

10. She briefly summarized the Japanese Government's official position on the questions of Namibia, South Africa and southern Africa in general. Since 1962 Japan had consistently voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions on economic sanctions, the breaking of diplomatic relations with and the general boycott of South Africa, and had always supported the sanctions policy. She wished, however, to stress the difference between the stated policy of the Japanese Government and the actual practice followed by Japanese corporations.

11. In Namibia, for example, where the world's second largest uranium deposits were situated, private Japanese electric power companies had arranged long-term contracts providing for nearly 80 per cent of their uranium needs for a 10-year period. Those companies dealt with the Rössing Uranium Mine, which was operated by a partnership between the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Ltd. and the South African Government, through its state-owned Industrial Development Corporation: Japanese companies were therefore purchasing uranium directly from a mine financed and run, at least partially, by South Africa, which illegally occupied the Territory. Thus, Japan and other big Powers which had dealings with the Rössing Mine, implicitly recognized South Africa's occupation of Namibia, in violation of United Nations decisions, and at the same time enabled South Africa to derive profit from that occupation—thereby increasing South Africa's vested interest in staying in Namibia—and to rob the Namibians of their natural resources. She urged the Committee to use its powers to stop the purchase of Namibian uranium by Japanese companies. She also pointed out that Japanese power companies would purchase uranium directly from South African mines during the period 1975-1985. In addition, certain United Nations documents and the press in South Africa and Japan indicated that Japan might participate in a large number of South African economic activities, including the construction of a nuclear power station near Cape Town, and might assist South Africa in the production of nuclear weapons.

12. Currently, more than 70 Japanese firms had representatives and offices in South Africa, particularly in the car, electrical and electronic equipment and rubber industries. In the current decade, the trade between the two countries had developed to the extent that Japan was in effect almost the sole purchaser of South Africa's iron ore exports and bought more than 50 per cent of South Africa's sugar exports. A high percentage of Japanese imports of chrome, manganese and

asbestos—54 per cent, 44 per cent and 33 per cent respectively—came from South Africa, and those figures probably included products from Southern Rhodesia. Since 1972, Japan had become the fourth largest trading partner of South Africa; the total volume of trade between the two countries in 1973 had exceeded \$1,000 million, and continued to grow. The growing role played by Japanese corporations in South Africa's economy ran directly counter to the Japanese Government's official position on *apartheid*.

13. In the case of industrial development projects, the white minority in South Africa sought to strengthen its political and economic power base by encouraging rapid industrial development and building up its military strength. No other nation was as heavily involved as Japan in South African Government-sponsored economic projects. In particular, it contributed to five major projects for expanding the production of iron ore, manganese, coal, electricity and iron and steel by means of loans, technical assistance and the provision of equipment, and by concluding advance purchase agreements. Consequently, without investing Japanese capital, Japanese companies had become major cogs in South African industry.

14. In addition, Japanese companies often participated in joint ventures in which South Africa provided the capital and Japanese companies the blueprints, technical expertise and sometimes the necessary equipment. Many of those joint ventures were located near the Bantustans, thus assisting the South African Government in moving Africans out of the cities into miserable reservations. Among the Japanese companies in South Africa, Toyota and Nissan could be mentioned: they paid their employees in South Africa starvation wages that were far below those paid by other foreign companies such as General Motors or Ford.

15. There was a need for the most careful scrutiny of any support, whether diplomatic, economic or political, which strengthened the white minority Government in South Africa, since any such support indirectly assisted and encouraged South Africa in its continued illegal occupation of Namibia.

16. Mr. TAKASUGI (Japan) said that his delegation would state its position on the question of the activities of Japanese companies in South Africa in due course, when the matter had been investigated.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

2102nd meeting

Friday, 1 November 1974, at 3.15 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Buyantyn DASHTSEREN (Mongolia).

AGENDA ITEM 65

Question of Namibia (*continued*) (A/9623/Add.3, A/9624 (vol. I), A/9624/Add.1, A/9725 and Corr.1, A/9728, A/9775-S/11519, A/9786-S/11526, A/C.4/771 and Add.3)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)*

1. Mr. ENAHORO (Nigeria) said that the question of Namibia was different from all other decolonization issues because it was purely and simply a question of the illegal occupation by a Member State of a Territory under United

Nations trusteeship. In 1966, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2145 (XXI), had terminated South Africa's Mandate and had declared that thenceforth South West Africa, namely, Namibia, was the direct responsibility of the United Nations. Subsequently, in 1967, in its resolution 2248 (S-V), the General Assembly, cognizant of the need to transfer powers to the people of South West Africa, had established the United Nations Council for South West Africa—renamed the following year "United Nations Council for Namibia"—and entrusted it with the responsibility of administering the country until it attained independence. The United Nations had, however, been unable to exercise its responsibility because of

A/C.4/SR.2102

* Resumed from the 2100th meeting.

the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. The racist régime had continued to deceive the international community by creating the false impression that its leaders would act responsibly in a dialogue. Instead, South Africa had intensified measures which strengthened its hold on Namibia, exposed its real intentions and rendered dialogue meaningless. Consequently, the Security Council had in its resolution 342 (1973) terminated the dialogue between the Secretary-General and the Government of South Africa.

2. There could not be the slightest doubt about the insincerity of the racist régime. In the view of his delegation, South Africa's military presence in Namibia was an act of aggression against that Territory and a direct confrontation with the United Nations. The responsibility of every Member State for the international Territory was inescapable, and the time had come for the United Nations to take real practical measures in the matter. The Committee had a legal, political and moral duty to evolve an effective approach which would immediately restore the authority of the United Nations over the Territory, the continued occupation of which by a Member State of the United Nations was due solely to the approval of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. His delegation had taken note of the indefatigable and invaluable efforts made during the year by the United Nations Council for Namibia, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia. Nevertheless, his delegation was profoundly disheartened to note that only 40 States appeared to be seriously concerned with the fate of the Namibians, to judge from the replies to the Secretary-General's questionnaire regarding compliance with the relevant United Nations resolutions.

3. In view of the fact that the recent events in the Portuguese Territories of southern Africa had made the racist régime of South Africa intensify its oppressive activities, his delegation believed it was also imperative for all Member States to give full support to the activities of the United Nations Council for Namibia. It was time for all Member States which still maintained diplomatic, consular, economic and military relations with South Africa to give evidence of their adherence to the principles of the United Nations. South Africa's trade figures invariably included sales of important Namibian minerals, such as uranium, diamonds, copper and lead. Nigeria condemned without reservation all Member States which still violated United Nations resolutions. The mineral wealth of Namibia legitimately belonged to Namibians. The General Assembly had, in its resolution 1803 (XVII), proclaimed the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. Nevertheless, it was clear from the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia (A/9624 (vol. I) and A/9624/Add.1) that Western companies continued to maintain and, in fact, were increasing the tempo of their activities and exhausting the natural resources of Namibia. The main culprits were some members of the European Economic Community—in particular the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany—the United States of America, Portugal, Japan and Canada. Some developing countries were also indirectly involved in those activities. In that connexion, Nigeria did not share the view that the giant transnational companies which were illegally operating in Namibia were above the laws of their respective countries. It was to be hoped that those companies would revoke their agreements with South Africa and conclude new agreements exclusively with the United Nations Council for Namibia. His delegation welcomed the adoption by the Council of an important measure to protect the natural resources of the Territory, namely, the Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia (see A/9624/Add.1, para. 84) and would do everything in its power to ensure that it was scrupulously implemented.

4. As far as the internal situation in Namibia was concerned, Nigeria deplored the intensification by the illegal régime of South Africa of repression, arrests, summary political trials, torture and detention, which had become widespread throughout the Territory as a result of the application of the South African Terrorism Act of 1967. Such action by the South African Government should be strongly condemned by the Committee.

5. His delegation viewed with concern the assistance and succour lent to the racist régime by some members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in particular the United Kingdom, France and the United States. It therefore appealed to those countries to re-examine their military strategies in southern Africa in order to avert a situation that would one day lead to armed confrontation between the South African régime and the rest of Africa. Nigeria strongly deplored the recent naval exercises carried out jointly by forces of South Africa, the United Kingdom, France and the United States, and the reported secret agreements signed by the leaders of *apartheid* and the Western countries.

6. His delegation noted with satisfaction the increase in the contributions to the United Nations Fund for Namibia, which during the current year totalled \$200,000, and the further pledges. It also fully supported the decision by the United Nations Council for Namibia to establish an Institute for Namibia (*ibid.*, para. 73), to be temporarily situated in Lusaka, under the terms of General Assembly resolution 2679 (XXV). In the light of those developments the Committee should endorse the recommendation of the Council in part three of its report (see A/9624 (vol. I)) that \$200,000 should be allocated to the United Nations Fund for Namibia from the United Nations regular budget. Furthermore, each Member State should increase its voluntary contribution to the Fund.

7. Feeling itself threatened by the unexpected developments in the Portuguese colonies, the régime in Pretoria had again proposed the holding of multiracial talks between the peoples of Namibia on the future constitutional development of the Territory. The Bantustan policy implicit in that proposal was just as illegal as the occupation of the Territory by the racist régime. Under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Namibians had repeatedly rejected any attempt to divide their Territory since the termination of South Africa's Mandate by the United Nations in 1966. Developments during the current session should serve as a warning to the Pretoria régime and its clique of Western friends. In view of the failure of diplomatic efforts, the time had come for the Security Council to take stronger measures against South Africa, with immediate effect, by applying mandatory economic sanctions as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

8. Mr. SCHOLTEN (Netherlands) said that, as the problems of southern Africa were interdependent, the changes that had taken place in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau would influence the situation in Namibia. The Netherlands considered the occupation of the Territory by South Africa to be a flagrant contravention of the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Netherlands had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) because it had shared—and it continued to share—the opinion of the international community that the policy of South Africa violated the right to self-determination and independence of the Namibian people. His Government had therefore accepted the conclusions of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,¹ consequently considered that South

¹ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.*

Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal and recognized the obligation to refrain from all acts which might strengthen South Africa's position in the Territory. In order to contribute practically to the cause of the freedom of the people of Namibia, his Government had supported the United Nations Fund for Namibia and was considering increasing its contribution.

9. The Netherlands Government was deeply concerned about the so-called Bantustanization policy implemented by the South African Government in Namibia. That policy was a threat to the territorial integrity of the Territory and should be firmly opposed. The untrammelled exploitation of the Territory's resources also gave cause for concern. It had been estimated that Namibia's natural resources, including its fishery resources, would be exhausted within 15 years if the current rate of exploitation was maintained. Consequently, his Government supported the statement of the United Nations Council for Namibia in its Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia (see A/9624/Add.1, para. 84) that animal and mineral resources should be exploited only with the consent of the Council. His Government was particularly disturbed by the large number of legislative measures enacted by South Africa in Namibia, which had resulted in the Namibian people being denied their basic human rights.

10. The representative of South Africa had stated at the 1800th meeting of the Security Council, on 24 October 1974 that his Government was fully in accord with the view that the inhabitants of South West Africa should decide their own future and that, in the light of the new developments in the Territory, his Government believed that the stage at which the population would be ready to exercise its right to self-determination might be reached considerably sooner than had been anticipated. In view of that apparently promising statement, his delegation invited the Government of South Africa to be more specific and to provide the Committee with more details regarding the time at which and manner in which the South African Government intended to grant the right of self-determination to the people of Namibia.

11. The General Assembly had entrusted the United Nations Council for Namibia with the task of preparing Namibia for independence, and his Government would support proposals for associating the Council with the work of the specialized agencies and international organizations. It was following the activities of Mr. Seán MacBride, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, with great interest and welcomed the establishment in Lusaka of an Institute for Namibia, which would undertake research and train and prepare Namibians for independence. His Government was considering making a contribution to the Institute and increasing its contribution to the United Nations Fund for Namibia. His delegation expressed its appreciation to the Government of Zambia for its hospitality to refugees from Namibia. His Government considered that the people of Namibia should be given multilateral and bilateral support, in close co-operation with the United Nations Council for Namibia, and was prepared to provide assistance for that purpose.

12. Mr. CHAN (Singapore) congratulated Mr. MacBride, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, who had recently been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. His firm dedication to the cause of human freedom inspired confidence in the success of the struggle of the people of Namibia.

13. He reaffirmed his Government's acceptance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 to the effect that the presence of South Africa in Namibia was illegal, and its full acceptance of the obligations incumbent on it under that opinion as a Member State of the United Nations. With the termination of the South African Mandate by the General Assembly in 1966, Namibia had become the direct responsibility of the United Nations. The United Na-

tions had an obligation to liberate Namibia from South African colonial rule and to protect its vital interests during the period of struggle. The work of the institutional apparatus established for that purpose was commendable. His delegation hoped that the United Nations Council for Namibia would adopt effective measures to accelerate the complete liberation of the Territory.

14. South Africa ignored appeals, and cynically and cruelly repressed the Namibian nationalist opposition. It had laid the foundations for a policy of *apartheid* in Namibia with a view to condemning the Namibian people to perpetual inferiority. Furthermore, it was systematically plundering the mineral wealth and natural resources of that country, in collaboration with several major foreign companies. The United Nations Council for Namibia was preparing for publication a study showing that Namibia was an extremely wealthy country, whose gross domestic product was the second highest in Africa and among the 15 highest in the world. Besides its enormous mineral wealth, it also had important agricultural and marine resources.

15. The people of Namibia had no Government to regulate the activities of foreign companies. The pillaging of Namibia by South Africa and foreign companies was such that each year one third of the gross domestic product was taken out of the Territory, making it possibly the most exploited colony in history. At the existing rate, it was estimated that its mineral deposits would be exhausted in 25 years.

16. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the United Nations Council for Namibia had on 17 September 1974 issued a Decree on the Natural Resources of Namibia with a view to curbing the illegal economic exploitation of its natural heritage. His delegation hoped that there would be an honest response to that decree, even if further measures had to be taken to put it into effect.

17. The most important factor in the liberation of Namibia, however, was the active struggle of the Namibian people themselves. The United Nations had recognized the value of SWAPO, and it was to be hoped that the solidarity between that organization and the United Nations would influence the situation in Namibia.

18. His Government would do everything within its means to ensure that the objectives of the United Nations in Namibia were fulfilled.

19. Mr. BANDA (Zambia) said that his country supported armed struggle by the oppressed masses as the only reasonable response to reactionary violence. However, it followed the policy of advocating peaceful change in southern Africa wherever it was possible. That position had been clearly stated in the Manifesto on Southern Africa, adopted at Lusaka on 16 April 1969.² In that context, his country had offered its good offices to the Caetano régime to negotiate with the liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese administration. Caetano had rejected that offer but the new Government in Portugal had accepted it. A few days earlier, in an address made at the University of Zambia, the President of his country had challenged the South African Prime Minister to prove the honesty of his statements concerning peaceful change in southern Africa. Having cited the Lusaka Manifesto, he had pointed out that to close the way to peaceful change made violent change inevitable, and had stated that the consequences of an escalation of conflicts in southern Africa could be extremely grave in material and human sacrifice. The struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia was not against whites but against a system of oppressive government which had brought about economic stagnation and racial strife and was incapable of protecting even the whites whom it claimed to represent.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes, agenda item 106, document A/7754.*

20. The question of Namibia was an integral part of the southern African situation and should be resolved as far as possible by peaceful means. The United Nations reports on the question of Namibia showed that, although some progress had been made, a great deal remained to be done. The Pretoria régime continued to occupy the international territory illegally and had begun to introduce *apartheid* there. Furthermore, it was attempting to Balkanize Namibia, increasing its military activities and the ill-treatment of political prisoners, and maintaining an incredible disparity between the wages of blacks and whites.

21. The white population occupied the most prosperous southern region of the Territory and had relegated the black population to the Bantustans in the arid, unproductive, northern area. As a result of that policy Namibians were forced to move to the southern region, where they were paid slave wages, or to emigrate to neighbouring countries as refugees.

22. It had been argued that foreign investment in Namibia enabled the investing countries to press for the introduction of reforms within the *apartheid* system. In reality, such investments perpetuated that system.

23. His delegation fully endorsed the recommendations contained in part three of the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia (see A/9624 (vol. I)) and in the addendum to the report (see A/9624/Add.1, para. 85). It attached particular importance to the recommendation that the Security Council should be invited to take effective measures to put an end to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and to bring about the speedy realization of the United Nations presence in the Territory.

24. Mr. TOLSTIK (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) paid tribute to the courage shown by SWAPO in the struggle for the national liberation of Namibia. His country had always supported the right of Namibia to self-determination and independence, and had consistently condemned South Africa for its refusal to respect United Nations resolutions. The support given to the racists by certain countries and certain monopolies—which formed a kind of international plunder syndicate, taking advantage of the *apartheid* system to exploit the wealth of Namibia—was shameful. The peace-loving forces of the world could not be indifferent to the assistance which the NATO countries gave racist régimes.

25. In 1966, in its resolution 2145 (XXI), the General Assembly had terminated the South African Mandate for Namibia and assumed direct responsibility for the Territory. That resolution had been followed by a series of resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council calling on South Africa to leave Namibia. South Africa's response to those appeals had always been negative and the Prime Minister of that country had recently reaffirmed that the United Nations would never force South Africa to give up the Territory.

26. How could South Africa treat the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council so disdainfully? The

only explanation was the support the Pretoria régime had in the capitals of certain Western countries. The report of the United Nations Council for Namibia clearly demonstrated that the very active foreign monopolies operating in Namibia were guilty of plundering Namibian resources.

27. Investment in Namibia was very profitable, but most of the foreign companies' profits were taken out of the country. The natural resources of the Territory were being rapidly exhausted. The relevant documents cited numerous foreign companies operating in Namibia—a living example of the crimes which capitalism could commit in pursuit of profit.

28. A glance at the map of the Territory showed the close relationship between economic, military and strategic interests. South Africa was arming itself at a feverish rate. It was no accident that, while United Nations bodies were seeking to establish the right of Namibia to self-determination and independence, Western countries were reluctant to take effective measures and creating a situation equivalent to a veto. At the same time, they floated the idea of dialogue, another dilatory tactic, because, while the so-called dialogue was taking place, South Africa continued imposing *apartheid* in Namibia and doing everything possible to undermine its territorial integrity.

29. As shown in the statement on political developments concerning Namibia adopted by the United Nations Council for Namibia at its 211th meeting on 23 October 1974,³ there was an established pattern of South African manoeuvres to placate world opinion when strong international pressure was brought to bear on it. Faced with the threat of expulsion from the United Nations, South Africa had proposed bogus constitutional negotiations in Namibia, the sole objective of which was to distract public opinion.

30. His delegation supported the initiative of the African countries regarding the Security Council's consideration of the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa. Unfortunately, the draft resolution recommending the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations⁴ had been sabotaged by the veto cast by three Western countries at the 1808th meeting, on 30 October, a clear demonstration of who it was that was impeding the elimination of colonialism and racism. History would be the judge.

31. Namibians rejected the demagoguery of the Pretoria régime and continued to intensify their struggle, as shown by the attitude of SWAPO and the information contained in chapter IX of the report of the Special Committee (A/9623/Add.3). His delegation would support the strongest measures to speed up self-determination for the Namibian people.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.

³ A/AC.131/36.

⁴ *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-ninth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1974, document S/11543.*