination of such dangers and the removal of focal points of crisis. It suggested, in that connexion, that the first steps towards conventional disarmament should be taken by the militarily most significant countries, primarily military blocs and their leading members. Venezuela, for its part, pointed to Latin America's continuing efforts towards regional conventional arms restraint as an example of what could be done in the field, given the will to search for solutions.

Beyond the general debate on conventional disarmament, the specific problem of the international transfers of conventional weapons was also considered. While there was, as on previous occasions when this question was considered within the United Nations, a general belief that the unrestricted

international transfer of armaments jeopardized local or world security and was detrimental to socio-economic development, especially of the developing areas, there was, however, no consensus as to how to deal with the problem effectively. Furthermore, several States, mostly non-aligned, while expressing concern over the escalating arms trade, maintained their view that nuclear disarmament remained the primary disarmament concern and that nothing should be done to limit the struggle, including armed struggle, of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to achieve their independence and freedom.

Nevertheless, a very large number of States, developed as well as developing, including Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Japan, Madagascar, Mexico, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Suriname, Sweden, Tunisia, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela, called for arms transfer restraints, in particular within the framework of the Final Document of the special session, which urged consultations or negotiations at all levels, especially among the major arms supplier and recipient countries, towards the realization of such restraints.

Bangladesh and Chile, among others, saw arms transfer reductions as a means of curbing the conventional arms race. Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom emphasized the role of supplier countries in promoting arms transfer limitations although the United Kingdom also stressed that nothing could be done in that regard without the agreement of the recipient countries. It stated further that in seeking to limit conventional weapons accumulation, nothing should be done to endanger the security of States that were unable to produce their own arms. In the view of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, the weapons market had largely changed from a seller's to a buyer's market, where conditions and specifications were allegedly being dictated to the suppliers by the recipients. The Federal Republic of Germany and Japan furthermore specifically called for restraints on arms transfers to areas of conflict and pointed out that they had prohibited arms exports to such areas altogether. The Federal Republic of Germany explained further that only in exceptional cases did it allow weapons to be supplied to countries outside NATO and that the proportion of its arms sales to the so-called third world amounted to just 0.2 per cent of its total exports. The United Kingdom, for its part, pointed out that it accounted for only 5 per cent of the international arms trade and stated that although that represented export earnings and jobs for the United Kingdom, it would continue to exert its best efforts to secure measures of arms trade restraint by international agreement.

The Sudan contended that limiting conventional arms transfers to developing countries could adversely affect the interests of those developing countries if the basic causes of instability and tension, such as colonial or foreign domination, were not eliminated. Furthermore, in the Sudan's view, by limiting arms supplies the developed countries might encourage developing countries to buy weapons at exorbitant prices from private arms dealers, a situation

detrimental to the economic interests of the developing countries which were also concerned about their security.

Tunisia and Venezuela, expressing concern about the arms trade in the developing countries, asserted that the traffic in arms was encouraged mainly by the producers and suppliers, largely for reasons of economic profit. Colombia noted, in the same connexion, that the manufacture of conventional weapons was currently one of the most flourishing industrial activities and perhaps the most significant contributing factor to the economic prosperity of several industrialized countries.

A number of ideas were advanced concerning possible approaches to the arms trade question with a view to its resolution. Many speakers, among them the representatives of Canada, Colombia, France, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States, specifically supported the regional approach (see chapter XX above) in addition to any other approach that might be effective in promoting progress on the question. France explained that, in its view, it was at the regional level that the exigencies of each State's right to security could best be envisaged and assessed. It held, further, that real progress could not be made from outside by a cartel of producers or through unilateral actions. In France's view, progress could be based only on the common will of the interested States and their common understanding of the purpose and scope of a verifiable regional agreement.

The initiative of Latin American and Caribbean States aimed at limiting conventional weapons in their region was widely mentioned and supported as a leading ongoing example of the regional approach to promoting restraints on the transfer of arms. On the other hand, Japan argued that although the mutual and balanced reduction of forces was a desirable measure in certain regions where appropriate conditions existed, it might lead one party to devote its surplus to the increase of military forces in another area, and thus not actually contribute to world peace.

The Sudan held that the regional approach to limit conventional arms transfers was not entirely satisfactory to developing and, in particular, non-aligned countries because it did not adequately stress the global approach within the over-all framework of general and complete disarmament and also failed to link the problem of transfers with the problem of production. It held, in that connexion, that since some States in southern Africa and the Middle East had developed their arms-production capabilities, it would be inimical to the security of the non-producing States in those regions if their arms supplies were reduced.

The bilateral approach, involving action by the United States and the Soviet Union, was also discussed in connexion with the search for international arms trade restraint measures. Most States which referred specifically to that approach, including Canada, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain and the United Kingdom, generally welcomed the bilateral United States-USSR talks on arms transfers as a contribution towards wider efforts to reduce the arms traffic. During 1978, the two countries held a series of three meetings, in May, July and December, to continue their discussions

on the subject. The December 1978 meeting was held at Mexico City at the invitation of the Mexican Government which recognized “. . . the importance of these talks as part of the efforts being made by the international community in regard to the need to adopt measures, negotiated in the appropriate forums, with the participation of the countries concerned, on the transfer and use of certain conventional weapons . . . ”¹⁹ Albania, on the other hand, held that the participation of the United States and the Soviet Union in bilateral and international disarmament discussions was really meant to sow illusions and to promote the maintenance of their military superiority. It held further that the two countries which were the greatest producers and suppliers of conventional arms used arms transfers as a means of penetrating various regions economically and militarily, in order to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

While looking forward to substantive progress in the bilateral super-Power consultations, some States, among them Canada and Singapore, suggested that other major arms suppliers should eventually join the arms restraint talks, otherwise any restraints agreed upon would simply be exploited by other suppliers which would take over the arms markets and expand their sales. Canada considered further that multilateral and regional efforts by importers to complement the efforts by suppliers would be useful and urged the Committee on Disarmament to devote more attention to the arms trade problem, with a view to achieving security at a lower level of armaments and to introducing some qualitative and quantitative restraints on the production and transfer of conventional weapons. Denmark, for its part, noted the Committee on Disarmament's heavy schedule of work and thought instead that the Disarmament Commission should take up the subject of conventional armaments, including their transfer.

A number of other possible ways of dealing with the arms trade reduction issue were suggested.

The Soviet Union stressed its view that for a solution to the problem of the sale and transfer of conventional arms to be just and lasting, it should be based upon a clear-cut political approach which would make it possible to produce such political and legal criteria, based on the United Nations Charter, the definition of aggression and other universally accepted international political and legal documents, as would be in keeping with the purposes of strengthening international peace and security as well as international détente. The Soviet Union emphasized further that the inadmissibility of placing the aggressor and the victim of aggression on the same footing, or of doing prejudice to the rights of countries and peoples waging a struggle for freedom and independence, should be taken into account in connexion with the task of limiting conventional arms sales.

Ghana, for its part, urged the General Assembly at its thirty-third session to establish guidelines which would effectively restrain both supplier and

¹⁹ Communiqué of the Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 21 October 1978, read by Mexico in the First Committee. For the complete text, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 30th meeting.

recipient countries. Colombia, which considered the approach contained in paragraph 85 of the Final Document of the special session as adequate, emphasized that it would have been pleased if the Final Document had gone further in indicating norms and guidelines for bolder international action. In its view, it would be necessary, in the future, to insist on the establishment of principles and mechanisms of a multilateral nature to facilitate a reduction of trade in conventional armaments by setting standards to be complied with by the entire international community. Australia urged the making of efforts to erode mutual suspicions and distrust and to build confidence among States since, in its view, it would be difficult for States to deal fully with the question of excessive international arms transfers until each State felt secure in its relations with others.

Some States, including in particular Japan, Madagascar and New Zealand, stressed the need for a comprehensive study by experts on the question of international conventional arms transfers. New Zealand, emphasizing that it would support any formal proposal to that effect, stated that such a study should consider the question of production in addition to that of transfers. Japan felt that the General Assembly at its thirty-third session should decide to commence such a study and take concrete action such as requesting the Secretary-General, with the assistance of his Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, to formulate a programme of work for carrying it out.

The General Assembly, despite its extensive consideration of the subject, did not take any formal action at its thirty-third session on the suggestion for a study or on the over-all question of international conventional arms transfers, as no draft resolution dealing with the matter was submitted.

Conclusion

The international transfer of conventional armaments is a very complex issue involving a great number and diversity of countries as well as a wide range of economic, political and security considerations.

Nevertheless, the international climate for discussions on possible restraint in this field appears to have improved in recent years, as a significant number of Member States have continued to express increasing anxiety over escalating military expenditures and have recognized that the widely held objective of general and complete disarmament calls not only for nuclear but also for non-nuclear disarmament. Also, the view is widely held that world peace and security as well as socio-economic progress, especially of the developing countries, can be hampered and existing sensitive situations exacerbated by an unbridled traffic in conventional arms.

The main area of contention at the moment is no longer whether States support the idea of curtailing this mammoth annual multibillion-dollar arms enterprise, but rather how to realize reductions fairly and effectively, without jeopardizing any State's vital interests. Several differing views and approaches have been advanced as to how the problem might be treated but a

consensus has not yet emerged on a specific measure or concrete course of action, although the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament calls for consultations among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfers of conventional weapons.

International consideration of the problem of limiting world-wide conventional arms transfers is currently at an initial stage. While the debate so far has revealed many of the positions, concerns and anxieties of a great number of States on various aspects of this problem, a number of important issues remain to be fully clarified, defined or agreed upon, for instance the scope, modalities, and practical approaches or machinery for arms transfer limitation efforts.

Further consideration of the arms transfer problem in all its aspects, within or outside of the United Nations, may help not only to clarify outstanding issues but perhaps also to determine possible ways and means of dealing more concretely with the subject.

Reduction of military budgets

Introduction

IN ARTICLE 26 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS it is stated that, in order to promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council is to be responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. The question of the limitation of military expenditures, both as an approach to disarmament and for the purpose of freeing resources for economic and social development, has been a constant preoccupation of the United Nations, particularly since 1950, when the General Assembly adopted resolution 380 (V), in which it determined that every State should agree to reduce to a minimum the diversion for armaments of its human and economic resources and to strive towards the development of such resources for the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world.

The work of the General Assembly in this general area has been reflected in a number of resolutions¹ as well as in the conclusions and recommendations of studies dealing with the need to reduce military expenditures through disarmament and with the link between disarmament and development.²

While consideration of the general subject was continuing, the General Assembly, on the basis of a 1973 initiative of the Soviet Union, began consideration of the specific question of the reduction of military budgets. The original Soviet proposal called for 10 per cent reductions by the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the allocation of part of the funds thus saved to provide development assistance. Three of the permanent members, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, objected to the

¹ The resolutions adopted up to 1977 were the following: 914 (X) of 16 December 1955; 1516 (XV) of 15 December 1960; 1837 (XVII) of 18 December 1962; 2387 (XXIII) of 19 November 1968; 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969; 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970; 2685 (XXV) of 11 December 1970; 2831 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971; 3075 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973; 3462 (XXX) and 3470 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; 31/68 of 10 December 1976; 32/75 of 12 December 1977.

² *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.62.IX.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16); *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1).

Soviet proposal on the basis, *inter alia*, of the difficulties involved in measuring different military budgets, while China held that it was inappropriate to call for proportionally equal reductions in the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Council. The progress of the General Assembly's consideration of the question and subsequent actions are reflected in the resolutions which it adopted from 1973 on,³ and the surveys and studies⁴ it carried out in order to obtain the views of Member States and to develop an acceptable system of measurement and international reporting of military expenditures as a basis for their reduction.⁵

At its thirty-first session in 1976, the General Assembly had before it the report entitled *Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures*, which had been prepared, in pursuance of resolution 3463 (XXX), by a group of experts. It contained recommendations concerning the definition and scope of the military sector and of military expenditures and, on that basis, elaborated the reporting formula, or matrix, as an instrument for a standardized reporting system. The format of the matrix is shown on pages 420-421.

The General Assembly, after considering the report, adopted resolution 31/87 by which it, *inter alia*, invited all States to communicate to the Secretary-General their comments with regard to matters it covered, particularly their views and suggestions on the proposed standardized reporting instrument; and requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of an intergovernmental group of budgetary experts, a report containing an analysis of the comments thus communicated.

In their report,⁶ which was considered by the General Assembly at its thirty-second session in 1977, the experts analysed the comments provided by 14 States, considered the further development of the reporting instrument, examined practical problems which would face budgetary experts in completing the recommended format and extracting appropriate information from data delivered by States in the process of testing and refining it, and submitted conclusions and recommendations. The experts stated, *inter alia*:

The work set in motion by General Assembly resolution 3093 A and 3093 B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973 has reached a decisive stage. A satisfactory reporting instrument has been devised and reviewed. The time thus appears propitious to attempt to move a step further. Progress along these lines will require operational testing and refining of the reporting instrument, which is work of a character different from that undertaken by the expert groups of 1974, 1976 and 1977. Development of the instrument, although necessary, is not sufficient in itself. It must be recalled that without an accompanying process of co-operation among States with large

³ The resolutions adopted from 1973 to 1977 were the following: 3093 A and B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973; 3254 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974; 3463 (XXX) of 11 December 1975; 31/87 of 14 December 1976; 32/85 of 12 December 1977.

⁴ *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.1.10; *Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.1.6); see also A/10165 and Add.1 and 2; A/32/194 and Add.1.

⁵ For details of the Assembly's actions, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), chap. XX.

⁶ A/32/194 and Add.1.

- (c) Nuclear warheads and bombs
 - (d) Ships and boats
 - (e) Tanks, armoured personnel carriers and other armoured equipment
 - (f) Artillery
 - (g) Other ground force weapons
 - (h) Ordnance and ammunition**
 - (i) Electronics and communications
 - (j) Vehicles
 - (k) Other
2. Construction
- (a) Airbases, airfields
 - (b) Missile sites
 - (c) Naval bases and facilities
 - (d) Electronics, communications and related structures and facilities
 - (e) Personnel facilities
 - (f) Medical facilities
 - (g) Warehouses, depots, repair and maintenance facilities
 - (h) Command and administration facilities
 - (i) Fortifications
 - (j) Shelters
 - (k) Other

III. *Research and development*

1. Basic and applied research
2. Development, testing and evaluation

* *Subdivide by*

Domestically produced vs. imported;
Allocation to forces vs. stockpiled.

** Excluding elements in (b)¹ and (c) above.

military expenditures, as referred to in Assembly resolution 3093 (XXVIII), in reducing military expenditures it will not be possible to accomplish the ultimate objectives—the reduction of military expenditures and the freeing of significant resources for social and economic development, particularly of developing countries.⁷

The General Assembly, in resolution 32/85 of 12 December 1977, *inter alia*, noted with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General and requested him to ascertain which States would be prepared to participate in a pilot test of the reporting instrument and to report thereon to the Assembly at its tenth special session; it also requested the Secretary-General to prepare a background report for the tenth special session, compiling the proposals and recommendations put forward by the groups of experts appointed by him and under resolutions 3463 (XXX) and 31/87, and containing information on the progress made with regard to the pilot test.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

At its special session, the General Assembly had before it the report⁸ prepared by the Secretary-General in pursuance of resolution 32/85. The Secretary-General reported the following concerning the pilot test of the reporting instrument of military expenditures:

With respect to paragraph 2 of resolution 32/85, the Secretary-General, by a note verbale dated 4 January 1978, drew the attention of all Member States to the request made to him by the General Assembly and asked for the views of Governments on the subject.

Substantive replies were received from the following Member States: Australia, Austria, Barbados, Canada, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Regarding the pilot test of the reporting instrument of military expenditures, Austria, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States of America indicated without qualifications their willingness to participate in such a project. Australia indicated that it was prepared to provide information on its military budget or the pilot study envisaged in resolution 32/85. It explained, however, that the information would be confined to past and currently approved budgetary data as published in appropriation bills and the annual report of the Department of Defence, since, in this particular respect, Australian military expenditure accounting practices did not correspond in all aspects with the proposed format in the United Nations experts' report. Japan stated its readiness to take part provided that participation of States representing a wide range of different economic systems and geographical distribution could be secured. The United Kingdom believed that, in order properly to test the reporting mechanism, the States participating in the pilot test should include a fair sample of developed and developing countries, and of States with centrally planned economies and market economies. Provided that such a representative sample of States was willing to participate in the pilot test, the United Kingdom would agree to take part.

The Federal Republic of Germany indicated that the test group should comprise States with different budgeting and accounting systems as well as different economic systems representing all regions. Since a number of western industrialized States had already indicated their willingness to participate in the test phase, the Federal Republic of Germany was of the opinion that its participation did not seem to be required at this time from the point of view of political and

⁷ A/32/194, para. 106.

⁸ A/S-10/6 and Corr.1 and Add.1.

regional balance. The project of the test study itself was welcomed by the Federal Government without any reservation.

Finland reiterated its support for the efforts to further the feasibility of the reduction of military budgets. It expressed the hope that the pilot test could promote the goal of reducing world military expenditure and the closely linked goal of reallocating funds thus released to social and economic development. It also indicated that Finland would follow the testing project with a view of participating in it at an appropriate later stage.

The Government of Barbados indicated that it would not be able to participate in the pilot test of the reporting instrument on this occasion.⁹

The background report of the Secretary-General also contained a compilation of the proposals and recommendations put forward by the groups of experts appointed by him, as well as information on progress made with regard to testing the reporting instrument.

Almost without exception, speakers at the special session¹⁰ deplored the high level of military expenditures in the world. Many pointed to the fact that military expenditures in the world, some 400 billion dollars a year, represented some 5 to 6 per cent of the world's total gross national product or two thirds of the gross national product of the countries where the poorest half of the world's population lived. That situation was widely characterized as irrational. The representative of Denmark stated that the arms race had reached absurd and scandalous proportions. Bahrain affirmed that it was truly shameful that such enormous sums should be devoted to weapons production at a time when millions of human beings were living in a state of poverty, ignorance and disease. In its view that was a flagrant violation of the unanimous decision of the United Nations to work towards raising the standards of living of people throughout the world and towards improvement of economic and social conditions. The United Republic of Cameroon denounced the disproportion between the vast resources devoted to destruction and those set aside for the alleviation of poverty. Stating that the arms race had long since entered the sphere of the irrational, Bulgaria asked if it was not a challenge to common sense that military expenditures in the world had reached that colossal figure and were continuing to rise.

The economic and social consequences of military expenditures were widely discussed, frequently in the context of the burden on States, both developed and developing, and the current efforts to establish a new international economic order (see also chapter XXIV below). Romania, for instance, said that the tremendous proportions of the arms race were giving rise to serious troubles in the world economy; they affected the rate of economic growth of all States, whatever their social régime or size, caused stagnation and even recession in the economic development of various countries, brought about disturbances in the balance of payments, and aggravated and

⁹ A/S-10/6, paras. 4 to 9. Subsequently, the Governments of Denmark and the Netherlands replied that they would be prepared to participate in a pilot test of the reporting instrument, while that of Suriname stated that it was not, for the time being, in a position to do so.

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

prolonged considerably the economic crisis with its entire suite of harmful consequences upon the standard of living of all peoples. Czechoslovakia felt that the arms race was one of the biggest obstacles to the creation of a new equitable economic order and drew off immense material and human resources exactly from where they were most needed. Denmark saw a connexion between international efforts to reduce world-wide consumption for military purposes and the commitment to a new international economic order, the latter having in the long run a direct impact on world security.

Throughout the debate, the reduction of military budgets was seen as both a disarmament and a development measure. Foreign Minister Gromyko of the Soviet Union advocated the reduction of military budgets, first of all of the permanent members of the Security Council and of other States with large military and economic potential, as a practical step which could scale down the arms race and at the same time release additional funds for development needs. Afghanistan regarded the reduction of military budgets as an effective measure for preventing an arms race and stated that the sums thus released should be utilized to better the standard of living of hundreds of millions of people of the world. Belgium felt that the reduction of military budgets in keeping with harmonized and verifiable procedures could be an efficient way to proceed with effective disarmament measures and would free resources which could be spent to satisfy needs in the economic and social field.

Some countries placed emphasis on particular aspects of the question. Jordan, for example, considered that the proposed conversion from war-time to peace-time allocations was primarily designed to free resources for development, while Italy advocated the setting aside of even a modest percentage of sums devoted to armament for the international financing of the struggle against some of the most serious scourges of modern life such as pollution of the human environment, deforestation, overcrowding and so on. In general, the developing countries discussed the question in terms of various aspects of the disarmament-development relationship.

The subject was discussed also in the context of the security of States. Australia, in principle, supported reductions in military budgets carried out in ways which would not be destabilizing or create new tensions. Hungary stated that it would willingly reduce its military expenditure in proportion to the decrease in international tension and the strengthening of peace and security. The Prime Minister of Iceland, Mr. Hallgrímsson, referring to the conventional arms race, stated that ways must be found to guarantee security without a constantly increased rivalry in military expenditures between nations, thus making it possible to reduce such expenditures on a global basis.

A number of Western countries, including Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, insisted that in order to implement reductions in military budgets, there was a need to overcome the practical problems of defining and measuring military expenditures and establishing machinery for verifying compliance with any agreed reduction. The question of openness regarding military budgets was seen by several countries, including Sweden, both as a step on the way to agreed reductions acceptable to all and as an important confidence-building measure. The

United Kingdom stated that some States published defence budget figures which were very incomplete and appealed to them to take the opportunity offered by the special session as the occasion on which to end that practice. Some countries, mainly Western European, urged that the system of measuring and reporting of military budgets which had been devised under the auspices of the Secretary-General be tested by a representative sample of States and, if found satisfactory, implemented internationally without delay. That approach was supported by a number of developing countries. The Philippines, for instance, hoped that the initiative with respect to the development of a standardized reporting instrument would contribute to the reduction of arms through the budget-cut approach and that the pilot test of the reporting instrument would soon be carried out. Bangladesh felt that a major objective should be to accelerate implementation of the work on the international comparability of military expenditures with the view to facilitating agreements and at least, in the first instance, reducing the rate of growth of military expenditures.

Disagreement with the approach described above was also expressed, particularly by Eastern European States. The Soviet Union maintained its position that States having large economic and military potential—particularly the permanent members of the Security Council—should agree to reduce their military budgets, not in terms of percentage points, but in absolute figures, and also agree on the amounts to be allocated for increased development aid.¹¹ The Soviet Union also declared its readiness to reduce its military budget along with others on such a basis. The Ukrainian SSR, for its part, said that unfortunately the proposal for the reduction of military budgets, made as long ago as the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, had been drowned in a flood of rhetoric and scholastic hair-splitting about the structure of budgets, their comparability and so on. Others, including Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, indicated their support of the Soviet position. Several other speakers referred to the resolutions adopted by the Assembly over the years on the subject of the reduction of military budgets and expressed disappointment at the lack of progress in implementing them.

Vice-President Mondale of the United States stated that his country's defence budget was no larger in real terms than in the late 1950s and was less than it had been a decade earlier, but other nations, he said, had increased their military budgets in real terms by more than one third over the past decade. He added, however, that following their summit meeting in Washington, the NATO nations would modestly increase their defence budgets, not from preference but from necessity, since they faced a build-up of unprecedented proportions in Europe. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR, in referring later to that announcement, questioned whether additional United States military appropriations and the decision of the NATO States to increase military expenditures could be reconciled with the tasks facing the special session.

¹¹ See A/S-10/AC.1/4, annex, para. 7.

The special responsibility of the super-Powers, other nuclear-weapon States and other States with large military expenditures was repeatedly emphasized. China supported the reduction of military budgets to assist developing countries but held that, whether in terms of percentages or absolute figures, the two super-Powers, whose military spending accounted for two-thirds of the total world military expenditure, should be the first to take concrete action. China could therefore not agree to ask all countries without distinction to freeze and gradually reduce their military budgets, nor could it agree to the placing of special emphasis on all the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States. Romania said that in view of the role of the larger States in international life and the size of their military forces, quantities of armaments and share of expenditures, it was necessary that measures concerning freezing and reducing military budgets and armaments should start with them. Poland attached considerable importance to the problem of the reduction of the military budgets of States, particularly permanent members of the Security Council and others with significant military potential. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya demanded that the big Powers reduce their military budgets if they wished to demonstrate their good-will and sincerity in the cause of establishing the new international economic order.

It was recognized that the process of the reduction of military budgets should be gradual and various suggestions were made for setting it in motion. Bangladesh said that a general approach would be to lay bare the basic facts and then to seek active steps for introducing restraint either by the indirect method of reducing military expenditures across the board or by the direct method of curtailing production or limiting arms transfers; it added that regional agreements aimed at mutual restraint should also be actively encouraged. Romania proposed¹² that, as an initial step, all participating States should agree to freeze military expenditures, military forces and armaments at the 1978 level while undertaking subsequently, beginning perhaps as early as 1979, to move on to gradual reductions: in the first stage, up to 1985, the reduction should be between 10 and 15 per cent of the current levels and should cover all components of the armed forces—land, sea and air—and all categories of weapons, both conventional and nuclear. Canada suggested¹³ an agreement to limit and then progressively reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems. Ireland suggested¹⁴ that studies should be undertaken with a view to working out a system of incentives and targets to encourage progress in arms control and disarmament. One possibility might be for the Assembly to consider adopting as a voluntary target a maximum ceiling on national defence expenditures which States would be encouraged to observe. The ceiling could, for example, be calculated as a proportion of gross national product and, with progress, might steadily be lowered. Costa

¹² See A/S-10/14, annex.

¹³ See A/S-10/AC.1/L.6, para. 4.

¹⁴ See A/S-10/AC.1/21, annex.

Rica proposed¹⁵ that the Assembly call upon States to reduce their military expenditures at once by at least 10 per cent and to create a fund, with the resultant savings, which would go in part to economic and social development assistance and in part to nations that reduced military expenditures by at least 1.5 per cent of the public budget and 0.5 per cent of their national product concurrently. Costa Rica referred to its own case as evidence that it was possible, without any loss of dignity or independence, to effect such a proposal. Several other developing countries also referred to their policy of restraint in the field of military expenditures. Papua New Guinea, for instance, said that, on gaining independence, it had not maintained an expensive defence force inherited from the colonial power and had kept only the basic necessities. The President of Senegal, Mr. Senghor, in his address, suggested a tax on military budgets.¹⁶

With regard to further suggestions, the Secretary-General, in his address at the opening of the special session, proposed that one million out of every billion, or one one-thousandth, of the dollars spent on armaments be given for national and international disarmament efforts. A number of countries, including France, India, Mexico, Romania and the USSR, elaborated on the apportioning of savings from the reduction of military budgets to economic development or referred specifically to consideration of the establishment of a disarmament fund. President Giscard d'Estaing of France, for instance, announced a proposal for the setting up of a special disarmament fund for development and France later submitted a memorandum¹⁷ on the proposal whereby the fund would eventually be built up from resources released through disarmament measures. The Governing Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), through the Chairman of its Executive Board, addressed a message to the General Assembly¹⁸ drawing attention to the particularly precarious and disquieting situation of the unmet needs of children in the developing countries throughout the world with which UNICEF co-operates. Speaking on behalf of the Executive Board at the final meeting of the session, the representative of the United Republic of Cameroon welcomed the fact that one State had responded to the Board's appeal by announcing its intention to earmark from its military budget an amount of \$7 million for the International Year of the Child.

The consensus achieved as a result of the debate on the reduction of military budgets is reflected in the Final Document. The Introduction, paragraph 4, states:

Furthermore, it has not been possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and human, which are wasted on the unproductive and spiralling arms race and which should be made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a race "places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries"

¹⁵ See A/S-10/AC.1/40, annex.

¹⁶ See also A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 101.

¹⁷ See A/S-10/AC.1/28, annex.

¹⁸ See A/S-10/AC.1/5.

The Declaration includes the following paragraph:

16. In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

The Programme of Action includes two paragraphs, as follows:

89. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

90. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

In the section entitled "Machinery", paragraph 125 lists the proposals put forward at the session which were to be transmitted to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs. A number of them are referred to above, and certain others have a partial or less direct relationship with the question of military budgets.

Finally, paragraph 126 stresses that in adopting the Final Document, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly affirmed their determination to work, *inter alia*, for:

... reducing military expenditures and utilizing the resources thus released in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

Consideration by the CCD, 1978

The question of the reduction of military budgets was considered briefly in the CCD, particularly during its summer session.¹⁹

¹⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. I, paras. 234-237.

The Soviet delegation recalled that General Assembly resolution 3093 A (XXVIII)²⁰ calling for reduction by 10 per cent of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council had been adopted on the basis of a proposal by the USSR and had not been implemented. In order to facilitate progress, the USSR had suggested at the special session that the permanent members of the Council reach agreement on specific amounts of reduction, each for its own military budget, not in percentages but in absolute figures.

The United Kingdom noted that the Final Document of the special session had drawn attention to the contribution that gradual reduction of military budgets would make to the curbing of the arms race and the possibilities of reallocating resources. However, it held that to implement such a measure the first step was to agree on the system of measuring and comparing military budgets which had been worked out by the group of experts. The United Kingdom had made known its willingness to participate in a pilot test of that system in company with a fair sample of States. It stressed that the potential benefits were so great that delay should no longer be accepted in pressing ahead with steps to achieve such a measure on a universal and balanced basis with provisions for verification.

The Federal Republic of Germany referred to the comparability of military budgets as a confidence-building measure, while Sweden emphasized that a gradual, mutually-agreed reduction of military budgets would contribute to trust between nations.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

Most of the speakers in the debates of the General Assembly at its thirty-third session²¹ stressed the heavy burden placed by military expenditures on the peoples of all countries, the contradiction between this huge waste of resources and the objective of establishing a new international economic order, and the urgent need to put an end to the arms race and to allocate resources thus released to peaceful purposes. Frequent references were made within that context to the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. For instance, the representative of the Netherlands, in evaluating the significance of the special session, said that the session constituted an expression of the strong desire shared by all members of the world community to arrive, *inter alia*, at important reductions of military arsenals and expenditures in favour of the application of human endeavours and resources to the stimulation of economic and social development. Czechoslovakia quoted paragraph 89 of the Final Document stressing the

²⁰ See above, page 6.

²¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 55th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

value of the reduction of military budgets both as a disarmament and development measure. Other countries, including Bangladesh, Burundi, Senegal and the United Arab Emirates made similar points.

The representative of Mauritius reminded the Assembly that in adopting the Final Document, Member States reaffirmed solemnly their determination to work, *inter alia*, for reducing military expenditures and utilising the resources thus released in a manner which would help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

The issues of studies on military budgets and the need for an accepted method for measuring and comparing military expenditures were discussed along the same lines as in previous years and at the special session. Poland, for instance, saw the need for a straightforward approach in coming to grips with the problem of taking appropriate political decisions without directing the whole issue along the road of endless technical studies. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, stated that past efforts in that field had shown that international agreements on a balanced reduction of military expenditures depended on devising an accepted method for measuring and comparing those expenditures.

A number of countries, for instance, the Federal Republic of Germany, expressed support for confidence-building measures and referred in that context to participation in the preparatory work done by the Secretary-General to ensure the disclosure and comparability of military budgets.

Some States, particularly Western ones, reaffirmed their intention to take part in a pilot test of procedures to develop an appropriate reporting instrument on military budgets. Canada held that it was essential that countries from different geopolitical groups agree to participate in the test of the reporting system. It stated that the development of a standardized system of reporting could open the way to the possible adoption of concrete measures, including effective reduction of military spending. A precondition would be a willingness to make information available and to permit the verification of reports. The United Kingdom believed that the budgetary approach could provide the statistical basis for the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Philippines, noting that the arms race had resisted all approaches, whether piecemeal and related to specific weapon systems, or general and related to its over-all character, added that the approach aimed at reductions in military budgets remained one of the most promising avenues.

The Soviet Union, supported by Eastern European countries and others, reaffirmed the proposal it had made at the special session that States with major economic and military potential, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, should come to an agreement on the scope of the reduction of their respective military budgets, not in percentages, but in absolute terms. The USSR expressed the hope that the Assembly would take a decisive stand in favour of a real reduction of military budgets, and stressed that it attached great significance to the problem and was working to accelerate its solution.

Romania, referring to its proposals at the special session, again envisaged the freezing of military budgets at the 1978 level and thereafter gradually reducing them, with the sums thus released to be used for the economic advancement of all countries and for assistance to under-developed countries. In May, Romania had submitted a document, under the agenda item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security",²² regarding an additional increase in military expenditures which, it considered, strongly stimulated the arms race. Consequently, it had asked NATO countries to cancel their decisions. It also stated that the socialist countries should say a firm "no" to the arms race and do everything possible to initiate a reduction of military expenditures.

Recalling its proposal at the special session, Costa Rica reiterated its conviction that when the ways and means of implementing the measures mentioned in paragraph 89 of the Final Document of the special session were considered, it would be possible to find a way of rewarding nations which substantially reduced their military budgets and reallocated the resources saved to improvement of economic, social and cultural conditions for their peoples.

On 13 November 1978, Austria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Liberia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, Romania, Senegal and Sweden submitted a draft resolution, subsequently sponsored also by Bolivia, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Zaire, which was adopted by the First Committee at its 55th meeting on 29 November by a vote of 101 to none, with 18 abstentions.

Before the vote, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and the USSR explained their intention to abstain, not because they were against the concept of the reduction of military budgets, but because the draft resolution contained provisions and implications which they could not support, particularly concerning the reporting instrument. Hungary stressed that few States had submitted comments supporting the testing and refining of the proposed instrument; the German Democratic Republic did not share the view that systematic measurement and reporting was an important first objective and referred to the high costs involved; the USSR referred to studies of the comparability of military budgets as unpromising and held that the draft resolution would involve studies for the sake of studies. After the vote, Cuba similarly explained its abstention.

Brazil, in explaining its affirmative vote, stressed the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States.

At its 84th meeting on 14 December 1978, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution as recommended by the First Committee by a vote of 121 to none, with 18 abstentions, as resolution 33/67 (France, the United Kingdom and the United States voted in favour, the USSR abstained and China did not participate in the vote). The resolution reads as follows:

²² A/33/548.

The General Assembly,

Noting that, according to the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, it should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question,

Reaffirming its conviction that there is an urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States to carry out reductions in their military budgets and that this would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Convinced that a reduction of military budgets could be carried out without affecting the military balance to the detriment of the national security of any country,

Conscious that the attainment of the ultimate objectives will require the co-operation of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States,

Convinced that the systematic measurement and reporting of military expenditure is an important first objective in the move towards agreed and balanced reductions in military expenditure,

Recognizing the need for the availability of a satisfactory instrument for standardized reporting on the military expenditure of Member States,

Recognizing also the value of such an instrument as a means of increasing confidence between States by improving the information on military expenditure.

Recalling that in its resolution 32/85 of 12 December 1977 it requested the Secretary-General to ascertain those States which would be prepared to participate in a pilot test of the reporting instrument and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament,

Noting with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session in response to paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 32/85,

Recognizing that the work set in motion by the General Assembly on the reduction of military budgets has reached a decisive stage and that successive reports of groups of experts, in particular the latest report issued on 14 September 1977, have moved the whole exercise to a position where practical steps for testing and refining the proposed reporting instrument could now be taken,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of an *ad hoc* panel of experienced practitioners in the field of military budgeting:

(a) To carry out a practical test of the proposed reporting instrument with the voluntary co-operation of States from different regions and representing different budgeting and accounting systems;

(b) To assess the results of the practical test;

(c) To develop recommendations for further refinement and implementation of the reporting instrument;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the *Ad Hoc* Panel on Military Budgeting with the assistance that may be deemed necessary;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

Conclusion

There is no controversy about the potential benefits to be derived from the reduction of military budgets and reallocation of the resources thus released to peaceful endeavours, including development assistance.

There remain, however, basic differences of opinion, which have been evident since 1973 when the question was first included in the agenda of the General Assembly, as to how the measure should be implemented. A number of Member States, including those of Eastern Europe, feel that it should be possible to reach agreement on the progressive reduction of military budgets, especially of the super-Powers, the States permanent members of the Security Council (the nuclear-weapon States), and other militarily significant States, even without a system for direct comparison of what comprises the military budgets of various States. Other Members, among them the Western States, insist that development of an adequate means for comparison of military budgets among countries with various economic and social systems is the necessary first step. They point to the technical complexity of that problem as well as the need for openness of reporting and for verification procedures. Other countries favour an approach between the two extremes which, while recognizing the value of comparability, calls for early progress on the measure in the interest of both disarmament and development.

Short-term progress on the question will depend on the success of the practical test of the reporting instrument called for in resolution 33/67 and on the reaction to that test by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

PART SIX

Studies and information

Disarmament and development

Introduction

THE NOTION OF ESTABLISHING SOME FORM OF LINK between disarmament and development has a long history in the United Nations. The opportunity for a highly advantageous revision of priorities in global resource allocation away from armaments towards economic and social development has been clearly apparent since the early years of the postwar era and has been recognized, for example, in the periodic proposals concerning the reduction of military budgets (see chapter XXIII above) and in a series of reports on the economic and social consequences of the arms race.¹ In general, the attitude of the international community has been that both disarmament and development should be pursued independently as urgent goals but, particularly in recent years, there has been a growing feeling that the interrelationships between them are intimate and that there was much to be gained from an explicit recognition of that fact.

The most recent report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race² highlights the multiplicity of those consequences and the fact that virtually all of them are negative. It states that large military expenditures contribute to the powerful inflationary trends that exist around the world and to the depletion of scarce natural resources. Resources are drawn away from consumption and productive investment, thereby lowering both current standards of living and the capacity to raise those standards over time. The global effort in the areas of science and technology is grossly distorted towards the achievement of military objectives. The civilian benefits of military technology are quite incidental and, it seems, increasingly marginal. The burgeoning

¹ *Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilization of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.I.10); *Reduction of Military Budgets: Measurement and International Reporting of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.I.6); *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.62.IX.1); *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.72.IX.16); *Disarmament and Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.IX.1).

² *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.1). For a fuller discussion of this report, see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2: 1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.4), chap. XIX.

international trade in armaments (see chapter XXII above) represents a highly unequal exchange, beneficial for the industrialized exporting countries but very costly for the developing importing countries where the opportunity cost of foreign exchange, skilled labour and industrial capacity used for military purposes is particularly high. The report contains the following paragraphs in its conclusion:

172. It has been stressed throughout this report that the two most important goals of the international community, disarmament, on the one hand, and development, on the other, which the States Members of the United Nations are committed to pursue vigorously, each in its own right, are in fact intimately linked. Development at an acceptable rate would be hard if not impossible to reconcile with a continuation of the arms race. Research and development is one area where the misdirection of efforts is glaring. In this as in other respects, vast resources, badly needed for development, are being consumed as countries make ever greater sacrifices for military purposes.

173. Conversely, substantial progress in the field of development is increasingly understood to be essential for the preservation of world peace and security. These cannot in the long run be preserved in a world where large and growing economic gaps separate the countries of the world. Genuine security cannot be assured by the accumulation of armament but only through disarmament, co-operation and the growth of exchange and interdependence in a world of diminishing inequalities.

174. Substantial progress in the field of disarmament would represent a decisive turning point as regards development, imparting new momentum to efforts in this direction and greatly facilitating progress in this field. Progress towards disarmament would release internal material, financial and human resources both in developed and in developing countries and would permit their redeployment to purposes of development. In the case of many developing countries, these resources are relatively small in absolute terms, but in other cases they are very substantial, and in all cases the impact on development would be significant. The relaxation of the climate of fear, hostility and confrontation which progress towards disarmament would bring about, would remove some of the barriers now hampering international exchanges in general and the free circulation of raw materials and advanced technology in particular, and would greatly facilitate the free choice by each country of its particular path towards development. Last but not least, substantial progress towards disarmament would represent major savings in industrialized countries and would make possible substantial increases in development assistance. In fact, disarmament should be so designed that this close connexion between disarmament and development gets full recognition. Provisions to ensure the transfer to development purposes of part of the resources released, provisions to ensure that measures of armaments limitation are so designed that they do not impede the transfer of technology for peaceful ends and other similar provisions must be an integral part of disarmament measures.

In 1977, the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament included in its recommendations a proposal submitted by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden for an in-depth study on the relationship between disarmament and development.³ That recommendation was taken up in the course of the disarmament debate at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly. A draft resolution concerning such a study was introduced by Norway and adopted by consensus in the First Committee and by the General Assembly as resolution 32/88 A.

The resolution specified that the terms of reference for the study should be determined by the General Assembly itself at its special session devoted to disarmament and, to that end, requested the Secretary-General to appoint an

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-second Session, Supplement No. 41 (A/32/41 and Corr.1)*, para.32.

ad hoc group of governmental experts for the purpose of elaborating a possible framework and terms of reference for the study. The *ad hoc* group was to report on its work no later than 1 April 1978.

Meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development

Pursuant to resolution 32/88 A, the Secretary-General appointed a group of 22 governmental experts from the following countries: Egypt, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. The *Ad Hoc* Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development met in New York from 13 to 21 March 1978 and submitted its report⁴ to the Secretary-General, who transmitted it to Member States on 5 April 1978.

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Group contained suggestions on the general guidelines for the study, its terms of reference and the organization of work. With regard to general guidelines, it was stated that the study should be made in the context of the current situation in the field of disarmament and the reciprocal relationship between disarmament on the one hand and détente, international peace and security, economic and social development and the promotion of international co-operation on the other. It was further stated that the study should be made in the context of how disarmament could contribute to the establishment of a new international economic order.

The *Ad Hoc* Group felt that a real and effective process of disarmament was imperative and hoped that the study would serve as a basis for decisions on concrete actions to reallocate resources released through disarmament measures to economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries. To that end, it urged in its report that the study be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of and, most particularly, the substantive feasibility, of such a reallocation of resources. Further, the report stated that use should be made of relevant past studies in the disarmament field but that, to the extent necessary, new research should be undertaken.

With regard to the terms of reference for the study, the *Ad Hoc* Group recommended that research should be focused on three main areas: (a) present-day utilization of resources for military purposes; (b) economic and social effects of a continuing arms race and of the implementation of disarmament measures; and (c) conversion and redeployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes.

In the first area, the report stressed the need to determine the share of the total real resources currently available which were devoted to military pur-

⁴ A/S-10/9.

poses and stressed also that a particular effort should be made to examine the opportunity cost of the resources used in that way. The second area would be concerned with analyses of the effects on economic growth, economic stability and social development both of further increases in the quantity of resources devoted to armaments and of the implementation of a disarmament programme. Within the broad task the report identified a number of specific issues, including the effects of armament/disarmament on resources of energy and raw materials and effects on the supply of and demand for research and development capacity. Finally, in the third area, the task would be to analyse the short-term and long-term problems associated with the reallocation of real resources to economic and social development and to suggest methods by which those problems could be overcome. With respect to the transfer of resources released through disarmament, the report emphasized the resource requirements arising out of aims related to the economic and social development of all countries, especially of the developing countries.

With regard to the organization of the work of the study, the report envisaged that the study would take two or, at most, three years and that it would involve calling on expert assistance from all over the world. It also anticipated that the staff of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament would have to be strengthened with a number of qualified research consultants for the purpose of assisting the *Ad Hoc* Group in the preparation of its final report. It was suggested that the final report should be submitted in advance of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly and that a short and popular version of the main report should be prepared for general distribution.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

The report of the *Ad Hoc* Group was considered by the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament in May and June 1978 and received widespread endorsement. In the general debate and in the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Tenth Special Session, virtually every speaker, including those from the five nuclear-weapon States, drew attention, in one way or another, to the magnitude of global military spending and the blatant contrast between that waste of resources and the unfilled needs of development.⁵ The representative of Nigeria, for example, echoed a general consensus when he expressed the conviction that "as long as 25 per cent of the world's scientific manpower and 40 per cent of the world's expenditure on research and development is tied down to the unproductive military sector, as long as the world expends 7 per cent of its gross national product on armaments, economic and social progress cannot run its full course". Bulgaria added that the 400 billion dollars now

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum. For discussion of related themes, see chapters IV, V and XXIII above.

being spent annually on armaments represented waste on a scale that, in the past, was associated only with actual warfare.

The great majority of Member States considered the link between disarmament and development to be beyond dispute. The German Democratic Republic felt that the arms race was a barrier to the satisfaction of mankind's elementary needs and stated its conviction that disarmament was inseparably linked to the economic and social development of developing countries. Venezuela argued that prevailing economic and social conditions in developing countries and the magnitude of global military spending was a contradiction without parallel in history and added that that diversion of resources had a fundamental impact on the world's ability to solve urgent problems. Sierra Leone felt that the diversion of resources to armaments amounted to a denial of the basic human right to a decent standard of living. Many other Member States, including Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, Malta, Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the USSR and Yugoslavia sympathized with that view, namely, that the arms race was a major obstacle to, if not simply incompatible with, the solution of urgent economic and social problems, particularly in the developing countries.

Another widespread view was that the coexistence of extravagant expenditures on armaments and massive resource requirements for socio-economic development was a reflection of priorities in resource allocation and represented a major challenge to common sense. States expressing such a view included Bahrain, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Ghana, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and Uruguay. President Giscard d'Estaing of France pointed out that the idea of a link between disarmament and development was not new and suggested that the major reason why it had not been translated into reality was that there had been no objective or generally accepted way of measuring the true level of armaments. That stumbling block was one of the issues addressed in the French proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development.⁶

Other widely expressed aspects of the question included the relationship between disarmament and the new international economic order, and the relationship between development and the prospects for disarmament. On the first question, the Sudan, for example, argued that the problem of the arms race could not be separated from international development, the uneven distribution of resources, and the unfair economic relations between developed and developing countries. Kenya, Norway, Romania and Rwanda, among others, supported the view that the arms race was a serious obstacle to the establishment of a new international economic order or, alternatively, that disarmament would be a major impetus to progress towards such a new order.

On the second question, the relationship between development and disarmament, a number of States pointed out that the large economic and social disparities that existed between and within States were a major source of tension and potential conflict. Malta argued that successful efforts to mini-

⁶ See A/S-10/AC.1/28, annex.

mize those disparities would provide a major dividend in terms of international stability and security and that international development would be far more productive in that regard than further increases in military arsenals. Similarly, Bangladesh and Zambia felt that existing economic and social disparities posed a serious danger to stability, that the arms race perpetuated such disparities and that disarmament, by accelerating development and facilitating the evolution of a new international economic order, would therefore promote a genuinely secure global order. Among the other countries that endorsed such a view were Burundi, Democratic Yemen, Guyana and the Syrian Arab Republic.

The views expressed in the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Tenth Special Session reflected broadly similar sentiments. The representative of the United Nations Development Programme, for example, pointed out that whatever difficulties might revolve around the question of the benefits of disarmament for development there was little doubt that development, because it necessitated integration and interdependence and provided positive incentives for co-operation, was good for disarmament. Similarly, the representatives of the majority of non-governmental organizations and research institutes which addressed the *Ad Hoc* Committee noted, in one way or another that, quite apart from the political and security ramifications of the arms race, the diversion of resources to armaments on the current scale seriously restricted the efforts to deal with the global problems of economic and social development.

In sum, the proposal to undertake a major study of the relationship between disarmament and development was generally considered important and timely, and the issue did not contribute materially to the arduous deliberations in the *Ad Hoc* Committee in connexion with the drafting of the Final Document of the special session. The Final Document addresses the question primarily in two paragraphs in the Programme of Action, which read as follows:

94. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action.

95. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, and the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels.

First meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development

In pursuance of paragraph 94 of the Final Document, a group of 24 governmental experts, appointed by the Secretary-General, met for the first time between 4 and 13 September 1978 in New York.⁷ The meeting was primarily devoted to consideration of the recommendations regarding the organization of work contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group. In order to secure the broadest possible participation in the study, the Group of Governmental Experts decided to establish a list of the researchers and research institutes around the world with relevant expertise and to invite them to submit research proposals on the various subjects detailed in the Group's mandate. It also decided to recommend that the Secretary-General appeal to all Governments to make voluntary contributions to a special fund—the Disarmament Project Fund—that had been established for the study to supplement the financial resources from the regular budget of the United Nations. The Group further decided to recommend that the Secretary-General invite Governments to submit their own data and information relevant to the study.

In addition, the Group decided that it would be useful to establish contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutes and to secure the co-operation of United Nations institutions and specialized agencies with expertise in areas relevant to the study. It also expressed the desire to hold at least one series of meetings in a developing country and endorsed the view expressed in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group that it would seem necessary to strengthen the staff of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament with qualified research consultants.

The results of the first meeting were set out in an organizational report⁸ submitted to the Secretary-General on 13 September 1978 and which the Secretary-General subsequently submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session under item 125 of the agenda, entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session".

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

During the thirty-third session the support for a study on the relationship between disarmament and development continued to be strong and wide-

⁷ The countries represented were: Brazil, Egypt, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sweden, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

⁸ A/33/317.

spread.⁹ Commentary on the issue closely paralleled that heard at the tenth special session earlier in the year. A number of Member States were particularly encouraged by the fact that the study would be forward-looking and policy-oriented while others stressed its relevance to the establishment of a new international economic order.

Among the many States that endorsed the rationale behind the study in the First Committee debate were Colombia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Iraq, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia. Finland, for example, viewed the redeployment of resources used for military purposes to economic and social development as a crucial facet of disarmament. Pakistan, for its part, expressed the hope that the Group of Governmental Experts, in addition to analysing how global military expenditures contributed to economic and social disorder, would examine the thesis that the existing economic disparity between developed and developing countries was a factor permitting the diversion of resources to armaments which, in turn, perpetuated that disparity.

The Assembly had to deal with two aspects of the study. The first and central question arose out of the Group's organizational report and the requests and recommendations contained therein. Subsequent to the submission on 8 November of an initial draft resolution, Sweden, on 22 November, introduced a revised draft resolution in the First Committee responding to those requests and recommendations. The revised draft was sponsored by Bangladesh, Barbados, Botswana, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Jamaica, Mauritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia. The First Committee adopted the revised draft resolution by consensus on 28 November, and the General Assembly adopted it, also without a vote, on 14 December as resolution 33/71 M. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions contained in paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Final Document of its tenth special session, about the relationship between disarmament and development,

Noting with satisfaction that the Secretary-General, pursuant to paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Final Document, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, has initiated a study on the relationship between disarmament and development,

Re-emphasizing that one of the principal aims of the study should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures,

1. *Takes note* of the organizational report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;

2. *Appeals* to all Governments seriously to consider giving, as a supplement to the financial resources allocated for the study in the regular budget of the United Nations, voluntary contributions to the Disarmament Project Fund or to finance, on a voluntary basis, and in domestic

⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 84th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th, 52nd and 53rd meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

currency, where appropriate, national research projects, in order to ensure the total resources necessary to carry out the study;

3. *Appeals* to Governments to make available data and information relevant to a meaningful completion of the study;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session an item entitled "Interim report of the Secretary-General with respect to the study on the relationship between disarmament and development"

The second aspect of the study to be considered concerned the proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development. As mentioned earlier, the establishment of such a fund has been proposed by France at the tenth special session of the General Assembly. In the Final Document of that session the Assembly had included this proposal in paragraph 125, which listed a number of proposals that deserved to be studied further and more thoroughly. With regard to that particular question, a draft resolution sponsored by 40 countries was submitted to the First Committee. It was introduced by the representative of France on 21 November 1978. The draft resolution, in essence, requested that the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development include on its agenda the question of the establishment of an international disarmament fund for development. The draft resolution was adopted by consensus by the First Committee on 27 November 1978.

Both the United States and the USSR indicated that their participation in the consensus was subject to certain reservations. The United States said that some features of the proposal concerning the fund did not appear to be feasible at the present time and that it also had serious reservations as to its desirability in principle. The Soviet Union indicated that it was resolutely opposed to the idea that the objectives of development should be financed merely through contributions of the militarily most prominent States and that it participated in the consensus on the understanding that that viewpoint would be taken into account by the Group of Governmental Experts.

On 14 December 1978, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution without a vote as resolution 33/71 I. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Aware of the disproportion existing between the resources allocated to expenditure on armaments and those devoted to development assistance,

Convinced of the need to take concrete measures reflecting the desire of Member States to encourage the allocation to development assistance of the resources released by reductions in expenditure on armaments,

Recalling the concerns expressed in that regard by it at its tenth special session, in particular concerning the harmful economic and social consequences of pursuing the arms race,

Noting that a study on the relationship between disarmament and development has been initiated by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, contained in resolution S-10/2,

Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, for its consideration, the proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development which was submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session.

Conclusion

By the end of 1978, it was apparent that the initiation of a study on the relationship between disarmament and development was among the more concrete achievements of the tenth special session. The fact that the mandate for the study stresses the need to produce results that would provide a basis for concrete policy measures concerning the redeployment of resources from military purposes to economic and social development undoubtedly contributed strongly to the widespread support for it. Similarly, the expectation that such results would in fact emerge was presumably strengthened by the fact that the study would be based to a significant extent on original research explicitly commissioned for the purpose.

Studies, information and training

Introduction

SINCE THE EARLY 1960S studies on disarmament and arms limitation matters have been made under the auspices of the United Nations for the purposes of facilitating better understanding of the problems of the arms race and of disarmament and to give assistance and support to the negotiating process through an analysis of specific matters related to negotiations in progress.¹ To permit the United Nations to draw on as wide as possible a range of expertise and political outlook, most of the studies have been made with the assistance of consultant or governmental experts appointed by the Secretary-General or by experts appointed directly by Governments. In some cases the United Nations Secretariat has made analyses having the characteristics of studies.²

The interest in such studies has been growing in the past several years. In 1976, the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament considered the question of additional functions the Organization should assume in that context and recommended, *inter alia*, that the General Assembly should consider making increased use of in-depth studies of the arms race, disarmament and related matters on an *ad hoc* basis conducted by the Secretary-General with the assistance of qualified experts nominated by Governments and with assistance, whenever appropriate, from other sources.³ With regard to information, the *Ad Hoc* Committee recommended that the United Nations publish a Disarmament Yearbook and consider publishing a periodical to present, in highly readable form, current facts and developments in the field of disarmament and contain, *inter alia*, summaries of United Nations and CCD studies. It also recommended that the Secretariat continue to disseminate information on disarmament to the general public.⁴ Those recommendations were subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 31/90 of 14 December 1976.

¹ The purposes of the studies were so defined by Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, in *Disarmament*, vol. 1, No. 1, May 1978 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.3).

² See A/33/312, paras. 4 and 5 and annex.

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Supplement No. 36 (A/31/36)*, para. 18, "Agreed proposals", para. 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, "Agreed proposals", para. 7.

The topic of United Nations studies on disarmament continued to take a prominent place during the preparations for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as the special session itself. The discussions on the subject were both substantive and procedural. On the one hand a number of delegations made proposals for various studies which, in their opinion, should be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations as part of the programme of action to be adopted at the special session. On the other hand, the debates on disarmament machinery became the framework for discussion of the manner in which a programme of disarmament studies could be prepared, which led to the request to the Secretary-General to set up an advisory board to advise him on various aspects of such studies and related matters.

With regard to information, a number of proposals were put forward during the preparatory stages of the special session which led to the General Assembly, at the session itself, adopting several measures designed to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, including the intensification of activities in the area of dissemination of information, particularly those of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and UNESCO, designed to encourage or facilitate study and research. As for the wider promotion of professional expertise in disarmament, the significant development was the decision of the Assembly, on the basis of a Nigerian proposal, to establish a programme of fellowships in disarmament, particularly for the benefit of developing countries to help ensure that all Member States might participate equally effectively in disarmament matters.

Consideration by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Most of the substantive consideration of the question of disarmament studies in connexion with the special session took place at the session itself, but the Preparatory Committee also dealt briefly with both the procedural aspects and specific subjects to be dealt with. Several working papers proposed elements for inclusion in the programme of action and the machinery sections of the final document or documents. Some of them referred in general terms to studies and the need to equip the United Nations Secretariat with the means necessary to meet requirements in that area.⁵ Others contained substantive proposals. Japan proposed that comprehensive studies should be made on the international transfer of conventional weapons and on the limitation of conventional armaments and armed forces, according to regions;⁶ Sweden, *inter alia*, proposed an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and

⁵ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. VI, documents A/AC.187/96, A/AC.187/103, para.1, and A/AC.187/110. (For a more detailed review of these documents as well as those cited in footnotes 6 to 9 and 11, see also chapter I above, pages 13 to 24.)

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. V, document A/AC.187/86.

development;⁷ a working paper submitted by a group of Western States⁸ included a list of studies to be carried out with the aim of facilitating further disarmament and security measures; and Austria submitted a working paper suggesting an in-depth study of a number of aspects of verification.⁹

In the discussions in the Preparatory Committee¹⁰ the delegation of Austria raised the possibility of setting up an advisory board, elected on a basis of rotation, to provide guidance in connexion with expert studies, and that of France proposed the establishment of an international institute for research on disarmament whose purpose would be to make available to the international community technical studies on programmes of disarmament. France included that proposal in a working paper.¹¹

In his statement at the opening meeting of the special session,¹² the Secretary-General referred to the subject of disarmament studies in the following words:

The more active involvement in the field of disarmament of a large number of medium-sized and small nations will place increasing demands on the United Nations for research, information and documentation. If a gradual convergence of views on disarmament measures is to be achieved, it will require objective and authoritative information and analysis readily available to Governments and public groups. If we in the United Nations are to accomplish this, we shall have to draw on as wide a range of expertise as possible. I have on a number of occasions in the past convened groups of expert consultants at the request of the General Assembly to study specific aspects of disarmament. These expert groups have served us well in providing a basis for a common understanding based on a sober assessment of facts. In this connexion I consider it important to develop a comprehensive approach to international study in the field of arms control and disarmament. One means of achieving effective utilization of international expertise would be through the appointment of an advisory board composed of eminent persons. Such bodies have functioned effectively in other areas of United Nations activities, providing governmental organs and the Secretariat with useful advice on the range of issues under consideration. I would very much welcome the contribution that could be made by such a board and hope the Assembly will consider approving the establishment of such a group.

Subsequently, the delegations of Austria, Egypt, India, Mexico, Norway and the United Kingdom submitted a proposal to establish an advisory board of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General on all aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms control.¹³ The sponsors of the proposal pointed out that it was likely that the Secretary-General would be requested to undertake a considerable number of studies which would take several years to complete and that several

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/95.

⁸ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/96.

⁹ *Ibid.*, document A/AC.187/101; subsequently the Preparatory Committee requested the Secretariat to prepare a background paper on the subject of verification (*ibid.*, document A/AC.187/109, and chapter I above, page 23).

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 1* (A/S-10/1), vol. VII, 4th to 42nd meetings; see, in particular, the 32nd and 33rd meetings, paras. 36 and 4 respectively.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. VI, document A/AC.187/105.

¹² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st meeting.

¹³ A/S-10/AC.1/29, annex.

of those studies would probably lead to further in-depth inquiries. A comprehensive approach to the planning of international disarmament studies therefore seemed important. In order to assure the effective utilization of international expertise, it was necessary, in the view of the sponsoring delegations, for the Secretary-General to appoint an advisory board of eminent persons to give advice and assistance in the planning and execution of the studies. That would be a logical organizational response to the multitude of requirements designed to put such studies in an integrated and operative frame, and conducive to facilitating the study activities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, taking due account of the various political, socio-economic and regional considerations involved. The board should have the mandate of proposing and periodically adjusting a comprehensive programme of studies for two to three years ahead, taking into consideration what already has been achieved in the field of disarmament studies. It should further have the task of proposing the framework and content of subjects to be studied, the approach to and organization of the studies, and the presentation of relevant results. The board should also be in a position to initiate proposals for new studies.

Statements in favour of the establishment of the advisory board were made by a number of States speaking in the plenary meetings,¹⁴ including Austria, Chile, Guyana, Liberia, Nepal, Norway, Oman and the United Republic of Cameroon. The delegation of Mauritius commented that the advisory board could function as an institution for transforming the "raw material" of positions adopted at one session of the General Assembly into reports for the next session. In the opinion of that delegation it was necessary to create an institution with which the General Assembly could enter into a dialogue from which a consensus of views on problems faced and the strategy to deal with them could emerge; the advisory board should thus function as a dialogue partner to the General Assembly. Accordingly it should be similar enough to the Assembly to permit a genuine dialogue and differ enough to make that dialogue dialectical. The board should thus be smaller than the Assembly with weight being placed on expertise, but nevertheless politically representative and sufficiently permanent, and it should have a purely advisory status.

In the *Ad Hoc* Committee¹⁵ statements were made, among others, by Sri Lanka and Venezuela. The representative of Sri Lanka submitted a working paper¹⁶ which referred to the proposal, introduced by his Foreign Minister, for a world disarmament authority to be established under the aegis of the United Nations which might also assume the functions proposed by the Secretary-General for his advisory board in the area of disarmament studies. Venezuela expressed the opinion that the proposal on the establishment of an advisory board was similar to the proposal of France on the establishment of a research

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 25th and 27th meetings.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Tenth Special Session, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle, corrigendum*.

¹⁶ A/S-10/AC.1/9/Add.1, annex.

institute for disarmament and that of Uruguay on the establishment of a polemological institute.

The French proposal referred to above was contained in a memorandum submitted by the French Government.¹⁷ It called for the establishment, within the framework of the United Nations, of an international institute for disarmament research with the basic task of implementing a continuing programme of theoretical and applied research on questions relating to disarmament and international security. It would conduct its work in an independent scientific manner and, whereas its Executive Director would be appointed by a board of trustees who in turn would be appointed by the Secretary-General, the institute would have complete scientific autonomy. It would engage in research that was both more technical in nature and more future-oriented than that carried out by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, whose work would, in the French view, be related principally to ongoing negotiations. The institute proposed in the French document would be financed in a manner similar to UNITAR in order to preserve its independence.

Close to the end of the special session, France submitted a draft resolution by which the General Assembly would take note of the proposal for the establishment of an international research institute and would request the Secretary-General to appoint a group of qualified governmental experts entrusted with the work of preparing a report on the conditions under which such an institute might be established.

The proposal of Uruguay,¹⁸ introduced by the Minister for External Relations of that country during the general debate, called for the establishment of a polemological agency for peace and conflict research. The agency would, *inter alia*, make in-depth studies on the subjects of peace and aggressivity. The proposal also foresaw the establishment of a network for the collection of data on conflict situations and the elaboration of forecasting methods.

With regard to information, many speakers, including the representatives of Australia, Chile, Guyana, Kuwait, Mongolia, Morocco, Norway, Thailand and Venezuela, referred in one context or another to the need for greater public awareness of the complexities of disarmament questions and the importance of mobilizing public opinion in support of disarmament. Ethiopia and Guyana, among others, also noted the need for the General Assembly to be adequately informed of developments. Saudi Arabia stressed the importance of the public being aware of the horrors of war through such media as the film on that subject which it had proposed and other ideas, including the use of peace posters and enlisting the support of mothers.

Nigeria referred to its proposal for a programme to provide in-depth knowledge on disarmament to public officials as an additional step to those stemming from the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament. It noted that developing countries were short of such expertise and proposed that under the programme

¹⁷ A/S-10/AC.1/8, annex.

¹⁸ A/S-10/AC.1/25, annex.

the General Assembly would award about 20 scholarships annually of up to six months' duration, for a course consisting of lectures, seminars and on-the-job observation, the cost to be included in the regular budget of the United Nations. In its proposal on the subject,¹⁹ Nigeria stressed that in the past not all Member States had been able to participate equally effectively in the consideration of disarmament issues and noted that replies to questionnaires sent by the Secretary-General in compliance with resolutions had often been very few, particularly from the developing countries. It felt that its proposal represented an investment by the international community which was worth making and urged the support of all for it.

The general topic of disarmament studies and information and related matters was discussed intensively in the various drafting groups, in connexion with both the programme of action and the machinery. With regard to the programme of action there emerged consensus on a general endorsement of disarmament studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations. It was reflected in the Final Document, as follows:

96. Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.

The discussion on the various proposals for specific studies, to which brief reference is made below, illustrated the need, mentioned by the Secretary-General in his opening address at the special session, to follow a systematic approach in establishing what studies should be undertaken. The awareness of that need was set out in the Final Document, as follows:

98. At its thirty-third and subsequent sessions the General Assembly should determine the specific guidelines for carrying out studies, taking into account the proposals already submitted including those made by individual countries at the special session, as well as other proposals which can be introduced later in this field. In doing so, the Assembly would take into consideration a report on these matters prepared by the Secretary-General.

The consensus achieved with regard to information activities was reflected in several paragraphs in the Programme of Action, as follows:

99. In order to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted.

100. Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority to the preparation and distribution of printed and audio-visual material relating to the danger represented by the armaments race as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures.

101. In particular, publicity should be given to the Final Document of the tenth special session.

102. The General Assembly proclaims the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.

103. To encourage study and research on disarmament, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of information concerning the armaments race and disarmament. Also, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

¹⁹ A/S-10/AC.1/11, annex.

Organization is urged to intensify its activities aimed at facilitating research and publications on disarmament, related to its fields of competence, especially in developing countries, and should disseminate the results of such research.

104. Throughout this process of disseminating information about developments in the disarmament field of all countries, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer liaison between them and the United Nations.

105. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

106. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

107. The General Assembly welcomes the initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education and, in this connexion, urges that organization to step up its programme aimed at the development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study through the preparation, *inter alia*, of teachers' guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials. Member States should take all possible measures to encourage the incorporation of such materials in the curricula of their educational institutes.

The endorsement by consensus of the Nigerian initiative was reflected in the next paragraph:

108. In order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries, the General Assembly decides to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament. The Secretary-General, taking into account the proposal submitted to the special session, should prepare guidelines for the programme. He should also submit the financial requirements of twenty fellowships to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations, bearing in mind the savings that can be made within the existing budgetary appropriations.

Emphasis was also placed on the research and information functions of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and there was recognition of the consequent need to strengthen the resources of the Centre, as well as of the valuable contribution that other United Nations bodies and non-governmental organizations, particularly research institutes, could make in this regard. That recognition was reflected in the Machinery section of the Final Document, as follows:

123. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by this special session, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened and its research and information functions accordingly extended. The Centre should also take account fully of the possibilities offered by specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament. The Centre should also increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions in view of the valuable role they play in the field of disarmament. This role could be encouraged also in other ways that may be considered as appropriate.

In a similar context, endorsement was also given to the Secretary-General's proposal for the establishment of an advisory board, as follows:

124. The Secretary-General is requested to set up an advisory board of eminent persons, selected on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation, to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies.

With regard to the proposed international research institute, it was not possible to arrive at a consensus in the course of the special session and France, in a spirit of conciliation, agreed not to press to the vote the draft resolution it had submitted on the subject. The proposal was included, however, in paragraph 125 of the Final Document as one of those that deserved to be studied further and more thoroughly, and France reserved its right to present it for consideration at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. Uruguay's proposal concerning the establishment of a polemological institute was also included in paragraph 125 of the Final Document.

A consensus also emerged on a number of the proposals concerning specific studies and was reflected in several paragraphs of the Programme of Action, as follows:

93. .

(c) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

94. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action.

95. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, and the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels.

. . .

97. The Secretary-General shall, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, continue the study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security requested in Assembly resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977 and submit it to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

Finally, other proposals put forward for consideration which related to specific studies and information and on which a consensus did not emerge were listed in paragraph 125 as follows:

125. . . .

(d) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency;

(k) Proposal by Ireland for a study of the possibility of establishing a system of incentives to promote arms control and disarmament;

(q) Proposal by Norway entitled "Evaluation of the impact of new weapons on arms control and disarmament efforts";

(s) Memorandum from Liberia entitled "Declaration of a new philosophy on disarmament";

(cc) Proposal by Austria for the transmission to Member States of working paper A/AC.187/109 and the ascertainment of their views on the subject of verification;

(gg) Proposal by the Netherlands for a study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization.²⁰

Consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session

At the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, United Nations activities relating to studies and information continued to figure prominently in the consideration of disarmament questions.²¹

During the debate in the First Committee on the agenda item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session"²² (see chapter III above), considerable attention was devoted to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, envisaged in paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the special session.

In that connexion the Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General concerning United Nations studies on disarmament.²³ In his report the Secretary-General outlined the type of studies that had been carried out in the past under the auspices of the United Nations, the purposes that disarmament studies might serve and the contribution that various United Nations bodies, non-governmental organizations and research institutions could make to the work of the United Nations in that sphere. With respect to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, the Secretary-General pointed out that it was still being constituted and that its first meeting would be held later during the

²⁰ A/S-10/AC.1/7, annex; A/S-10/AC.1/21, annex; A/S-10/31, annex; A/S-10/35, annex; A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 113; and A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 186, respectively.

²¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th, 84th and 86th meetings.

²² *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th, 52nd and 53rd meetings, particularly 4th to 19th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

²³ A/33/312.

Assembly session, following which a further report to the Assembly would be submitted (see page 461 below). It was recalled that, in his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General had stated that, if a comprehensive approach to disarmament were to be successful, it should encompass not only the deliberative and negotiating levels, but also supporting activities, such as research, study and information. He had also pointed out that the Advisory Board should develop a programme of studies responsive to the requirements imposed by the Programme of Action on disarmament.

The creation of the Advisory Board was generally welcomed. For instance, Czechoslovakia commented that it had looked forward with hope to the Board's establishment and trusted that it would help to increase further the effectiveness of United Nations activities in the field of disarmament studies. France considered that the creation of the Board was timely, considering the number of studies that progress in disarmament negotiations would undoubtedly generate. Bangladesh fully endorsed the establishment of the Board. Mauritius, recalling its statement at the special session, expressed its satisfaction at the Board's establishment.

Some countries underlined the importance of the Board for enhancing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The Philippines, for instance, said that with the establishment of a board of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General on aspects of studies to be made, and the mandate for the further strengthening of the Centre for Disarmament, the United Nations was in a much better position than previously to contribute creatively to the achievement of disarmament. Pakistan, considering that it was apparent that in the coming years the United Nations would have to play a central and catalytic role in promoting the disarmament process and that it should be provided with the capacity to discharge those responsibilities, attached importance to the work of the Advisory Board and said that it would not fail to make an active and constructive contribution to the Board's work.

A number of countries commented on the work to be carried out by the Advisory Board, dwelling in particular on the elaboration of a programme of studies in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. In the view of Norway, the Advisory Board might be entrusted, *inter alia*, with the task of suggesting priority areas for studies and giving advice to the Secretariat on the carrying out of studies. It supported the suggestion of the Secretary-General that the Board should develop a programme of studies responsive to the requirements imposed by the Programme of Action adopted at the special session and considered that the studies conducted under the auspices of the United Nations should primarily be action-oriented. Austria, considering that a number of valuable proposals for the carrying out of specific studies had already been put forward in the course of the special session and that those suggestions, as well as new proposals that might be made, could form the basis for the elaboration of a comprehensive and integrated programme of studies, said it believed that such a programme would have to establish priorities and ensure that the studies would be carried out in the most efficient manner. It held that the newly constituted Advisory Board should at its first meeting focus its attention on the preparation of such a programme. Kuwait

was of the opinion that concrete and specific guidelines for disarmament studies were essential to obtain optimal results and that an Assembly with 150 members could hardly agree on a detailed programme of disarmament studies. It welcomed the decision to set up an Advisory Board to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies, since, in its view, the Board, with its limited membership, would be in a better position to deal with the matter than larger United Nations bodies.

There were comments also on the kinds of studies that should be undertaken and the way in which they should be carried out. For instance, Canada, pointing to the factors of cost and available means and to the consequent importance of priorities, suggested that study priorities might be related to actual work now being done, especially the ongoing negotiations and topics which it was agreed might form the basis of further negotiations. Those kinds of studies, in its view, were perhaps best done by "experts", usually nominated by Governments. At the same time, it considered that the very valuable work done by the Secretariat on the background of various issues and developments should continue and even be expanded as resources permitted. It also believed it might be possible to assimilate certain proposals within the terms of reference of current studies—for example, proposals relating to funds to be established for economic development purposes might be considered by the Group of Governmental Experts on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development. Finally, in Canada's opinion, States could make a useful contribution by initiating their own studies, to be shared later with other States and with the United Nations.

The functions of the Advisory Board were also discussed in connexion with proposals for specific studies. For instance, in the case of the new study on nuclear weapons some countries considered it would be useful for the Secretary-General to seek the advice of the Board in conducting it (see chapter VII above, pages 181 to 183).

Important questions bearing on the function of the Advisory Board also came to the fore during the consideration in the First Committee of Saudi Arabia's proposal for the production of a film on the horrors of war. On 29 November, the United States proposed that the Advisory Board be requested to give its opinion on the advisability of making such a film, a proposal that was endorsed by France and the Soviet Union. Opposing such a course of action, the representatives of Argentina and Mexico contended that it was not within the competence of the Board, as it was defined in paragraph 124 of the Final Document, to pronounce itself on the production of films. The Committee then decided to seek the opinion of the Legal Counsel on the question. The Legal Counsel gave his opinion on 30 November, saying that the film could come within a broad meaning of the word "study". In the ensuing discussion, the representatives of Argentina and Mexico pointed out that a decision to request the Board's opinion on the advisability of making the film had implications that went far beyond the immediate question at issue, for what was involved was the possibility of the Advisory Board acting as a censor of

proposals made by Member States, a function that was not within the Board's mandate. The proposal to refer to the Board the question of whether the film should be made was defeated by 62 votes to 33, with 22 abstentions. The proposal to make the film was then approved (see chapter IV above). The decision concerning the proper functions of the Board was confirmed at the following meeting of the First Committee in connexion with India's proposal that the Advisory Board be requested to give an opinion on the study on regional aspects of disarmament envisaged in the draft resolution initiated by Belgium (see chapter XX above). Belgium said that the Board could comment on the study at any time and that such comments would be welcomed but, recalling the discussion at the previous meeting, held that it was not within the Board's mandate to pass judgement on the advisability of studies proposed by Member States in the General Assembly. Thereupon the First Committee proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, which was adopted by 79 votes to none, with 40 abstentions.

The General Assembly adopted two resolutions which entrusted specific tasks to the Advisory Board. One originated in the French initiative put forward at the special session for the creation of an international institute for disarmament research within the framework of the United Nations. At the thirty-third session a considerable number of countries joined France in sponsoring a draft resolution on the subject (see chapter III above) which was adopted by consensus as resolution 33/71 K, paragraph 2 of which reads as follows:

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek in this regard, *inter alia*, the advice of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, established in implementation of paragraph 124 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in view of the competence to be assigned to that body in respect of a programme of studies on disarmament.

The second resolution originated in a proposal by Liberia concerning the new philosophy on disarmament, originally made at the thirty-first session and subsequently pursued at the special session (see chapter III above). It was adopted by consensus as resolution 33/71 N. It made reference to the Board in the operative part as follows:

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, to study ways and means whereby the objectives in paragraph 1 above can be accomplished and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session;

3. *Expresses the hope* that the Advisory Board may be able to report results, as appropriate, in time for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session.

Virtually all references to the subject of dissemination of information in the First Committee debate were along the same lines as those made at the special session: the importance of an informed public mobilized in support of disarmament throughout the world was very widely recognized. The continuation of efforts to mobilize public opinion in accordance with the concepts set out in the Final Document was therefore encouraged. Moreover, a number of delegations, including those of Argentina, Bangladesh, Kuwait, Mongolia, the Sudan and the United Kingdom, took specific notice of the participation of non-governmental organizations in the special session and encouraged in-

creased association between such organizations and research institutions and the United Nations.

The General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions relating to specific studies and to the dissemination of information.

Some of these are discussed in other chapters of the present *Yearbook*, including resolution 33/91 D on the study on nuclear weapons (see chapter VII above), resolution 33/71 M on the study on the relationship between disarmament and development (see chapter XXIV above), resolution 33/91 E on the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament (see chapter XX above), and resolution 33/71 J on the monitoring of disarmament agreements and strengthening of international security, which called for a study on the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency (see chapter III above). Finally, resolution 33/91 I was adopted, by which the Assembly again requested the continuation of the study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, as it had directed in paragraph 97 of the Final Document of the special session (see page 454 above); that study is discussed below, in a separate section of the present chapter.

The importance of the information aspect was also recognized, *inter alia*, in resolution 33/71 D concerning activities and programmes to be carried out in connexion with Disarmament Week as proclaimed by the General Assembly at its special session in paragraph 102 of the Final Document (see chapter III above); the activities carried out in that connexion in 1978 are outlined in annex I to the present chapter. Also, in paragraph 3 of resolution 33/71 F, on the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session, the Assembly noted with satisfaction that progress had been or was being made in the adoption of measures aimed at promoting studies, information, teaching and training on disarmament (see chapter III above).

The question of dissemination of information was dealt with specifically in a draft resolution initiated by Venezuela and sponsored in its final form by Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Liberia, Mal., Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Sweden, the United Republic of Cameroon, Uruguay, Venezuela and, subsequently, the Philippines.

In introducing the draft resolution, Venezuela stated that the sponsors considered education, information and all means available to peoples and Governments to be essential for a better understanding of the arms race. They therefore attached vital importance to the role to be played by Member States, the specialized agencies and IAEA, non-governmental organizations and research institutions, and noted that a properly informed public could aid in solving certain problems affecting contemporary society. The proposal was intended to set in motion the machinery needed to carry out a systematic information campaign.

The draft resolution was adopted by consensus by the First Committee at its 52nd meeting and by the General Assembly at its 84th meeting as resolution 33/71 G. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Aware of the grave dangers inherent in the arms race,

Convinced that it is essential that both the Governments and the peoples of the world should be better informed of the dangers of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and of the efforts made to contain it,

Recalling that, in paragraph 99 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, it recognized that, in order to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament, concrete measures must be taken to increase the dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament,

1. *Urges* Member States, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as non-governmental organizations and concerned research institutes, to promote education and information programmes relating to the arms race and disarmament;

2. *Requests* Member States to report to the General Assembly, through the Secretary-General, on their activities in the field of dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament;

3. *Welcomes* the initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education and, in that connexion, invites the Director-General of that organization to report to the General Assembly, at its thirty-fourth session, on the preparations for that event;

4. *Requests* the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, in preparing the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* and the disarmament periodical, to take account of the recommendations of the General Assembly regarding the form and content of such publications;

5. *Further requests* the United Nations Centre for Disarmament to increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions, in accordance with paragraph 123 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and, after appropriate consultations, to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on other ways of encouraging the role of such organizations and institutions in the field of disarmament;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to include in any studies on arms limitation and disarmament prepared under the auspices of the United Nations a summary of those studies, drafted in easily understood language, to facilitate their dissemination among the general public;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities of co-ordinating the public information activities relating to disarmament of all specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Strong support was expressed in the First Committee for the implementation of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament as agreed to by the General Assembly at the special session and outlined by means of guidelines in the report of the Secretary-General.²⁴ That support came not only from a great number of developing countries of various regions, but also from some Western ones. Canada, for instance, accepted the guidelines recommended and noted that an enlightened public opinion depended upon availability of adequate information and experience in the process of negotiations. France stated that the implementation of the fellowship programme would increase the number of qualified experts on disarmament, particularly from the developing countries. Cuba and Finland, welcoming the establishment of the programme, expressed views similar to that of France.

The draft resolution on the fellowships programme was sponsored by 34 developing countries and Sweden. In introducing the draft, the representative of Nigeria, noting the clear indications of support for the programme, stated that it was no longer necessary to seek justification for it. He stated that the

²⁴ A/33/305.

medium-sized and small States which made up the majority of the membership of the United Nations would benefit greatly from the programme and added that the aim of the resolution was to remove the problem of many States which were unable to follow disarmament discussions because, *inter alia*, of the technical nature of those discussions. Before the vote in the First Committee, Morocco proposed an amendment by which paragraph 3, calling for a report to the General Assembly on the implementation of the programme, was added to the draft. The resolution was adopted by consensus by the Committee and by the Assembly at its 84th meeting as resolution 33/71 E; it reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision at the tenth special session to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the guidelines for the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament,

1. *Approves* the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make adequate arrangements in order that the programme of fellowships on disarmament may be commenced during the first half of 1979;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a report on the implementation of the fellowships programme.

First session of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies held its first session from 14 to 22 November 1978 at United Nations Headquarters in New York. The session was attended by 26 members (see annex II to the present chapter). Mr. Agha Shahi, Advisor on Foreign Affairs to the President of Pakistan, chaired the session. The session was opened by the Secretary-General who outlined the mandate, clarified the immediate and long-term tasks of the Board, and stressed the importance of developing a comprehensive approach to studies on disarmament and the need of relating them to the strategy for disarmament and to negotiations on the implementation of that strategy. As recorded in the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly regarding the first session of the Advisory Board,²⁵ the Board attached special importance to the Secretary-General's remark that its work could have a stimulating effect on current and future disarmament negotiations. It also attached particular importance to his comments regarding the independence of the Board and its freedom to conduct discussions on any aspect of its work, without publicity and without the constraint of formal decision making. The Board noted the Secretary-General's view that it might, *inter alia*, make recommendations for updating or complementing earlier United Nations studies and for the investigation of areas which had not been adequately studied so far. The Board further took note of certain specific functions that the Secretary-General envisaged it would perform:

²⁵ A/33/312/Add.1.

(a) Defining the purposes of disarmament studies in the context of the guidelines laid down in the Final Document of the tenth special session;

(b) Elaborating a comprehensive programme for such studies in order to support the work of the negotiating and the deliberative organs in the field of disarmament;

(c) Helping in the better utilization of possible contributions by specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on this subject;

(d) Drawing together the expertise of research institutes and non-governmental organizations that are concerned with various aspects of the problem.

In addition, the Board noted that in the future the Secretary-General might wish to submit for its consideration and comments reports on studies on specific subjects prepared under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Board discussed the purposes to be served by the United Nations studies in the area of disarmament and arms limitation, and agreed that they included:

(a) Assisting in ongoing negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation;

(b) Assisting in the identification of specific topics with a view to initiating new negotiations;

(c) Providing the general background to current deliberations and negotiations;

(d) Assessing, and promoting public awareness of, the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race and its impact both on international security and development.

It was agreed that studies might meet several of those purposes at once and complement each other.

At its first session, the Board concentrated in particular on the way in which it would approach its work. It had a preliminary discussion regarding a comprehensive programme of study and decided to continue at its later sessions consideration of the substantive areas which disarmament studies should cover, as well as the criteria for the selection of such studies and the guidelines for their implementation in the context of its elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament studies.

In connexion with the question, referred to above (pages 457-458), of the appropriateness of the Board expressing its opinion on proposals made by Member States in the General Assembly, the Board stated that it was not in a position to give a considered opinion with regard to proposals for studies currently under consideration by the Assembly. The Board noted that such studies, if approved by the Assembly, as well as other studies which were already under way, would be continuing and that it could give its view subsequently. The Board specifically agreed that it was within its mandate to suggest subjects for United Nations disarmament studies.

Study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security

On the basis of an initiative of Cyprus, the General Assembly, at its thirty-second session in 1977, adopted resolution 32/87 C by which it recognized the close interrelationship between disarmament and international security and requested the Secretary-General to initiate a study of that question and submit a progress report thereon to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament. The resultant report of the Secretary-General²⁶ indicated in general terms the nature of the relationship between international security and disarmament and contained a preliminary examination of how the linkage between international security and disarmament had been approached in the United Nations with a view to drawing attention to some of the main issues that had arisen in that connexion. It also attempted to explore, tentatively, the implications of the interrelationship and to indicate possible objectives of further study.

In the body of the report, the Secretary-General stressed that disarmament and international security had been a primary concern of the United Nations throughout its history. The relationship between the two parts of the question, he said, could be summarized under three headings: first, arms acquisition since the Second World War had become a major source of insecurity; secondly, progress in disarmament would increase the scope for international co-operation in all fields, thus contributing to consolidation and expansion of détente; and, thirdly, disarmament would facilitate solution of other security-related problems, including those connected with development and the establishment of a new international economic order. The prominent place given in the Charter of the United Nations to questions of international security and the international security system was particularly noted. The responsibilities and powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly for arms regulation and disarmament were also noted, and an interrelationship between questions of security and questions of disarmament was affirmed. In an over-all review of the disarmament efforts of the United Nations, the report drew attention to the fact that a great many disarmament resolutions took into account related questions concerning the maintenance of security of States. It referred to such ideas as establishment of a system of collective security, balanced reduction of forces, and international control mechanisms. Moreover, the disarmament discussions in the United Nations had indicated an awareness that peace-keeping in its widest sense would assume central importance during and after a planned disarmament process.

The implications of the partial measures of disarmament, arms limitation and military restraint so far agreed upon, as well as of measures undertaken, *inter alia*, to develop friendly relations among nations and reduce tensions, were also analysed briefly in a disarmament and security context.

²⁶ A/S-10/7.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General stated that, in view of the fundamental importance of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, the subject merited more thorough and systematic consideration. The concluding section also provided some idea of the areas which might be examined and the potential value of further work on the question.

In the discussions during the tenth special session of the Assembly²⁷ most speeches made some reference to the interrelationship between disarmament and international security and several took note of the report of the Secretary-General. President Kyprianou of Cyprus stated that his country was gratified to see progress on the study. One of the conclusions that should be drawn from the report of the Secretary-General, he said, as well as from previous reports prepared and submitted by the Secretary-General on armaments and disarmament, was that what was needed in order to halt and reverse the arms race was a clearer understanding of the issues involved in the various processes which sustained the arms race and determined its orientation. Disarmament could not be conceived, he held, without the exercise of a system of international security and legal order affording some guarantee of security. Nations could not easily abandon the arms competition in a vacuum and, more particularly, smaller countries which were in danger could not abandon their defence needs without some effective guarantee of their security through the United Nations. Cyprus indicated that it would propose a draft resolution asking for the continuation of the study with the participation of governmental experts representing all the regions of the world.

The Philippines saw the study as a necessary first step in what must inevitably become one of the most important searches in human history, namely, the search for the means to provide security for the human community as a whole. The Philippines stressed that if the special session should succeed only in one particular—in establishing clearly the interdependence between disarmament and the emergence of an alternative world security system—it would have succeeded in a most important respect. It suggested most urgently the formation of a working group to consider the report of the Secretary-General and to initiate an ongoing approach to the relationship between disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security. In the Final Document of the tenth special session, the General Assembly agreed by consensus to a number of paragraphs indicating the close link between disarmament and international security. The Declaration contains the following:

13. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual

²⁷ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1st to 27th meetings; *ibid.*, *Tenth Special Session, Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session*, 3rd to 16th meetings; and *ibid.*, *Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

34. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

The Programme of Action states:

97. The Secretary-General shall, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, continue the study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security requested in Assembly resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977 and submit it to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

Finally, two of the proposals listed in the Final Document as deserving further study relate to the over-all question:

125. . . .

(o) Proposal by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping;

(ff) Proposal by Italy on the role of the Security Council in the field of disarmament in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations;²⁸

At the thirty-third session of the General Assembly the question of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security was raised by a large number of States, both in plenary meetings and in the First Committee.²⁹ Bulgaria, for instance, held that it was necessary to do away once and for all with the anachronistic pattern of thinking on questions of peace and security as well as the outmoded stereotypes based on military superiority. There could be no doubt that the policy of the position of strength was not in keeping with the realities of the present-day world. Honduras believed it was necessary to pose a number of questions with respect to disarmament and security. The subject, it held, would be inexhaustible until such time as one could devise a formula that reconciled the two in order to achieve, not a balance of forces, but the binding commitment to renounce force on the basis of new international mechanisms and to limit the arms race. The Netherlands stressed that interdependence, security and disarmament were closely linked. In the face of the undiminished build-up of conventional and nuclear arms and of the interdependence of the political fate of nations, disarmament was a

²⁸ A/S-10/AC.1/26 and Corr. 1 and 2; and A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 179, respectively.

²⁹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings*, 6th to 34th and 86th meetings; *ibid.*, *Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 4th to 50th and 55th meetings; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

matter of compelling necessity, it stated, but there was also the question of security and here lay the dilemma in the question of disarmament. Turkey stated that peace and prosperity were indivisible, that questions of détente and disarmament could not be considered apart from their economic dimension, and that there could be no stability or security in a world of hunger, misery and injustice. Views along similar lines were expressed by a large number of countries from all regions of the world.

Cyprus referred to its initiative as incorporated in the Final Document of the special session, and expressed the hope that the group of consultant experts would be established quickly and the final report completed for the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly. It also noted that in its declaration referring to the arms race as a major threat to the survival of mankind, the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978 had stated with regard to the arms race that the situation was mainly due to the lack of adequate international security, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, and the failure to replace the outdated concept of balance of power as a means of security; Cyprus went on to stress that in its view the solution of the problem of the arms race and disarmament depended on the degree of compliance with the Charter concerning international security.

Cyprus also submitted the draft resolution on the item. In introducing it, it called attention to the heavy disarmament conference calendar for 1979, and proposed that the final report of the group of experts on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session and a further progress report provided for the thirty-fourth session. The First Committee and the General Assembly both adopted the draft resolution by consensus. The resolution, 33/91 I, reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it declared the decade of the 1970s a Disarmament Decade,

Reaffirming the purposes and objectives of the Decade,

Bearing in mind the close relations between disarmament, international security and development,

Recalling its resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977, in which it requested the Secretary-General to initiate a study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, parallel with the study on the interrelationship between disarmament and development,

Recalling also that, in paragraph 97 of its resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, to continue the study of the relationship between disarmament and international security,

1. *Considers* that the maintenance of international security through the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter is an essential objective of the Disarmament Decade;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to expedite action for the continuation of the study of the relationship between disarmament and international security, with a view to submitting a progress report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and the final report to the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

Conclusion

Studies on disarmament and arms limitation made under the auspices of the United Nations permit the international community to widen its background knowledge of a range of problems in this area. They thus constitute a positive factor in the realm of disarmament.

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies is an important tool in that context, designed primarily to develop a programme of studies and to advise on the direction of those studies. The Board's composition should permit it to give consideration to all relevant aspects of this field of activity of the United Nations. Because its membership provides expertise, at the highest official as well as academic levels, on the political and the technical aspects of the problems discussed, and reflects on a smaller scale the major regions and political trends of the General Assembly, the Board is in a unique position to advise on all the relevant aspects of the programme of studies and on topics related to research and study. The initial sessions of the Board indicate that its work may enhance the value of United Nations research and study on disarmament and arms limitation matters. The Board's work is still in an early stage and shows a potential for becoming an important factor in the disarmament activities of the United Nations.

The value of increased efforts to encourage dissemination of information on disarmament cannot immediately be assessed. However, there is every possibility that a better informed public would be able to contribute to the cause of disarmament both through Governments and by directing its own efforts in more appropriate directions.

The early accomplishments of the fellowship programme and of the group of experts studying the interrelationship between disarmament and international security will become clear through the relevant reports to the General Assembly.

[Annexes overleaf]

ANNEX I

Disarmament Week activities, 24 to 30 October 1978

Observance in the First Committee

The First Committee held a special meeting at Headquarters on 24 October to inaugurate Disarmament Week.^a A number of the messages read and statements made at that meeting are highlighted briefly in chapter IV above (see pages 116-117). The messages of the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly were made available throughout the world through United Nations Information Centres.

Observance in the United Nations system

Various United Nations organizations, specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and regional commissions expressed their support of Disarmament Week, and in several cases organized film programmes, exhibits and other activities. In letters to the Centre for Disarmament, officials of United Nations organizations referred to the relevance of disarmament to their particular concerns—such as improving health, protecting the environment, expanding food production or aiding children and refugees.

National observances

With less than four months between the end of the tenth special session and the start of Disarmament Week in 1978, there was little time to plan special events. A number of countries, however, marked the occasion, and arranged meetings and seminars; many non-governmental organizations also organized activities. Often the disarmament theme was incorporated in speeches, discussions and broadcasts marking United Nations Day.

Reports from Governments and United Nations Information Centres in many countries described activities, including meetings, newspaper and magazine articles, television and radio broadcasts, exhibits, distribution of United Nations materials and translations into local languages of the Final Document of the special session.

Materials utilized for Disarmament Week observances

The United Nations-produced film *Nuclear Countdown*—which traces the history of the nuclear arms race, exposes the resulting dangers to peace, and illustrates continuing international control efforts—was presented in Disarmament Week or United Nations Day programmes in various parts of the world, on television as well as at meetings.

The “mad perversion of priorities” in the world’s huge arms expenditures was the theme of a 60-second television “spot” film produced by the United Nations and seen by viewers in a number of countries. The film dramatizes the conflict between military spending and goals of the new international economic order.

Conclusion

The annual observance of Disarmament Week is expected to become one of the ways to focus public attention on the dangers of the arms race and the advantages of disarmament measures for development as well as for international peace and security. Through the support and co-operation of Governments, intergovernmental bodies and, especially, non-governmental organizations, it is hoped that Disarmament Week will have increasing impact each year in widening public understanding of the issues. Significant Disarmament Week activities could help combat apathetic or negative attitudes or acceptance of the arms race as inevitable.

^a See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, First Committee*, 13th meeting; and *ibid.*, *First Committee, Sessional Fascicle*, corrigendum.

ANNEX II

Membership of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies as at 22 November 1978

- Mr. Erich Bielka-Karltru, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria
- Mr. Frank Edmund Boaten, Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations
- Mr. Constantin Ene, Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations, Geneva, and representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
- Mr. Alfonso García Robles, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
- Mr. John Garnett, Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies, Department of International Politics, University of Aberystwyth, Wales, United Kingdom
- Mr. Enrique Gaviria Liévano, Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations
- Mr. Ignac Golob, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia
- Mr. A. C. S. Hameed, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka^a
- Mr. John W. Holmes, Professor of International Relations, University of Toronto and York University, Canada
- Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations
- Mr. Hussein Khallaf, Former Minister and Ambassador of Egypt
- Mr. Akira Matsui, Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
- Mr. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina and Chairman of the Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
- Mr. José Luis Pérez, Division for International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba
- Mr. Radha Krishna Ramphul, Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations
- Mr. Klaus Ritter, Director, Foundation of Science and Politics, Ebenhausen, Federal Republic of Germany
- Mr. Alexei Roschin, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
- Mr. Alejandro Rovira, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay
- Mr. Agha Shahi, Adviser on Foreign Affairs of Pakistan
- Mr. Pierre-Christian Taittinger, Senator and former Minister of the French Republic
- Mr. Oscar Vaernø, Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway
- Mr. Milous Vejvoda, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia
- Mr. Piero Vinci, Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations
- Mr. Jerome Wiesner, President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
- Mr. Eugeniusz Wyzner, Director, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland
- Mr. Alejandro D. Yango, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations
- Mr. Alexander Yankov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations

^a Unable to attend this session.

APPENDICES

Resolution adopted on the report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Tenth Special Session*

S-10/2. Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation inflicted by all wars,

Convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order,

Having resolved to lay the foundations of an international disarmament strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations should play a more effective role, aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Adopts the following Final Document of this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE TENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in

*See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Special Session, Supplement No. 4 (A/S-10/4)*, sect. III; for detailed research, the original document (A/S-10/4) should be referred to.

disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future.

2. Unless its avenues are closed, the contiqued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind.

3. The dynamic development of détente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all regions of the world, with the participation of all countries, would create conditions conducive to the efforts of States to end the arms race, which has engulfed the world, thus reducing the danger of war. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

4. The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further because the arms race is not diminishing but increasing and outstrips by far the efforts to curb it. While it is true that some limited agreements have been reached, "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" continue to elude man's grasp. Yet the implementation of such measures is urgently required. There has not been any real progress either that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Furthermore, it has not been possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and human, which are wasted on the unproductive and spiralling arms race and which should be made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a race "places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries."

5. The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.

6. Thus a powerful current of opinion has gradually formed, leading to the convening of what will go down in the annals of the United Nations as the first special session of the General Assembly devoted entirely to disarmament.

7. The outcome of this special session, whose deliberations have to a large extent been facilitated by the five sessions of the Preparatory Committee which preceded it, is the present Final Document. This introduction serves as a preface to the document which comprises also the following three sections: a Declaration, a Programme of Action and recommendations concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations.

8. While the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. Negotiations on the entire range of those issues should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere. The aim of the Declaration is to review and assess the existing situation, outline the objectives and the priority tasks and set forth fundamental principles for disarmament negotiations.

9. For disarmament—the aims and purposes of which the Declaration proclaims—to become a reality, it was essential to agree on a series of specific disarmament measures, selected by common accord as those on which there is a consensus to the effect that their subsequent realization in the short term appears to be feasible. There is also a need to prepare through agreed procedures a comprehensive disarmament programme. That programme, passing through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Procedures for watching over the fulfilment of the obligations thus assumed had also to be agreed upon. That is the purpose of the Programme of Action.

10. Although the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the "political will" of States, especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a significant role can also be played by the effective functioning of an appropriate international machinery designed to deal with the problems of disarmament in its various aspects. Consequently, it would be necessary that the two kinds of organs required to that end, the deliberative and the negotiating organs, have the appropriate organization and procedures that would be most conducive to obtaining constructive results. The last section of the Final Document, section IV, has been prepared with that end in view.

II. DECLARATION

11. Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and material resources. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds, to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war.

12. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the right of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council.

13. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

14. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security. Therefore the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, in accordance with its Charter, must be strengthened.

15. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may

develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

16. In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

17. Disarmament has thus become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community. No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of reduction of armaments. However, certain positive changes in international relations in some areas of the world provide some encouragement. Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and excluding particular areas from the arms race. The fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. For more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament.

18. Removing the threat of a world war—a nuclear war—is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.

19. The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The principal goals of disarmament are to ensure the survival of mankind and to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. Progress towards this objective requires the conclusion and implementation of agreements on the cessation of the arms race and on genuine measures of disarmament, taking into account the need of States to protect their security.

20. Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.

21. Along with these measures, agreements or other effective measures should be adopted to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority.

22. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and

conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the same principle, and taking into account the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations, and Co-operation among States, as well as the need of recipient States to protect their security.

23. Further international action should be taken to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be excessively injurious, cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects.

24. Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.

25. Negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament shall be guided by the fundamental principles set forth below.

26. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

27. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

28. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

29. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

30. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

31. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

32. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear

war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

33. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

34. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

35. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

37. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

38. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

39. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

40. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would also contribute to the attainment of that goal.

41. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements. There are certain negotiations on disarmament under way at different levels, the early and successful completion of which could contribute to limiting the arms race. Unilateral measures of arms limitation or reduction could also contribute to the attainment of that goal.

42. Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, Member States hereby declare that they will respect the objectives and principles stated above and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action set forth in section III below.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

43. Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of action on disarmament, in accordance with the

goals and principles established in the Declaration on disarmament. The present Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to giving the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

44. The present Programme of Action enumerates the specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress towards general and complete disarmament.

45. Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

46. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

47. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

48. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

49. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

50. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

(a) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;

(b) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(c) A comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

51. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the above aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context the negotiations now in progress on "a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty," should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date. All efforts should be made by the negotiating parties to achieve an agreement which, following endorsement by the General Assembly, could attract the widest possible adherence. In this context, various views were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States that, pending the conclusion of this treaty, the world community would be encouraged if all the nuclear-weapon States refrained from testing nuclear weapons. In this connexion, some nuclear-weapon States expressed different views.

52. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks. They are invited to transmit in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly. It should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant

reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms. It should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, of establishment of a world free of such weapons.

53. The process of nuclear disarmament described in the paragraph on this subject should be expedited by the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations and the urgent initiation of further negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States.

54. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

55. Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis.

56. The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

57. Pending the achievement of this goal, for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and of the use of force in international relations, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including the use of nuclear weapons.

58. In this context all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. All States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

59. In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure.

61. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

62. With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:

(a) To respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone:

(b) To refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

63. In the light of existing conditions, and without prejudice to other measures which may be considered in other regions, the following measures are especially desirable:

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed at the tenth special session on the adherence to it:

(b) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so:

(c) In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the Security Council of the United Nations shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(d) The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps, as described in the paragraphs above, required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions, where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation exists. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

(e) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from the objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

64. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In this regard, the General Assembly notes the proposals for the establishment of zones of peace, *inter alia*, in:

(a) South-East Asia where States in the region have expressed interest in the establishment of such a zone, in conformity with their views;

(b) The Indian Ocean, taking into account the deliberations of the General Assembly and its relevant resolutions and the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

65. It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament by urgent application of the measures outlined in the relevant paragraphs of this Final Document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

66. Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

67. Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

68. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing

countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

69. Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

70. In accordance with the principles and provisions of General Assembly resolution 32/50 of 8 December 1977, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

71. Efforts should be made to conclude the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation strictly in accordance with the objectives set out in the final communiqué of its Organizing Conference.

72. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

73. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

74. States should also consider the possibility of adhering to multilateral agreements concluded so far in the disarmament field which are mentioned below in this section.

75. The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represents one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification.

76. A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

77. In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

78. The Committee on Disarmament should keep under review the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use.

79. In order to promote the peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, the Committee on Disarmament is requested—in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and taking into account the proposals made during the 1977 Review Conference of the parties to that Treaty and any relevant technological developments—to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in that environment.

80. In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

81. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest mili-

tary arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.

82. In particular the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of all States with full respect for security interests and independence of States outside military alliances, by agreement on appropriate mutual reductions and limitations would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security. Current efforts to this end should be continued most energetically.

83. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include those in the following two paragraphs.

84. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

85. Consultations should be carried out among major arms supplier and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based in particular on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

86. The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, to be held in 1979, should seek agreement, in the light of humanitarian and military considerations, on the prohibition or restriction of use of certain conventional weapons including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. The Conference should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which were the subject-matter of previously conducted discussions.

87. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task.

88. The result of the Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.

89. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

90. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets, bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

92. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

93. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following, and other measures yet to be agreed upon, should be undertaken:

(a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(b) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament;

(c) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

94. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action.

95. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the *Ad Hoc* Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, and the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels.

96. Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.

97. The Secretary-General shall, with the assistance of consultant experts appointed by him, continue the study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security requested in Assembly resolution 32/87 C of 12 December 1977 and submit it to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

98. At its thirty-third and subsequent sessions the General Assembly should determine the specific guidelines for carrying out studies, taking into account the proposals already submitted including those made by individual countries at the special session, as well as other proposals which can be introduced later in this field. In doing so, the Assembly would take into consideration a report on these matters prepared by the Secretary-General.

99. In order to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted.

100. Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority to the preparation and distribution of

printed and audio-visual material relating to the danger represented by the armaments race as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures.

101. In particular, publicity should be given to the Final Document of the tenth special session.

102. The General Assembly proclaims the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.

103. To encourage study and research on disarmament, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of information concerning the armaments race and disarmament. Also, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is urged to intensify its activities aimed at facilitating research and publications on disarmament, related to its fields of competence, especially in developing countries, and should disseminate the results of such research.

104. Throughout this process of disseminating information about developments in the disarmament field of all countries, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer liaison between them and the United Nations.

105. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

106. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

107. The General Assembly welcomes the initiative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education and, in this connexion, urges that organization to step up its programme aimed at the development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study through the preparation, *inter alia*, of teachers' guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials. Member States should take all possible measures to encourage the incorporation of such materials in the curricula of their educational institutes.

108. In order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries, the General Assembly decides to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament. The Secretary-General, taking into account the proposal submitted to the special session, should prepare guidelines for the programme. He should also submit the financial requirements of twenty fellowships to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations, bearing in mind the savings that can be made within the existing budgetary appropriations.

109. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme.

110. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States

to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

111. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force. -

112. In addition to the several questions dealt with in this Programme of Action, there are a few others of fundamental importance, on which, because of the complexity of the issues involved and the short time at the disposal of the special session, it has proved impossible to reach satisfactory agreed conclusions. For those reasons they are treated only in very general terms and, in a few instances, not even treated at all in the Programme. It should be stressed, however, that a number of concrete approaches to deal with such questions emerged from the exchange of views carried out in the General Assembly which will undoubtedly facilitate the continuation of the study and negotiation of the problems involved in the competent disarmament organs.

IV. MACHINERY

113. While disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, has become a necessity for the survival of mankind and for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, little progress has been made since the end of the Second World War. In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved to enable implementation of the Programme of Action and help the United Nations to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament. In spite of the best efforts of the international community, adequate results have not been produced with the existing machinery. There is, therefore, an urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character. For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament—deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.

114. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field and, in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures—unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral—and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

115. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures. An item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" shall be included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly.

116. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

117. The First Committee of the General Assembly should deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions.

118. The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission originally established by resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, a Disarmament Commission, composed of all States Members of the United Nations, and decides that:

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission

should, *inter alia*, consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament;

(b) The Disarmament Commission shall function under the rules of procedure relating to the committees of the General Assembly with such modifications as the Commission may deem necessary and shall make every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on substantive issues be adopted by consensus;

(c) The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly and will submit for consideration by the Assembly at its thirty-third session a report on organizational matters; in 1979, the Disarmament Commission will meet for a period not exceeding four weeks, the dates to be decided at the thirty-third session of the Assembly;

(d) The Secretary-General shall furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the effective accomplishment of the Commission's functions.

119. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held on a date to be decided by the Assembly at its thirty-third session.

120. The General Assembly is conscious of the work that has been done by the international negotiating body that has been meeting since 14 March 1962 as well as the considerable and urgent work that remains to be accomplished in the field of disarmament. The Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus. It attaches great importance to the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States in an appropriately constituted negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament. The Assembly welcomes the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the Member States during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the Committee on Disarmament will be open to the nuclear-weapon States, and thirty-two to thirty-five other States to be chosen in consultation with the President of the thirty-second session of the Assembly; that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament will be reviewed at regular intervals; that the Committee on Disarmament will be convened in Geneva not later than January 1979 by the country whose name appears first in the alphabetical list of membership; and that the Committee on Disarmament will:

(a) Conduct its work by consensus;

(b) Adopt its own rules of procedure;

(c) Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Committee on Disarmament, to appoint the Secretary of the Committee, who shall also act as his personal representative, to assist the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and time-tables of the Committee;

(d) Rotate the chairmanship of the Committee among all its members on a monthly basis;

(e) Adopt its own agenda taking into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly and the proposals presented by the members of the Committee;

(f) Submit a report to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently as appropriate, and provide its formal and other relevant documents to the States Members of the United Nations on a regular basis;

(g) Make arrangements for interested States, not members of the Committee, to submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents;

(h) Invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion;

(i) Open its plenary meetings to the public unless otherwise decided.

121. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

122. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

123. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by this special session, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened and its research and informa-

tion functions accordingly extended. The Centre should also take account fully of the possibilities offered by specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament. The Centre should also increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions in view of the valuable role they play in the field of disarmament. This role could be encouraged also in other ways that may be considered as appropriate.

124. The Secretary-General is requested to set up an advisory board of eminent persons, selected on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation, to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies.

* * *

125. The General Assembly notes with satisfaction that the active participation of the Member States in the consideration of the agenda items of the special session and the proposals and suggestions submitted by them and reflected to a considerable extent in the Final Document have made a valuable contribution to the work of the special session and to its positive conclusion. Since a number of those proposals and suggestions, which have become an integral part of the work of the special session of the General Assembly, deserve to be studied further and more thoroughly, taking into consideration the many relevant comments and observations made in both the general debate in plenary meeting and the deliberations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Tenth Special Session, the Secretary-General is requested to transmit, together with this Final Document, to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with the questions of disarmament all the official records of the special session devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the recommendations which the Assembly may adopt at its thirty-third session. Some of the proposals put forth for the consideration of the special session are listed below:

(a) Text of the decision of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party concerning Romania's position on disarmament and, in particular, on nuclear disarmament, adopted on 9 May 1978;

(b) Views of the Swiss Government on problems to be discussed at the tenth special session of the General Assembly;

(c) Proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on practical measures for ending the arms race;

(d) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency;

(e) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Institute for Research on Disarmament;

(f) Proposal by Sri Lanka for the establishment of a World Disarmament Authority;

(g) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "Contribution to the seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban";

(h) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled, "Invitation to attend an international chemical-weapon verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany";

(i) Working paper submitted by China on disarmament;

(j) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning zones of confidence-building measures as a first step towards the preparation of a world-wide convention on confidence-building measures;

(k) Proposal by Ireland for a study of the possibility of establishing a system of incentives to promote arms control and disarmament;

(l) Working paper submitted by Romania concerning a synthesis of the proposals in the field of disarmament;

(m) Proposal by the United States of America on the establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Reserve and on confidence-building measures and stabilizing measures in various regions, including notification of manoeuvres, invitation of observers to manoeuvres, and United Nations machinery to study and promote such measures;

- (n) Proposal by Uruguay on the possibility of establishing a polemological agency;
- (o) Proposal by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping;
- (p) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development;
- (q) Proposal by Norway entitled "Evaluation of the impact of new weapons on arms control and disarmament efforts";
- (r) Note verbale transmitting the text, signed in Washington on 22 June 1978 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, reaffirming the principles of the Declaration of Ayacucho with respect to the limitation of conventional weapons;
- (s) Memorandum from Liberia entitled "Declaration of a new philosophy on disarmament";
- (t) Statements made by the representatives of China, on 22 June 1978, on the draft Final Document of the tenth special session;
- (u) Proposal by the President of Cyprus for the total demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus and the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations;
- (v) Proposal by Costa Rica on economic and social incentives to halt the arms race;
- (w) Amendments submitted by China to the draft Final Document of the tenth special session;
- (x) Proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation of the nuclear arms race;
- (y) Draft resolution submitted by Cyprus, Ethiopia and India on the urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons;
- (z) Draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and India on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war;
- (aa) Proposal by the non-aligned countries on the establishment of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean;
- (bb) Proposal by the Government of Senegal for a tax on military budgets;
- (cc) Proposal by Austria for the transmission to Member States of working paper A/AC.187/109 and the ascertainment of their views on the subject of verification;
- (dd) Proposal by the non-aligned countries for the dismantling of foreign military bases in foreign territories and withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories;
- (ee) Proposal by Mexico for the opening, on a provisional basis, of an *ad hoc* account in the United Nations Development Programme to use for development the funds which may be released as a result of disarmament measures;
- (ff) Proposal by Italy on the role of the Security Council in the field of disarmament in accordance with Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations;
- (gg) Proposal by the Netherlands for a study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization.

126. In adopting this Final Document, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war; implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race; strengthening the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; and reducing military expenditures and utilizing the resources thus released in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

127. The General Assembly expresses its satisfaction that the proposals submitted to its special session devoted to disarmament and the deliberations thereon have made it possible to reaffirm and define in this Final Document fundamental principles, goals, priorities and procedures for the implementation of the above purposes, either in the Declaration or the Programme of

Action or in both. The Assembly also welcomes the important decisions agreed upon regarding the deliberative and negotiating machinery and is confident that these organs will discharge their functions in an effective manner.

128. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the number of States that participated in the general debate, as well as the high level of representation and the depth and scope of that debate, are unprecedented in the history of disarmament efforts. Several Heads of State or Government addressed the General Assembly. In addition, other Heads of State or Government sent messages and expressed their good wishes for the success of the special session of the Assembly. Several high officials of specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system and spokesmen of twenty-five non-governmental organizations and six research institutes also made valuable contributions to the proceedings of the session. It must be emphasized, moreover, that the special session marks not the end but rather the beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

129. The General Assembly is convinced that the discussions of the disarmament problems at the special session and its Final Document will attract the attention of all peoples. Further mobilize world public opinion and provide a powerful impetus for the cause of disarmament.

27th plenary meeting

30 June 1978

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The President of the General Assembly subsequently informed the Secretary-General that the Committee on Disarmament, referred to in paragraph 120 of the above resolution, would be open to the nuclear-weapon States and to the following thirty-five States: ALGERIA, ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, BURMA, CANADA, CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EGYPT, ETHIOPIA, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF, HUNGARY, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, ITALY, JAPAN, KENYA, MEXICO, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, NETHERLANDS, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, PERU, POLAND, ROMANIA, SRI LANKA, SWEDEN, VENEZUELA, YUGOSLAVIA and ZAIRE.

Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements: actions taken in the period 22 March to 31 December 1978

The following list reviews the basic details concerning the agreements contained in the special supplement to the *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, volume 2: 1977,^a and shows the actions taken, if any, with regard to those agreements in the period subsequent to publication of the special supplement, that is, from 22 March to 31 December 1978. No further agreements were opened for signature or ratification or entered into force during the period.

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification of the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES: none

The Antarctic Treaty

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES: none

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water

SIGNED BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

NEW PARTIES: Bhutan (W) (a)^b

^a *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.78.IX.2).

^b Accession is indicated by (a). Instruments of ratification or accession (a) may be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L) and/or the United States of America (W).

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

NEW PARTIES: none

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: MEXICO

TREATY — NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I — NEW PARTIES: none

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II — NEW PARTIES: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

SIGNATURE — 18 May 1978^c

^c With the following declaration:

"As a consistent supporter of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, and wishing to assist the efforts of the Latin American States to that end, the Soviet Government has taken the decision to sign Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

"In signing Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to state the following:

"1. The Soviet Union proceeds from the principle that article I of the Treaty applies, as laid down in article 5 of the Treaty, to any nuclear explosive device and that, consequently, the carrying out by any party to the Treaty of explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes would constitute a violation of its obligations as defined in article I, and would be incompatible with its non-nuclear status. A solution of the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes for States parties to the Treaty may be found in the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in the context of the international procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

"2. In signing Additional Protocol II, the Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that at the present time the zone of application of the Treaty includes the territories for which the Treaty is in force, as laid down in article 4, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. The signature by the Soviet Union of Additional Protocol II in no way signifies recognition of the possibility of application of the Treaty, as prescribed in article 4, paragraph 2, beyond the territories of States parties, including the air space and the territorial sea established in accordance with international law.

"3. With regard to the reference in article 3 of the Treaty to 'its own legislation' in connexion with the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the States parties to the Treaty exercise sovereignty, the signature by the Soviet Union of Protocol II does not signify recognition of their claims to exercise sovereignty which infringe the generally accepted principles of international law.

"4. The Soviet Union takes into consideration the interpretation of the Treaty included in the Final Act adopted by the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, whereby transport of nuclear weapons by the parties to the Treaty is covered by the prohibitions laid down in article I of the Treaty.

"5. In the Final Act adopted by the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, the Treaty is interpreted to mean that the granting of permission for the transit of nuclear weapons at the request of States not parties to the Treaty falls within the competence of each individual State party to the Treaty. In that connexion the Soviet Union reaffirms its position to the effect that to grant permission for the transit of nuclear weapons

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

NEW PARTIES: Congo — 23 October 1978 (W) (a)

Liechtenstein — 20 April 1978 (L) (M) (W) (a)

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

NEW PARTIES: Congo — 23 October 1978 (W) (a)

in any form would violate the spirit of the treaty, which — as expressly stated in its preamble — is that Latin America should be wholly free from nuclear weapons; and would be incompatible with the non-nuclear status of States parties to the Treaty and with their obligations as defined in article I of the Treaty.

“6. Any action taken by one or more States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that is incompatible with its non-nuclear status, and the commission by one or more States parties to the Treaty of an act of aggression in support of a nuclear-weapon State or jointly with that State, will be considered by the Soviet Union as incompatible with the relevant obligations of those countries under the Treaty. In such cases the Soviet Union reserves the right to review its obligations under Additional Protocol II.

“The Soviet Union also reserves the right to review its position with regard to Additional Protocol II in the event of any action on the part of other nuclear-weapon States that is incompatible with their obligations under the said Protocol.

“7. The Soviet Government declares that the provisions of the articles of Additional Protocol II are applicable to the text of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in the version in which it was formulated up to the time of signature of the Protocol by the Government of the USSR, taking into account the position of the Soviet Union set forth in this declaration. In that connexion, any amendment to that Treaty which enters into force in accordance with the provisions of articles 29 and 6 of the Treaty shall have no force in respect of the Soviet Union in the absence of clearly expressed agreement to that effect on the part of the USSR.”

The Secretariat was subsequently informed that the instrument of ratification was signed on 12 December 1978 and deposited on 8 January 1979, accompanied by the following Statement:

“The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that it has ratified the following document:

“The Additional Protocol to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Moscow, on 18 May 1978, accompanied by a declaration made by the Government of the USSR when signing this Protocol, and by the following statement:

“The Soviet Union affirms that the obligations accepted by it in accordance with Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco also extend to those territories to which denuclearized zone status applies, in accordance with Additional Protocol I of the Treaty.

“Moreover, the Soviet Union reaffirms its position with respect to the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on this question (General Assembly resolution 1415 (XV) of 14 December 1960).”

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

NEW PARTIES: Bhutan — 8 January 1978 (W) (a)
Congo — 23 October 1978 (W) (a)
Venezuela — 18 October 1978 (L)

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW SIGNATORIES: AUSTRALIA 31 May 1978
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 13 April 1978
SIERRA LEONE 12 April 1978
TUNISIA 11 May 1978

NEW PARTIES: BULGARIA 31 May 1978
BYELORUSSIAN SSR 7 June 1978
CUBA 10 April 1978
CYPRUS 12 April 1978
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 12 May 1978
DENMARK 19 April 1978
FINLAND 12 May 1978
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 25 May 1978
GHANA 22 June 1978
HUNGARY 19 April 1978
INDIA 15 December 1978
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 5 October 1978
MALAWI 5 October 1978 (a)
MONGOLIA 19 May 1978
POLAND 8 June 1978
SPAIN 19 July 1978
SRI LANKA 25 April 1978
TUNISIA 11 May 1978
UKRAINIAN SSR 13 June 1978
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS 30 May 1978
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND 16 May 1978^d

^d The instrument of ratification specifies that the Convention is ratified in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Associated States (Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent), Territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the island of Cyprus.

Activities of the United Nations Environment Programme related to disarmament*

Introduction

The Declaration on the Human Environment adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in June 1972 and endorsed by the General Assembly, clearly states in principle 26 that "Man and his environment must be spared the effects of nuclear weapons and all other means of mass destruction. States must strive to reach prompt agreement, in the relevant international organs, on the elimination and complete destruction of such weapons". Since the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), its Governing Council has adopted a number of resolutions and also some of the UNEP's activities are related to that principle for the enhancement of the environment. A brief review of such resolutions and activities is given in this appendix.

Resolutions and reports

1. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its sixth session in May 1978, requested the Executive Director of UNEP to continue to gather, through the International Referral System, sources of information on methods of dealing with environmental problems caused by the material remnants of wars, to render assistance to Governments in preparing their programmes for the elimination of mines in their territories and to carry out and promote studies on the environmental effects of the material remnants of wars, particularly mines. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fourth session in April 1976 and at its fifth session in May 1977, had requested the Executive Director of UNEP to render assistance in the field of environmental protection to States in preparing their own programmes for the elimination of mines in their territories.

2. The Executive Director of UNEP submitted a report (A/32/137) entitled "Material remnants of wars and their effect on the environment" to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly highlighting the adverse effect of remnants of wars on the environment.

3. The United Nations Conference on Desertification, held in 1977, adopted a resolution concerning the effect of weapons of mass destruction on ecosystems. It noted that the use of chemical and biological weapons during wars was one of the factors contributing to desertification in certain parts of the world and that those factors were most seriously felt in developing countries, including those which were currently engaged in armed struggle for independence and those which had recently achieved independence through armed struggle. It condemned the use of any techniques that cause the desertification of the environment and denounced the effects of destructive weapons and practices on the ecosystems of all countries. The use of chemical and biological weapons which destroy or diminish the potential of ecosystems and are conducive to desertification was also condemned and the prohibition of the use of poisons in water as a weapon of war was demanded. In implementation of the resolution, the Secretary-General presented a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

* Text contributed by the United Nations Environment Programme.

4. The Governing Council of UNEP, at its fifth session in May 1977, took note of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques annexed to General Assembly resolution 31/72 of 10 December 1976 and requested Member States to facilitate exchanges of information on the use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.

Ozone research and monitoring

UNEP organized a meeting of experts designated by Governments, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations at Washington, D.C., in March 1977. The outcome of the meeting was an agreed World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer. Following the recommendations contained in the Action Plan, the Co-ordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer was set up. It was composed of representatives of the international agencies and non-governmental organizations participating in implementing the Action Plan as well as representatives of countries with major scientific programmes contributing to it. The Committee met in November 1977 and November 1978 to review the progress made in implementing the Action Plan, identified deficiencies and made recommendations for future work. At its first meeting, held at Geneva in November 1977, it was agreed that UNEP should issue a half-yearly bulletin (January and July) giving information on ongoing and planned research activities on the ozone layer relevant to the Action Plan. The publication of the bulletin was begun in January 1978. At the second meeting, held at Bonn in November 1978, the Committee issued "An assessment of ozone depletion and its impacts—December 1978"

UNEP is supporting a Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project meant to provide advice to Member States, to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone.

Weather modification

UNEP is co-operating with the World Meteorological Organization in the Precipitation Enhancement Project, whose objective is to obtain scientifically accepted information on the feasibility of precipitation enhancement with an assessment of the environmental impact of such enhancement.

UNEP has also co-operated with WMO in preparing draft principles of conduct for the guidance of States concerning weather modification. The first of these principles calls for considering the atmosphere as a global resource whose protection and use is the legitimate concern of the international community. The second calls for dedicating any technique developed to modify the weather to peaceful purposes. Plans are in progress to have the draft principles accepted by Governments.

Activities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization related to Disarmament*

Introduction

1. In 1978, two events which had a direct influence on the activities of UNESCO in the field of disarmament were the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament and the twentieth session of the General Conference of UNESCO. Both of those events encouraged UNESCO to increase further its efforts in promoting disarmament since it has a specific contribution to make towards the solution of that problem. Recalling the decision of the Executive Board of UNESCO, the Director-General said in his speech at the special session on disarmament: "UNESCO has a vital role to play in creating a general climate conducive to halting the growing arms race and promoting disarmament and should make an effective contribution, within the spheres of its competence, towards generating such a climate, which would facilitate the extension of aid to developing countries, the establishment of a new international economic and social order and the promotion of international cultural understanding"

Mandate for UNESCO disarmament activities in 1978

2. In 1978, the Organization continued implementing the Programme and budget for 1977-78, which was prepared on the basis of and in accordance with the objectives set out in the medium-term plan for 1977-82 both approved by the General Conference at its nineteenth session of UNESCO, held in Nairobi, in November 1976.^a

3. The General Conference at its nineteenth session also adopted two resolutions bearing directly on the issues of disarmament. They are resolution 12.1 entitled "UNESCO's contribution to peace and its tasks with respect to the promotion of human rights and the elimination of colonialism and racialism" and resolution 13.1 entitled "Role of UNESCO in generating a climate of public opinion conducive to the halting of the arms race and the transition to disarmament". By the former the General Conference invited the Director-General, "under the short- and medium-term programmes, to promote studies and research on the contribution that can be made by UNESCO, in its field of competence, to knowledge of problems of disarmament, and to their solution, by employing all possible ways of making world opinion alive to this problem". In the latter, the General Conference invited the Director-General "in implementing UNESCO's programme for 1977-78, to bear in mind the special importance of the problems of disarmament".^b

* Text contributed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

^a For detailed description of the objectives of the medium-term plan see *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 2:1977 (United Nations publication, Sales No.E.78.IX.4), pp. 325-326.

^b *Ibid.*, p. 326.

4. During 1978 the Executive Board of UNESCO held two sessions (104th and 105th), at both of which it considered the contribution of UNESCO to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and to the follow-up to that session.

5. At its 104th session, the Executive Board adopted decision EX 7.1.5 by which it, *inter alia*, expressed the view that UNESCO should intensify its efforts in the field of disarmament and follow-up on suggestions which it might receive from the special session. It also welcomed the invitation which the Director-General of UNESCO received from the General Assembly to address the session, which he did on 29 May 1978.

6. At its 105th session, the Executive Board discussed the results of the special session on the basis of a special document^c containing the full text of the Final Document and adopted decision 105 EX 7.1.2 by which it appreciated the work of the tenth special session and expressed "the readiness of UNESCO to take a most active part in its fields of competence, in promoting implementation in the appropriate provisions of the Final Document . . . taking into account the elaboration and carrying out of integrated multidisciplinary activities in this field" It also endorsed the proposals for additional activities made by the Director-General in the same document and invited the Director-General:

(a) To continue to make full use of UNESCO's possibilities in generating all over the world a climate of public opinion conducive to the implementation of the aims identified in the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament;

(b) To promote further extension of the participation of non-governmental organizations and of the mass media in UNESCO's activities in regard to solving the problems of disarmament, particularly by strengthening contacts between them and UNESCO;

(c) To report to the General Conference of UNESCO in the framework of his report on the activities of UNESCO at its twentieth session on the course of the discussion of this problem at the 105th session of the Executive Board.

7. In addition to those decisions of the legislative organs of UNESCO, the Organization's mandate was also determined by the General Assembly itself, particularly in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

8. Certain provisions of the Final Document are of direct concern to UNESCO which, apart from the International Atomic Energy Agency, is the only organization of the United Nations system to which the special session addressed specific recommendations. In particular, in paragraph 103, UNESCO "is urged to intensify its activities aimed at facilitating research and publications on disarmament, related to its fields of competence, especially in developing countries, and should disseminate the results of such research" In paragraph 107, the General Assembly welcomes the initiative of UNESCO in planning to organize an International Congress on Disarmament Education and "urges that organization to step up its programme aimed at the development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study through the preparation, *inter alia*, of teachers' guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials. Member States should take all possible measures to encourage the incorporation of such materials in the curricula of their educational institutes."

9. Finally, at its thirty-third session, the General Assembly in its resolution 33/71 urged, *inter alia*, the specialized agencies "to promote education and information programmes relating to the arms race and disarmament" and invited the Director-General of UNESCO to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on preparations for the World Congress on Disarmament Education.

10. Pursuant to the mandate of the General Assembly, UNESCO carried out in 1978, in the field of disarmament, activities relating to research and studies, dissemination of public information and support to national commissions and non-governmental organizations. The Organization also carried out preparatory activities for its future programmes in the field.

^c 105 EX/29 Add.1.

Research and studies in the field of disarmament

11. A meeting of experts on "the obstacles to disarmament and ways of overcoming them" was held at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, from 3 to 7 April 1978.

12. The purpose of the meeting was to draw from an analysis of obstacles identified as preventing or slowing down the process of disarmament a series of conclusions regarding the steps which may be taken in the fields of education, science, culture and information in order to overcome those obstacles. Conceived as the contribution of UNESCO to the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the meeting considered the international economic, diplomatic and military structures involved, as well as the psychological, social and cultural factors determining the creation of conditions and a climate of public opinion conducive to disarmament.

13. The meeting adopted three series of recommendations: the first concerned the place which might appropriately be given to matters of concern to UNESCO in the declaration and programme of action to be adopted by the special session on disarmament; the second set out three major projects which deserve to be highlighted as exemplifying the specific contribution UNESCO can make in this area, including an international congress on disarmament education, a study of the concept of disarmament from the standpoint of international law, and development of new uses of audio-visual media with a view to ensuring more efficient dissemination of information on disarmament, such as a film festival on the arms race and disarmament; the third referred to specific measures that could be taken in each of the UNESCO fields of competence.

14. With a view to facilitating access of peace researchers throughout the world to scientific literature on various aspects of the arms race and disarmament, UNESCO continued publishing relevant reference materials. Since publishing an annotated bibliography and report on research trends on the social and economic aspects of the arms race and disarmament in 1977 as No. 39 in the series *Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences*, UNESCO published another bibliography concerning dangers to man and his environment in modern armaments and techniques of warfare, as No. 40 in the series.

15. With the co-operation of several non-governmental organizations, a selection of previously published scientific articles representing different regional and disciplinary perspectives was made with a view to publishing a reader on disarmament. The material assembled in 1977-78 for publication at a later date covers various historical efforts to achieve disarmament and the social and economic aspects of the problem.

Dissemination of public information about disarmament

16. Pursuant to resolution 19 C/13.1, which invited the Director-General, *inter alia*, "to ensure wider publication, in UNESCO's periodicals, of articles and materials dealing with the necessity to halt the arms race and take measures to achieve disarmament", UNESCO continued publishing materials relating to disarmament in order to alert public opinion to the urgency of the transition to disarmament and to provide information about the issues involved.

17. The following materials were published in UNESCO periodicals in 1978:

International Social Science Journal

"Atomic bombs and human beings", by Arthur Booth (vol. XXX, No. 2)

"The dynamics of the arms race: military research and disarmament", by Marek Thee (vol. XXX, No. 4)

Unesco Courier

"Education for disarmament", by Swadesh Rana (October 1978)

Unesco Features

"Dutch institute studies peace" (No. 730), containing an interview with Professor B. Röling and Dr. N. Tromp

"Power politics and disarmament: a third world view" (No. 731-732), containing an interview with an Indian peace researcher, Swadesh Rana.

18. Also pursuant to resolution 19 C/13.1, the question of disarmament was discussed at a regional (European) workshop on the use of television for the popularization of science which took place in Luxembourg from 8 to 13 May 1978. The participants at that workshop stressed the need to constantly remind the public of the threat posed to humanity by the conversion of science and technology into the tools of war.

Support of disarmament-related activities by national commissions and non-governmental organizations

19. A collection of articles entitled "Research, education and information on disarmament" was published as No. 12 in the series of *Publications of the Finnish National Commission for UNESCO*. It contains the results of the debates of the meeting of experts on research education and information on questions relating to disarmament and international co-operation in this field, held by the Finnish National Commission at Sirkaranta near Helsinki, on 1 and 2 December 1977. The publication covers the following themes: obstacles to disarmament and ways of overcoming them; activities of UNESCO in questions related to disarmament; an overview of the special session on disarmament; international co-operation and co-ordination of education and research relevant to disarmament.

20. Financial assistance of 3,000 dollars was given to the National Committee of Hungarian Youth for a European Youth and Student Conference on Disarmament, which took place at Budapest in January 1978. Among the subjects discussed were the interdependence between political and military détente, general problems of disarmament, socio-economic consequences of disarmament for youth, the effects of disarmament on the establishment of a new international economic order and co-operation of youth and students in the field of disarmament.

21. Similar financial assistance was given to the International Seminar on World Disarmament organized by the International Student Movement for the United Nations. The seminar, which was held at Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, in March 1978, examined major issues surrounding the links between disarmament and development as seen by young people at both the national and international levels.

22. Under the Programme of Participation, financial support was provided to the International Peace Research Institute (IPRIO) at Oslo, to assist the publication of the *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*. Disarmament is a subject of high priority in the *Bulletin*. Issue No. 2 was published under the title "Armaments—Militarism—Disarmament: Disarmament for a Just World"; issue No. 3 was entitled "Disarmament and the United Nations", and issue No. 4 "Alternative Defense and Security".

Preparatory work for future programmes

23. The orientation of future activities was determined by the UNESCO General Conference at its twentieth session, held in Paris in November 1978, which adopted the programme and budget for 1979-80, as well as a number of resolutions of direct relevance to the subject in question.

24. The General Conference adopted a series of resolutions which authorize numerous activities relating to the question of disarmament. In resolution 1/I.5 - 2.3/1, the General Conference invited the Director-General, in carrying out the activities contributing to the achievement of Objectives 1.5 (Promotion of education and wider information concerning human rights) and 2.3 (Development of school and out-of-school programmes as well as of information aimed at furthering peace and international understanding) to promote the implementation of the aims identified in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly within the UNESCO field of competence.

25. In resolution 3/I.5 - 2.3/1, the General Conference authorized the Director-General to carry out activities designed to contribute, at the level of social sciences, to the attainment of the above-mentioned Objectives 1.5 and 2.3 in such a way that they help in implementation of the Final Document in the whole context of the recommendations concerning education for international understanding, co-operation and peace and education relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms.

26. In resolution 3/2.1/1 the General Conference authorized the Director-General to carry out activities designed to contribute to the attainment of Objective 2.1 (Promotion of peace research, in particular on manifestations of the violation of peace, causes preventing its realization, ways and means to eliminate them and proper measures to be taken in order to maintain and reinforce a just, lasting and constructive peace at the level of groups, societies and the world) in such a way that those activities have the effect of promoting understanding of the processes involved in the arms race, for example by exploring the role of military research and development and its impact on the scientific communities and the arms race in order to contribute to disarmament in the light of the Final Document of the tenth special session.

27. Apart from programme resolutions, the General Conference adopted resolution 11.1 entitled "Role of UNESCO in generating a climate of public opinion conducive to the halting of the arms race and transition to disarmament". By that resolution UNESCO welcomed and supported the work undertaken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session and called upon persons active in education, science, culture and communication in UNESCO to play a most active part in the organization's activities related to disarmament. By the same resolution, the General Conference made specific requests to member States of UNESCO and to the Director-General. The resolution reads as follows:

11. ROLE OF UNESCO IN GENERATING A CLIMATE OF PUBLIC OPINION CONDU- CIVE TO THE HALTING OF THE ARMS RACE AND TRANSITION TO DISARMA- MENT

11.1 *The General Conference.*

Considering that Unesco is committed to offer its full contribution, in the fields of its competence, to the strengthening of peace, of confidence, of understanding and of solidarity among the nations, encouraging co-operation in the fields of education, science, culture and communication,

Noting resolution 13.1 which it adopted at its nineteenth session on the role of Unesco in generating a climate of public opinion conducive to the halting of the arms race and the transition to disarmament, and the Director-General's report thereon,

Bearing in mind the dangers with which the accumulation of arms and the continuation of the arms race confront humanity, the serious negative consequences of the arms race for development in general, and especially for development efforts in developing countries, and therefore the significance of disarmament for peace, development, and the social and material progress of nations and peoples,

Noting with deep concern that the arms race has now attained truly world-wide dimensions and has come to represent in the history of mankind an unprecedented threat for all nations and peoples and for the future generations, and therefore calls for concerted and comprehensive action on the part of the world community as a whole,

Expressing the firm conviction that the key to the problem of the security of nations and peoples lies therefore not in an unchecked increase in armaments but in the consolidation and the strengthening of détente, and in the establishment of international relations based on peaceful co-operation, understanding and trust between all States, and on friendly relations among nations irrespective of their political, economic and social systems or the levels of their development,

Stressing that one of the most urgent tasks today is to halt the arms race and to promote disarmament, the final objective being general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the establishment of the new international economic order,

Considering that qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race, and that effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements, so that scientific and technological achievements will ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes,

Bearing in mind the significance of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament which took place in New York from 23 May to 1 July 1978,

Emphasizing the importance of the Final Document adopted by the Special Session and referring especially to those sections which particularly stress Unesco's field of action with a view to disarmament,

Expressing its approval for the work undertaken at the Special Session and its hope for the convening, at the earliest appropriate time, of a World Disarmament Conference with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

Paying particular attention to the fact that this Special Session stressed the importance of world public opinion in halting the arms race and in bringing about disarmament.

Noting with satisfaction that paragraph 102 of the Final Document proclaims the week starting 24 October, day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.

Welcoming Unesco's action in this domain until now as well as the contribution of the Director-General to the Special Session.

Convinced that Unesco can and must make its own effective contribution to improving the international climate by mobilizing public opinion on behalf of disarmament.

Recognizing that Unesco's programme deals with a wide range of issues of the highest importance to mankind, the full implementation of which depends on a halt to the arms race and the consequent transition to disarmament.

Considering that the development of a multidisciplinary programme is of particular importance and would give a new impetus to the Organization's activities in this area, as well as to the activities of the National Commissions for Unesco.

Convinced that, by reason of its experience and its international standing, the Organization is assured of the understanding and support of the peoples of the world for its undertakings and its initiatives, and *persuaded* that the Organization could give proof in this respect of a lofty sense of its responsibilities towards the international community,

I

1. *Calls upon* persons active in education, science, culture and communication in all Unesco's Member States to play a most active part in the Organization's activities designed to contain the arms race and promote the transition to disarmament;

II

2. *Invites* the Member States:

(a) to encourage the development of the programme activities likely to attain those aims and objectives set out in the Final Document adopted by the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament which could be achieved through education, science, culture and communication, and to disseminate the results of such efforts;

(b) to take steps for early follow-up on the results of the World Congress on Disarmament Education, at all levels of formal and non-formal education;

(c) to encourage all public and private scientific institutions and scientific researchers in research and the application of the results of scientific development for the progress of humanity, in such areas as rational use of natural resources, research into and use of new energy sources, improvement of the quality of life and of the environment and the harmonious development of society, as well as in research showing the economically and socially negative consequences of the production and accumulation of arms for mass destruction—atomic, biological, chemical and others—as well as conventional weapons;

(d) to endeavour to ensure that resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures are devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries, with special emphasis on the development of education, science, culture and communication;

(e) to pay particular attention to the role which information, including the mass media, can play in generating a climate of confidence and understanding between nations and countries, as well as in increasing public awareness of ideas, objectives and action in the field of disarmament, as proposed in the Final Document of the Special Session;

(f) actively to respond to the call of the Special Session to observe a week to promote the objectives of disarmament and to take all necessary steps to ensure the success of this important measure;

3. *Invites* the Director-General:

(a) to pay special attention to the implementation of those parts of the Programme for 1979-1980 and the Medium-Term Plan for 1977-1982 which concern disarmament;

(b) to arrange for Unesco's participation, within its fields of competence, in implementing the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the United Nations

General Assembly devoted to disarmament, bearing in mind the possible activities mentioned in the Director-General's report to the Executive Board on the results of the Special Session (105 EX/29, Add.1), as well as the Board's decision thereon (105 EX/Decision 7.1.2):

(c) in compliance with paragraph 103 of the Final Document, to intensify activities aimed at facilitating research and publications on disarmament related to Unesco's fields of competence, especially in developing countries, and to disseminate the results of such research;

(d) to pay particular attention, in compliance with paragraph 107 of the Final Document, and in co-operation with Member States and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, to preparations for Unesco's World Congress on Disarmament Education as well as to the development of a programme on such matters;

4. *Also invites* the Director-General to consider, within the framework of the Programme and Budget adopted for 1979-1980, as well as in the preparation of the Draft Programme and Budget for 1981-1983, whether certain activities or studies in the following areas may be initiated or encouraged by the Organization:

(a) international interdisciplinary research or symposia, in the most appropriate form, concerning disarmament problems and on such themes as:

(i) the relationship between socio-economic development and the solution of problems connected with efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, and the promotion of the transition to disarmament;

(ii) the technological revolution and its implications for the prospects of disarmament;

(iii) the interaction of the social and natural sciences in overcoming obstacles hampering disarmament;

(iv) the possibility of increasing the dissemination and publication of information about the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, in conformity with paragraphs 99 and 100 of the Final Document;

(v) the damage occasioned by the increase in armaments and military action to the environment, to social progress and to cultural development;

(vi) the development of aspects of disarmament related to international law;

(b) increasing, under the education sector, activities aimed at halting and reversing the arms race, and at popularizing the idea of disarmament;

(c) extending the use of Unesco's information channels in order to mobilize world public opinion about the dangers of the arms race and the need for disarmament, for example by increasing the publication of Unesco brochures and books on this subject, holding art exhibitions and film festivals;

(d) on the basis of the results of case studies and expert meetings mentioned in document 20C/16, studying the possibility of publishing a multidisciplinary study on disarmament problems;

(e) in the framework of the preparation of the World Congress on Disarmament Education, studying the possibility of fostering the production of manuals and teaching programmes on disarmament for different levels, including the possibility of offering such programmes, on an experimental basis, to Member States, on their request;

5. *Further invites* the Director-General:

(a) to initiate, stimulate and assist activities to be implemented by international non-governmental organizations oriented to the realization of disarmament objectives;

(b) to encourage international non-governmental organizations co-operating with Unesco to play a larger part in Unesco's activity in this area, as well as to initiate their own;

(c) to assist Member States, at their request, particularly under the Participation Programme, in working out and applying programmes on disarmament in the fields of activity of the Organization;

(d) in co-operation with other organizations, agencies and programmes of the United Nations, to offer Unesco's contribution to the further development of appropriate activities foreseen in the Final Document;

(e) to plan the Organization's activities in association and co-ordination with the activities of other organizations and institutions of the United Nations system;

(f) to report to the twenty-first session of the General Conference on progress in implementing this resolution.

Statement by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament*

The nations of the world have often gathered in recent times to address the fundamental needs of man, to seek solutions to the problems which affect the quality of life on this earth or to focus on those discriminated against, the neglected and the poor. The promise of a better, more equitable and just world has invariably emerged from these meetings.

The special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is dealing with one of the most intractable problems of our time. After many years of discussions, little real progress has been achieved. And yet, no promise of a better world can be taken seriously while the arms race continues unabated.

The Assembly has been provided with scores of figures which relate the world's expenditure on armaments at the global, regional and country levels to the resources devoted to other sectors such as health, nutrition and education. These figures indicate that on the average countries are devoting five to six per cent of their annual product to military ends and that there is no evidence of any recent decrease in this share. Informative as they are, these figures tell only part of the story. The arms race also has adverse qualitative effects, particularly in developing countries with limited technological capabilities which are often diverted to the defence sector, to the detriment of other areas where they could produce greater social and economic benefits. Agriculture is clearly in this category. Agricultural research in developing countries must be stepped up in order to diminish the present dependence on imported, often unsuitable and sometimes even harmful technology. Training needs further impetus if the rural masses are to participate effectively in development.

Countries which give priority to the defence sector are also bound to devote a disproportionate amount of land and other resources, including energy, for military purposes. Large military expenditure contributes to the depletion of natural resources and raw material reserves. These effects are not easy to quantify and therefore the figures given for world military expenditures, currently estimated at 350 billion dollars per annum, give only a rough indication of the nature and magnitude of this phenomenon.

This figure is, however, a useful indicator of the inadequacy of resources devoted to other priority sectors, such as agriculture. The flow of external resources to this sector actually declined by nine per cent in real terms in 1976,^a a year in which world military expenditure reached its maximum level. Agriculture received in the neighbourhood of 5 billion dollars of external assistance, considerably short of the 8 to 8.5 billion dollars which are estimated as annual external investment requirements for achieving a minimum growth rate of 3.6 per cent in this sector. Preliminary figures for 1977 indicate a slight recovery but external assistance to agriculture still remains pitifully inadequate.

Food and agricultural development, especially in the poorer countries, will need large external support in the foreseeable future. The over-all food and agriculture situation, in spite of

* Text contributed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

^a Using the OECD "broad definition" of agriculture which includes rural infrastructure, fertilizer production, etc.

recent improvements, is still fragile and the long-term trends do not give reasons for complacency. Food production in the developing world has increased at an average annual rate of 2.6 per cent during 1970-1977 and just managed to keep ahead of population growth. Ravaged by war and drought, food production in Africa has increased only 1.3 per cent annually during this period. This implies an actual decrease of 1.4 per cent in *per caput* terms over the same period. In effect, *per caput* production in the group of developing countries increased only marginally (0.3 per cent) from 1970 to 1977.

The Fourth World Food Survey conducted by FAO shows that the number of undernourished has continued to grow in spite of marked improvements in certain regions like the Near East. Although the 1973-1974 food crisis has been overcome, malnutrition continues to be widespread in the developing world. FAO estimates that the situation has not changed much in recent years from 1972-1974, when an estimated 455 million people in the developing market economies, or a quarter of their population, suffered from severe undernourishment. Between 1969-1971 and 1972-1974, the number increased by 15 per cent, which is much higher than their population growth rate.

It is against this background that the task of disarmament appears most urgent. Indeed, the vision of an overarmed but underfed humanity is in itself demonstrative of man's capacity for absurdity.

The world reservoir of destructive technology has grown beyond any reasonable limits, making the notion of security virtually meaningless. At the same time, food security which would ensure the availability of food supplies for the future is still far from being attained. Carry-over stocks of cereals are now more or less at the minimum safe levels, but in the absence of any agreement yet on the establishment of a system of internationally co-ordinated national stocks, the world is no better placed to face emergencies such as those that occurred in 1972-1973.

Even a small reduction in current investment in weaponry could have wide repercussions, both material and psychological, if the resulting funds were diverted to development projects. Many such proposals have remained on paper in the past, and technical reasons have been advanced for the failure to implement them. However, most technical difficulties can be overcome by political will. The Assembly will be considering specific proposals for development funds while the developing world looks with hope at its deliberations. FAO, with its responsibility to assist in improving the food situation and bettering the standards of living particularly of the rural masses, also hopes that the results will this time be positive and is ready to co-operate in the implementation of development projects in its field.

Disarmament and development have been identified as the two most pressing problems of humanity. Near the end of the Second United Nations Development Decade, it has become apparent that its goals will not be achieved. Much the same can be said of the Disarmament Decade which was held simultaneously. The intimate links that join the two do not need to be stressed again. The special session is being held at a time when preparations for the next International Development Strategy are entering their active phase. The world at large stands to benefit from the agreements that may be reached in this Assembly, with the aim of reducing military expenditures and using the resources which would thus become available for development purposes.

The ultimate objective of peaceful coexistence cannot be achieved in the conditions of economic and social disparity that prevail today. Should the arms race continue at the present pace, it can only bring the world closer to total destruction. There is not much time left for words. The world has to act.

Activities of the World Health Organization related to disarmament*

The International Conference on Primary Health Care, organized jointly by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund in September 1978, held at Alma-Ata, USSR, expressed the need for urgent action by all Governments, all health and development workers, and the world community to protect and promote the health of all the people of the world. The Conference adopted a Declaration which, in article X, states:

"An acceptable level of health for all the people of the world by the year 2000 can be attained through a fuller and better use of the world's resources, a considerable part of which is now spent on armaments and military conflicts. A genuine policy of independence, peace, détente and disarmament could and should release additional resources that could well be devoted to peaceful aims and in particular to the acceleration of social and economic development of which primary health care, as an essential part, should be allotted its proper place."

The achievement of the objective of an acceptable level of health for all demands not only a more equitable distribution of health resources, but also the generation of additional resources to satisfy essential or basic health care needs, which include adequate food and housing, safe drinking water, suitable sanitation, services for maternal and child health care—such as nutritional support, health education and immunization against the major infectious diseases of childhood—prevention and control of locally endemic diseases and simple care of injury and illness in all age groups.

The reduction of the gap between health needs in developing countries and the resources available for satisfying them is an important challenge. In most countries much could be achieved for health development with existing resources, a high proportion of which are presently allocated for military purposes. Reduced expenditure on armaments would release funds for investment in health infrastructures, in development of health manpower and in research aimed at generating new knowledge and applying existing knowledge.

The following WHO programmes illustrate well the enormous benefits which could be derived for the health of millions of human beings from funds presently spent on armaments.

The WHO smallpox eradication programme has proved that dramatic results can be achieved in the control of major communicable diseases. It has taken some 300 million dollars to reach the present state of world-wide smallpox eradication. Approximately one third of the resources required came from international bilateral and multilateral donations channelled through the World Health Organization and approximately 200 million dollars were generated by countries from their own national programmes. The success of the smallpox eradication programme has benefited not only the developing countries directly affected by smallpox, but also the developed countries in the form of substantial savings of resources formerly allocated to control measures when smallpox importation occurred. A modest estimate of the global savings following the confirmation of smallpox eradication is in the region of 1 billion dollars annually.

* Text contributed by the World Health Organization.

Among other numerous health problems, malaria represents a major scourge and affects approximately 2 billion people. In Africa alone, 1 million children die from malaria before they reach the age of five. The World Health Organization estimates that it would take a minimum of 1.7 to 2 billion dollars annually to bring malaria to the point of control where the dreaded disease would exist only just below that of a public health hazard. Out of the estimated figures above, 30 per cent would have to come from the richer nations of the international community, with the developing countries investing the remaining 70 per cent in their own national programmes.

At the heart of good health, as was recognized at the recent United Nations Water Conference, is a safe water supply and sanitation. Speaking only in relation to the goals set by the Mar del Plata Conference for the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade 1980-1990, capital investment required to meet essential health requirements, through the application of only minimal standards, is estimated at 50 billion dollars. From what seems a staggering sum, but which in reality is only a fraction of total world expenditure on armaments, one can foresee that no less than 20 billion dollars would be required from external sources, whereas the remainder, that is to say 30 billion dollars would have to be invested locally by the developing countries which are most in need of an adequate water supply and sanitation for their populations.

The above examples clearly show that increased investments in the health field can pay visible and easily appreciable dividends.

Activities of the World Meteorological Organization related to disarmament*

Introduction

The World Meteorological Organization is not directly involved in questions of disarmament. Some of the activities of the Organization, however, have some relevance to article III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (General Assembly resolution 31/72, annex) and the understandings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating thereto.^a A brief review of such activities in 1978 is given in the present note. Before describing those activities, it may be mentioned, as a matter of general interest, that the World Weather Watch, which is the basic programme of WMO, contains the following provision:

“The World Weather Watch shall be used only for peaceful purposes, due account being taken of the national sovereignty and security of States, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the spirit and traditions of the World Meteorological Organization.”

Weather modification

The Seventh Congress (1975) of WMO approved a Weather Modification Programme, the most important element of which is a Precipitation Enhancement Project consisting of an internationally planned and executed and scientifically evaluated field experiment to obtain scientifically accepted information on the feasibility of precipitation enhancement under given conditions. Further progress was made in the development of the Project which is at present in the site-selection phase. It should, however, be mentioned that the tentative time-table for the Project, drawn up assuming favourable circumstances, provides for the seeding experiment to take place during the period 1981-1986, following a final decision on the site to be used based on an intensive study of the relevant meteorological conditions at the site. During 1978, final preparations for measurements of the characteristics of the cloud system over the proposed experimental site were completed and the field measurements for that purpose were scheduled to begin in February 1979.

The Seventh Congress (1975) of WMO authorized the Secretary-General to assist members, upon request, in conducting their own weather modification experiments, the costs involved being met by the country concerned. Advice was given to four member countries in investigating the feasibility of undertaking experiments on rain enhancement over their respective territories.

The Seventh Congress also decided that an inventory of activities within member countries related to weather modification should be maintained and distributed from time to time in order

* Text contributed by the World Meteorological Organization.

^a See *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. I: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), appendix IX.

better to inform Members of world-wide activities and advances in that field. In compliance with that decision, the Third Register of National Weather Modification Projects, which relates to the year 1977, was distributed.

Ozone research and monitoring

Action was continued in implementing the WMO Global Ozone Research and Monitoring Project, the objective of which is to enable WMO to provide advice to member countries and to the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations concerning various aspects of atmospheric ozone. The project is being carried out with support from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

The main activities are related to the improvement of the global network of ground-based total-ozone measuring stations and the organization of meetings of experts for discussion of specific problems relating to the Project in accordance with the UNEP World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer.

Draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons*

The States Parties to this Convention,

Expressing the profound interest of States and peoples in preventing the use of the achievements of modern science and technology for the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to contribute to the halting of the arms race, particularly in the field of means of mass destruction,

Realizing the danger which nuclear neutron weapons present to the peace and security of peoples,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to produce, stockpile, deploy anywhere or use nuclear neutron weapons.

Article II

1. Control over compliance with this Convention shall be exercised by the States Parties, using the national technical means of verification which are at their disposal, in a manner conforming to the universally recognized rules of international law.

2. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultations and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

3. Any State Party to this Convention which claims that any other State Party may be acting in breach of the obligations assumed under this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations.

4. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

*Submitted to the CCD on 9 March 1978 by the representative of the USSR. Text also circulated as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-Third Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/33/27)*, vol. II, document CCD/559.

Article III

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article IV

This Convention shall be open to all States for signature.

Article V

1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations who is hereby designated as the Depositary.

2. This Convention shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by . . . Governments.

Article VI

1. This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Substantive documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session on the item entitled “Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States”

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States^a

The States Parties to this Convention,

Conscious of the fact that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Prompted by a desire to take all possible steps to reduce and ultimately to eliminate the danger of such a war,

Wishing to contribute to the prevention of the wider proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the cessation of the nuclear armaments race and the adoption of effective measures directed towards nuclear disarmament,

Welcoming the desire of States in various regions of the world to keep their territories free from nuclear weapons,

Bearing in mind their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to maintain peace, to refrain from the threat or use of force and to live in peace with each other as good neighbours,

Having regard to Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968, General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) of 29 November 1972 and the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of 30 June 1978, including the request made therein that urgent efforts be made to conclude effective agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Regarding guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear-States as an important means of strengthening peace and universal security and wishing to give such guarantees an international legal character,

Have agreed as follows:

^a First transmitted by the letter dated 8 September 1978 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (see A/33/241, annex) and subsequently submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-third session by the representative of the Soviet Union (see A/C.1/33/L.6, annex).

Article I

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States Parties to this Convention which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons in their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control, on land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space.

Article II

The obligation set forth in article I of this Convention shall extend not only to the territory of non-nuclear States Parties, but also to the armed forces and installations under the jurisdiction and control of such States wherever they may be, on land, on the sea, in the air or in outer space.

Article III

Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that the actions of any other State Party are contrary to the provisions of articles I and II of the Convention may request that consultations be held between the States Parties with a view to clarifying the actual circumstances of the matter. Such a request must include any information relating to the matter and also all possible evidence to support it.

Article IV

1. This Convention shall be concluded for an indefinite period of time.
2. Each Party to the Convention shall, in the exercise of its State sovereignty, be entitled to secede from the Convention if it decides that exceptional circumstances relating to the content of the Convention have placed its higher interests in jeopardy. It shall notify all the Parties to the Convention and the Security Council of the United Nations of its secession, giving three months' notice. Such notification must include a statement of the exceptional circumstances which it regards as having placed its higher interests in jeopardy.

Article V

1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to this Convention. The text of each proposed amendment must be submitted to the depositary, who shall immediately transmit it to all States Parties.
2. An amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this Convention which accepts the amendment after the documents concerning its acceptance have been deposited with the depositary by the majority of States Parties. Subsequently, the amendment shall enter into force for each of the remaining States Parties on the date of the deposit by them of the document concerning its acceptance.

Article VI

1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention is subject to ratification by the States which have signed it. The instruments of ratification or the documents concerning accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is hereby designated the depositary.
3. This Convention shall enter into force following the deposit of the instruments of ratification by . . . States which have signed the Convention, including at least . . . nuclear-weapon States.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, the Convention shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession.

5. The depositary shall immediately notify all States which have signed or acceded to this Convention of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or document concerning accession, the date of the entry into force of this Convention and of any amendments thereto, and also of the receipt by him of other notifications.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Convention, the Russian, Arabic, Chinese, English, French and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall duly forward certified copies of the Convention to the Governments of the States which have signed or acceded to the Convention.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, which was opened for signature on . . .

Pakistan: draft international convention on guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons^b

The States Parties to this Convention,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race and the threat to mankind due to the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that only nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, will assure complete security in the nuclear era,

Desirous of safeguarding the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Bearing in mind the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Also bearing in mind that the non-nuclear-weapon States have called for legally binding and credible assurances from nuclear-weapon States that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention, as a first step towards the complete ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pledge themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon States.

This undertaking is without prejudice to the obligations of States Parties to this Convention arising from treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

^b Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-third session by the representative of Pakistan (see A/C.1/33/L.15, annex).

Article II

The nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Convention also undertake to avoid the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any contingency and to achieve nuclear disarmament, resulting in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, in the shortest possible time.

Article III

Any State Party to this Convention which has reason to believe that there has been or is likely to be a breach of the obligations of the States Parties arising from articles I and II of this Convention may request an urgent meeting of the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to preventing such a breach or redressing the situation arising therefrom.

Article IV

This Convention shall be concluded for an indefinite period of time. It shall lapse once nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

Article V

1. Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to this Convention. The text of each proposed amendment must be submitted to the depositary, who shall immediately transmit it to all States Parties.

2. An amendment shall enter into force for each State Party to this Convention which accepts the amendment after the documents concerning its acceptance have been deposited with the depositary by the majority of States Parties. Subsequently, the amendment shall enter into force for each of the remaining States Parties on the date of the deposit by them of the document concerning its acceptance.

Article VI

1. This Convention is open for signature by all States. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification by the States which have signed it. The instruments of ratification or the documents concerning accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is hereby designated the depositary.

3. This Convention shall enter into force following the deposit of the instruments of ratification by . . . States including the two leading nuclear-weapon States, i.e. the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, the Convention shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or documents concerning accession.

5. The depositary shall immediately notify all States Parties to this Convention of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or document concerning accession, the date of the entry into force of this Convention or of any amendments thereto, and also of the receipt by him of other notifications.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Convention, the Russian, Arabic, Chinese, English, French and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall duly forward certified copies of the Convention to the Governments of the States which have signed or acceded to the Convention.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized for that purpose by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, which was opened for signature on . . .

United States of America: proposal of the United States of America on strengthening confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons^c

The approach of the United States to strengthening the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the threat or use of nuclear weapons takes into account paragraph 59 of the Final Report of the SSOD which provides:

“In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.”

The United States position on the way to work out effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons is based upon the diverse nature of the security requirements, both of the nuclear-weapon States, and also of the non-nuclear-weapon States. For many of the non-nuclear-weapon States relations with specific nuclear-weapon States are an essential ingredient in the national security.

The United States believes that in view of these diverse interests an effective and practical way of enhancing the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is by individual declarations by nuclear-weapon States on this subject rather than by single world-wide treaty on this subject, which it does not believe would be a fruitful subject of negotiation. The United States also recognizes that this approach can be buttressed by treaty obligations regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons in regional situations where it seems appropriate such as in the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

For its part the position of the United States with respect to assurances is based on a Presidential declaration which reads as follows:

“The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack.”

The United States is convinced that the solemn pledges given by the nuclear Powers during the special session represent an instant measure of security for the non-nuclear-weapon States, and believes that the international community should take cognizance of them. For this reason, we have suggested that the Security Council take formal note of them. The United States is not committed, however, to this approach as the sole way of proceeding. There may be other forums, such as the Committee on Disarmament, in which the question of negative security assurances could be treated, so long as all views and all ways of treating this subject are open for consideration.

The United States believes that this proposal of the United States should be put before the Committee on Disarmament if it should take this matter under consideration.

^c Enclosed in the letter dated 17 November 1978 from the representative of the United States of America to the Secretary of the First Committee (see A/C.1/33/7, annex).

List of resolutions on disarmament and related questions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session, held from 19 September 1978 to 29 January 1979 (including voting)

	<i>Reference in text</i>
<i>Resolutions on disarmament questions</i>	
33/57	246
Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference	
<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 122 to 1, with 16 abstentions.^a as follows:</i>	
<i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire.	
<i>Against:</i> Albania.	
<i>Abstaining:</i> Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma.	

^a The delegation of Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

- Equatorial Guinea, France, India, Israel, Mozambique, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia.
- 33/58 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/76 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 287
Adopted without a vote
- 33/59 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
Resolution A 321
Adopted without a vote
Resolution B 325
Adopted without a vote
- 33/60 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/78 206
Adopted by a recorded vote of 134 to 1, with 5 abstentions,^b as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.
Against: China.
Abstaining: Argentina, Cuba, Ethiopia, Fiji, France.
- 33/61 Implementation of General Assembly resolution 32/79 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) 288
Adopted without a vote

^b *Idem.*

- 33/62 Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade 139
Adopted without a vote
- 33/63 Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 289
Adopted by a recorded vote of 136 to none, with 3 abstentions,^c as follows:
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.
- Against:* None.
- Abstaining:* France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
- 33/64 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 292
Adopted by a recorded vote of 138 to none, with 1 abstention,^d as follows:
- In favour:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German

^c *Idem.*^d The delegations of Chad and Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Israel.

33/65

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

294

Adopted by a recorded vote of 97 to 2, with 37 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,^e Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire.

Against: Bhutan, India.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malawi, Mongolia, Norway, Panama, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Singapore, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

^e The delegation of Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as an abstention.

Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

Resolution A

339

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to none, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, Pakistan, Poland, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam.

Resolution B

339

Adopted by a recorded vote of 118 to none, with 24 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua, New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,

Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

33/67

Reduction of military budgets

431

Adopted by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 18 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Iraq, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zambia.

33/68

Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

397

Adopted by a recorded vote of 130 to none, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican

Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

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|-------|--|-----|
| 33/69 | World Disarmament Conference | 151 |
| | <i>Adopted without a vote</i> | |
| 33/70 | United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects | 364 |
| | <i>Adopted without a vote</i> | |
| 33/71 | Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session | |
| | Resolution A—Military and nuclear collaboration with Israel | 82 |
| | <i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 72 to 30, with 37 abstentions, as follows:</i> | |
| | <i>In favour:</i> Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia. | |
| | <i>Against:</i> Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Ger- | |

many, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Suriname, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

Abstaining: Argentina, Barbados, Burma, Central African Empire, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Greece, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Nepal, Panama, Papua New-Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Upper Volta, Venezuela.

Resolution B—Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

180

Adopted by a recorded vote of 103 to 18, with 18 abstentions,^f as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Austria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Resolution C—Urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons

205

Adopted by a recorded vote of 130 to 2, with 8 abstentions, as follows:

^fThe delegation of Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: China, France.

Abstaining: Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Resolution D—Disarmament Week 83

Adopted without a vote

Resolution E—United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament 461

Adopted without a vote

Resolution F—Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session 84

Adopted without a vote

Resolution G—Dissemination of information on the arms race and disarmament 459

Adopted without a vote

Resolution H—Nuclear disarmament negotiations and disarmament machinery 86 and 124

Adopted by a recorded vote of 129 to none, with 13 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czecho-

slovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,⁸ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Resolution I—Disarmament and development 445

Adopted without a vote

Resolution J—Monitoring of disarmament agreements and strengthening of international security 87

Adopted by a recorded vote of 121 to none, with 18 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra

⁸ The delegation of the Netherlands subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yeman, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America.

Resolution K—Programme of research and studies on disarmament 88 and 458

Adopted without a vote

Resolution L—Paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session 89

Adopted without a vote

Resolution M—Study on the relationship between disarmament and development 444

Adopted without a vote

Resolution N—New philosophy on disarmament 90 and 458

Adopted without a vote

33/72

Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States

Resolution A 227

Adopted by a recorded vote of 137 to 2, with 4 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thai-

land, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania, China.

Abstaining: France, Pakistan, Somalia, Turkey.

Resolution B

227

Adopted by a recorded vote of 124 to none, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Greece, India, Ireland,^h Israel, Mongolia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America.

33/91

General and complete disarmament

Resolution A—Report of the Disarmament Commission

119

Adopted without a vote

Resolution B—Confidence-building measures

120

Adopted by a recorded vote of 132 to none, with 2 abstentions,ⁱ as follows:

^h The delegation of Ireland subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

ⁱ The delegation of Mauritius subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Kuwait, United Arab Emirates.

Resolution C—Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

195

Adopted by a recorded vote of 127 to 1, with 10 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic,^j Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emir-

^j The delegation of the German Democratic Republic subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as an abstention.

ates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania.

Abstaining: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Hungary, Malawi, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Resolution D—Study on nuclear weapons

183

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to none, with 21 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Angola, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Resolution E—Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament

381

Adopted by a recorded vote of 93 to none, with 40 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Canada, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,

Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Oman, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Resolution F—Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present

175

Adopted by a recorded vote of 105 to 18, with 12 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Abstaining: Angola, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Gabon, Ireland, Israel, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sweden.

Resolution G—Committee on Disarmament

122

Adopted by a recorded vote of 126 to 9, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Mexico.

Resolution H—Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

177

Adopted by a recorded vote of 108 to 10, with 16 abstentions,^k as follows:

In favour: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

^k The delegation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the resolution.

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bhutan, Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Guinea, India, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Sao Tome and Principe.

Resolution I—Disarmament and international security 466

Adopted without a vote

Resolutions on related questions

33/3 Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency 271

Adopted without a vote

33/4 Peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development 273

Adopted without a vote

33/5 Effects of atomic radiation —

Adopted without a vote

33/73 Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace —

Adopted by a recorded vote of 138 to none, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatamala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Israel, United States of America.

33/74

Non-interference in the internal affairs of States

Adopted by a recorded vote of 128 to none, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

33/75

Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security

92, 125
and 398

Adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to 2, with 19 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swazi-

land, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Israel, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

33/96

Report of the Special Committee on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Non-Use of Force in International Relations

Adopted by a recorded vote of 117 to 1, with 23 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Empire, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

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