

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 3 April 1990, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Shahbaz

(Pakistan)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 548th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to two distinguished visitors who will address this plenary meeting. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Kjell Magne Bondevik, represents a non-member State which, over a number of years, has played an outstanding role in the Conference by contributing in a substantial way in several key areas of our work. His Excellency the Minister is a political personality of wide experience, having been a member of Parliament since 1973 and of its Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs. In addition, he has previously served in the Cabinet.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, His Excellency Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, has been conducting the foreign relations of his country for the last six years. He is a distinguished political figure in Spain, who during an outstanding and intense public career has assumed heavy responsibilities at important stages in the Spanish political process. His presence among us reflects the continuing interest of Spain in all matters relating to peace, international security and disarmament. It is no accident that he is addressing us in this conference room, known as the Francisco de Vitoria room, and surrounded by the works of that eminent Spanish painter, José Sert.

I should also like to welcome cordially, on behalf of the Conference, His Excellency the Director-General for Nuclear Affairs and Disarmament of Argentina, Ambassador Enrique Candiotti, a distinguished career diplomat, who is following the proceedings of this plenary meeting today.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of agenda items 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, and the representatives of Czechoslovakia, India, Iraq and Poland. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, His Excellency Kjell Magne Bondevik.

Mr. BONDEVIK (Norway): Mr. President, may I be the first to congratulate Pakistan on taking up the presidency of the Conference for the month of April? Norway and Pakistan have enjoyed good relations for many years, and we wish you every success in your important endeavour. Let me also, at the outset, say how pleased I am to be here and to have this opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament for the first time. I would like to reaffirm Norway's strong support for the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its important tasks.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

1989 was a revolutionary year in our part of the world. The process of change is continuing this year as well. The challenges before us are well known. We are now facing the task of building stable new political and security architecture in Europe, not based on political, ideological and military confrontation, but on confidence, co-operation and common interests.

The CSCE process has been and continues to be a vital element in the effort to replace the old divisions in Europe by co-operative patterns and structures of State interaction in a Europe no longer divided. The CSCE spans all the major dimensions of the new political architecture, including the political, military, economic and human dimensions. It is based on a set of fundamental principles and commitments which should also serve as a guide to Europe's future. It constitutes an ongoing process which has served us well in good times and bad.

It is in the light of considerations such as these that Norway has strongly supported the idea of a CSCE summit meeting this year. The summit will provide an opportunity to take stock of the political situation in Europe and stake out the future direction of our continent as well as the role of the CSCE in that process. It could also provide political impetus to ongoing arms control processes, particularly the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament.

In the field of arms control, the prospect of drastic reductions in conventional forces in Europe is now better than ever before. An agreement on conventional forces in Europe along the lines now emerging would improve the security of Europe as a whole as well as the security of each individual country. It would largely eliminate the capability for surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations. It would also consolidate the political changes that have already been achieved and set the stage for further progress. Finally, a first CFE treaty would pave the way for negotiations on United States and Soviet ground-based shorter-range nuclear missiles. For all these reasons, Norway attaches great importance to the completion of a first CFE treaty this year.

But in the context of the broad ongoing drive to strengthen stability and security in Europe, we should not neglect the potential of the Vienna CSBM negotiations. Confidence-building is an indispensable complement to disarmament and can make a vital contribution to the consolidation of the new security structure emerging in Europe. The recent CSBM seminar in Vienna on security concepts and military doctrines represents a pioneering contribution to enhanced transparency in the military sphere. Hopefully, the "open skies" negotiations will also lead to an agreement which will add to the security of all participating States.

We must not permit ourselves to be distracted from the task of achieving early agreement on a CFE treaty. Such agreement will be an important step towards a stable and lasting security order for Europe; however, it will not solve all of the continent's security problems. For this reason Norway believes that there must be no break in the conventional arms control process following a first agreement. In a second negotiating phase we envisage

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further reductions as well as the inclusion of new equipment categories. The general objective should be to make military structures in all participating States defensive in character, through enhanced transparency and predictability and through a reconsideration of military doctrines.

I have spoken at some length about our European experience, particularly in the light of the CSCE process, and I have done so in the belief that this is also relevant to our global disarmament efforts.

This session of the Conference on Disarmament is particularly focused on the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We should now be ready to fulfil our commitment from last year's Paris Conference to intensify negotiations with a view to finalizing a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest date.

The revised and improved mandate of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons permits the Conference to include the final drafting of the convention in the work of this session. It should now be possible to solve the remaining technical and political issues, and make 1990 a decisive year for the convention.

We fully recognize, however, that important, sensitive and complex issues have yet to be solved. The system of verification of non-production is one such issue. The Conference will have to find verification measures for plants producing dual-purpose chemicals which are not part of the regular routine inspection system. The national trial inspections have provided a great deal of valuable experience and information, which has been useful both for the negotiations and for the national authorities and industries involved in this work.

I am pleased to be able to report to this forum that Norway conducted its first national trial inspection in February of this year. The facility inspected was an organic chemical production plant producing a commercial product by application of a schedule 3 chemical. The inspection showed that it was possible to verify that the schedule 3 chemical was used in legitimate production, and that the flow of the schedule 3 chemical could be easily followed as well as accounted for. A report to the Conference about this inspection and our experience with it is under preparation and will be presented to the Conference before the end of the first part of the 1990 session.

The United States and the Soviet Union have declared that they possess chemical weapons. It is of paramount importance to the negotiations that all countries possessing such weapons make similar declarations and draw up plans for their destruction. All chemical-weapon States should furnish information about the location, composition and size of their stocks. This is not only important as a confidence-building measure, but must also be considered a prerequisite for universal adherence to the convention. Likewise all countries not possessing chemical weapons should make declarations to that effect. Norway has no chemical weapons and we have firmly stated that such weapons will not be stationed on Norwegian territory.

(Mr. Bondevik, Norway)

The progress in the bilateral consultations on chemical weapons between the Soviet Union and the United States is, of course, of great significance to progress in the multilateral negotiations. These two countries have a particular responsibility to contribute to a convention that would be accepted by the entire world community.

Norway continues her research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, carried out by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. The programme is based on field experiments designed for such verification. Another research report will be submitted this summer. In this connection, I would like to express my support for those who advocate that a complete prohibition of use of chemical weapons must be given a proper place in the convention.

Let me now turn to another priority agenda item in the Conference on Disarmament, the question of a nuclear test ban. At last year's session, the Conference did not succeed in reaching agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on this issue. In our view, the draft mandate tabled by Czechoslovakia in 1988 would permit a committee to start substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues. In any case, these issues will have to be dealt with in detail before a test-ban treaty can be concluded. It is our wish that the ongoing efforts to reach agreement on a mandate will be successful.

In our view, the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban should be given the highest priority by the Conference on Disarmament once the chemical weapons convention has been concluded. This effort should go hand in hand with a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and defence structures.

Norway will continue her active participation in the Group of Scientific Experts towards the establishment of a modern global network for the exchange of seismic data. The global seismological network proposed by this Group will be an essential part of a future verification system. Rapid advances in recent years in computer and data communications technology have opened up new possibilities for improving the effectiveness of such a global network. The main phase of the large-scale experiment on the global exchange of seismic data carried out by the Group of Scientific Experts is scheduled for the autumn of this year, and we are looking forward to the results.

Norway is actively participating in this global data exchange experiment by providing data from her seismic array stations. The two regional arrays in Norway provide for excellent detection of small seismic events over a large portion of the northern hemisphere. A global network capable of providing a valuable analysis of weak seismic events is crucially important if we are to create confidence that a test ban is being complied with. This is the background for the Norwegian proposal that the global seismological network should as far as possible incorporate establishment of this type of array.

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The NORSAR organization is prepared to offer technical assistance to seismological institutions that are interested in establishing such arrays. This aspect of international research co-operation represents a serious effort on our part to contribute to the solution of the verification issues relevant to a nuclear test ban. We attach great importance to maintaining NORSAR as a research facility open to scientists from all countries.

The role of regional seismic arrays and their use in nuclear test ban verification was the subject of an international symposium organized in Oslo by NORSAR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February this year. More than 70 experts from 21 countries attended the symposium. The Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Komatina, honoured the symposium with his presence. A report is being prepared and will be presented to the Conference during the second part of this year's session.

Let me now turn to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the most far-reaching international disarmament agreement so far. Norway attaches the greatest importance to this treaty as a means of safeguarding international peace, strengthening the security of States and promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Universal adherence to this treaty would be the best guarantee for the achievement of its primary objectives: prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and pursuance of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The INF Treaty eliminating intermediate nuclear forces on land is a concrete step towards nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT commitment of the two most important nuclear Powers. We look forward to the next step in this direction, a START agreement on substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by each side.

The fourth review conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty later this year takes place at a time when tangible progress has been achieved in the disarmament process in both a bilateral and a regional context. The prospect of further progress is bright indeed. The scene should now be set for a positive outcome of the review conference, which would underline the continued viability and relevance of the Treaty.

Thus far, 141 States have acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. It is my firm conviction that if the two remaining nuclear-weapon States, as well as other States not yet parties, were to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, it would significantly strengthen the non-proliferation régime and ensure the objectives of the Treaty.

In closing, I repeat our hope that Norway, as the endorsed Western candidate for membership, may soon become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, His Excellency Francisco Fernández Ordóñez.

Mr. FERNANDEZ ORDOÑEZ (Spain) (translated from Spanish): I would like first of all to address a word of welcome to His Excellency Mr. Shahbaz, who is chairing our work this morning, and to sincerely wish the delegation of Pakistan, a friendly country, every success at this meeting. I would also like to greet all the distinguished delegates of the other countries on the occasion of this, my first statement in this Conference, and I must also say that I am very happy to be able to speak in this room overlooked by these paintings by José María Sert, which clearly illustrate the fact that peace is a collective task, a collective hope.

In this half-century we are experiencing momentous changes, perhaps more intense in nature than at any other time in recent history. The old relationships based on rivalry are being replaced by others based on co-operation. There is a new approach in East-West relations which will necessarily have an effect on North-South relations. The new climate will also have a positive effect in the field of disarmament. At this point we are in an ideal position to make a change, to exchange the traditional concept of security viewed as confrontation for another idea of security based on co-operation. In our view, this new strategy will have to be built around four interrelated aims. I am going to refer to these four aims, which we consider to be fundamental. First, the steady building-up of a climate of trust. We have often said that while mistrust persists, one country's security patterns will always be based on lack of security for others. The second point is the need to reformulate military doctrines and strategies so that the aim is not to make war but to prevent war. This will mean the elimination of strike capacity and military superiority where it exists. The third point is the establishment in various cases of a balance of forces at lower levels. These new levels must be set so as to correspond to the level of trust, the new trust, and the defensive character of military strategies, and must be accompanied by verification machinery, because without verification there is no security. And the fourth point is the need to channel the benefits of disarmament towards the development and welfare of peoples. Only in a system of co-operative security, security in co-operation, will we be able to make the triangular relationship between disarmament, development and security a reality. To sum up, I think that we are now living through a profound contradiction between political reality and military reality, and that the process of disarmament should cause military reality to march in step with political reality. This means that many objectives that were most ambitious until recently are now minimum objectives, and what we thought were final objectives are now intermediate stages. Lastly, we should not forget that the dimensions of the problem are universal, and that explains the importance of this Conference. The process of disarmament in issues of the scale of chemical weapons or non-proliferation of missiles require global solutions, world-wide solutions, and this also applies to confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament.

I would now like to say a few words about the process of conventional disarmament in Europe, which nowadays is centred on the negotiations taking place in Vienna. For Spain it is vital that these negotiations should move ahead at least at the same speed as the political changes that are occurring in the continent. We consider that it is necessary to make an enormous effort and work towards the signature of a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe before the end of 1990, and that in some areas it is necessary to

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achieve a share of political compromise. I am referring, for example, to the case of fighter aircraft, where it will be necessary to display the necessary flexibility to seek a solution acceptable to everyone. With regard to these talks I should like to add that no disarmament agreement can be viable unless it is founded and built on a broad basis of trust. Hence we attach the greatest importance to the other talks, the talks which are taking place in Vienna between the 35 countries on confidence-building measures and which offer a guarantee of steady progress in this area. Finally I would like to add that the first conventional disarmament treaty we expect to sign this year is not the final goal but a point of departure, an initial step, and that these negotiations, the new negotiations on conventional disarmament, should go beyond the idea of the two alliances and highlight limitations for each country and each region, beyond the search for balance between alliances, and will require a new mandate that must be negotiated so as to complete it before the CSCE meeting in 1992. Spain considers that these new negotiations should also focus on greater arms reductions, structural changes in armed forces so that their configuration and doctrines are defensive, and limitations of a logistic nature which will reduce the possibility of large-scale offensives and surprise attacks.

Once the treaty on conventional disarmament starts to be applied, negotiations will begin on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It is difficult to imagine that in the not too distant future Europe might still contain short-range nuclear missiles, still less nuclear artillery. It is obvious, therefore, that we are moving, as I have said, towards a new pattern of security based on co-operation where political factors - that is human dignity, individual and collective rights, social justice, the right of nations to choose their own political and economic system, and so on - will contribute to the establishment of a new security equation. What I wish to say is that in this context it seems to us that the CSCE has been a fundamental instrument and will be or should be the most appropriate forum for dialogue directed towards creating a new security structure - a pan-European security system that should be created on the basis of the CSCE structure.

While speaking of this new security structure, I would like to mention a topic of particular concern to the delegation of Spain - I am referring to the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean basin today contains one of the most substantial concentrations of arms in the world. In addition there are political problems, serious demographic problems, problems of respect for human freedoms, ecological problems, problems of differences in incomes, and there is a need to look at the possibility of establishing a framework for co-operation in the Mediterranean that would cover all the aspects of confidence, transparency, security, economic and technical co-operation and political and social freedoms. Just as we talk about the Helsinki Final Act, and it came about in a similar situation, I think that we could imagine something similar to the CSCE procedure in the Mediterranean and one day we will have a Mediterranean final act to speak about - with satisfaction, I hope.

I would like to speak of the universal dimension of arms control after having made these specific comments. First of all, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Our country acceded to the Treaty because we believe that it has a very important dimension, and we would like to reiterate our position in favour not only of maintaining the non-proliferation régime

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but also of its being strengthened. However, there is also a need for the nuclear States to live up to their commitments relating to the transfer of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which, moreover, are transfers subject to the safeguards régime of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In 1991 a conference for the amendment of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty will be held on the initiative of a group of countries which seek to convert this partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We endorse the possibility of a total ban, but we think that the best ally of the disarmament process is a gradual and realistic approach. Consequently, in order to bring about the total banning of nuclear tests, we must start by making the necessary joint efforts to reduce nuclear weapons on our planet gradually until we have eliminated them. We hope that during 1990 it will finally be possible to ratify the two treaties of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses.

There is a non-proliferation issue which gives cause for concern: the proliferation of ballistic missiles with not only a conventional or chemical capability but also a nuclear capability. Spain is a party to the missile technology control régime and we hope that all countries with a technological capability in this area - not only European countries, but those belonging to any continent - will also join. I think that today, in the light of certain news items we have been reading about in the newspapers in the last few days and of which we have direct knowledge, we have reasons to be very concerned about the possible use of this kind of missile in regional conflicts, so that it is worthwhile to reiterate with the greatest vigour the appeal for the universal adoption of measures in this area of missile proliferation.

On strategic nuclear disarmament we hope that the signing this year of the START agreement, the delinking of the negotiations on defence and space between the United States and the Soviet Union and the START negotiations, will permit very considerable progress. It is our view that in this universal dimension of disarmament of which we are speaking, in the same way that European conventional disarmament has its foundations in the confidence-building measures adopted in Stockholm, the universal disarmament process requires regional or universal confidence-building measures. And if we accept the idea that there should be regional or universal confidence-building measures, we must stress the importance of the voluntary exchange of information on military budgets which takes place annually in the framework of the United Nations, and we think and propose that it would also be useful to exchange information on armed forces structures on a world-wide and voluntary basis, so that their purely defensive character can be evaluated. The universal forum of the United Nations is a suitable one for the negotiation and implementation of these universal confidence-building measures. That is the vocation of this international organization, and we endorse its work.

I have left until the end of my address any mention of the serious problem of chemical weapons. I have pointed out in various international forums, and I wish to reaffirm here, that Spain gives absolute priority to the search for a solution that will make possible the world-wide eradication of these particularly hateful weapons. Spain does not produce such weapons,

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Spain does not possess such weapons, and we consider it a matter of the greatest urgency to conclude the multilateral convention to ban their production, development, use or storage. Spain is aware of the difficulties involved in verification, but this difficulty should not serve as an excuse to delay a universal agreement. On the contrary, it should be an incentive so that all States make the necessary efforts. This urgency is underscored by the recent use of this kind of weapon in certain conflicts, and I would like to add in talking about verification that the intrusive nature of the verification machinery that will have to be incorporated into the convention should in no way be perceived by the chemical industries or by certain countries as institutionalizing interference in matters of industrial secrecy or interference in the development of chemical industry for peaceful or beneficial purposes. It is simply a question of accepting certain measures that provide the international community as a whole with an assurance that the horrors of chemical warfare have been eradicated. In this context, my Government welcomes the progress made in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, although this agreement is not sufficient because of course it is limited exclusively to the bilateral level. Spain believes it is necessary to continue to pursue the policy of non-proliferation of chemical precursors. We favour this complementary policy of non-proliferation, which is another way of achieving the ultimate goal of eliminating this threat. Spain considers that the multilateral convention on chemical weapons is not only a desirable goal but an imperative, and consequently it welcomes the national initiatives presented in this body in the form of declarations of non-possession or non-production, reports on national trial inspections or reports on the future composition and structure of national authorities. In this context I wish to announce the intention of the Spanish Government to make similar contributions in this forum, so as to add our efforts to those already being made in this Conference.

Finally I would like to say that in the present international situation this Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has acquired fundamental importance and responsibility. We fully support - and this is the purpose of my statement this morning - the efforts of this Conference, we have been participating actively for years as observers and we hope to be able to become full members as soon as possible so that we can contribute to its work in a more effective way. In the last few years the process of expansion of the number of full members has been blocked. This has prevented the entry of countries which, like Spain, have on many occasions shown, as they continue to show day by day, their interest in contributing effectively to this process. We consider that in a world like this, which is increasingly interdependent, it would perhaps seem anachronistic to restrict efforts to deal with a problem of such enormous dimensions as that of multilateral disarmament to a limited number of countries. It might be necessary perhaps to rethink the structure and working methods of the Conference, and we could benefit from experience with the chemical weapons convention. I think the international climate would favour progress in this direction. I am convinced that such a step would give a vital boost to the disarmament negotiations and help to ensure universal endorsement of what is adopted in this Conference because, sooner or later, the restricted Conference on Disarmament will have to face the problem caused by having a limited number of members, as happens now.

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At the beginning of my statement I pointed out that the process of disarmament must make it possible to bring military reality into step with political reality, so that they both move at the same speed. The political reality, the reality that we are living through, has recently been undergoing a radical and very positive transformation. The consequence is that a different international political context is being formed before our eyes, in which disarmament will no longer be a Utopian and endless task, but a reality within our reach.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Pagac.

Mr. PAGAC (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, let me on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation congratulate you on conducting the first April plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. At the same time may I ask you to convey our best wishes to Ambassador Ahmad Kamal upon his assumption of the presidency during the third month of the 1990 CD session? You can rest assured of my delegation's full support and co-operation.

Since I am addressing the Conference for the first time, I wish to join all the distinguished representatives who have, prior to me, expressed appreciation for the outstanding manner in which Ambassadors Wagenmakers and Azikiwe guided our work in the course of February and March.

The statements we are privileged to listen to at this Conference very often reflect the sweeping changes in the world, and recently in particular in Europe, and again very specifically in its central and eastern part. This provokes vivid discussions and gives rise to new courageous ideas. We can witness the erosion of old biased dogmas and prejudices. Former security concepts and doctrines stemming from them are swiftly becoming anachronistic and are fading away. The urgent need for a common endeavour is being felt in practically all spheres of international life. Favourable tendencies enable us to formulate new initiatives with better prospects of realization, not in distant visions but rather in the foreseeable future. And - especially significant for a country like Czechoslovakia - there is a role for the so-called small and medium-sized States to play.

Profound political changes in my country, as well as new realities in the "old" continent, have produced a somewhat distinct perception of our security needs. Czechoslovakia has put forward a number of suggestions on establishing new all-European security structures conceived in the broadest possible sense, including their economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects. These new structures of co-operation and European integration should gradually replace the functions of the existing alliances. In this respect we consider that it would be desirable to establish a "European security commission", as formally proposed at the Prague meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Organization held on 17 March 1990. The commission would, in our view, facilitate the historical process towards a united confederative Europe of free nations with equal rights for each one. However, I do not intend to elaborate on the new security concepts of the Czechoslovak foreign

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policy, nor am I going into a detailed explanation of our proposals for future security arrangements. Other international forums and possibly other opportunities in the Conference on Disarmament may be more appropriate.

Turning to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to stress two areas in which my country has traditionally been involved. These priorities for us are the nuclear test ban and the chemical weapons convention. My delegation appreciates all activities which can contribute to the cessation of nuclear weapon testing. We highly esteem the tireless efforts of Ambassador Donowaki to reach consensus on a drafting mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda based upon the Czechoslovak proposal, the "Vejvoda text" (CD/863).

Luckily enough, we are now in a situation where all the technical prerequisites for a comprehensive nuclear test ban have either already been met or can be met in a relatively short span of time. Technology which can be employed for future verification measures has recently improved to such an extent as to become highly reliable. It is therefore encouraging to observe the current results of the Second Technical Test (GSETT-2) organized by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Since it is understood that for full functioning of the eventual future verification system, the participation of as many States as possible is needed, Czechoslovakia hereby expresses its readiness to take part in GSETT-2 in keeping with its technical capabilities.

As for on-site verification, we believe it may be a significant step forward. Nevertheless, that system will always be limited to known test areas; only observers from some States can be present, and perhaps for a limited period of time. On the other hand, GSETT-2 offers the prospect of a system open to every State, a system operating independently 24 hours per day and checking the entire surface of the Earth. Current advances in measuring technology and world-wide data transmission should guarantee its sound operation. In this regard, I would like to say how highly we appreciate the activities of both the Swedish and the Canadian delegations. Czechoslovakia is ready to co-operate with all States in the exchange of technology, data and experience in the course of GSETT-2.

When we resumed our negotiations on the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, we did so under the favourable impact of the Paris and Canberra conferences, and, moreover, in the light of the bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Morel the intensity of work was increased, and with the active assistance of technical and legal experts we have achieved important results in elaborating the "rolling" text. We are convinced that under the skilled guidance of Ambassador Hyltenius the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will proceed successfully to the final drafting of the convention.

Czechoslovakia has consistently adhered to the principles and purposes of the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which was signed as long ago as 1925. In this context, Czechoslovakia welcomed the

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conclusion last year of the work of the expert group of the United Nations Secretary-General that prepared technical guidelines and procedures for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons.

In reply to the request made in resolution 44/115 B, Czechoslovakia informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it is ready to provide 2 consultants, 15 qualified experts and 5 laboratories for examination and analyses in the event of an investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical or biological weapons. The experts selected are highly qualified in the fields of analytical and organic chemistry, biochemistry, biology, virology and toxicology. They are prepared to take steps to solve the problem of the use of chemical or biological weapons, including assistance. On the instructions of my Government I have asked the secretariat of the Conference to distribute the aforementioned list as a CD document (CD/980), which is now being circulated.

Czechoslovakia believes that the list of experts and laboratories may be of interest to the Conference on Disarmament, since it is ready to involve both these experts and the laboratories in implementing the future convention and in particular in the work of the organs of the future Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Moreover, presentation of these data by a number of countries may result in more contacts between scientists, which will promote an extensive exchange of views, scientific publications or scientists themselves. Consequently, more effective measures not only against chemical weapons but also against highly toxic substances in general, including protection of the environment, could be discussed.

We believe that it may be a useful contribution to our deliberations here in the Conference to release information on chemicals and facilities relevant to the future chemical weapons convention. Therefore, Czechoslovakia will continue to present data on its chemical industry as it did for the first time in document CD/949.

We also welcome new contributions in the area of challenge inspections. Czechoslovakia, like other States, has carried out a national trial inspection and intends to perform a second in the first half of this year.

Somebody said very eloquently that history has accelerated its pace. Current political observers could certainly confirm this hyperbole. But when it comes to security arrangements in this powerful, all-encompassing process, full of unpredictability, one can wonder about its effect on the disarmament talks. Have they adapted themselves to these sweeping changes? Are they responding to new challenges provoked by rapid developments in the contemporary world? In the Vienna talks, maybe. Within the framework of the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations, let us hope. But what assessment should we give to the Conference on Disarmament? There is a widespread and strong feeling that more should be done. Nowadays, the representatives of a number of countries are rightly pointing out this problem. They are questioning the effectiveness of the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This subject may not be resolved at this session. But the important thing is that the discussion has begun.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Sharma.

Mr. SHARMA (India): Mr. President, it gives us great pleasure to see Pakistan, our immediate neighbour, preside over the Conference on Disarmament for the month of April. I would like to convey my delegation's felicitations on your Presidency and to assure you of our co-operation in the fulfilment of your tasks. I would also like to take this opportunity to compliment your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria and Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for the extremely competent manner in which they guided us through the first part of our spring session.

I would like to wish every success to our colleagues who have left us since the last time I addressed the Conference and to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the United States and Venezuela. We look forward to working in close co-operation with them in the future.

We have entered the 1990s with a sense of both concern and expectation born of the many hopeful political developments that have taken place in recent years. I think we are all aware that we have reached a turning-point of major consequence. Apart from the significant relaxation in the political climate in recent years, we also have to squarely address the question of the longer-term expectations of mankind on the threshold of the twenty-first century, which we ourselves have to shape into reality. While the world is not a homogeneous whole, the recognition has to take hold more than it has that all its parts are fatefully bound together. It is our hope that the Conference on Disarmament will increasingly reflect this healthy multilateralism in its endeavours.

Today, there is a perceptible movement away from the precipice of disaster for humankind and a constructive dialogue has been started. For this, we must pay tribute to the sagacity of the American and Soviet leaderships, who have seen the folly of nuclear escalation and have started tracing the outlines of a pattern of disarmament. In our view, the INF Treaty is notable not so much for the few thousand missiles that are to be dismantled as a result of its provisions, but for the historical beginning it made, away from the old approach of seeking to manage an escalating arms race and, we hope, towards halting and reversing it. The INF Treaty was a historical departure in erasing a complete class of weapon systems for the first time. It demonstrated the principle, even if in limited form, that the road to enhanced security lies through nuclear disarmament and not through accumulation of nuclear weaponry. We look forward to the signing of the START agreement between the United States and the USSR later this year in the hope that it will pave the way for all States to join in the process of nuclear disarmament and thus enable the world to move in the not too distant future towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The process and logic of nuclear disarmament in one field should be extended energetically to other fields. For instance, the logic of the INF Treaty and the forthcoming START agreement dictates that the thousands of tactical weapons that still exist - and for that matter all nuclear weapons - must also follow the route of abolition. The positive momentum generated by international events today

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should not be allowed to dissipate, and the historic opportunity of ridding our planet of the apocalyptic menace of nuclear weapons should be seized purposefully.

The validity of nuclear weapons cannot be justified on the basis of doctrines of nuclear deterrence and the claim that nuclear weapons have maintained peace in the post-war years. Nuclear weapons cannot be given credence on the grounds that they stabilize the era of friction, which we wish to put behind us. Rather, the nuclear arms race has exacerbated the friction to a level of lethality which embraces the whole of mankind. It would indeed be an irrational world in which doomsday weapons could be seen or legitimized as a prescription. The rivalry which the nuclear arms race represented had a negative effect on all parts of the globe. Let us not see as any form of remedy a class of weapons which it is now proven would bring complete annihilation and a global radioactive winter in their wake. The world is beginning to see the imperatives of enlightened globalism in the challenge of poverty and development, degradation of the environment, economic and technological interdependence, the need to husband resources for common goals and the inter-connectedness of all the enormous tasks the world faces. It is our hope that this globality of concern will also inform the dialogue for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which should be the priority area in this multilateral negotiating forum. As we know from the prescient warning against the juggernaut of the industrial-military complex delivered four decades ago, a vast constituency composed of industry, the military, scientists, engineers and bureaucrats constitutes a critical and catalytic group of vested interests for the doctrinal underpinning and maintenance of the nuclear arms race. It produces the theorists, developers and deployers of ever more complex and destructive systems and devices. We have to believe that with sustained and enlightened political will and dialogue this ethos can be transformed. The United Nations Charter does give all Member States the right to individual and collective self-defence, but those who drafted these essential safeguards could not have imagined that they could be made to imply the right to threaten the survival of the world, which the Charter was supposed to lead into an enlightened new age.

We firmly believe that the time has come for the international community to engage in collective introspection on our present predicament. Serious consideration needs to be given to the attitudes, policies, doctrines, institutions and instruments required for a nuclear-weapon-free world, which it is in our hands to realize. In particular, the misplaced faith in the relevance of nuclear weapons for keeping peace and enhancing security needs to be speedily discarded. An air of cautious optimism and hope is all that we can allow ourselves at this stage. The recent signs of a turning-point that we have perceived are vulnerable. These cannot be nurtured in a world order based on any form of domination or divisiveness, whether political, economic or military. At SSOD-III, India proposed the outline of a nuclear-weapon-free and peaceful world order in the form of an action plan, which called upon the international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. While nuclear disarmament constitutes the central motif in each stage of the plan, it is supported by collateral and other measures to further the process in a comprehensive manner that would enhance global security. It includes proposals for banning chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction,

(Mr. Sharma, India)

bringing to a halt and reversing the arms race, using scientific and technological developments for the benefit of mankind and reducing conventional arms and armed forces to the minimum levels required for defence purposes, and sets out principles for the conduct of international relations in a world free of nuclear weapons. The action plan has been tabled in the Conference on Disarmament as CD/859 of 15 August 1988. We believe that the action plan will always be relevant in a world which seeks an alternative structure of inter-State relations.

This is the vision and backdrop against which we look at the activities of the CD, the sole forum of the United Nations for negotiation of disarmament agreements. My delegation attaches the highest priority to the first three nuclear issues on our agenda. Our record on these items has been disappointing. We still find ourselves unable to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1. For many years, the General Assembly has adopted resolutions with overwhelming support regarding the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and reaffirming the responsibility of this Conference in the negotiation of such an agreement. Partial or gradual approaches evade the issue and cannot provide the answer to this universal concern. In the Mexico Declaration, circulated as CD/723 four years ago, the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative offered to monitor a test ban in co-operation with the United States and the USSR. The twenty-ninth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has just ended. Very soon, phase 3 of GSETT-2, to develop a global system for seismic data exchange, will get under way. It is time an ad hoc committee on this item was established to provide the necessary political framework within which to consider the important results of GSETT-2. Ambassador Yamada of Japan and his successor Ambassador Donowaki have undertaken intensive consultations with all delegations to try and resolve the issue of the mandate for this committee. We are appreciative of their efforts. It is encouraging to note that there is a narrowing of differences. The flexibility shown by a majority of the members of the CD has to be matched by others if an ad hoc committee is to be established during this year. The situation is much the same on items 2 and 3 - "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" - where, once again, we have had to resort to discussing these topics, which should be of central concern to the CD, in the form of informal plenary meetings. While we welcome progress achieved in bilateral negotiations, nuclear-weapon States should, in keeping with respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear nations, accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament. Whatever the differences in the theoretical models used, there is a clear consensus among all experts that even a limited nuclear exchange would produce catastrophe for our biosphere. Conventional wars cannot under any circumstances be equated with nuclear war. It is by now a truism that if nuclear weapons are ever used, it will not matter who used them first. It is, therefore, clear that nuclear weapons cannot be used for any kind of defence. Pending the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament, the only way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear holocaust is to conclude a convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, delegitimizing nuclear weapons as the currency of power.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

The malaise of inaction arising out of unshakable positions has also prevented useful work on agenda item 5 - "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". Despite the fact that the Ad hoc Committee has once again been set up with a non-negotiating mandate, procedural issues like the programme of work have stalled our work in this very important field, where qualitative research on weapons systems has been undertaken with intensity. Over the past few years, we have debated this issue endlessly. Instead of getting into such a debate again, the Conference on Disarmament should work on specific proposals to prevent outer space from becoming the new frontier of the all too familiar terrestrial arms race. More than a dozen concrete proposals have been put forward by delegations. Priority should be accorded to halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, dismantling existing systems, prohibiting the introduction of new weapon systems in outer space and ensuring that the existing 1972 ABM Treaty is fully honoured and extended as required by new technological advances. The issues of verification are complex enough today. If anti-satellite weapons and other space weapons are deployed, this problem would threaten to become intractable.

The stagnation in the process of negotiations on the agenda items mentioned above is not due to inherent faults in the Conference on Disarmament, which is an institution of our times and subject to the policies of the Governments that make up the CD. If the CD has not lived up to the hopes that accompanied its birth, it is largely a reflection of our individual and collective failings. On the positive side of our efforts, we have the negotiations towards a chemical weapons convention. We are happy to note that the efforts of Ambassador Morel of France, as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last year, are being matched this year by his able successor, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, as we move forward towards a convention. We welcome the bilateral agreement between the United States and the USSR on the destruction of their CW stocks and CW production facilities, which has undoubtedly given impetus to our work in the CD.

Our common aim is the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are eliminated and that further development, production, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited. If we want a convention that will attract universal adherence, it should be non-discriminatory and should provide for equal rights and obligations for all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons and whether or not they have a large chemical industry. The convention should ensure the unimpeded right of States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and should not hinder or impede international co-operation in peaceful areas of chemical industry development. If the proposed convention is to build on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it should be able to abrogate the "right" to retaliatory or second use of chemical weapons as long as these weapons exist after the entry into force of the convention, i.e., during the 10-year destruction period. Otherwise, we would be left, during this period, with a fragile and inefficient system which would undermine the possibility of attracting universal adherence to the convention. The provisions of article X, on assistance, should be adequate to deter any possible aggressor against a State party to the convention. Adherence to an international agreement cannot be forced. But it can be urged by demonstrating the advantages of the system of collective security offered by disarmament.

(Mr. Sharma, India)

Similarly, article XI on economic and technological development should ensure that no arbitrary restrictions or export controls are imposed against another State party once the treaty is in place with its attendant verification system. The significance of the CW convention lies as much in the world community successfully abolishing an abhorrent class of weapons as in the successful example it would create of the universal approach which should characterize other deliberations of the Conference. We still believe, as we suggested earlier, that the Conference on Disarmament should take advantage of the political momentum by setting itself a deadline to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

The fourth NPT review conference is scheduled to be held later this year. Though India has not subscribed to the NPT on account of its discriminatory character and is not a State party to it, it is useful to recall that India, along with seven other countries, sponsored one of the first resolutions on this subject in the General Assembly in 1965. The resolution, which identified a set of principles to guide the negotiations on an eventual treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, was adopted unopposed. One of the principles was that the treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit proliferation by nuclear or non-nuclear Powers, and that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. Unfortunately, the 1968 NPT failed to reflect either of these principles, and the apprehensions of vertical and spatial proliferation have been amply borne out. Even with the reductions under negotiation in the START talks, there will exist almost double the number of nuclear warheads that existed in 1968. It is relevant to recall that the NPT was not to be an end in itself but was meant to lead to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. It is in this spirit that India's action plan called for negotiations for a new treaty that would "give legal effect to the binding commitment of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2010, and of all the non-nuclear-weapon States not to cross the nuclear weapons threshold". We hope that the States parties to the NPT will take advantage of the 1990 session to look at the genesis of this Treaty and take decisive steps towards a more broad-based régime as part of a comprehensive system of peace and security.

Finally, I would like to quote the United Nations Secretary-General's end-of-year message of 27 December 1989, which sums up the options before us:

"Despite the present uncertainties and recent violence, 1989 has been a historic and epoch-making year: this is by now universally recognized. ... There is little doubt that these developments have unfrozen the old fears and animosities which dominated the world for decades. They hold tangible promise of ending the incessant arms race. ... They have thus phenomenally advanced the interests of global peace. ... the new possibilities for international co-operation will remain but shadowy or sectional if they are not brought to bear on the old stubborn problems, unrelated to the cold war. ... The agenda for international action is not, therefore, lightened in the slightest degree. If anything, it now invites the undeflected attention which it has not received so far."

It is our hope that the CD will reflect this prescription in exercising its mandate.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq, Ambassador Al-Ketal.

Mr. AL-KETAL (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to say how pleased we are to see you, who represent Pakistan, a Muslim and friendly country, presiding over the Conference on Disarmament, because everyone is familiar with your skills.

It is a particular pleasure for us to have yet another opportunity to address this body. The presence of Iraq in the Conference on Disarmament and its participation in the Conference's work in this and the previous year clearly demonstrate the interest that the Government of Iraq has in disarmament negotiations, as well as its support for all international efforts to devise effective methods to control nuclear armament, reducing it to the minimum level needed to protect the integrity and security of States, and totally eliminating all weapons of mass destruction in order to free our world from the threat of annihilation due to the accumulation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The Government of the Republic of Iraq is simultaneously endeavouring to ensure the advent of a world in which relations based on the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law and the settlement of bilateral and regional conflicts through direct negotiations among the parties concerned will prevail. My Government has expressed its belief in these principles by giving a positive response to international peace efforts and by respecting all Security Council resolutions adopted since September 1980 in which the Security Council has called for a cease-fire between Iraq and Iran and a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Iraq was the first to accept resolution 598 and informed the Secretary-General of its acceptance only two days after the adoption of the resolution.

For disarmament negotiations to result in effective measures that can win wide support, those measures must be conducive to the national security interests of States. In that regard, Iraq has always endeavoured to achieve a just, comprehensive and durable peace with Iran, and to eliminate the reasons which have compelled the States of this region to enter into an escalating arms race, so that they can redirect their efforts towards national reconstruction.

To ensure the security of States in an adequate fashion, it is not enough to take regional measures. Weapons have developed and can now reach their targets irrespective of national and regional boundaries. Likewise, the use of nuclear weapons would have a devastating effect on other States, even those not directly involved in the conflict. Therefore it would be unwise to focus efforts on security in just one region of the world separately from the security of other regions of the world. The security concerns of the developing countries are justified in so far as they do not benefit from the same degree of attention as those of the developed countries. In order for peace to be established in the world on a clear basis, disarmament measures must be encouraged. A peace based on mutual terror rather than equality and justice cannot endure.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

The presence of nuclear weapons in the Middle Eastern region poses a serious threat to peace and security and is a source of deep concern to the countries of the region. Iraq, together with all other Arab States, has called for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region and the prohibition of the proliferation of such weapons in the countries of that region, regardless of whether those weapons belong to those countries and are under their control, or are under the control of a third State outside the region. However, Israel's persistent opposition and refusal to give up its nuclear weapons in a legally binding manner, as well as its refusal to subject its nuclear facilities to international control, as has been done by Iraq and other States of the region which are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, constitutes an obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The continuation of the present situation is not conducive to the adoption of effective disarmament measures. On the contrary, it will lead to a further escalation of the arms race in the region.

Since the Paris Conference on chemical weapons, our Conference has continued its discussions on the total prohibition of these weapons and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. During this period, several conferences and symposia have been held on this subject in various regions of the world, including the Canberra Conference held in September 1989. No observer at these conferences would have any difficulty in acknowledging the following facts which have characterized international efforts in this field. Firstly, the Paris Conference greatly furthered international efforts, and the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament in particular, to draft an international treaty totally prohibiting the production and utilization of chemical weapons. However, the slow progress of negotiations and the persistence of obstacles and numerous problems that are as yet unresolved have diminished the momentum engendered by the Paris Conference. Secondly, the Conference on Disarmament achieved limited progress in negotiations last year, given the fact that many issues and problems were raised in regard to various aspects of the draft international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Moreover, some countries participating in the negotiations attached more importance to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons than to the elimination of the weapons which they already possess. Some countries have opted for a policy of placing greater constraints on the transfer of various products and technologies to prevent their use in the production of chemical weapons. Such measures not only violate the incontrovertible right of countries to acquire the technology and materials needed for development; they also constitute a violation of the Paris Declaration on chemical weapons, a declaration which was drafted by those countries themselves. Thirdly, since the signing of the INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR, the nuclear-weapon States have adopted no practical measure for the control of nuclear weapons, or for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests - despite the appreciable improvements that have occurred in East/West relations and the fundamental changes that have taken place in recent months in Europe.

Our presence in this Conference stems from our desire to participate seriously in all international efforts in the field of disarmament in accordance with the concepts and principles that I outlined at the beginning of my statement. However, we will not agree to become a party to any effort aimed at making negotiations on chemical weapons a pretext to prevent

(Mr. Al-Ketani, Iraq)

developing countries from having access to chemical technology and products or to impede a transfer of technology in this area. Hence, we call upon the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a clearly defined position on the transfer of technology, products and information, and to refuse to allow its efforts to be exploited for the purpose of impeding development in the developing countries.

With regard to the convention on chemical weapons, I have some comments to make. The convention must be drafted in such a way as to make it universally acceptable. The crucial issues in this connection include the legitimate, actual needs of the developing countries, and primarily security guarantees against the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons. The convention will be widely supported if it contains a binding commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to take nuclear disarmament measures as a corollary to chemical disarmament measures. They should also enter into a commitment not to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, along the lines of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and toxic gases. In this connection, we would like to express our satisfaction of the fact that our efforts have taken a step forward through the agreement to hold a Conference to review the partial test-ban Treaty in order to examine proposed amendments which we hope will convert this treaty eventually into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Our support for these measures does not signify premature optimism at the possibility of such a result, because that will depend on the attitudes adopted by the nuclear-weapon States during the review conference. The attitudes that these States have hitherto manifested do not make us particularly optimistic in this regard. In these negotiations, it would be particularly inadmissible for nuclear armament to remain isolated from the focal point of interest, thereby leaving this question in suspense and unresolved.

(continued in English)

I have now come to the end of my written statement. With your permission, however, Mr. President, I would like to add a few words with regard to a matter that is very much related to the work of the CD.

I am referring to the latest campaign of falsification - smears - against my country carried out in part in the United States and in part in the United Kingdom, echoed by other circles. First, I would like to say that all these accusations have been denied as unfounded and baseless by the Iraqi Government. Second, I will not try to go into the details of these allegations: all missions will receive a circular from the Mission of Iraq containing all pertinent details of the incident. You will find that the first act in this play was staged on American television, which by showing some aerial photographs, claimed without any proof that these were Iraqi installations. The network went on to say that this installation was used for uranium, the other one for so-and-so, without producing any proof. If one had questions about the timing of the programme, unhappily the answer came quickly from Heathrow. That was the second act in the play. What is the third act? We believe that these are actions designed to prepare the way for a new aggression against my country, against our scientific industrial installations, similar to that carried out by Israel in 1981. In this

(Mr. Al-Ketani, Iraq)

connection, I would like to state the following points of principle. First, Iraq is a sovereign State and has the right and duty to acquire the means needed to defend itself and to guarantee its security in accordance with international law. Second, Iraq as a sovereign State has the inalienable right to acquire any technology it deems necessary for its industrial, scientific and social development. Peaceful nuclear energy is no exception. Third, the aim of this campaign against Iraq is to lay the ground for a new aggression against Iraqi industrial and scientific installations, and to frustrate the legitimate ambitions of the Iraqi people for social progress. Fourth, the present campaign of distortions against Iraq, a party to the NPT, will if continued call into question the usefulness of the NPT as an international treaty. It will also have consequences for the coming review conference of the Treaty. Fifth, the NPT contains means and procedures of verification. It entrusts IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the task of verification and inspection. Attempts by a State to take the law into its own hands and to assume the role of policing others' commitments under the Treaty will seriously undermine the role of IAEA and greatly damage its safeguards system. Sixth, disarmament is a matter for negotiation among States with the aim of achieving reduced levels of armaments with undiminished security. Deviations from this norm, which is universally accepted, and attempts to replace it by unilateral actions will deal a blow to disarmament negotiations. Negotiations, by their very definition, are among equals, equals that enjoy the same rights. Campaigns of distortion - smear - cannot in anyone's mind be considered as confidence-building measures.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Iraq for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate your delegation on taking up the presidency of the Conference for this month. I can assure you of my delegation's full support and co-operation in your efforts. I wish to thank your predecessors in the Chair, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria and Ambassador Wagenmakers of the Netherlands, for their able guidance in our deliberations. Let me also take this opportunity to welcome all new colleagues who have recently joined us and assure them that my delegation will actively co-operate with them. I would like to ask them to convey to their predecessors our best wishes in their new appointments and in their personal lives.

I listened with great interest to the very important and thought-provoking statements made by their Excellencies the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Norway and Spain.

I would like to limit my intervention today to the issue of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. I was prompted to do so by the inspiring statements of many speakers who have preceded me during this spring session. Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil opened the series at the very beginning of our work. I share his opinion that "the time has come for us to proceed to a thorough re-examination not only of some of our goals, but of our ways and means of approaching them".

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

This is particularly true when we look at the inefficiency and lack of progress on many items of our agenda in the light of the positive transformation in international relations. There is a clear movement towards the peaceful solution of conflicts in many regions of the world. In this very context international institutions, and especially the United Nations, are regaining their place in international relations. Negotiations in many fields are producing significant results. Deep and essential political changes are taking place in central and eastern Europe. As our Minister for Foreign Affairs stated at the "open skies" conference in Ottawa, "the Europe of two ideologies and the confrontation based on them is becoming a thing of the past, though the two multilateral alliances still exist". At the same time these two military groupings are undergoing profound internal changes. More and more, past myths and illusions are dissolving. The black-and-white image of the enemy is giving way to a many-coloured image of the partner. These political processes have a direct impact on the vigorous dynamic of the USSR-United States bilateral talks and the European disarmament negotiations, which promise an early and rich harvest. The need for effective verification and various confidence-building measures has deeply rooted itself as an essential element of disarmament agreements.

Against this background the slow progress, and to a considerable extent the stagnation, of our negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, the inability of our Conference to come to concrete results, are less and less well understood by many Governments and by public opinion. And it is quite understandable that more and more frequently we ask: What has been the role of the Conference on Disarmament in these processes? What role can it and should it play in the future? Is it not necessary to adjust it properly to a new situation? What can be done to increase the effectiveness of the work of this forum? As was observed in the statement made in this forum by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, "the 1990s will be a decade of opportunities and challenges and of hopes and dangers, all existing side by side".

We feel that proper answers to these highly pertinent questions will help us find the most efficient way to avoid the dangers and get the best out of existing and emerging opportunities, because opportunity seldom knocks twice. This does not mean that the goals and tasks of the Conference on Disarmament are easy and simple. But at the same time I suppose everyone will agree that they are much easier today than, let's say, 10 years ago. If we fail to find such answers, the prestige of the Conference could be further damaged and the Conference itself will be more and more marginalized.

Despite the limited results of the Conference's work in the last 10 years, my Government strongly believes that this forum continues to be an important and, in fact, indispensable organ of the world community. A simple test can prove it: let us imagine for a moment that there was no Conference on Disarmament. Undoubtedly, the necessity to have such a body would immediately emerge as a question of priority in international deliberations on security issues. The Conference is a vital forum, especially for small and medium-sized States, of which Poland is one, and we believe that questions in the field of disarmament should not all be left for the decision of great Powers, although we fully recognize their major and global responsibility.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The membership of the Conference, comprising all the nuclear Powers and the representatives of all regions, emphasizes the universal responsibility for disarmament. It is an essential forum in the search for any global solutions. The present trend towards the democratization of international relations, as well as new needs which seem to be emerging in disarmament efforts, will further increase the role and value of this forum and its potential contribution to international security and stability. Some of these requirements seem to be the following: substantial progress in negotiations between the USSR and the United States, and between Warsaw Treaty and NATO States, will be important, but will form just a portion of disarmament endeavours; and changes in the international system, and especially the clear trend towards a less bipolar world, will give a bigger political role to other Powers and regions and will require their greater involvement in disarmament efforts. If these assumptions are correct, then they form an additional justification for our discussion on how to make the work of the Conference more effective and better adapted to existing and future realities.

Let me present some considerations on the part of my delegation related to the organization of work and the agenda of the Conference. As far as the methods of work are concerned, our principal aim should be to make them more flexible and more responsive to real needs and opportunities. If there is a chance of progress we should be able to concentrate our efforts on this particular problem and to pursue them as long as necessary and desirable. Opportunities and the willingness to make progress should dictate the pace and the rhythm of our work, not a pattern of negotiations established in other circumstances or the time frames of routine openings and closings of sessions. In this very context the legitimate question arises of how to avoid protracted discussions on the establishment of subsidiary bodies repeated at the same time every year. One wonders whether this question could not be easily and effectively solved by drawing up a general mandate enabling each body to continue its work until its task has been accomplished.

It seems to our delegation that we should be more flexible in determining the goals of our endeavours and ways and means of achieving them which better correspond to challenges and possibilities. My delegation has already presented some ideas related to this dilemma; let me just refer to them very briefly. Undoubtedly, the elaboration of new agreements placing legal obligations upon States is and should remain the principal task of this Conference. This basis approach, in the opinion of my delegation, need not, however, prevent the Conference from undertaking other measures, particularly in circumstances where the stage of negotiations or other considerations make them advisable and the only ones feasible. In fact, different situations may require different approaches and responses. Why should we not envisage, for example, a kind of intermediate arrangement or protocol of understanding or joint recommendations or declarations on confidence-building and security-building measures? These documents, with the character of political obligations rather than fully-fledged legal instruments, could be properly recorded in our annual reports.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

We believe that this more flexible approach to the possible results of the work of the Conference can make it more productive. Different types of intermediate measures can play an independent role in building security and can at the same time gradually evolve into, or be a part of, binding international rules, thus helping the Conference in its treaty-making endeavour, which - let me stress again - should remain its main responsibility. The changing international situation, the movement towards new security perceptions and real changes in the strategic policies of States and alliances - all this seems to make the proposed approach even more feasible and desirable.

Finally, let us remember that according to the rules of procedure the agenda of our work is always established by ourselves for each year's session. We have the opportunity and, in fact, the obligation to review it and adjust it, if necessary, taking into account our experience and realities. We should approach such a re-evaluation with both caution and boldness, as well as with imagination. Very often we should ask ourselves whether it is better to continue our attempts to reach ambitious goals, with rather little chance of success, or whether it would be more effective to concentrate our efforts on other or more limited aims, but based on common interest and offering better prospects of a positive outcome. The choice is not easy. But at least we should not forget that sometimes such a choice exists, and that we are responsible for making appropriate decisions.

In our discussion on the agenda we need realism and understanding that we are touching on really delicate questions. It is doubtful that any discussion on such changes will bring rapid, positive and substantial results. It is also doubtful that radical changes are desirable. It seems to us rather that we need an "evolutionary" approach, a gradual adjustment to new situations, taking into account other developments, including the results of other disarmament negotiations. Change should not be made for the sake of change, as was rightly pointed out by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, but because of the perception of new opportunities.

My delegation is ready to consider any suggestions concerning the agenda of the Conference, if they are acceptable to other members of this body. We note those which have been already presented. We have also some ideas of our own. One of them is that the agenda of the Conference could include - apart from the questions of the reduction and limitation of armed forces and armaments - measures related, for example, to the "organization" of international security, in other words measures consolidating international security, for example a world early warning system. There is no other place where such measures can be discussed. They could become important "technical arrangements" complementing the United Nations collective security system and making it more effective. They could also facilitate discussion on some disarmament agreements.

These are just a few considerations and ideas related to the future work of the Conference. However, it is our hope that they complement the views of other delegations on this issue. But probably none of us has a clear idea of what is the proper remedy. In fact, what we need is our collective wisdom in order to approach the issue correctly and define proper responses.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The distinguished Ambassador de Azambuja - permit me to quote him again - rightly stressed that "this task could be handled ... at least in its preliminary stage, by a small group of our most experienced members". My delegation fully supports this conclusion. We believe that the revival of an informal Group of Seven or some other informal team has become highly desirable. Such a group should be entrusted, among other things, with collecting through a series of consultations all ideas and proposals the members of the CD may have in mind. My delegation is ready to present this group with our concrete proposals.

We also need intensive consultations on the more effective functioning of the Conference among all States and groups of States participating or interested in the work of this body. All of them should take an active part in these consultations. They should be carried out both in Geneva and between our capitals. It is, however, extremely important that they should not hamper the work of the Conference. This is the only condition my delegation attaches to this debate - whatever its form and content. Indeed, it would be a sad paradox if our discussions on increasing the effectiveness of the Conference paralysed its work.

It is also important for us not to forget that our debate on the future work of the Conference is not a new one. We have behind us efforts undertaken by the Group of Seven, headed by Ambassador Fan of China, and documents presented by this Group. New and interesting ideas concerning the principles of work and the agenda of the Conference have been submitted last session and this session.

My delegation proposes that the secretariat of the Conference should prepare a register or compilation of these ideas and suggestions. It would be of great help in our further thinking and could become a good starting-point for the debate in a body entrusted with in-depth analysis of the problem and the elaboration of appropriate recommendations. It goes without saying that until these recommendations have been endorsed by capitals they cannot commit any delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): May I first congratulate you, Mr. President, and your delegation on your accession to the presidency? I am delighted to see in the Chair a country with which my own has such very close relations, and I am sure we are all fortunate that our leadership is in the hands of a delegation so rich in diplomatic skills and experience.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

I asked for the floor to respond to references by the distinguished Ambassador of Iraq to my own country and, in particular, to recent events in Heathrow airport. It might be helpful if I began simply by reminding delegations of the facts. The facts are as follows:

On 28 March, United Kingdom customs officials prevented the export from Heathrow airport to Iraq of a number of highly sophisticated capacitors made by a United States company. The capacitors are designed to a military specification for use in the firing circuit of nuclear weapons. This was the culmination of an exercise run jointly over several months by the United Kingdom and United States customs authorities against EUROMAG, a United-Kingdom-based company. The Iraq Airways Station Manager in London, Mr. Omar Latif, has been served with a deportation order and a number of other persons have been arrested and will be committed to trial in the United Kingdom. Those are the facts.

The distinguished Ambassador of Iraq also speculated about the possible aims, I think, of my own country as well as those of others. I can only speak for the United Kingdom: our aims are very straightforward. They are to uphold our commitment that we have entered into under the non-proliferation Treaty and, more specifically, under article I of that Treaty. Perhaps I might just remind this meeting of what that article states.

"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."

It was to fulfil those obligations that our action was aimed, and that was the sole aim. Similarly, we would look to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty to scrupulously fulfil their obligations under article II of the Treaty. That article states that:

"Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

In our view, activities which might call into question the fulfilment of this commitment should be condemned by all parties to the Treaty and by all supporters of the principle of non-proliferation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Solesby for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the distinguished representative of the United States.

Mr. BRECKON (United States of America): Mr. President, my delegation also congratulates you on your accession to the presidency, and pledges its co-operation and full support in the work before all of us this month.

My delegation endorses fully the remarks just made by our distinguished colleague from the United Kingdom. Regarding the remarks made this morning concerning nuclear proliferation by the distinguished representative of Iraq, let me make the following brief comments.

The United States has expressed at the highest level its deep concern at recent evidence of possible undermining of the goals of the non-proliferation Treaty. Let me affirm that this is a serious concern - it is a concern that will not be turned aside by charges that it is educed for other purposes, or simply to smear the name of another country. The United States stands by its statements on this subject and will pursue this issue. Far from undercutting the non-proliferation system, the actions of the United States support it. What we would welcome is convincing information that the evidence that recently came to light does not represent erosion of NPT objectives. This would be far more constructive than threats addressed against the NPT system. In this connection, let me call attention again to a statement made by President Bush on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT Treaty on 5 March of this year:

"It is essential in these times of great change and great promise, and of major progress in arms control, that the community of nations works together even more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, which poses one of the greatest risks to the survival of mankind. ... I call upon all States party to the Treaty to join our efforts to secure the integrity of the NPT, which benefits all countries."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Iraq.

Mr. AL-KETAL (Iraq): I would like to be brief in stating a few points. Iraq is fully aware of its commitment under the NPT, and we challenge all those who spoke before me to produce one item of evidence which shows that Iraq is not living up to its commitment under the NPT. Those capacitors they are speaking about - they know very well that they have plenty of uses and not only one use. Professor Goldblat of SIPRI spoke on this on Swiss radio - I heard that - and he enumerated many uses for these capacitors. One of these uses is for oil exploration and production. Others say it could be used for scientific research in many places. It is, as we call it, a campaign of accusations, falsifications, as this very notion that has been spoken about by the distinguished representative of Great Britain. Why do they have to assume that these are going to be used to trigger a nuclear device? All nuclear activities in Iraq are under IAEA surveillance, all nuclear material - so to take this triggering device to trigger what? To trigger new aggression against Iraq and nothing else.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to inform you that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday 5 April, when we reach the end of the list of speakers, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, will introduce the progress report on the twenty-ninth session of that Group, which will be circulated as an official document of the Conference under the symbol CD/981. As usual, members wishing to do so may comment on the progress report, as well as on the statement to be made by its Chairman. As is the practice in the Conference, we shall take action on the recommendations contained in paragraphs 9 and 13 of the progress report at the plenary meeting to be held on Thursday 12 April.

I should also like to inform you that, owing to consultations to be held by the Secretary-General of the United Nations during his mission in Geneva, the Council Chamber will not be available this afternoon and tomorrow morning. Accordingly, the meeting of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space which was to have been held in this conference room this afternoon will take place instead in conference room III. The meeting of the Group of 21 scheduled for tomorrow morning will be held in conference room V.

I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 April, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.