

United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

TWENTY-THIRD SESSION

Official Records



SIXTH COMMITTEE, 1076th
MEETING

Thursday, 21 November 1968,
at 11.15 a.m.

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

Page

Agenda item 86:

Report of the Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression (continued) 1

Chairman: Mr. K. Krishna RAO (India).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Gobbi
(Argentina), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 86

Report of the Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression (continued) (A/7185/Rev.1)

1. Mr. ALVAREZ TABIO (Cuba) said that, although the General Assembly in 1952 had considered that it was possible and desirable to define aggression (see resolution 599 (VI)), no generally acceptable definition had yet been found. The Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression had agreed that it was possible to draft a definition which would meet with general support.

2. There were a number of conclusions to be drawn from the Special Committee's report. First, it considered that the question was no longer whether or not aggression should be defined; General Assembly resolution 2330 (XXII) had put an end to that discussion. Its task, it had decided, was to submit specific proposals for the definition of aggression (see A/7185/Rev.1, para. 16). Secondly, most members considered that the definition should be a mixed one in which a flexible description would precede and govern a list of definite acts of aggression included merely to illustrate and not to restrict the general description (*ibid.*, para. 34). His delegation agreed that, given the infinite number of cases arising in international reality, it would be impossible to compile an exhaustive list of acts of aggression or a list valid for all times and all areas of the world. To claim that legal norms were pure concepts removed from time and space would be tantamount to denying that in its evolution, development and transformation law reflected life, which itself was constantly changing. The Special Committee's proposal, therefore, was merely that the most typical acts of aggression should be identified with a view to ensuring that in their international relations States maintained a satisfactory standard of conduct and to establishing the limits of legitimate defence. The inalienable right to self-defence, defined clearly in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, had been abused frequently to cover and justify acts of aggression or brutal reprisal. The enumeration of the most significant acts of aggression would act as a brake on aggressors, in the same way as each State's penal code deterred persons from transgressing the social order.

3. The argument that a definition of aggression would be in conflict with the discretionary authority conferred on the Security Council by Article 39 of the Charter, was unfounded. There was nothing to prevent the legal organ from working out typical examples in order that in its decisions the supreme body of the United Nations might be guided by criteria of justice prepared by the majority of Member States and based on the principles and norms of international law.

4. The thirteen-Power proposal submitted to the Special Committee (*ibid.*, para. 9) had obviously met with strong support. His delegation considered that the general definition should refer to the use of armed force, since that was the most serious and dangerous form of aggression, but without prejudice to the mention, in the list of specific cases, of other direct or indirect forms of the use of force, such as political or economic pressure. The maintenance of operative paragraph 1 in the form drafted by the thirteen Powers might result in a dangerous extension of the scope of self-defence, since the concept of "armed force" could include, in addition to the cases mentioned in operative paragraph 5, other undefined cases of the indirect use of armed force. That danger became greater if it were borne in mind that there was no indication in preambular paragraph 5 of who would decide, in the circumstances of each particular case, whether armed aggression had occurred.

5. Operative paragraph 2 did not indicate which body would be empowered to use force in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Far from clarifying the meaning and scope of the phrase "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security", the paragraph seemed to reinforce the idea that other bodies than the Security Council were empowered to use force under the Charter.

6. Considering operative paragraph 3 in the general context of the preambular part of the draft proposal, and particularly in relation to operative paragraph 5, it had to be admitted that self-defence could extend to other acts of aggression than those mentioned in operative paragraph 5, since the list in that paragraph was not exhaustive.

7. Although operative paragraph 4 was based on the provisions of Article 53 of the Charter, it nevertheless allowed the possibility that a regional agency could determine whether an act of armed aggression

had occurred, thus allowing it to invoke the right to collective self-defence without—as expressly stated in the last phrase of operative paragraph 1—referring the matter to the Security Council. It was true that operative paragraph 10 provided that no act other than those listed in operative paragraph 5 could be deemed to constitute aggression unless the Security Council so decided. It had to be remembered, however, that self-defence had to be assessed a posteriori, which implied that a pretext of self-defence to justify the use of force by a State or group of States against another State could remain unpunished if the Security Council failed to reach a conclusion.

8. Operative paragraph 8 was contradictory. It prohibited recourse to individual or collective self-defence while at the same time authorizing "reasonable and adequate steps". That was no more than implicit acceptance of a form of self-defence whose scope was undefined and contrary to the Charter. It should be borne in mind that, according to the Charter, the pretext of self-defence could be invoked only against armed attack.

9. In conclusion, his delegation viewed with favour the amendment submitted to the thirteen-Power proposal by Sudan and the United Arab Republic (*ibid.*, para. 10).

10. Mr. HOUBEN (Netherlands) said that the gradual development of limitations imposed on the right of States to use force had been accompanied by many efforts to define the various elements of the complex notion of aggression. Since 1923, international lawyers and politicians had been attempting to distil from the notion of aggression generally applicable and objective elements precluding subjective interpretations. The Netherlands had always rejected the view that aggression was a concept which by its nature did not lend itself to further definition. In its view, a common aspiration toward—and a deep faith in the possibility of—a universal definition of the greatest crime conceivable was inherent in membership in one and the same international community. As professional precision-seekers, international lawyers naturally wished to see the various legal systems of the world co-operate in providing guidance concerning the generally accepted implications of the paramount pledge under the Charter to refrain in international relations from the threat or use of force, and in clarifying the way in which that pledge was connected with the United Nations security system. A formulation which would in all cases help to determine the existence of acts of aggression would be welcomed by all countries seeking a truly effective system for the maintenance of international peace. A definition of aggression could only be considered useful if it was acceptable to a very large number of States, including the permanent members of the Security Council.

11. A large part of the report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression was devoted to discussions on the Middle East, the Portuguese Territories, Viet-Nam, Hungary, the Baltic States, Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Korea, etc. Although it was self-evident that the elements of a general definition were tested in the light of what nations considered to be examples

of aggression, the discussions in the Special Committee appeared to have concentrated primarily on the political aspects of those questions. His delegation sincerely doubted the value of those debates within a Committee established to accomplish tangible results. As his delegation had feared the previous year, the Special Committee had been abused for propaganda purposes and too little attention had been paid to the formulation of the principle itself.

12. Any discussions that had taken place on the elements of a definition of aggression overlapped considerably with the work being done by the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States; for example, both Special Committees had discussed the question whether or not force or, for that matter, aggression within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter covered all forms of economic, political or ideological pressure (see A/7185/Rev.1, paras. 45-53, and A/7326, paras. 49-54). Both Special Committees, furthermore, had discussed the question of indirect aggression and such matters as the support of armed bands of one State against another, sabotage, terrorism and subversion. As to that matter, the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, unlike the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, had achieved agreed formulations (see A/7326, paras. 111-134). Those comparisons of the work of the two Special Committees were not intended to suggest that the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States had resolved the major problems on those matters. Nor were both Committees confronted with exactly the same issues. When they were discussing, for example, the relationship between self-defence (article 51 of the Charter) on the one hand and aggression or the threat or use of force on the other, it could well be that that was the major problem in the debate on the question of aggression and that, without a clear-cut solution as to that matter, no definition would be adequate. On the other hand, the "Friendly Relations" context might perhaps not exclude the ultimate adoption of some compromise—and therefore necessarily rather vague—formula on the lawful use of force with a view to saving other important elements of an agreed formulation of the principle. While fully aware of the particular problems entailed in a definition of aggression, his delegation considered that the two Special Committees were to some extent duplicating each other's debates. If only for that reason, it might be better to await the results of the work of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States before trying to define aggression.

13. It was significant that, at the Geneva session of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, there had not been the slightest sign of a consensus between the permanent members of the Security Council on a single element of a definition. That fact should be noted, because any definition would be useless unless it was at least acceptable to, if not proposed by, the permanent members themselves. Was it not signal proof of the futility

of the work of the Special Committee that none of the permanent members had submitted any proposal on the substance of the matter, let alone any joint proposal? Were they, instead, taking pains to bridge their differences over the elaborate and substantial formulations contained in three draft declarations submitted by other members of the Special Committee (see A/7185/Rev.1, paras. 7-9). Real progress was surely dependent on the readiness of those Powers to co-operate, and as long as that readiness was absent the United Nations should acknowledge the fact, however regretfully.

14. In addition, recent events had again made it seem doubtful whether a definition would contribute to international peace and security and promote respect for international law. The country that was pressing for a definition was actually committing aggression according to the sense that it had itself always given to the notion. He was referring to the definition proposed by the Soviet Union in 1957,^{1/} which stated *inter alia* that in an international conflict that State would be declared the attacker which first invaded the territory of another State by its armed forces, even without a declaration of war, and went on to add that attacks such as those referred to could not be justified by any arguments of a political, strategic or economic nature and that in particular no revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement could be used as a justification for attack. Since the USSR and four other members of the Warsaw Pact were maintaining that aggression could not be said to have taken place in the particular case where a country, against its clearly expressed will, had been invaded by their armed forces, the question arose whether there would be any sense even in adopting the very definition those countries had been pressing for. As long as that fundamental difference of opinion on the concept of aggression prevailed, it was difficult to see how any further discussions could usefully be held with a view to increasing respect for the law. Moreover, the Netherlands emphatically wished to avoid giving the Czechoslovak people the impression that it sincerely believed in a possibility of a common definition of aggression so long as Soviet troops were occupying that country.

15. It was for those reasons that his delegation was opposed to the extension of the mandate of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. Instead, it would welcome a proposal to the effect that both the report of the Special Committee and the records of its 1968 Geneva session be transmitted to the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

16. Mr. NACHABEH (Syria) thanked the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression for the constructive work it had done. In 1952, when the United Nations had been composed of only 60 members, the General Assembly had stated in resolution 599 (VI), adopted by 30 votes to 12, with 8 abstentions, that it was possible and desirable to define aggression. Fifteen years later, despite

the obstacles created in the two earlier Special Committees, it had reaffirmed that view in resolution 2330 (XXII) by 90 votes to 1, with 18 abstentions, a majority which had not only exceeded two thirds of those voting, but two thirds of the United Nations membership.

17. When the Special Committee resumed its work, it had to take into account the "present international situation", in the words of the title of that resolution. If it wished to be able to determine the elements which constituted a definition of aggression, the Special Committee would do well to take account of the real facts of contemporary international life, since it was only in the light of those facts that it would be in a position to lay down an adequate rule to govern them. The United States representative had said (1074th meeting), quite correctly, that aggression was not an abstract concept. In the present-day world, examples of aggression were unfortunately numerous and varied. Despite the solemn proclamation of the purposes and principles of the Charter, reaffirmed by relevant resolutions and declarations, a large number of people, particularly in Asia and Africa, were still subjugated and deprived by force of the exercise of their inalienable rights, including the right of self-determination. In the Middle East, the Israel aggression—that new form of colonialism called the colonialism of settlement—which had been established by force at the expense of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people, continued its misdeeds by the occupation of new territory. A mere glance at the maps submitted as an addendum to the statement by the head of his delegation in the General Assembly on 22 October 1968 (1702nd plenary meeting) made it clear how over the years world Zionism, encouraged by the complicity of certain Powers, was attempting to build what was now significantly termed "Greater Israel", for Israel, born of violence, could survive only through violence, and it was by resort to force that Israel intended to achieve its dark designs. He wondered whether its leaders would learn a lesson from the Viet-Nameese experience and understand at last that peace could not be imposed by force and that, to achieve a just and durable peace, it was indispensable to recognize the legitimate rights of peoples and to restore their inalienable rights.

18. He had referred specifically to the Israel aggression because it illustrated the main elements of the definition of aggression; it was established by violence; it continued to acquire new territories by conquest; it annexed additional parts of a holy city venerated through the centuries, and all in defiance of repeated Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

19. Considering the proposals submitted to the Special Committee and the debate on them, it would seem that the majority of the members of that Committee had agreed on three essential points. Firstly, the definition should be embodied in a declaration in order to mark the special importance which the General Assembly attached to that question, and so that the definition might have a greater influence on the progressive development of international law. The sponsors of both the twelve-Power proposal (see A/7185/Rev.1, para. 7) and the thirteen-Power

^{1/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 16, annex II, section I.

proposal (ibid. para. 9) had endorsed that view by using the term "declaration" in the title of their proposals. Secondly, there had been agreement on the adoption of a mixed definition, which would be neither so general as to restate the principles of the Charter nor so specific as to appear to provide for all cases. His delegation was in favour of such a definition. Thirdly, the Special Committee should begin first with the definition of direct armed aggression, which should be completed later by the more complex definition of indirect aggression in its various forms. His delegation shared the majority view regarding those three points. His delegation also shared the view that the two proposals remaining before the Special Committee could be reconciled.

20. However, the thirteen-Power proposal contained some provisions which his delegation could not accept. Thus, it was opposed to the words "direct or indirect" qualifying the expression "armed force" in operative paragraph 1 because they introduced the idea of indirect aggression, discussion of which had been postponed by the Special Committee because of its special complexity. His delegation was also dissatisfied with the wording of operative paragraph 8, which it feared might give rise to interpretations justifying acts prejudicial to the inalienable rights of peoples still subjugated and oppressed. His delegation also wondered whether that paragraph was appropriate in a text devoted principally, at the present stage, to the consideration of the question of direct armed aggression. Moreover, any text would be incomplete unless it included a provision outlawing any resort to force tending to prevent those peoples from exercising their inalienable rights. While not perfect, the twelve-Power proposal, which his delegation had co-sponsored, was the best text which the Special Committee had been able to achieve; it could undoubtedly be improved, in particular by the notion of priority, which had been mentioned by several delegations during the discussions in the Special Committee, and by the characterization of acts of armed aggression as crimes against international peace giving rise to political and material obligations and responsibilities for States which committed them, an element which had been taken up in paragraph 9 of the thirteen-Power proposal.

21. His delegation regretted that it was not feasible for the Special Committee to resume its work before the end of 1968 and hoped that it would meet as soon as possible in 1969.

22. Mr. OSTROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had stated its position and answered the slanderous allegations of the United States representative at the 1074th meeting, and had hoped that one reply to the United Kingdom representative at the 1075th meeting would suffice for the delegations of the other NATO members. However, as the Netherlands representative had chosen to repeat those allegations, his delegation was reluctantly obliged to reply once again.

23. It was true that the USSR had in the past put forward a definition of aggression. The Netherlands representative, however, had not mentioned that the definition had failed to be adopted because of the opposition of the United States, the United Kingdom,

the Netherlands and other members of their military bloc, or the fact that the definition had included the concepts of indirect aggression and ideological aggression. The Netherlands representative would like to see the USSR accept one side of that definition and close its eyes to the other, but that was hardly to be expected. His delegation agreed that the definition of aggression must be comprehensive. No State should think that by preventing the drafting of a definition of aggression it would be free to act aggressively and that the USSR would not take measures of self-defence. His country was resolved to defend its vital interests, and would oppose any acts of aggression designed to overthrow the Governments of socialist countries or negate their achievements. He hoped that the representatives of the NATO countries would not repeat such illogical, tired arguments again.

24. Mr. NALL (Israel), exercising his right of reply, said that the statement made by the Syrian representative was historically untenable, factually distorted and morally wrong, containing as it did threats which had been made in other places as well. There had been aggression in the Middle East, but it had been committed not by Israel but against Israel. That fact was borne out by the events which had preceded the June 1967 war, when its Arab neighbour had resorted to vicious caricatures and attacks on Israel in the Press and on the radio, when the speeches of its leader calling for war had been heard every day accompanied by martial music, and when Arab leaders had told visitors to their countries and the world Press that their clear-cut intention was to annihilate Israel once and for all. Furthermore, immediately preceding the confrontation there had been the request for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, the blocking of the strait of Tiran to Israel shipping, and the bringing up of tremendous forces to the Israel frontiers. If all that was not aggression, what was it? Israel had done what every nation would do to safeguard its existence: it had resorted to self-defence. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country, in his statement to the General Assembly on 8 October 1968 (1686th plenary meeting), had made certain proposals, which remained unanswered to date. He hoped that the Committee would apply itself to a constructive consideration of the question actually before it—the question of defining aggression.

25. Mr. NACHABEH (Syria) said he pitied the representative of Tel Aviv, who had the difficult task of defending the aggressive acts of those he represented, particularly before the Sixth Committee. Under Article 51 of the Charter, only the victim of an armed attack could invoke the right of self-defence. Could there be the slightest doubt in the mind of the Tel Aviv representative that Israel had taken the initiative of attacking and unleashing war against the territory of three Arab States on 5 June 1967? Self-defence was the unacceptable reason he had given to justify Israel's aggressive war; the real reason would be found in the words of the Israel leaders, clearly indicating the cause. On 16 October 1968, in a speech at Jerusalem, Mr. Dayan had declared that Israel should create a *de facto* situation even without the consent of the Arabs, settle the Golan heights, fortify the Sinai peninsula, and incorporate the West Bank and Gaza

in Israel economically and administratively; and, also in October 1968, he had been reliably reported as saying that Israel must prepare actively for a new war and in the meantime, without officially proclaiming the annexation of the occupied territories, it should make the situation in those liberated areas a fait accompli. Moreover, on 14 November 1968, following the extraordinary meeting of the so-called Israel Government, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had stated that while the new peace frontiers need not coincide with the present cease-fire lines, neither would there be a return to the 1949 armistice lines which had constituted the de facto frontiers of 4 June 1967. Those remarks so vehemently extolled the rule of arbitrary power over law and so clearly demonstrated the futility and indefensible character of the arguments put forward by the representative of Tel Aviv that no commentary was required.

26. Mr. HARGROVE (United States of America) noted that the USSR representative had characterized the United States representative's remarks made at the 1074th meeting as slanderous of the USSR and as having been adequately replied to. He wished to place on record the fact that those remarks had not been replied to adequately or—so far as their substance was concerned—at all. The United States representative had made the point that the Soviet Union's action against Czechoslovakia had violated the United Nations Charter and the definition of aggression adopted between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in 1933 as a matter of treaty obligation. He had pointed out that, in an effort to justify that action, the USSR representative had advanced the position that in so far as relations between the Soviet Union and certain unspecified States referred to as members of the "socialist commonwealth" were concerned, the Charter and international law might be superseded by other considerations when they conflicted with what the Soviet Union considered its vital interests. The USSR representative had not replied to those legal arguments; instead, he had presented his version of the facts which had made his country believe it advisable to undertake a military takeover of Czechoslovakia. The United States delegation did not question the sincerity of that belief, although it did deny the accuracy of the facts. However, the USSR representative had made no claim that his country's action fell within any exception to the prohibition of the threat or use of force stated in the Charter, and in fact it did not.

27. Mr. EL REEDY (United Arab Republic), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that Israel had invaded and occupied the territories of three Arab States Members of the United Nations, had formally annexed Jerusalem and had so far refused to comply with any resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council relating to the Palestinian refugees, or the return of the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons of the occupied territories to their homes. Israel had even been shooting at Arab schoolgirls who had demonstrated against the foreign occupation, had been destroying Arab houses, bulldozing residential sections and razing entire Arab villages. It had been condemned by the International Conference on Human Rights,

held at Teheran in May 1968, for its violations of human rights in the occupied territories. Israel had also unilaterally denounced the international agreements it had signed with the Arab States in 1949. He asked the Israel representative whether he could declare that his Government considered itself committed to those agreements.

28. The statement of the Israel representative was typical of the false propaganda disseminated by Zionist machinery throughout the world with the sole aim of deceiving international public opinion and justifying its war of aggression of 5 June 1967.

29. When the United Arab Republic had requested the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from its territory, it had been within its sovereign rights. The starting point in the crisis of the Middle East in 1967 was Israel's policy of aggression and its threats to Syria. Israeli leaders had threatened publicly to attack Damascus. He recalled further that when the United Arab Republic had accepted the presence of the Force on its territory in 1956, Israel had refused to accept United Nations troops on its side. When the United Arab Republic had requested the withdrawal of the Force, some countries had suggested that United Nations troops should be stationed on both sides, and Israel had again refused. He would await with interest the comments of the representative of Israel on that point.

30. He said that during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, the Israel representative had alleged (1566th plenary meeting) that the United Arab Republic resorted to a "naval blockade". He noted that the Israel representative had used different language at the present session. He reiterated that the United Arab Republic had never proclaimed or exercised a naval blockade. He reaffirmed his country's opposition to any use of force on the high seas or in the territorial waters of other States.

31. The Israel representative had said that his Foreign Minister had made certain proposals in his statement to the General Assembly. The central point, however, was that the United Arab Republic had publicly declared that it accepted the peaceful settlement laid down in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and was willing to implement all its provisions. So far, Israel had made no commitment to implement that resolution. He would await with interest any statement from the representative of Israel to the effect that his Government would implement the resolution in question, and that it would withdraw its forces from all occupied territories in accordance with that resolution, which emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". Israel's continued occupation of those territories was contrary to the provisions of the Charter and of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

32. The Israel representative's statement provoked serious concern, because it implied that aggression could legitimately be committed in the guise of self-defence. In other words, the Israel representative was suggesting that the Sixth Committee should accept the proposition that self-defence could mean

the launching of a preventive war and territorial expansion. In a statement issued on 5 June 1967, the Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Israel had said that their forces did not have the objective of conquering Arab land and that Israel had no territorial ambitions, its only interest being to defend its territory against Arab aggression. Now, one and a half years later, Israel forces were still occupying the Arab territory they had overrun in the 5 June war and were oppressing the Arab population in a way which recalled the activities of the Nazis in occupied Europe, using such measures as mass deportation, the plundering of public and private property, the destruction of houses and residential quarters and the razing of whole villages. Israel was thus pursuing a consistent policy of flagrant aggression and territorial expansion.

33. Mr. HOUBEN (Netherlands), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said it was by pure coincidence that his delegation was speaking after the United States representative. He wished to remind the USSR representative that the Netherlands was an independent country and would never accede to any alliance which might infringe its right to independence of thought. His previous statement had been based on a genuine wish to convince the lawyers of other countries that the task of defining aggression was not an abstract exercise. It also wished to try to bring home to its European neighbour that it was invoking justification for conduct which the Netherlands regarded as condemnable and a violation of international law.

34. The USSR representative had mentioned that a definition of aggression submitted by his delegation had been rejected by some countries, including the Netherlands. He wondered whether the USSR still regarded that definition as valid, and, if so, how it could justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia by its own forces, especially since the USSR definition in question stated that a revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement could not be regarded as justification for an armed attack on another country.

35. The USSR representative had stated at the 1443rd meeting of the Security Council that it was inept juridically speaking and inconsistent to say

that the granting of assistance to Czechoslovakia by the socialist countries within the framework of individual and collective security was interference in the domestic affairs of that State and had claimed that the USSR action had been an act of collective self-defence. However, under Article 51 of the Charter, individual or collective self-defence was justified only if an armed attack had occurred. He was not aware that Czechoslovakia had made any such attack.

36. His delegation believed that the members of the Sixth Committee, as lawyers, should be free to discuss such matters. Otherwise, their debates would be mere academic exercises. The Netherlands had made sincere efforts towards a *détente* in Europe. Those efforts had received a severe setback, but he hoped that the future would provide more grounds for optimism.

37. Mr. OSTROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said he was amazed that the United States now expressed dissatisfaction with the reply given by the USSR delegation at the 1074th meeting. He had had the impression that the United States had fully accepted the Soviet reply, but it was now—two days later—claimed that the United States delegation's questions had not been answered. On the contrary, it was the USSR delegation which could justifiably expect an answer to its questions. The USSR delegation had produced concrete facts concerning the millions of dollars spent on subversive activities against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries under the United States Mutual Security Act. He would welcome an explanation by the United States representative of how those activities accorded with the provisions of the Charter. Nor had the United States representative made any attempt to refute the facts adduced by the USSR delegation concerning United States aggression in other parts of the world and its support of aggression in the Middle East. The USSR had a right to take measures in self-defence against United States imperialist aggression in Europe and elsewhere, and it was not surprising that the aggressor continued to adopt a negative attitude concerning the definition of aggression.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.