



**UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL**



Distr.
GENERAL

S/13691
14 December 1979

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period from 9 June to 10 December 1979)

CONTENTS

| | <u>Paragraphs</u> |
|---|-------------------|
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE | 2 - 12 |
| A. Composition and command | 2 - 12 |
| B. Deployment | 10 - 12 |
| II. ACCOMMODATION AND LOGISTICS | 13 - 18 |
| A. Accommodations | 13 |
| B. Logistics | 14 - 18 |
| III. FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE | 19 - 51 |
| A. Guidelines and terms of reference | 19 |
| B. Co-operation with UNTSO | 20 |
| C. Contacts with the parties | 21 |
| D. Situation in southern Lebanon and activities of UNIFIL | 23 |
| E. Humanitarian activities | 50 |
| IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS | 52 |
| V. OBSERVATIONS | 53 |

Annex: Map of UNIFIL deployment as of December 1979

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report describes developments relating to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the period from 9 June to 10 December 1979. The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive account of the activities of UNIFIL in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and extended by resolutions 434 (1978), 444 (1979) and 450 (1979). The last extension of the Force's mandate, as decided by the Security Council in resolution 450 (1979), was for a period of six months, until 19 December 1979.

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

A. Composition and command

Composition

2. The composition of UNIFIL as of 10 December 1979 was as follows:

Infantry battalions

| | |
|-------------|-----|
| Fiji | 658 |
| Ghana | 300 |
| Ireland | 653 |
| Nepal | 644 |
| Netherlands | 865 |
| Nigeria | 700 |
| Norway | 659 |
| Senegal | 591 |

Headquarters camp command

| | |
|---------|----|
| Ghana | 57 |
| Ireland | 47 |

Engineer company

| | |
|--------|----|
| France | 94 |
|--------|----|

Logistic units

| | |
|--------|------------|
| France | 524 |
| Italy | 33 |
| Norway | <u>301</u> |

Total 6,126

/...

3. In addition to the above personnel, UNIFIL is assisted by 38 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

4. The following unit adjustments were effected during the period covered by this report:

(a) The Norwegian helicopter wing was replaced by an Italian helicopter unit in July 1979;

(b) As a result of the withdrawal of the defence platoon from the Irish headquarters company and its replacement by Ghanaian troops, an integrated Headquarters camp command has been established. Ireland has maintained its administrative personnel under the new structure;

(c) The French engineer company was reduced by one platoon, and a unit of equal strength was added to the French logistic battalion;

(d) The Ghanaian contingent which was assigned to UNIFIL (S/13496 and S/13497) became fully operational on 16 September 1979.

5. At present, UNIFIL strength stands at 126 in excess of the ceiling of 6,000 decided on by the Council, but this is a temporary situation that will be rectified once ongoing rotations and planned operational and logistical readjustments are completed. As mentioned in my last report, the Force was below its authorized strength at the end of the preceding mandate (S/13384, para. 4) and remained so until the arrival of the Ghanaian battalion.

Command

6. Command of UNIFIL continues to be exercised by Major-General Emmanuel A. Erskine. Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo continues as the Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East.

Rotation of contingents

7. During the present reporting period, Fijian, French, Irish, Nepalese, Nigerian and Norwegian contingents carried out full rotations. The Dutch battalion rotates on a periodic frequency different from that of other battalions. The Ghanaian battalion element which had been temporarily transferred from UNEF was replaced by a unit of equivalent strength shortly after its arrival in the mission area.

Casualties

8. During the period covered by this report, five members of UNIFIL were killed and 15 wounded as a result of hostile action in the course of operational duties. Two soldiers lost their lives and 16 were injured as a result of accidents.

/...

Discipline

9. The discipline, understanding and steadfastness of the members of UNIFIL, who have worked in difficult and often dangerous conditions, have been of a high order, reflecting credit on the soldiers and their commanders, as well as on the countries that contribute contingents to the Force.

B. Deployment

10. There have been some changes in the deployment of the Force since the presentation of my last report (S/13384). With the arrival of the Ghanaian troops, in September, the number of infantry battalions was brought back to eight. This entailed a redeployment in the south-eastern part of the central sector, where the operational strain on the Irish battalion has now been reduced.

11. The present deployment of UNIFIL is as follows (see annexed map):

(a) The Force headquarters is located at Naqoura.

(b) The Senegalese battalion is deployed in the northern part of the western sector, with its headquarters at Marakah.

(c) The Fijian battalion is deployed in the southern part of the western sector, with its headquarters at Qana.

(d) The Nigerian battalion is deployed in the northern part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Tayr Zibna.

(e) The Dutch battalion is deployed in the south-western part of the central sector with its headquarters at Haris.

(f) The Irish battalion is deployed in the south-eastern part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Tibnin.

(g) The Ghanaian battalion is deployed in the eastern part of the central sector, with its headquarters at Kafr Dunin.

(h) The Nepalese battalion is deployed in the western part of the eastern sector, with its headquarters at Blate.

(i) The Norwegian battalion is deployed in the eastern part of the eastern sector, with its headquarters at Ebel Es-Saqi.

(j) The headquarters camp command, composed of Ghanaian and Irish troops, is based in Naqoura.

(k) The French logistic component is located at Naqoura.

/...

- (l) The French engineer company is located at Ras al Lawzah.
- (m) The Norwegian logistic component is deployed as follows:
 - (i) the maintenance company is located in the vicinity of Tibnin;
 - (ii) the medical company is located at Naqoura.
- (n) The Italian helicopter wing is based in Naqoura.
- (o) UNTSO military observers, organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) based at Naqoura, continue to man OP Lab. The other four UNTSO observation posts (Hin, Ras, Mar and Khiam) are manned by members of the Dutch, Irish, Nigerian and Norwegian battalions.
- (p) A composite guard detachment is situated in Tyre barracks. This 45-man unit from one battalion continues to be drawn on a two-week rotation basis from all infantry battalions in the Force.

12. As mentioned in my last report, a Lebanese national army battalion of 500, all ranks, was introduced and deployed in the UNIFIL area of operation in April 1979 (S/13384, para. 18). This unit is under the operational control of the Force Commander, and its members take part in patrol activities and in the manning of observation posts and check-points jointly with UNIFIL soldiers.

II. ACCOMMODATION AND LOGISTICS

A. Accommodations

13. Despite difficulties caused by periodic firing and shelling in the UNIFIL area of operation, considerable progress was achieved on the transfer of personnel from tents to prefabricated installations both at Naqoura headquarters and in the field. At Naqoura, work on storage facilities for supplies is nearing completion. Likewise, sufficient sleeping quarters will soon be available to accommodate all military personnel, including those in transit. Three new prefabricated office buildings have been erected, and a fourth is under construction. In the contingent areas, work on the replacement of tented by prefabricated accommodation has continued, and erection of cock-houses and dining-halls at unit headquarters has commenced. Should the mandate of UNIFIL be extended by the Security Council, this programme will continue and consideration will be given to the transfer of personnel now in privately owned buildings to prefabricated accommodation. Most of the prefabricated buildings in the battalion areas have been erected by the battalion engineers on a self-help basis. In some cases, the French engineer company has assisted in their construction.

/...

B. Logistics

14. During the present mandate, changes in the logistic support structure included the replacement of the Norwegian helicopter wing by an Italian helicopter unit and the increase of the French logistic component by a full platoon. The latter reinforcement constitutes an important step in UNIFIL efforts to redress a long-standing imbalance between the combat units of the Force and its logistic components. A supplementary measure will be the deployment of 50 additional logistic personnel generously offered by the Government of France and expected to arrive in Naqoura in the near future. The increase in the strength of the logistic units would be part of the over-all readjustment scheme referred to in paragraph 5 of the present report. There have been no changes in the function of UNIFIL logistic units as described in my report of 13 September 1978 (S/12845, paras. 22 and 23). Communications continue to be provided by contingents and by Field Service Officers.

15. During the present reporting period, UNIFIL has achieved substantial progress in its efforts to increase purchases of supplies from Lebanese sources or through Lebanon. The Ghanaian, Nepalese, Nigerian, Norwegian and Senegalese battalions, as well as the Norwegian maintenance company, are now receiving all of their supplies of fresh rations from Lebanon. When possible, incoming shipments are channelled through the port of Beirut. However, since difficulties of communication and supply in Lebanon have not been altogether overcome, arrangements for supplementary provisioning from sources outside Lebanon have been maintained.

16. Health services to Force personnel have continued to be provided by the UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura. In view of the shortage of qualified Lebanese personnel in the UNIFIL area, the hospital, in conjunction with the battalions' medical and para-medical staff, have continued to assist the local population as required. To improve these services, action has been taken by UNICEF, in co-operation with the Lebanese Government and UNIFIL, to establish civilian health centres at Qana, Marakah, Et-Taibe and Shebaa, in the Fijian, Senegalese, Nigerian and Norwegian areas of operation. The intention, however, is to have the Lebanese Government take over these centres as soon as qualified Lebanese personnel becomes available.

17. During the month of August, when there was intensive armed activity in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL wounded were evacuated by helicopter to the hospital in Naqoura. In some instances, flights were undertaken at considerable risk to the helicopter crews and hospital personnel involved. Because of the hospital's limited capacity and facilities, the severely wounded were, as on past occasions, evacuated by helicopter to Rambam Hospital in Haifa.

18. Appreciation should be expressed to the Israeli Government for expediting the entry and administrative processing of shipments consigned to the Force in transit through the Port of Haifa and for the assistance provided by Israeli health authorities in the treatment of wounded UNIFIL personnel.

/...

III. FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCE

A. Guidelines and terms of reference

19. During this period of its mandate, UNIFIL continued to operate in accordance with the guidelines set out in my report of 19 March 1978 on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) (S/12611), which was approved by the Council in its resolution 426 (1978). According to that report, UNIFIL was envisaged as a two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory to the international border. Once this was achieved, UNIFIL was to establish and maintain an area of operation. In that connexion, the Force was to supervise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful character of the area of operation, control movement and take all measures deemed necessary to ensure the effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in the area.

B. Co-operation with UNTSO

20. Military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL), continue to assist and co-operate with UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks under the institutional and operational arrangements described in my reports of 12 January 1979 (S/13026, para. 14), and 8 June 1979 (S/13384, para. 15). The only new development to be recorded during the present reporting period concerns the withdrawal last July of the liaison observer team from Chateau de Beaufort, north of the Litani River. This was done following heavy shelling of the area by the de facto forces which resulted in extensive damage to OGL facilities, rendering them unsafe for the military observers to perform their duties in a normal manner. Efforts to have this observation post relocated in the same area have so far been unsuccessful. However, and as a temporary measure, UNIFIL has been carrying out periodic patrols, with a view to maintaining an active United Nations presence in the area.

C. Contacts with the parties

21. Contacts with the parties concerned have been maintained both at United Nations headquarters and in the area, with a view to further implementing the UNIFIL mandate. In pursuance of this objective, Mr. Brian E. Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, visited the region from 30 July to 3 August 1979. In the course of that visit, Mr. Urquhart had discussions with senior officials in Lebanon and Israel, with the Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East and with the Commander of UNIFIL. General Siilasvuo, the Chief Co-ordinator, also maintained contact with the parties concerned in efforts aimed at securing progress in the further implementation of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 434 (1978), 444 (1979) and 450 (1979). Additionally, UNIFIL remained in touch with Mr. Iqbal A. Akhund, Co-ordinator of Assistance for Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon, with a view to helping his office in the fulfillment

/...

of the tasks envisaged in General Assembly resolution 33/146. The services of Mr. Samir Sanbar, Director of the United Nations Information Centre in Beirut, continue to be beneficial to the Force. As in the past, the headquarters of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in Beirut functions as a liaison office for UNIFIL and for the Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East and provides valuable assistance to the Force. UNIFIL has also established its own office in Beirut, which, in addition to providing accommodation for UNIFIL personnel on duty, also serves as a location where UNIFIL representatives can meet with Lebanese authorities and others.

22. General Erskine has maintained constant contact with the parties on matters concerning the deployment and functioning of the Force. In the area of operation, negotiations and consultations were held by members of UNIFIL with the various armed groups, as required, to ensure the smooth operation of the Force, minimize the risks of confrontation and defuse dangerous situations resulting from serious incidents. Such activities were generally undertaken by UNIFIL headquarters staff, OGL military observer teams and battalion commanders. The battalion commanders investigated local violations of the cease-fire and all other situations involving incidents which might have led to hostile activities within the UNIFIL area of operation. UNIFIL also maintained regular contacts with the Governor of southern Lebanon on questions relating to the restoration of Lebanese civilian administrative presence in the area and the provision of humanitarian assistance to the local population. Similar contacts were maintained with civilian and gendarmerie authorities in Tyre, as well as in the UNIFIL area of operation, and with the local population in general.

D. Situation in southern Lebanon and activities of UNIFIL

23. The Security Council, in resolution 450 (1979), reiterated that the objectives of UNIFIL as set out in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 444 (1979) must be achieved. However, despite intensive efforts both at United Nations headquarters and in the field to fulfil the UNIFIL mandate, it proved very difficult to make significant progress during the period under review.

24. In July and August, the situation in southern Lebanon deteriorated markedly. There were increasing attempts by the de facto forces (Christian and associated militias) to encroach upon the UNIFIL area of deployment, and four positions were established by them inside that area. At the same time, there were increasing attempts by the armed elements - mainly the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Lebanese National Movement - to infiltrate the UNIFIL area. The efforts of UNIFIL to stop and contain the attempts at encroachment or infiltration led to a number of incidents, some of them serious, involving UNIFIL personnel. On several occasions, Israeli forces, alone or accompanied by de facto forces, undertook incursions into the UNIFIL area.

25. During the same period, there were exchanges of fire, in increasing number and intensity, between the armed elements and the de facto forces, most of them across and over the UNIFIL area, and some within that area. Concurrently, the

/...

level of conflict between the Israeli forces and PLO outside the UNIFIL area escalated dangerously. There were, on the one hand, several bomb explosion incidents in Israel or Israeli-occupied territory for which the PLO claimed responsibility and, on the other, large-scale Israeli artillery, air and sea attacks against PLO targets in southern Lebanon.

26. On 23 August, following a heavy and extended exchange of fire, I issued an appeal to the parties concerned to avoid any hostile actions against the UNIFIL troops and to co-operate with the Force in the performance of the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council. On 24 August, I instructed the Force Commander to renew his efforts to obtain an immediate cease-fire in the area. In the afternoon of the same day, the President of the Security Council also issued an appeal for restraint on the part of all concerned, so that hostilities could be brought to an end.

27. In reply to these urgent appeals, relayed by the Force Commander, all agreed not to open fire unless fired upon. Thus, a de facto cease-fire was established in southern Lebanon and became effective on the morning of 26 August.

28. On 28 August, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, requesting the adoption of specific measures in the interest of consolidating peace and security in southern Lebanon (A/34/444-S/13519). At the request of the Government of Lebanon (S/13516 and S/13520), the Security Council met on 29 and 30 August to discuss the situation in southern Lebanon. At the conclusion of the debate on 30 August, the President of the Security Council appealed to all concerned to make permanent the cessation of hostilities and to implement Security Council resolution 425 (1978) in all its parts (S/PV.2165, p. 52).

29. In September, I began formulating, in consultation with the Lebanese Government, a plan of action for UNIFIL, with a view to expediting the implementation of Security Council resolutions. The plan would provide for specific steps to be taken by UNIFIL and the parties concerned by stages. Those stages included, in the initial phase, the consolidation of the cease-fire, the consolidation of the UNIFIL area of operation and undertakings by the parties to exercise restraint and refrain from aggressive acts. The main long-term objective of the plan would remain the restoration of the sovereignty and effective authority of the Lebanese Government up to the internationally recognized boundary and a return to normalization, including the reactivation of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, in accordance with the 1949 General Armistice Agreement and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The Lebanese Government indicated in that connexion that it planned to deploy additional Lebanese military and civilian personnel in southern Lebanon at an early date.

30. In the field, UNIFIL took a series of measures to consolidate the cease-fire in accordance with the plan of action. The Force Commander requested the parties not to open fire, even if fired upon, but to report firing violations to UNIFIL, which would take the necessary steps to bring it to a halt. To that end, UNIFIL made arrangements to improve its lines of communication with all the parties concerned.

/...

31. Increased efforts were also made, both through the Chief Co-ordinator and by the Force Commander, to stop and contain encroachments by the de facto forces and infiltrations by armed elements. As encroachments and infiltrations are closely linked, one leading to the other, it was felt that those problems must be solved simultaneously. As a result of the efforts of UNIFIL, there was some reduction in infiltration attempts, but the de facto forces have so far refused to remove their four positions from the UNIFIL area.

32. In order better to contain attempts at infiltration or incursion, UNIFIL undertook several operational changes, in accordance with a new perimeter-oriented concept involving the redeployment of troops in greater density along the perimeter of the UNIFIL area. Additionally, UNIFIL has been steadily trying to augment its surveillance and detection capability, which was originally based on networks of check-points, observation posts and mobile and foot patrols. In view of continuing attempts at infiltration and incursion, the difficulty of the terrain, the limited number of troops and an increasing number of civilians moving freely in densely populated areas, it became necessary to widen the use of surveillance devices in UNIFIL operations. As a first step, the number of night-vision binoculars and stronger search lights was increased. That was followed by the introduction of sophisticated ground surveillance radars, which have provided UNIFIL with an early warning system at medium range and greatly enhanced its capacity to block incursion attempts and apprehend infiltrators. As a further measure to improve the Force's operational capability and its reaction time to incidents, armoured personnel carriers have been introduced into a number of contingents.

33. UNIFIL also continued its efforts to establish an adequate security zone around its headquarters at Naqoura. However, although there has not been a recurrence of the serious incidents of 29 March 1979 (S/13258, para. 18) and 18-19 April 1979 (S/13254), conditions in the Naqoura area have remained unsatisfactory as a result of restrictions periodically imposed by the de facto forces on the freedom of movement of UNIFIL.

34. After the establishment of the de facto cease-fire, the situation in southern Lebanon remained generally quiet. Regrettably, there have recently been an increasing number of firing incidents.

35. The incidents which took place during the period under review are described in more detail in the sections below.

1. Incidents involving the armed elements

36. Armed elements continued their attempts at infiltration into the UNIFIL area of operation, particularly before the establishment of the cease-fire on 26 August. During the period covered by the present report, 110 infiltration attempts, involving 785 armed persons, were recorded by UNIFIL. UNIFIL troops have exerted their best efforts to stop and contain such infiltrations, armed or uniformed personnel being stopped at the check-points and prevented from entering the UNIFIL area of operation. Whenever infiltrators are discovered inside the UNIFIL area, they are apprehended, disarmed and removed from the area.

/...

The operational improvements reported in paragraph 32 above have substantially increased the effectiveness of UNIFIL in detecting and controlling infiltration attempts.

37. Measures taken by UNIFIL to prevent infiltrators have led, on occasion, to serious incidents with the armed elements. On 14 August, a Nigerian patrol was ambushed by unidentified armed persons after a Nigerian unit had stopped and turned back infiltrators; four Nigerians were wounded in this incident, one seriously. On 22 August, in the wake of an incident in the Fijian area of operation in which one member of the Lebanese National Movement was killed, a Fijian position which had been reinforced by Dutch soldiers came under fire from unidentified armed elements; four UNIFIL personnel were wounded, one of them critically. On 24 August, two Fijian patrol vehicles were ambushed by armed elements, presumably members of the Lebanese National Movement, in consequence of which three Fijian soldiers were killed and two wounded. Finally, on 2 October, a Senegalese soldier was fired upon and wounded while on check-point duty.

38. During the initial phase of the period under review, armed elements hijacked a number of United Nations vehicles. Those incidents, however, ceased after 17 August, and most of the captured vehicles were recovered with the help of the PLO liaison office in Tyre. There were also, until early September, seven instances of firing at United Nations helicopters by armed elements from points along the coast north of and within the UNIFIL area of deployment. In addition, there were a number of cases of firing by armed elements at UNIFIL patrols and vehicles.

39. Strong protests were lodged by UNIFIL with the PLO Lebanese National Movement Joint Command in all those instances. The situation improved significantly following meetings between UNIFIL and representatives of the PLO Lebanese National Movement Joint Command.

2. Incidents involving the de facto forces

40. As noted in my last report (S/13384, para. 26), the de facto forces had already shown by early June tendency to use force, not only in order to frustrate the UNIFIL objective to deploy more widely in the area under their control but also to encroach into the UNIFIL area of deployment. That tendency increased markedly in late July and early August, when the de facto forces established four positions inside the UNIFIL area at Jebal Basil, Rshaf, Bayt Yahun and Et Taibe.

41. The establishment of those positions has, among other things, made it more difficult for UNIFIL to stop and contain infiltrations by armed elements and to negotiate a thinning out of those elements in its area. The position at Bayt Yahun, which commands the regions of Brashit and Haddathah, has become particularly sensitive in the light of the reaction to it by armed elements. They attempt to infiltrate into those regions on the grounds that the de facto forces can use Bayt Yahun as a staging area for further encroachments and attacks directed at villages inside the UNIFIL area. It must also be noted that from Bayt Yahun and Rshaf, the de facto forces have, on repeated occasions,

/...

fired against targets in the areas of the Dutch and Irish battalions. Efforts at various levels to have those four positions removed have, so far, not proved successful.

42. During the period under review, incidents involving the de facto forces occurred with great frequency. In addition to the encroachments mentioned above, these incidents were related to restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNIFIL personnel, vehicles and helicopters, firing and other provocative acts against the UNIFIL positions and patrols. The firing on the UNIFIL positions occurred frequently, particularly in the Dutch and Irish battalion areas, and included the use of small arms, heavy machine-guns, mortars and tanks. The de facto forces were recently involved in two cases of highjacking of UNIFIL vehicles, one of which was recovered.

43. A practice resorted to by the de facto forces with increasing frequency is the kidnaping of civilians inside the UNIFIL area of deployment, as well as threats to villages, especially in the Irish and Dutch battalion areas. In a typical recent incident, leaders of six villages were summoned to meet a representative of the de facto forces on 27 November. They were served with an ultimatum to sign, by 2 December, a document calling for the withdrawal of UNIFIL from certain of the villages. An Israeli Defence Force (IDF) officer was present during part of the meeting. On 4 December, the village of Yatar was shelled, resulting in the destruction of a house and the wounding of a small girl. Again, on 7 December, leaders of the same six villages received a letter from Major Haddad, summoning them, under threat of force, to meet him, with a view to discussing arrangements for their joining his "Free Lebanon". In the event, the village leaders refused to meet Haddad and asked instead for UNIFIL protection, as did the Government of Lebanon. In that connexion, UNIFIL reinforced its presence in the area and was in immediate contact with all concerned, urging restraint. Despite those efforts, on 8 December, the de facto forces subjected the villages of Haddathah, Tibnin, Haris and Yatar to mortar fire, which resulted in the wounding of four civilians, one of them seriously.

44. As indicated in previous reports, UNIFIL maintains a number of positions inside the enclave controlled by the de facto forces. Those positions have frequently been harassed. Armed action directed at OP Ras, one of the five UNTSO observation posts along the armistice demarcation line, must be mentioned in view of three separate attacks directed against that post over a four-month period. The first assault began on 31 July. The post was initially surrounded by 15 members of the de facto forces and submitted to round-the-clock harassment for three days. On 24 September, a group of approximately eight persons belonging to the de facto forces subjected OP Ras to small-arms and machine-gun fire for approximately one hour. Finally, on 6 November, the post was surrounded by 30 members of the de facto forces who fired over and at the post.

45. On a number of occasions, UNIFIL traffic through the enclave controlled by the de facto forces has been restricted or prohibited, roads having been blocked by armoured personnel carriers, half-tracks and tanks of the de facto forces. Helicopter flights over the enclave have been banned altogether, and movement of UNIFIL vehicles is permitted only four days a week. A most serious situation

/...

developed from 6 to 8 November, when all traffic between UNIFIL headquarters and its battalions was barred to UNIFIL vehicles, an action that was apparently taken in an attempt to force UNIFIL to agree to allow the de facto forces to reinforce their position at Bayt Yahun. In the event, that effort was successfully resisted.

3. Incidents involving the Israeli forces

46. During the period under review, there were several incidents involving the IDF. On 17 August, Israeli soldiers entered the village of Shaqra in the Irish battalion area of operation and demolished two houses. On 20 August, approximately 30 IDF personnel penetrated to a depth of 200 metres into the Norwegian area of operations in the vicinity of Kafar Chouba. They were intercepted and stopped by UNIFIL and, following negotiations, they withdrew. On 22 August, a force of about 50 IDF soldiers made an incursion into the village of Brashit in the Irish area of operation, destroying two houses. When an Irish patrol attempted to halt the incursion, some IDF elements fired at the patrol. On 13 September, there was an incursion carried out by approximately 13 IDF soldiers west of the village of Chebaa in the Norwegian area of operation. As regards the area controlled by the de facto forces, IDF personnel were frequently observed crossing into Lebanese territory.

4. Exchanges of fire across the UNIFIL area

47. During the same period, there were serious exchanges of fire across the area where UNIFIL is fully deployed, involving the armed elements, on one side, and, on the other, the de facto forces or the Israeli forces or both combined. The firing, which in some instances impacted inside the UNIFIL area, reached a peak during the period 19 to 25 August, during which the IDF fired a total of 155 artillery rounds, the de facto forces a total of 3,250 artillery and mortar rounds and the armed elements a total of 426 artillery and mortar rounds, as well as several rockets. Other instances of heavy exchange of fire occurred on 8 and 28 June, 19-22 July, and 2 August. Following the establishment of the cease-fire, the situation was quiet for nearly two months; but since mid-October, there have been several serious firing incidents.

5. Other incidents

48. The planting of mines in the UNIFIL area has been a disturbing development of relatively recent occurrence. On 29 October, a Lebanese civilian was killed after his tractor hit a mine in the vicinity of Et-Taibe. Another mine was later found at the same place and defused. On 9 November, a Dutch battalion truck hit a mine as it was travelling on a track in the neighbourhood of one of the Dutch coastal positions. One Dutch non-commissioned officer was killed and one soldier wounded. Another mine was located later at the same place and later defused. On 26 November, an explosion, presumably caused by a mine, damaged a truck of the de facto forces approximately 200 metres south of the village of Rshaf. Two men were reported wounded. On 27 November, a patrol of the French engineer company found a mine in the vicinity of Bayt Yahun and defused it. In all these cases, it has been impossible to determine the identity of those responsible for planting the mines.

/...

49. In a situation as complex as the one in which the Force has to operate, it is inevitable that incidents involving Israeli forces and Palestinian armed elements outside the UNIFIL area of operation will have a bearing on developments in the area. This has continued to be the case whenever there have been bomb explosions and other activities inside Israel or the Israeli-occupied territories for which Palestinian organizations claim responsibility. The same can be said about the extensive air and sea attacks by Israeli forces on targets in Lebanon, as well as the artillery and mortars attacks by the Israeli forces and the de facto forces against Palestinian targets in the Tyre pocket and north of the Litani River, especially in the sector extending from the Chateau de Beaufort-Nabatiyeh area to that of Hasbaya. As in the past, such incidents have inevitably compounded the problems facing UNIFIL. They have been brought to the attention of the Security Council and/or the General Assembly by the Permanent Representative of Israel (A/34/333-S/13412, A/34/334-S/13413, A/34/387-S/13474, A/34/403-S/13490, A/34/429-S/13508, A/34/435-S/13511, A/34/498-S/13545, A/34/632-S/13593, A/34/681-S/13625, A/34/705-S/13635), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/13452, A/34/378-S/13464, S/13486, A/34/401-S/13488, A/34/433-S/13509, A/34/434-S/13510, S/13516) and the representatives of PLO (S/13417, S/13421, A/34/350-S/13433, S/13507).

E. Humanitarian activities

50. During the period under review, UNIFIL carried out its humanitarian activities in close collaboration with the Governor of southern Lebanon and the United Nations Co-ordinator of Assistance for Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon. UNIFIL also continued its co-operation with United Nations programmes, particularly UNICEF, in efforts aimed at assisting the Lebanese Government in the normalization of socio-economic conditions in southern Lebanon. Through its humanitarian section, the Force continued to participate in the implementation of projects involving restoration of water, electricity and health services, distribution of supplementary food supplies, rebuilding and repair of houses, schools and roads, and providing help, as required, in resolving cases of kidnaping.

51. Of particular significance was the holding of intermediate and baccalaureat examinations for more than 1,000 students from the districts of Bint Jubail and Marjayoun, the first to take place since 1974. The examinations were conducted at UNIFIL headquarters from 7 to 23 July. At the request and with the co-operation of the Lebanese Ministry of Education, UNIFIL made all the necessary arrangements.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

52. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of six months beyond 18 December 1979, the costs of maintaining the Force for that period, assuming continuance of its existing strength and responsibilities, are estimated at \$64,603,000 gross (\$64,060,000 net). These estimates are based on my report of 25 October 1979 to the General Assembly (A/34/570, para. 11), and reflect the recommendations made by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in its related report of 15 November 1979 (A/34/689, para. 14).

/...

V. OBSERVATIONS

53. Despite continuous efforts at all levels both at United Nations Headquarters and in the field, UNIFIL has reached the end of its fourth mandate without adequate progress being achieved in the further implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978). During the earlier part of the period under review, tension in southern Lebanon reached a critical level as a result of heavy exchanges of fire and other incidents. The de facto cease-fire brought about through UNIFIL on 26 August defused a situation which was highly dangerous, but the basic problems remain unresolved.

54. The essential problem which UNIFIL faces derives from its inability to assume complete and peaceful control of its area of operation as a preliminary to the restoration of the effective authority of the Lebanese Government in the entire area. The assumption upon which Security Council resolution 425 (1978) was based was that this process was in the interest of all the parties concerned and that UNIFIL would therefore have their full co-operation in fulfilling its mandate. This has not proved to be the case.

55. A main element of the problem is the intransigence of the de facto forces. Apart from refusing to co-operate with UNIFIL in the further deployment of the Force in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, they have continued, and even intensified, their attempts at encroachment of the UNIFIL area. The four positions they have established in the UNIFIL area are a source of constant tension and instability; additionally, the increased harassment of the local population in that area is a disturbing development. The de facto forces have tried to force the inhabitants of certain villages, under threat, to join their ranks and to oppose UNIFIL and, when the villagers refused to comply, they have, on occasion, resorted to shelling, causing casualties. Strenuous efforts have been made by UNIFIL, in close co-operation with the Lebanese authorities, to contain the encroachments, to have them removed and to protect the local population. These efforts will be pursued with determination.

56. Another problem results from the continuing attempts by armed elements to infiltrate the UNIFIL area. While PLO has renewed its assurances of co-operation with UNIFIL, infiltrations have nevertheless continued, although their number has diminished since the establishment of the cease-fire. Regrettably, as described in the above report, some of these attempts at infiltration have led to casualties. These infiltration attempts are usually explained by PLO and the Lebanon National Movement as being defensive measures necessitated by the encroachments or the aggressive intentions of the de facto forces acting with the encouragement and assistance of Israel. The de facto forces, in turn, seek to justify encroachments and other activities as defensive measures against the activities of the armed elements. This is a vicious circle which must be broken if the cease-fire is to be strengthened and progress is to be made, in the interest of all concerned, towards the implementation of Security Council resolutions.

57. It is evident that the maintenance of the cease-fire and the consolidation

/...

of the UNIFIL area of operation are priority objectives in this process. With this in mind, a plan of action has been formulated in close consultation with the Lebanese Government, setting out these objectives as its first essential steps. The main long-term objective of the plan would be the restoration of the sovereignty and effective authority of the Lebanese Government up to the internationally recognized boundary and a return to normalization, including the reactivation of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission, in accordance with the 1949 General Armistice Agreement, the validity of which was reaffirmed by Security Council resolution 450 (1979). The Lebanese Government has given full support to this plan and has undertaken to deploy additional Lebanese military and civilian personnel in southern Lebanon at an early date. In this connexion, the Lebanese Government has also informed me recently of the resolutions adopted at the Tenth Arab Summit Conference held in Tunis from 20 to 22 November 1979.

58. As I mentioned in my previous report, an essential factor in UNIFIL's success in the implementation of its mandate is the position of the Israeli Government, inasmuch as the de facto forces are supported by Israel. The attitude of Israel as regards southern Lebanon is apparently dictated by Israel's perception of its own over-all security, which is in turn interrelated with the situation in the rest of Lebanon and in the Middle East as a whole. The impact of this interrelationship has continued to be felt during the period under review and underlines once again the necessity for progress towards a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East.

59. For all the difficulties which UNIFIL continues to face, any move to withdraw or reduce the Force at this juncture, would, in my view, be extremely dangerous, for it could easily result in a resumption of hostilities not only in the UNIFIL area of operation but also elsewhere in the region. In fact, I believe that there is an increasing general recognition that the Force's presence is indispensable in preventing a dangerous escalation of conflict.

60. For these reasons, I feel it is essential to recommend to the Security Council that the mandate of UNIFIL be extended for another period of six months. The Lebanese Government has informed me of its full agreement with this recommendation.


61. In making this recommendation, I am aware that the mandate of UNIFIL cannot be extended indefinitely unless there is reasonable assurance that the objectives of the relevant Security Council resolutions will be fulfilled without undue delay. It is my earnest hope that given the clear will of the Security Council, and in the interests of peace, all parties concerned will increasingly extend to UNIFIL the co-operation that it requires. In this connexion, I wish to record here my deep appreciation to the Government of Lebanon for the unstinting support and assistance it has extended to the Force. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Lebanese army for the conduct of its battalion deployed with the Force.

62. In concluding this report, I wish to pay tribute to the Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siillasvuo, to the Commander of UNIFIL, Major-General Erskine, and his

/...

staff, both civilian and military, to the officers and men of the contingents of UNIFIL, and to the UNTSO military observers assigned to the area for their courage, dedication and steady discipline in the face of a very difficult and often dangerous mission. I wish also to express my gratitude to the Governments which are providing contingents and other forms of support to UNIFIL.

/...



一九七九年十二月联合国维和部队的部署情况
 UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF DECEMBER 1979
 DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS DE DÉCEMBRE 1979
 ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВООНП НА ДЕКАБРЬ 1979 ГОДА
 DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN DICIEMBRE DE 1979

- | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| 观察所 | 观察站 | 巡逻基地 | 哨所 |
| Observation post | Observation post | Patrol base | Base de patrouille |
| 观察站 | 观察站 | 哨所 | 哨所 |
| Poste d'observation | Poste de contrôle routier | Заграждение на дороге | База патрулей |
| Наблюдательный пункт | Зграждение на дороге | Барьера на caminos | База патруляжа |
| Puesto de observación | Барьера на caminos | | |
| 联合国维和活动范围的界限 | 黎巴嫩单位 | | |
| UNIFIL operational boundaries | Libanese unit | | |
| Limites des zones d'opérations de la Force | Unité libanaise | | |
| Оперативные пределы ВСООНП | Ливанское подразделение | | |
| Limites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza | Unidad libanesa | | |

The dispositions employed and the presentation of the map, as well as the location of the UNIFIL units, are subject to change without notice. The UNIFIL units are subject to the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The UNIFIL units are subject to the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The UNIFIL units are subject to the jurisdiction of the United Nations.