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## REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(for the period 1 December 1989-31 May 1990)

### CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION .....	1	2
I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF UNFICYP .....	2 - 6	2
II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES .....	7	3
III. FUNCTIONS OF UNFICYP .....	8 - 27	4
A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the <u>status quo</u> .....	8 - 17	4
B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions .....	18 - 27	5
IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS .....	28	7
V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS .....	29 - 32	7
VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL .....	33	8
VII. OBSERVATIONS .....	34 - 38	8
<u>Annex.</u> Press <b>communiqué</b> issued by the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus on 11 April 1990 .....		10
<u>Map.</u> Deployment of UNFICYP, May 1990		

## INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 December 1989 to 31 May 1990 and brings up to date the record **of** activities **of** the United Nations Peace-keeping **Force** in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary-General's mission of good offices pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) **of** 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions concerning Cyprus. In its resolution 646 (1989) **of** 14 **December** 1989, the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with UNFICYP on the basis of **the** present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission **cf** good offices, to keep the Security Council informed **of** the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 31 May 1990.

### I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF UNFICYP

2. The function of UNFICYP was originally defined **by** the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) in the following **terms**:

"**In** the interest **of** preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent **a** recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration **of** law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the **Greek** Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, **most** recently in its resolution 646 (1989). In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, **some** of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire (see S/14275, **para.** 7, note).

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 31 May 1990:

<u>Military personnel</u>			
Austria	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	Infantry battalion, UNAB	393	
	Military police	<u>10</u>	410
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	8	
	HQ CANCON	17	
	Princess Patricia's Canadian		
	Light Infantry	526	
	Signal squadron	12	
	Military police	<u>12</u>	575

Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Infantry battalion, DANCON 52	323	
	Military police	<u>13</u>	342
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	4	
	Military police	<u>3</u>	7
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP		
	Military police	4	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Military police	<u>3</u>	6
United Kingdom of Great . Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	23	
	HQ BRITCON	6	
	Force Scout Car Squadron, C Squadron, 9/12 Lancers	109	
	2nd Field Regt., Royal Artillery	320	
	Support Regiment (engineers, signals, army aviation flight, transport, medical centre, ordnance, workshops)	275	
	Military police	<u>9</u>	<u>742</u>
			<u>2 092</u>
<u>Civilian police</u>			
Australia		21	
	Sweden	<u>18</u>	<u>39</u>
Total UNFICYP			<u>3 131</u>

4. At my request, Sweden increased its civilian police by three.

5. UNFICYP suffered two fatal casualties as a result of traffic accidents. This brings to 149 the total number of casualties since the inception of the Force in 1964.

6. Mr. Oscar Camilión continued as my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remained under the command of Major General Clive Milner.

## II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

7. UNFICYP maintained liaison and co-operation at all levels with the two sides in order to carry out its tasks effectively. The Force had freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for restricted military installations. Regarding movement in the northern part, the guidelines established in 1953 (see S/15812, para. 14) continued to be applied. As stated in my previous report

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(S/21010, para. 6), those guidelines were the subject of a review. Despite considerable effort, it has not yet been possible for UNFICYP to increase its freedom of movement in the northern part of the island. UNFICYP vehicles were occasionally delayed when crossing the United Nations buffer zone, and in a number of instances the forces on both sides challenged UNFICYP patrols that moved in parts of the buffer zone that are seldom visited. Such incidents were protested to the authorities concerned.

### III. FUNCTIONS OF UNFICYP

#### A. Maintenance of the cease-fire and the status quo

8. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land.

9. UNFICYP kept the buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of 149 observation posts, 52 of which were permanently manned. Mobile and standing patrols were also employed, especially in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices were used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

10. The UNFICYP patrol track has been gradually developed into a network, which covers the length of the buffer zone. It is essential to the ability of the Force to monitor the cease-fire lines, supervise farming in the buffer zone, re-supply observation posts and react promptly to incidents. British engineers made available to UNFICYP maintained the tracks in a workable condition.

11. During the period under review, UNFICYP initiated a mine-clearing project that will cover certain parts of the buffer zone where members of UNFICYP as well as civilians are at risk. The first step will be a detailed reconnaissance by experts that the Government of Canada has agreed to make available. The need for this work was highlighted on 3 April 1990, when an anti-tank mine exploded under a Ferret Scout Car on patrol in the buffer zone on a seldom-used road. Fortunately, the two crew members suffered only minor injuries.

12. During the period under review, the number of cease-fire violations remained at a very low level. The 1989 agreement concerning the unmanning of certain positions in Nicosia generally held, despite occasional increases in tension, UNFICYP pursued its efforts to extend the agreement to other positions in Nicosia.

13. There were 12 overflights of the United Nations buffer zone by Turkish forces aircraft and 2 by National Guard aircraft. In addition, there were two overflights from the north and six from the south by civilian aircraft. Further, there were five overflights by civilian or military aircraft of other countries.

14. At the end of February 1990, tension rose in the island, following the arrest by the Turkish Cypriot police of a young Greek Cypriot who had managed to cross the cease-fire lines undetected. The arrest was followed by a series of demonstrations, in which mostly students participated, on the Greek Cypriot side at the Ledra crossing point and in the vicinity of Paphos Gate in Nicosia. Subsequently, four more Greek Cypriots crossed the cease-fire lines and were arrested by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Until the end of March, the Ledra crossing point was from time to time closed to traffic by the demonstrators. UNFICYP was never confronted by the demonstrators and its freedom of movement was not affected by the closure of the crossing point. The five arrested men were given gaol terms by the Turkish Cypriot authorities of 15 days, 20 days, 3 months, 4 months and 6 months respectively. UNFICYP was given access to them and arranged for them to communicate with their families and receive visits from them. As at 31 May 1990, two of the five remained in detention.

15. On 29 April 1990, two Greek Cypriot men on a motorcycle crossed the cease-fire lines at Nicosia, apparently by accident, and were arrested on the Turkish Cypriot side. They were released two days later; UNFICYP assisted in their return.

16. A serious incident directly involving UNFICYP occurred in the night of 23 May at an observation post at Athna, behind the Turkish Forces forward positions near the Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia. Five men, armed with pistol and knives, overwhelmed the two United Nations soldiers manning the post, tied them up and took two rifles, ammunition, radios, telephones and personal equipment. The two soldiers suffered minor injuries. The authorities concerned are co-operating with UNFICYP in investigating the incident. The United Nations observation posts in the area were reinforced.

17. Both sides again expressed strong concern about the strength and development of the military forces on the other side. UNFICYP remained concerned about the level of forces in Cyprus and monitored them by overt means to the best of its ability.

#### **B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions**

18. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP facilitated economic and other civilian activities in the areas between and adjacent to the cease-fire lines. In particular, UNFICYP facilitated farming in the buffer zone.

19. UNFICYP used its good offices as necessary in regard to the supply of electricity and water from one part of the island to the other. Both sides co-operated in solving problems as they arose. The projects mentioned in the last report (S/21010, para. 19), the desilting of the Marathasa dam and the repair of the Lefka-Kafiaes pipeline, were completed. UNFICYP also helped arrange the replacement of old water pipes in the buffer zone.

20. UNFICYP facilitated normal contacts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots by making available the facilities of the former Ledra Palace Hotel in the buffer zone in Nicosia. Various Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot organizations and groups, including the leaders of political parties from both sides, used these facilities to meet each other. Meetings and seminars were also organized there by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

21. The United Nations civilian police (UNCIVPOL) maintained close co-operation and liaison with the Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot police on matters having intercommunal aspects. In conjunction with the UNFICYP line units they contributed to the maintenance of law and order and assisted in investigations, control of civilians in the buffer zone and the Force's humanitarian activities.

22. The 1990 anti-mosquito programme arranged by UNFICYP commenced on 12 March 1990 with full co-operation from both sides. The programme is scheduled to end on 20 December 1990.

23. UNFICYP discharged its humanitarian functions for the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island, almost all of them in the Karpass peninsula. They now number 593. UNFICYP delivered to them 403 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and the Cyprus Red Cross. It also delivered social welfare and pension benefits. UNFICYP personnel continued to interview, in private, Greek Cypriots who applied for permanent transfer to the southern part of the island, in order to verify that the transfer was voluntary. Five such transfers took place during the reporting period. UNFICYP also facilitated 606 visits by Greek Cypriots to the southern part of the island. The Greek Cypriot primary school in Riaokarpaso now has 26 pupils and the one in Ayla Trias has 10. UNFICYP again assisted in arranging visits of children attending school in the south to their families in the Karpass during holidays.

24. UNFICYP periodically visited Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island. It helped them to maintain contact with their relatives in the northern part and arranged 22 family reunions involving 101 persons. UNFICYP also distributed pensions to Turkish Cypriots in the northern part of the island who were formerly employed by the Government of Cyprus.

25. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island is now 269. UNFICYP delivered to them 238 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and assisted in arranging frequent contacts between Maronites living on different sides of the cease-fire lines.

26. UNFICYP continued to provide emergency medical services, including medical evacuation, to members of both communities. It escorted Turkish Cypriots to hospitals in the southern part of the island and regularly delivered medicines to the Turkish Cypriot community. It also delivered mail and Red Cross messages across the cease-fire lines.

27. UNFICYP co-operated with UNHCR, as co-ordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance to needy displaced persons in Cyprus, and UNDP, in particular to facilitate projects involving both communities. UNHCR supported such projects concerning sewage, medical care and rehabilitation of the handicapped. UNDP continued its activities in the framework of the Nicosia Master Plan and pursued projects with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) for the control of newborn animal diseases, with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) for the development of handicrafts and with the World Health Organisation (WHO) for the prevention and control of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS),

#### IV. COMMITTEE ON MISSING PERSONS

28. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held four sessions comprising 25 meetings, of which 16 were attended by the three members and their assistants and 9 were attended by the three members. The Committee discussed reports submitted by both sides, and investigations were carried out in the field with the participation of the Third Member and/or his assistant. On 11 April 1990, the Committee issued a communique outlining its activities and the difficulties it faced in accomplishing its task. The communique is reproduced in the annex to the present report.

#### V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

29. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for a further period of six months beyond 15 June 1990, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and assuming continuation of its existing strength and responsibilities, is estimated at \$13.8 million, as detailed below:

##### UNFICYP cost estimates by major category of expense

(In thousands of United States dollars)

##### I. Operational costs incurred by the United Nations

Movement of contingents	290
Operational expenses	1 602
Premises (maintenance, utilities, etc.)	710
Rations	683
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	2 965
Miscellaneous and contingencies	<u>250</u>
Total I	<u>6 500</u>

##### II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Government & providing contingents

Pay, allowances and transport	6 730
Contingent-owned equipment	470
Death and disability	<u>100</u>
Total II	<u>7 300</u>

Grand total (I and II) 13 800

30. The estimate does not reflect the full cost of the operation. It excludes, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by the troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and *normal* expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb,

31. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force that is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. In this regard, only \$2.4 million have been contributed by Member States, against anticipated expenditure<sup>8</sup> of some \$13.8 million for the mandate period that is about to end. As these contributions have never been sufficient to meet the cost of the Force, the reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries have been met only up to December 1980. Unless additional contributions are received, the accumulated deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be \$179.3 million for the periods from the inception of the Force to the end of the current mandate period, 15 June 1990.

32. In a joint letter dated 7 May 1990, the Governments contributing troops to the Force expressed to me again their grave concern at the growing deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account (S/21294, annex). I have also taken note of their joint letter of 14 May 1990 to the President of the Security Council, in which they expressed the view that, in the absence of adequate voluntary contributions, there could be no alternative to the provision of funding through assessed contributions by all Member States (S/21301, annex). It may be recalled that some time ago I made a similar suggestion (S/18491, para. 65).

## VI. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

33. I have informed the Security Council about developments relating to my mission of good offices, particularly in my report of 8 March 1990 (S/21183). On 12 March 1990, the Council adopted resolution 649 (1990). In that resolution, the Council requested me, among other things, to inform it in the present report of the progress made in resuming the intensive talks and in developing an agreed outline of an overall agreement in line with its resolution. Since then, I have pursued my efforts and in May, in the absence of Mr. Camilión who was away from the island for compelling personal reasons, Mr. Gustave Feissel, Director in *my offices*, spent several weeks in Cyprus to hold, on my behalf, consultations with the two sides concerning the implementation of resolution 649 (1990). Those contacts have not yet been concluded. I intend to submit to the Council a further report and related observations, as soon as this has happened.

## VII. OBSERVATIONS

34. During the last six months, UNFICYP continued to perform its important functions of supervising the cease-fire, maintaining calm and promoting peaceful civilian activity in the area between the cease-fire lines. In carrying out its tasks, the Force had the co-operation of both sides.



35. In the light of the prevailing circumstances, I have concluded that the continued presence of the Force in the island remains indispensable to achieve the objectives set by the Security Council. I therefore recommend to the Council that it extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six-month period. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this matter with the parties concerned, and I shall report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

36. In making this recommendation, I have to underline that UNFICYP is facing a chronic and ever-deepening financial crisis, which imposes an inordinately heavy burden on the countries contributing troops to the Force. I fully share their Governments' concern at this situation. An important step towards alleviating it would be for the United Nations part of the cost of the Force to be financed from assessed contributions. I hope that the Security Council will come to accept this measure.

37. I take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the Governments contributing troops and civilian police to UNFICYP for the steadfast support they have continued to give this important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations. I also wish to express my gratitude to the Governments that have contributed towards the financing of the Force,

38. In concluding, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Oscar Camillón, to the Force Commander, Major General Clive Milner, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNFICYP who have continued to discharge with efficiency and dedication the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council,

**Annex**

**Press communiqué issued by the Committee on Missing Persons  
in Cyprus on 11 April 1990**

1. In its communiqué of 25 October 1989, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus alluded to some of the difficulties it was facing. It has been brought to the attention of the Committee that there is still little public knowledge of the realities of its activities and of the nature of the difficulties it is facing. The Committee on Missing Persons is bound by rules of discretion and confidentiality. As a result, it may not have been sufficiently explicit in its public announcements. At this stage, it is felt that there is scope for more information on the nature of its work and difficulties it encounters.
2. The Committee on Missing Persons was set up in 1981, under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, after agreement between the two sides, in order to investigate the cases of missing persons, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. It comprises three members, one representative from each side and a Third Member appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The Committee underlines here that it is a purely humanitarian organ; it has no police or judicial powers. Indeed, such powers would be in total contradiction to its basic humanitarian nature, as it is concerned with obtaining information and not with attributing responsibility for the disappearances.
4. As the Committee has already said in the past, its activity is entirely based on two factors:
  - (a) The files and documents submitted to it by each side on the missing persons of that side;
  - (b) The testimony of the witnesses, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, interviewed by the investigative teams.
5. In practice, the investigative teams are organized by, and under the entire responsibility of, the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot side, as the case may be. The Third Member and/or his assistant(s) participate in the interviews, put the questions they want, as well as making any visits in the field which the investigations may require. The Third Member and his assistants have never experienced any difficulties as regards the interviews or the visits in the field, while accompanying the investigative teams on both sides. These investigative teams are responsible for locating witnesses, arranging interviews and translating statements.
6. The real, central difficulty the Committee is confronted with is that the witnesses are often reluctant, unwilling or unable to give full information in their knowledge on the disappearance of a missing person. The co-operation of the witnesses is absolutely fundamental for the Committee. The Committee, it must be added, cannot compel a witness to talk. Therefore, when witnesses are reluctant to

give complete and precise evidence, the Committee **is faced** with a serious problem, because it may not then have at its disposal all the information it **needs**. Although the members can have different views as to the quality of the information necessary to draw conclusions, there is agreement in the Committee that the fullest information must be sought.

7. One of the reasons **for** the reluctance **of** the witnesses, regrettable as this reluctance is, can be explained, in certain circumstances, where the witness is **afraid of incriminating** himself or incriminating others in disappearances.

8. The Committee **and its investigative teams** repeatedly tell all witnesses that information given to the Committee and to the teams will be kept strictly confidential **and that they, the witnesses**, will not be subject to any form of police or judicial prosecution. This policy was decided in order to reassure the **witnesses as far as** possible but, unfortunately, the outcome **so far has not** yet yielded the expected results.

9. In this connection, the Committee solemnly appeals to both sides to pursue, with renewed vigour, their assistance to the Committee so that it **can** accomplish its humanitarian mandate in the best conditions. **A significant** contribution in this respect is to encourage generally all witnesses interviewed by the Committee, in the framework of its procedures, to give the very fullest information in their knowledge.

10. In order further to allay the fears of the witnesses, the Committee, so as to give the strongest guarantees to the witnesses, is examining measures that could be taken to ensure that they would be immune from possible judicial and/or police proceedings solely in connection with the issue of missing persons and for any statement, written or oral, made for the Committee in the pursuit of activities within its mandate.

11. A further element complicates the work of the Committee: the mere **passage of** time (the **disappearance** of missing persons 15 or even 25 years **ago**). Some witnesses are now too old to remember precisely the events surrounding the disappearances; others have left the country in the mean time, or are dead.

It must be recalled in this respect that the Committee's mandate is to investigate **cases** of missing persons, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, reported missing in, as stated in the terms of reference, the intercommunal fighting as well **as** in the events of 1974 and afterwards.

It must also be added that the disappearances in 1963/64 and in 1974 occurred during troubled periods.

12. The Committee feels obliged to repeat here that, in order to fulfil its mandate, and to take decisions about the fate of a missing person, the Committee must act by consensus, that is, by unanimous agreement amongst the three members,

13. The Committee is fully aware of the anguish and anxiety of the families, both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot. It would obviously **be most** desirous of finding ways and **means** to relieve their uncertainties. This **is indeed a matter** of serious concern to the Committee.

14. It is **the** duty of the Committee to **use its** best efforts to try to compile lists of **missing** persons **of** both communities, specifying, **as** appropriate, whether they are alive **or** dead, and in **the** latter case the approximate **time** of the deaths.

The Committee will not attempt to attribute responsibility **for** the deaths of any missing persons or make findings as to the **cause of such** deaths.

The **most** conclusive proof of the death **of** a missing person would, of course, **be** identifiable **remains**, and the desire **of the families to obtain the** remains of the missing **one** **s** a humanitarian and legitimate one, notably also **for** religious reasons. The investigative teams have for that reason also inquired systematically on both sides on burial places of missing persons, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. **However**, on neither side has the Committee been successful **in** this respect. No disinterment can take place under **the** aegis of the **Committee**, **except** that, should the Committee decide it, **the matter** would be referred to the International Committee of the Red **Cross** for processing according to **its** customary procedure.

15. The Committee is **free** to access all the evidence available and is not restricted to **any one** particular type of evidence. It is also clear, however, that to **reach** conclusions **about the** fate **of** missing persons on the evidence submitted, **the Committee must** have a common appreciation of **the** value of this evidence. The Committee **has** not been able as yet to reach that stage) it is pursuing its efforts to find an indispensable common denominator.

16. The Committee is **now** considering the possibility of requesting that the two sides furnish it with basic information concerning **the** files of all missing persons. The Committee will thus have a global view of the whole problem and also hope thereby to get relevant information and additional evidence which would help **it** to conclude those cases in hand which it has been unable to finalize up to now.

17. In Conclusion, it is under these various objective difficulties that the Committee has to accomplish its humanitarian task. The Committee will do everything to pursue vigorously all the necessary investigations to obtain the fullest possible information on the basis of which to determine the fate of the missing persons, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, and communicate the results **of** its investigations to both sides, to the families concerned, as early as possible.

