

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 12 June 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)

The PRESIDENT (Peru) (translated from Spanish): I call to order the 555th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all I wish on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Adolf Ritter von Wagner, who is joining in the work of the Conference today. In so doing I take pleasure in congratulating him on his appointment, and I wish him all the best in discharging his important responsibilities. I am also pleased to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of Norway, Ambassador Oscar Vaernø, who has also just taken up his duties. As we are all aware, Norway is a non-member State, but it contributes actively to the progress of our work and we welcome him.

I would now like, in keeping with the practice of the Conference, to make an opening statement as Peru begins its term as President for the month of June.

It gives me particular pleasure to address you as we resume our work in the Conference on Disarmament and to express the great satisfaction and honour for me personally and for the delegation of Peru to take up the presidency of this distinguished forum for the current month. I should like to stress that the Government of my country attaches the highest priority to the work of this Conference, and that we shall continue unfailingly to contribute all we can to attaining the common objective of strengthening international peace and security.

During the work of this Conference on Disarmament we should not lose sight of the present international climate and the new trends in international relations that are bringing forth a new concept of international security which is setting aside the classic, traditional view of security based solely on national military and strategic factors. Security is now beginning to take on a planet-wide, global and shared significance. Security embraces an economic component and a component of food security. This new concept also includes the conservation of the environment, the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking, the protection of human rights and the development of democracy. Disarmament is indisputably, now more than ever before, an indispensable element of this global and planet-wide security which is common to all States. The development of this global, planet-wide and common security should be the new interpretation of the concept of international peace and security set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. For this reason we must strive to ensure that the reinterpretation of this basic concept is effected in the light of present-day international interdependence and allows us to transcend unilateral perceptions of security which in the past were viewed solely on the basis of each country's specific strategic interests. We must open the way to a new system founded on a global and common form of security for this small planet.

This new trend is even being reflected in the course taken by the military alliances in Europe. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been coming to recognize that they must place more emphasis on the political dimension, abandoning military interventionism and assuming greater responsibilities in the area of disarmament.

(The President)

As we heard on several occasions during our spring session, we are in the midst of a particularly interesting and positive trend in the field of disarmament, which gives us reasonable grounds for hoping that by the conclusion of this year's session of the Conference we will see substantial progress. Consequently we must note that all the subsidiary bodies set up during 1990 have now started work. The first informal plenary meetings on agenda items 2 and 3 have been held. Agreement has also been reached on the procedure to be followed with respect to items 7 and 8 of our agenda. Thus, during the first part of this year's session the Conference was able to agree on how to proceed in respect of all substantive agenda items with the exception of item 1, the importance and priority of which is widely recognized. I hope that the necessary will to compromise and spirit of co-operation which I have observed in all of you, and which now marks the international situation with respect to bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, can be expressed in concrete progress in this forum.

This year's session of the Conference on Disarmament is also particularly important as we are on the eve of the fourth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Undoubtedly there is a close link between the work of this Conference and the positive atmosphere surrounding the preparations for the NPT review conference, and in fact this has played a role in ensuring that countries with major nuclear capabilities that are not members of the NPT wish to attend the august conference as observers. This atmosphere should be encouraged and promoted by our forum. In this context I must say that we should give the highest priority to the establishment of an ad hoc committee to consider the matter of a nuclear test ban. This subject is one of the corner-stones on which the progressive advancement of the work of this Conference should be built, and there can be no justification for the fact that since 1984 we have not managed to undertake a constructive debate on this issue within a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament. In the light of the great capacity of this forum to solve organizational problems it is paradoxical that we have not been able to reach an agreement on this issue, particularly bearing in mind the general convergence of positions that has emerged with respect to the mandate of a subsidiary body. It is for this reason that I am of the view that we can delay no further in the prompt adoption of a substantive decision towards initiation of the work of an ad hoc committee on the matter of the total cessation of nuclear tests. I assure you that I will make every effort during the present month so that the consultations being carried out with such competence and diplomatic skill by Ambassador Donowaki meet with success. I invite him to redouble his efforts in view of the short time left during the current session to conduct substantive work jointly on this important agenda item. It goes without saying that I stand fully ready to co-operate with Ambassador Donowaki whenever he deems it necessary.

However, we might say that this Conference has its own "home front". We must strive to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament is much more effective, giving greater continuity to our work, dropping positions which are merely rhetorical, linking our work in a realistic way with the progress being made bilaterally, and focusing on those areas in which it is reasonable to hope that concrete results can be achieved, without this implying, of course, that we should abandon the aspirations of each of our countries on the

(The President)

question of disarmament. In short, I think that we should work hard and quickly to achieve a real improvement in the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. To this end - and I am sure that you will all agree with me - I feel we could not have adopted a better decision than that of electing Ambassador Kamal to preside over this necessary and all-out effort at renewal.

The negotiations that have made the greatest progress in this Conference are undoubtedly those concerning the chemical weapons convention. In this regard Ambassador Hyltenius, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, has shown commendable dynamism and efficiency. Under the present circumstances the speediest possible conclusion of the convention is incumbent on the entire international community. We should demonstrate that we can achieve concrete and effective results, multilaterally, that would complement the positive agreements recently reached by the countries possessing the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons. There is an urgent need to arrive at a unified and comprehensive text for a convention providing for the total and final prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as the complete destruction of existing stocks, within the transitional period laid down in the agreement. The text should meet the aspirations of all our countries and should enshrine a universal and non-discriminatory régime for the elimination of chemical weapons. With respect to the bilateral aspect of the present political situation, and without prejudice to extensive and detailed analysis of the situation, I must place on record the general welcome given to the results obtained a few days ago at the presidential summit meeting in Washington between the heads of State of the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the 35 per cent cut in the stocks of strategic weapons held by these two Powers will influence the approach this Conference must adopt to halting the nuclear arms race, and we hope that this is a step that will immediately be followed by others, as we move towards the aim of general and complete disarmament. Special mention should be made of the bilateral agreements concerning the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles. The substantial percentage to be destroyed under the agreement, and the link between the destruction of the remaining percentage and the conclusion of the convention on a chemical weapons ban which is under negotiation in this forum, should spur our countries on to exercise maximum political will in this Conference.

I cannot and must not conclude without placing on record our profound appreciation to my predecessors who have served as President of the Conference on Disarmament during the current session - Ambassadors Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, Azikiwe of Nigeria and Kamal of Pakistan. I hope that I will measure up to the outstanding contributions that these distinguished diplomats and friends have made during the course of recent past months.

Following my opening statement, I now propose that we move on to our list of speakers for today. On the list are the representatives of Sweden, Bulgaria and the United States of America. I now call on the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, whom I am very pleased to see here among us again.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Mr. President, let me first congratulate you on taking up the important task of guiding our Conference during the crucial month of June. I am confident that our work will greatly benefit from your well-known diplomatic skill. I would also like to express my thanks for the outstanding presidency of your predecessor, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan. I regret that some colleagues have left Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament - Ambassadors Azambuja of Brazil, Sharma of India and von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. My best wishes go to them in their new responsible functions, and my sincere congratulations go to Ambassador Sinegiorgis for her well-deserved promotion. I am very happy to see the appointment of another female ambassador to this Conference. I also wish to take this opportunity to welcome the new ambassadors to the Conference - Ambassador Králik of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil, Ambassador Chadha of India and Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany, and I also welcome to Geneva my friend, the distinguished representative of neighbouring Norway, Ambassador Oscar Vaernø.

Nuclear missiles are now being turned into objects of art. And American Pershing-2s and Soviet SS-20s are to be placed side by side in the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington and in the Central Military Museum in Moscow.

We are, indeed, living in historic times. Disarmament is picking up speed. Through unilateral undertakings. Through bilateral agreements. Through multilateral negotiations. There may have been more progress in disarmament in the last 30 months than in the previous 30 years. And, in a sense, more progress appears to have been recorded in the last 30 days than in the previous 30 months.

A couple of years ago, the two super-Powers agreed to eliminate their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Today they are systematically destroying them and steadily approaching the goal of the final elimination of these missiles. But not quite total elimination, however. They have agreed to salvage two pairs of such missiles for posterity. One pair in a museum in each super-Power capital for future generations to examine and to ponder over. These missiles have finally come to the right place and been put to the right use. As post-modern sculptures or museum artefacts, illustrating human madness.

Progress in disarmament was dramatic in the late 1980s. But in the 1990s we have only had to wait five months for the super-Powers to agree in principle on the most spectacular disarmament deal ever. The Washington summit 10 days ago endorsed the beginning of significant strategic nuclear disarmament. Considerable cuts in nuclear weapon arsenals by the two major Powers are welcomed by all States.

It should be recalled, moreover, that the two super-Powers had previously agreed that, ultimately, their bilateral negotiations "should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere". Nuclear test explosions are carried out for the progressive refinement of nuclear weapons. And nuclear testing continues. Modernization is the main driving force from behind these tests. But the international community can never accept that quantitative reductions may be offset by qualitative improvements.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

A comprehensive nuclear test ban would still be the single most effective measure to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt. A CTB would effectively promote quantitative reductions and would hamper qualitative improvements and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The test-ban issue is particularly topical this year in view of the fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty in August-September. Furthermore, the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty will be convened in January 1991. These developments must generate the additional political stimulus required to permit a breakthrough, at long last, on the comprehensive nuclear test-ban issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

In the partial test-ban Treaty, nearly 27 years ago, the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty undertook to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and expressed their determination to continue negotiations with this objective. In the non-proliferation Treaty, more than 20 years ago, they undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. A slow, gradual approach, which justifies continued testing, sustains the nuclear arms race. The two threshold agreements between the super-Powers are technically and militarily meaningless. Threshold arrangements can only make genuine contributions to nuclear disarmament if they are linked to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the swift phasing out of nuclear tests.

An effective nuclear test-ban treaty, with universal adherence, must be negotiated in a representative multilateral body. Complete draft treaty texts are on the table. In the Conference on Disarmament, where all five nuclear-weapon States are represented, the appropriate negotiating mechanism is already at hand. What is needed is the political decision to set it in motion.

It has to be added that there is strong international opinion against continued nuclear tests by the principal nuclear testing Powers. In the current international atmosphere, these Powers should declare a nuclear test moratorium in anticipation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Over the years, the Conference on Disarmament has made considerable progress in its work on test-ban verification. The Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts has elaborated a system for global seismic verification, which is currently being tested. Other verification techniques - such as the monitoring of airborne radioactivity and satellite-based surveillance of the infrastructure - could also be developed and could usefully be entrusted to the Group of Scientific Experts for deliberation. The global and reliable exchange of data is of crucial importance.

The verification issue can no longer be used as a pretext for not even negotiating a nuclear test ban. This is a political, not a technical matter.

There seems to be a declared willingness on all sides in the Conference to contemplate a mandate for an ad hoc committee on the nuclear test ban. With sufficient flexibility in the Conference, an ad hoc committee could be established with a reasonable mandate at the commencement of this summer

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session. This would be a constructive response to the repeated calls by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly for action by the CD. This single measure could contribute greatly to a successful fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty in just two months.

Efforts to prevent a nuclear arms race and a proliferation of nuclear weapons are as old as the technology for developing such weapons. These efforts have failed to prevent a nuclear arms race. And these efforts have not succeeded in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a handful of States. Nevertheless, 20 years ago these efforts were crowned with significant partial success when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force.

Today, more than 140 States have acceded to the Treaty. In two months' time, the fourth review conference of the non-proliferation Treaty will be meeting in Geneva. I want to take this opportunity to comment on some major aspects of the NPT and the forthcoming review conference, where many of us will be meeting again.

The Preparatory Committee has concluded its work in a constructive spirit which gives us reason to hope that the review conference itself will produce concrete and positive results. In Sweden's view, that conference stands out as a major international political event. All parties to the Treaty should do their utmost to bring the fourth review conference to a successful conclusion. It is extremely important that the NPT, the corner-stone of the international non-proliferation régime, should be further strengthened. In order to facilitate the success of the review conference in 1990 and the prolongation of the Treaty in 1995, I strongly urge the nuclear-weapon States to continue nuclear disarmament and move towards a test ban.

We have to admit that the NPT is not yet a universal treaty. Two nuclear-weapon Powers and several other States with major unsafeguarded nuclear facilities have so far chosen to remain outside it. Despite this, the NPT, with its more than 140 States parties, is one of the most important post-war treaties in the disarmament field. Sweden again urges all States which have not yet done so to accede to this treaty. International security would be greatly strengthened, and our planet would become a less dangerous place, if all States joined forces to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In this context, I should like to emphasize the following issues. States which have abstained from nuclear weapons by adhering to an international, legally binding commitment have a legitimate right to receive binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States that they will not be attacked or threatened with such weapons. Existing assurances, with their reservations and ambiguities, do not meet this need. With the fourth review conference in mind, Sweden would welcome a constructive initiative on negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States. In this context, I would also like to note the interesting proposal made by Nigeria.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

All production of new nuclear material for weapons purposes must cease. In order to make an undertaking of such cessation credible, all future production of fissionable materials must be subjected to safeguards. A pre-condition for a verifiable "cut-off" is the separation of civil and military nuclear activities in all nuclear-weapon States. Sweden therefore urges all nuclear-weapon States to take measures to this effect.

It is important to continue the work on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In view of the forthcoming review conference, the parties participating in the negotiations on such a prohibition should re-examine their positions so as to achieve a pragmatic understanding. And all other States should support continued efforts to achieve such an understanding.

In the radically improved international climate, there are new opportunities for disarmament negotiations. In part, these opportunities have already become manifest. Not least in the last few days and months. It is vitally important that the prevailing constructive atmosphere should embrace all aspects of disarmament. However, while land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles are now in the process of being scrapped; while bilateral super-Power reductions in strategic nuclear arms have been agreed in principle; while agreement has been reached between the two major military Powers on the elimination of the bulk of their chemical arsenals; and while prospects for conventional disarmament measures have greatly improved - naval nuclear disarmament has not yet begun.

Naval forces are an integral part of overall military structures, and must not be excluded from disarmament efforts. At least every fourth nuclear weapon is said to be earmarked for maritime use. Large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons are deployed on naval vessels routinely crossing the oceans, our common heritage. While it could be argued that sea-borne strategic nuclear weapons may contribute to stability, this does not apply to these tactical nuclear weapons. While sea-borne strategic nuclear weapons may be the last ones the nuclear-weapon States will forgo, tactical naval nuclear weapons should swiftly be phased out.

Widespread naval activities by nuclear weapon Powers are a source of concern for many States, since the mobility of naval forces allows for flexible and rapid deployment.

Sea-borne nuclear weapons are a global concern and should be speedily integrated into the disarmament process. A series of measures may be envisaged in this context - tactical naval nuclear disarmament, whether by unilateral, bilateral or multilateral means; the reconsideration of the principle of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on board naval vessels; confidence-building and security-building measures.

My delegation has proposed that the Conference on Disarmament should include the issue of naval nuclear armaments and disarmament in its deliberations. Sweden has further proposed that the risks pertaining to nuclear weapons at sea should be considered by the Conference on Disarmament in the context of the prevention of nuclear war.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Sweden notes with satisfaction that important deliberations on naval armaments and disarmament have taken place within the framework of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Sweden further welcomes suggestions made by other States in the UNDC deliberations in the naval field, including the possibility of using the United Nations standardized reporting system for military budgets for the sharing of information concerning naval forces.

A great number of States participated actively at the UNDC in the negotiation of a Chairman's paper on naval armaments and disarmament. This document marks clear progress towards an open and fruitful dialogue on naval issues. I recognize that not all States represented here are committed to this paper. Still, perhaps I may express the hope that it will now prove possible to continue the dialogue on naval issues with the active participation of all the major naval Powers.

Sweden has long taken an active interest in naval nuclear disarmament. Increasingly, naval issues are debated in both military and civilian circles, both outside and within various disarmament forums. On the Swedish side we have listened carefully to the pros and cons.

It is the view of my Government that all military forces should be dealt with in the appropriate forums, and that no single category of weapons, be they nuclear, chemical or conventional, can be excluded in the search for security at lower levels of armaments. Sweden would like to challenge those who may wish to pursue a selective logic, arguing in favour of disarmament and openness in certain fields, but not in others. Furthermore, time will show that it is essential to prevent the circumvention of agreements reached in other areas by means of changes in naval force structures. And maybe it is time for a little optimism in this respect. It now seems possible that sea-launched cruise missiles will be encompassed in forthcoming bilateral agreements. This may be a breakthrough.

Another area where further progress may come is the sharing of information acquired by various means, in and above international waters. Globally, it may even prove less difficult to achieve agreement on this kind of information-sharing than on information acquired through observation of national territories. Furthermore, it appears that more and more nations recognize the value of agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea. I hope that such agreements can be standardized through multilateral negotiations in the CD as soon as possible.

All possible measures should be actively pursued to increase openness and transparency concerning vessels carrying nuclear and conventional weapons. This includes the sensitive but important issue of the navigation of such vessels, which has created a great deal of mistrust. The nuclear-weapon States should abandon their outdated practice of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board any particular ship at any particular time.

If naval experts can now agree that tactical nuclear weapons on board surface ships serve no useful military purpose - if nuclear weapons have a military purpose at all - why not try to settle this issue once and for all? The most effective way of dealing with the problems of distrust related to

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nuclear weapons at sea would be to prohibit all naval tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, we have in mind all nuclear weapons on all ships and submarines, other than those classes specifically designated by agreement. Such a ban should include all sea-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The Swedish Government feels that the time has come to start seeking wider support for this and other closely related disarmament issues.

These are truly global issues. They should, therefore, be discussed in a global forum. It is our belief that discussion and analysis in the United Nations will promote progress in the area of naval disarmament. It is therefore our intention to consult with other Governments on how such a discussion can be continued in the most fruitful manner. Following such consultations, Sweden intends to raise the issues related to the problem of naval nuclear disarmament in the General Assembly this year, either through a draft resolution or in another form conducive to progress.

Sweden welcomes the important agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to halt the production of chemical weapons and to start the destruction of the bulk of their chemical weapons stocks. The logical consequence should be an undertaking to proceed with the destruction of their entire chemical weapons stocks. It is therefore with some disappointment that we have learned that the idea of keeping 2 per cent of the stocks until all chemical-weapon-capable States have joined an international chemical weapons convention has survived the summit meeting. Only on the basis of an unambiguous undertaking not to use chemical weapons and to destroy them entirely can the work on a chemical weapons convention in Geneva be crowned with success.

The United Nations General Assembly stated last autumn that the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament would be of pivotal importance in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. There are in fact several reasons for viewing the situation with some optimism. The mandate for the negotiations was improved at the beginning of this year's session. An increasing number of States are participating in the negotiations, and progress has been made in all the working groups. The two leading military Powers have contributed significantly to the work of this Conference on a multilateral chemical weapons convention by submitting several texts, most recently on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and on chemical weapons production facilities. It is crucial that they continue to contribute actively to these negotiations and that they now devote even more effort to this work.

It is also a source of satisfaction that an increasing number of States are conducting trial inspections to test the viability of the draft "rolling text" and to prepare themselves for the entry into force of the convention. In this context, I should like to mention that Sweden has just carried out a trial inspection under article IX at a military facility. The Swedish delegation will submit a report on this inspection as soon as possible.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The consultations conducted by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee have clearly borne out the importance that all delegations attach to universal adherence to the Convention. My delegation welcomes initiatives to hold regional conferences on this vital subject. The conference at Ma'in in Jordan last month made an important contribution by highlighting the particular implications of the chemical weapons convention in the Middle East.

This year, the work of the Committee has largely focused on the political issues. It is high time that agreement was reached on at least some of them. For example, it should not be too difficult to agree on article X on assistance and protection, article XI on economic and technological development, and article XIII on amendments. As regards another, more difficult issue, namely article IX, the Chairman has presented a comprehensive draft text in an attempt to make a new start on the basis of the useful work done under previous chairmen. If this draft can be accepted as a basis for negotiations, it would be a decisive step forward. Work could take place in parallel on all aspects of verification in the convention. It should then be possible to bring this work to its conclusion before the end of this year's session.

The Convention is within reach. Decisive efforts should now be made to resolve the remaining problems. No obstacles must be allowed to impede agreement on a non-discriminatory convention which will ensure the complete prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and their total elimination. Several avenues must be explored to ensure universal adherence. All States which are participating in the negotiations here in the CD should consider making a declaration of intent, individually or collectively, to become original parties to the forthcoming convention. Sweden for its part intends to become one of the original parties to the convention. In this context, I propose the convening of a well-prepared conference at ministerial level, aimed at achieving the simultaneous signing by all States.

The decision by the United States and the Soviet Union to place two of their intermediate-range nuclear missiles side by side in museums in Moscow and Washington is profoundly symbolic. As the super-Powers eventually approach the final elimination of their strategic nuclear weapons, it would be equally appropriate if they similarly reserved a couple of strategic missiles as well to be exhibited in museums. Likewise, I hope that, here in the Conference on Disarmament, we will soon be in a position to consign the last chemical weapons to a museum. A museum is where these weapons rightly belong.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for her kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the second speaker on the list, the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Kostov.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, it is a pleasure for my delegation to see you presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the very important first month of its summer session. My congratulations on this occasion are directed to you both as a representative of Peru, a country which has been for years actively committed to the cause of disarmament, and as an

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esteemed colleague whose high professional and human qualities I admire very much. I wish you a lot of success in the discharge of your duties. I would like also to express my delegation's gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan for his very active and able stewardship in the month of April.

We have all been impressed by the recent summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Though higher-level contacts between the two great Powers have recently ceased to be unusual, every new meeting of this kind is rightly regarded as a most significant event in international life. The last one is no exception, in spite of the fact that this time, the mass media did not provide, in my opinion, the same extensive coverage of the event as they did on previous occasions. I am sure that our Soviet and American colleagues will generously help us fill this information gap - something that we are also becoming used to in the Conference on Disarmament. Especially since the results of the meeting in the field of disarmament, which we wholeheartedly welcome, have a direct bearing on the CD. This is particularly true for the agreement on chemical weapons. We hope that it will help speed up the conclusion of the multilateral convention under negotiation in the Conference.

The Conference on Disarmament should cover part of the road itself. Nobody will do it for us - neither summits, nor the Vienna talks, nor the "open skies" conference. Therefore we are again and again confronted with the question of the effective functioning of the Conference. We are satisfied with the fact that this question received serious attention during the spring part of the session, and with the decision on the organizational format to handle it. Ambassador Kamal was kind enough to take upon himself a daring task. Knowing well his diplomatic skills, personal tact and devotion to our work, I am confident that the consultations on this very important topic will proceed under his guidance in a businesslike and results-oriented manner. What we are now engaging in should differ from the deliberations within the Group of Seven, which had primarily the character of an intellectual exercise.

We shall soon mark the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter. On 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, the Charter of the United Nations was signed as an expression of the determined wish "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

Despite the awful recent experience of the most devastating war he has ever known, man created the means for his own destruction, a modern Frankenstein - the Bomb. In the end we are all dependent on monsters of our own creation, to put it in Goethe's words ... The Bomb gave a new meaning to the notion of the "scourge of war". Had the founders of the United Nations known what would happen in only a few weeks' time, they would certainly have found stronger words when drafting the Charter. Like disaster, or cataclysm, or maybe Armageddon. But it is not words that matter. What matters is the ability of man to realize that in a nuclear age military power can no longer be an absolute guarantee of security. That the arms race cannot be won, but can provoke at any time the fatal spark that will ignite a global fire, this time the last one on the Earth. The national security cannot be opposed to international, common security.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

We have to learn to think in a new way, warned Einstein. But have we? "Mutual assured destruction", "balance of terror", "deterrence" ... Is this our new way of thinking? What kind of thinking is it that makes terror the main motivation of human behaviour? I hope these terms will soon go into oblivion. The process of reconsidering strategic concepts and doctrines, which I feel has already begun, must fully take into account universal human needs and values.

It is often argued that nuclear weapons have preserved peace, at least in Europe, for the last 45 years. This assertion is far from proven, as one cannot prove a negative. Nobody can know for sure what would have happened in the absence of nuclear weapons. But what we do know for sure is that the doctrine of deterrence has been closely linked to an unbridled arms race, to enormous build-up of highly sophisticated means of death and destruction. What we also know for sure is that deterrence and the arms race that has ensued have been accompanied by a continuous increase in tension, distrust and instability. And that in such an environment, it has been extremely difficult to conduct rational policies. The outcome has always been the same - further and further rounds of the arms race and more and more insecurity. A situation compared once by Olof Palme with addiction to a drug when you continually need a larger and larger dose. Nuclear armaments are our heaviest common burden and a matter of common concern. Nuclear disarmament should therefore find the priority place it deserves in multilateral negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament.

I completely agree with my former colleague Ambassador Sharma, who pointed out on 3 April that we have to "squarely address the question of the longer-term expectations of mankind on the threshold of the twenty-first century, which we ourselves have to shape into reality". What our future will be depends to a great extent on our ability to draw all necessary conclusions from past experience and to avoid past illusions and mistakes. This is exactly the reason why I expanded on the political situation in the world which, until recently, was not a source of inspiration.

The world is now in a unique situation in its post-war history. For a very short period of time it became possible to reverse the negative trends and start building international relations on a new basis. We have recently been witnessing changing attitudes to war and military power. We feel a greater awareness of the inadmissibility of war and the need to curb the arms race, the interdependence of countries and peoples. Fundamental changes are occurring in Soviet-American relations - from confrontation to dialogue and co-operation. The "image of the enemy" is fading away. The rhetoric, mutual insults and recrimination seem to be left in the archives. There is now an apparent determination on both sides to seek radical reductions in nuclear arms. A crucial point was the INF Treaty. It made a first break in the vicious circle of military actions and counter-actions and the corresponding political arguments and counter-arguments. It demonstrated that nuclear disarmament is practical and possible. Yet there is still a long way to go.

We must all work together to build a system of collective and comprehensive security. The most urgent task along this road is the removal of the threat of nuclear war - a task which can be resolved most effectively through the complete elimination of the means of nuclear warfare. We

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

therefore welcome the resolve of the super-Powers to remove a considerable portion of the nuclear weapons hanging over the world like the sword of Damocles. We have the right to ask the other nuclear-weapon States, even if their arsenals are smaller, also to commit themselves in a manner corresponding to their responsibility as possessors of such awesome weapons. We have every reason to insist on a universal and clear-cut renouncement of the nuclear option by everybody. We also have the duty to help uphold the non-proliferation régime through, inter alia, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a ban on all space weapons, negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States and other measures, the adoption of which will be our Conference's contribution to the general public demand and aspiration for lasting peace and common security.

This is my last statement in this hall as head of the Bulgarian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. In only a week I shall leave Geneva. The period of time which has passed since I took up my post has been particularly rich in political changes in the world. The years of my service here were an excellent experience and a real pleasure for me. This I owe very much to all of you, dear fellow ambassadors and colleagues. I greatly enjoyed the close contacts, both professional and personal, which I had with you. I benefited a lot from your experience, your knowledge and your wisdom. To all of you and to the members of your families I want to extend my best wishes for health, well-being and success. As I am not leaving multilateral diplomacy and disarmament, my hope is that we shall be meeting again in the years to come.

Finally, I would like to warmly thank my goods friends Ambassador Komatina, Ambassador Berasategui, all the members of their team in the secretariat, translators, interpreters, documentation, conference services and security officers - everybody who is involved in the work of this body - for all they are doing in order to make our job easier and more effective.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Thank you very much, Ambassador Kostov. I thank you for your statement and for the kind words you addressed to all of us and to the Chair. Ambassador Kostov has just pointed out that this is his last statement in our Conference. Ambassador Kostov has played an active part in our work over the past two years, contributing to the pursuit of our tasks with his recognized diplomatic skill and professional competence. He has represented his country with the effectiveness of an experienced diplomat, and in addition he served as Chairman of the Conference's Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances in 1988, an occasion, I repeat, when we were able to appreciate your qualities, Mr. Ambassador. On behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish to convey to you and your wife our best wishes for personal happiness and professional success, and for meeting us in the future.

The last speaker on the list is Mr. Breckon, the representative of the United States, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Mr. President, as we open the summer session of this year's Conference, I would like to extend to you our congratulations upon your assumption of the Conference presidency, and pledge to you my delegation's full co-operation as we proceed with our work. In a similar vein, I would like to express my appreciation to Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan for his excellent work as Conference President during the last session in April, taking note especially in the area of improved and effective functioning of the Conference. Thanks to your efforts, we are starting to move to make the improvements we all know are necessary. And lastly, may I join in the expressions of welcome to our new colleagues from Brazil, Ambassador Ricupero, from the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Wagner, and from Norway, Ambassador Vaernø. The United States delegation looks forward to working closely with you as we move forward in the CD's work. Finally, may I bid farewell on behalf of our delegation to Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, and express our appreciation for his significant contributions to the Conference and wish him all the best in his new responsibilities?

As we begin our work this summer, I would like to provide information to the Conference on a few of the achievements of the summit meeting that took place in Washington at the end of May and earlier this month, especially those which have been alluded to already by other speakers and which relate closely to the CD's areas of interest. This statement by the United States delegation is made with the agreement of the head of the Soviet delegation, Minister Sergei Batsanov.

When Ambassador Ledogar reported to you on 24 April regarding the results of the fifteenth bilateral round of United States/USSR discussions on chemical weapons, he expressed the joint hope of both countries that a new bilateral chemical weapon agreement would be signed at the summit meeting, and that it would be possible to report further progress toward a global, comprehensive chemical weapons ban. I am pleased to report that this hope has been fulfilled. On 1 June, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a bilateral agreement which calls for the destruction of the vast bulk of the United States and Soviet declared chemical weapons stockpiles, with on-site inspections to confirm that destruction has taken place. To promote the objective of a global ban, both countries have agreed they will not produce chemical weapons when the bilateral destruction agreement enters into force or thereafter, and they will encourage all chemical-weapons-capable States to follow suit.

Key provisions of the bilateral CW destruction agreement are as follows: destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to begin by the end of 1992; destruction of at least 50 per cent of declared stocks by the end of 1999; declared stocks to be reduced to 5,000 agent tons by the year 2002; both countries agree not to produce chemical weapons upon entry into force of this agreement and thereafter without waiting for the global chemical weapons ban; on-site inspections during and after the destruction process to confirm that destruction has taken place; annual exchanges of data on the stockpile levels to facilitate monitoring of the declared stockpiles; details of the inspection procedures will be worked out by 31 December 1990; both countries will co-operate in developing and using safe and environmentally sound methods of

(Mr. Breckon, United States)

destruction; the United States and USSR will take steps to encourage all chemical-weapons-capable States to become parties to the multilateral convention. Both countries took an initial step in this direction by exchanging data on declared chemical weapons stockpiles in December 1989.

The bilateral United States-Soviet agreement was designed to provide new impetus to the conclusion of a comprehensive verifiable global chemical weapons ban at the earliest possible date. Toward that end, both countries have agreed to accelerate their destruction of chemical weapons under a global chemical weapons convention so that by the eighth year after it enters into force, the United States and USSR will have reduced their declared stocks to no more than 500 agent tons. In addition, the United States and USSR will propose that a special conference be convened at the end of the eighth year of a multilateral convention to determine whether participation in the convention is sufficient to complete the elimination of chemical weapons stocks over the following two years. In this regard, you should note that we will have specific modalities to propose regarding the procedures that will apply at this eighth-year conference, to ensure that its objectives regarding participation are achieved.

The summit meeting was also the occasion for the United States and USSR to release a joint statement on non-proliferation. This statement addresses the problems of proliferation in the nuclear weapons, missile technology and chemical weapons fields, notes our agreement to work closely together and with other members of the international community to develop and put into action concrete measures against the proliferation of these types of weapons, and calls on other nations to join a renewed commitment to effective non-proliferation measures as a means of securing international peace and stability and as a step toward the effective limitation world-wide of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and missile technology. Of specific interest to this Conference, the joint statement reaffirms the commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to a global, verifiable ban as the best long-term solution to chemical weapons proliferation. In this statement, the United States and the USSR further undertake to expedite the CW negotiations with a view to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date.

In closing, may I add that the summit meeting recorded significant and concrete achievements in a number of other relevant areas as well. My statement this morning, however, is intended to address just those areas of immediate importance for the future work of the Conference. In this regard, Minister Batsanov and I will be asking you to circulate as Conference documents the texts of the bilateral CW agreement and the joint statement on non-proliferation.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States, Mr. Breckon for the statement he has just made, and I also thank him for the kind words and co-operation offered to the Chair. I shall also ensure that the secretariat circulates the documents that he mentioned.

(The President)

I have no other speakers on my list for today, and I wish to ask whether any delegation wishes to take the floor. None does, and I shall therefore move on to the organization of our work for the next few days. As you will recall, in the timetable for this week we had scheduled an informal meeting to take up the programme of work for this second part of the 1990 session. As it was not possible to organize prior consultations to begin consideration of this matter, I think it would be better to postpone that informal meeting to Thursday morning. I have asked the secretariat to circulate the document that we should all have (CD/WP.385), which contains the draft programme of work, so that the groups may take it up in their meetings tomorrow morning and the Chair can have the views of the groups at the co-ordinators' meeting and consultations to be held tomorrow afternoon. By way of a brief presentation of the paper I would say that the draft is identical to that adopted by the Conference for the second part of the 1989 session and basically the same as that adopted this year for the first part of our work. This applies to the order followed for consideration of the agenda items by the plenary, the time allotted to each one and the paragraphs that come after the programme of activities of plenary.

Members of the Conference will note that the closing date for this annual session is not indicated in the draft. This is because during the consultations that took place in April, the vast majority of delegations thought it best to conclude our work on Friday 24 August, following the precedent of 1985 and bearing in mind that during the last week there are no other meetings apart from the two plenaries, the last of these being to adopt the report. However, no agreement was reached at that stage. I think it would be useful for everyone to know the closing date as early as possible. For that reason I would suggest that the groups should take up this matter too tomorrow, so that we can take a decision when we look at the programme of work on Thursday. If a consensus is reached, and I hope that will be the case on these matters, we would resume the plenary at the end of the informal meeting on Thursday to formalize the agreement reached. If you agree, we could proceed in that way.

I have no other matters to be dealt with, and I will proceed to adjourn the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday 14 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.