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President: Mr. Salim Ahmed SALIM
(United Republic of Tanzania)

AGENDA ITEM 29

Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte: report of the Secretary-General (*concluded*)*

1. Mr. KANE (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): Once again the Assembly is discussing the question of the Comorian island of Mayotte. My delegation has already had the opportunity to express its opinion on this question at this rostrum, as it has also done elsewhere: in the Organization of African Unity [OAU], at the Islamic Conference and in the group of non-aligned States.

2. We are speaking today above all to welcome the atmosphere now prevailing between the French Government and the Comorian Government, an atmosphere which is a prerequisite for the search for a final solution to this problem and which, we hope, will predispose the parties concerned to undertake fruitful discussions. As the French and Comorian parties stressed in the statements we heard yesterday [90th meeting], both countries wish to find grounds for understanding.

3. Ambassadors have been exchanged and major agreements have been entered into in Paris, on 10 November 1978, including a treaty of friendship and co-operation and other agreements in the financial, cultural, technical and military fields between the two countries [see A/34/665, para. 3]. This proves that the atmosphere now existing between France and the Comoros, following the high-level contacts between their leaders, is quite different from that which prevailed immediately after the Comoros became independent.

4. However, it is important to recall some principles useful for the understanding of the debate, because the Comorian claim does not date from today. It originated

* Resumed from the 90th meeting.

when that State attained internationally recognized sovereignty. It is simply a matter of decolonization. In our opinion, a colonial territory that accedes to independence must be independent in its entirety—in other words, to the limits which existed during the colonial period. The corollary to this is that there should be no subsequent territorial claim that would undermine the principle, because it might bring about untenable situations as regards the delineation of the borders of former colonial territories. That is the spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It is also one of the basic principles of the charter of the OAU, which Senegal helped to draft.

5. For that reason, my country has always respected that principle and will continue to do so, because what would Africa look like today if the wisdom of the founding members of the OAU had not led them to accept that fact of history, despite all the pressures existing in 1963 which were brought to bear to reopen the question of the borders inherited from the colonial Powers?

6. It is because we respect this principle, which we regard as inviolable, that we have settled with our neighbours what otherwise or at other times might have given rise to insurmountable border disputes. It is also in that spirit that my country accepts the contention that the Comoros must recover the geographical limits they had under French colonial rule, that is, with all the islands that make up the archipelago: Anjouan, Grande-Comore, Mohéli and Mayotte.

7. Is it not in this perspective that since 1889 French laws have viewed the administration and the status of the country, the political unity and territorial integrity of which were never questioned until the February 1976 referendum?

8. The French authorities themselves say no less and the French head of State, in a press conference of 24 October 1974, has said:

"[The Comoros] are an archipelago which constitutes a single entity. . . . The population is homogeneous, with practically no people of French origin, or only very few. . . . was it reasonable to imagine that a part of the archipelago should become independent and that one island, whatever sympathy one might have for its inhabitants, should retain a different status?"

"I believe that one must accept contemporary realities. The Comoros are a single unit, they have always been a single unit, and it is natural that their fate should be a common fate. . . ."

9. However, apart from this principle that we have just reaffirmed, we have to dwell on the method and on the sincere will of the parties to settle their dispute, if we can call it that, by negotiation, that is by peaceful means.

10. Senegal, which feels that dialogue is one of the essential methods of diplomacy, sincerely welcomes the spirit that prevails between the two parties. My country, which has particularly close relations with both countries, made every effort to ensure the establishment of the relaxation of tension we are now witnessing.

11. In Africa, nearly half of the present States of which were once French colonies, and in this Assembly, in which the prestige of France has increased daily since that country agreed to decolonize its colonial territories without any mental reservations, it is difficult to understand how Mayotte can be a bone of contention and cast doubt on the credibility and prestige of France throughout the world. A French journalist recently wrote in *Le Monde*:

“An island of 400,000 inhabitants, a vestige of this crumb of the old French colonial empire, isolated in the Indian Ocean between Mozambique and Madagascar, one tenth of whose population speaks French, cannot be accorded department status without offending somewhat against common sense.”

12. Indeed, it was proposed that another referendum, following that of 8 February 1976, be organized this year to establish the final status of the island. It is therefore fortunate that the French authorities have not considered it opportune, at present, to determine the political status of Mayotte.

13. We feel that this is a sign of the good will of the French Government at a time when it has been announced that discussions at the ministerial level are soon to begin between the parties concerned.

14. Further, my delegation hopes that our Assembly, by the positions it takes and the recommendations it makes, will encourage France and the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros to begin immediately negotiations on the basis of the resolutions of this Organization. My delegation is therefore ready to support any initiative along these lines.

15. Mr. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): It should be noted at the outset that in this matter the unity and territorial integrity of the Comorian archipelago have not been contested, either before or after independence, even by France.

16. This eliminates the need for any one to engage in legal or political analyses to establish the natural and traditional inclusion of the island of Mayotte under Comorian sovereignty.

17. Everyone knows of the events following which the island of Mayotte, an integral part of the Comorian archipelago, was placed and maintained under French administration on the morrow of the independence of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros.

18. The authorities of the French Republic have always agreed that the Comoros are an archipelago which constitutes a single entity, that its population is homogeneous and includes practically no one of French origin and that it is inconceivable that one part of the

archipelago should become independent and that one island, whatever sympathy might be felt for its inhabitants, should preserve a different status; in short, that the Comoros are a single unit and have always been a single unit and that, as the representatives of Senegal has just noted, it is natural that the destiny of the Comoros should be a common destiny.

19. On 22 December 1974 the Comorian people, consulted in a referendum, pronounced itself overwhelmingly in support of independence.

20. Sixty-four per cent of the voters on the island of Mayotte, as France points out, voted in favour of maintaining political links with France, the administering Power.

21. The Comorian authorities do not deny this fact, but they accord it no legal value, for they consider that an assessment of electoral results must be an over-all assessment and must take account of all the favourable votes cast throughout the Comorian archipelago, for it was the Comorian nation that was called upon to show its political will for independence and therefore an assessment of the results cannot be made in a piecemeal fashion, island by island. The Comorian authorities also consider that the result of the referendum in Mayotte was the outcome of certain political manoeuvres carried out by some metropolitan forces with special relationships and interests in common with certain great families of Mayotte, interests and relationships which those forces were not prepared to give up.

22. For their part, the French cite legal and constitutional reasons for not granting to the island of Mayotte the same fate as to the other islands, recognizing at the same time the political embarrassment caused by this unprecedented legal situation and never denying the fact that the island of Mayotte belongs to the Comorian archipelago. However, they promise that a solution will be found to this problem within the framework of legal arrangements in co-operation and friendship with the authorities of the new Republic of the Comoros.

23. These are the real terms of the dispute. It is this situation that led the Comorian leaders to urge anew that France should agree to return the island of Mayotte, an integral part of its national territory, to the Republic of the Comoros.

24. The Republic of Zaire reaffirms that the island of Mayotte is an integral part of the national territory of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros, a position that is fully in conformity with that of the OAU and that of the Conference of non-aligned countries.

25. The Republic of Zaire expresses its sincere gratitude to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the clear and precise report on the question of the Comorian island of Mayotte [A/34/665] which he has submitted to the General Assembly.

26. My delegation notes with satisfaction both the constructive, realistic and responsible approach of the Comorian authorities and the initiative of the French Government in proposing to the Comorian Government that talks be held at the ministerial level on various aspects of the Franco-Comorian problem which have

not been solved, and on ways to strengthen economic and cultural relations between Mayotte and the other islands of the Comorian archipelago.

27. The Republic of Zaire feels that the positive actions of the Government of the Comoros and the initiative and good will displayed by France—confirmed by contacts and talks at the highest level between the French and Comorian authorities—will make possible a wise settlement of this problem in the interest of both parties.

28. We have full confidence that the sense of responsibility and the will for co-operation of the two countries will make possible a happy outcome of the negotiations, in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

29. The Republic of the Comoros needs to consolidate its independence and improve its economic and financial situation so as to be able to deal with the effects of the various calamities of which the Comorian people has been the victim.

30. A situation of tension in the Comoros cannot but harm the economic and financial health of the young Republic, which is already in a disastrous state.

31. The delegation of the Republic of Zaire pays a tribute to the Committee of Seven of the OAU for the excellent report which it makes annually on the development of the situation of the island of Mayotte. We encourage it in its efforts aimed at finding and recommending to both parties appropriate ways and means of putting an end to the occupation of the island of Mayotte by France.

32. We call upon our friend, France, which earned merit by its policy of decolonization and has shown its good will, to adopt the necessary measures to accelerate negotiations aimed at restoring the island of Mayotte to the Republic of the Comoros, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 33/44 and with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

33. The delegation of Zaire, which has taken note of the important step taken by the Comorian and French Governments in agreeing to act according to the recommendations of the OAU, the non-aligned countries and the United Nations, which request them to discuss the problem of the island of Mayotte and to find an appropriate solution to it, sincerely hopes that the negotiations between the two parties will result in an equitable solution which will permit the people of the Comoros to devote its full effort to the development of its country.

34. The Republic of Zaire will therefore vote in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.54 and Add.1 on the Comorian island of Mayotte.

35. Mr. ROA KOURÍ (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): At this thirty-fourth session, the General Assembly has today taken up one of the best known colonial cases of our time, the persistence of which prompts almost all the peoples of the world to express, and to continue to express their unswerving solidarity with the colonized population. If this unanimity is not entirely on a universal scale, that is only because the permanent

member of the Security Council that is militarily occupying the Comorian island of Mayotte has systematically opposed the will of other nations as expressed in the United Nations, in the OAU and in the non-aligned movement.

36. The precedents for and reasons in favour of returning the island of Mayotte to the archipelago of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros are so overwhelming and so well known that they serve only to stress the isolation of the anachronistic policy of the colonial Power. Yesterday, before this Assembly [90th meeting], Mr. Ali Mroudjae, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros, undertook to refresh our memory with a detailed account of the legitimacy of the Comorian claim.

37. Minister Mroudjae expatiated upon the just claim of his Government, which is determined to affirm full sovereignty over the entire national territory. Since this is unquestionably a problem of decolonization, it is inconceivable that our Organization should still have to be reminding a permanent member of the Security Council of such universally accepted and recognized principles as that of the inviolability of frontiers inherited from colonialism and those embodied in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

38. The Comorian Minister was right to quote the well-known words of the French mandatory authorities of 24 October 1974, when, in relation to the Mayotte question, their representative said he was ready to accept present-day reality and regard the Comorian Islands as a single entity, without any dismemberment. The reality that has to be accepted is not only that of the present day. The legal, ethnic and religious unity of the islands of Anjouan, Grande-Comore, Mayotte and Mohéli dates back a long time, and, of course, to the time when France established its protectorate over the islands of the archipelago in the nineteenth century. The ways and means of achieving this acceptance are, however, rather unclear. We all remember how, starting in 1974, the colonial Power began to prepare plebiscites. After the general referendum of 1974, strange referendums which were taken in Mayotte exclusively, in February and April 1976, alerted international public opinion.

39. General Assembly resolution 31/4, of 21 October 1976, which condemned the holding of those referendums and of any other referendums that might be held in the future by the colonial Power, was proof of the rapid international reaction to a manoeuvre that was jeopardizing a genuine process of decolonization and of restitution of Mayotte to the Federal Islamic Government of the Comoros.

40. Even now all the clouds have not yet been dispelled. We have news that a fresh referendum has been scheduled to be held, exclusively in Mayotte, before the end of this year. We understand that the choice in this scheduled referendum will be between the status of a department or independence. If the choice is indeed what I have said, it would be wise to ask ourselves what is the nature of the independence proposed: does it mean restitution of the island to the archipelago within an Islamic Federation of the Comoros, as is rightly sought by the Moroni Government, or a fragmented

independence, with formal separation from France but without return to the motherland?

41. We say that it would be wise to ask ourselves that question because of the well-known separatist machinations of a few families established in Mayotte and their contacts with certain groups with interests in France.

42. The foregoing has, of course, been said on the understanding that this type of referendum was rightly condemned by the United Nations in 1976. Furthermore, we have learned that the colonial Power has proposed to its Comorian counterpart the holding of talks "on ways and means to strengthen economic and human relations between Mayotte and the other islands of archipelago".

43. That curious wording—at any rate, curious in Spanish—does not necessarily mean handing back the island of Mayotte to the Federal Islamic Government of the Comoros. Nevertheless, in the same constructive spirit in which the Comorian Government has always dealt with this issue, Mr. Mroudjae foresaw the need for a climate that would be more favourable to a dialogue and announced that those talks would take place shortly, at the ministerial level, although at the same time he also said that they should examine with all objectivity the situation prevailing in Mayotte. After all, five years have passed since 1974, when France admitted the need to accept present-day reality.

44. Even though the intellectual metabolism of the metropolitan country was five years late, my delegation would view with favour the forthcoming talks between France and the Comoros if they proved to be the enzyme necessary for the slow digestion of historical facts and if they culminated in the restitution of Mayotte to the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros.

45. One parallel, no less important, aspect must be mentioned: namely, the regional security of the coastal States of that part of the Indian Ocean.

46. Our joint effort towards the decolonization of Mayotte is supported also by our concern at the aggressive designs of some Powers in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] which have military and naval facilities in that area and strategic control objectives in that part of the Indian Ocean.

47. A short while ago—at the 31st plenary meeting and at the 15th meeting of the First Committee—we called the attention of representatives to something similar when we dealt with the matter of the Malagasy Islands in the Indian Ocean, also under French occupation. Some international information media have taken up this question and emphasized the existence of a plan to establish military installations in Diego Garcia, Simonstown and the Malagasy Islands, among other places. A foreign military presence in Mayotte would be another element in that dangerous enterprise.

48. I am sorry to say that this situation has nothing to do with the legitimate goal of the international community—to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace—and that it jeopardizes peace and security for the countries of that region.

49. In conclusion, I have no doubt that the colonial situation of Mayotte will be resolved, sooner rather than later, in a manner that will satisfy the just claims and aspirations of the Comorian people. In that endeavour are involved, besides that people and its Government, all those of us who have spoken on this topic at the United Nations, at the OAU and, more recently, at the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana.

50. I am pleased to assure the representative of the Government of the Federal and Islamic Republic of the Comoros of the solidarity and support of my delegation for the noble cause of that fraternal people.

51. Mr. DEBBASH (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Perhaps it would be useful at the outset, in examining once again the question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte, to go back and recall the coming to independence of the Comorian Islands. The Comorian Island of Mayotte now appears on the agenda of the United Nations as one of the problems related to decolonization which we must solve in order to guarantee the legitimate rights of the Comorian people in accordance with the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples which was adopted by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

52. At the time of the accession to independence of the Republic of Madagascar in 1960, the four Comorian islands shared the same local government and the same Chamber of Deputies which administered the internal affairs of the country within the framework of the French colonial administration. With time, there was an increase in the national awareness of the people of the Comoros and, in December 1972, the Chamber of Deputies empowered the Comorian Government to negotiate with the French Government with a view to obtaining independence for the country.

53. Consequently, the Comorian Government entered into negotiations with the French Government and these resulted, on 15 June 1973, in the signing of a "Joint Declaration on the Accession to Independence of the Comoro Archipelago"¹ concerning: first, recognition of the desire of the Comoros for independence; secondly, confirmation of the legitimacy and sanctity of the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comorian Islands; and, thirdly, consultation with the Comorian people regarding their future, on the basis of the population of all four islands.

54. Within the framework of the efforts of the United Nations to secure implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, the General Assembly adopted unanimously resolution 3291 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974. That resolution confirmed the right of the people of the Comoros to freedom and independence and the unity and territorial integrity of the Comoro Archipelago.

55. On 22 December 1974 the French authorities carried out a referendum among the peoples of the four islands in which they were to choose between independence and remaining under French administration. The

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23*, chap. XI, annex, appendix II.

Comorian people expressed its will clearly: 94.56 per cent of the population chose independence.

56. What happened after that? Did France comply with the desire of the Comorian people and grant it its independence as a unified political entity?

57. Unfortunately, instead of doing so, France began to procrastinate and tried to undermine the territorial integrity of the Comoros, which caused the Comorian authorities to declare independence on 6 July 1975 in accordance with the will of the Comorian people.

58. It was natural that this young Republic should obtain the recognition of the international community, since it became a member of the OAU on 18 July 1975 as one political unit comprising the four islands. It also became a Member of the United Nations, on 12 November 1975 [*resolution 3385 (XXX)*]. All that did not prevent France from implementing its sinister plans against the Comorian people. It decided to hold a separate referendum on the island of Mayotte, ignoring all its previous commitments, revealing its flagrant intervention of the internal affairs of the independent Comorian islands and defying all relevant resolutions and international instruments.

59. The United Nations tried, through the Security Council, to prevent such an illegal referendum from taking place; but France, through its abuse of the right of veto, was able to thwart the draft resolution of the Security Council² and, consequently, block the will of the international community. France then held the referendum by which it was allegedly empowered to continue its colonial régime in the island of Mayotte.

60. From the time France carried out that referendum on the island of Mayotte, international organizations have been trying to find a just and speedy solution of the problem. The OAU set up a special committee consisting of seven States members of OAU—the Committee of Seven on the Question of the Comorian Island of Mayotte—in an attempt to find a solution to the problem. On more than one occasion, it has called on the Government of France to withdraw from the island and respect the territorial integrity of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros.

61. The conferences of the non-aligned countries have also expressed solidarity with the Comorian people in its just struggle to liberate the island of Mayotte.

62. However, to this very day, all international efforts at solving this problem have failed because one of the parties is a big Power, a permanent member of the Security Council and disposes, moreover, of military power enabling it to impose its will on small countries.

63. We should not be misled by the manoeuvres of colonialist countries. Every time the hour for leaving a given Territory draws near they create all kinds of obstacles in a desperate attempt to maintain their hegemony over, and to continue their plunder of the

riches of that Territory. Thus we sometimes see them creating all kinds of dissension and disputes within a single Territory or, in other cases, separating off a part of that Territory and keeping it to themselves so as to be able to continue the exploitation of its economic and strategic wealth, ignoring the principles of international law and the rights and aspirations of the indigenous population. The question that we are now examining is the best proof of what I have just said.

64. The strategic situation of the island is perhaps one of the most important reasons why France has continued to occupy it. Owing to its position, it controls the Mozambique channel which is an important waterway for international trade. There is no doubt that the French forces present in the islands of Mayotte and Réunion are an offensive force which France can use to attain any aim and to threaten any country in the region. It is clear to all that that constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

65. On the present situation of the island of Mayotte, we do not discount the possibility of France's strengthening that island's separation from the others by the creation of a midget entity which would accept the continuation of French presence on the island.

66. We wish to reconfirm that there is no difference whatsoever between the Comorian island of Mayotte and the other Comorian islands. The unity of the four islands and the similarities between them are very clear, a fact that has even been reconfirmed by the French authorities themselves. I see no reason to go into the details of the geographical, historical and cultural links which exist between those islands. There is no doubt that the statement made yesterday by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros is sufficient in that respect.

67. As today we take up again the question of the Comorian island of Mayotte, we should take into consideration only the national interests of the Comorian people and take all necessary measures to restore the island to the motherland.

68. The delegation of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya firmly believes that the security of the territory of the Comorian islands can in no case be a matter for negotiation between France and the Republic of the Comoros.

69. It is for France, if it wishes to show its good intentions, to start to negotiate with the Republic of Comoros with the main objective—I insist on that point—of transferring power, in the island of Mayotte, from the French administering authority to the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros. Perhaps it would be useful if such negotiations were attended by two observers—one from the OAU and one from the United Nations.

70. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on the representative of France who wishes to explain his vote before the voting. I wish to remind him of the Assembly's decision [*4th meeting*] that explanations should be limited to 10 minutes and that representatives should speak from their seats.

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-first Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1976*, document S/11967.

71. Mr. LEPRETTE (France) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation wishes to explain, before the vote, its position on draft resolution A/34/L.54 and Add.1 on which the Assembly is about to vote.

72. I should like at the outset to recall that, in our opinion, this debate should not be taking place at all. This was first explained during the discussion held at the 1st meeting of the General Committee of the Assembly on the inclusion of agenda item 29 and was reiterated in the statement I made yesterday, 5 December [90th meeting]. We consider that the discussion of the problem of Mayotte in the United Nations constitutes interference by the Organization in the internal affairs of France, in contradiction with the provisions of the Charter.

73. Under the rules of procedure, my delegation could request a 24-hour postponement of the vote, since the draft resolution before us was circulated only this morning. We shall not, however, oppose an immediate vote being taken, in view of our position of principle on the very nature of this debate.

74. With regard to the draft resolution, we regret that its wording is much more a reflection of sterile and outmoded attitudes than an expression of the spirit of understanding and co-operation to which we, for our part, are attached. It is certainly not by proceeding in this manner that the problem can be solved. In that connexion, we regret in particular the change made in operative paragraph 1, which will make more difficult the negotiations scheduled to begin this week between France and the Government of the Comoros. But perhaps that is what those who were behind this change had in mind.

75. For us, there can be no satisfactory solution to the question of Mayotte except one to which its inhabitants freely rally. We cannot agree to a draft resolution that claims to settle the fate of the island, without taking account of the right of its inhabitants to choose their future.

76. For the various reasons that I have just set forth, my delegation will have no choice but to vote against draft resolution A/34/L.54 and Add.1.

77. The PRESIDENT: The Assembly will now vote on draft resolution A/34/L.54 and Add.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,

Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: France.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Central African Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Seychelles,³ Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The draft resolution was adopted by 112 votes to 1, with 23 abstentions (resolution 34/69).⁴

AGENDA ITEM 25

The situation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General (*concluded*)*

78. The PRESIDENT: Members will recall that the General Assembly concluded the debate on agenda item 25 at its 88th plenary meeting, on 4 December. I now propose, as I mentioned yesterday [90th meeting], to put draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 to the vote. I shall first call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the voting. I would remind them of the Assembly's decision that explanation of vote should be limited to 10 minutes and that representatives should speak from their seats.

79. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of Egypt wishes to explain its position on draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 on the Middle East, sponsored by the group of non-aligned countries.

80. Agenda item 25, entitled "The situation in the Middle East", was included in the General Assembly's agenda as a result of the Israeli aggression in 1967 and the occupation of Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza. The purpose of the discussion of this item was and remains essentially the confirmation of the need to ensure Israel's withdrawal from all the territories occupied by force in 1967. Indeed, the Security Council confirmed that when it adopted resolution 242 (1967).

81. A comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved until Israel withdraws from all the above-mentioned territories, including Arab Jerusalem, which—in the eyes of Egypt and Arabs and Moslems in the entire world—has a special spiritual and

* Resumed from the 90th meeting.

³ The delegation of Seychelles subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution.

⁴ The delegations of the Ivory Coast and Yemen subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution.

sacred character and which must be returned to Arab sovereignty in conformity with the relevant United Nations resolutions. Similarly, a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved unless the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are recognized, including that people's sacred right to free self-determination, without any foreign interference. That has been constantly confirmed, by ever-increasing majorities, in the General Assembly.

82. The main requirement is that Israel withdraw from the occupied Arab territories. The international community has been unanimous about that since 1967. The accurate interpretation of "withdrawal" is that it must take place to the international boundaries, in application of the well-established principle of law concerning the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by means of war.

83. It should be pointed out that all the attempts made by the United Nations to obtain from Israel a recognition of its legal obligation to withdraw to the international boundaries have failed. I would refer in this respect particularly to the identical aide-mémoire submitted in February 1971 by Mr. Gunnar Jarring to Egypt and Israel,⁵ calling upon them to conclude a peace treaty as a counterpart to Israel's withdrawal to the international boundaries. As is known, Israel persistently refused to undertake such a commitment. But today, since the signature of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel,⁶ it has been possible for the first time to obtain from Israel a clear, binding legal commitment, under article 1 of the Treaty, to withdraw to the international boundaries. Similarly, it has been agreed that all the Israeli settlements in Sinai will be eliminated so that Egypt may exercise its full sovereignty over its territory. Thus, the principle of total withdrawal to the international boundaries is no longer open to interpretations of any kind that contradict provisions of the United Nations Charter and United Nations resolutions.

84. That is Egypt's important achievement, which also makes major provisions applicable to other fronts, designed to implement the Security Council resolution in a sound way and in conformity with the United Nations Charter and basic principles of international law. This would lead to the establishment of a comprehensive, lasting and just peace, so that all the States of the region, including Israel, might live in security and peace and the Palestinian people might enjoy the legitimate rights which the international community has recognized that that people possesses.

85. In this respect, it is important that it should be very clear that the Egyptian policy vis-à-vis the Middle East question has always been consistent. President El-Sadat declared Egypt's acceptance of a peace treaty in 1971 on condition that Israel withdrew to Egypt's international boundaries with Mandat and Palestine. The General Assembly has supported that step in more than one resolution. It has praised it and considered it a positive and genuine contribution to the achievement of a comprehensive peace, and its resolutions 2799 (XXVI) and 2949 (XXVII) to that effect were adopted

⁵ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1971*, document S/10070/Add.2, para. 8.

⁶ Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, signed at Washington on 26 March 1979.

by an overwhelming majority representing the various tendencies in the General Assembly.

86. That initiative was supported by socialist States, Western States and Latin American States, as well as the non-aligned countries. It suffices to refer to the deliberations of the General Assembly in 1971 and 1972, to see the overwhelming support Egypt obtained then and which is today being faithfully translated into truly practical steps, for the first time in the Arab-Israeli conflict. If Israel had accepted the Egyptian offer and set out then to seek peace, our region would certainly not have experienced the disasters of the 1973 war.

87. In the light of this framework, the parameters of which have been established by the international community, the Egyptian delegation would like to make some important observations on draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1.

88. First, we interpret the third preambular paragraph which mentions resolution 34/65, adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November last, as being limited in its scope solely to the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, a Committee whose activities Egypt supports. Egypt had its well-defined reservations concerning a particular reference which we felt was not constructive and Egypt's stand is in the record of the General Assembly for the meeting of 29 November [83rd meeting]. There is no need now for me to repeat what I explained before. Suffice it to say that Egypt believes that the Palestinian affair is the core of the whole problem of the Middle East and it will therefore support any positive steps which will bring about a strengthening of the cause of the rights of the Palestinian people. Consequently we believe that the Camp David agreements⁷ are a step in the right direction. In consequence, Egypt voted in the General Assembly in favour of the recommendations of the Committee, with a reservation concerning the aforementioned reference.

89. I should like to make it clear that, in our view, it would have been better to have deleted the whole of that paragraph so that the draft resolution would conform to our customary procedure of limiting ourselves, in the draft resolutions on the question of the Middle East, to recalling resolutions concerning only the item on the Middle East. We also wish to repeat that we have reservations on that paragraph.

90. Secondly, operative paragraph 3 is taken word for word from a resolution adopted at the thirty-third ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, held at Monrovia from 6 to 20 July 1979 [see A/34/552, annex I, CM/Res.726 (XXXIII)]. Since Egypt has frequently and decisively made it clear that it is not seeking a partial solution or a separate treaty, but that it unceasingly aims at bringing about a just over-all solution to the issue, in accordance with Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, it does not interpret that paragraph as prejudicing the framework concluded at Camp David, since that framework is based on the implementation of the Security Council resolution.

⁷ A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Agreed at Camp David, and Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, signed at Washington on 17 September 1978.

91. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Egypt's 10 minutes are more than up. I request him to conclude his statement.

92. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Consequently Egypt accepted that paragraph at Monrovia and accepts it once again in the light of the clarifications made.

93. Thirdly, the reference to relevant United Nations resolutions that is to be found in more than one place, and particularly in operative paragraphs 1, 4 and 7, includes, notably, Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which is considered the basis of any settlement of the Middle East question, and also Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

94. In the light of what I have just said and the reservations I have made, the delegation of Egypt will vote in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1.

95. Mr. KOH (Singapore): First I wish to recall that my delegation abstained when draft resolution A/34/L.44 and Add.1 was adopted—as resolution 34/65—on 29 November 1979. My delegation will therefore reserve its position on the third preambular paragraph, which refers to that resolution.

96. Secondly, my delegation understands the phrase "Palestinian and other Arab territories" in operative paragraphs 1 and 4, and the phrase "Arab and Palestinian territories" in operative paragraph 2, to mean such territories occupied by Israel since 1967.

97. Thirdly, my delegation construes the phrase "relevant resolutions of the United Nations", in operative paragraph 4, to refer to Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

98. With those explanations, my delegation will cast a positive vote on draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1.

99. Finally, I wish to refer to document A/34/760, which contains a proposal by the delegation of Austria. The proposal encapsulates some of the important ideas contained in Chancellor Bruno Kreisky's address to this Assembly [*49th meeting*]. My delegation regards that proposal as an important contribution to our debate on the Middle East at this session. If it had been submitted to us as a draft resolution, my delegation would have gladly supported it.

100. Mr. URQUÍA (El Salvador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In explanation of vote on draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 on the situation in the Middle East, my delegation wishes to say that, with the exception of the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 3 and 7, the draft resolution appears to be in accordance with the policy adopted by the Revolutionary Junta of the Government of the Republic of El Salvador, as explained in the General Assembly by one of the heads of State, Mr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo, when speaking on 30 November last of the situation in the Middle East, and particularly of the question of Palestine. He said, among other things:

"The efforts at negotiation carried out by Egypt and Israel under the aegis of the United States of America are a positive step and have resulted in initial formulations which are embodied in

agreements and are already in force. However, El Salvador maintains that a comprehensive solution to this problem would naturally require the participation of all the parties concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people, in the process of negotiating and adopting agreements.

"The United Nations has an important role to play in the search for ways of settling this dispute, a more decisive role than that which it has played so far. In accordance with the objectives of the Organization, it must intensify its efforts until a just and lasting peace is attained in the region, and thus until the danger of a military confrontation of world-wide dimensions is eliminated." [*84th meeting, paras. 148-149.*]

101. In view of our reservations, if a separate vote were taken on the paragraphs I have mentioned, we would have to abstain, but we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

102. Mr. KATAKA (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): Once again, the international community has unanimously deplored in the strongest terms the serious problem posed by the situation in the Middle East. Our delegation wishes to add its voice to those of all who, in the debate on this item, have expressed their concern and their desire for a just and equitable solution of the problem, with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization [*PLO*]. We shall always support any initiative which is aimed at restoring peace in this region. Such initiative must take into account the following factors which we regard as essential: first, the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and to a homeland under the aegis of the PLO; secondly, the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied since 1967; thirdly the right of Israel to exist in peace and tranquillity.

103. However, although we wish to vote in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 as a whole, our delegation wishes to enter a reservation on the third preambular paragraph and on operative paragraph 4, for reasons which we gave last year during the voting on a similar draft.

104. Mr. EVRIVIADES (Cyprus): Our agenda is a formidable one and time is of the essence if we are to complete our work. My delegation therefore opted not to make yet another statement on the Middle East question because our position has been consistent, is of long standing and has been stated repeatedly *in extenso* in various international forums. Therefore it is a well-known position.

105. We have made clear in our statements, and most recently on 27 November 1979 before this body [*79th meeting*], that we consider the Palestinian question as entwined with the Middle East problem. We have also outlined the five cardinal principles that have guided our country's position on the question of Palestine and which, by and large, are also applicable to this question.

106. In the light of these principles, and with the high hope that the draft resolution that is before us will bring all the parties to this grave international problem closer to a lasting peace, my delegation will cast, without any degree of hesitation, an affirmative vote.

107. Before concluding, my delegation wishes also to refer to the fact that the Government of Lebanon should and must be enabled to exercise its authority over the whole of its territory. The entire southern region must be reintegrated into the Lebanese body politic and all the types of belligerency affecting the Lebanese State, in particular Israeli raids, must cease. In your own cogent words, Mr. President:

“The world community must redouble its efforts to bring an end to this tragedy, so that the freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon are respected” [*1st meeting, para. 49*].

108. Mr. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): We, too, wish to explain our vote on the draft resolution now before us. In the opinion of the delegation of Zaire, the problem of the Middle East is essentially a problem of disruption of balance: disruption of the balance among all the ethnic and cultural elements of that region; disruption of the balance achieved in the peaceful coexistence of the great religions; disruption of the legal balance established in the region and demonstrated by respect for and recognition of, on the one hand, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each State in the region and, on the other, the right of each State in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized borders and protected from the threat or use of force.

109. The disruption of the balance which existed in the spheres of ethnic and cultural coexistence, tolerance and peaceful coexistence of the great religions and, finally, recognition of and respect for the sovereignty of neighbouring States and their territorial integrity, political independence and right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries and protected from the threat or use of force, has in turn disrupted the balance of forces among the great Powers in the region by injecting foreign elements which have aggravated all the latent internal contradictions of the region, which all the peace-loving forces of the world have endeavoured to eliminate progressively in the interest of the entire world.

110. It is the disruption of this balance that has led to the state of belligerency in that part of the world. What is now clear is that the situation in the Middle East threatens international peace and security. It involves serious tension among the great Powers in search for spheres of influence, serious tension between Arabs and Jews in the region, dangerously exacerbating the internal contradictions of the Arab world. Lebanon is an example of this. The responsibility for the breakdown in these basic balances lies with Israel from the day it seized a large part of the territories of Palestine and of the States of Egypt and Syria, from the day it arbitrarily nationalized Jerusalem.

111. That is why the international community, aware of the dangers inherent in the breakdown of these basic balances and the state of belligerency, not only for that part of the world but for mankind as a whole, has condemned, and rightly continues to condemn, the cause of the disruption of those fundamental balances, the State of Israel. The extreme complexity of this matter, however, should succeed in tempering excessive passions and lead to a calm search for a just, comprehensive and lasting solution to the problem. When we speak of a just, comprehensive and lasting

solution to the problem, we are referring to the fundamental elements of the disruption which has taken place. It seems clear to us that a solution to the problem of the Middle East requires the re-establishment of the balance of the ethnic and cultural elements, the religious elements, the political and legal elements concerning respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence of all peoples and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized frontiers.

112. The restoration of this balance, as we see it, could only lead to the ending of assertions of belligerence or of any form of belligerence. This, as we see it, is the meaning of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), a judicious resolution which we should bear in mind constantly when we are seeking an effective, comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Middle East problem.

113. It is in the light of this upset balance, as defined in resolution 242 (1967), that we must consider the Camp David agreements. We do not feel that these agreements handicap the process of re-establishment of these disrupted balances, quite the contrary. We consider that making the condemnation of these agreements, which were entered into by Egypt in good faith, a pre-condition for a solution to the Middle East crisis, can only introduce a dilatory element of confusion in an already extremely complex situation, further exacerbate the internal contradictions of the Arab world and end up by delaying the solution of this distressing problem.

114. Therefore we ask our Arab brothers in the region to understand that, in adopting a position contrary to theirs, we are not seeking to complicate their task; we wish to help to create objective conditions that would lead to a solution of the problem.

115. If our friends in the region could solve this problem themselves, if there were no need for international support from all the Member States represented here, this problem would never have come before the OAU, the non-aligned movement or the United Nations.

116. They should by now realize that the contributions of the African States, the non-aligned States and many other States of the world have helped to strengthen them in their position and to refute the claims of Israel.

117. We do not believe that the contribution made by us—who are not of that region but are just as concerned at the threat to international peace and security represented by the Middle East problem—should merely be an expression of support for their thesis. We can make a constructive contribution by adopting a different but honest and objective approach on one aspect or another of the problem. That is why, until we have contrary evidence, we shall not associate ourselves with such out-and-out condemnation of the agreements, all the while continuing to support the just cause of the Arab and Palestinian peoples against Israel. For the Republic of Zaire this support is not merely verbal—we do not regret what it has cost us.

118. For these reasons and taking into account our previous position with regard to the third preambular

paragraph of the draft resolution and to General Assembly resolution 34/65 A mentioned in operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution, we reaffirm our reservations concerning this particular problem of the Camp David agreements and we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution in order to express Zaire's support for the cause of the Arab States in the Middle East.

119. Mr. PALMA (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation has supported, is supporting and will support any effort to bring a solution to the problem of the Middle East. In doing so it has always considered that the solution must be found within a framework which would include the implementation of Security Council resolutions, such as resolution 242 (1967) and resolution 338 (1973).

120. Therefore we shall vote in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1, although the wording of some paragraphs, and the inclusion of the reference to a resolution on which my delegation abstained when it was voted upon, are not totally satisfactory to us.

121. Once again my delegation wishes to state that it is convinced that confrontation and conflict can be overcome through the political process of negotiation which, with the participation of all parties concerned, could leave behind three decades of painful clashes and bring, in conditions of justice, a new era of peace to the region.

122. Mr. de PINIÉS (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Spanish delegation has some reservations concerning operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/34/L.53 which we intend to interpret as in no way affecting ongoing negotiations. We wish to recall our abstention in the voting on resolution 34/65 B, which is mentioned in the third preambular paragraph. Having said this, we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution.

123. Mr. PIZA ESCALANTE (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Costa Rica wishes to say that it will vote in favour of the draft resolution, but we wish to place on record express reservations with regard to the third preambular paragraph, the end of operative paragraph 2 concerning the city of Jerusalem, and operative paragraphs 3 and 7, the latter because it refers to General Assembly resolution 34/65 A.

124. We join in the condemnation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories since 1967, as expressed in operative paragraphs 1 and 4. We concur in the idea contained in operative paragraph 2 and reiterated in operative paragraph 6 that peace is indivisible and that there must be a just and lasting settlement based on a comprehensive solution, worked out under the auspices of the United Nations, which would cover all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly the realization of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the withdrawal by Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories.

125. We share the view that it is not possible to resolve the problem of Palestine through partial agreements or separate treaties to which the Palestinian people have not been parties and which they have not accepted. We join in the call for a peace conference on the Middle East expressed in operative paragraph 5.

We join in the appeals to the Security Council and the Secretary-General contained in operative paragraphs 7, 8 and 9; but we do not agree with the references in the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 3 and 7 where partial agreements and separate treaties are condemned in the categorical manner of General Assembly resolution 34/65 which is specifically mentioned. We voted against the latter resolution and we explained our negative vote at that time. Furthermore, we cannot agree with the wording of operative paragraph 3 which condemns all partial agreements and separate treaties, taking it for granted that they violate the rights of the Palestinian people.

126. We should have no objection to operative paragraph 3 if it had referred to partial agreements and separate treaties in so far as these violate the rights of the Palestinian people or decide the destiny of that people without its agreement or participation through its legitimate representatives.

127. Operative paragraph 2, in so far as it regards the city of Jerusalem as an occupied Arab territory, is not acceptable to us. We have stated and reiterate that Jerusalem must be an international city, as provided for in resolution 181 (II) of the General Assembly, in 1947, and resolution 298 (1971) of the Security Council.

128. The PRESIDENT: I shall now put draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 to the vote. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic,⁸ Germany, Federal Republic of, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

⁸ The delegation of the Dominican Republic subsequently informed the Secretariat that it wished to have its vote recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution.

Abstaining: Austria, Barbados, Burma, Central African Republic, Chile, Democratic Yemen, Fiji, Finland, France, Honduras, Iraq, Japan, Malawi, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Samoa, Swaziland, Sweden.

The draft resolution was adopted by 102 votes to 17, with 20 abstentions (resolution 34/70).⁹

129. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call upon representatives who wish to explain their vote after the vote.

130. Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (*interpretation from French*): The Romanian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1, submitted by a number of non-aligned countries, on the situation in the Middle East. In our view, the resolution just adopted by a large majority represents a positive contribution to the quest for ways and means conducive to a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Middle East crisis.

131. As we emphasized in this hall a few days ago [86th meeting], ever since the outbreak of the conflict Romania has constantly favoured a political solution and the establishment of a comprehensive peace leading to the withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories occupied following the war of 1967, to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, including the establishment of its own independent State, and to the guaranteeing of the independence and sovereignty of all States in the region. We have also always supported most actively the participation of the PLO, as the legitimate and authentic representative of the Palestinian people, in negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East situation.

132. We welcome the appeal addressed by the General Assembly to all parties to the conflict, as well as to all other interested parties, to work towards the achievement, within the framework of the United Nations, of an over-all settlement covering all aspects of the problem.

133. The Romanian delegation is particularly satisfied to note that the General Assembly, by the terms of the new resolution, requests—as Romania and its President, Nicolae Ceaușescu, have more than once advocated—the immediate convening of a peace conference on the Middle East, organized under United Nations auspices, with the participation on an equal footing of all the interested parties, including the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, as well as the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

134. We very much hope that in pursuit of these objectives, for which Romania and its President have worked energetically and constantly, the Security Council will act in accordance with the terms of paragraph 7 of the resolution for the implementation of the provisions of the important document we have just adopted, including the provision for the convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East.

⁹ The delegations of the Ivory Coast and Yemen subsequently informed the Secretariat that they wished to have their votes recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution.

135. In conclusion, I should like to state once again that, for its part, Romania will continue to make every effort and to contribute to the achievement of a peaceful negotiated settlement of the Middle East conflict which will ensure the free and democratic development of all the States and peoples of that region and will be in the general interests of the cause of world peace, détente, progress and stability.

136. Mr. FRANCIS (New Zealand): New Zealand voted against draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 because the text presented us with two particular difficulties. My delegation voted against resolution 34/65 B on the question of Palestine last week, and we therefore reserve our position with respect to the reference to that resolution in the third preambular paragraph of this text. Similarly, we have serious reservations with respect to operative paragraph 3.

137. New Zealand has all along believed that the key elements in achieving a solution in the Middle East are adherence to Security Council resolution 242 (1967), affirmation of Israel's rights as a sovereign State, Israel's duty to withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967, and the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, including the right to set up an independent State if they wish.

138. The New Zealand Government views with considerable interest the initiative taken by the Austrian delegation this year. My delegation feels that there were several elements in the Austrian proposal circulated as document A/34/760 which could make a positive contribution to solving the Middle East conflict in the future by encouraging a more flexible approach. My delegation regrets that the resolution before us today contains elements which detract from an even-handed approach.

139. Mr. KLESTIL (Austria): During this General Assembly session, Austria, has had several occasions to put before this international forum its views on the situation in the Middle East, as well as the principles which govern its policy in this matter. It would therefore be redundant to explain the considerations which led to Austria's abstention on the draft resolution contained in document A/34/L.53 and Add.1. Suffice it to say that in our opinion it does not adequately reflect the spirit of our deliberations and will not be conducive to promoting a just and equitable solution of the situation in the Middle East.

140. Furthermore, I wish to state that Austria interprets the reference in operative paragraph 2 to the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem, strictly within the meaning of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and as applying only to the territories occupied since 1967. Had operative paragraph 3 been put to a separate vote, my delegation would not have been able to support it.

141. Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (*translation from Chinese*): The Chinese delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/34/L.53 and Add.1. We support the just position embodied in those parts of the draft resolution which condemn Israel for its continued occupation of Arab territories, in violation of the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law, and call for Israel's withdrawal from Palestinian and other Arab territories under its occupa-

tion and the attainment of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the achievement of a comprehensive and just settlement of the Middle East question.

142. However, the Chinese delegation has reservations on operative paragraph 5 of the said draft resolution. Since we have made this clear at relevant meetings, we are not going to repeat it here.

143. Mr. THUNBORG (Sweden): Draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 contains several elements which compelled us to abstain in the vote. Let me state also that we interpret operative paragraph 2 strictly in the light of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), and that the wording of operative paragraph 3, to the extent that it could be considered to refer to the Camp David agreements, is not acceptable to us.

144. Mr. BALETA (Albania) (*interpretation from French*): The Albanian delegation did not participate in the vote just taken on draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1. In explanation of our position, we should like to say the following.

145. As we stated during the recent debate on the Middle East situation [*86th meeting*], Albania fully supports the just cause of the Arab people and their struggle to liberate their territories occupied by Israel and to restore all the national rights of the Palestinian people. We therefore support the parts of the resolution that condemn the continuing occupation of Arab territories by Israel and those that emphasize the need to solve the problems of the Middle East in conformity with the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples and in accordance with the principles of international law which stress the principle of non-acquisition of territory by force.

146. We should like to recall that our delegation voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 34/65 of 29 November 1979.

147. Having said that, however, the Albanian delegation wishes also to say that it has reservations concerning certain parts of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1. Our delegation does not intend to explain them in detail since we have already done so during the voting on some of the resolutions to which reference is made in the preamble of the resolution just adopted. We shall confine ourselves to making certain comments on the last two preambular paragraphs and on operative paragraph 5.

148. We still consider that certain resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the Middle East, and in particular Security Council resolution 242 (1967), have seriously prejudiced the cause of the Palestinian people and the Arab peoples.

149. We feel that the problem of the Middle East cannot be solved by counting on the good faith of the imperialist Zionist aggressors or on arbitration by the two imperialist super-Powers, which have always interfered in and plotted to control the situation in the Middle East. That is why they also speculated very broadly on the convening of a conference on the Middle East at Geneva. We feel it is very harmful to the cause of the Arab peoples to grant to the imperialist super-

Powers an arbitration role in the Middle East. Recently we saw again that so-called solutions, under the aegis of an imperialist super-Power, are dangerous. Solutions of this type set up under an American-Soviet co-chairmanship, cannot—in our opinion—be any different or have better results.

150. That is why the Albanian delegation was unable to vote in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 and did not participate in the vote.

151. Mr. MUNTASSER (Libyan Arab Jamahariya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): My delegation did not participate in the vote on draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1, in accordance with our stand on this issue, which has been expressed in the past few days, and because the spirit of some of its paragraphs is related to Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which my country does not recognize.

152. There are, however, certain positive paragraphs in the draft resolution, particularly those which refer to the rights of the Palestinian people.

153. Mr. ASHTAL (Democratic Yemen) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1, which we have just voted upon, includes a number of positive paragraphs in the view of my delegation.

154. First, there is the reference to General Assembly resolution 34/65 which, in part B, considers the Camp David accords null and void because they do not recognize the rights of the Palestinian peoples.

155. Secondly, it condemns all partial agreements and separate treaties which violate the recognized rights of the Palestinian people and contradict the principle of a just and comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem to ensure the establishment of a just peace in the area.

156. Thirdly, it reaffirms the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory through force under the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and the fact that all territories must be restored to their original owners.

157. Even so, my delegation did not participate in the vote on draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 because of the contents of operative paragraph 4, recognition of Israel and our non-recognition of Security Council resolution 242 (1967)—a resolution that does not recognize the Palestinian people and its national rights—to which reference is made in some paragraphs of the draft resolution.

158. Mr. BLUM (Israel): Israel voted against the resolution which has just been adopted because it is nothing but yet another crude and transparent attempt by the Arab rejectionist States and their supporters to hamper the progress of the only constructive, practical and ongoing peace process which has been launched for over three decades with the aim of achieving a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict.

159. The resolution just adopted is attuned to the language of General Assembly resolution 34/65 B of 29 November 1979, which in effect condemns that peace process. To that end it follows the already highly objectionable resolution adopted on this item by the General

Assembly at its thirty-third session, resolution 33/29 of 7 December 1978, and has further negative elements added to it. Thus, for example, operative paragraph 3 follows closely the language of operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 34/65 B.

160. This, then, is an anti-peace resolution. It turns the United Nations against its very *raison d'être*—the prevention of war and the promotion of peace. Consequently it is in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and all it stands for. Moreover it is totally incompatible with the provisions contained in Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which it refrains from mentioning for reasons that are readily understandable. It should be borne in mind that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) remains the only agreed basis for a negotiated peace in the Arab-Israel conflict.

161. One only needs to glance at the list of sponsors of this resolution to recognize how preposterous it is. It is led off by Cuba, whose credentials as a peace-loving State are all too well known. As a peace lover, Cuba has over the last two decades put itself both militarily and politically at the complete disposal of one particular super-Power. Its troops have been ever ready to act as proxies for the expansionism and neo-colonialism of that super-Power and as its mercenaries in all corners of the globe, including the Middle East, where it continues to fish in troubled waters.

162. Then what about Viet Nam, another of the sponsors of the resolution which was just adopted? Viet Nam is the very model of a modern major genocidal State. Or perhaps some would disagree and suggest that Viet Nam has been the very model of a State practising good neighbourliness and the principle of non-intervention, military or otherwise, in the affairs of other countries.

163. But yet, despite their unenviable record, both Cuba and Viet Nam have no inhibitions about sponsoring a resolution which talks in its preambular part about what is called "Israeli aggression"—and that when it is well known that Israel has been the victim of four Arab wars of aggression in the span of 30 years.

164. It is precisely resolutions such as this one which bring the United Nations into further disrepute. Some representatives have expressed their reservations about this resolution while at the same time voting for it. Others have supported it for reasons of expediency and out of a desire to demonstrate bloc loyalty. Be that as it may, people around the world will start asking themselves—as in fact they are already—what kind of Organization the United Nations is if it finds fault with two nations, which have been in a state of war for 30 years, concluding peace with one another and expressing their determination to live together as good neighbours. What a perversion of the Charter it is for the majority here to tell those two nations: "Don't conclude peace, maintain a state of war".

165. By all precepts of international law, it is surely not only a legitimate but also a desirable and commendable position for two sovereign States to conclude peace and establish good neighbourly relations. No third party or parties have the legal or moral authority to question, let alone deny, the validity of accords obtained in the pursuit of these goals.

166. But of course the sponsors of this resolution and, behind them, the Arab rejectionist States and their supporters are not bothered by such considerations. They apparently do not give a fig for the reputation of the United Nations. Their only interest is to transform the Organization into a battleground against peace in the Middle East and to exploit it in their unrelenting political warfare against Israel. The resolution just adopted fits in with their over-all tactics.

167. Last week the General Assembly determined that peace in the Middle East was not an "important matter". The Charter of the United Nations takes a somewhat different view of the importance of peace in any area of the world, but for the majority here that is, of course, a secondary consideration. However, since the Assembly has determined that resolutions on peace in the Middle East are unimportant, Israel will treat the present resolution accordingly.

168. Mr. AL-JBORI (Iraq) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Iraq does not believe that a remedy for the explosive situation in the Middle East, stemming from the occupation by the Zionist entity of all the Palestinian territories, in addition to three Arab States, can be found without a courageous, clear and honest settlement of the elements in this conflict. Consequently, Iraq considers that draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1, on which we have just voted, includes elements which prejudice the rights of the Palestinian people and of the Arab nations. The resolution which has just been adopted also wilfully ignores certain important issues closely related to the Middle East. Topping the list of these issues are the Camp David accords. Those accords were unanimously condemned at the Arab Summit Conferences held at Baghdad and Tunis in 1978 and 1979, respectively. They were also condemned by the Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Fez in May 1979, and again by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Havana in September 1979.

169. Since Iraq is an active member of the League of Arab States and of the Islamic Conference and is a non-aligned country, and since we are convinced that such resolutions should express the views of the majority of the international community and truly and clearly define the rights of the Palestinian people and of the Arab nations, we have abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1. However, Iraq is not planning to take a stand in conflict with the aforementioned groups which have all agreed on complete condemnation of the Camp David accords, which have so clearly harmed the interests of the peoples and countries of the Middle East.

170. If a vote had been taken on the individual paragraphs of the draft resolution in question, we would have voted in favour of some of these paragraphs.

171. Mrs. HEANEY (Ireland): I am speaking today on behalf of the nine member States of the European Community. We were unable to support resolution A/34/70, largely because of the contents of paragraph 3.

172. Mr. MANSOURI (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): We have voted in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 because of our understanding that apparently, after signing the separate peace treaty, Egypt is no longer a party to the

Middle East conflict since the Camp David accords have effectively and practically excluded Egypt from the Arab ranks and from collective Arab responsibility to defend Arab and Palestinian rights in Palestine. The expression "all parties" does not, in any case, mean the participation of Egypt in a conference on peace. In the light of all these reasons, any new framework for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East should, in our view, stem from the United Nations and should bring together the actual parties in this conflict to which Egypt is no longer a party.

173. Mr. PIBULSONGGRAM (Thailand): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add. 1 on the situation in the Middle East. However, my delegation wishes to express its reservation on the third preambular paragraph referring to resolution 34/65 of 29 November 1979, on part B of which it had abstained in the voting.

174. As regards operative paragraph 1, it is the understanding of my delegation that the territories referred to are those which have been occupied since 1967.

175. The Thai delegation would also like to take this opportunity to refer to document A/34/760 which contains a proposal by the delegation of Austria, and in which are found important ideas from the address by Chancellor Bruno Kreisky to this Assembly [49th meeting]. My delegation considers this Austrian proposal an important contribution to the debate on the Middle East.

176. Mr. CHADERTON (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Venezuelan delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add. 1 subject to a reservation concerning the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 2 and 3, in accordance with its position on resolution 34/65 B and other previous resolutions.

177. Mr. TUBMAN (Liberia): The Liberian delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add. 1; but because my Government has already welcomed, and still welcomes, the Camp David accords and the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel as a step towards a comprehensive, just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, our positive vote should in no way be construed as a condemnation of those accords or treaty.

178. Mr. DIEZ (Chile) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We wish to express our constant solidarity with the just cause of the Palestinian people. However, we could not support draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add. 1 for legal reasons—mainly because of the third preambular paragraph. Our disagreement with that paragraph on legal grounds is so serious that when resolution 34/65 was voted on we had to abstain, even though we shared many of the central ideas expressed therein.

179. Mr. OBIANG NGOMO (Equatorial Guinea) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation voted in favour of the resolution in document A/34/L.53 and Add. 1. However, we wish to express our reservations on the third preambular paragraph which makes reference to resolution 34/65, and on operative paragraph 3.

180. Mr. RASUL (Bhutan): I should like to state that

my delegation's affirmative vote on draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add. 1 should be viewed in the light of our explanation of vote on draft resolutions A/34/L.43 and Add. 1 Rev. 1 and A/34/L.44 and Add. 1, adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November last [83rd meeting].

181. Mrs. KIRSTE (Norway): My delegation voted against draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add. 1. We did so mainly because the sponsors of that resolution seem to imply that the Camp David agreements "violate the recognized rights of the Palestinian people and contradict the principles of just and comprehensive solutions to the Middle East problem". My Government has consistently supported the Camp David agreements and Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, because we view them as a step towards the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which contain the basic principles on which a just and comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem must be based.

182. We also recognize that a solution of the problem of the Palestinians through recognition of their legitimate national rights is essential for such an over-all solution. The Camp David agreements have, in our view, also contributed to a greater awareness of the problem of the Palestinians.

183. Mr. ESQUEA GUERRERO (Dominican Republic) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Our delegation voted against draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add. 1, although it really wished to vote in favour. We therefore request that our vote be recorded as having been in favour of the draft resolution.

184. We wish, however, to express our reservations on the third preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 7 of the draft resolution.

185. The PRESIDENT: Several delegations have asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply. Before calling on them, I wish to remind them of the time-limit and that they should speak from their seats.

186. Mr. BLANCO (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation does not usually waste its time or that of other delegations, particularly in the matter of insults or absurd calumnies which no one in this room—not even Mr. Blum's friends—would dare say are worthy of attention. However, since the Ambassador of Israel has seen fit to make use of the explanation of vote to attack my country, I would say that, as a Hebrew, he should be ashamed of representing a State which is today using Nazi policies and methods against the Arab countries and the Palestinian people.

187. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the PLO to make a statement in reply.

188. Mr. TERZI (Palestine Liberation Organization): The vote just taken by the General Assembly—102 to 17—and its positive vote on 29 November 1979 when it reaffirmed our inalienable rights, namely, the right of return and the right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, encourage us and strengthen our confidence in the effectiveness of this Organization.

189. Peace is our aim, and we have made it very clear that we shall continue our struggle by various means to achieve that aim. But peace is not the three letters "RIP" that are seen on tombstones. It is a peace based on justice and aimed at ensuring happiness and prosperity and the full exercise and attainment of the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

190. We have heard a few comments, and in particular a lot was said about operative paragraph 3 of the resolution just adopted. For the information of the Assembly, this paragraph was taken verbatim from a resolution adopted at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held at Monrovia. I wish the representatives who have voted against the resolution simply because we reiterated what our brothers in Africa have asserted, had known that earlier. However, we are in favour of all efforts conducive to peace. It is for that reason that we think operative paragraphs 4 and 5 are conducive to peace, because peace should be comprehensive, just and based on the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. This Assembly has said that the question of Palestine lies at the heart of the conflict in the Middle East. At this point, I wish to thank the representative of Austria for having taken the initiative of circulating some ideas in a working paper [A/34/760]. Unfortunately, the representative of Austria seems to have forgotten that this Assembly has already laid the basis for achieving peace, elaborated the concepts thereof and established the mechanism for doing so. This consideration seems to be lacking in the paper presented by Austria. I think he had also forgotten that the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories is a pre-condition for peace.

191. Mr. BLUM (Israel): As is well known, Cuba masquerades here as the spokesman of the non-aligned group of nations. One is bound to note that Cuba follows a very odd form of non-alignment. Indeed, its track record hardly qualifies it as a non-aligned country at all.

192. In 1973, Cuba provided pilots to South Yemen in its war with its neighbour to the north. Later in the same year, a Cuban armoured brigade was in Syria at the time when that country launched the Yom Kippur war of aggression against Israel. Today, Cuban troops are to be found throughout the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Iraq and Libya. For a country which scatters like confetti slogans and phrases such as "colonialism" and "imperialism" at the drop of a hat, Cuba surely has a very long way to go before it can prove that it is not the puppet of a certain super-Power and is thus capable of exercising a policy of restraint and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

193. Furthermore, as a country which was so aptly described in *Le Monde* on 16 February 1979 as a "tropical Gulag", Cuba is scarcely qualified as an arbiter on any matter which touches on fundamental human rights and the dignity of man.

194. How odd it was that when the President of Cuba, that self-proclaimed champion of human rights, who feels so strongly about oppression and genocide, appeared before the General Assembly [31st meeting], he had in the whole of his long oration not a single word to say about the continuing genocide, oppression and human misery in South-East Asia.

195. Instead, he made an obscene comparison, as did his representative here today, between the Jewish State of Israel and the accursed Nazi régime.

196. The entire world knows that the Jewish people was the prime target and the main victim of Nazi barbarism before and during the Second World War. More than one third of the Jewish people fell victim to Nazi hordes. The civilized world will thus join in emphatically rejecting and condemning this shameless and scurrilous comparison, which constitutes a grave affront to the memory of 6 million Jewish martyrs of Nazi tyranny and oppression, including one and a half million children.

197. It must also be recalled that before the President of Cuba sold himself out completely to his masters, he used to speak with an entirely different voice about Israel and the Jewish people.

198. Mr. EL-CHOUFI (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The allegations made by the Israeli representative regarding the presence of Cuban forces in the Middle East, and particularly in Syria, are unfounded and erroneous.

199. Our delegation circulated on 21 November last a letter on the subject, as an official document [A/34/707]. Had the representative of Israel read the memorandum, he would have spared himself the trouble of repeating false allegations which no one here believes.

200. Mr. AL-ALI (Iraq) (*interpretation from Arabic*): We all know that the lies of the Zionist representative have become part and parcel of everything he says. In fact, he never hesitates to lie and does so at every opportunity. His allegation regarding the presence of foreign forces on Iraqi territory is the latest lie he has told this Assembly, whose sacred character imposes on all of us the obligation to speak the truth when we come here to make a statement.

201. Iraq has never before felt the need to call on any foreign forces. Why should we do so now, when we have attained a state of greater maturity and viability?

202. The Zionist representative, in his right of reply, said something which I did not quite understand: is draft resolution A/34/L.53 and Add.1 supposed to assess Cuban policy, or to deal with the situation in the Middle East? Having taken a second look at the Zionist representative's statement, I now understand him only too well. He seeks as ever to induce representatives to discuss issues in no way related to the item under consideration. His objective in doing so is very clear and known to us all: it is to distract our attention from the substance of the matter before us.

203. Mr. MUNTASSER (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I shall be brief. The Zionist representative has referred to the presence of military forces on Libyan territory. I wish to deny this. A high level of co-operation does exist between Cuba and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Cuban doctors are working in the desert and in other very difficult regions and are helping us to develop our country. We also have Cuban engineers but we do not have any Cuban military personnel whatsoever on our territory.

204. On this occasion, I should like to remind this Assembly that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is indeed very grateful to the Government of Cuba and its President, Fidel Castro, for the assistance they are extending to the third world, and particularly to my country.

205. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the PLO who wishes to make a statement in reply.

206. Mr. TERZI (Palestine Liberation Organization): It is with deep regret that we recall the 50 million victims who fell as a result of the Nazi atrocities; it was not only 6 million, because we do not discriminate among victims of racism. Those killed in the Second World War were all victims of racism, and I do not know for how long the representative of Tel Aviv has claimed to be speaking on behalf of world Jewry.

207. We know very well that there is no difference between Nazi Germany and Zionist Israel. They are both based on an Aryan exclusionism, or, as the Zionist Israelis call it, Jewish exclusivism.

208. A country that practises positive segregation—I stress the word "positive"—against its Arab population is nothing but a Nazi country.

Organization of work

209. The PRESIDENT: Since making my previous announcements on the programme of work for next week, I have been reviewing the remaining problems—including the necessity of synchronizing our schedule with that of the Committees.

210. As members will recall, the General Assembly agreed yesterday [90th meeting] to extend the deadline for the Second Committee's work until Thursday, 13 December. I wish to give the members of that Committee maximum time to conclude their work prior to that deadline. Therefore instead of taking up a series of reports of the Second Committee on Tuesday afternoon, 11 December, as originally planned, we shall deal at that meeting only with item 55 (a), "Development and international economic co-operation: Report of the Committee of the Whole Established under General Assembly Resolution 32/174", action on which by the plenary Assembly is required in order for the Second Committee to take other related decisions. This will afford the plenary Assembly extra time for other work on Tuesday afternoon.

211. As I announced yesterday [89th meeting], I intend to continue the balloting for the election of one non-permanent member of the Security Council on any occasion when the schedule of the plenary Assembly permits, so that we may discharge this important Charter obligation. Since there will now be time available next Tuesday afternoon, I propose to resume the election to fill the place on the Security Council on Tuesday afternoon instead of Wednesday, 12 December, as had been expected.

212. May I also draw representatives' attention to the problem facing us in completing the debate on Namibia. Although the speakers' list is not yet closed, we already have 63 additional speakers inscribed. A large number of the speakers have indicated that, as of now, they do not expect to be ready to speak tomorrow. This con-

fronts us with something of a problem since we must conclude the item, including the voting, by 7 p.m. on Monday, 10 December, since the annual Human Rights Day concert will be held at 8 p.m. that evening. Accordingly, unless a sufficient number of delegations are prepared to make their statements tomorrow, during an extended session, unless people are prepared to start the meetings punctually and unless the statements are fairly brief, I regret that there will be no alternative but to schedule meetings for Saturday.

213. I should be glad if representatives would give the Secretariat a clear indication of their intentions in this regard so that I may arrange for Saturday meetings, if necessary.

AGENDA ITEM 27

Question of Namibia (continued)

- (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;
- (b) Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia;
- (c) Report of the Secretary-General

214. Mr. VERRET (Haiti) (*interpretation from French*): The Haitian delegation once again wishes to restate its commitment to the cause of the liberation and independence of the Namibian people. It again proclaims the direct responsibility of the United Nations towards Namibia, until that country's people has acceded to self-determination and true national independence. In any case, that is the opinion of the international community, often reflected in the decisions of the United Nations since 1966, when the General Assembly abolished South Africa's mandate over Namibia [resolution 2145 (XXI)] and decided to place the Territory under the administration of the Organization until the people could govern themselves.

215. Therefore it was up to the United Nations to compel South Africa to put an end to its illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978).

216. Can we reasonably say that that duty has been discharged by the Organization? The very effectiveness of the United Nations is at stake here. In replying to that question we would probably have to accuse ourselves, a founder-Member of this Organization and also a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

217. The Security Council resolutions concerning the situation of the people of Namibia have represented praiseworthy efforts towards the liquidation of colonialism, racial segregation and *apartheid* in South Africa. However we all know that, in spite of those resolutions and the almost total condemnation by the peoples of the world, South Africa still holds on to its position in Namibia because, for reasons that certain Member States cannot admit, it continues to play a role in the settlement of the Namibian question. As a result of that fact, it is recognized as having a real right over that country. Its presence on Namibian territory would even appear to be legalized, although it was declared illegal by the International Court of Justice and in many United Nations resolutions. Facts being what they are, South Africa is constantly increasing its

manoeuvres to consolidate its hold inside the country and to dazzle the rest of the world with its administration's benefits for the Namibian people.

218. Countless negotiations have taken place between the South African Government and the United Nations for a peaceful solution of the situation in Namibia. The five Western members of the Security Council, tired of war, put forward a plan¹⁰ which South Africa accepted. That plan, taken as a whole, offered serious chances for a peaceful settlement of the question, but these hopes were soon deflated.

219. In spite of the combined efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the representatives of the five Western Powers to carry out the plan, South Africa suddenly dropped its mask and, fully revealing its bad faith, launched attacks against the South West Africa People's Organization [SWAPO] bases in Angola. The South African Prime Minister subsequently stated that the publication of the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations¹¹ had created a new situation. What South Africa did not wish to accept, although it had approved the plan in question, was that the armed forces of SWAPO in Namibia at the time of the cease-fire would be restricted to base at designated locations inside Namibia to be specified by the Special Representative after the necessary consultations. That measure, set forth in the report of the Secretary-General,¹² is in no way contrary to resolution 435 (1978) nor to the plan submitted by the five Western countries. South Africa's illegal procedures in Namibia are well known. First of all, on 1 September 1977, the Pretoria Government appointed an administrator whose powers are like those of a Roman proconsul.

220. He can promulgate administrative decrees or revoke acts of Parliament concerning Namibia where, as if to mock us, South Africa installed a puppet Government made up of tribal collaborators. Then there was the consolidation of the reservation system, the militarization of the Territory, mass arrests of members of SWAPO and the torture of civilian sympathizers in the security areas—not to mention the repeated attacks against neighbouring countries with a view to neutralizing any concerted action.

221. That is the present situation, despite the endless consultations and negotiations to persuade South Africa to accept the decisions of the United Nations and to abide by the provisions of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) on its total withdrawal from the Territory of Namibia.

222. The truth is that South Africa has powerful allies which by subtle manoeuvres encourage its obduracy in the face of international opinion. However, we should like to believe that the United Nations will be strong enough to meet the challenge posed by South Africa in perpetuating its odious system of *apartheid* on Namibian soil.

223. The Haitian delegation, in its dual capacity as a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia and

a State traditionally involved in the struggle against racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid*, calls on all Member States, specialized agencies and other organs to give the broadest possible support to the people of Namibia and its liberation movement, SWAPO, its sole and authentic representative.

224. The Haitian delegation proclaims again that the free exercise of the right of self-determination by all Namibians is the only valid political solution to the Namibian problem. My delegation, in solidarity with that people ill-used in its land illegally occupied by the *apartheid* régime, states again that it will spare no effort in the United Nations in the common endeavour to free Namibia, including Walvis Bay, which is an integral part of the country.

225. The Haitian delegation declares that the Government of Haiti, under the progressive leadership of its leader, His Excellency Jean-Claude Duvalier, President-for-Life of the Republic, in developing a policy of social justice, continues to condemn the criminal policy of racism, racial discrimination, *apartheid* and boundless hatred, and will fully support any new measures undertaken to remove the last obstacles standing in the way of the valiant fighters of SWAPO in their desperate struggle to achieve the sovereign rights of the Namibian people.

226. Resolutions and condemnations are merely empty words to South Africa. What is needed, as everyone knows, is action, decisive action, coordinated action, action that is properly organized and strengthened by the unconditional and unreserved assistance of all the peoples of the world, of all men of good will.

227. Through action, and only through such action, will it be possible for a new day to dawn over a humanized Namibia, free, independent and sovereign.

228. Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Never has a régime defied the will of the international community and the many United Nations resolutions over such a long period of time in such a flagrant manner as has the racist régime of South Africa. It is indeed unfortunate that, in spite of the unanimous condemnation by the international community of the policy of *apartheid* as carried out by the Pretoria régime and of its continued occupation of Namibia, the United Nations seems to be incapable of confronting this challenge and compelling that racist régime to respond to the resolutions, withdraw from Namibia, grant the people of Namibia the right to self-determination and genuine independence and renounce its policy of *apartheid*.

Mr. Illueca (Panama), Vice-President, took the Chair.

229. The sad truth is that, had it not been for the co-operation of certain Western States with South Africa, the international effort deployed, particularly during the past two and a half years, would certainly have borne fruit in bringing about a peaceful and just settlement of the Namibian question. It is well known that some of those Western States themselves took the initiative in efforts to reach such a settlement and submitted the proposals that were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 431 (1978). Those same proposals,

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978*, document S/12636.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1979*, document S/13120.

¹² *Ibid.*

which South Africa pretended to accept, were also accepted by SWAPO in spite of certain negative aspects. We are all familiar with the development of the situation since the adoption of Security Council resolution 431 (1978), which was followed by the adoption of the Secretary-General's plan in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). That plan calls for United Nations supervision over elections in Namibia, the transfer of authority to the black majority and the attainment of true independence by the Territory.

230. The international community awaited the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), believing that a just settlement was not far away. But South Africa, which appeared at first to accept the international proposal in the belief that SWAPO would reject it, was surprised by the conciliatory attitude of SWAPO and consequently proceeded to invent excuses and to put obstacles in the way of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), because it was determined from the outset to implement its own plan of internal settlement in Namibia and to set up a puppet régime which enables it to continue its control and occupation of the Territory.

231. And, while the representative of the Secretary-General was carrying out consultations concerning the implementation of the provisions of the United Nations plan, South Africa declared its determination to conduct elections unilaterally in the Territory, in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978).

232. In view of this dangerous development, Congo, on behalf of the African group of States, called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to confront this challenge.¹³ Yet, despite that meeting¹⁴ and the adoption of resolution 439 (1978), in which the Council declared that such elections and their results would be considered null and void, cautioned South Africa to cancel the elections and warned it that it would initiate appropriate actions under Chapter VII of the Charter, the racist régime in Pretoria ignored that resolution of the Security Council and held illegal elections in December 1978. These were preceded by acts of aggression against Angola and Zambia and the arrest of a number of leaders and members of SWAPO in Namibia in order to overcome their resistance to the internal elections. The result of the elections, as everybody knows, led to the setting up of a so-called Constituent Assembly which later, on 14 May 1979, was transformed into what was called the National Assembly, with legislative and executive powers. This was followed by the setting up of an Advisory Council of 12 members, regarded as a Ministerial Council, to work with the Governor-General, and the formation of what is called a south-western African army. All this is proof that South Africa is determined to attain its objective of setting up a puppet racist régime, to be followed by a declaration of sham independence, thus turning Namibia into another bantustan as part of an over-all plan by which South Africa hopes to surround its racist régime with "independent" entities which, at the same time, would form demilitarized zones between it and the other African States. In this way South Africa seeks to guarantee the protection of the white minorities'

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1978*, document S/12945.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Year*, 2103rd meeting, paras. 2-71 and 2104th meeting, paras. 6-7.

interests, the continuation of their policy of *apartheid* and their control over southern Africa.

233. The economic and military situation in Namibia, the escalation of the repressive measures of the racist occupation authorities, the arrest and persecutions of SWAPO members and the massacres of Namibian refugees furnish irrefutable proof of what are the true intentions of South Africa in Namibia in its recent manoeuvres, which are aimed at no less than maintaining its control over that Territory.

234. South Africa has penetrated all fields of the economy in Namibia and reports show that in the first half of this year Namibia was the fourth-ranking exporter of minerals in the world, coming after South Africa, Zaire and Zambia. At the top of the list of these metals and minerals are diamonds, uranium and other metals of strategic and industrial value. The mineral wealth of the region and the cheap black labour are what lie behind the application of the policy of *apartheid*, which has encouraged foreign investments by certain Western countries in order to participate in the exploitation of these resources, which is in flagrant contradiction of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, issued on 27 September 1974¹⁵ by the United Nations Council for Namibia, relating to the protection of the natural resources of Namibia and forbidding their exploitation either by the occupation authorities or by foreign interests. And so that those foreign investors can continue to benefit from the huge profits of this exploitation, they maintain their political and financial support for the illegal occupiers of the Territory. All this adds dangerous dimensions to the problem and constitutes an obstacle to its rapid and lasting solution.

235. In regard to the military situation in the Territory, South Africa increased its military power during 1978-1979 and now has 60,000 soldiers there. The raids perpetrated by the racist occupation forces and the repeated attacks against Angola are proof of that increasing military build-up. In this respect, we notice that South Africa's military capabilities continue to increase despite Security Council resolution 418 (1977) on arms embargo. This had encouraged South Africa to reinforce its occupation of Namibia and continue its military attacks against neighbouring countries.

236. The importance of Namibia to South Africa, whether it be from the economic, military or strategic point of view, convinces us that the Pretoria régime will not abandon the Territory voluntarily or allow the Namibian people to exercise its right to self-determination and independence. The recent attitude of South Africa—the intensification of the exploitation of the riches of the Territory, the new concentrations of troops, the stepping up of acts of repression against and arrest of the leaders and members of SWAPO, and the repeated acts of aggression against neighbouring countries, together with the massacres of Namibian refugees in those countries, prove the true intentions of Pretoria. The General Assembly at its last session warned of the dangerous deterioration of the situation in Namibia. It decided to resume its work to confront the situation and to seek effective means of checking the racist régime and compelling it to comply with the

¹⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 24 A*, para. 84. The Decree has been issued in final form in *Namibia Gazette No. 1*.

relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly resolution 435 (1978) and at its resumed thirty-third session, held from 23 to 31 May 1979, it adopted by an overwhelming majority resolution 33/206, thus scoring a record in the expression of international support for the heroic struggle of the people of Namibia and for the leadership of SWAPO, its sole authentic representative. The resolution called, *inter alia*, for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to take effective measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

237. Six months have elapsed since the adoption of that resolution, and the Security Council has not met for that purpose, for reasons of which we are all aware, despite the fact that such steps are the only course now open to us and that they are considered necessary by the international community, as was reaffirmed at the thirty-third ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of OAU, held at Monrovia from 6 to 20 July 1979 [see A/34/552, annex I, CM/Res.720 (XXXIII)].

238. There is no doubt that we appreciate the efforts which have been deployed to persuade South Africa to implement the United Nations plan. In this connexion, I wish to refer to the negotiations which took place in New York in March 1979 within the framework of these efforts, and to the negotiations which have taken place at Geneva in the past few days and in which all parties concerned had participated. However, we need to understand the manoeuvres to which South Africa resorts at every stage of the negotiations and which lead us to doubt the sincerity of its intentions. The outcome of the March 1979 negotiations was apparent to us all as the result of South Africa's intransigence and we also have witnessed its attempts to undermine the recent negotiations in Geneva, even before they started. That became clearer in the several letters exchanged by the Pretoria régime and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, contained in various Security Council documents issued during the period 7 to 13 November last.¹⁶

239. The negotiations at Geneva in mid-November between the parties concerned dealt with the concept of the demilitarized zones. Although SWAPO and the front-line States had accepted that concept, as stated in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 November 1979,¹⁷ South Africa has not responded to it in a positive manner, despite the urgent request of the Security Council of 28 November 1979¹⁸ to South Africa to make known its reaction as soon as possible.

240. It is true that we have received today South Africa's answer dated 5 December 1979¹⁹ to these proposals, but, as usual, it is an answer that includes pre-conditions which Pretoria is seeking to impose to impede implementation of the United Nations plan.

241. Again, this is proof of the intransigence of the Pretoria régime and its persistent defiance of the international community.

242. Finally, the delegation of Egypt would like to praise the work of the United Nations Council for Namibia, of which Egypt is proud to be a member, and

¹⁶ *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1979*, documents S/13611, S/13612, S/13614, S/13619, S/13620 and S/13621.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, document S/13634.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, document S/13657.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, document S/13680.

its efforts under the guidance of Mr. Paul Lusaka, who is known for his dynamism and his wide experience, to achieve a just settlement of this problem. In this regard, my delegation would like to reaffirm that Egypt will continue to give all possible moral and material support to the heroic people of Namibia and to its national liberation movement, SWAPO, until their achievement of self-determination, independence and freedom.

243. Mr. SAMHAN (United Arab Emirates) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Once again we are meeting to consider the question of Namibia, which is today one of the vital and fundamental problems the United Nations and the international community have to face. There is no need here to go into the history of the question and of all the negotiations between South Africa and the United Nations to resolve this matter peacefully. We all know that South Africa's mandate over Namibia ended in 1966. Since that time the United Nations has been directly responsible for Namibia, and South Africa no longer has the legal right to administer the Territory. What we have to face is the fact that South Africa is trying to predetermine the future of Namibia by holding rigged elections, which are neither fair nor free, and in which SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, will not participate. It is clear that the United Nations cannot be a party to this action, which is contrary to its resolutions.

244. The solution to the problem of Namibia's independence is a matter of urgency and prime importance. In recent years, debates have been held and intensive and broad-ranging negotiations have been conducted to try to reach a solution to the Namibian problem on the basis of free and fair elections under the aegis of the United Nations. Efforts have been made in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976), which was a positive step towards resolving the Namibian crisis. The Secretary-General's proposal for the implementation of that resolution was approved by the Security Council in resolution 435 (1978). Namibia could have gained its independence if that proposal had been implemented, and peace could have been established in Namibia. Had it not been for the intransigence of South Africa, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group [UNTAG] would now be in Namibia.

245. The deadlock in this matter is the result of the fact that South Africa refused to accept the report of the Secretary-General and to co-operate in its implementation. Once again, South Africa continues to be intransigent and to defy the United Nations with regard to Namibia, as it has done in recent years. What perplexes us is that South Africa hopes to present the international community with a *fait accompli* by installing its agents in what it calls the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, in Namibia. In this connexion, South Africa has set up in Namibia an illegitimate National Council and in its frantic attempts to impose a so-called internal settlement in Namibia, it has multiplied its policies of persecution against SWAPO members whom it is constantly harassing, arresting and torturing. Dozens of SWAPO leaders have been arrested in an attempt by the authorities to spread disorder and fear in the ranks of that organization because of its persistent opposition to the manoeuvres of South Africa.

246. The importance of the diplomatic initiatives taken in recent years by five Western States, which

normally collaborate with South Africa, is that those States have become directly concerned in the matter. The United Nations has frequently requested those States not to continue their policy of co-operation with and support for South Africa. We see in that initiative good reasons for hope. We must now implement the Secretary-General's report, and those who took the initiative in drawing up the independence plan for Namibia must assume the responsibility of its implementation before all else. Those States must take up the challenge and persuade South Africa to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report and; if it does not do so, they must join the other members of the international community to condemn the Pretoria régime and compel it to respect the United Nations resolutions concerning Namibia.

247. My country's position is as follows.

248. First, any political solution of the problem of Namibia must be based on the ending of the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and the latter's withdrawal from the Territory, so that the people of Namibia can exercise freely their inalienable right to self-determination and independence in a united Namibia.

249. Secondly, free elections must be held, under the auspices and control of the United Nations, in Namibia as a political entity, including Walvis Bay, on the basis of Security Council resolution 385 (1976).

250. Thirdly, SWAPO is the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people, and we will support any solutions accepted by the people of Namibia, represented by SWAPO, without whose participation no decision on Namibia's future can be taken.

251. Fourthly, the United Nations has a direct responsibility in the matter of Namibia until that Territory is completely independent and exercises its right to self-determination. We do not recognize any of the elections held by the Government of South Africa because they are illegal.

252. In conclusion, I would like to praise the efforts deployed by the United Nations Council for Namibia and the Secretary-General to find a solution to this important question. I should like to repeat the position of the United Arab Emirates, that we shall continue to give all possible material and moral assistance to the people of Namibia and to its legitimate representative, SWAPO, until final victory crowns their struggle and Namibia assumes its place among nations as a free and independent State.

253. Mr. KLESTIL (Austria): General Assembly resolution 33/182 C has proclaimed 1979 the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia and, in doing so, has expressed the conviction of the international community that this year will be of decisive importance for the progress of the Namibian people to independence and self-determination, based on the United Nations transition plan. Austria has consistently associated itself with the United Nations plan for Namibia's peaceful and negotiated transition to independence. In the view of the Austrian Government, any political settlement which aims at stability and durability has to rest on the broadest possible basis and to include all the parties involved in the problem.

254. The plan, originally put forward by the five Western Powers²⁰ and subsequently endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 435 (1978), meets these basic requirements as it provides for democratic and internationally supervised elections. Austria continues to regard the United Nations transition plan as the most promising—and probably the only—way to discharge the United Nations' special responsibility for that Territory and to arrive at a genuine and peaceful transfer of power to the Namibian people.

255. We have, on several occasions, expressed our dismay and deep concern over the stalemate arrived at in the negotiations with the South African Government. Instead of appreciating fully the long-term advantages of a peaceful and internationally recognized transition of Namibia to independence, based on democratic principles, South Africa has over the past year introduced new elements which have obstructed the implementation of the United Nations plan. It has furthermore embarked on a course of unilateral action, which started with the elections in Namibia, led to the imposition of a constituent assembly and has presented further obstacles to the implementation of the United Nations plan. The military presence of South Africa has increased and has been accompanied by a new wave of detention and imprisonment of SWAPO personnel. South Africa's policy towards the front-line States has become even more aggressive and blatantly overbearing.

256. In the view of the Austrian Government, those steps taken by the South African Government reflect a wrong assessment of the political situation, which could have grave and far-reaching consequences. This course cannot lead to stabilizing the area or to establishing an atmosphere of peaceful and mutually fruitful co-existence in southern Africa. On the contrary, it will inevitably cause further violence and bloodshed in the military struggle and will rightly increase the impatience of those who for so long have been deprived of the right to self-determination and independence. The South African Government should be well aware that it cannot dissociate itself from the responsibilities resulting from its actions in Namibia.

257. On this premise, Austria welcomes the news which arrived only yesterday, that the South African Government finally accepts²¹ the plan for the establishment of a demilitarized zone on both sides of the northern border of Namibia, on which agreement was reached at the recent Geneva meeting with representatives of the front-line States and SWAPO. We hope that the points requiring further clarification raised by South Africa can be settled without delay and that the implementation of the plan, so long overdue, can speedily commence.

258. In this context, we wish to express once more our appreciation and gratitude to the five Western Powers, to the Secretary-General and to his Special Representative for their unswerving efforts to implement the plan, as well as to SWAPO and those African nations most intimately concerned, that in a spirit of co-operation and understanding have participated in this endeavour. Special appreciation is also due to the United Nations Council for Namibia which, under the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-third Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978*, document S/12636.

²¹ *Ibid.*, *Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1979*, document S/13680, annex.

experienced and wise guidance of Ambassador Lusaka, represents the interests of the Namibian people with skill and devotion. Austria was pleased to receive a delegation from the United Nations Council for Namibia led by Ambassador Oyono of the United Republic of Cameroon in Austria on 14 and 15 May 1979. That visit provided the opportunity for a detailed discussion of the present state and the future prospects of the Territory, as well as of the appropriate actions to be taken.

259. The present debate provides an excellent opportunity to impress once again upon South Africa that a solution to the Namibian question can only be found in an internationally recognized settlement, based on the principles on which the world community has been united for a long time.

260. Mr. CLARK (Nigeria): This debate on Namibia is taking place at a time when the entire history of colonization and racism in southern Africa is at a crossroads. The political ferment in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa has acquired such force and momentum that few, if any, can fail to see the direction history is taking. The tide of freedom and liberation is moving inexorably forward. Like destiny, it can be stopped by no one. It may be delayed, but the tide will run its course logically to the end.

261. Pretoria is watching closely the current talks on the political future of Zimbabwe which are going on in Lancaster House in London between Her Majesty's Government and the Patriotic Front. Pretoria had hoped that the illegal Smith-Muzorewa administration, which could not govern Zimbabwe, win the war of liberation or gain international recognition, would survive the talks and provide it with an excuse to implement its own racist programme of an illegal internal settlement in Namibia. The truth is that, while perfidy may still be lurking around the corner, Her Majesty's Government has assumed its responsibilities to itself and to the nationalists of Zimbabwe. Whether the agreement just reached in London between the administering Power and the Patriotic Front will succeed depends on the good faith of all the parties concerned. The world will be watching most closely to see how scrupulously all the terms and conditions of the agreement are carried out. We cannot but wish all the parties well. A truly free and independent Zimbabwe is all we want.

262. As regards the threats by South Africa to undo by armed intervention or criminal subversion the outcome of the London talks, as reported by *The New York Times* of Tuesday, 20 November 1979, let me sound this simple note of warning. Free Zimbabwe will not be alone. The death-wish and the suicidal streak in the character of the racist régime of South Africa will doom that régime much sooner than it thinks through such ill-advised adventurism.

263. Some two weeks ago several delegations, representing all the political and geographical regions of the world, submitted some 17 resolutions at the end of a deeply moving debate on the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa. Both the debate and the resolutions had a common thread running through them. They all condemned *apartheid*, without exception. They all wanted an end to *apartheid* without delay. They all called for concrete action to meet the challenge of *apartheid*. They all likened the racist ré-

gime of Pretoria to those tragic characters in Charles Lamb's tale who, not knowing how and where to roast a pig, burnt their own house over their own heads.

264. Unfortunately, it has not taken long for events in that tragically sad country to prove us right. On 15 November 1979 the trials of the Pietermaritzburg Twelve were concluded. In contravention of the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949²² and the resolutions of the United Nations, one of the freedom fighters, James Mange, has purportedly been sentenced to death, and 11 others have been sent to gaol for between 13 and 18 years. Perhaps it is significant to record that, even by South African standards, the trials were unique and the penalties bizarre. The accused did not plead guilty, and the so-called witnesses against them testified *sotto voce*, *in camera*, and without due process of law.

265. Perhaps it will arouse and move world public opinion, from mere expressions of moral indignation to a deeper and more serious perception of the heinous monstrosity that the policies of *apartheid* truly constitute, if the facts are known, if it is known that James Mange was sentenced to death for an alleged political crime. It was not for attempted murder or any offence involving a killing. Even in South Africa such a sentence has no parallel or precedent since the Second World War. The implication is that the racist régime may be embarking on a novel course of policy, one of systematically liquidating all leaders of thought, whether or not they commit any offence.

266. I do not want to take undue advantage of the debate on Namibia to dwell at length on events in South Africa. The temptation to seize upon the organic link between all the political developments in southern Africa and to say more about the tragic flaws in the racist régime of South Africa is irresistible. However, so convinced am I that the fate of the Pietermaritzburg Twelve is a crying affront to human conscience and the principles of the United Nations that I wish to appeal once again—and this time through you, Mr. President—to all Member States, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and all men and women of good will to use their good offices to achieve the release of James Mange from the South African gallows and of his other colleagues from unconscionable brutality.

267. Some three years ago the five Western members of the Security Council, relying on their influence and friendship with South Africa, undertook an initiative to work out a face-saving formula that would permit the racist régime of South Africa to renounce its illegal occupation of Namibia in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976). In the ensuing developments, considerable pressure was brought to bear on SWAPO and independent African States, particularly the front-line States, to co-operate with the five Western countries, so that Namibia might move peacefully into independence. A United Nations presence, in the form of UNTAG, was to be established in the Territory. There was to be a cease-fire. Free and fair elections conducted by the United Nations were to be held, and by December 1978 a free Namibia would take its place among our ranks in the OAU and in the United Nations.

268. The high hopes which the above scenario

²² Document A/32/144, annexes I and II.

generated rested first on our confidence in the integrity and good faith of the five Western States; and, secondly, we could hardly believe that a country like South Africa, so dependent on the five Western States for its very survival, and a clay colossus in the calculation of world power, would dare to defy the five States and reject Security Council resolution 435 (1978). But what has happened? Last December, the racist régime of South Africa organized illegal elections in the Territory, in open defiance of the Security Council, after arrogantly ignoring the solemn warning of the five Western States.

269. Subsequent events lead us to presume that the illegal elections were an integral part of the fraudulent design on the part of South Africa to install and consolidate an internal settlement that would leave Namibia firmly in the control of the discredited Democratic Turnhalle Group, thereby keeping SWAPO out of power. For how else can one rationally explain Pretoria's decision to convert a so-called Constituent Assembly emanating from those overtly staged elections into a National Assembly? What is the logic behind the decision to confer legislative powers on that unrepresentative Assembly, from which SWAPO, which represents the main currents of Namibia's political and social life, has been excluded?

270. The answers to those questions are simple. First, South Africa wants its own puppet government in Namibia in order to ensure its continued exploitation of the enormous mineral resources of that country and the perpetuation of its *apartheid* doctrine in Namibia. Thus South Africa would confront the United Nations with a fait accompli. Since it does not wish to leave the Territory free and independent, the longer it holds out against the United Nations the better the chances of survival for its quislings. Secondly, South Africa sees itself as a colonial Power and does not recognize the authority of the United Nations over Namibia, despite the unconditional termination of its Mandate in 1966. South Africa does not want a United Nations presence in the Territory. Such an attitude is quite consistent with its policy of arrogant defiance of the United Nations.

271. Consequently there has been no forward movement on the Namibian issue since the last meeting of the resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly. The Pretoria régime pretends to keep the matter alive by stalling, by maladroitly seeking clarifications on issues that are patently clear. A little over two weeks ago simultaneous high-level consultations took place, at the instance of the Secretary-General, at Geneva to consider the latest United Nations plan for the establishment of a demilitarized zone along Namibia's border with Angola and Zambia. The idea was to meet South Africa's objections to the Security Council's settlement proposals. The consultations, which were attended by representatives of six African States, the five Western States, SWAPO and South Africa, were once again inconclusive. All the front-line countries and SWAPO accepted the concept of the demilitarized zone. The African States even expressed their acceptance of the general outline of the working paper in respect of the practical and security arrangements for the zone. But, as before, South Africa remained the villain of the piece.

272. Yesterday, on the very eve of this debate, the

South African Government sent in a reply to express its conditional acceptance of the idea of the demilitarized zone. A passage of the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs' letter dated 5 December 1979 reads as follows:

"... the South African Government accepts the concept of the zone, provided agreement is reached in further discussions, *inter alia*, on the following:

"1. The number of South African bases remaining in the DMZ;

"2. Acceptable arrangements regarding the disarmament of SWAPO personnel on the closure of bases, i.e., 7 days after certification of the election;

"3. The deployment of an acceptable percentage of UNTAG inside the DMZ in the light of practical requirements;

"4. Agreement on practical arrangements between the UNTAG military commander and the South African military authorities;

"5. Confirmation that the settlement proposal (S/12636) accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1978 remains unchanged;

"6. Confirmation that the claim for SWAPO bases inside South West Africa/Namibia, which is in any case not provided for in the settlement proposal, will not be revived."²³

273. It must be recalled that the supplementary report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia,²⁴ dated 20 November 1979, was submitted to the Security Council after days of anxious anticipation of South Africa's response to the consultations held at Geneva between 12 and 16 November 1979. Paragraphs 10 and 12 of that report are significant both for their implications and for what they reveal of South Africa's dilatory tactics. Paragraph 10 states:

"At the conclusion of the consultations, the Front-Line States accepted the concept of the demilitarized zone and the broad outline of the working paper. SWAPO also accepted the concept of the demilitarized zone. It was indicated that, provided that South Africa also accepted the concept, detailed technical discussions could follow."

274. Paragraph 12 says:

"I shall not fail to inform the Council immediately of the reaction of the South African Government concerning the acceptance of the concept of the demilitarized zone."

275. The Security Council has been holding informal consultations on the Secretary-General's report, with a view to deciding when to convene in response to the urgent request of the African group of States, the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, held at

²³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1979*, document S/13680, annex.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, document S/13634.

Monrovia last July [see A/34/552, annex I, CM/Res.720 (XXXIII)] and the Final Declaration of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana last September [see A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 61-73], so as to deal under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter with South Africa's obstinate and illegal occupation of Namibia. Aware of this and threatened by the statement of the President of the Security Council last week²⁵ demanding an urgent answer, South Africa has resorted to further sleight-of-hand, equally clumsy and mischievous.

276. Is it the intention of South Africa to divert the Security Council from assuming its responsibility to honour its own resolutions 385 (1976), 431 (1978), 432 (1978), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978)? Is this another sordid manoeuvre to prevent the General Assembly's addressing itself to the dangerous situation which obtains in Namibia, pursuant to its own resolutions 2145 (XXI), 2248 (S-V) and 33/206 of its resumed thirty-third session? Or is it another attempt to delay the attainment of independence by Namibia by undermining the efforts to achieve a just and lasting solution to the Namibian problem?

277. There are still other questions in my mind concerning the South African Government's letter of yesterday. Even if one were to grant it the benefit of the doubt, one would still wish to ascertain more clearly what special viewpoint South Africa has regarding Namibia. How does South Africa see its present role and presence in Namibia? Is it that of a colonial Power or Administering Authority with trusteeship responsibilities—or that of a usurper in illegal occupation of the Territory? Does South Africa recognize the fact that its Mandate over the Territory was terminated in 1966? Did the five Western Powers remind South Africa of its bandit status in the Territory? Did they tell South Africa that by refusing to accept their role as mediators, in open defiance of the United Nations, South Africa and its friends were, in the eyes of the world, undermining the institutions of the United Nations beyond repair and contributing to the current wave and spate of lawlessness and flagrant disregard of international obligations that bedevil our times?

278. Even if these questions can be answered to our satisfaction, one might still wish to ask who is to conduct the further discussions with South Africa? Is it still the five Western Powers, or the Secretary-General, or the United Nations Council for Namibia? Will there be a predetermined time-table for these talks? For how long will the discussions be prolonged? Will there be a deadline? When will they commence? Will they be restricted purely and solely to technical details? What are the probable results, given South Africa's gratuitously self-appointed role of guardian angel or Father Christmas to the people of Namibia?

279. The answers to these questions can only be contemplated with scepticism, if not cynicism. The South African letter may be further evidence of South Africa's delaying tactics, calculated to freeze the implementation of the United Nations settlement plan and to forestall decisive action by the Security Council against South Africa's obscene policy of continued intransigence. It could be further evidence of South Africa's present policy, aimed at destabilizing the front-line

²⁵ *Ibid.*, document S/13657.

States, particularly Angola and Zambia, in pursuit of its plan of establishing a so-called constellation of States in southern Africa.

280. As Mr. Peter Mueshinge, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of SWAPO, told the General Assembly this morning [91st meeting], new Draconian laws are being introduced under the cover of so-called emergency powers which enable the illegal Administrator-General of the Territory to detain SWAPO leaders at will. So widespread have been these provocative arrests of SWAPO supporters that SWAPO, which has been recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people by the United Nations, the OAU, the non-aligned States and the overwhelming majority of the world community, is being compelled to narrow its options to armed struggle. The last straw was the perfidy shown by South Africa and her Western allies in purportedly raising certain bogus international loans in the Swiss money market. According to the Reuters report yesterday:

“South West Africa (Namibia) has taken out its first international loan, it was announced by the Capetown-based company, Lawfin Limited, which said the 15.2 million Swiss Franc (\$9.5 million) loan was negotiated by Lawfin in association with Creafin (South Africa) of Zurich, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rothschild's Bank. The loan, signed recently in Johannesburg by South West Africa/Namibia Administrator-General Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, was guaranteed by South Africa, the spokesman said.”

281. Nigeria supported the initiative of the five Western Powers out of the pragmatic necessity to bring to an end the agony of the Namibian people, after half a century of racist repression and exploitation. At that time, my Government relied on the good faith of the five Western Powers. The minimum that my delegation therefore expects from them is an assurance that they will not only condemn unequivocally the current charade in which South Africa is indulging, but also pledge their support for all the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter, including mandatory political and economic sanctions against the Pretoria régime, should South Africa persist in its acts of defiance and intransigence over Namibia.

282. The recent loan to which I have just referred and which the South African authorities raised in Zurich, Switzerland, underlines the urgent necessity of implementing Decree No. 1 in respect of the permanent sovereignty of the Namibian people over their natural resources. The loan is, for all intents and purposes, illegal, null and void. It must be repudiated by this Assembly.

283. I should like to end my statement, first, by paying a very high tribute to the courage and untiring efforts of the United Nations Council for Namibia under the able leadership of our brother Ambassador Paul Lusaka of Zambia, whose country continues to bear more than its fair share of the burden of Africa's liberation; and, secondly, by quoting from a declaration made by a Namibian patriot who, in 1968, was savagely sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for challenging the illegal occupation of his country:

“We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now recognize your right to govern us, to make

laws for us in which we had no say, to treat our country as if it were your property and us as if you were our masters. We have always regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country."

That patriot's words show that the tragic story of Namibia remains to be finished. It will be finished by the people of Namibia in triumph and dignity. Either the United Nations will help them to finish that story soon after this International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia in order to maintain peace and security in southern Africa, or South Africa will be compelled to withdraw from Namibia in disgrace and with irreparable damage to the credibility of the United Nations.

284. Mr. SHAIKHO (Bahrain) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Since its existence, the United Nations has attached great importance to the question of Namibia in all its thorny aspects. The Government of South Africa has refused to place that Territory which was under its Mandate, under United Nations trusteeship. The Pretoria Government has also refused to recognize the United Nations jurisdiction, which succeeded that of the League of Nations. Moreover, it has practiced the odious policy of *apartheid* and creates bantustans in the Territory, contrary to the terms of the Mandate.

285. In 1960 the Governments of Ethiopia and Liberia brought a case before the International Court of Justice concerning Namibia's future, but the Court's decision in 1966,²⁶ which stipulated that Ethiopia and Liberia had no legal competence to submit that question to the Court, destroyed the great hopes that had been placed in the justice of international law.

286. And so, the General Assembly almost unanimously adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), which put an end to South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa and placed it under the direct responsibility of the United Nations.

287. Here we must stop a moment to mention an extremely important and vital issue. The principle of self-determination, though not codified in any international convention, is a noble one which has become part of respected international custom and is accepted as law. This is confirmed by the frequency of recourse to Article 38, paragraph 1 *b* of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. There are even international jurists who feel that the principle of self-determination is not only part of international tradition but is one of the binding international laws—*jus cogens*—because it is a clear, logical and humane rule. That is why the 1966 International Court of Justice's decision came as a shock to the international community and gave rise to indignation.

288. Then events developed throughout the world and the Security Council, in its resolution 284 (1970), requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI). On that occasion, the International Court of Justice handed down a clear decision—its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971.²⁷ It decided, first of all, that

²⁶ *South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1966*, p. 6.

²⁷ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal; secondly, that the States Members of the United Nations were in duty bound to reaffirm the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia; and, thirdly, that it was the duty of all States, whether or not Members of the United Nations, to co-operate in the attainment of the objectives of the United Nations regarding Namibia.

289. As we discuss the question of Namibia, the international community must also discuss the tragedy of the Namibian people, and not limit itself to the mention of the legal, economic and political aspects, forgetting that that people suffer daily from all sorts of torture and injustice. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Namibian people saw waves of settlers arrive, settlers of various nationalities and languages, yet who were similar in many ways. Those who committed the Kassinga massacre in 1978 were basically similar to those who committed the Hereros massacre in 1904 when 90 per cent of the Hereros people was massacred. They numbered 80,000 at the time.

290. The invading settlers have continued to massacre the Namibian people and to plunder their land and natural resources. The land belonging to whites, which amounted of 11.5 million hectares at the beginning of the Mandate, rose to 16.3 million hectares towards the end of 1922; in 1946 that figure reached 27.4 million hectares. Today the Pretoria Government is trying to relocate the Namibian people on parts of the land that are not habitable owing to drought. That inhuman policy will lead to something similar to the bantustans, the surface of which constitutes 39 per cent of the Namibian territory; the settlers are thus keeping 61 per cent of the Namibian territory which represents the most fertile parts of the land. This policy of bantustans, called national homelands, will make the parcelling of land easier and restrict the Namibian people to poor regions, compelling them to depend for their survival on the white racists. It will thus provide cheap manpower.

291. Is it not time for the entire international community to take action to help the Namibians who are suffering from injustice at the hands of the whites? Is it not time for action to be taken on behalf of civilization and the free world? Where is today that free world which advocates human rights, when people are suffering from the tyranny of racist régimes in all its forms? Freedom and the respect for human rights—are these to be enjoyed by only one people? Are we to disregard the rights of others?

292. The international community had almost reached the point of applying the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter against South Africa, through Security Council resolutions 428 (1978) and 439 (1978). But the Security Council has not yet applied Chapter VII of the Charter and it is clear that the negligence of the international community has only encouraged the Pretoria Government in its defiance of and disregard for the appeals of the entire world. The non-application of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter will make it easy for South Africa to acquire nuclear capability, which would represent a danger for southern Africa and a threat to international peace and security. It is to be feared that the Pretoria Government has already detonated a nuclear device on 22 September last.

293. The international community is in duty bound

today, even more than in the past, to apply the provisions contained in Chapter VII of the Charter against South Africa in order to curb its tyranny and its constant acts of aggression, not only against the people of Namibia, but also against the peoples in neighbouring States. It is also time to compel the Pretoria Government to comply with the just and humane resolutions adopted by the international community.

294. The supplementary report of the Secretary-General²⁸ indicates the latest developments concerning the talks that were recently conducted at Geneva, under United Nations auspices, from 12 to 16 November 1979. Delegations from African front-line countries, SWAPO, Nigeria and delegations from South Africa and from certain Western States took part in those talks. In this context, I should like to express our views on two important points contained in this report. First of all, paragraph 9 shows that the representatives of the Secretary-General in those talks actually met with representatives of Namibian organizations apart from SWAPO. My delegation wonders whether this is consistent with the decision of the General Assembly as expressed in its resolution 31/146. That resolution stipulated that SWAPO was the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. In our view, paragraph 9 should be defined more accurately, so that we can understand its full implications.

295. The second point which my delegation would like to mention is that SWAPO, the United Nations and the front-line countries have shown flexibility and made concessions. Similar concessions have not been made by the Pretoria Government, which continues to defy the entire international community, thus obliging us to stress that Chapter VII of the Charter must be invoked against that inhuman, racist régime. Here we cannot fail to reiterate our support for the just struggle of the Namibian people against the racist régime of South Africa, under the leadership of SWAPO, the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

296. In conclusion, I should like to pay a tribute to the work done by the Council for Namibia. Since its establishment in 1967, it has worked constantly for the success of this just cause.

297. History does not judge us according to the colour of our skin, whether white, black, yellow or red. History judges us by our acts. The tyranny and injustice of racists no matter how strong, will disappear and, regardless of the length of the tunnel, the light at the end of it will be seen.

298. Mr. VLASCEANU (Romania): The settlement of the tragic situation in Namibia is one of the most urgent problems which has faced the United Nations, and the international community as a whole, for some time.

299. Having become the direct responsibility of this Organization in 1966 and being in a way unique, the situation in Namibia has been over the years the subject of extensive deliberations within the General Assembly's main bodies, as well as in special sessions. On these occasions, the adequate political and legal framework required by a just settlement of the Namibian

question has been set up in accordance with the aspirations of the Namibian people and the obligations assumed towards that Territory by the United Nations.

300. The United Nations Council for Namibia, as the body of the General Assembly entrusted with the administration of the Namibian Territory until independence, has maintained a sustained level of activity deserving of high appreciation from this forum in discharging its mandate and creating the necessary conditions for the granting of independence to the Namibian people.

301. The struggle of the Namibian people to achieve its fundamental rights to a free, independent and united State widely enjoys the sympathy, solidarity and support of the international community today. There is a wide consensus in support of the efforts aimed at doing away with the illegal occupation régime imposed by South Africa in Namibia and for the restoration of international justice. On the other hand, the world community is highly concerned at the insolent attempts of the Pretoria authorities to perpetuate in this part of the African continent the most reactionary occupation régimes and colonial domination based on racial segregation and *apartheid*. Therefore, compelling reasons and a strong basis already exist for vigorous action to be taken by the United Nations in order to eliminate the serious threat posed by the maintenance of these racist and colonialist régimes and by the aggressive policy of the racists in southern Africa to peace and security on the African continent and all over the world.

302. In view of that political situation, the United Nations has continually increased and diversified its moral, political and material support for the struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of its national liberation movement, SWAPO. The mobilization of the international community in support of the Namibian people's struggle; the political and diplomatic efforts aimed at ensuring the implementation of Security Council resolutions on Namibia, especially resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978); the multifaceted assistance given to the Permanent Observer of SWAPO to the United Nations; the working out and implementation of the Nationhood Programme for Namibia; the training of Namibian personnel within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Namibia at Lusaka; the other assistance programmes implemented through the United Nations Fund for Namibia: these are a few important tokens of the support given by our Organization in discharging its responsibilities towards Namibia. The annual report submitted to the General Assembly [A/34/24] by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Ambassador Paul Lusaka, the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations, the annual report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [A/34/23/Rev.1, chap. IX] regarding Namibia and the report of the Secretary-General concerning action taken for the implementation of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions are significant in that they show the determination and consistency of the efforts made by the international community to further the cause of an independent Namibia.

303. Meanwhile, on the spot, the national liberation struggle in Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO, as

²⁸ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1979, document S/13634.

well as the struggle in southern Africa as a whole, is gaining ever-stronger impetus, bringing nearer and nearer the inevitable collapse of the last colonial remnants and the triumph of the peoples' aspirations to freedom and independence.

304. Such developments are so many favourable reasons for taking more resolute action and hastening the attainment of independence by Namibia.

305. We believe that the attainment of that goal imperatively requires the concentration of all the progressive, democratic and anti-imperialist forces on both the national and the international level so as to put an end once and for all to colonial and neo-colonial domination, to the policies and practices of racist discrimination and *apartheid* in Namibia and southern Africa as a whole, and to ensure the freedom and independence of the peoples in that area.

306. To that end more effective support should be given by all Member States to the hard liberation struggle, waged at the cost of heavy sacrifice, by the Namibian people against a repressive and inhuman régime of occupation. We believe that if that were done, a new and valuable contribution would be made to the general efforts to establish a new type of international relations, which requires first of all the elimination of practices and policies based on force, domination and interference and of every form of racial discrimination and *apartheid*, and the assurance of each people's right freely to shape its own destiny and dispose of its natural resources.

307. The militant solidarity of Romania with the Namibian people in their valiant struggle for national independence, and with the efforts of the African countries to fulfil their basic aspirations freely to decide their destiny and to be masters of their national riches and resources, so as to use them for the benefit of their own economic and social development, is well known. These constant guidelines of my country's foreign policy were strongly reaffirmed by the President of Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu, at the recent Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, when he declared:

"Romania and the Romanian Communist Party, firmly pursue a policy of active solidarity with the peoples who struggle to secure their right to a free and independent life, to eliminate any form of colonial and neo-colonial domination. To this effect, the Romanian people fully supports the national liberation movements of Namibia and Zimbabwe in their struggle for complete national independence, and manifests its constant solidarity with the South African people in their struggle against the racist and *apartheid* policy."

308. The militant solidarity and the permanent and multilateral support given by socialist Romania to the Namibian people in their just struggle and to its national liberation movement, SWAPO, were once again reaffirmed by President Ceaușescu during his meeting with the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, at the end of November last. On that occasion, the importance of the unity of all the national, patriotic and progressive Namibian forces for the building of a free and independent Namibia was stressed. Also emphasized in the talks was the importance of using all political and diplomatic means, including negotiations and armed strug-

gle, to fulfil the aspirations of the Namibian and other peoples in southern Africa for freedom, justice and progress.

309. In establishing measures to be agreed upon during the present session in order to accelerate the attainment of independence by Namibia, we should start with the main obstacle that still impedes the efforts of the United Nations to fulfil its responsibility and implement its resolutions concerning Namibia. We should act resolutely to remove such obstacles, which prevent the exercise by the Namibian people of its right to self-determination and independence. In fact, those efforts come up against the same reactionary forces interested in the continued exploitation and plundering of the national riches and resources of Namibia, and in promoting their economic, political and strategic interests in that part of the African continent, through Draconian measures of colonial oppression and domination, *apartheid* and racial segregation.

310. Although involved practically in the negotiations aimed at implementing the plan concerning the granting of independence to Namibia, in compliance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978), South Africa has, at the same time, adopted a series of measures, including military ones, meant to consolidate its régime of occupation in Namibia and to stimulate developments which, in its view, would lead to a unilateral solution of a neo-colonial type and the fictitious independence of the Territory.

311. That duplicity, evidenced in the negotiations, has been accompanied by continued measures of violence and repression against the Namibian patriots and the national liberation movement, SWAPO, recognized by the United Nations as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. Such measures have included an intensification of mass arrests among SWAPO members and actions meant to undermine the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia. South Africa is continuing its delaying tactics, in spite of recent efforts to reach an agreement on the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia. That attitude is confirmed by its ambiguous position concerning the initiative on the reactivation of negotiations on the future of Namibia and the establishment of a demilitarized zone on the Namibian frontiers, as well as by the manoeuvres of the South African administration aimed at undermining SWAPO positions on Namibian territory and internationally.

312. Such actions, denounced and rejected by SWAPO, the leader of the national liberation struggle of Namibia, and condemned by the United Nations and progressive forces in all continents, represent a flagrant attempt to prevent the fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations to freedom and national independence of the Namibian people, in disregard of the requirements of the international community and of this Organization's responsibility.

313. The acts of provocation perpetrated by the illegal South African régime in Namibia are an attempt to reverse the inexorable course of history, further aggravate tension in southern Africa and stir up dangerous hotbeds of tension and conflict on the African continent and in the world as a whole.

314. We have already stressed on previous occasions

that such a state of affairs, with deep implications in the international arena, cannot be modified by the mere reiteration by the General Assembly of its political and legal position regarding the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. We should like to reaffirm on this occasion too that vigorous steps have to be taken, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, in order to put an end to the illegal régime of occupation and to any attempts to impose upon Namibia a régime that would be contrary to the interests of the Namibian people and to the framework set up by the United Nations resolutions.

315. At this stage in this matter, in our opinion, effective co-operation is called for from all Members States in the efforts made by this Organization, and particularly from those States that have maintained relations with South Africa and therefore have a direct or indirect responsibility for maintaining the colonial and occupational rule in Namibia.

316. Likewise, we think that such a correlation of efforts should involve closer links between the measures adopted by the General Assembly and by the Security Council, so that the aspirations of the Namibian people to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia may be fulfilled without delay.

317. Romania actively supports the efforts made by the United Nations to discharge its responsibilities towards the Namibian people and the Territory of Namibia, to liquidate the last remnants of colonialism and neo-colonialism and to implement its resolutions concerning the granting of independence to the colonial countries and peoples. Within the framework of the United Nations, of the United Nations Council for Namibia and other international bodies, my country resolutely supports the just cause of the national liberation of the Namibian people and acts in favour of the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia, including the Security Council resolutions. In this respect, we praise and support the efforts made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, in order to establish the measures which would secure the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

318. We consider that the Namibian people and SWAPO are fully entitled to receive from the United Nations any assistance necessary in accordance with the stage reached in the struggle for the elimination of the occupation régime in Namibia and the creation of a national, sovereign, independent and united State of Namibia.

319. It is the firm belief of my delegation that, in order to discharge its unique responsibilities towards the Territory of Namibia and the Namibian people, the General Assembly will not conclude its present debate simply by reaffirming active solidarity with the Namibian people in their struggle, although that is indispensable. In my delegation's opinion, it is imperative to define new lines of action likely to eliminate the obstacles still hindering the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Namibia and to restore international legality, so that the Namibian people can take their destiny in their own hands and shape their independent future.

320. Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): In April 1978, at its ninth special session, the General Assembly conducted deliberations on the question of Namibia,²⁹ and the announcement of the settlement proposal by the five Western countries then serving on the Security Council raised the hope that the long-awaited independence of Namibia would at long last come true. By last December, however, when we continued our discussions at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, that hope had been shattered by South Africa's rejection of the implementation plans for the settlement proposal prepared by the Secretary-General and endorsed by Security Council resolution 435 (1978). Then, in May this year, at the resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly, we took up the question once again in the hope of finding a way out of the impasse, created this time by South Africa's rejection of the Secretary-General's report of 26 February 1979.³⁰ This report contained the Secretary-General's views on how to solve certain outstanding issues related to the settlement proposal and his implementation plans. Now, once again, we are gathered here in the General Assembly hall to discuss the same question.

321. The General Assembly adopted resolution 2145 (XXI), which terminated the Mandate South Africa exercised over what was then known as South West Africa. With that, Namibia became a direct responsibility of the United Nations. Thus, the international community as a whole has been entrusted with the task of helping the people of Namibia gain their independence. We must not under any circumstances let them down.

322. My delegation has steadfastly maintained the position that the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia should be terminated promptly and by peaceful means. Thus, we have firmly supported the initiatives of the five Western countries in preparing the settlement proposal along the lines of Security Council resolution 385 (1976), which was adopted unanimously. My delegation supported unconditionally the implementation plan and the explanatory statement of the Secretary-General, which the Security Council approved in resolution 435 (1978). We also supported the successive reports he prepared for the implementation of the settlement proposal.

323. Despite the various efforts undertaken by the international community, South Africa has continued to reject the implementation plans prepared by the Secretary-General, even though it accepted the settlement proposal of the five Western countries more than one and a half years ago.

324. Since presenting his first report to the Security Council in August of last year,³¹ the Secretary-General has been obliged to issue a series of reports in order to clarify points raised successively by South Africa. But his efforts seem to have been of no avail and South Africa still does not accept the plan. The other party involved, namely, SWAPO, however, has shown flexibility and accepted all arrangements suggested by the Secretary-General. We in the international community

²⁹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 1st to 15th meetings.*

³⁰ *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1979, document S/13120.*

³¹ *Ibid., Thirty-third Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1978, document S/12827.*

have endured this long process of consultations and clarifications because we believed it would hasten the process of negotiation.

325. Last July, a way out of the impasse in the negotiating process seemed possible, and the prospects for the settlement proposal brightened considerably when the late President of the People's Republic of Angola, Mr. Antonio Agostinho Neto, suggested a plan to the Secretary-General for the establishment and monitoring by the United Nations of a demilitarized zone.

326. Mr. Neto, who met with a tragic and untimely death shortly after submitting his plan, will be long remembered for this and other valuable contributions he made to the pursuit of peace and understanding among peoples and among nations. The people and the Government of Japan offer their sincere condolences to the people and the Government of Angola on the passing of a great and deeply admired statesman.

327. Mr. Neto's proposal was carefully examined and incorporated in the working paper drawn up by the Secretary-General and the five Western countries and circulated to the Government of South Africa, SWAPO and the front-line States. On the basis of this plan, the Secretary-General invited all parties concerned to hold consultations to devise a means of setting up a demilitarized zone. My delegation regards those consultations, which were held at Geneva from 12 to 16 November, as a significant step forward. On 20 November, the Secretary-General issued a supplementary report concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), in which he also indicated that, at the conclusion of the consultations at Geneva, the front-line States had accepted the concept of a demilitarized zone and the broad outline of the working paper, and that SWAPO had also accepted the concept of a demilitarized zone. My delegation is once again very much encouraged by and greatly appreciative of the consistent readiness of the front-line States, as well as of SWAPO, to cooperate in good faith in these international efforts.

328. Yesterday, after a delay of several weeks, South Africa finally informed the Secretary-General of its reaction to the proposal for a demilitarized zone. My delegation welcomes South Africa's acceptance of the concept of the demilitarized zone, but regrets that its acceptance is once again conditional upon agreements to be worked out in further discussions on a number of items. My delegation sincerely hopes that these renewed consultations under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General will lead to a final agreement on the detailed arrangements for the actual deployment of UNTAG. We appeal to the Government of South Africa to cooperate in good faith with the unified efforts of the international community, bearing in mind that this is a rare opportunity to achieve Namibia's independence by peaceful means, with the recognition and blessing of the international community.

329. My Government has always held the view that the question of Namibia should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978). Japan confirms once again its readiness actively to participate in and give co-operation to United Nations efforts to assist in Namibia's peaceful transition to independence.

330. In endeavouring to attain this goal as early as possible, all of us in the international community must, first of all, give our full and steadfast support to every attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement. We must also refrain from taking any action that may hinder such efforts. Secondly, we must exert unified and continuous pressure on South Africa and keep our relations with that Government to a minimum. Thirdly, we must maintain our support of the Namibian people.

331. Japan has co-operated in these efforts by prohibiting investment in that Territory by Japanese nationals or by corporate bodies under its jurisdiction. Consequently, there is no Japanese national taking part in the management of any enterprise in Namibia, and no Japanese national or enterprise has a mining concession in Namibia. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, Japan is not importing, nor has it ever imported, uranium from Namibia.

332. In seeking to help the Namibian people prepare for independence, Japan has made voluntary contributions to the United Nations Fund for Namibia, the Trust Fund for the Institute for Namibia, and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. We shall make every possible effort to increase our contributions in the years to come.

333. It is a fact that Namibia's peaceful transition to independence has at every turn been thwarted by the Government of South Africa. Now, however, the Secretary-General's implementation plans have the support of all the parties concerned, and of the international community as a whole. How rapidly we can fulfil our responsibility now depends on South Africa's attitude. It is imperative that South Africa co-operate with the unified efforts of the world community.

334. My delegation reiterates its hope that a new round of talks among the parties concerned will result in the independence of the Namibian people, through free and fair elections held under the supervision of the United Nations. My delegation also reaffirms its readiness fully to participate in the activities of UNTAG, and looks forward to co-operating with the people of Namibia in their nation-building efforts.

335. The tasks which lie before us in assisting Namibia to achieve its independence at the earliest possible date are by no means easy ones. Nevertheless, I am confident that through our determined and concerted efforts this long-cherished goal will be attained in the very near future.

336. Mr. HAMIDULLAH KHAN (Bangladesh): It is a matter of the utmost concern to the Government of Bangladesh that progress towards a solution of the Namibian problem remains virtually at a standstill as a result of South Africa's continued defiance and intransigence.

337. Thirteen years ago this Assembly judged it necessary and right to bring Namibia under its direct responsibility. Members States of the United Nations thereby entered into a solemn commitment not only to assist the people of Namibia and defend their interests, but to secure for them enjoyment of those fundamental rights guaranteed to them under the Charter. That commitment remains alive and binding today, as it did in 1966.

338. My delegation believes that it is indispensable that in this International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia we move towards the fulfilment of our joint undertaking in more than mere words.
339. We need today not only to reaffirm our total support for the people of Namibia, but also to demonstrate more forcefully than ever our unswerving resolve to reach a solution which would put an end to the suffering and bloodshed and ensure the realization of their legitimate aspirations; a solution which, in short, would ensure the removal of South Africa's illegal presence from Namibia and enable the people of that Territory to exercise freely their inalienable right to self-determination, freedom and national independence, through democratic elections under United Nations supervision and control, in a Namibia that would be a fully integrated political entity.
340. The evolution of the United Nations plan for a negotiated and peaceful settlement in Namibia, through the adoption of Security Council resolutions 366 (1974), 385 (1976) and 431 (1978) and the follow-up implementation programme of the Secretary-General for transition to independence, is a unique record of the persistence and patience of the international community in the face of the determined opposition, prevarication and undisguised duplicity of South Africa.
341. That it was possible to reach a stage at which a solution appeared to be in sight was due to several parallel forces. I refer to the tenacity, courage and fortitude of Namibian patriots, led by SWAPO, that was to fuel their unrelenting liberation struggle and to compel Pretoria towards acceptance of Security Council resolution 385 (1976); the unremitting support and statesmanship of the front-line States; the valuable role of five Western members of the Security Council, which was responsible for narrowing apparently insurmountable differences of opinion between SWAPO and South Africa on the implementation of the main substance of the plan; the flexible and constructive approach by members of the Security Council and the consistent co-operation of all members of the international community; and, finally, the willingness of the Secretary-General and of his Special Representative to assume new responsibilities and carry out even more arduous tasks.
342. The fact that today efforts at an early solution have reached a critical impasse serves to highlight more profoundly than ever the unprecedented concessions made by SWAPO, on the one hand, and the studied deviousness and defiance of South Africa's racist régime, on the other.
343. Forward movement in the evolution of the United Nations plan itself was predicated on the temporary retraction of one of its most fundamental decisions, namely, the revocation of South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. SWAPO was thereby forced into accepting the proposal that primary responsibility for maintaining law and order during the period of transition continued to be vested in South Africa's police forces while over-all authority in Namibia would continue to be exercised by an Administrator-General appointed by South Africa. The fate of Walvis Bay was conveniently left in abeyance. South Africa sought to subvert further the provisions of the United Nations plan and tailor it to suit its own long-term prerogatives.
- Unilateral registration of voters, pursued through intimidation and corruption, led inevitably to the holding of so-called internal elections and subsequently to the emergence of a sham National Assembly.
344. Meanwhile SWAPO, under pressure for compromise, has accepted virtually all aspects of the implementation plan while South Africa continues to raise questions and objections which are clearly obstructionist. Thus it has raised objections to the timing of elections, to modalities regarding cease-fire, to the size, composition and very role of UNTAG and of the Special Representative. Even the latest initiative of the Secretary-General regarding the establishment of a demilitarized zone on each side of the Namibia-Angola and Namibia-Zambia frontiers, aimed at overcoming one of South Africa's major objections regarding the presence of SWAPO armed forces, has met with typical South African recalcitrance.
345. Thus, while the prognosis for an early solution, even up to March this year, seemed positive, the reality was soon to dawn that South Africa's objectives were quite different, indeed radically so. Having failed in its attempts at outright annexation, South Africa's clear intent appears to be to circumvent this failure by gaining directly or indirectly complete control of the Territory through the imposition of a puppet régime. The prime objective, however, by whatever means possible, including disruption of the territorial unity of Namibia, remains that of excluding and negating SWAPO's role in the future of Namibia. This has gone to the extent of armed incursions across international frontiers to weaken and destabilize the Governments of front-line States so as to dampen their unrelenting support of the liberation struggle.
346. In the meantime, violence and repression continue to prevail in the Territory. The heartless brutality of *apartheid* has seen no abatement. Harassment, intimidation and subjugation continue to escalate through arbitrary mass arrests, torture, detention and imprisonment of SWAPO officials and supporters. The logical extension of this policy has been a systematic fragmentation of the Territory along ethnic and racial lines exemplified by the bantustanization policy. Many Namibians have been divided, herded and corralled into virtual concentration camps. Others have been dispossessed of their agricultural lands, livestock and holdings and reduced to penury in barren outposts. Still others, who have been uprooted and dispersed as exiles, have been pursued, harried and even slaughtered in neighbouring countries through genocidal ground attacks and aerial bombardment.
347. There can be no doubt that the policies of the South African Government in Namibia, and indeed in southern Africa as a whole, constitute a serious threat to peace and security, with far-reaching implications for international peace and security. Against this background, reports of the detonation of a nuclear device by South Africa indicate dangerous potentialities with incalculable consequences.
348. South Africa seems to believe that its policy of international confrontation can continue with impunity as long as support from its Western allies is forthcoming. The logic of the situation leaves us with little choice. South Africa must be condemned for its intransigence in frustrating all efforts towards a peaceful and

internationally negotiated settlement. This Assembly must reject out of hand all attempts on the part of South Africa to impose a unilateral and *de facto* solution in Namibia. It is clear to the Bangladesh delegation that the impact of moral pressure and political persuasion has not been enough. Should South Africa continue to respond negatively to the international demand for a negotiated settlement as proposed by the five Western countries and endorsed by the Security Council, such defiance must be recognized as constituting a threat to international peace and security, and must result in the adoption of mandatory measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The United Nations, or at least the Western supporters of South Africa, have a special responsibility for Namibia which leaves no other alternative but to implement a policy of concerted action against South Africa until its racist régime ends its illegal occupation of Namibia and permits its transition to independence through free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control.

349. Meanwhile the international community must continue to extend all political and material support to the people of Namibia in their struggle against the illegal occupation of the Territory by South Africa. It must pursue the wide range of initiatives devised by the Council for Namibia and supplemented by the Special Committee on decolonization, including the programme of activities launched in this International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia. The United Nations cannot abdicate its responsibilities. It cannot betray its trust to the people of Namibia without seriously jeopardizing its own authority and credibility.

350. For its part, Bangladesh reaffirms its total moral, political and material commitment to SWAPO in its just struggle for the total and effective liberation of Namibia. In the ultimate analysis, it is the Namibian people under their leadership who will decide on the course to be pursued, be it peaceful or violent.

351. Mr. NUSEIBEH (Jordan): The question of Namibia, which has been as long on the agenda of the General Assembly as the question of Palestine, that is, since 1946, is a classic example of lawlessness, defiance and intransigence which the United Nations finds itself unable to overcome or resolve, notwithstanding the General Assembly's latest resolution, 33/182 B of 21 December 1978, entitled "Refusal of South Africa to comply with United Nations resolutions on Namibia". Instead of respecting the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 439 (1978), the racist régime of South Africa has behaved as though the United Nations and international law do not exist or, if they do, are irrelevant since they constitute an obstacle to its capricious aim of unbridled exploitation of the Territory, its resources and its people.

352. Even though Namibia is a sacred trust of the United Nations, discharged by the Council for Namibia, whose efforts we very highly commend, the racist régime of South Africa unilaterally and unlawfully held sham elections from 4 to 8 December 1978, in blatant defiance of the Security Council. Needless to say, those elections and all the consequences which may flow therefrom are null and void. They were intended merely to impede the attainment of genuine independence for Namibia under its sole legitimate representative, SWAPO.

353. That defiance highlights one of the most fundamental issues with which the United Nations must come to grips, sooner rather than later, even if that should require amendment of the Charter to make the United Nations an effective instrument of implementation rather than, as some consolingly or complacently suggest, a necessary forum for letting off steam on boiling-hot issues.

354. The facts of the situation are incontrovertible. Namibia and its oppressed people are the sacred trust of the United Nations, which inherited from the defunct League of Nations the Mandate granted to South Africa in 1920.

355. The General Assembly has consistently refused South Africa's capricious and ruthless designs against South West Africa. In 1966, despairing of the success of persuasion after 20 years and fortified by the ruling of the International Court of Justice, the Assembly revoked South Africa's Mandate, and that revocation was subsequently endorsed by both the International Court of Justice and the Security Council itself. The fifth special session of the Assembly, held in 1967, set up the United Nations Council for South West Africa [*resolution 2248(S-V)*]—renamed Namibia—to establish United Nations authority there.

356. Instead of enumerating the long list of resolutions demanding the withdrawal from Namibia of South African troops, which have been launching raids against contiguous sovereign African States, suffice it to recall Security Council resolution 385 (1976), which embodied all relevant United Nations resolutions and condemned South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its brutal repression of its struggling people, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia by resorting to the cosmetic and illusory policy of establishing bantustan homelands, and other activities with which members are all too familiar. However, has that resolution or have the numerous previous ones brought Namibia any nearer to freedom? Have they made South Africa budge from its course, which sets it at loggerheads with the whole world? They have not.

357. This simply symbolizes the erosion of faith in the law-enforcement organs of the United Nations fulfilling the obligations solemnly undertaken under the Charter. When I refer to the United Nations as an Organization, I am mindful, and all of us are deeply appreciative, of the assistance which many Member States have been channelling to the struggling and oppressed people of Namibia. Nor is my delegation unmindful of the regular monitoring, the studies, the reports and the dissemination of information which the United Nations as an institution has been painstakingly undertaking. I am referring to the ultimate political will, which only the highest organs of the United Nations can effectively exercise, to bring a recalcitrant State such as South Africa—and, it goes without saying, Israel too—to respond to United Nations injunctions and resolutions.

358. As the 1977-1978 edition of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, entitled "Issues before the 32nd General Assembly of the United Nations", objectively and aptly described it:

"The stakes in Namibia are high. It is a Territory rich in minerals: copper, lead, zinc, uranium and

most of all diamonds, over a million carats a year. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. and the American-controlled Tsumeb Corporation together account for 90 per cent of mineral production. Most of the profits are normally exported in the form of shareholders' dividends and taxes to South Africa, and the Africans are demanding retention of that income, or at least a sizable portion of it, for distribution within Namibia to increase living standards for the black majority."

359. Is that too much to ask on the basis of equity and justice? And is it not anathema that the inhabitants of Namibia should remain in bondage in the barter of human freedom for the human greed of the few? And if there must be a barter in legitimate trading, why not make the deal with the rightful inhabitants and a lawful Government of Namibia rather than with an illegal occupation régime, which openly practises *apartheid* and has extended its doctrine to encompass Namibia as well? After all, it should be presumed that an independent Namibia will continue to require technical know-how, capital outlays and world-wide marketing facilities for those precious minerals.

360. Having exhausted all possible means of persuasion, including stern and unequivocal Security Council resolutions, we in the United Nations have only two options open to us. The first and more merciful is a Security Council decision to start implementing the punitive measures outlined and spelled out in graded form in Chapter VII of the Charter with a view to preventing or suppressing threats to international peace and security. The second is for the Security Council to fail to adopt effective measures, which would be not only a herald of further erosion of United Nations authority, but an inescapable green light to the aggrieved parties to intensify their armed struggle against South Africa and thereby spark off a racial war of indefinite duration and unforeseeable magnitude.

361. What our brethren on the African continent need and deserve is a helping hand to build themselves up through education, to erase or mitigate poverty and to fill the gap which has been the legacy left to them by the exploitation and neglect of the centuries of "the white man's burden".

362. Must they and the usurpers undergo the ordeal of a blood-bath before the world, as represented here, realizes this inevitable fact and does something to prevent it from happening, for the good of all people regardless of colour or race? The tragedy is that irrationality is as much a component of human nature as rationality, and it is our sacred duty to see to it that the latter prevails over the former.

363. In this context, and in the most earnest hope that rationality will prevail, Jordan expresses the hope that the Security Council will at long last implement an acceptable solution, based on its own resolution 385 (1976), with a view to ensuring free elections under the auspices of the United Nations. Such free elections can only be held after the withdrawal of the armed forces of South Africa from Namibia.

364. There should be no doubt that South Africa's non-compliance with United Nations resolutions, including those of the Security Council, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. It is our duty to forestall the threatened development by forcing

South Africa to heed the rule of law as represented by the United Nations.

365. Even though the item under discussion today relates to Namibia, we cannot but be shocked by a dispatch published in *The New York Times* today, 6 December 1979, from correspondent John F. Burns, under the headline "South Africa Plans to Move Town of 50,000 Blacks". It is a neat little town of 50,000 blacks who have lived there for generations, with 11 schools, 7 churches, as many general stores, a community centre and a clinic. The Pretoria Government of the white man has ruled that the town must be struck down and its people, all blacks, removed.

366. Such savage brutality would call for the strongest condemnation by the General Assembly even if it were a one-time isolated crime. But evidently it is not, for, according to the dispatch, about 2 million blacks have already been uprooted and resettled elsewhere in the past quarter of a century under a policy that in human consequences and scale finds few echoes in Western experience.

367. According to the Government's racist régime, another million blacks could be removed before the master plan is completed. And on what grounds is the black population uprooted? Ostensibly for what are called strategic considerations, which is very reminiscent of Israel's uprooting of the Palestinian people over the past three decades on what the colonizers call security grounds.

368. The real reason in both cases is to enable the outlaw aggressors to take over the land for themselves and to assign the legitimate inhabitants to arid and barren areas, without water or the means of sustaining vegetation or grazing. Such appalling inhumanity and greed strikes a particular wound in our hearts because our people have been through this grim process of uprooting and we know exactly what it means.

369. It is the fervent hope of my delegation that our President will issue a statement on behalf of the General Assembly deploring the impending measures in South Africa and requesting that they be rescinded forthwith.

370. Mr. HING UN (Democratic Kampuchea) (*interpretation from French*): The delegation of Democratic Kampuchea, in participating in this debate of the Assembly devoted to Namibia, wishes once again to reiterate to the valiant people of Namibia and their national liberation movement, SWAPO, its unswerving solidarity in their sacred struggle freely to control their destiny and to attain independence. At the same time, we wish to express our deep appreciation of and admiration for the determination they have demonstrated in this lengthy, difficult struggle in which they have made many sacrifices not only for their own noble cause, but also for the cause of world peace and justice and the dignity of mankind and all of Africa. In the historic combat it is waging together with the other peoples of southern Africa against the common enemy, the minority régimes of the Pretoria and Salisbury racists, the Namibian people knows it can rely upon the solidarity of all peoples that cherish peace, justice and independence. It knows that its valiant fight in the face of the massacres and the Fascist acts of repression of the colonialist régime of Pretoria is followed and supported by the work done by the United Nations Council for

Namibia, whose mission it is to guarantee, in keeping with the mandate conferred upon it by the General Assembly, that the interests of the Namibian people will be represented at the international level. That Council acts "as a policy-making organ of the United Nations and as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until independence". [A/34/24.]

371. In this connexion, my delegation is gratified by the success achieved in 1979 in the organization of the International Year of Solidarity with the People of Namibia, proclaimed by the General Assembly in its resolution 33/182 C, and we should like to convey our heartfelt congratulations to the United Nations Council for Namibia and its President, Mr. Paul Lusaka, on the tireless efforts they have made to successfully discharge their task in spite of the difficulties they have faced. We feel it is our duty firmly to support all action and initiatives taken by the Council in the framework of its mandate. In particular, we feel there is an urgent need to implement resolution 33/206, in which the General Assembly called upon the Security Council to convene urgently to take enforcement measures against South Africa, as provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Any delay in implementing that resolution, and above all any delay on the part of the Security Council in following up on that resolution of the General Assembly can only unduly prolong the untold hardships and suffering of a people that has the same right as all other peoples throughout the world to recover its independence and freedom, the territorial integrity of its country and its national unity. We believe that any prevarication would only encourage Pretoria in its heinous manoeuvres to maintain its domination, its exploitation and its barbarous repression in Namibia. Those manoeuvres are, first of all, aimed at breaking the unity of Namibia, at installing a puppet government, under the cover of sham elections, at committing acts of aggression against front-line countries, including Zambia, Botswana and Angola. Any prevarication would also run counter to the cause of peace and international security, which is increasingly threatened by the South African régime's defiance of our Organization and the international community. The danger is more real than ever since the news that Pretoria recently detonated a nuclear device.

372. My delegation would like to reiterate Democratic Kampuchea's position on the question of Namibia.

373. First, Democratic Kampuchea invariably supports the just struggle of the Namibian people, under the guidance of SWAPO, for the achievement of total independence in a united Namibia.

374. Secondly, we condemn all the odious constitutional or political manoeuvres through which the Pretoria Government endeavours to perpetuate its colonial domination and exploitation in Namibia. Likewise, we condemn the racist, Fascist and *apartheid* régime of Pretoria for its Fascist acts of repression against the Namibian people and the SWAPO leaders.

375. Thirdly, we denounce and condemn the criminal acts of aggression committed by the South African régime against the front-line States, to which we wish to reiterate our abiding esteem and solidarity.

376. Fourthly, Democratic Kampuchea believes that the Security Council should apply the provisions of

Chapter VII of the Charter against the South African Government, as that is the only means of compelling South Africa to respect the relevant resolutions of our Organization.

377. Mr. OBIANG NGOMO (Equatorial Guinea) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Once again the General Assembly of the United Nations has included in its agenda—that of its thirty-fourth session—the question of Namibia, and I am pessimistically afraid that at its thirty-fifth session the General Assembly will again be seized of this entire issue. This impairs considerably the work of the international community, which has on many occasions used its supreme Organization, the United Nations, to assume its well-known and appreciated role of arbiter, through the good offices of the Secretary-General, in order to bear witness to the truth: the existence of the Namibian people and its right, through its legitimate representative, SWAPO, to manage and decide its own historic destiny.

378. My delegation is deeply concerned at the fact that there has been no reaction from the racist minority régime of Pretoria nor the least consideration concerning: General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), which contains the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples; the decisions adopted by the General Assembly in resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V), reflecting the need for the Namibian people to be placed under the responsibility of the United Nations until it can achieve self-determination; all the other resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of Namibia; the advisory opinion of 1971 of the International Court of Justice, issued in response to the request of the Security Council in its resolution 284 (1970); the decisions of the Council of Ministers of the OAU at its thirty-first ordinary session, held at Khartoum from 7 to 18 July 1978³² and those of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU at its fifteenth regular session, also held at Khartoum from 18 to 22 July 1978;³³ the decisions of the Council of Ministers of OAU, at its thirty-third ordinary session, held at Monrovia in July last [*see A/34/552, annex I, CM/Res.720 (XXXIII)*]; and the decisions of the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Havana in September last [*see A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 61-73*].

379. There have been on many occasions forceful condemnations by the members of the international community of Namibia's continuing subjection to South African control. These have been expressed in resolutions such as 385 (1976), 431 (1978), 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) by which the Security Council condemned as forcefully as the General Assembly Pretoria's refusal to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations.

380. Pretoria turns a deaf ear to those resolutions. It challenges and defies the international community and, with the connivance of certain Member States, claims the right to create a regressive "mini-world" of repression, exploitation and inflexibility, in order to fulfil its own interest and ambitions, without considering the very serious regional, continental and international consequences that could result, and without bearing in mind that the liberation movement—SWAPO—will re-

³² See document A/33/235 and Corr. I, annex I.

³³ *Ibid.*, annex II.

lax neither its determination nor its efforts and that the world will never consent to such premeditated injustice or to an action condemned to failure. This story will tell whether time is history.

381. Violence breeds more violence. The military bases of South Africa, which are installed on the Namibian territory of Walvis Bay and gradually expanded, can only breed the violence that characterizes Pretoria in its attempt to undermine and annihilate once and for all the just cause of the liberation movement of Namibia. Thus the reprisals of Pretoria against the front-line States, and very recently against Angola—to which those States must stand up, regardless of the price they must pay for their legitimate defence, cannot in any way accelerate the adoption of a satisfactory solution apt to create an atmosphere of peace and stability in the region.

382. This morning, the Assembly heard a statement by Comrade Peter Mueshahange [91st meeting] about the terror and the atmosphere of panic to which our brothers in Namibia are subjected. Everyone in this room was moved to indignation by the reports of those acts of torture, massive massacres, detention, concentration camps, the poisoning of cattle, the burning of crops and the contamination of drinking water. None of these are methods which could help in the development of a peaceful, satisfactory solution—or even be in the interest of Pretoria, in our modern times.

383. The manoeuvres of the racist régimes result in similar methods, the aim of which is to confuse world public opinion. Pretoria, like Salisbury, has promoted the establishment of a neo-colonialist junta, with so-called “elections” à la Boer, and claims that with this step the decolonization of Namibia has reached its final stage, without the participation of the legitimate representative of the Namibian people, SWAPO. This is, just as in the case of Salisbury, one more absurdity which the world and this Assembly will have to face.

384. My country, Equatorial Guinea, received with great regret and indignation the news of the first nuclear test by South Africa, little more than two months ago. The African continent is thus becoming a theatrical stage where nuclear weapons will be the actors and South Africa the producer. Thus, Pretoria can achieve extermination. It has preferred exploitation to exploration. It has preferred force to reason, racism to equality, recalcitrance to collaboration. It has elected negation over dialogue. It has let its own interests prevail over good will and has therefore turned its back on peace. Hence for so many years, in spite of the good offices of the international community and of the Secretary-General, the situation in Namibia has remained the same, while Africa begins to suffer as a result of the detonation of nuclear weapons.

385. In this spirit, my delegation hopes that whatever resolution or decision may be adopted by this Assembly, it will be accompanied by positive, joint action that can make South Africa come to its senses. We know that this may not be possible in a day, a month or a year. Perhaps it will not even be possible—in the worst of cases—in two or three years, but we should at least make an attempt.

386. We should like to reiterate here to the Member States whose companies operate in Namibia that they should comply with General Assembly resolution 32/9 G. We should like to repeat to them that they must give priority to the human being, as the depository of eternal values, and place the human being above material goods.

387. There should be a strict and final application of an oil embargo, economic sanctions and an arms embargo. It should be possible for the entire international community to support the legitimate Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO. It should be possible for the United Nations to intensify its assistance to the United Nations Council for Namibia so that it can promote the decolonization of the Namibian people as quickly as possible. It should be possible for SWAPO to participate fully and effectively in all negotiations, votes and action aimed at strengthening the independence of Namibia.

388. It should be possible for this Assembly to condemn the elections imposed by the Pretoria régime in order to establish a neo-colonialist Boer régime which would guarantee the continued exploitation of the resources of the Namibian people. It should be possible to obtain an unconditional withdrawal of all the South African occupation forces in the Territory of Namibia and to obtain recognition of the indivisibility of Walvis Bay from the rest of Namibian territory.

389. At its thirty-fourth session the General Assembly must be aware of the responsibility that it bears to the history of mankind. It must be aware of the gravity of the problem, independently from partisan manifestations, and set aside all emotional and selfish feelings along with every other manifestation of ambition. It must affirm in the strong and decisive manner which has always characterized our Organization, the grandeur of Namibia, its existence, its identity and its legitimate right to self-determination.

390. In conclusion, my country and my Government have faith and hope that the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, at this thirty-fourth session, will find an adequate formula to guarantee the Namibian people control over their own destiny, so that they will no longer be mere spectators of history.

The meeting rose at 8.10 p.m.