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### EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

Forty-first session

#### SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 459th MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 4 October 1990, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

- (a) REVIEW OF UNHCR PROGRAMMES FINANCED BY VOLUNTARY FUNDS IN 1989-1990 AND ADOPTION OF A REVISED 1990 BUDGET AND PROPOSED PROGRAMMES AND BUDGET FOR 1991
- (b) STATUS OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND OVERALL FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 1990 AND 1991
- (c) ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT (agenda item 5) (A/AC.96/751, parts I to V, and A/AC.96/751/Add.1, part I, A/AC.96/752, A/AC.96/753, A/AC.96/754 and A/AC.96/759)

1. Mr. STAFFORD (Deputy High Commissioner), introducing agenda item 5, listed the documents to be considered under the item and said that the budgets being submitted were tight and that such a state of affairs would have its effect on the refugee situation. The financial targets for 1990 and 1991 would not enable all needs to be met, because they had been based on a projection of expected resources. Like a number of delegations, he, too, was concerned about the relatively small amount of funds allocated to durable solutions.

2. For over a year, the Executive Committee and UNHCR had been essentially preoccupied with improving the Office's financial situation and with altering its structure, and they had achieved some success. While efforts in that direction would be continued, the time had come to refocus on responding to the expectations of those that it was UNHCR's mission to assist, namely refugees. UNHCR could not allow itself to remain inert in the face of a changed political climate, but should take advantage of the readiness of States to use the machinery of the United Nations.

3. It was ironic that, at the very moment opportunities for durable solutions were at hand, UNHCR was encountering severe financial difficulties. He would remind the Committee that, to complete its 1990 programme, UNHCR still needed \$60 million. It was thus crucial that members should do all they could to provide the Office with the additional funds which would enable it to fulfil its mandate up to the end of the year. As to questions of administration and management, UNHCR had reached a crossroads and, that although much had been accomplished, much remained to be done. The support of the Executive Committee would be essential in carrying out that task.

4. Mr. MARKIDES (Observer for Cyprus) pointed out that the 200,000 Cypriots who had been forced to abandon their homes and property following the 1974 invasion had the same needs as refugees in the strict sense of the word. The funds generously made available to UNHCR for its Cyprus programme (A/AC.96/751, part V) were being used to promote projects benefiting both communities, and to improve the general living conditions of the refugees, who, after 16 years of exile, still had a burning desire to return to their homes.

5. The population of Cyprus consisted of 82 per cent Greek Cypriots and 18 per cent Turkish Cypriots. He noted that the proportion of funds allocated by UNHCR to Turkish Cypriots was in excess of their ratio to the island's total population. For the Government of Cyprus, which was concerned to promote unity rather than division, the best solution to the refugee problem was voluntary repatriation under conditions of safety, and, once the situation had returned to normal, most displaced persons would in all likelihood choose to return home. The refugee question should also be considered from the political point of view, as recognized by the High Commissioner from the moment he had taken office. The problem of Cyprus could only be solved through negotiation, with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and on the basis of United Nations resolutions, high-level agreements, and international law. Unfortunately, the other side had done nothing but foster division, thus blocking the way to any possible solution. Lastly, his country stood ready to co-operate closely with the Regional Director for South-West Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.

6. Mr. MORLAND (United Kingdom) commended UNHCR for taking into account the recommendations of the Temporary Working Group, notably by concluding an agreement with the World Food Programme on food transportation costs, an agreement which had already resulted in savings in the 1990 budget and should make for further savings in the 1991 budget. The agreement was evidence of the advantages to be derived from co-operation with other agencies. The Gulf crisis afforded a good example of the way in which United Nations agencies and other agencies could co-operate in very difficult circumstances without trespassing on each other's mandates.

7. He also welcomed the efforts by UNHCR to bring staff numbers down to the 1986 level. Despite the difficult decisions that policy had involved, the longer term benefits should include an increase in the proportion of resources channelled to direct refugee assistance. Particularly gratifying were UNHCR's efforts, in Europe and elsewhere, to identify savings that could be made through better use of regional offices, efforts that were a fundamental part of the Office's planning activities. In the new structure, evaluation had rightly been strengthened, and its independence guaranteed by creating a direct link between the Evaluation Unit and the High Commissioner's Office. It was to be hoped that the recommendations made as a result of the evaluation exercise would be applied more widely in the UNHCR system as a whole.

8. Also commendable were the new procedures to respond to emergency situations: they should ensure not only that assistance was provided as rapidly as possible, but also at the lowest possible cost. Due to lack of time, the Temporary Working Group had not dealt with important financial questions, notably UNHCR's funding mechanisms. He thus welcomed the recent decision to appoint external consultants to make recommendations for improving those mechanisms, and to seek the views of donors through their Geneva missions as well as through the Sub-Committee on Administrative and Financial Matters. How to improve predictability of resources should be one of the key concerns of the consultants, and his delegation awaited their conclusions with interest. The United Kingdom, for its part, would, as in the past, strive to make an

earlier and more accurate estimate of the likely amount of its annual contribution. However, greater predictability could not in itself guarantee that UNHCR would have sufficient resources to be able to carry out its task. Both traditional donors and host countries had done their utmost to come to the aid of an ever-increasing number of refugees, but there were still too many States which did not see it as their duty to pay any contribution to UNHCR's programmes. It was to be hoped that the events of the past few weeks would encourage them to reconsider their position.

9. All would agree that 1990 had been an extremely difficult year for UNHCR. However, by adapting its programmes to the level of resources it could reasonably expect to receive, and by endeavouring to reduce administration costs, the Office was ensuring that it would be in a better position to respond to future appeals for assistance. The principal aim in 1990 had been to balance the budget, and that had been achieved, although the problem had yet to be solved as far as the last three months of the year were concerned.

10. UNHCR was to be congratulated on the improvements it had made in the presentation and regularity of its financial reports; the new format meant that they were now easier to consult.

11. The initial budget estimates for the 1991 General Programme showed a drop of \$16 million in comparison with 1990. However, that decrease had now been almost entirely cancelled out by the Liberian crisis. The programme reserve had been slightly increased, which gave a certain degree of flexibility to the new programme, and though the reserve was small, it was a step in the right direction.

12. Although the financial crisis had not yet been overcome, the High Commissioner and his staff had taken steps which should further improve the situation in years to come, and should ensure that the Office was well placed to respond to the challenges of the 1990s.

13. Mr. EL KHATIM (Observer for Sudan) said that document A/AC.96/751 (part I) contained some errors in the figures relating to the Sudan. In fact, the total number of refugees in the Sudan was not 768,000 (para. 1.17.1), but 950,000, and the refugees being assisted by UNHCR numbered 234,000 and not 377,000. Those errors could have serious consequences, in that it was impossible to operate properly targeted programmes on the basis of false data. In addition, as had been already stated by the representative of Sudan at the Committee's extraordinary session in May, UNHCR's assistance programmes for 1990 met only 9.6 per cent of the basic needs of refugees. A mission sent by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which had visited a Sudanese reception centre in September had found that the refugees' living conditions were appalling, and that the plight of children was particularly tragic. It now seemed that allocations for 1991 would be even lower than those of 1990. Sudan, which was already suffering from major economic problems and from endemic drought, would not be able to continue to assist those refugees, and it urgently requested UNHCR and the international community to take action in order to avoid a repetition of the tragedies of 1984 and 1985.

14. Mr. EL GHALI BENHIMA (Morocco) said that a compromise permitting a durable solution to UNHCR's financial crisis could be achieved, provided three basic conditions were met: a policy of austerity at all levels, a broadening of UNHCR's resource base, and adequate attention to refugee concerns by meeting basic needs. Assistance should not be allowed to become institutionalized to the detriment of durable solutions, and voluntary repatriation was the preferred solution. Priority assistance should go to the most vulnerable refugee groups, notably women, children and the elderly. In addition, any initiatives to promote self-sufficiency were to be encouraged, and his country welcomed UNHCR's new approach, which sought to strike a balance between available resources and refugee needs. The numerous programme reviews in recent months showed that the Office was honouring its commitment to maintain that balance.

15. Where circumstances were favourable to local integration, development aid offered an effective solution for some categories of refugees. As far as possible, development projects should be integrated into national plans. It was also important that the refugee burden worldwide should be shared, and the efforts made in that direction by a number of development agencies were particularly worthy of attention.

16. In his introductory statement, the High Commissioner had welcomed the fact that the problem of the Western Sahara now seemed to be nearing a solution, and Morocco, for its part, hoped that that solution would not be long in coming. He would point out, however, that his delegation had always disputed the suggested figure of 165,000 Saharan refugees. He also disputed their origin, since the number of persons genuinely originating from the Western Sahara region represented only a small proportion of the total population of the settlement camps. It should be remembered in that connection that that exaggerated figure had not been included in the United Nations Peace Plan, which referred to data supplied by the 1974 Spanish census, data which had been used by the United Nations Identification and Census Commission as a basis for the referendum.

17. Lastly, his delegation had taken note of the financial target for 1991 and supported the budget proposals as amended by the High Commissioner.

18. Mr. MEJIA (Observer for Honduras), speaking on behalf of the countries of Central America, said that the follow-up operation to the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) had been one of UNHCR's greatest successes. In that connection he would like to thank Mr. Dannenbring, who, as Chairman of the Executive Committee, had made every effort to support the work of the Latin American Group.

19. However, a number of important problems still had to be solved. Although moves were being made towards peace, the process of reconciliation in the region was not yet complete, and in some countries, the socio-economic situation gave cause for great concern. Both for UNHCR and for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the priority need was to strengthen links through which the Conference's initiatives could form part

of national development efforts. Only by that means could repatriation and reintegration endeavours achieve success. As the High Commissioner had pointed out in his opening statement, the success of the Conference was closely tied in with the furtherance of peace and development in the region. For that reason, the countries of Central America urgently requested Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations alike to continue to support implementation of the Concerted Plan of Action. In conclusion, he wished to thank the High Commissioner and his staff, who had worked untiringly to put the Office's chosen policies into practice.

20. Mr. SIMINGTON (Australia) commended the High Commissioner for his commitment in the scrupulous and balanced implementation of all elements of the comprehensive Plan of Action. The document before the Committee clearly showed that great progress had been made in certain areas, notably with regard to persons with genuine refugee status. For example, the resettlement of refugees in camps in South-East Asia was ahead of schedule. Australia had played an important role in that process, since it had already considered the cases of 80 per cent of the total number of refugees it had offered to receive. Normalization of emigration from Viet Nam under the Orderly Departure Programme was also proceeding well, and under that programme, too, Australia had taken in large numbers of refugees.

21. However, the Comprehensive Plan of Action depended for its success on the repatriation of persons who did not meet the agreed criteria for the granting of refugee status. The situation of Vietnamese asylum-seekers in that category had reached an impasse, which was endangering the whole principle of protection. The Comprehensive Plan of Action was very clear on that point: the return of those who did not come within the definition of a refugee was inevitable, and lack of consensus on the timing and modalities of repatriation was merely aggravating the situation.

22. It was essential that the inhabitants of the camps should accept that they had to return home. There were, in fact, few volunteers for repatriation and it had to be said that a number of factors combined to discourage possible candidates: pressure from relatives at home, or rumours circulating in the camps which discouraged volunteers by implying that eventually the international community would open up its borders more freely to asylum-seekers.

23. The inhabitants of the camps had to be told clearly and unequivocally that, for those found not to be refugees, return was inevitable and there was no prospect of relaxation of restrictions on agreed settlement in third countries. They should be brought to understand that it was futile to insist on remaining in the camps, and they should not be encouraged to cherish false hopes. In that connection, counselling services in the camps should be improved, and Australia was prepared to assist in that effort.

24. Mr. GARBA (Nigeria) said that the past year had brought out the best in UNHCR, which had successfully streamlined its structure and activities to bring them more in line with its limited resources. However, it had to be

admitted that in future the Office would need a better funding mechanism, since the unpredictability of its income had repercussions both on the refugees themselves and on asylum countries and often meant that projects which would have led to durable solutions had to be abandoned.

25. Among the various options proposed to remedy the situation was the possibility of seeking private sources of funding. For that purpose, UNHCR would utilize the services of communications and marketing professionals experienced in private fund-raising. His delegation invited donors to support that initiative, which would have the advantage of enlarging the limited circle of traditional donors, thereby reducing the financial burden they were now bearing.

26. His delegation wished to draw attention to the exemplary co-operation between UNDP and UNHCR in activities initiated under the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), co-operation that should serve as a model for inter-agency action in line with the Executive Committee's decision on the sharing of responsibilities for operational activities. Co-ordination between different organs of the United Nations system made it possible not only to share expenses, but also to take advantage of the technical skills of each of the partners; hence the importance of the section dealing with inter-organizational co-operation in the new secretariat structure.

27. Nigeria supported the proposal to set up a Contingency Fund, which would give UNHCR more flexibility in responding to emergency situations, and it hoped that the assurances given by the Office that it would report annually on the use of the Special Account would satisfy the concern expressed by some delegations.

28. The decisions taken to streamline administration and make budgetary cuts had put UNHCR and the Executive Committee on the right road. All that was needed now was the political will to put them into effect.

29. Mr. DEMIRALP (Turkey) said he protested at the exploitation of the plight of displaced persons in Cyprus for political purposes. Such a manoeuvre was an attempt to distort the facts, and should be strongly opposed in all forums, particularly a humanitarian forum such as the UNHCR Executive Committee. He would like to give an account of the origins and development of the situation regarding displaced persons in Cyprus, a situation which should be taken into consideration in the implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes.

30. In 1958, even before the island had acceded to independence, again in 1963 and as late as 1974, despite the presence of the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot villages and urban areas had been attacked and in some cases destroyed. Turkish Cypriots had been dispersed in over 40 enclaves that were in all parts of the island but covered only 3 per cent of its territory. After the coup d'état of 1974, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots had been obliged to seek refuge in safer areas. The persistently hostile attitude of one side had meant that the only possible

solution was to divide the two populations into two separate zones. Partition had been decided on by common agreement in 1975 in Vienna, paving the way for the introduction of a two-zone federal system. Both communities had suffered great hardships, but the population in the north was more in need of humanitarian aid than that in the south. In fact, since 1975, the Turkish Cypriot people, determined to defend their freedom, security and dignity, had suffered from numerous restrictions imposed by the opposing side in the economic and cultural field. As far as the population of the south were concerned, they were the only group of displaced persons in the world who enjoyed a per capita GNP of \$8,000 a year. It would appear that holding on to persons still not properly resettled or reintegrated was deliberate policy on the part of the opposing side, which hoped to retake the north of the island and re-establish the situation that had existed before 1974.

31. United Nations Security Council resolution 649 had made provision for the setting up of a two-zone, two-community federation. Ill-disguised attempts were being made to overturn the two-zone principle by exploiting the plight of displaced persons. Those receiving UNHCR's assistance on the island could in no way be considered as refugees. The High Commissioner's role in Cyprus was confined to co-ordinating United Nations humanitarian assistance to both communities. Turkey hoped that that programme would continue to be implemented, but with the emphasis on Turkish Cypriots.

32. Mr. KELLY (United States of America) said he would like to comment on the recommendations made by the Board of Auditors, which were in line with some of the recommendations of the Committee's Temporary Working Group, on how to ensure better use of existing resources and to mobilize new resources.

33. His delegation strongly supported the recommendations contained in paragraph 5 (b) and (e) of the Board's report (A/AC.96/755); the first was that the use of funds channelled through UNHCR as simple transfers to third parties should be monitored, and that the administrative expenses incurred should be recovered; the second was that reporting and payment procedures for cash-for-food contributions should be streamlined, and that reimbursement by donors for food purchases and related costs should be accelerated. Those two recommendations should serve to increase UNHCR's resources. As to the recommendation in paragraph 5 (c), the Auditors rightly pointed out that UNHCR ought to indicate in its financial statements the volume and estimated value of food aid, which formed such an important component of its programme. In cases where several organizations in the United Nations system were incurring substantial expenditure on a particular programme activity, the total cost should be reflected in the financial statements, so that Member States could determine how the limited resources available should be allocated throughout the system.

34. The recommendation in paragraph 5 (d), concerning staff rotation policy, was designed to reduce the frequency, and hence the cost, of staff reassignments; his delegation was in agreement on that point, provided that the varying degree of hardship existing at different duty stations was taken into account. The recommendation in paragraph 5 (f) called for effective



arrangements for monitoring funds administered by implementing agencies. He fully supported that recommendation, which would go far in ferreting out waste and irregularities in the management of resources.

35. In conclusion, he wished to make two comments regarding funding. His delegation would support an increase in the regular budget, provided zero real growth budgeting was respected. Secondly, it hoped that in seeking a mechanism to improve funding flexibility, consideration would be given to the need to maintain the Emergency Fund at an adequate level, since that Fund was very useful to UNHCR in responding to emergency situations.

36. Mr. MARTIUS (Germany) commended UNHCR for keeping the revised 1990 budget within the limit set by the Executive Committee at its extraordinary session in May. However, the funding shortfall in general programmes called for continued budgetary discipline and for an undiminishing donor support. His delegation could accept the 1991 General Programmes target of \$345.5 million. If that target was to be met, great efforts would have to be made to raise funds from donors. In addition, UNHCR should take every opportunity to make savings, notably on administrative expenditure. In that area, Germany was ready to assist through its multilateral co-operation programme.

37. In 1989, Germany's contribution to UNHCR trust fund projects had reached nearly 8 million marks. For the financial year 1990, the indicative planning figure had fallen to 6.35 million marks. If that situation was to be improved, progress would need to be made in three main areas: project identification and planning, effectiveness in project implementation, and financial management.

38. Germany was ready to provide about 1 million marks over a three-year period into a project planning and preparation trust fund, to enable the Technical Support Service to recruit experts in project planning and preparation, in particular for income-generating activities and natural resource management. As far as implementation was concerned, his delegation was concerned that the Transport Operation for Refugees project in Ethiopia had come to a halt, and recommended that agency heads both in UNHCR and in WFP should take steps to continue the project.

39. The financial management of trust fund co-operation projects in which Germany was taking part posed serious problems. The progress reports and financial statements which were provided for in the project agreements were being submitted very late, and they often left much to be desired.

40. In 1987, a food security project for Eastern Sudan, financed by a special trust fund, had been launched jointly with UNHCR. That project had been halted, and an unspent balance of \$2.7 million had remained available for two years. It had been made clear at several review meetings that a number of "food for work" activities would need to be undertaken, more particularly in sectors such as transport, road maintenance, warehouse construction, water and forestry, to use up the remaining funds. However, nothing had been done to

give effect to those proposals, despite the fact that the current financial crisis had meant that cuts had had to be made in a number of similar activities.

41. Another financial management problem lay in the use of interest accrued from trust funds. He reiterated his appeal that UNHCR's financial division should work out an acceptable solution, in line with existing trust fund arrangements. The German Government was financially accountable to Parliament and could not allow the current situation to continue much longer. In future, in any co-operative activities with UNHCR financed by trust funds, Germany would insist on proper project planning and on effective implementation and financial management. It had noted with satisfaction that the Technical Support Service was preparing a project planning and feasibility study in the water sector in Malawi. It sincerely hoped that that project would serve as a model for its future co-operation with UNHCR.

42. His delegation had carefully studied the report of the Board of Auditors (A/AC.96/755) and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/AC.96/756) and it supported their recommendations. It was particularly concerned about UNHCR's current funding and expenditure mechanism. It fully shared the Auditors' view that UNHCR's ability to respond to growing needs was seriously restricted by the lack of mechanisms for timely and guaranteed funding. The question could not be left pending any longer. On the contrary, a thorough review should be made of current procedures so that UNHCR could be given all the flexibility it needed to respond to new emergency situations. His delegation believed that there was still room for improvement, even within the existing framework. It was pleased to note that the Sub-Committee intended to meet on a more regular basis and to take up any work left unfinished by the Temporary Working Group.

43. Mr. SAFAEI (Islamic Republic of Iran) welcomed the new Director of the Regional Office for South-West Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. His country would like to thank the outgoing director for his efforts to promote co-operation in the region, and hoped that that co-operation would continue.

44. Mrs. RUESTA DE FURTER (Venezuela) noted that the Deputy High Commissioner, when introducing agenda item 5, had not included the document entitled "UNHCR policy on refugee women" (A/AC.96/754) among the documents to be considered under item 5 (c). Nor was any mention made of that document in the annotated agenda; she wondered whether an administration and management policy designed to change accepted attitudes and habits should not be included under agenda item 5 (c).

45. Mr. STAFFORD (Deputy High Commissioner) said that the omission was the result of an oversight. The document in question had been carefully considered both by the Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection and by the Sub-Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters, but it should also have been included among the documents to be considered under agenda item 5 (c) in the plenary meeting.

46. Mr. IDOYAGA (Observer for Uruguay) said he fully endorsed the statement by the representative of Honduras on behalf of the Latin American Group regarding the follow-up process to CIREFCA. The Government of Uruguay entirely supported that process and welcomed the fact that the High Commissioner had made particular mention of it and cited it as an example for other regions of the world. In refugee assistance activities, the CIREFCA process stood out by its policy of co-operation not only with UNHCR, but also with UNDP and other United Nations agencies, with a view to arriving at durable and wide-ranging solutions. He had been favourably impressed by the fact that representatives of countries as far distant as India and Japan had also referred to CIREFCA, and that Japan had even announced a contribution of \$1 million in support of follow-up programmes. For the moment, however, as had been pointed out by the representative of Honduras, the reconciliation process in Latin America was still incomplete and it was important that efforts to that end should be continued. At its latest meeting, held in Tegucigalpa on 18 September, the CIREFCA follow-up committee had made a number of recommendations. Uruguay supported those recommendations, notably those contained in chapter 8, in which the Follow-up Committee appealed to the international community to lend its support to UNHCR and UNDP through the joint UNHCR/UNDP CIREFCA follow-up programme. He urged that such support should not simply be political and moral, but should also be economic.

47. Mr. MARKIDES (Observer for Cyprus), referring to the statement made by the representative of Turkey, said it was an attempt to politicize the UNHCR Executive Committee and to conceal the serious responsibilities borne by Turkey, which had created, and was now prolonging, the refugee problem in Cyprus. The representative of Turkey was merely rehashing Turkish propaganda, which had already been refuted on a number of occasions. Rather than answer those assertions, he would refer the Turkish representative to the reports of the United Nations Secretary-General, which spoke for themselves. The Turkish representative seemed to have forgotten that it was the Turkish army which had evicted, by force of arms, 200,000 Greek Cypriots - in other words, 80 per cent of the population of the occupied zone - from their ancestral homes and taken away their property, and it was that same army which still prevented them from returning, in contravention of United Nations resolutions and of international law. It was Turkey's army which had imposed division and separation on Cyprus and continued to maintain them, at a time when, elsewhere in Europe, barriers were coming down. Unfortunately, Nicosia was today the only divided capital in Europe. It was absurd to claim that Cyprus wished to keep its refugees for political reasons. In his statement, the representative of Turkey had distorted the facts as well as the verdict of the international community, as expressed in United Nations resolutions and in reports of the Council of Europe's Commission on Human Rights, all of which had found Turkey guilty of gross violations of human rights with regard to Cyprus. It was Turkey which, in 1974, had invaded and occupied Cyprus in defiance of international law, and which still held more than 40 per cent of Cypriot territory under military occupation.

48. In an effort to promote the partition of Cyprus, the Turkish representative had referred to "the Turkish Cypriot people". He wished to

remind him that the Cypriot people were in fact one people, 82 per cent of which comprised the Greek Cypriot community and 18 per cent the Turkish Cypriot community. To refer to the "Turkish Cypriot people" was tantamount to a denial of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and recent Security Council resolutions, more particularly resolution 649 (1990), which rejected any such claims, and to which Ankara hypocritically paid lip-service. He wondered whether Turkey was really prepared to implement the mandatory resolutions of the United Nations Security Council with regard to Cyprus, resolutions which until now it had consistently and flagrantly violated.

49. Mr. DEMIRALP (Turkey), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that one of the aims of the coup d'état by the Greeks in 1974 had been to strike at the defenceless Turkish population scattered throughout the island. Turkey had then intervened, in conformity with the law and in conformity with its obligation under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, to protect Turkish Cypriots and to preserve the island's independence. However, he would avoid engaging in political debate and would keep to humanitarian issues.

50. There were in Cyprus two different populations separated by language, traditions, culture and ethnic origin. There was no Cypriot nation. It was the Greek Cypriots themselves who had said at the time that the 1960 Agreement, which recognized Cyprus's independence, had created a State, but not a nation. Two populations had always coexisted in Cyprus within a dual social structure. The physical separation of the two was the fault of the Greek Cypriots, who had launched an all-out attack against the Turkish Cypriots in 1963. The "green line" in Nicosia had been drawn on the map to protect Turkish Cypriots against the violence and aggression of Greek Cypriots. After the 1974 coup d'état, the attitude of the Greek Cypriots, which had been the initial cause of the division, had left no other course than to regroup Cyprus's two populations into two separate zones. The agreement on the voluntary exchange of populations, signed in Vienna in 1975, had served as a basis for the four-point guidelines on which the leaders of the two sides had agreed on 12 February 1977, and which envisaged the setting-up of a two-community, two-zone, independent federal republic. Those principles had been reconfirmed by Security Council resolution 649 (1990). It was thus abundantly clear that any solution to the Cypriot question would be a bi-zonal solution.

51. To judge by the statement that the Executive Committee had just heard, it was equally clear that the question of displaced persons was also being exploited by the Greek Cypriot side so as to break down bit by bit the agreed basis, namely the concept of a bi-zonal federal State. At the moment, the Turkish Cypriots were living in the north of the island, whereas the major part of the Greek Cypriot population lived in its own area, the south. The return of displaced persons to their former homes would not only be unrealistic, in view of the voluntary exchange of populations that had taken place, it would also be inhuman, because the persons in question were now

resettled. If there were any further points to discuss, they should be discussed by the two parties themselves, on the island, with a view to reaching overall agreement on the Cypriot problem.

52. Mr. MARKIDES (Observer for Cyprus) pointed out that the Turkish representative had completely ignored the existence of the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council and had failed to reply to the question just asked, namely, whether Turkey was prepared to comply with the Security Council's mandatory decisions concerning Cyprus.

53. Mr. DEMIRALP (Turkey), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, pointed out that the existence of an agreement concerning the voluntary exchange of populations - an agreement which had already been implemented - had once again been ignored. That agreement had paved the way for the two-zone concept, a concept which had been reconfirmed by Security Council resolution 649 (1990). The only possible solution in practice was for the two populations of Cyprus to coexist side by side, since the policies of oppression pursued by the Greek Cypriots had made living together impossible. In view of the voluntary nature of the exchange of populations, and the two-zone solution envisaged for Cyprus, it should be acknowledged that fundamentally the question of displaced persons in Cyprus was now resolved. As matters now stood, in Cyprus, "displaced" did not imply "misplaced". Humanitarian assistance to the groups affected on both sides should not take the form of a demand for the return of displaced persons to the areas in which they had originally been settled. Such a demand would be incompatible with Security Council resolution 649 (1990), which the Greek Cypriots were now endeavouring to invalidate. His delegation hoped that the Greek Cypriots would review their position, and would respect commitments they themselves had accepted, in order to avoid unwanted and irreversible solutions.

54. Mr. HAIYLE (Somalia) said his delegation had some comments to make on a question to which it attached the greatest importance, namely international protection of refugee women. It approved in its entirety the report of the Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection (A/AC.96/758) which emphasized the paramount need to ensure full participation of refugee women in the identification of needs and resources, the planning of activities, and their implementation (para. 7). However, those principles were rarely put into practice, at least where refugee women in Somalia were concerned. Yet almost the world over, it was refugee women who bore the heaviest burden, despite the fact that they represented the most vulnerable group. His delegation therefore appealed to all international organizations to pay particular attention to that problem, because refugee women in Somalia were leading a wretched existence.

55. Mr. KASTBERG (Sweden), speaking on behalf of the Nordic countries, said that the delegations he represented had already expressed their views in detail on the questions covered by agenda item 5 in meetings of the Sub-Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters. The progress achieved in a short time had been considerable, as pointed out by all the previous speakers. The same pace should be kept up in the streamlining and

restructuring process, and in any other measures which the High Commissioner might decide to take. It would probably be some time before the process could be completed. The High Commissioner and his staff could count on the full support of the delegations of the Nordic countries in the task ahead.

56. Mr. MOLLARD (Commission of the European Communities) said the Commission viewed its mission to promote humanitarian solidarity as a standing priority. That approach had its origins in the very foundations of the European Community and its history in modern times. It also stemmed from the links the Community had forged with peoples throughout the world. Accordingly, the Community could not stand aloof from the humanitarian crisis that was now taking place. The aid it was giving to refugees and displaced persons was channelled primarily through UNHCR, but also through WFP, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations. The Community's solidarity formed practical expression in emergency aid, food aid through WFP, and aid to refugee reintegration and self-reliance, in other words assistance in the search for durable solutions. In 1989, the Community had undertaken to increase its direct aid to UNHCR provided that the projects funded were in line with its own objectives and policies. Thus, at the beginning of October 1990, the Community's direct contributions to UNHCR had stood at 426.15 million ecus, or just under \$60 million. That total should be increased by the food aid to refugees channelled through WFP, which would amount, transport included, to over 21 million ecus, or some \$27 million.

57. Between now and the end of the year, the European Community also planned to take action to assist refugees in South-East Asia, particularly the boat people. There was need not only for swift emergency response but also for an attack on the root causes of the exoduses that were affecting vast numbers of men, women and children. It was with that end in view that the Commission had launched its initiative to assist the boat people, and its efforts in Central America and Africa pursued the same objective.

58. Mr. SZYNALSKI (World Food Programme) said he realized that members of the Committee were already familiar with the co-operation agreements between UNHCR and WFP with regard to relief assistance for refugees. Nevertheless, to illustrate the intensity of that collaboration, WFP had prepared an information document (EC/SC/2/1990/CRP.2), which described the salient features of that relationship as it had evolved over the past 12 months. There was also continuing contact between the Deputy High Commissioner and WFP's Assistant Executive Director. The High Commissioner and the Executive Director of WFP also met at regular intervals, and working contacts were on an almost daily basis.

59. It was easy to understand why the relationship was so intense: the volume of food assistance to refugees in 1989 had totalled 1.2 million tonnes. In 1990, food aid provided jointly by UNHCR, WFP, bilateral donors and non-governmental organizations was likely to amount to some 1.3 million tonnes.

60. The World Food Programme had followed up with vigour its Governing Body's decision to transform long-term refugee assistance programmes into protracted relief operations, with separate funding arrangements from those governing emergency operations. Donors had given extensive support for the new procedures, as was evidenced by the commitments entered into by the Programme for 1990 and 1991, amounting to over \$403 million. It was expected that by the time all projects for 1991 had been prepared, the total value of assistance given by WFP in the course of the biennium for protracted refugee relief projects would exceed \$500 million. That figure did not include additional funds of some \$100 million for short-term refugee feeding operations.

61. Much had been said both in the Executive Committee and in the Sub-Committee on Administrative and Financial Matters about development activities in favour of refugees. Of course, protracted refugee relief operations included development support whenever feasible. In general, WFP tried to promote income-generating activities, but the scope of such activities was very limited. The difficulties encountered related primarily to funding, availability of land, and the fear that such activities could lead to permanent settlement of the refugees in the host country. To overcome those problems, WFP's plan was to develop collaboration with other organizations, both inside and outside the United Nations system, and to build up an atmosphere of confidence with local administrations. Food aid was normally provided to refugees as part of the repatriation and/or integration package, as was the case in WFP-supported refugee relief operations in Somalia, Afghanistan and Namibia, to cite only a few examples.

62. In programming food assistance to refugees, WFP had always collaborated with UNHCR, both in the field and at headquarters level. However, it should not be forgotten that all planning ultimately depended on the co-operation of donors: any failure by one or more of them to honour deadlines made it necessary to resort to makeshift solutions which were not always satisfactory. WFP had established excellent co-operation agreements with most donors as well as with recipient governments, and it was rare for crises not to be overcome. However, that did not mean that all crises could invariably be resolved. Refugee feeding was a unique operation in the sense that, unlike other recipients of food aid, refugees relied almost exclusively on external assistance, and hence breakdowns in supplies could not be tolerated.

63. In the course of the past 12 months, much had been said about inter-agency co-operation as a means of helping UNHCR to overcome its financial difficulties. WFP, for its part, had increased its support to refugees, not only as far as food supplies were concerned but also in funding internal transport, storage and handling costs (ITSH). ITSH costs funded by WFP during 1990 and 1991 were expected to reach some \$26 million (A/AC.96/756, para. 18). ITSH costs for refugee food, funded by donors through WFP between 1 January 1988 and 30 September 1990 had amounted to \$27 million. Out of that total, almost \$12 million had been paid direct by WFP to transport contractors. WFP would be continuing its efforts in that direction.

64. WFP had taken note of the comments by several members of the Committee and the Sub-Committee calling on it to play a greater part in mobilizing food resources and meeting the costs of food transportation. It was expected that the task force document that was to form the basis of an understanding between the Executive Director of WFP and the High Commissioner would be ready before the end of the year, in time for final consultations and discussions with donors. It was of course essential for any agreement involving a change in responsibilities with regard to food relief to refugees to be fully backed by the donors who provided funds to both organizations. The constant increase in the numbers of refugees, which was only partly offset by hopes of permanent solutions for some of the current caseloads, gave cause for the greatest concern, and it would be crucial to arrive at a clear understanding with donors on the responsibilities of each party.

65. In conclusion, he expressed the Programme's gratitude to donors, refugee host countries and UNHCR for the support and co-operation they had given it in fulfilling its extremely delicate task namely the channelling of the bulk of the food aid required for the survival of refugees.

66. Mr. ACHE (Chairman, UNHCR Staff Council) said that, despite the continuation of the dialogue between the High Commissioner and the Staff Council, the priority given to staff retrenchment in the course of the past year had hindered progress towards a solution of the serious problems facing UNHCR staff. The Administration should as a matter of urgency formulate and implement a comprehensive approach to career development, and should also address the issue of recourses, following the General Service reclassification exercise carried out at Headquarters in 1988. It was regrettable that posts should have been reclassified without any consultation with an organization of comparable status, and that they should have been filled without having been advertised, which was contrary to the regulations. An equitable and transparent rotation policy should also be adopted in filling posts, including posts at the highest level.

67. The Council also deplored the fact that staff had not been informed of the steps taken by the Administration on the core/temporary categorization issue. In that connection, it was important to deal with the question of staff in the project personnel (L) category. All those problems, which had been outlined in the document submitted the previous week to the Sub-Committee on Administrative and Financial Matters had, unfortunately, not been given the attention they deserved at the current session. It was to be hoped, however, that the Administration would take them into consideration and would take the necessary measures.

68. The financial crisis was having disastrous effects on the morale and work of staff members, particularly those in isolated field offices who were constantly being urged to cut costs, with the result that their ability to take action was restricted. Efforts should therefore be made to make sufficient funds available for such staff to do their job, namely, aiding refugees who would otherwise have to endure even greater sufferings.



69. Staff in the General Service and related categories made up more than 75 per cent of all UNHCR staff. Many of them were doing remarkable work, and they bore heavy responsibilities which were not reflected in their grades and categories. It was therefore essential for steps to be taken to enhance their career prospects and to reward their dedication. The Secretary-General had recently decided to set up a group to study conditions of service of General Service staff in the United Nations Secretariat, and UNHCR would be well advised to do the same as a matter of urgency.

70. The situation of women in UNHCR also left much to be desired. In the report submitted to the Administration and to the Staff Council, the permanent working group on the subject had outlined the methods needed to be taken to attain a more equitable representation of female staff in the organization. In particular, it had recommended that the target of 30 per cent women in the professional and higher categories set by the Secretary-General should be met as soon as possible, and that the aim should be eventually to achieve a minimum representation of 50 per cent in all categories. The report had not yet been approved, but the Staff Council would like to express its appreciation to the High Commissioner for what had already been done in that area. However, promotions would still not be sufficient to meet the 30 per cent target; and further measures should be taken, on the understanding that competence was always the paramount consideration.

71. As to promotions in general, the Staff Council welcomed the steps taken by the High Commissioner to solve the problem expeditiously. Many staff members had finally been granted the promotions long due to them. Some inequities had thus been redressed, but a considerable number of cases had still not been resolved. The Staff Council therefore urged the High Commissioner to do all he could to ensure that a satisfactory solution was found for all deserving cases.

72. On the question of staff-management relations, the Staff Council welcomed the establishment of the Joint Advisory Committee in May 1990. The Committee had dealt mainly with the question of staff retrenchment, and it was still too early to judge its real effectiveness. Staff and management should work in partnership, with the emphasis on communication, consultation and transparency, and it was to be hoped that the dialogue would lead to concrete results.

73. Lastly, the Staff Council supported the High Commissioner's six-pillar strategy for resolving UNHCR's financial crisis. He appealed to the international community to make the necessary resources available to the High Commissioner to enable him to discharge his responsibilities effectively. UNHCR staff would do their utmost to enable the Office to carry out its mission, which was to aid and protect 15 million refugees world-wide.

ADOPTION OF THE REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY MATTERS (A/AC.96/759)

74. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to an error in the penultimate line of paragraph 54: the word "storage" should be substituted for "shipping".

75. The report of the Sub-Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Matters was adopted.

ADOPTION OF THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED "UNHCR ACTIVITIES FINANCED BY VOLUNTARY FUNDS: REPORT FOR 1989-90 AND PROPOSED PROGRAMME AND BUDGET FOR 1991"  
(A/AC.96/751 (Parts I to V and Add.1))

Part I. Africa

76. Mr. BWAKIRA (Head of the Regional Bureau for Africa), in reply to the question raised by the representative of Sudan, said that although the figure quoted in the report for refugees in Sudan might seem to be an underestimate, that was because it did not include spontaneously settled refugees. In future, persons in that category would be taken into account in the statistics. With regard to refugees receiving UNHCR assistance, the figure included some 35,000 Ethiopians who were receiving indirect aid as a result of improvements in services (health, education, hygiene, etc.). As far as allocations for 1991 were concerned, the question had been discussed in bilateral consultations between UNHCR and the Sudanese delegation, and a programming mission would shortly be sent to Sudan to investigate the situation.

77. As to the comments made by the representative of Germany, further to consultations with the Ethiopian Government, WFP and UNHCR had decided to send an independent mission to Ethiopia to look into logistical refugee assistance operations and to advise those concerned on the best solutions. Concerning Germany's contribution of \$2.2 million, consultations would very shortly be held with the German Government to consider how it could best be utilized.

78. Part I of document A/AC.96/751 was adopted.

Part II. Asia and Oceania

79. Mr. ANVAR (Head of the Regional Bureau for Asia and Oceania), in reply to the comments made by the representative of Australia, agreed that efforts to facilitate the repatriation of Vietnamese refugees should be intensified. Admittedly, UNHCR's financial crisis was a serious obstacle, but a number of ways of overcoming it were being considered.

80. Part II of document A/AC.96/751 was adopted.

Part III. Europe and North America

81. Part III of document A/AC.96/751 was adopted.

Part IV. Latin America and the Caribbean

82. Mr. FRANCO (Head of the Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean) said that, although the refugee situation in South America showed a marked improvement, the political fragility of that continent and the economic and social difficulties it faced meant that many problems still had to be solved. The return of refugees gave rise to further problems, and UNHCR's efforts should be backed up by assistance from other bodies, such as UNDP and non-governmental organizations, as well as by bilateral support.

83. Part IV of document A/AC.96/751 was adopted.

Part V. South-West Asia, North Africa and the Middle East and overall allocations

84. Mr. MORJANE (Head of the Regional Bureau for South-West Asia, North Africa and the Middle East), expressed the hope that a political settlement of the problems now being encountered in the region would lead to durable solutions.

85. Part V of document A/AC.96/751 was adopted.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.