

65. Mr. VON UTHMANN (Federal Republic of Germany), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation had been surprised to hear the Tanzanian representative allege, at the previous meeting, that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany tolerated the recruitment of mercenaries for Southern Rhodesia. That allegation was unfounded. Under article 109 *h* of his country's Penal Code, the recruitment or the attempt to recruit citizens of the Federal Republic for a foreign army was a criminal offence punishable by no less than three months' imprisonment.

66. In January 1975, a national of the Federal Republic had placed an advertisement in a local newspaper for 300 "safari participants" for Southern Rhodesia. Four days later he had been arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of recruiting for a foreign armed service. Investigations had confirmed that he had been seeking soldiers for the Southern Rhodesian army in violation of article 109 *h* of the Penal Code and on 19 May 1975 he had been convicted by a criminal court at Munich and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

67. His delegation, far from concealing the matter from the United Nations, had kept the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia informed of the conviction in a note dated 10 July 1975. Since the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations was the current Chairman of that Committee, he would suggest that he request the Secretariat to submit the note to him.

68. Mr. MWASAKAFYUKA (United Republic of Tanzania) said that his delegation did not wish to reply in substance to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at that time but would merely give notice that, at the appropriate time, it would reply in detail to the statement of the representative of a Government which, from all the evidence available, was insensitive to the plight of Africans in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The reply would reveal that Government's collaboration with the racist régimes of Smith and Vorster and its involvement in Namibia. His delegation would present hard facts and figures showing that the Federal Republic of Germany was an enemy of the African cause. A 1975 issue of the magazine *Shooting Times* stated that mercenaries were paid SR 1,000 or \$US 1,400 per month and were stationed at the King George VI Barracks at Salisbury.

69. Mr. VON UTHMANN (Federal Republic of Germany) said that his delegation was sorry to note that, instead of substantiating the allegations made earlier, the Tanzanian representative had added new unfounded allegations. Allegations without immediate proof only poisoned the atmosphere without helping the oppressed peoples of southern Africa. The Tanzanian representative should therefore submit hard facts to the Committee or to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which would study them carefully and do its utmost to put an end to all illegal acts.

*The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.*

## 2143rd meeting

Thursday, 9 October 1975, at 10.55 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mrs. Famah JOKA-BANGURA (Sierra Leone).

A/C.4/SR.2143

### AGENDA ITEM 89

**Question of Southern Rhodesia (*continued*) (A/9998-S/11598, A/10023/Add.2, A/10050-S/11638, A/C.4/788)**

#### GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. AL-WALI (Iraq) said that at a time of the liberation of peoples and their accession to independence, racist régimes that used military and technological power to impose their rule must disappear. In Southern Rhodesia, 5 per cent of the population, with the help of the great world monopolies, were exploiting the African inhabitants and denying them the right to self-determination notwithstanding the condemnation of the international community, the United Nations and the efforts exerted by the United Kingdom.

2. There had been little progress since the unilateral declaration of independence a decade ago: Ian Smith had not kept his promises, the United Kingdom had not

fulfilled its obligations as administering Power and many countries had not applied the mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. He deplored the fact that the United States Congress had not repealed the Byrd Amendment, which authorized the import of Rhodesian products into the United States.

3. Mozambique's recent accession to independence would accelerate the process of the liberation of Zimbabwe, but Mozambique had to be helped to resolve its economic difficulties. Iraq, for its part, was prepared to provide such assistance.

4. His delegation supported and endorsed the unification of the liberation movements and thought that the establishment of a united front under the aegis of the African National Council was a very positive step forward. In the past two years, Iraq had participated in the work of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the

Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia and had consistently called for strengthening sanctions and imposing them on South Africa as well, inasmuch as Southern Rhodesia and South Africa were supporting one another. The illegal régime had to be isolated economically, culturally, and even touristically. His delegation reiterated its support for the Dar es Salaam Declaration adopted by the OAU Council of Ministers at its ninth extraordinary session, held from 7 to 10 April 1975, which expressed African solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe.

5. The only course remaining to the people of Zimbabwe was armed struggle; Iraq had also suffered and was suffering the consequences of a racist and Zionist régime in its region. The victory of OAU was the victory of all because justice was indivisible, as was the struggle against colonialism regardless of the form it took.

6. Mr. FRASER (United States of America) noted that the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Henry Kissinger, had recently told the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the States members of OAU that strengthening the relationship between the United States and Africa was a major objective of United States foreign policy. It was in that spirit that the United States delegation intended to participate in the Committee's work.

7. In order to maintain pressure on the minority régime, the United States intended to adhere scrupulously to the economic sanctions against the Smith régime and, to that end, President Ford and his administration remained committed to repealing the Byrd Amendment, despite the recent failure of the House of Representatives to pass a bill to that effect. Repeal of the Byrd Amendment was imperative not only for its effect on Southern Rhodesia, but as an expression of the integrity of the United States in fulfilling its international obligations.

8. Referring to the statements made in the Committee to the effect that some United States citizens were fighting as mercenaries in the Rhodesian Army, he recalled that, under United States law, any citizen enlisting in the armed forces of another country ran the risk of losing his United States citizenship and being subjected to criminal prosecution. If there was any specific evidence that United States citizens were serving in Ian Smith's armed forces, he would welcome detailed information so that appropriate action could be taken as prescribed by law. He wished to reiterate that the United States did not collaborate in military matters in any way with the Smith régime in Rhodesia.

9. The United States was an active participant in the Security Council Committee on sanctions and was prepared to consider recommendations for closer supervision of the enforcement of sanctions.

10. He referred, in closing, to the statement by the United States Secretary of State in his speech to the General Assembly at the 2355th plenary meeting to the effect that the differences between the two communities in Rhodesia had been narrowed in the last decade, that both sides in Rhodesia and Rhodesia's neighbours, black and white, had

an interest in averting civil war, and that the United States would support all efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement. The United States strongly favoured the creation of a Government in Rhodesia which was freely elected by all the people of that country.

11. Mr. HULELA (Botswana) expressed appreciation of the kind words addressed to the President of Botswana regarding his efforts to break the stalemate in Southern Rhodesia. The talks held at Lusaka in November and December 1974, which had been aimed at creating conditions that would be conducive to holding a dialogue between the Zimbabwe nationalists and the Smith régime with a view to achieving majority rule, without further bloodshed, had broken down because of Smith's attempts to split the African National Council, his refusal to release political prisoners, his continued harassment of the African population and the torture and execution of his political opponents. As a result, the situation in Rhodesia remained potentially explosive.

12. His delegation fully supported General Assembly resolution 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962, which, *inter alia*, called upon the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to take appropriate measures to put an end to the rebellion and restore the political rights of the people of Zimbabwe. It further supported United Nations resolutions calling upon all Member States to implement sanctions against the rebel régime in order to achieve majority rule. His delegation had always believed that the black and non-black peoples of Africa could live together in peace and that racism or *apartheid* had absolutely no justification. Consequently, it would continue to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle for freedom and self-determination. It urged the international community to continue to deny recognition to the rebel régime, as it had no mandate from the people it purported to represent.

13. Mr. SINGH (Nepal) said that the illegal racist régime of Ian Smith was a glaring example of colonialism, which had perpetuated itself by committing the most heinous, brutal and atrocious acts. With the support of the racist Government of South Africa, it had obstinately held to the policy of white supremacy in defiance of world opinion and the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The illegal Salisbury régime had been condemned by peoples all over the world; the United Nations had condemned its policies in many resolutions and had called upon countries helping to sustain the régime to withdraw their support and collaboration.

14. It was disheartening to note that many countries, in the hope of obtaining economic gains, were not complying with the mandatory sanctions recommended by the Security Council and that some commodities, such as chrome and nickel, were continuing to be exported to the United States.

15. His delegation felt that the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, could not evade responsibility for taking the necessary steps to put an end to the situation in Zimbabwe. The people of Zimbabwe had demonstrated their readiness to achieve majority rule by peaceful and democratic means, but the obstinacy of the minority régime was forcing the liberation movement to choose the

alternative of armed struggle. Nepal had always been opposed to colonialism in all its forms and supported all efforts directed towards eliminating colonial rule and foreign domination throughout the world. It also opposed *apartheid*, racism and racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations and had always been associated in the United Nations with the cause of human rights and the realization of the aspirations of colonial peoples for independence.

16. There had recently been some positive developments in Rhodesia. First, the independence of Mozambique had created a situation favouring the use of more effective means against the racist régime. The United Nations, the specialized agencies and all concerned should assist the new independent Government of Mozambique in that task. Another development was the unification of the liberation movements under the African National Council. It would mean greater effectiveness in ousting the illegal régime and securing the inalienable right to self-determination and independence.

17. By flagrantly violating the agreement negotiated between the leaders of the nationalist movement and the racist Ian Smith régime at Lusaka in December 1974, the Smith régime had frustrated the hopes for a peaceful solution to the problem. His delegation appreciated the Dar es Salaam Declaration of April 1975, which gave unqualified support to the freedom fighters of the nationalist movement for the liberation of Zimbabwe. The liberation of a people was their birth-right and no means could be ruled out to achieve that end. It was to be hoped that the racist régime would read the writing on the wall and thus avoid an armed struggle which would cause great loss of life and property to both the whites and the indigenous people.

18. He hoped that the Fourth Committee would regard the recommendations by the Special Committee contained in chapter IX of its report (see A/10023/Add.2, para. 16) as the basis for a rapid and just solution to the Rhodesian problem. If the existing situation was prolonged, it might endanger world peace and security. The United Nations and the peoples of the world must therefore press for a widening of the sanctions and exercise their influence on the racist régime in order to establish majority rule as soon as possible.

19. Mr. BAJA (Philippines) said that the continued existence of the illegal Smith régime, despite all the measures adopted by organs and agencies of the United Nations system and numerous international and regional organizations, was due to the fact that one element was still lacking, namely, unity. If the opposition forces within and without Southern Rhodesia were united, the collapse of the racist régime would be inevitable.

20. The national liberation movements in the Territory must remain united and must co-ordinate their moves, since that was a prerequisite for the success of their struggle. Another prerequisite was unity of action by Southern Rhodesia's neighbours, which, with one exception, were opposed to the illegal régime's practices of oppression and persecution. The third side of what might be called the triangle of unity was international action, which should start with the obligation of the administering Power to

exert more effective pressure on the Smith régime. If it was unable to do so, then it should help the liberation movements to act in its stead, for example by adopting specific measures for strengthening the African National Council.

21. That must be coupled with the application by all countries of the United Nations sanctions, which, if strictly enforced, would achieve their objective. If added sanctions were needed, his delegation was ready to support them, and it believed that no country would be severely jeopardized if contact with Southern Rhodesia was cut off. The United States, it was reported, had a sufficient stockpile of chrome to enable it to repeal the Byrd Amendment. Nations must endeavour not to be prisoners of convenience or of the economic practices of their transnational corporations.

22. The Philippines took pride in its record on questions of decolonization, racism, racial discrimination and *apartheid*, and it maintained no relations of any kind with the Smith régime. In that connexion, he was pleased to inform the Committee that the two Philippine airlines listed in table 11 in the annex to chapter IX of the report of the Special Committee (A/10023/Add.2) had withdrawn their agreements with Air Rhodesia, and he hoped that that fact would be reflected in documents on the subject. Furthermore, the Philippine Government prohibited Filipinos from visiting Southern Rhodesia and did not grant visas to nationals of Southern Rhodesia. It continued to contribute to the various United Nations humanitarian funds and had established scholarships for students of Non-Self-Governing Territories, including Southern Rhodesia.

23. Majority rule in Southern Rhodesia was inevitable; the only question was whether it would be attained through peaceful or violent means. Those who collaborated with the Smith régime were only promoting the second alternative. His delegation welcomed the efforts by leaders of African countries to convene a constitution conference between the Smith régime and the African National Council, and regretted the failure of the first meeting. A peaceful solution would be possible only if the Smith régime changed its attitude and acted in good faith.

24. His delegation reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe to secure, by all means at their disposal, the exercise of their inalienable rights, and reiterated its firm commitment to continue supporting them to that noble end.

25. Mr. BURGERS (Netherlands) said that the questions of Southern Rhodesia and Namibia were the most important and pressing items on the Committee's agenda. In the Netherlands, the question of Rhodesia was frequently and intensively dealt with by the information media. A private association, the Anti-Apartheid Movement of the Netherlands, was actively engaged in stimulating public awareness of the necessity of ending minority rule and of combating violations of the sanctions instituted by the Security Council. In 1973 the Government had created an interministerial committee to advise it on the possibilities of strengthening and refining the application of the sanctions, and its recommendations were being implemented. The Government also had frequent contacts with the representatives of the liberation movements and it was



prepared to provide humanitarian and development aid to the people of Zimbabwe up to an amount of \$1 million for the current year.

26. The developments of the past year in regard to the question of Southern Rhodesia gave rise to feelings of hope and of frustration. When the Salisbury régime had released the leaders of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) to enable them to take part in consultations abroad, the Government and people of the Netherlands had hoped that Mr. Smith would be prepared to engage in negotiations with the African National Council that could lead to a constitutional settlement acceptable to the whole population of Southern Rhodesia. They had been extremely disappointed when the first talks had broken down although the African leaders had demonstrated their willingness to negotiate seriously for a peaceful settlement.

27. Another important and promising development had been the merger of the liberation movements into one African National Council. However, that development, too, was now being clouded by internal discord. His delegation associated itself with the appeals to the leaders of the Council to overcome their differences and maintain their unity.

28. Another setback had been the failure of the United States Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment. In that context, his delegation hoped that the application of sanctions would not become less stringent in the time ahead. The fact that there had been direct contacts between Mr. Smith and the Zimbabwe liberation movement was no reason for relaxing the international pressure on the Salisbury régime. In order to promote a peaceful solution to the problem, it was essential to maintain, and if possible increase, the pressure on the white minority in Southern Rhodesia, as had been made unmistakably clear by the representative of Italy in his statement on behalf of the nine members of the European Economic Community at the preceding meeting. He commended that statement to the Committee's attention.

29. Mr. QUARTIN SANTOS (Portugal) said that his delegation hoped to bring to the discussion, for the first time, a constructive approach aiming at a solution for the question of Southern Rhodesia.

30. Until the revolution of April 1974, Portugal had been one of the main targets of the justified accusations of those who had included it among the few countries openly supporting the rebel régime. The common border with Mozambique—then a Portuguese colony—had facilitated collaboration between the former Portuguese régime and the Smith régime in their policies of repression directed against the legitimate rights of their respective African populations. Portugal had also provided the rebel régime with means which allowed it to evade the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations.

31. The new policy of decolonization carried out by Portugal, one of the major consequences of which was the independence of Mozambique, had substantially changed the balance of power in southern Africa and had shown more clearly the fragility of the illegal régime and extent of its isolation.

32. He believed that the real nature of the illegal régime and its inherent vulnerability were well demonstrated by the data contained in the working paper on Southern Rhodesia prepared by the Secretariat (*ibid.*, annex).

33. The racist, discriminatory and colonialist nature of the Rhodesian régime was strongly condemned by the democratic and progressive Government of Portugal, as had been affirmed by the former Minister for Inter-Territorial Co-ordination in his statement to the Special Committee at its 1008th meeting, held at Lisbon on 17 June 1975. On that occasion, the following guidelines of Portuguese policy regarding the question of Southern Rhodesia had been outlined: firstly, recognition that all the inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia had the same political and civic rights implicit in the principles of "one man, one vote" and of majority rule; secondly, condemnation of the discriminatory and repressive policy of the minority that held political power and exercised economic control over the Territory; thirdly, recognition of the African National Council of Zimbabwe as the only true representative of the aspirations of the people; fourthly, hope that the problem could be resolved peacefully, without prejudice to the use of other means should the unyielding attitude of the régime cause negotiations to fail; fifthly, upholding of the mandatory sanctions laid down by the Security Council.

34. With regard to peaceful settlement, the Portuguese Government praised the efforts made by the Presidents of Zambia, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Botswana, and by the United Kingdom, which had been aimed, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Dar es Salaam Declaration, at bringing together the representatives of the African National Council and of the Smith régime in order to participate in a constitutional conference to decide upon the future of the Territory. The international community could not remain indifferent to the need to solve the Rhodesian question by peaceful means, and the countries that had supported the illegal régime must recognize their special responsibility to exert pressure on it so that it faced the realities arising from the new balance of power in southern Africa. The Salisbury régime had to recognize the impossibility of maintaining the unfair *status quo* and the necessity of engaging, in good faith, in negotiations with the African National Council.

35. With regard to the sanctions, he said that, in view of the very limited extent of the trade between Portugal and Southern Rhodesia, its extinction had only symbolic value. He also noted that the Portuguese Government had closed the Rhodesian diplomatic mission in Lisbon and had recalled its Consul-General from Salisbury.

36. His delegation called the international community's attention to the losses and sacrifices that enforcement of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia imposed upon neighbouring States. Accordingly, Portugal whole-heartedly supported any initiative aimed at setting up a specific programme of assistance to Mozambique. The international community must adopt an attitude in keeping with the courageous stand taken by the Government of Mozambique, which, as its Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated recently in the General Assembly (2375th plenary meeting), had decided to assume all its responsibilities with regard to application of the sanctions.

37. Mr. BING (Liberia) stressed the gravity of the situation in Southern Rhodesia and said that, if the situation got out of hand and led to civil war, its effect on States in the area would be disastrous socially and economically, if not politically.

38. His Government had repeatedly proclaimed its position with regard to the illegal régime of Ian Smith: it was committed to majority rule in Rhodesia on the basis of the principle of self-determination and independence for the black population of the Territory. It wished the Security Council to use its influence to bring pressure to bear on the Smith régime and thereby to avert another holocaust and protect the indigenous population from absolutism and avarice. His delegation's objective was to contribute constructively to the peace and security of all the people of Southern Rhodesia through understanding, co-operation and mutual respect. Implicit in that objective was an appeal to developed States of the Organization to assume their humanitarian responsibilities and obligations towards Africa.

39. In view of the serious conditions of racial tension and ethnic antagonism prevailing in Rhodesia, the more developed States should use their power and experience in efforts to remove all difficulties and bridge the gaps that separated the people of the Territory, with a view to forming a multiracial community that knew no distinction of colour, race or sect. All the parties concerned must reconsider their attitudes, abandon their racial prejudices and resentments and seek to build a constructive relationship so that Rhodesia could make a new beginning and justify its existence as a State.

40. In his speech before the General Assembly on 22 September 1975 (2355th plenary meeting), the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, had said, among other things, that his country welcomed the efforts of both black and white leaders who were seeking to prevent violence and bloodshed and to promote a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, and that all parties involved had an interest in averting civil war. The Secretary of State had also declared that his country would support all efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement. The Liberian delegation entertained the hope that the United States could exert a positive influence on developments in Rhodesia, so that all its people without exception, could live in peace and partnership.

41. Despite resolutions and sanctions, Mr. Smith and his supporters remained intransigent, and unless the United Nations took a more useful and positive position violence might well be the only answer to the problem. Unless the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France took the matter in hand, all efforts at settlement by the black population would be fruitless. It was also to be hoped that the African National Council, ZANU and ZAPU would agree among themselves, would assist in achieving a peaceful climate and would, with the great Powers, find an acceptable formula for direct negotiation.

42. Notwithstanding all the difficulties, his delegation was optimistic. It believed that realization of the futility of armed confrontation would induce all factions in Rhodesia to find a peaceful means to settle their problems. The

alternative to coexistence was mutual destruction. Coexistence required wisdom, clear thinking and a readiness to compromise. It was to be hoped that the great Powers and the United Nations would spare no efforts to solve the problem of Rhodesia for the good of Africa and the world.

43. Mr. SANON (Upper Volta) said it would appear from the statements that had been made on the item under discussion that no State Member of the United Nations had violated the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. Yet two obvious facts persisted: the Smith régime survived without major difficulties, and Rhodesia's imports and exports continued to increase. It was therefore necessary to state that the United Nations was simply lying to itself at the expense of the people of Zimbabwe. Chapter IX of the report of the Special Committee (A/10023/Add.2) indicated that the principal offenders were Japan, France, the United States, the Netherlands, South Africa, Italy, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, despite the profound disappointment caused to Africans by the attitude of the United States Congress towards the Byrd Amendment, his delegation derived some encouragement from the statement made before the General Assembly at the 2355th plenary meeting by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, with regard to the question of Southern Rhodesia, when he had declared that the United States would support all efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement.

44. His delegation appealed to those countries that had violated the sanctions to reverse their stand by taking concrete action. A major difference between the decolonization of Zimbabwe and that of other former Territories was, in fact, that in Zimbabwe the liberation movements had to contend not only with a State, but with a consortium of extremely powerful interests. Consequently, in order to weaken the minority rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, what was needed was scrupulous enforcement of the existing sanctions and a widening of their scope, in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter. That would not be enough, however; the United Kingdom, which bore primary responsibility as the administering Power, must not simply await the day when the majority had assumed power in order to grant independence to its colony but must also furnish effective aid to the freedom fighters.

45. OAU, at the twelfth ordinary session of its Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, had described as fraudulent, in the light of its experience of developments in Southern Rhodesia during the past decade, the manoeuvres engaged in by Vorster and Smith in connexion with what had been termed détente in southern Africa. Ian Smith's tactics were well known; they were to hold talks in order to gain time and build up his forces, thereby demonstrating that he had no interest in reaching a peaceful settlement.

46. He reiterated the Upper Volta's consistent position that any dialogue in southern Africa could only be, and must be, a dialogue between the white minority, which was in power, and the black majority. He was reiterating that position because those Africans who were defending their interests were defending their future and their patrimony and had no other concern than their own future.



47. In the view of his delegation, the problem of Southern Rhodesia was a test for the United Nations. He also urged all the liberation movements to unite, since they had to face a common enemy, Ian Smith. The struggle would be arduous, of course, but there was no doubt that, however long it lasted, it could have only one outcome, namely, victory for the valiant people of Zimbabwe.

48. Mr. RAZZOUQI (Kuwait) said that the situation in Rhodesia was extremely serious and constituted a threat to international peace and security, because the racist minority régime was a negation of fundamental human rights. The United Nations had adopted a number of resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, including the Security Council resolutions establishing sanctions against the Southern Rhodesian régime. However, many Members had not endorsed the sanctions or had not applied them. No excuse should be accepted for failure to comply with the sanctions, which was tantamount to giving support to the Fascist régime in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom had evaded its obligations as the administering Power and had allowed the existence in Southern Rhodesia of a society based on the plundering and exploitation of the black population. It should be recalled that the United Kingdom had adopted a similar attitude in Palestine, when, in withdrawing from the Territory, it had helped to create a racist régime, without regard for the interests of the population.

49. In view of the fact that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a threat to international peace and security, his delegation called for the application of the sanctions, and even armed intervention, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. Whatever was necessary should be done to establish majority rule in Zimbabwe. The existing situation in Southern Rhodesia—namely, the exercise of power by an illegal régime—had been possible because of the political, economic and military support of some States Members of the United Nations. His delegation therefore called on those Member States to abandon their policy of assistance to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and to comply with the relevant United Nations resolutions. The action of the racist Government of South Africa, which rendered assistance to the equally racist white minority Government of Southern Rhodesia, was also to be condemned. Accordingly, his delegation urged the United Nations to impose very strict sanctions on South Africa for the assistance it was rendering to the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia.

50. Mr. ADAM (Somalia) said that there should be no illusions about the policies of the illegal white minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, which were designed to perpetuate the repression of the majority of the population. After Ian Smith had broken off the latest negotiations with the leaders of the people of Zimbabwe, it was apparent that the illegal régime had never had any intention of entering into serious negotiations leading to majority rule, which was the only acceptable formula for the black African majority in the Territory. The black leaders must avoid any division or conflict, which could only weaken them and give the enemy the chance to exploit their differences in an effort to maintain the *status quo*.

51. Despite the fact that the leaders of the liberation movements had frequently shown their willingness to enter into negotiations that would lead to a peaceful and just settlement of the question, and despite the good offices and the untiring efforts of the four African heads of State, who had tried so hard to bring about those negotiations, the situation as it stood now could not be solved politically and peacefully. That was so not through any fault of the leaders of the liberation movements, but because the illegal white minority régime had deliberately caused the breakdown of the negotiations.

52. The main source of power and support for the illegal régime was the collaboration of certain Western States which continued their economic relations with the régime. Those States continued to exploit natural resources that belonged to the people of Zimbabwe, despite the numerous calls of the United Nations to desist from all actions that might impede the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Contrary to what some delegations might wish others to believe, the economic growth of the illegal régime was on the rise. In that connexion, his delegation strongly deplored the increasing and continued importation of chrome and nickel to the United States from Zimbabwe in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) and all the other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Council.

53. Mr. Omer Arteh Ghalib, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Somalia, in his statement to the General Assembly at its 2376th plenary meeting, had addressed a strong appeal to the Government of the United States of America, now celebrating the bicentennial of the first successful war against colonial domination, to desist from those practices and to view the struggles of oppressed peoples today as a reflection of its own revolutionary struggle for freedom and independence. He had also said that it was the duty of the United States Government to view the problem of Zimbabwe not in the light of economic interest, but first and foremost in the context of the more serious and fundamental questions of human rights and universally accepted democratic principles of majority rule.

54. As the Chairman of the Committee had pointed out in her opening statement (2133rd meeting), the Government of the United Kingdom was duty-bound to solve the anomalous situation in Zimbabwe and must exercise its primary responsibility, as the administering Power of the Territory, to create the necessary conditions for immediate majority rule in Zimbabwe. The United Kingdom must take effective measures to enable the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise its rights by establishing immediately full democratic freedom and equality.

55. Because of the obstinacy of the Smith régime, because of the activities of the Vorster régime in South Africa and, most of all, because of the support, both overt and covert, of their Western allies in the field of economic relations, the present situation in Zimbabwe constituted a potential threat to international peace and security.

56. His delegation wished to state that, if armed struggle became the only alternative for the solution of the

Zimbabwe problem, the people and Government of the Somali Democratic Republic would give unqualified support, both morally and materially, to the liberation movements and the people of Zimbabwe. His delegation urged the Committee to take effective measures to exert utmost pressure on the Governments concerned to put an

end to the illegal racist régime in Zimbabwe, and to create the necessary atmosphere for the establishment of immediate majority rule and independence for the people of Zimbabwe.

*The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.*

## 2144th meeting

Thursday, 9 October 1975, at 3.15 p.m.

*Chairman:* Mrs. Famah JOKA-BANGURA (Sierra Leone).

A/C.4/SR.2144 and Corr.1

### AGENDA ITEM 89

Question of Southern Rhodesia (*continued*) (A/9998-S/11598, A/10023/Add.2, A/10050-S/11638, A/C.4/788)

#### GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. BAUDOUIN (Canada) said that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was perhaps more serious than ever before. Important changes had taken place and were still taking place in southern Africa, and to the west, the east and the north, the Africans who made up the vast majority in Southern Rhodesia saw their neighbours, friends and brothers free and independent, having regained their human dignity and fully enjoying their fundamental human rights. They were now more than ever determined to obtain those elementary rights for themselves, and the manner in which that problem was solved was of great importance for the future of humanity.

2. The efforts undertaken by the Presidents of Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique deserved high praise and, while it was true that only the Rhodesians could solve the basic problems of the Territory, it was also true that it was only the leaders of neighbouring countries who could create favourable conditions and prepare the scene for a settlement. Canada therefore fully supported the efforts of the four Presidents and also those of the Prime Minister of South Africa, regardless of his motives.

3. The Smith régime had so far done nothing to indicate a willingness to arrive at a settlement. Despite several meetings since 1965, first with the United Kingdom and currently with the Africans of Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith had never shown himself ready to negotiate seriously or to grant any real concession, even though the opportunity had never been better for him to display good faith. It was to be hoped that he would understand that it was in his real interest to enter into discussions in good faith because, with or without him, majority rule would come.

4. The formation in December 1974 of the unified African National Council had been encouraging; for the first time since the nineteenth century, the white minority in power in Southern Rhodesia had been faced with a single adversary. Canada was therefore concerned at the recent

differences within the Council and hoped that internal rivalries would not divert the Africans of Southern Rhodesia from their real goal.

5. Among the favourite expressions of the Smith régime were "the preservation of civilization" and "civilized rule". It was therefore important to state unambiguously that the true civilized world rejected both the vocabulary and the policies of the rebel régime. The international community should use all the means at its disposal to persuade Ian Smith that he would not succeed in getting it to accept his concept of "civilization".

6. Although the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had not succeeded in bringing about the downfall of the illegal Government, they had at least helped to show the extent of the international community's disapproval of the Smith régime. The success or failure of the sanctions as coercive measures depended on two factors: first, States should accept and be prepared to apply the sanctions, and, second, the sanctions should be realistic and adapted to the economy which they were intended to disrupt. Countries that did not wish, or which openly refused, to apply mandatory sanctions should be exposed to international approbrium.

7. His delegation wished to draw attention to the list of international airlines reported to have had interline agreements with Air Rhodesia in April 1974, given in table 11 in the annex to chapter IX of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/10023/Add.2), which included Air Canada and Canadian Pacific Air. On 13 May 1974, the Secretary-General, on behalf of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia, had brought the matter to the attention of the Canadian Government, which, on 11 September 1974, had informed the Secretary-General that inquiries had shown that all the Canadian airlines involved, namely, Transair Ltd., Nordair Ltd., Canadian Pacific Air and Air Canada, had terminated their interline ticketing and agency agreements with Air Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup> Paragraph 147 of the annex to chapter IX of

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Special Supplement No. 2, annex V, para. 31.*