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### REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION

#### Note by the Secretary-General

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## I. INTRODUCTION

In connection with paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 39/148 O of 17 December 1984, the Secretary-General has received communications from the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the texts of which are reproduced below.

## II. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

### GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

[Original: English]

[17 October 1985]

1. In the Concluding Document of the First Special Session of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament, all United Nations Member States unanimously acknowledged the need for serious disarmament negotiations based on the principle of undiminished security. In an endeavour to promote such negotiations, the German Democratic Republic, together with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and other States, took the initiative for the adoption of resolution 39/148 O.
2. The complicated current international situation calls for increased efforts to prevent a nuclear inferno. Plans for the militarization of outer space threaten to set off an arms race unprecedented in scope and to wreck the endeavours for arms limitations and disarmament on earth. Consequently, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its termination on earth has become the crucial question in our days. As the leading representatives of the Warsaw Treaty Member States reaffirmed at their meeting in Warsaw, on 26 April 1985, its solution requires that all peoples and States, all peace-loving forces, regardless of their political orientation, pool their efforts. Both bilateral and multilateral negotiations must be actively used for this purpose.
3. The German Democratic Republic wholeheartedly welcomed the initiation of new negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in Geneva on the entire complex of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons - both strategic and intermediate-range. They provide a chance to stop the fatal process of developing ever more sophisticated weapons systems, and to proceed to disarmament. The German Democratic Republic believes that the negotiations can be successful if and when the objectives agreed upon in the Joint Soviet-American Statement of 8 January 1985 are implemented consistently, with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. The proposals submitted by the USSR during this year offer real possibilities for such a success.
4. The comprehensive and far-reaching peace programme which General Secretary M. Gorbachev of the CPSU Central Committee submitted during his visit to France is fully and entirely endorsed by the German Democratic Republic. His proposals are suited to lead to a real turnabout in terms of disarmament, away from confrontation

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and towards co-operation. They have opened the door for positive results at the meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the President of the United States.

5. Under the present conditions, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament assumes increasing importance as the sole multilateral negotiating body on global aspects of disarmament. This year's session has demonstrated again that the overwhelming majority of the States present at the Conference is agreed in calling for avoidance of a militarization of outer space, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, concrete measures to prevent nuclear war, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

6. The constructive initiatives of the socialist States have opened up great opportunities for sweeping progress in these fields. New impulses have emanated from the non-aligned and neutral countries. In this connection, the German Democratic Republic pays particular tribute to the Delhi Declaration issued by the six Heads of State or Government.

7. Measured by current requirements, the results of the latest session of the Conference on Disarmament cannot be satisfactory. Some States continue to keep the Conference from proceeding to negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war, and prevention of an arms race in space.

8. The establishment of a committee with an agenda on arms competition in space is no doubt a positive result of the 1985 session. Its operation illustrates the concern of States about the plans for the militarization of space and the adverse consequences that would arise therefrom for international security. Consideration was given to a number of substantive questions regarding the prevention of an arms race in space. There exist all chances for the next session of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on the conclusion of relevant accords in line with resolution 39/59. The German Democratic Republic considers that the Soviet draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth is a viable base for such negotiations.

9. A comprehensive prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests would decisively contribute to ending the qualitative arms race and strengthening the non-proliferation régime for nuclear weapons. The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation has underscored the importance of an agreement to that effect. However, one side continues to consider such a step as a "long-term goal". The German Democratic Republic strongly objects to any effort to delay negotiations on an agreement under a variety of pretexts. The draft agreements of the USSR and Sweden provide an appropriate base for such negotiations.

10. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the Soviet Union's moratorium on all its nuclear explosions that was put into effect on 6 August 1985 as a step which facilitates the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The German Democratic Republic expects the United States of America and the other nuclear Powers to declare a similar moratorium.

11. In accordance with resolution 39/143 P the German Democratic Republic advocates immediate negotiations on appropriate and practical measures to prevent a nuclear war. Together with the other socialist States it submitted document CD/484 containing a set of politico-legal as well as material proposals. The German Democratic Republic attributes special importance to the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. It would essentially contribute to the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe if the other nuclear Powers followed the example of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China and also issued binding non-first-use declarations for nuclear arms.

12. The German Democratic Republic, together with the majority of States, advocates the initiation of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament, as provided for in resolutions 39/148 C and 39/148 K. The Conference on Disarmament offers all the necessary prerequisites for such negotiations. It is the sole negotiating body comprising all the five nuclear Powers. This fact was taken into account by the Third NPT Review Conference when calling on the Conference on Disarmament to proceed to multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Concluding Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament. The German Democratic Republic expresses its expectation that the Western States, which up to now have rejected such negotiations, will at the next Session of the Conference on Disarmament, stand by the consensus reached at the Review Conference.

13. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the progress made this year in elaborating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The report of the respective committee shows that, under the leadership of the representative of the Polish People's Republic, its proceedings have reached a new stage. In the course of further negotiations it will be essential to continue this line in order to conclude work on the convention as soon as possible. The German Democratic Republic will play its part to help achieve this aim. But success will only be possible if all States are prepared to conduct bona fide negotiations and make reasonable compromises meeting the interests of all sides. No steps should be undertaken that would be a burden on the negotiations. The German Democratic Republic therefore shares the concern of many States about the United States plans to start mass production of binary weapons and about their possible deployment in Central Europe.

14. Endeavouring to fulfil their responsibility for peace, détente and security in Central Europe and to reduce the weapons stockpiles accumulated in this area, the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in September last proposed to the Federal Republic of Germany to enter into negotiations on the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone. Agreement on such a zone, which would comprise the territories of those three States to begin with, would contribute to confidence-building and would facilitate the early achievement of a global ban on these dangerous means of mass destruction.

15. This move of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was preceded by a joint initiative of the German Democratic Republic's Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Federal Republic of

Germany's Social-Democratic Party of Germany. The outline of an agreement to establish such a zone elaborated by the two Parties in that context takes full account of the close connection between a global ban and regional steps.

16. The German Democratic Republic considers the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe as an important opportunity to reduce the military confrontation. This becomes all the more important as the international situation continues to be dangerously aggravated.

17. Together with the other Warsaw Treaty States the German Democratic Republic holds that military confrontation can be reduced best when steps of confidence-building in the political field are organically linked with such steps in the military field. The comprehensive proposals of the Warsaw Treaty States at the Stockholm Conference do correspond to this concept. In this context, the German Democratic Republic attaches particular importance to accords which concretize and give maximum effect to the principle of non-use of force. The discussion on this issue has justifiably occupied a significant place at the Stockholm Conference. An agreement on the mutual renunciation of armed force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations would not only correspond with the Final Act of Helsinki and the mandate of the Stockholm Conference but would also meet the need for a lessening of military confrontation in Europe. The German Democratic Republic feels it is most important to translate the will to negotiate, which was expressed by all sides, into concrete steps and to focus on areas where accords appear attainable at this juncture. It is imperative that all participants to the Conference explore the avenues towards result-oriented negotiations and concentrate on those fields where a rapprochement of their positions can be achieved. The Warsaw Treaty States have declared their readiness to take such an approach and look forward to an early, positive response from the member States of NATO.

18. In the course of the now 12-year old Vienna Talks on a Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments in Central Europe, the German Democratic Republic together with the other socialist participants undertook a variety of initiatives in order to reach substantive agreements. In so doing it has been aware of a more and more urgent need to stem a further increase in the military confrontation in Central Europe.

19. The negotiations so far failed to produce results. The new initiative of the socialist States of 14 February 1985 has taken account of this situation. The proposals embodied in it largely exclude complicated, controversial questions. They aim at an immediate discussion of simple and practicable steps of reduction. The initiative provides that, within one year, the Soviet Union and the United States should withdraw 20,000 and 13,000 troops, respectively, including their armaments and equipment, from their ground forces stationed in Central Europe. Subsequently, all parties to the agreement should undertake to freeze the level of their armed forces and armaments. On this basis negotiations should then continue with the objective to decrease the total strength of the armed forces on both sides in Central Europe to 900,000 troops each.

20. The initiative of the socialist countries represents a compromise approach to lead the Vienna Talks out of the present stalemate. The German Democratic Republic expects a constructive reply from the Western side. What is required above all is the political will of the NATO States to contribute to the achievement of an agreement on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe in accordance with the principles agreed upon in 1973.

21. The fortieth anniversary of the victory over Hitler fascism and of the end of the Second World War has very much reinforced the perception that peace is the highest good of mankind. It is vital to unite all forces of reason and realism against the danger of nuclear war. The German Democratic Republic and the other Warsaw Treaty States are prepared to take the most radical steps of limiting and eliminating every kind of armaments.

22. The fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly should provide new impulses to speed up the efforts for agreements on effective measures of armament limitation and disarmament.

#### UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[20 September 1985]

1. The Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations, referring to General Assembly resolution 39/148 O, "Implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session", of 17 December 1984, which requests information concerning disarmament and arms-limitation negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations, states the following.

2. In today's dangerous world situation, the question of war and peace continues to be the most important question of the present age, essentially a question of mankind's survival. The senseless arms race, particularly in nuclear arms, which has been imposed on the world by the imperialist forces is continuing.

3. In these circumstances, the Soviet Union fully recognizes its responsibility to the world's peoples for the preservation and strengthening of peace. It has done and will do everything in its power to reduce the threat of nuclear disaster, to end the build-up of nuclear arsenals and to arrive at effective agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The Soviet Union takes a profoundly serious attitude towards disarmament negotiations within and outside the United Nations, working for the adoption of favourable decisions at those negotiations.

4. This is the attitude demonstrated by the Soviet side in the Soviet-United States negotiations at Geneva, undertaken at its initiative in March 1985, on the subject of nuclear and space weapons.

5. With regard to the questions to which they relate - space strike weapons, strategic offensive weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons - these new

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negotiations take full account of the reality of the present strategic situation and reflect the objective organic connection between those three problems. The objective interdependence of those problems was reflected in the joint Soviet-United States declaration adopted at Geneva on 8 January 1985. The declaration clearly stated that the purpose of the negotiations must be to prevent an arms race in outer space and to put an end to the arms race on earth.

6. Progress at the Geneva negotiations depends above all on whether both sides will comply scrupulously with every part of the agreement reached concerning the subject and purposes of the negotiations. The Soviet Union, for its part, will do everything it can to implement that agreement.

7. In its efforts to create suitable conditions for the preparation of constructive solutions, the USSR has proposed instituting a moratorium on nuclear and space weapons for the entire period of the Geneva negotiations.

8. The Soviet Union has advanced at the negotiations a whole programme of measures whose distinguishing feature is that it is strictly in keeping with the principle of equality and equal security, which precludes the acquisition of any military advantage by either side.

9. The Soviet side is steadfastly working to see to it that the negotiations include the start of a practical discussion of measures concerning the key question of the spread of the arms race to outer space. To that end, it proposes prohibiting an entire class of space strike weapons and reaching an agreement to the effect that the production (including scientific investigation), testing and deployment of such weapons should be prohibited on a reciprocal basis. The two sides' entire present stockpiles of such weapons, i.e. anti-satellite weapons, would be liquidated. At the same time, the USSR advocates strict and undeviating compliance with the unlimited-term 1972 Soviet-United States treaty on the limitation of ABM systems, which prohibits the deployment of ABM systems for the defence of a country's territory, as well as the base for such a defence, and also prohibits the establishment of space-based anti-missile systems.

10. The Soviet Union is convinced that if both sides have the political good will to keep the arms race from spreading to outer space, a verifiable agreement on this subject can be worked out.

11. If such an agreement is not concluded, agreement on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons will also be impossible.

12. It is quite clear that the militarization of outer space will whip up the arms race in all its aspects, will in particular accelerate the nuclear arms race and the development of more sophisticated nuclear weapons and will aggravate the threat of nuclear war. The production of space strike weapons would mean the end of the 1972 ABM Treaty, on which the entire process of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons is based.

13. An arms race in outer space would also divert enormous resources from the solution of urgent problems confronting all mankind, such as the fight against hunger, disease and economic backwardness.

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14. In the complex of questions associated with the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space and in connection with the solution of that problem, the Soviet Union has proposed reaching agreement on a radical reduction of strategic weapons - intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers - and proposed that at the same time the two sides should renounce any programmes for producing and deploying new kinds and types of strategic weapons or should place strict limits on such programmes. The reductions would apply both to the delivery vehicles themselves and to the total number of nuclear charges carried by them. The USSR also advocates total renunciation of such a dangerous new kind of strategic offensive weapons as long-range cruise missiles irrespective of how they are based.

15. The Soviet side has previously taken a position favouring a 25 per cent reduction in the level of strategic weapons; developing this, it has now expressed its willingness to go even further and agree to even more radical reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR. In this connection it would, of course, also be necessary to take account of how the question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe could be settled, since the United States weapons of that class already deployed in Western European countries, i.e. within range of targets in Soviet territory, constitute a direct and substantial supplement to the strategic arsenal of the United States.

16. The Soviet Union is working for a strict balance of forces at sharply reduced levels with regard to medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe as well. The Soviet side has proposed a solution under which the United States would withdraw its Pershing II missiles and land-based cruise missiles from Europe and the USSR would reduce its medium-range missiles in the European zone to a level equivalent in warhead count to the corresponding nuclear weapons of United Kingdom and France. As a result, the USSR would not have on its medium-range missiles in Europe a single warhead more than the number included in the corresponding nuclear arsenal of the North Atlantic Treaty countries.

17. Under the Soviet approach, equal and reduced ceilings would also be set for medium-range launcher aircraft for NATO and the USSR in Europe.

18. The USSR has expressed a willingness to move on to an even more radical solution - the complete liberation of Europe from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

19. The Soviet Union is backing its constructive attitude at the Geneva negotiations with unilateral actions designed to prompt the United States, in turn, to embark on practical measures aimed at the achievement of mutually acceptable agreements and at the building of mutual confidence. In April 1985, for example, the USSR unilaterally halted until November of this year the deployment of its medium-range missiles and the implementation of other measures in Europe adopted in response to United States deployment of its new medium-range missiles on that continent. Already in August 1983, a unilateral Soviet moratorium was announced on being the first to place anti-satellite weapons in outer space; the moratorium could naturally remain in force for as long as other States, including the United States, assumed a similar commitment.

20. The USSR is not creating space strike weapons, is not constructing a large-scale system of anti-missile defence or the bases for such a defence and is strictly complying with the 1972 ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union does not intend to place weapons in outer space and is opposed to competition in the matter of space weapons and weapons in general. It feels strongly that outer space should remain peaceful. This was precisely why the Soviet Union proposed that the question of "International co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization" should be considered at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly. This is a programme for an extensive joining of efforts by States in the peaceful exploitation of outer space for the purpose of meeting the economic and social requirements of all peoples.

21. With a view to achieving a halt to the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union established, as of 6 August 1985, a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions and suggested to the United States that it should follow suit. This is a weighty action, which is significant because it erects a solid barrier to the establishment of newer and newer types of weapons of mass destruction and dooms existing nuclear arsenals to gradual moral and physical aging. If the other nuclear Powers, and primarily the United States, were to respond in kind to this peaceful Soviet action, the prospects for agreement on nuclear weapon issues would be considerably improved.

22. Unfortunately, however, the United States has so far displayed an obvious unwillingness to seek ways to agreement in Geneva.

23. The United States stubbornly refuses to reach an agreement on averting an arms race in outer space. Instead, it actually says that the parties should concern themselves with deciding precisely which types of weapon could be stationed in outer space - in other words, with the actual programming of the race in space strike weapons.

24. United States actions outside the negotiations are also directed towards the unleashing of an arms race in outer space. The United States is going ahead with work on the creation of space strike weapons, a large-scale ABM system with space-based elements and anti-satellite weapons and is leading up to the undermining of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The United States is doing all this in the context of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative". The attempts to present this matter as though it involved defence carry no weight. The implementation of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" would inevitably lead to a new and even more dangerous spurt in the arms race in all directions and would make it uncontrollable. Strategic stability would be radically undermined. The threat of an outbreak of nuclear war would increase. Implementation of this programme would eliminate once and for all the Soviet-American understanding regarding the maintenance of strategic stability.

25. The United States decision to test a second generation of anti-satellite systems is also fraught with serious consequences. This decision will lead directly to the beginning of the development of a new class of dangerous weapons - space strike weapons. It is one more step in the escalation of the arms race, involving its extension to outer space.

26. In response to the restraint displayed by the USSR in practical matters and to its constructive position at the Geneva negotiations, the United States demonstrates its unwillingness to reach agreement and to display corresponding restraint. It is claimed that at the Geneva negotiations the United States is seeking strict limitations on anti-satellite weapons. In actual fact, the United States flatly refused and is still refusing to consider any measures to prohibit and limit anti-satellite weapons, presenting matters as though it were impossible to resolve this issue. It is thus intentionally creating an artificial deadlock in this question. In this, it is clearly calculating not only that it will acquire anti-satellite weapons but also that it will, under the pretense of testing an anti-satellite system, evolve air-based and other anti-missile weapons. This again reveals the true attitude of the United States towards the Geneva negotiations and its unwillingness to reach agreements on real steps to avert an arms race in outer space and to halt the arms race on earth.

27. With regard to strategic offensive weapons, the American side is proposing that the Soviet Union should undertake a completely unwarranted restructuring of its strategic defence capabilities first of all by sharply reducing its intercontinental ballistic missiles, which form the basis of the Soviet strategic forces. On the other hand, the American strategic forces and programmes for increasing them would remain virtually untouched. In practice, this would mean that the United States would have the opportunity to increase sharply - by several thousands - the number of its strategic weapons, primarily by adding more long-range cruise missiles in any base.

28. The American proposals regarding medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe were also made with a view to ensuring unilateral military advantages for the United States. In considering the balance of nuclear forces in Europe, the American side refuses to take into account the nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom and France. Outside the limitations, the United States would like to keep its air carriers, as well as, in essence, almost all the rest of its medium-range launcher aircraft in the European zone. In an attempt to circumvent the SALT II Treaty, the United States is insisting on its "right" to deploy in immediate proximity to the USSR - and not only in Europe - medium-range missiles, counting on the possibility of using those weapons against the USSR in a first strike.

29. Thus, the negative, unconstructive position of the American side is blocking the achievement of agreements in all areas of the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on nuclear and space weapons. The United States, apparently, is interested only in negotiating but not in achieving practical results.

30. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament - the only organ for multilateral negotiations in this field. The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of enhancing the effectiveness of the Conference and promoting fruitful and business-like negotiations on the whole range of issues being discussed there with a view to achieving mutually acceptable agreements.

31. The Soviet Union fully shares the opinion of those who consider the prevention of nuclear war to be the most important task and highest priority of contemporary

world politics. It urges the Conference at last to begin evolving practical measures for preventing nuclear war, as well as working out a programme for nuclear disarmament.

32. In the opinion of the USSR, the Conference should not disregard such a key issue as the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Soviet Union considers the creation in 1985 of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on that issue as a first step to beginning the relevant negotiations.

33. The Soviet Union is also a staunch supporter of the immediate commencement, within the framework of the Conference, of negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It most actively supports the speedy completion of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

34. The Soviet Union is in favour of the conclusion of relevant international agreements on the prohibition of radiological weapons and the safe development of nuclear energy, and on the strengthening of assurances concerning the safety of non-nuclear-weapon States, and of the formulation of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

35. During the period of détente, the Geneva forum produced a number of important multilateral agreements. However, in recent years, the efficiency of forum has become a cause for serious concern. The reason for this is the unconstructive position of the United States and its closest allies. It is they who use various, far-fetched pretexts to block the beginning of practical negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It is they who are unwilling to reach an earnest agreement even on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, by attempting to address that question in the framework of general discussions on the subject. Moreover, even on matters which are already being discussed at the Conference, and particularly the prohibition of chemical weapons, the United States is not only unwilling to take into account the proposals and legitimate interests of other States but it is gradually hardening its position, deliberately putting forward unacceptable and unrealistic proposals.

36. The Soviet Union, for its part, will continue its efforts to break the current deadlock in this forum and thereby enable the Conference on Disarmament to perform its tasks. The Soviet Union - like the majority of the other participants in the Conference - is in favour of establishing subsidiary working bodies authorized to conduct negotiations on the priority issues which have yet to be addressed, with a view to making tangible progress in all the areas covered by the work of the Conference.

37. The position adopted by the NATO countries at the Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments in Central Europe is also far from constructive. No tangible results whatsoever have been achieved there to date. The talks have been at a standstill for a considerable period of time.

38. The reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs lies in the lack of political will on the part of the United States and its NATO allies to reach

agreement on the basis of the principle of parity and equal security. At Vienna, the Western countries are continuing to adhere to their former unrealistic position which is obstructing the elaboration of concrete and mutually acceptable agreements. As in the past, they are endeavouring to impose on the Soviet Union and the other States parties to the Warsaw Treaty unfair conditions and obligations which, if applied, would give a one-sided military advantage to the West.

39. In an attempt to give new impetus to the Vienna talks, the USSR and the other socialist countries submitted on 14 February 1985 a draft of basic provisions for an agreement on a preliminary reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of ground forces and armaments in Central Europe with a commitment not to increase subsequently the levels of armed forces and armaments in that region. The significance of this initiative lies in the fact that it offers a real opportunity for tangible progress at the Vienna talks, for achieving concrete results which would lead to a practical reduction in the disproportionate concentration of forces and armaments in Central Europe. This proposal could easily be put into effect because it focuses on elements on which agreement can be reached even at present. However, the NATO countries have still not expressed their views on the substance of that proposal.

40. The obstructionist approach adopted by the NATO countries at Vienna and the one sided nature of their position are not coincidental. They constitute an extension and a reflection of the military and political views held by the United States and NATO, and of their concrete acts, in connection with the build-up of their military potential in Europe. For example, when the USSR unilaterally withdrew 20,000 troops, 1,000 tanks and various other military equipment from Central Europe in 1979-1980, the United States of America, according to official Western figures, increased the number of its troops by 26,000 in the Federal Republic of Germany alone, and by 40,000 in Central Europe as a whole. Progress in Vienna has also been hindered by the deployment of the new US first strike missiles in certain Western European countries, including a number of States participating directly in the talks.

41. The Soviet Union is convinced that progress is possible in Vienna. Everything will depend on the Western side's realism and political readiness to embark at last on the path of reaching mutually acceptable decisions in the Vienna talks.

42. At the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the USSR is doing its utmost to enable the Conference's work to proceed in a business-like manner and its first stage to culminate in the adoption of effective measures to normalize the political climate and reduce the level of military confrontation in Europe. This is precisely the aim of the whole spectrum of Soviet proposals envisaging the organic combination of far-reaching political and international legal moves with specific measures in the military and technical field.

43. In a situation where international tension is rising and the threat of nuclear conflict increasing, particular importance attaches to the Soviet Union proposal to conclude a treaty on the reciprocal non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations, a pivotal provision of which would be the obligation not to

be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another, and therefore not to use military force against one another at all. The working paper on the basic provisions of such a treaty, submitted by the Soviet Union on 29 January 1985, develops and defines, in concrete terms and in accordance with the realities of the European continent, the general formulation of the principle of the non-use of force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act.

44. The Soviet proposal was formulated with due regard for the wishes and views both of the NATO and of the non-aligned and neutral countries.

45. The USSR is also proposing an important step forward in the field of military confidence-building measures. With that aim in view, it has submitted together with other socialist countries a number of working papers on limiting the scale of military exercises in Europe and notifying large-scale exercises by ground, air and naval forces, and relating to major troop movements and transfers. In both scope and nature, these measures go considerably further than the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Their adoption would represent a qualitatively new advance in the area of confidence-building measures.

46. However, the main obstacle to progress in Stockholm remains the rigid position of the United States and its NATO allies, which is aimed at obtaining unilateral advantages to the detriment of the security of other States. The "package" of proposals offered by the Western States as long ago as January 1984 has undergone no changes since then. Its aim was not so much to strengthen confidence as to obtain information of an intelligence nature. Such "proposals" can only evoke legitimate doubts about the intentions of those who advance them.

47. The Soviet Union for its part is ready to proceed without delay, in Stockholm, from discussions of a general nature to business-like negotiations and the search for agreements combining major measures of a political nature with specific confidence-building measures in the military field.

48. The Soviet Union takes a responsible attitude to participation in negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament, including those outside the framework of the United Nations, and makes every effort to achieve mutually acceptable solutions. It will continue consistently to seek radical progress in curbing the arms race and will demonstrate its political will and readiness to co-operate constructively with all those who, for their part, seek effective solutions.

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