

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**
THIRTY-FOURTH SESSION
*Official Records**



FIRST COMMITTEE
44th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 27 November 1979
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERTABIM RECORD OF THE 44TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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ORGANIZATION OF WORK

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Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/34/PV.44
30 November 1979

ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 AND 42 TO 45 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: The First Committee will continue its consideration of and action upon draft resolutions under the disarmament items. It is my intention to deal first with draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9, on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This draft resolution has 19 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Bulgaria at the thirty-third meeting of the First Committee on 12 November 1979. The sponsors of the draft resolution are: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Mali, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam.

Mr. DEYANOV (Bulgaria): On behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9, I should like to submit an oral amendment to the eighth preambular paragraph. The letter "A" after "resolution 33/72" should be deleted. The text of the eighth preambular paragraph will then read:

"Recalling its resolution 33/72 of 14 December 1978".

The sponsors believe that draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9 as thus amended will receive the full support of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call upon those members who have asked to speak in explanation of vote before the voting.

Mr. SIMARD (Canada) (interpretation from French): Before draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2, A/C.1/34/L.9 and A/C.1/34/L.35 are put to the vote, I should like to explain my delegation's votes on these texts, all of which relate to the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. My delegation supports draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 because we are in agreement with the substance

(Mr. Simard, Canada)

of that draft, which is expressed, in our opinion, in operative paragraph 4, which recommends that the Committee on Disarmament conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It recommends that the Committee do this not only by taking into account the conclusion of an international convention in this regard, but also by "giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective". We believe, as we have already stated, that at this stage we must not prejudge the form effective international arrangements in this field should take. All possible options must be examined before reaching a decision, and we must bear in mind that the final objective can be reached only with the assistance of nuclear-weapon States.

I shall not conceal the fact that we have some problems with certain passages of the text submitted by Pakistan, specifically to the extent that it appears to us to favour one solution among others. However, since on the other hand it affords an opportunity to consider other solutions we feel that we are in a position to support it.

As for the draft resolution submitted by Bulgaria, A/C.1/34/L.9, it does not appear to us to consider any possibility other than that of the preparation of a convention. Since we are not persuaded, at least at this stage, that this represents the only possible way to strengthen the guarantees of security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and since the draft resolution does not provide for any other arrangements, we shall abstain on this draft resolution.

It should be noted that the report of the Committee on Disarmament speaks of the "urgent need to reach agreement on ... international arrangements" (A/34/27, para. 49). The question of an international convention, as also mentioned therein, was the subject of wide discussions. However, it is emphasized that consideration was given to other possibilities, such as a General Assembly resolution, a Security Council resolution, various declarations, and so on. What the Committee on Disarmament has approved as a recommendation for the coming year is a continuance of "negotiations on ... international arrangements" (ibid.) without limiting itself to any single option.

(Mr. Simard, Canada)

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35, submitted by the United States, tends in this direction. It requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts in this area, without excluding any possibility of strengthening the security guarantees of non-nuclear-weapon States. It deals with that subject in a manner that is entirely in conformity with our delegation's views and also proposes the inclusion in the provisional agenda for the thirty-fifth session of this item, which we should like to be worded: "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States". For all those reasons, we shall also support draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Last year the General Assembly, during its thirty-third session, requested the Committee on Disarmament to initiate work on the question of assurances by nuclear-weapon-States to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In preparing its agenda the Committee on Disarmament decided to include that item, and subsequently it formed an ad hoc group to deal with it.

The United States participated fully in the deliberations which took place on this issue in the Committee on Disarmament, and we found them very useful. As can be seen from the report of that Committee, a number of important aspects of this complex problem were discussed. A range of proposals, suggestions and ideas were advanced and explored. The Committee decided by consensus to continue this work during its next session.

The United States is of the opinion that the General Assembly should encourage the Committee on Disarmament to continue the serious work which it has begun on this issue and that we should avoid anything that could complicate it. We should recognize that it is an issue that involves vital security interests of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and that these interests cannot be changed by exhortations. We should recognize that the only way to arrive at a generally acceptable solution is through patient consideration of the different appraisals of the problem.

The United States firmly believes that such consideration cannot be helped by draft resolutions that seek to prejudge the further course and even the outcome of the consideration of the problem in Geneva. In particular, the United States does not believe that it is appropriate for this General Assembly to impose one possible solution, particularly that of a convention, to the exclusion of others, when we have agreed in Geneva that all options for the handling of this most difficult problem should be kept open. We think that the taking of such a decision by this Committee would be a mistake.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Now, unfortunately, the draft resolution with which we are dealing, A/C.1/34/L.9, and its companion, A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2, would have precisely such an effect.

In view of all these considerations, the United States delegation will abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9 and its corollary, A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2, and we would hope that there would be a recorded vote on both these draft resolutions.

Mr. MULLOY (Ireland): On behalf of the delegation of Ireland, I should like to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9 on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, introduced by Bulgaria.

Support for a régime of nuclear responsibility and peaceful co-operation in the exploitation of nuclear energy based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a central element in Ireland's approach to international arms control and disarmament. We have always argued, and still strongly hold the view, that States which have formally renounced the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons have a right to expect that they should be secure from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against them.

Though not a participant in the Committee on Disarmament, we have followed closely the initial consideration by the Committee on Disarmament of the negative security assurances issue and are aware that a number of States have emphasized the need for an international convention in this area. We are naturally sensitive to the concerns of those non-nuclear-weapon States which have argued that this approach should be given fullest examination. We are also inevitably sympathetic to those States already party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that have argued within the Committee on Disarmament or in the General Assembly that other alternatives should be explored, which would involve no new formal commitment on their part.

(Mr. Mulloy, Ireland)

The possibility of a Security Council resolution has been advanced in this connexion as a means of harmonizing the unilateral statements or assurances already given by the nuclear-weapon States and as a way of meeting the legitimate expectations of all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. An approach such as this also deserves full consideration, in our view. We therefore believe that it is as yet too early to draw any firm conclusions from the first round of Committee on Disarmament discussion of negative security assurances and that all possibilities should remain open for further analysis and review.

In draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9 the position is taken basically that the task of the Committee on Disarmament now, after the first round of discussion has been concluded, is to proceed to the elaboration of an international convention. The essential conclusion is that no alternative to a convention would seem to exist and that the case for other possible arrangements, once advanced, need not be examined further. This does not seem, in our view, to be a balanced or adequate representation of Committee on Disarmament discussion, which has been, for the most part, a first attempt to deal with all the issues involved.

Therefore, while appreciating the concerns of those who believe strongly in a convention, we see no point in closing the door on other options or in giving priority to the convention solution only. Accordingly, because of the emphasis and thrust of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9, we consider that Ireland has no alternative but to abstain in the vote on that draft resolution.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): The delegation of Finland is going to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9, concerning the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Committee also has before it two other draft resolutions, A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 and A/C.1/34/L.35, which deal with the question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation will also support those two draft resolutions.

(Mr. Rajakoski, Finland)

In the Final Document of the tenth special session nuclear-weapon States are urged:

"... to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (resolution A/S-10/2, para. 59)

My delegation recognizes that the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States is an important issue for all countries: nuclear and non-nuclear, neutral and allied, large and small. It is intimately connected with many crucial questions of international security and disarmament. Therefore the issue should be seen in a wide context, and several approaches should be adopted.

(Mr. Rajakoski, Finland)

My delegation has been encouraged by the unilateral security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States. Those assurances represent one approach to the question. We have also noted with satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament has begun consideration of the issue by including on its agenda the item "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". We welcome the decision by the Committee that, as recommended by the Ad Hoc Working Group, work on the subject should continue at its forthcoming session next February.

Mr. POJANI (Albania): I should like to explain the vote of the Albanian delegation on draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.9 and A/C.1/34/L.35.

Concerning draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9 on the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, the Albanian delegation explained its position last year when we voted against the draft resolution on that question. We stressed then that the nuclear arms possessed by the two super-Powers and other imperialist Powers, especially the United States of America and the Soviet Union, as long as they continue their policy of aggression and war, constitute for all the peoples of the world a constant danger to peace and international security. We believe that the conventions and other juridical instruments which they propose, including the convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, can never replace disarmament, nuclear disarmament in particular and disarmament in general. On the contrary, their purpose is to legalize the right of the super-Powers to maintain and modernize their nuclear arsenals. At that time we emphasized that we considered the so-called formal guarantees, as well as the promises made and the obligations which the nuclear super-Powers say they will accept, to be but an attempt to impose their will on other countries not possessing nuclear weapons and to subdue them by blackmail so that they will not oppose the policies of those super-Powers.

(Mr. Pojani, Albania)

The draft resolution before this Committee on the conclusion of a convention on the strengthening of guarantees is almost a repetition of last year's resolution, with the difference that this year it is stressed that the Committee on Disarmament should continue negotiations.

We think that nothing has changed in the policy of the super-Powers. The United States and the Soviet Union continue the arms race, including the nuclear arms race. Nothing has changed our belief of one year ago that neither a convention nor all these guarantees will liquidate in any degree the danger of nuclear weapons, and especially the danger which comes from the policy of the two super-Powers.

It is for this reason that the Albanian delegation will vote against draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.9 and L.35.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now put to the vote draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9.
A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,

Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venequela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Albania

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9 was adopted by 91 votes to 1, with 25 abstentions.*

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives wishing to explain their vote after the vote.

Mr. DUMEVI (Ghana): The Ghana delegation voted in support of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9, which we have just adopted, and I should like to explain our position. Before doing so, I should also like to use this opportunity to state that we shall maintain this position on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2. Our reasons are as follows.

Ghana's position is that these negative assurances should not be viewed as substitutes for general and complete disarmament, which is the ultimate goal. Further, in the view of Ghana, the concept of negative assurances does not offer complete or genuine security to non-nuclear-weapon States, which, in our view, remain vulnerable to the global effects of atomic radiation and the disastrous environmental changes which would arise from the use of nuclear weapons in other parts of the world.

* Subsequently the delegation of Mauritius advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Last year Sweden voted in favour of the two draft resolutions concerning assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Our position was motivated by a strong concern for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and the particular method of strengthening their security was a matter which was left open in both those draft resolutions.

Since then, the Committee on Disarmament has had the subject on its agenda and several proposals have been made. We now know more about the type of arrangements the initiators behind last year's draft resolutions have in mind, and we are also now more aware of the difficulties in achieving generally acceptable solutions. As the Swedish Foreign Minister said in his speech in this Committee on 29 October:

"Sweden is in principle in favour of assurances by nuclear weapon Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

"Such assurances, if binding on all nuclear-weapon Powers and if they accommodate the interests and need of all countries, could play a role in the process of strengthening international security.

"There are some basic elements that are imperative, among them the fact that assurances must be made without reservations and must thus be unconditional. Various forms of assurances have been discussed, including an international convention. The Swedish Government has reservations with regard to this idea". (A/C.1/34/PV.20, p. 36)

Underlying the idea of a convention seems to be the assumption that all States concerned, nuclear and non-nuclear, should undertake some kind of reciprocal obligation. But the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have already accepted their share in adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is no reason for them to repeat this obligation. The responsibility for formulating co-ordinated and binding pledges acceptable to all States must therefore primarily rest with the nuclear Powers themselves. Our preference would be for co-ordinated guarantees to be worked out by the nuclear Powers in some kind of international legal instrument binding on them alone, such as a limited treaty or protocol, that would thereafter be endorsed by the Security Council. Since draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9 has left out options other than a convention, the Swedish delegation has had to abstain in the vote.

The Swedish delegation will likewise abstain for the same reasons on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2. This does not mean that we, a priori, exclude the possibility of achieving an agreement, in the form of such a general convention, on security guarantees, although such a solution at present seems to entail unnecessary difficulties.

Mr. DE LAIGLESIA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): The Spanish delegation during the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly voted in favour of the two draft resolutions that were submitted on guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of such weapons.

We continue to believe that this question is of the utmost importance and we are gratified that the Committee on Disarmament has decided to start studying it. In our opinion, it is advisable for the Committee on Disarmament to continue its negotiations, and therefore at this moment we consider it prudent not to exclude any possibility by insisting on searching for a single solution.

(Mr. de Laiglesia, Spain)

We continue to believe that the system of guarantees existing at present should be strengthened, and thus it is most urgent that effective international arrangements be agreed to in order to protect non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

The idea of trying to elaborate an international convention along these lines seems to us to be a positive one although, in our opinion, that is an over ambitious attempt, since it will require lengthy and intricate negotiations that can hardly be realistically expected to come - as the draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9 says - to an "early conclusion". For this reason, the Spanish delegation has been constrained to abstain in the vote on this draft resolution.

We are sorry that on such an important matter it has not been possible to co-ordinate the views of the different delegations. In fact, the views contained in draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2, A/C.1/34/L.9 and A/C.1/34/L.35 reveal a unanimous desire to guarantee the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Yet we believe that at the present moment we should place a certain degree of confidence in the Committee on Disarmament and not prejudge the results of its work. In the light of its work, we can sum up our objectives in this field, and then, if possible, in due course establish instruments that are more binding than those that at present seem to be within our grasp.

In consistency with this line of reasoning, we will therefore vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 and will do the same with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has concluded its consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9.

The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2, under agenda item 44, "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". This draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at our 37th meeting on 19 November 1979. Its two sponsors are Mali and Pakistan.

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): The sponsors wish to introduce an amendment to the seventeenth preambular paragraph, which begins with the words "Further noting the report of the Committee on Disarmament". The last two words "appendix I" should instead read "appendix II".

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on the representative of Ireland who wishes to explain his vote before the vote.

Mr. MULLOY (Ireland): On behalf of the nine member States of the European Community, I wish to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2, introduced by Pakistan, sponsored by Mali and Pakistan and entitled "Conclusion of an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

At the thirty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly the Nine voted in favour of resolution 33/72 B, introduced by Pakistan. We did so because the resolution followed a flexible approach in that it requested the Committee on Disarmament to consider all proposals submitted on this matter without in any way prejudging the final form of the effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Mulloy, Ireland)

We had hoped that this year also the draft resolution submitted by Pakistan would in a similar way have taken a flexible approach. However, the first version of A/C.1/34/L.3 was more restrictive, focusing only on the conclusion of what was termed the "international convention". Because of this, and because of our desire to see progress made in the important field of negative security assurances, we took a prominent part in consultations with the delegation of Pakistan with the aim of maintaining the flexibility of last year's text.

We are appreciative of the efforts made by Pakistan in seeking to meet our concern. However, the current text does not, in our view, adequately reflect the balance and conclusions of the consideration which has already taken place on this subject within the Committee on Disarmament. Moreover, because of the pre-eminence that it continues to give to a convention, the draft risks prejudging conclusions that might arise from further necessary consideration of this subject. We believe that all possibilities should remain open for negotiation in the Committee on Disarmament. Since draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 does not, in our view, adequately allow for this, we regret that we see no alternative but to abstain.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/L.3/Rev.2, including the amendment made by the sponsors in the seventeenth preambular paragraph, which reads:

"Further noting the report of the Committee on Disarmament (A/34/27), including the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group in its appendix II".
A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 is now put to the vote.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 was adopted by 99 votes to none, with 21 abstentions.*

* Subsequently the delegations of Ivory Coast, Mauritius and Peru advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon those representatives who wish to explain their vote after the vote.

Mr. RUDOFISKY (Austria): In explaining my delegation's abstaining vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 and A/C.1/34/L.9, I should like to repeat the basic considerations which guide the position of the Austrian Government on the question of arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

At the outset, I should like to recall that Austria takes a positive view in principle of arrangements which aim at effectively increasing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. As my delegation has pointed out in the general debate of this Committee, for reasons based on the law and policy of permanent neutrality, to which my country is committed, it is not acceptable for Austria to confer upon an outside Power the responsibility for the maintenance of Austria's security. Therefore, we cannot agree to so-called positive security guarantees.

Arrangements to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, or, as such assurances are sometimes called, negative security guarantees, welcome as they are, have, in our view, basically the character of confidence-building measures and must not take the place of effective measures of nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapon States.

Austria formally renounced the acquisition and production of nuclear weapons as long as 24 years ago, and has since reaffirmed this commitment by its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Therefore, Austria sees no reason for assuming additional obligations under a convention.

Austria welcomed last year the unilateral declarations issued by the Governments of nuclear-weapon States in the course of the special session on disarmament and considers that those declarations are binding upon the respective Powers under international law. Those declarations reflect in their diversity the different strategic doctrines and distinct security perceptions of nuclear-weapon States. In particular, they provide for certain important exceptions as far as their applicability is concerned.

(Mr. Rudofsky, Austria)

It follows from these limitations that Austria, owing to its geographical position, though protected from direct acts against its territory, might still be affected, albeit indirectly, by the devastating effects of any use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

There can be no doubt that the unilateral declarations would gain in effectiveness if it should prove possible to co-ordinate those pledges and mould them into a common formula. We fully realize that this would be a formidable task because the difficulties involved, to which I have just referred, are not likely to change in the foreseeable future.

It will, therefore, be necessary to take a flexible approach in this matter and, in the view of the Austrian delegation, it is certainly too early to give any clear-cut preference to any specific form for the final expression of such assurances. In any case, for a country like Austria, which has committed itself to a policy of neutrality, the idea of an international convention raises a number of serious questions which would have to be studied very closely.

As the two draft resolutions which were just voted upon seem to prejudge the further course of action in the direction of such a convention, about which the Austrian Government, for reasons just outlined, holds serious reservations, my delegation cast abstaining votes. On the other hand, we intend to vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.35, which is flexible enough to meet our concerns.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Japan, as a non-nuclear-weapon State and a Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is deeply interested in the ways and means of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Japanese delegation, therefore, participated actively in the work of the Committee of Disarmament when it was considering this subject earlier this year.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

My delegation felt that the draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 and A/C.1/34/L.9 did not reflect in a proper and balanced manner the conclusions of the Committee on Disarmament, as recorded in the report of the Committee contained in document A/34/27, nor the deliberations on the subject at this session of the General Assembly.

My delegation also wishes to reiterate its belief that, when considering measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, we should take fully into consideration the political and military conditions prevailing in each State and each region. These conditions involve various and diverse elements. The very fact that three draft resolutions on the same question have been presented to us demonstrates the existence of those diverse elements and the difficulties involved in dealing with this subject.

We would be ill-advised if we were to attempt to elaborate a single, all-embracing convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. For these reasons, my delegation, while appreciating the efforts of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 to accommodate the positions of other countries, was not in a position to support the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 and A/C.1/34/L.9. That is why we abstained on those draft resolutions.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to explain the reason for its vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2.

We have proceeded from the premise that this draft resolution is designed to speed up the drafting by the Committee on Disarmament of a draft international convention providing security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. As we know, such talks actually began in the Committee in 1979, and it is now necessary to give them new impetus. In those talks and negotiations the Soviet Union proceeds on the premise that the basis of such a convention should be the obligation of nuclear-weapon States never to use nuclear weapons against those States that have renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not have such weapons on their territories.

The CHAIRMAN: We have thus concluded our consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.1.

We now turn to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/34/L.35 on agenda item 44, "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". It is sponsored by the United States of America and was introduced by the representative of that country at the 39th meeting of the Committee on 21 November.

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes before the voting.

Mr. MARKER (Pakistan): Although the Pakistan delegation can understand the broad, though somewhat anodyne, objectives of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35, we believe that that draft more accurately reflects an attitude which existed about a decade ago and takes no account either of the progress made since that time or of current realities. Nor does it, in our view, provide the political impetus that is so necessary for the negotiations that lie ahead of us in our search for an international instrument that would provide credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, my delegation has particular difficulties with the text of some of the preambular paragraphs of this draft resolution. The Pakistan delegation will accordingly abstain when it is put to the vote.

Mr. MULLOY (Ireland): On behalf of the delegation of Ireland, I should like to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35, which was introduced by the delegation of the United States of America, under the item "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

In our view, that draft resolution reflects a much more satisfactory approach than either of the other draft resolutions introduced on the subject at this session of the General Assembly this year, reflecting, as it does, the balance of the two resolutions 33/72 A and B, adopted last year, which gave the Committee on Disarmament its initial mandate on this question. This balance, we feel, should be maintained in the directive given to the Committee on Disarmament at this session. Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35 provides a basis for discussion of all possibilities, while excluding none, and in so doing it most accurately reflects, in Ireland's view, the nature of and the stage reached in the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament and the range of options which are still open to that body for eventual referral of proposals to the Assembly.

Ireland will therefore vote in favour of this draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: I now put to the vote draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35.
A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Albania

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iraq, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Pakistan, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Upper Volta

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35 was adopted by 81 votes to 1, with abstentions.*

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes after the voting.

* Subsequently the delegation of Ivory Coast advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): India's position on the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons is based on its firm conviction that, pending nuclear disarmament, which alone can remove the threat of nuclear weapons, there should be a total prohibition of nuclear weapons. Thus India stands for a total comprehensive prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a prohibition that would cover all States without any exception, whether they are nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States.

This position stems from the incontrovertible fact that any use of nuclear weapons anywhere against any State, however limited it might be, is bound to have most dreadful and not fully predictable effects on future and present generations of mankind and in fact on all life in vast areas of the globe.

It was for that reason that India introduced a draft resolution at the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, and subsequently at the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly in which it was declared that any use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity. The General Assembly has adopted that draft resolution.

Various proposals or ideas which have been put forward for a limited partial prohibition or non-use of nuclear weapons would cover some States or certain situations only and provide only illusory security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons even to those States to which immunity might have been assured, since the awful effects of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be predicted. Each one of the proposals or ideas for limited partial prohibition or non-use of nuclear weapons would imply that nuclear weapons could be used against States not covered by the prohibition or in situations where their use has not been specifically forbidden. By implication, then, the use of nuclear weapons against certain States or in certain situations would be legitimized.

Consequently, India has not supported any proposal or idea for limited partial prohibition or non-use of nuclear weapons but has resolutely and consistently stood for the total prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Mrs. GORDAH (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): The fact that the majority of States have voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons and have accepted the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite certain discriminatory provisions, places a specific obligation on the nuclear Powers to take effective steps to reverse the arms race. They should therefore give guarantees that they will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

The special session provided a propitious framework for the five nuclear Powers to make unilateral statements on this subject. My delegation, without underestimating the value of those statements, feels that the only true response to this problem is to be found in nuclear disarmament and, pending the achievement of that goal, in a binding international convention unequivocally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35 despite its inadequacies because we believe that it is an appreciable contribution towards future negotiations on the conclusion of an effective international instrument.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Mexico voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in documents A/C.1/34/L.3/Rev.2 and A/C.1/34/L.35, pertaining to items 43 and 44 of the Assembly's agenda, which deal with so-called negative guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States.

We voted thus despite the fact that the drafts contained some provisions that were somewhat contradictory, but we are convinced that that vote will not in any way affect our complete freedom of action in the Committee on Disarmament, where, in keeping with the rules of procedure of the Committee, my delegation will bear in mind the recommendations made by the General Assembly, the proposals that may be submitted by members of the Committee and the decisions of the Committee.

The conduct of the delegation of Mexico in the Committee on Disarmament will conform to these criteria.

Mr. MESHARRAFA (Egypt): My delegation has just cast an affirmative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35, submitted by the United States. We should like to state, however, that our understanding of the meaning inherent in operative paragraph 2 of this draft, and particularly the word "arrangements", is acquiescence in principle in the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, an idea which, in our opinion, has considerable merit and must be highlighted.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has now concluded its voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.35.

The Committee will now take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.30, entitled "Study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament". This draft resolution has 14 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Sweden at the 40th meeting of the First Committee on 23 November 1979. The sponsors are: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

I shall call on the Committee Secretary to read out the financial implications of this draft resolution.

Mr. BANERJEE (Secretary of the First Committee): This is a statement submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, and it will be circulated as document A/C.1/34/L.51. It reads as follows:

"1. Under the terms of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.30 of 16 November 1979 the General Assembly would, inter alia, request the Secretary-General

- (i) with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study assessing present institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter;

(Mr. Banerjee)

(ii) to submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

"2. To carry out the requested study the Secretary-General intends to invite 20 governmental experts who would hold four meetings during the next 20 months.

"3. Based on the assumptions that the experts will be paid travel and daily subsistence allowance at the equivalent of the D-1 level and meetings will last one week (first and last meeting) and two weeks (second and third meeting) the cost of travel expenses involved will amount to \$140,900.

"4. Meetings of the group of experts would require the provision of interpretation in five languages (Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish) and translation of pre-session, in-session and post-session documentation of total volume of 180 pages. The related conference servicing cost would amount to \$228,600.

"To sum up, should the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.30 be adopted, the additional expenditures would have to be incurred in an amount of \$369,500."

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): The Hungarian delegation adheres to the view that a political process such as disarmament, when its political foundation is laid down, requires an organizational framework. One of the prerequisites for such a framework is that it adequately reflect the role played by the partners in the process. It was against this background that Hungary joined the consensus on the innovation introduced into the disarmament machinery at the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

It was recognized at the special session that the innovations introduced into the disarmament machinery were to be supported by a certain expansion of the resources available to the Secretariat, that is, the Centre for Disarmament within the Political and Security Council Affairs Department. At its thirty-third session the General Assembly took action accordingly.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Taking into account the short time that has elapsed since the special session and the rather limited nature of the experience acquired, it would seem premature to prejudge whether the organizational measures do or do not correspond to the requirements of the ongoing disarmament process as implied in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.30. There is no evidence either way, but it is doubtful whether the starting of a study of the questions involved would produce anything other than speculation. It is to be questioned whether such speculation would lead to any useful result, but it is certain that it would divert interest and energy, not to mention financial resources, from the main directions which the common disarmament effort has to take.

In the light of these considerations, the Hungarian delegation is unable to support the draft resolution in question and will vote against it.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.30. In that draft resolution, the General Assembly requests the Secretary-General to assess the institutional requirements within the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. Only two years ago, on 14 December 1976, the General Assembly, in resolution 31/90 on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, adopted a decision with regard to certain organizational changes in the United Nations Secretariat, as a result of which the Disarmament Division became the Centre for Disarmament within the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. That decision was adopted on the basis of a report by the Special Committee entrusted with examining the role of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. The Special Committee carefully studied the question and submitted its recommendations at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly, which adopted the above-mentioned decision.

It may be asked what new elements have appeared over the past three years that could make necessary a further reorganization of the disarmament machinery within the United Nations. In our opinion, no such reasons exist. In the preamble to draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.30 attempts are being made to provide a basis for further organizational changes; there is reference to the growing agenda with regard to disarmament, to the complexity of the questions involved and to the more active participation of a large number of Member States. There is no doubt that all of these phenomena exist. However, they have not suddenly appeared in the past three years. Indeed, this is a trend that has persisted in recent years. That is why, in our opinion, there is no reason for the organizational changes now being proposed, because all these factors were taken into account and carefully weighed during the General Assembly's thirty-first session by the Special Committee entrusted with examining the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

In the view of the Soviet delegation, the United Nations Secretariat, with its present structure, is competently carrying out the tasks entrusted to it in General Assembly decisions. The Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, of which the Centre on Disarmament is a part, is providing the necessary

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

correlation of disarmament questions and questions of strengthening international peace and security. The United Nations Secretariat is organized in such a way that it can provide the services necessary for the organization, preparation and conduct of negotiations on the various aspects of disarmament. We are also taking into account the fact that in the present structure of the Secretariat there are sufficient resources. The United Nations Secretary-General and his collaborators are using the Secretariat's resources in the field of disarmament with skill and flexibility in dealing with the questions that arise in that area, and we believe that they will continue to do so in the future.

In recent years, we have constantly had before us for consideration proposals for the reorganization of the bodies entrusted with disarmament questions. Of course, in some cases such measures are justified, inasmuch as they reflect the changing reality. However, even when such changes are justified, that does not mean that there will be decisive advances in the field of disarmament. In our opinion, the question of organizational changes in the bodies entrusted with disarmament questions is grossly exaggerated. In turn, this complicates the consideration of disarmament questions in depth, diverts attention from basic problems and creates the illusion of movement when in fact it consists in marking time.

In the light of all this the Soviet delegation considers that there is no justification for putting forward at this stage the question of organizational changes dealt with in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.30.

Finally, I have one more point on this draft resolution. For some time there has been an epidemic of disarmament studies. The Soviet delegation has already stated its position in this regard and has expressed its concern at this avalanche of studies. This would appear to be yet another example of a study that would result in a waste of time and material resources.

For all these reasons the Soviet delegation will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.30.

Mr. KRUTZSCH (German Democratic Republic): With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.30, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic would like to state the following. During the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, the situation in the field of disarmament was

(Mr. Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)

thoroughly reviewed. The Final Document contains the conclusions of Member States with regard to matters of substance as well as organizational questions. The deliberative and negotiating organs have now been working for only a year in accordance with the provisions contained in part IV of the Final Document, entitled "Machinery", provisions which, in the case of the Centre for Disarmament, are said to have been adopted in order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament.

Draft resolutions already adopted in this Committee correctly point to the fact that there is progress on questions of machinery, but there are insufficient results with regard to substantive issues. The logical consequence of this is the necessity to concentrate on substantial questions of disarmament. The draft resolution before us does not respond to this necessity. On the contrary, it only tends to feed the illusion that there exists a possibility of taking urgent and necessary steps in the field of disarmament by making certain innovations in the machinery.

Therefore, my delegation opposes the present draft resolution, as a matter of principle, and we shall vote against its adoption.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to announce that Ireland has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.30. We shall now vote on that draft resolution.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Brazil, Cape Verde, Cuba, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Niger, Sierra Leone

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.30 was adopted by 102 votes to 9, with
8 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish
to explain their votes.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): When, following the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly at its tenth special session, the machinery for disarmament negotiations was expanded, a number of delegations, while declaring their satisfaction with the provisions agreed to in that regard in the Final Document, expressed their conviction that institutional arrangements could no longer be blamed for possible failures of disarmament negotiations and emphasized that the only absolutely indispensable prerequisite for ensuring the success of such negotiations was the political will of States. They also indicated that no institutional arrangements could substitute for the lack of such will.

Indeed, my delegation feels that we now have at our disposal all the means necessary in order actively to pursue the goals of disarmament. We have a multilateral negotiating body, the enlarged Committee on Disarmament. We have two deliberative bodies: the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission. We also have an advisory organ, the Advisory Board of eminent persons. Furthermore, we have the Centre for Disarmament in the Secretariat, and, in addition to that, we are going to set up an institute for disarmament research within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).

The terms of reference of each of those organs have been defined in the Final Document of the tenth special session or in other relevant documents. To the best of our knowledge, they fully cover all possible present and future requirements of disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

What we really need now is a concerted and concentrated effort by all States to proceed with effective steps leading to a halt to the arms race and to disarmament, in particular, by initiating, resuming or intensifying negotiations on various concrete disarmament issues on a bilateral, regional or multilateral basis.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

In the considered view of the Polish delegation, we should not disperse our efforts in the futile search for new institutional arrangements. In our opinion such a search, notwithstanding the intentions of its proponents, objectively tends to divert attention from the actual issues of the arms race and disarmament, and is but a waste of resources otherwise needed effectively to overcome the real existing difficulties.

For these reasons, and also taking into account the considerable financial implications of the proposed study, my delegation could not support the draft resolution in question and that is why we voted against it.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): The United States voted for draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.30 because the United States is basically in sympathy with the interest of the sponsors and others in ensuring that United Nations management of disarmament affairs will continue to be effective and responsive.

The draft resolution calls for qualified governmental experts to assist the Secretary-General in preparing the study. Although we did not and have not sought to amend this provision, we would hope that the United Nations Administrative Management Service could also be used for this purpose. That Service is an operating, funded, professional body with easy and immediate access to financial and organizational data. Using it to the maximum would cut down on the time and expense required for the meetings of governmental experts.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): The delegation of India supports in principle a study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. However, it has strong views in regard to any proposal for the creation of a United Nations disarmament organization at this stage. It was only recently that the Disarmament Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat was upgraded to the present United Nations Centre for Disarmament. The Centre is adequately equipped and fully competent to carry out the promotional and preparatory work in the field of disarmament which it is sought to assign

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

to the proposed United Nations disarmament organization at this stage. There will be full justification for the creation of a United Nations disarmament organization in the context of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, but not in the present situation in the field of disarmament.

Mr. SUMNER (Sierra Leone): The delegation of Sierra Leone abstained on this draft resolution for the reason already given by other delegations. There is existing machinery in our Organization to carry out such a study, without introducing a new organization for the purpose. We abstained mainly because of the financial implications.

The CHAIRMAN: Since there are no more speakers inscribed on my list, the Committee has now concluded its voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.30.

The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 on the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session. This draft resolution has thirteen sponsors and was introduced in its original form by the representative of the Soviet Union at the 39th meeting of the First Committee on 21 November.

The sponsors are: Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao Peoples' Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now call on the representative of Brazil, who has asked to explain his vote before the vote.

Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): My delegation participated in the negotiations regarding the text of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1. We are indebted to the delegation of the USSR for having incorporated in its original text many of the suggestions made by other delegations, especially those which are members of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. de Souza E. Silva, Brazil)

In the opinion of the Brazilian delegation, draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 as it stands now puts into almost correct perspective the long-hoped-for negotiations on nuclear disarmament within the Committee on Disarmament. There is, however, one aspect of such negotiations which is focused in such a way as to prevent our delegation from casting an affirmative vote on that draft. We have always maintained that disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament, is a special responsibility of the nuclear weapon Powers, but that it is at the same time of paramount interest and concern to all nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike.

For those reasons, while commending the efforts of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 to introduce a balanced negotiated text, my delegation cannot agree to the inclusion of the expression "with the participation of all nuclear-weapon-States" in the second line of operative paragraph 2. In our view, that phrase introduces a discriminatory element, which amounts virtually to conferring a veto power on individual nuclear-weapon nations, so that they can block if they so wish the negotiating process within the Committee. Brazil believes that nuclear disarmament is too important an issue to be left to the discretion of any single nuclear weapon member of the Committee on Disarmament.

For this reason, the Brazilian delegation will abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of the Soviet Union who will explain some changes made in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Yesterday the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33 gave to the Secretariat a revised text, on which I should like to make a few comments and explanations.

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 is the result of consultations by the sponsors with other delegations, in particular the Group of 21 States.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

In a spirit of constructive co-operation, the sponsors have taken into account to the maximum extent possible those comments and wishes that were put forward to them in the course of consultations, and the result of this is the revised draft. The principal changes are the following.

Initially, the draft was based on the idea that although the Committee on Disarmament provides the most appropriate forum for the preparation and conduct of negotiations on disarmament in the nuclear sphere, there may be alternative methods to be considered as well.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Agreement to such alternative methods is contained in document CD/4, submitted by the Group of Socialist States in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in February this year.

However, since in the course of the present consultations it was unanimously indicated that it would be appropriate for negotiations to take place within the Committee on Disarmament, the sponsors altered the draft resolution in such a way as to meet the wishes of the majority of the members of our Committee and that the negotiations be conducted in the Committee on Disarmament. I should like to explain in this connexion that as far as we are concerned the most important consideration is that negotiations on disarmament within the nuclear sphere should begin at the earliest possible time. Of course, if during consultations other views had been expressed concerning the method of conducting negotiations on nuclear disarmament, we should have been prepared to weigh and examine any variations on that theme.

As a separate paragraph in the revised draft resolution we have included the provision that the Committee on Disarmament should undertake at the beginning of its 1980 session a preparatory series of consultations on negotiations on nuclear disarmament. As the Soviet delegation has already explained in the Committee on Disarmament, such consultations could be conducted without the participation of all nuclear States, although their participation would of course be highly desirable from the beginning of such preparatory consultations.

The substantive negotiations are an entirely different matter. We consider that all nuclear-weapon States must participate in such negotiations, as must a certain number of non-nuclear-weapon States. That is why, in operative paragraph 2, this requirement is emphasized. Of course, in the present instance we are not speaking of the creation of two categories of States for negotiations on nuclear disarmament. On the one hand we wish to take into account the objective reality that exists in the Committee on Disarmament, and on the other to make a possible distinction between a group of participants in preparatory consultations and that in the negotiations themselves. This distinction, as was pointed out earlier, resides in the fact that, in our opinion, consultations can be conducted with the present membership of the Committee on Disarmament, whereas it is necessary that all the nuclear States participate in the negotiations themselves.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Also we have somewhat reduced the preambular part, taking into account the wishes expressed in the course of consultations. I should like to emphasize that we are basing ourselves on the proposition that the elaboration of substantive measures in the sphere of disarmament on the one hand and the implementation of measures to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of security on the other must be organically related and conducted in parallel.

On the whole, the revised draft resolution retains its principal thrust towards the earliest possible opening of negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles until their total elimination.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): My delegation has doubts as to whether adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 would contribute to the advancement of actual nuclear disarmament. My Government continues to entertain the conviction that the only realistic way of promoting nuclear disarmament is to move in progressive stages, with the implementation of such concrete measures as a comprehensive test ban, a cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and so on - to give but a few examples of the most pressing tasks.

For this reason, my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Sweden will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 and I now wish to give the following explanation of vote.

Sweden supported in principle the initiative submitted in the Committee on Disarmament by seven Socialist States concerning negotiations on nuclear disarmament, generally referred to as document CD/4. This position is in line with our view that the Committee on Disarmament should be utilized as a forum for the preparation and conducting of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We welcome the flexibility of the initial sponsors of this draft resolution in accepting the proposals submitted to them by members of the Group of 21 in the consultations on this draft resolution.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

We have, however, made it clear that the nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility in the achievement of the goals of nuclear disarmament. Disarmament measures in the nuclear field must take into account the relative, qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, we attach particular importance to the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, in which the particular responsibility of the major nuclear-weapon States is emphasized.

The words "with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States" in operative paragraph 2 are, in our view, superfluous and should in no way be construed as contradicting or diminishing the particular responsibility of the major nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): In common with some of the other delegations that have addressed the Committee, my delegation would like to add its own word of appreciation to the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 for the understanding and flexibility they have shown regarding the views of others expressed in the consultations that were held with the members of the Group of 21.

With regard to operative paragraph 1, from what I recall of the last meeting of the Group of 21 we had thought of suggesting to the sponsors of this draft resolution that the verb "to undertake" be replaced instead by "to continue". The reason for this suggestion was that my delegation has the impression that those preparatory consultations, which we had advocated and supported in the Committee on Disarmament from the beginning of its spring 1979 session, had at that time already begun. Therefore I should like to ask the sponsors, through you, Sir, whether they would find it difficult to change the present text to read as follows:

(spoke in English)

"Requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue at the beginning of its 1980 session the preparatory consultations initiated in 1979 on the negotiations referred to in operative paragraph 2 of this resolution;"

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

(continued in Spanish)

That, Sir, is the question I should like to ask the sponsors through you, and I should like again to express our appreciation to the sponsors for the flexibility they have already shown.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1, since it is generally in accord with our own views on this subject.

At this stage, I should also like to express our appreciation to the sponsors for incorporating many of our amendments in their revised draft. However, since the existence of nuclear weapons poses a grave threat to the very survival of mankind, the delegation of India believes that the Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, should urgently negotiate, first, an immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons combined with the curtailment of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and, secondly, the attainment of the objective of nuclear disarmament as a time-related programme.

Mr. LI Chih-hung (China) (interpretation from Chinese): The Chinese delegation cannot support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1.

We are of the view that the greatest threat to international peace and security comes from the super-Powers' policies of aggression, expansion and war. The super-Powers, especially the late-coming super-Power, in order to contend for world hegemony, have spared no efforts in developing nuclear weapons and contending for nuclear supremacy and this is the root cause of the nuclear arms race.

The Chinese delegation has on many occasions expressed the view that in order to halt the nuclear arms race and realize genuine nuclear disarmament so as to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war, it is necessary to ask the super-Powers to be the first to reduce their nuclear arsenals on a large scale.

After they have made substantial and significant progress in the destruction of nuclear weapons, the other nuclear Powers should then join them in carrying out nuclear disarmament in a reasonable ratio, until the total destruction of all nuclear weapons on earth is realized.

(Mr. Li Chih-hung, China)

This, in our opinion, should be the central concern in all consultations and negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Basing itself on the above position, the Chinese delegation will not participate in the voting on this resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): The Nigerian delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1. Before doing so, we should like in the first instance to pay a tribute to the spirit of accommodation shown by the sponsors in their willingness to consider many of the suggested improvements to the original draft, which we see they have incorporated in the revised text of the draft resolution.

We should like to say that the suggested improvement made this afternoon by the representative of Mexico is, of course, in line with the facts of the situation, since the draft resolution itself does indicate in one of the preambular paragraphs that the Committee on Disarmament started consideration in 1979 of the substance of the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects".

In voting for the resolution my delegation would also like to stress that in operative paragraph 2, we interpret the phrase "with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States" not as an indication that no negotiations can take place in the Committee on Disarmament without the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, but as an expression of the hope that in fact all nuclear-weapon States will participate in the Committee on Disarmament.

With that understanding, my delegation has no difficulty whatsoever in voting for the resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon the representative of the Soviet Union to state whether the sponsors could accept the amendment made by the representative of Mexico to operative paragraph 1.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): With regard to the statement just made by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, I should like, in the first place, to make a small clarification.

Our delegation notes that this year the Committee on Disarmament started the consideration of the agenda item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects". We note the usefulness of the work done by that Committee. We note with satisfaction the fact that the overwhelming majority of the States members of the Committee expressed interest in achieving genuine results during the discussion of this question.

However, the fact that the consideration of the item started this year in the Committee on Disarmament does not, properly speaking, mean that there have been preparatory consultations. We understand by "preparatory consultations" the process by which the range of questions to be considered during the negotiations on nuclear disarmament is defined, and specific - I stress: specific - questions connected with the organizational aspect of the holding of negotiations are solved.

Nevertheless, in a spirit of compromise and in a desire to be as constructive as possible, and bearing in mind the importance of the item now being discussed and the need for the greatest possible progress in connexion with it, we are ready, if the other sponsors of the draft resolution agree, to accept wording under which the Committee on Disarmament would be requested to continue, at the beginning of its next session, its examination of the question of nuclear weapons in all aspects and to proceed with preparatory consultations on the negotiations. In that way we would be reflecting completely what is actually taking place in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and would also be taking into account the wishes expressed here by the representative of Mexico.

Hence, I repeat, if there is no objection by the other sponsors of the draft resolution, we would be prepared to agree to such an amendment.

The CHAIRMAN: I take it that, in essence, the representative of the Soviet Union rejects the statement made by the representative of Mexico and has now come up with his own amendment - if I may call it such - to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. I wonder whether the representative of Mexico would wish to make any comment in this connexion.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I think that this is really a matter of semantics, and I would not wish to engage in any polemics on it.

I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for the suggestion he has made. So far as I am concerned, what took place this year in the Committee on Disarmament was preparatory consultations. If, however, the representative of the Soviet Union feels that that is a misnomer, then, in my view, the text he has suggested covers both points of view. My delegation therefore gratefully accepts his suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN: I would ask the representative of the Soviet Union to read out the amendment he is proposing.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Operative paragraph 1 would begin as follows:
(spoke in English)

"Requests the Committee on Disarmament to continue at the beginning of its 1980 session consideration of the item 'Nuclear weapons in all aspects'." The remainder of the paragraph would read: "and to undertake preparatory consultations on the negotiations referred to in operative paragraph 2 of this resolution".

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the Committee that Viet Nam has become a sponsor of this draft resolution

I now put to the vote draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1, with the amendment to operative paragraph 1 read out by the representative of the Soviet Union.

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1, as amended, was adopted by 102 votes to 3, with 18 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

Mr. NOLAN (Australia): The Australian delegation abstained on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1, "Nuclear weapons in all aspects". The Australian delegation is concerned about the number of issues being assigned as matters of high priority to the Committee on Disarmament. It is not possible for the Committee to give equal priority to all issues assigned to it. To assign a large number of issues to the Committee on Disarmament as high-priority items will create confusion over which of these issues should in fact be given priority. Such confusion should and can be avoided by exercising greater selectivity in the assignment of issues.

The draft resolution just voted on attaches, in the Australian delegation's view, too high a priority to a proposal which has yet to be given a specific form. The Committee on Disarmament has already had assigned to it as matters of high priority more specific and pressing matters the consideration of which should not, we feel, be impeded. We have in mind particularly consideration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention.

Mr. de LA GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): The delegation of France had to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1. In doing so, we drew the logical conclusions from the French Government's basic positions on the approach to and conditions of nuclear disarmament. We hope that success can be achieved in that field. We know that nuclear disarmament cannot be isolated from the general undertaking of disarmament, which must take account of the complex of elements: military means, diversity of regional situations, everyone's right to security, and so forth.

But what is contained in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 does not meet those conditions or the specific facts of the problem posed by nuclear disarmament, taking into account the respective means of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

Under the draft resolution on which the Committee has just voted, the Committee on Disarmament must at the very beginning of its 1980 session undertake preparatory consultations on negotiations as a matter of priority, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States, with a view to achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. de La Gorce, France)

In fact, the volume and the continuing technical sophistication of the arsenals of the two leading nuclear Powers constitute the main aspect of the problem, for their capabilities are out of all proportion greater than those of the other Powers. Having recognized this basic fact and the risks that it involves, those two Powers have defined a specific approach, namely, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The French Government is well aware of the importance of those negotiations and hopes that they will lead to very substantial reductions of the nuclear armaments of those Powers. That was the wish expressed this year to the General Assembly by my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. François-Poncet, who added:

"As for France, it would take appropriate action on the basis of such reductions only if there were a change in the extent of the disparity persisting between those two arsenals and its own arsenal, which France keeps at its disposal to ensure the security and credibility of its deterrent" (A/34/PV.9, p. 42).

That is why, as far as the French Government is concerned, nuclear disarmament in the present circumstances remains the main responsibility of the two leading Powers. It therefore wishes on this occasion to express its basic objection to preparations, at this stage, for negotiations with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, negotiations the conditions for which, in our view, have not been met.

Mr. RUDOLFSKY (Austria): In the course of the general debate in this Committee the Austrian delegation had the opportunity to refer at some length to questions of nuclear disarmament and to elaborate on the position of the Austrian Government concerning some of the most urgent issues in this regard. In explaining the vote of the Austrian delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1, I shall therefore limit myself to those considerations which have a direct bearing on this draft resolution.

Austria welcomes the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to include on its agenda an item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and we appreciate the fact that during the first two sessions of the Committee its members have embarked on a serious consideration of these questions, in the course of which a number of interesting proposals and views have been presented. We believe that the Committee on Disarmament has not only the right but also, by virtue of relevant General Assembly resolutions, the duty to discuss and negotiate on questions of nuclear disarmament.

In the view of the Austrian delegation, these discussions and negotiations have to be based on a number of basic requirements. First, the work of the Committee on Disarmament in this field must be placed within the framework of paragraphs 29 and 47 to 50 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament. Any concrete mandate for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament should therefore refer to all the elements contained in these provisions and, in particular, in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. Secondly, such negotiations must not jeopardize the existing balance of power. Therefore, the participation of individual nuclear-weapon States and the obligations they would have to assume at the outcome of such negotiations must be commensurate with their total military strength including nuclear as well as conventional weapons. Thirdly, adequate verification is an indispensable element in all disarmament efforts and for measures of nuclear disarmament in particular. Therefore, such negotiations as are envisaged in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 will have to include an in-depth consideration of adequate methods of verification.

Negotiations on all aspects of nuclear disarmament are of a very delicate and complex nature. Therefore, it is all the more important that negotiations on individual aspects of nuclear disarmament be continued in parallel with negotiations of a comprehensive nature or be taken up as soon as possible.

(Mr. Rudofsky, Austria)

Multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament must be seen in conjunction with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the two leading nuclear-weapon States. My delegation has expressed the hope that the two parties to the SALT treaties will continue their negotiations with a view to arriving at more far-reaching agreements in accordance with the Final Document. Multilateral negotiations on nuclear issues, which, in the view of the Austrian delegation, can be conducted in parallel with the bilateral SALT process, should not constitute any impediment to this process.

My delegation is of the view that the draft resolution in the revised form now before us is of a sufficiently broad and general nature as to encompass all these considerations. In view of this fact, my delegation was in a position to cast a positive vote - a position which, however, should be seen in the light of this explanation of vote.

I should like to add one specific reservation which my delegation has with regard to the third preambular paragraph referring to paragraph 54 of the Final Document, which speaks of "political and international legal measures to strengthen the security of all States". This formulation, on which my delegation already expressed explicit reservations at the time of the adoption of the Final Document, is of a very ambiguous nature and leaves us in doubt as to what specific measures are to be considered. Austria reserves its right to give its views on such measures whenever individual proposals on them come up for discussion.

I should like further to add, with respect to the wording in operative paragraph 2, that my delegation considers the words "with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States" superfluous. This wording should not be construed in a way which might hamper the initiation of the negotiating process.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I wish to explain why my delegation has just cast its vote against draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 - or perhaps one should call it A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.2.

The sponsors of this draft resolution will know that my delegation commented in detail in the Committee on Disarmament on the proposal which is at the basis of this draft resolution. I do not wish to repeat those observations now, but it seems to my delegation that the reservations we expressed in the past are still relevant at this stage.

As we made clear, my Government attaches importance to the search for specific measures of nuclear disarmament and is already participating in the comprehensive test-ban negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on one such specific measure which will involve carefully worked-out methods of verification. We continue to believe that this approach has greater validity than one which envisages generalized measures.

My Government also believes, as it has stated on previous occasions, that the aim should be undiminished security for all States at a lower level of risk and armament. We do not believe that this aim can be realized by concentrating on the question of nuclear disarmament in isolation. On the contrary, such an approach would, in our view, be destabilizing, and it was for those reasons that we voted against the draft resolution.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): My delegation voted for draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1 because it certainly is a positive resolution, particularly at a time when we realize, from the developments in the world, that we are moving into a period of complete collapse of international legal order. Perhaps the signs are not as ominous as they might appear at first, but it is a reality that we are gradually slipping into a world of no legal order. The reasons for that are not to be explained at this moment, but any step towards bringing a halt to the arms race is welcome. We do not know to what extent it may succeed, and the danger is that it may not succeed, but I should like to point out in particular that operative paragraph 2 requests the Committee on Disarmament to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations with the participation of all nuclear-weapon-States on the question of the cessation of the arms race. We realize the difficulties for any agreement on the cessation of the arms race, particularly as some of the nuclear Powers consider themselves very much below any level of balance of nuclear weapons. Even between the two super-Powers there is the idea that one is not sufficiently advanced and that the other is more advanced. Therefore, it will be very difficult to arrive at an agreement for the cessation of the arms race because of these ideas and these differences, which may or may not be true.

Therefore, I would have thought that parallel with the negotiations on the question of the cessation of the arms race there could be agreement on a temporary halt to or a moratorium on nuclear weapons competition, until a way is found for the complete cessation of the nuclear arms race. There could be a temporary moratorium to allow time for consideration. To attempt quickly to agree on cessation involves difficulties and time is of the essence in the matter.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

That is why my delegation has voted for the draft resolution on the general grounds of our support for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. At the same time we realize the difficulties involved and the need to proceed first with a moratorium or a temporary halt, which is much easier to agree upon as an interim measure. Unfortunately, we still rely on the outmoded concept of the balance of power or rather the balance of weapons, and that is an impediment to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Each side wants to attain or maintain a balance, and for that purpose proceeds with armaments, whether nuclear or conventional.

Cyprus is not a member of the Committee on Disarmament and therefore we could not express our views there, but I submit here that every effort should be made to halt the arms race, because unless we halt the arms race we can never make any progress towards reducing armaments. It is illogical to expect nations to reduce armaments while the arms race continues. Therefore, a temporary halt to the arms race or a moratorium would be most beneficial in every way. I believe that can be achieved, and it should be considered by the nuclear Powers when they start their negotiations - if they do start them - on the cessation of the arms race, as a necessary step in that direction. It would also be a way of proceeding towards international security by means other than armaments, that is, towards collective security through the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, so that it may be possible to halt the arms race and subsequently to achieve its complete cessation.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1. This draft resolution deals with a most serious matter which, in the view of my delegation, requires a very careful approach in order to prevent any misunderstanding and not to be misleading.

In the view of my delegation, the proposal that the Committee on Disarmament should deal with nuclear disarmament problems in all their aspects, as formulated, is simply not realistic. We can best approach the question of nuclear disarmament by taking up and concentrating on specific measures. In supporting this approach, my delegation believes that the recommendation in paragraph 50 of the Final Document should be strictly followed and that agreements should be negotiated in appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification.

If the draft resolution had contained an appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to undertake negotiations on the lines recommended in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, to which I have just referred, and had requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue its work on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, then the position of my delegation would have been different.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has now concluded its consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.33/Rev.1.

The Committee will now take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.36, entitled "Committee on Disarmament". This draft resolution is sponsored by Burma and was introduced by the representative of Burma at the 39th meeting of the First Committee on 21 November 1979.

The financial implications of this draft resolution have been indicated in document A/C.1/34/L.50.

The Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament has requested that this draft resolution be adopted without vote. As there is no objection, it is so decided.

Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.36 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their position.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): We read the statement of financial implications in the time available to us. Frankly we do not completely understand the rather heavy expenditures in the year 1979. That year is almost behind us, yet we note the sum of \$520,000. I did not object to the draft resolution being adopted by consensus, but I should like to reserve our position on this aspect in order to examine it more carefully.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I, too, should like to make a brief comment on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.36, which has just been adopted. My comment does not concern the main purpose of the resolution, which we fully support, but the statement of financial implications contained in A/C.1/34/L.50. My delegation received this document only this afternoon and a superficial reading of the information in it suggests that there are aspects of the secretarial and document services for the Committee on Disarmament which will cost large sums of money, by which we mean something more than half a million dollars. This, in our view, requires further consideration.

Therefore, I should like to have it recorded that our approval of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.36 is without prejudice to the eventual decisions on various matters raised in document A/C.1/34/L.50.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like it to be recorded that in voting for the draft resolution which has just been adopted we, at the same time, reserve our right to decide our attitude regarding the financial implications of that resolution as contained in document A/C.1/34/L.50 at a later stage.

Mr. MORENO (Italy) (interpretation from French): My delegation would like to reserve its position with regard to document A/C.1/34/L.50, which contains the financial implications of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.36, which has just been adopted by consensus.

We have only just received A/C.1/34/L.50, and we should like to have time to examine it in greater detail.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has concluded its consideration of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.36.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: We have now concluded our work on disarmament items with the exception of the draft resolutions on the Indian Ocean in document A/34/29, because of their financial implications. It is hoped that the document concerning those financial implications will be ready by tomorrow, at which time we shall be able to conclude our work on disarmament.

On Wednesday morning, we shall begin our debate on agenda item 122, and on 30 November we shall deal with the question of the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism - agenda item 126. The deadline for the closure of the list of speakers has been set, and the list of speakers on agenda item 46 will be closed on 3 December.

Mr. FARRUGIA (Malta): When the delegation of Malta spoke on agenda item 126, on the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations, we stated that it was our intention to elaborate further on this item when it came up for discussion at a later stage.

However, when we recently attempted to inscribe our name on the list of speakers in the discussion of agenda item 126, scheduled for Friday, 30 November, we were informed that we could only be put on the waiting list of speakers without any promise or guarantee that we would be called upon. Furthermore, it appears that the number of delegations on the waiting list of speakers on this agenda item is almost equal to the number of speakers actually inscribed.

(Mr. Farrugia, Malta)

My delegation, therefore, would like to put on record that the only alternative available to it is not to participate in the discussion on agenda item 126, for which only two meetings have been reserved, on Friday, 30 November.

In view of these circumstances, we appeal to you, Sir, to find a way of accommodating the 12 or so delegations inscribed on the waiting list of speakers.

The CHAIRMAN: In answer to the question raised by the representative of Malta, I would like to say that the solution to the problem posed by the discussion of agenda item 126 is very simple. If delegates who have inscribed their names on the list to speak on this item will make their statements bearing in mind the time that we have for dealing with this question, all delegates will be able to speak.

If I may say so, I feel it is being rather hasty to decide not to participate because one's name has not been specifically inscribed to speak on an item, and I hope that the representative of Malta will reconsider his position.

We had some time to discuss this before we began our deliberations on disarmament items, and at that time it was explained that only two meetings could be devoted to this item given the limited time available to us.

At this stage I do not see any need to alter that decision, but I will do everything in my power to see that each delegate who wishes to speak on the item can do so. This also depends upon the co-operation of members, which they have given in the past. I am sure that if the same co-operation is given in the future it will be possible to accommodate all the speakers who have inscribed their names on the list, including those on the waiting list.

I trust that this answers the question raised by the representative of Malta and also satisfies any other delegation that may have encountered the same situation.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.