

under United Nations protection. Moreover, the United Nations Council for Namibia had not yet been able to establish itself in Namibia, as provided in General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V). The latest report of the United Nations Council for Namibia before the Committee (A/9024) confirmed the worsening situation in the Territory. According to that report, South Africa had adopted a number of administrative, political and military measures of a repressive nature in order further to entrench its illegal occupation of the Territory and to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia. It had created an Advisory Council, which was rejected by all the Namibians; it was continuing the policy of fragmentation and of increased repression, even going so far as to harass, banish and deport white missionaries in Namibia. The report confirmed also that the Namibians, for their part, were intensifying their resistance to South Africa's illegal occupation of the Territory and its policies of *apartheid*. That opposition of the overwhelming majority of the Namibians to South Africa's illegal rule had been the most encouraging development during the period under review. The freedom fighters, too, were not abandoning the struggle but, on the contrary, had expanded their area of operation. Furthermore, the Namibians had taken a further step towards political unity and collective political consciousness by the coalition of all the African political parties and organizations in Namibia.

12. The situation was serious and could at any moment explode into violence. It was still within the power of the United Nations to avert the danger by making it possible for the Namibian people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence without resorting to violence. Moreover, it was the duty of the United Nations to meet the challenge hurled at it by South Africa. The Security Council should, at the current session, adopt the most vigorous measures to oblige South Africa to comply with resolution 310 (1972) calling for its immediate withdrawal from the Territory. The report of the International

Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and *Apartheid* in Southern Africa (A/9061) proposed a number of effective measures which the Security Council and the General Assembly might adopt to that end; many of those proposals required the full co-operation of all Member States.

13. Her delegation's position was well known and was unequivocal. It condemned South Africa for its persistent non-compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, for its *apartheid* policies now extended to Namibia and for its oppression of the Namibian people. It disapproved of the actions of the States that were helping South Africa and thus enabling it to thwart the will of the international community and to perpetuate its illegal régime in Namibia. Her delegation supported the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination and independence and commended them for their tireless efforts to throw off the shackles of colonialism and *apartheid*. It thanked the Secretary-General for the efforts he was making on behalf of the Namibian people; it congratulated the Special Committee on its conscientious and thorough consideration of the question and on the consensus adopted on 29 June 1973 at its 926th meeting (see A/9023/Add.2, para. 14) and it commended the United Nations Council for Namibia for its excellent work. It fully endorsed the part of the Lusaka Declaration of the United Nations Council for Namibia (see A/9024, para. 157), in which the Council declared that the United Nations, having assumed responsibility for the Territory, had an obligation to intensify its action to compel South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and that the United Nations Council for Namibia would urge the Security Council to fulfil its obligation under the Charter by taking effective action to compel South Africa to withdraw immediately from Namibia.

*The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.*

## 2049th meeting

Thursday, 1 November 1973, at 10.50 a.m.

*Chairman:* Mr. Leonardo DIAZ GONZALEZ (Venezuela).

A/C.4/SR.2049

### AGENDA ITEM 70

**Question of Namibia (continued) (A/9023/Add.2, A/9024, A/9061, A/9065, A/9066, A/9225 and Corr.1)**

#### GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mrs. JIMENEZ (Cuba) said that, although the question of Namibia had been included in the agenda of the General Assembly for many years and the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations had voted in favour of the resolutions, appeals, condemnations and sanctions adopted with regard to it, the situation in the Territory remained unchanged. In view of the ineffectiveness of condemna-

tions, Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had joined together to take action which had enabled them to make their racist yoke still more oppressive. In Namibia, segregation measures had been accelerated, as was shown by the creation of Ovamboland and Kavangoland, against the will of the Namibian people and of the international community. At the same time, the South African régime cynically maintained contacts with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, contacts of which her delegation disapproved.

2. Referring to the text of the two consensuses adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on 27 April 1972<sup>1</sup> and 29 June 1973 (see A/9023/Add.2, para. 14), she pointed out that both condemned South Africa for its refusal to comply with the decisions of the United Nations and of the International Court of Justice, for its policy of extending *apartheid* to Namibia and its increasing resort to the use of force to oppress the Namibian people. They also condemned the aid which South Africa continued to receive from certain countries which were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and anything which helped to create a situation which seriously weakened the authority of the United Nations. Those two consensuses also paid tribute to the armed struggle of the Namibian people and expressed the hope that the Security Council would take effective measures.

3. Her delegation believed that, in order to analyse the situation in Namibia, it was important to understand the economic aspect of the situation, which was very well described in the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia (A/9024). *Apartheid*, like the economic hegemony of the whites, was sustained by an eminently unfair system of contract labour applied to the blacks. However, the economic tragedy of the Namibian people did not affect the racist minority which governed that Territory; quite the contrary, since it was calculated that the gross domestic product was increasing by 10 per cent a year, benefiting solely those who were in power.

4. There was nothing further to add to that and to all that was known of the South African Government and its plans, except that the Namibian people could rely only on themselves, in other words, on the liberation movement and on the sacrifices of the patriots who gave their lives to defend their country. The time had come to act and to help the Namibian people to save themselves from destruction and death. The South African Government should be outlawed and harried and, until the United Nations found the means to settle that problem, she reminded the Namibian freedom fighters that history was on the side of those who were struggling.

5. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that he would do his best not to engage in polemics, although he observed that since the question of Namibia had been under consideration, namely for some 20 years, it had awakened profound emotions in many representatives, while certain delegations had tried to confound the issue.

6. In fact, the problem involved was not that of *apartheid*, but of mandates and decolonization. He did not mean that *apartheid* had vanished; quite the contrary: the blacks in South Africa continued to be regarded as second-class or third-class citizens. But he wished to distinguish between the two questions and to describe the genesis of the question of Namibia. During the First World War, the countries of the "fertile crescent" region, namely Iraq, Iran, Syria and Palestine, had fought side by side with France and the United Kingdom against Germany and the Central Powers, but in recompense, instead of being given independence, they had been placed under a Mandate, as had

Namibia, under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The inhabitants of Damascus, Jerusalem and Beirut had revolted because they had been deceived by allies who had concealed their colonialist policy under the cloak of mandates. The local Governments had been unable to decide anything without the consent of the local High Commissioner, French or British, and that situation had caused a deep bitterness among the population, which had risen up in revolt during the 1920s against French and British colonialism; the peoples of those regions therefore well knew what the Mandates System represented. However, the Second World War had led to the collapse of empires and the end of mandates; Namibia, a former German Territory which had been placed under United Kingdom Mandate in 1920, was an exception and an anachronism.

7. At the time of the founding of the United Nations, he had been heartened when he had found that the principle of self-determination, one of President Wilson's well-known Fourteen Points, had been embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. It had become apparent, however, that the Palestinian people had been sold, had been the victim of secret agreements, whereas in 1916 the British had promised to liberate them from the Ottoman Empire. The African countries, with the exception of Ethiopia, had also been colonial Territories, as had some Asian countries. He himself, conscious of the rights of those peoples, had been one of those who had sought to make the principle of self-determination a reality. At the present time, the only remaining dependent Territories were those dominated by Portugal and South Africa and the majority of the African countries had been able to wave the flag of independence and become Members of the United Nations.

8. He warned the African delegations against the confusion which too often arose between the questions of *apartheid*, discrimination and Namibia. Once again, he pointed out that the Fourth Committee was dealing with the question of the independence of Namibia and should leave *apartheid* in the background. He then read out draft resolution A/L.486, which he had submitted at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, calling for the appointment by the Secretary-General of one or more co-administrators to administer South West Africa on behalf of the United Nations and to accelerate, during a specified period, the process of Namibia's accession to self-determination and independence.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the United Nations Council for Namibia had been created and, in the true spirit of the Anglo-Saxons, who let people speak and then set a trap for them, the United States, playing the role of an agent of the United Kingdom in the matter, did not oppose it, since it well knew that the question would be submerged under documents. As for the socialist countries, they had tried to uphold the Africans but nothing effective had been done. He himself had consulted Mr. Mendelevich, who at that time had represented the USSR in the Fourth Committee, and had asked him whether it was possible to consider organizing naval patrols of South Africa's shores. In reply, Mr. Mendelevich had told him that the USSR did not want to provoke a confrontation. And today, a further example of that policy could be seen in the situation in the Middle East.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8723/Rev.1)*, chap. IX, para. 19.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 1449th meeting, paras. 172-178.

9. Turning to the question of sanctions, he said that there could be no genuine sanctions unless ships carrying cargoes of illicit goods were intercepted; however, that solution would never be adopted. The African States should not let themselves be deceived by the Western Powers. In that connexion, he cited an example of the policy of those countries: one day, when the General Assembly, at its twenty-first session, had been examining the question of Southern Rhodesia, he had read a newspaper article stating that eight United States oil companies were going to prospect for oil in South Africa and try to circumvent any economic sanctions which the United Nations might apply. A little later, he had bought a later edition of the same newspaper and had seen to his amazement that the article in question had been omitted, under pressure from certain special interest groups. It was important, therefore, not to let oneself be deceived by the so-called freedom of the press.

10. In conclusion, he suggested three solutions to the problem of Namibia, a problem with which, in his view, the Security Council should continue to deal since the General Assembly could only formulate recommendations. The United Nations could adopt the proposal which he had submitted at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, namely, appoint several States, including South Africa, as co-administrators of Namibia. The United Nations could set a time-limit for the accession of Namibia to independence. Finally, but as a last resort, consideration should be given to the sending of troops by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which had an army at its disposal, to liberate Namibia. The United Nations sought peace and not bloodshed, but if there was no other solution, it would have to resort to arms. He would, however, prefer the United Nations to choose between adopting his proposal and organizing negotiations.

11. Mr. TEYMOUR (Egypt) referred to the tragic fate of the Namibian people, who were enslaved by the racist régime of Pretoria and subjected to an inhuman system that was contrary to international law and the Charter of the United Nations, the system of *apartheid*, when their only crime was not to have been born white and to live in a country which the South African racist régime wished to annex because of its wealth, in particular its minerals. South Africa's subsoil contained many minerals of strategic importance, on which many Western countries were dependent, minerals such as antimony, chrome, vanadium, tungsten and uranium, a circumstance which prompted those countries to support South Africa's policy in respect of Namibia. *Apartheid* was therefore not simply a racial question, but a question of neo-colonialism. South Africa had no intention of abandoning a Territory which it exploited to such advantage: the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa had stated unequivocally in 1971 that South Africa would on no account abandon South West Africa and would continue to administer the Territory as an integral part of South Africa. Since South Africa had embarked on the process of annexing Namibia by introducing the South West Africa Affairs Act (1969), which had empowered the South African Parliament to apply all South African laws to Namibia, the situation in the Territory had in no way improved; quite the contrary. In 1972, the South African Government had created a new "homeland" in Eastern Caprivi; in February 1973, it had

introduced a bill declaring Bantustans self-governing; lastly, it had just instituted the so-called Advisory Council, which, moreover, had been categorically rejected by the Namibian people, through Chief Kapuuo, the National Convention and the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). All those measures were part of the policy of the "Bantustanization" of the Territory, the aim of which was to enable South Africa to pursue its policy of *apartheid* and continue to exploit the Territory.

12. The Namibian economy was dominated by foreign companies, which dictated its development in terms of their own interests and not those of the indigenous inhabitants.

13. In order to retain all its advantages in the Territory, the racist régime of South Africa was resorting to force to carry out its severe acts of repression; it was increasing its military forces in Namibia, where it now stationed 15,000 men, and had a military base equipped with an airfield in the eastern part of the Caprivi Strip whence it could launch attack at any moment against Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania. It was also giving military aid, on a reciprocal basis, to other colonialist and racist régimes, such as Southern Rhodesia and Israel. Portugal was at present building several corvettes for South Africa in its shipyards. Israel had obtained plans of the French Mirage fighter engine through agents in Switzerland, had improved them and had made them available to the South African authorities; production had been about to start the previous year. It had also been reported that the Israeli firm of Tadiran was producing, in collaboration with the South African firm of C. F. Fuchs, sophisticated electronic equipment under licence. Tadiran was partly owned by the Israeli Ministry of Defence and 40 per cent of its production went to the Israeli armed forces. Israel was also supplying Arava aircraft, Gabriel missiles and Katyusha rockets to South Africa, which in turn allowed Israel to manufacture a South African napalm bomb under licence. Moreover, according to an article in the *Daily Telegraph* of London, the Mirage III that the Egyptian forces had recently shot down in Sinai was an aircraft of the South African Air Force, which had 52 Mirages; the article added that the Pretoria Government had sent a number of aircraft and pilots to Israel.

14. The reason for that co-operation between the racist régimes, which was helping to kill the Africans in the Middle East as well as the Africans in Namibia, in the Territories under Portuguese administration and in Zambia, had been explained by the Minister of Defence of South Africa when he had defined the position of his Government in respect of the Israel-Arab war in the following terms: the people of South Africa and Israel were fighting against the same enemy; South Africa would not fail to give Israel all the necessary assistance; and South Africa had made itself responsible for the security of navigation round the shores of Africa, just as Israel was doing for navigation through the Suez Canal, the two countries thus rendering the same service to the West. Indeed, South Africa considered that an Arab victory in the Middle East would be a severe blow to it and could lead to an intensification of the terrorist war throughout southern Africa. There was nothing surprising about that opinion when it was remembered that, when the former Prime Minister of South Africa had been asked why the Jews in South Africa had not taken a stand against

*apartheid*, he had replied that the Jews had taken Palestine from the Arabs, who had inhabited the country for over 1,000 years, and that Israel was based on *apartheid* just as South Africa was.

15. In the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization (A/9001/Add.1), the Secretary-General spoke of the grave situation in southern Africa, where millions of people were still deprived of their fundamental rights of self-determination, freedom and independence, and stated that, if that situation continued, it would have serious consequences far outside the confines of the region. Moreover, at the tenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government of OAU he had said that, whereas the Government of South Africa had declared its readiness to assist the people of Namibia to achieve independence, it had not given the desired assurances and clarifications.

16. In the light of the foregoing, Member States should recommend the application of the relevant measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to South Africa. If the international community failed in its duty towards the people of Namibia, the valiant freedom fighters would not fail to conquer independence for Namibia by force of arms, as the heroic people of Guinea-Bissau had done.

17. Mr. SIDIK (Indonesia) said that, in the struggle to free the Namibian people, all groups and individuals who were parties to that struggle should realize the necessity of submerging their differences in the effort to achieve their common goal—the liberation of the Territory. The unity of those participating in the struggle was a prerequisite, for any division would be exploited by the colonial Powers, which were always prepared to employ the strategy of “divide and rule” that had served them so well in the past.

18. The United Nations and the Fourth Committee had special obligations towards the Namibian people, arising from the past decisions of the United Nations itself, in particular resolution 2145 (XXI) by which the General Assembly had terminated the Mandate of South Africa for the Territory, the legality of that act having been confirmed by the International Court of Justice.<sup>3</sup> In that light, it behoved the Fourth Committee to take action to ensure the rapid progress of the people of Namibia towards the exercise of their inalienable rights as guaranteed to them by the Charter and by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

19. Unfortunately, recent developments, far from moving in that direction, showed that the South African Government was more determined than ever to maintain its control of the Territory and to extend its policy of discrimination and oppression to Namibia.

20. In its report to the General Assembly (A/9024), the United Nations Council for Namibia noted (*ibid.*, para. 19) that the true representatives of the Namibian people refused to collaborate with the South African Government and had denounced the Advisory Council imposed by the

Vorster régime, for they held that that body did not represent either the interests or the feelings of the majority of the inhabitants of the Territory.

21. Furthermore, the colonialist régime continued to apply its policy of fragmentation, in the hope of weakening the opposition groups which were seeking to attain independence for a unified territory. By attacking the integrity of Namibia, the South Africans hoped to triumph once again. The implementation of that policy was all the more reprehensible in view of the fact that it had been taking place at the very time that negotiations were being conducted between the South African Government and the representative of the Secretary-General in accordance with Security Council resolution 323 (1972). In the course of those negotiations the representative of the Secretary-General had been assured that the South African Government recognized and respected the integrity of the Territory. As was stated in the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia (*ibid.*, para. 26), such tactics revealed the unscrupulous methods of the South African leaders. The people of Namibia, however, were not deceived, as was shown by their boycott of the recent elections in Ovambo-land and Kavangoland. That fact was a tribute to the effective leadership of SWAPO. The policy of oppression practised by the South African régime had in fact strengthened the resistance of the Namibians, as was seen from a number of incidents reported in the newspapers of the Territory.

22. Against that background, it became more and more important for the United Nations and its associated organizations to support the struggle of the Namibian people. One of the best ways of doing so was by allowing the Namibians to participate in the work of the Organization and the specialized agencies. Such participation would be of two-fold benefit: on the one hand, it would prepare the Namibians for the exercise of their right of self-government and, on the other, it would provide the United Nations with a continuing stream of information on conditions in the Territory and thus enable it to judge better what steps were necessary to remove Namibia from the domination of South Africa and to prepare the Namibian people for the full exercise of their rights.

23. Miss Rogers had made a number of useful suggestions in that connexion at the 2047th meeting; particularly interesting was her suggestion for the organization of a team within the Secretariat which would co-ordinate action on the resolutions adopted by the various bodies of the United Nations. Such a team, which should include some Namibians, could play a most useful role in drawing attention to the provisions and possible application of existing resolutions.

24. His delegation considered that the suggestions made by Miss Rogers merited the serious consideration of the General Assembly and the United Nations Council for Namibia. Such participation by the Namibians would, of course, have to be carefully prepared in order to ensure that the Namibians derived the greatest possible benefit from it. There would be various difficulties to be overcome first of all, especially those with financial implications.

25. As the Council had made clear in its report (*ibid.*, paras. 57-118), South Africa had imposed a typical colonial

<sup>3</sup> See *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, *Advisory Opinion*, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.



economy on Namibia. An essential factor in such an economic situation was the exploitation of the resources of the colony by foreign economic interests; in the case under consideration, it had had a pernicious effect on Namibian interests.

26. The Council's examination of the activities of foreign economic interests in Namibia, undertaken pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3031 (XXVII), showed clearly that colonial exploitation of the most serious type existed in the Territory. The Namibians were being robbed of their national wealth, which, on the contrary, was benefiting the South African régime by enabling it to purchase the expensive modern weapons it needed in order to keep the Territory in a state of subjugation.

27. In those circumstances, the suggestion by the Reverend Michael Scott that the Council for Namibia should exercise all authority over Namibia's natural resources (*ibid.*, para. 253) should be speedily implemented in the most effective way possible. If States Members of the United Nations continued to integrate their economic systems into the South African type of colonial economy, those States were in danger of becoming outright supporters of *apartheid*.

28. A new and particularly disturbing aspect of such exploitation was the development of concession areas in Namibia by seven leading international petroleum companies (*ibid.*, para. 91). It was essential that effective action should be taken to prevent those and other companies from embarking upon the full-scale exploitation of the valuable resources of the Territory without the consent of the Namibian people. In that connexion, several suggestions made by the Reverend Michael Scott at the 2047th meeting should be seriously considered. He had suggested that the influence of the churches might be of benefit to the Namibian people. Some church groups in the United States and other Western countries were already refusing to invest their funds in the stock of companies active in South Africa. Students and universities might also draw attention to those issues. The suggestion made by the Reverend Michael Scott that churches might invest their funds in non-profit-making development corporations that had as their aim the advancement of the Namibian people, without waiting for the removal of South Africa's presence, was most ingenious. In that way substantial aid could be given to the Namibians despite the illegal régime's refusal to provide such aid itself. That would be bound to heighten, through education and improved economic conditions, the political awareness of the Namibians and to make their resistance to the Vorster Government more active and more effective.

29. The intentions of the South African Government were perfectly clear and it was more important than ever that all members of the international community should do their utmost to bring the domination of Namibia by South Africa to an early end. One way in which that could be done would be to contribute to the United Nations Fund for Namibia. Indonesia would, for its part, continue to support the Fund in the future as it had in the past.

30. In conclusion he would recall that despite his country's misgivings at the time, it had approved the decision in

Security Council resolution 309 (1972) that talks should be begun between the South African Government and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. But it was clear that such discussion had so far yielded no useful results. Consequently Indonesia supported the request of the United Nations Council of Namibia that an end should be put to those discussions. The future of the Namibian people rested to a large extent in the hands of the United Nations. It would depend to a considerable extent on the Member States whether the people of Namibia would soon be free or whether they would have to wage a long and bloody struggle to obtain their rights.

31. Mr. DOLZHINTSEREN (Mongolia) noted that the situation in Namibia was still a matter of concern to all mankind. Not only did South Africa continue to occupy the Territory and refuse to grant the Namibian people self-determination, but it was intensifying its policy of terror.

32. The international community had condemned the extension of *apartheid* to Namibia by the Government of Pretoria, but that did not deter the latter from persisting in its action of regrouping the African population on tribal lands on the Bantustan model.

33. Although General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) had been upheld by the International Court of Justice in 1971, South Africa still took no account of United Nations decisions and respected none of the obligations which devolved upon it under the Charter. Everyone knew that it was able to do that because it had the support of certain Western Powers.

34. Namibia was one of the main world producers of diamonds and of valuable ores such as copper, zinc and uranium. The exploitation of those valuable resources was entirely in the hands of foreign monopolies, whose only aim was to enrich themselves. The report of the United Nations Council on Namibia (A/9024) clearly brought out that state of affairs. In their looting of the Namibian heritage the monopolies enjoyed the full support of the Pretoria Government and were therefore direct accomplices in the crimes perpetrated by the racists against Namibia. Their interests coincided with the military interests of their own countries, which were consequently doubly accomplices of South Africa.

35. In view of that situation, his delegation considered that the General Assembly should condemn not only South Africa but also its accomplices. Mongolia called on those countries to stop co-operating with the Pretoria Government and to take the necessary legislative and other measures to put an end to the exploitation of Namibia by those monopolies.

36. The contacts of the United Nations with South Africa seemed to have been utilized to gain time and to consolidate the Pretoria Government's position. The South African Government had during that time adopted a law for the development of self-government for the indigenous peoples of South West Africa and had established what it claimed was a multiracial Advisory Council. In May 1973, the status of self-governing region had been granted to Ovamboland and Kavangoland, but those two areas remained in fact

under Vorster's authority. That was a manoeuvre of South Africa designed to perpetuate its rule over the territory. What was more, a number of large companies, particularly United States companies, had taken advantage of the contacts to consolidate their position in Namibia and exploit the mineral wealth of the territory. The Mongolian delegation had fears and misgivings about such contacts and discussions. It felt that to pursue them would be contrary to the interests of the Namibian people and thought that an end should be put to them in accordance with the views of OAU, the United Nations Council of Namibia and the Special Committee.

37. Obviously the Namibian people could not continue to accept the occupation of their territory. The liberation movement was constantly gaining strength and disturbances were breaking out, particularly in Ovamboland, which was one of the most populated areas. The racist Government obviously reacted immediately, which only served to make matters worse. In that connexion he wished to pay a tribute to the action of SWAPO and to thank the representatives of that organization for their contribution to the work of the Committee.

38. The racists were refusing to withdraw from the territory, so that it was the duty of the international community to give its full support to the Namibian population. His delegation approved chapter VIII of the report of the Special Committee (A/9023/Add.2), which urged that political, moral and military aid should continue to be given to the Namibian people and to its liberation movement, both through the United Nations and specialized agencies and on a bilateral basis, so that the territory could achieve its freedom.

39. The General Assembly must also request the Security Council to take effective measures to ensure the application of its previous decisions in the matter. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the General Assembly would adopt a decision along those lines which would promote the true interests of the Namibian people. His own delegation would give it its full co-operation.

40. Mr. MONTROYA (Peru) noted that the South African Government was persisting in its negative attitude despite the advisory opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice in 1971 and the numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations.

41. The South African Government's attitude was creating a situation which tended to weaken the authority of the United Nations. Since 1967, when the United Nations Council for Namibia had been set up, the Organization had

in general been unable to assume directly its responsibilities for that Territory and it had never been able to administer Namibia effectively.

42. The South African Government was continuing to defy the United Nations by adopting legislation which further confirmed the partition of Namibia into "Bantustans" and was pursuing its inhuman policy of *apartheid*. It had as its allies the economic, financial and other interests of certain countries and large enterprises, which grew prosperous from the exploitation of the natural resources of the Territory at the expense of the Namibian people, for they went so far as to take advantage of racial discrimination laws to commit abuses from which they profited. But the Namibian people were not discouraged. They were determined to struggle for their liberation, achieve their legitimate rights and intensify their political resistance, as the representative of SWAPO had declared in the Fourth Committee (2046th meeting).

43. The Government and people of Peru supported the struggle of the Namibian people. They condemned the policy of colonialism and racial discrimination of the South African Government and also the attitude of the countries that were working together to promote that policy.

44. True to its anti-colonialist position and opposed as it was to any form of discrimination, his delegation would support any initiative that might help the Namibian people to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, based on national unity and territorial integrity, and to find a solution which would bring to an end a situation which endangered international peace and security.

45. Mr. DE LATAILLADE (France) wished to deny the statements that France had opened a consulate in Namibia. France had a consular agency at Walvis Bay, in South African territory. Its agent, Mr. Albrecht, who had reached an advanced age, had retired at Grootfontein but was provisionally retaining the functions he had held at Walvis Bay, which probably accounted for the misunderstanding.

46. It was incorrect that a certain Mrs. Christina von Garnier was now carrying out the functions of Mr. Albrecht in a French consular agency that had been opened at Windhoek. Mrs. von Garnier was only President of the Alliance Française, which was a private and local association having nothing to do with a consular agency. The French Government had no intention of appointing a consular agent anywhere in Namibia.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*