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Chairman: Mr. Hermod LANNUNG (Denmark).

AGENDA ITEM 33

Draft Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (Economic and Social Council resolution 587 E (XX), A/2944, A/3059, A/C.6/L.373, A/3154, chap. VII, section IX, para. 541, A/3193, A/C.3/L.519, A/C.3/L.520) (continued)

NEW ARTICLE (concluded)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited any members of the Committee who wished to do so to explain the vote they had cast at the previous meeting.

2. Mr. MARTINS DE CARVALHO (Portugal) pointed out that some countries were in a special position with regard to universally applicable conventions, and could not sign them unless certain provisions were inserted. That was the only reason why his delegation had voted for the Belgian amendment (A/C.3/L.513), which took account of the political and legal structure of certain States. As that amendment had not been adopted, the Portuguese delegation had voted for the joint amendment (A/C.3/L.523/Rev.1 and A/C.3/L.523/Add.1 and 2) which served the same purpose and represented a valuable effort at conciliation.

3. Mr. ABIDIA (Libya), who had been absent when the vote had been taken, requested the inclusion in the summary record of a statement to the effect that his delegation had been opposed to both of the amendments submitted.

4. Miss BERNARDINO (Dominican Republic) had abstained in the vote on the joint amendment (A/C.3/L.523/Rev.1 and A/C.3/L.523/Add.1 and 2) in conformity with the position of principle her delegation had adopted in regard to that particular aspect of women's rights. It considered that those rights should be universal, and that women in the metropolitan States and in the Non-Self-Governing Territories should enjoy them on a footing of complete equality. But she did not underestimate the efforts to secure a compromise made by the delegations of Peru, Chile and Mexico as well as by the United Kingdom delegation with a view to facilitating the application of the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, particularly in the colonial territories.

5. Her delegation was anxious that a majority of countries should sign the Convention at the current session of the General Assembly. It hoped that when it had been ratified, the signatory States would apply it in such a manner as to abolish all forms of discrimination between men and women in matters of nationality. It was important that a woman should not be deprived of her nationality of origin as a result of marriage with an alien.

6. As no colonial clause had been included, she wondered whether the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Syria and Afghanistan would be able to sign the Convention.

7. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that as soon as the Convention had been adopted, his delegation would have it translated into Arabic and would transmit it to the Saudi Arabian Government, with a favourable recommendation. But he could not undertake to say what his Government's final decision would be.

8. Mr. MARRIOTT (Australia) said that his Government was prepared to extend the provisions of the Convention to all the non-metropolitan territories administered by it. That was why his delegation had refrained from pointing out the difficulties to which the joint amendment might have given rise. While his delegation would have preferred to allow the administering Powers greater latitude with regard to the application of the Convention, he had nevertheless felt that he could vote for the joint amendment.

9. Mr. BRINSON (United Kingdom) had voted for the two amendments, which would have enabled his Government to consult the Non-Self-Governing Territories in cases where consultation was required by the constitutional arrangements in force. His delegation deeply regretted the result of the vote, which seemed to indicate that the majority of the Committee attached greater importance to doctrinaire anti-colonialism than to the practical objectives of progressive self-government and of securing the most extensive application of the Convention. In connexion with the question just raised by the representative of the Dominican Republic, it was interesting to note that hardly one of the Arab or Asian States whose representatives had voted against the Peruvian amendment had yet ratified the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (General Assembly resolution 640 (VII), annex), although that Convention contained no colonial clause. As a result of the Committee's decision, the United Kingdom might be compelled to vote against the Convention, and would be unable to accede to it. His delegation would, however, continue to participate in the examination of the various articles.

10. Mr. AHMED (Pakistan) said that his delegation was in favour of universal application of the Convention, whose provisions, based as they were on article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were essentially designed to achieve equal

rights for men and women with regard to nationality, and to eliminate some of the problems encountered by women married to nationals of countries other than their own. That meant that it was a purely humanitarian Convention, and there should be no restrictions on its application.

11. Neither of the two proposals before the Committee had been entirely satisfactory. Colonialism was doomed to disappear shortly, but until it did disappear, some practical means must be found to ensure that women in the Non-Self-Governing Territories should benefit by the provisions of the Convention. It should have been possible to place an obligation on the metropolitan States in that respect and to obtain undertakings from them. His delegation had been obliged to abstain from voting on both of the draft amendments.

12. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) was not in a position to give an official reply to the question as to his Government's final decision on the Convention. But his delegation had voted for the first three articles of the Convention, and would vote for the rest if the text was satisfactory. As it had acted on the instructions of its Government, that vote was some indication of the final decision which that Government would take. He was convinced that the omission of a colonial clause would make matters easier for his Government and encourage it to adopt a favourable attitude.

13. Miss BERNARDINO (Dominican Republic) thanked the representatives of Saudi Arabia and Syria. The Dominican Republic, which had been the first country to sign the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, was deeply concerned with all social problems and would undoubtedly be among the first signatories to the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women.

ARTICLE 7

14. The CHAIRMAN requested the Committee to proceed to the consideration of article 7 of the draft Convention (Economic and Social Council resolution 587 E (XX), annex A).

15. Mr. MASSOUD-ANSARI (Iran) said that his delegation had a particular interest in that article. It had abstained from voting on the preamble and the three substantive articles of the Convention, because article 976 of the Iranian Civil Code automatically conferred Iranian nationality on any alien woman who married an Iranian. That provision, which was designed to protect the unity of the family, and in particular to put an alien woman on the same footing as her husband before the law, was the only piece of Iranian legislation that conflicted with the provisions of the Convention. His delegation had said that, if the word "automatically" in article 1 were replaced by the phrase "without the wife's consent", his Government would have been able to accede to the Convention without reservations. Although that suggestion had not been accepted, it was still open to the Iranian Government to make reservations.

16. There were many who, quite rightly, opposed the inclusion of articles concerning reservations in conventions relating to human rights. But in cases where there was a conflict of laws and a conflict of ideas, the insertion of a clause of that nature would enable countries whose legislation was not entirely in conformity with the provisions of the Convention to accede

to it as soon as it was adopted. His delegation would therefore support article 7. With regard to the effects of reservations, he did not think that a State making reservations should be deprived of the benefits of other provisions of the Convention in its relations with signatory States, unless those States gave express notice that they would not consider themselves bound in respect of that particular State. His delegation would be prepared on those grounds to support the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.519).

17. Mr. AZARA (Italy) thought that despite the inclusion of a reservations clause, his country might find some difficulty in acceding to the Convention. While article 3 of the Italian Constitution proclaimed the principle that all were absolutely equal before the law, article 29 stated another vitally important principle, that of the unity of the family. Under Italian law, a wife took her husband's nationality. The possibility of amending certain provisions of the Italian nationality law, which dated from 1912, was currently under consideration. An attempt would probably be made to avoid cases of statelessness and to take the wife's wishes into account, in her own interests and in the interests of the family and of society in general. In view of the existing situation, the Italian delegation would be obliged to abstain in the vote on article 7.

18. Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria) said that some of the provisions of the Convention were at variance with Austrian legislation, which was based on the principle of family unity. Article 7 of the Convention was accordingly of special importance to Austria. The Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520) constituted an innovation, in that it considerably modified the scope of the reservations clause. The Austrian authorities would give that question their full consideration.

19. Mrs. MIRONOVA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) drew attention to the legal consequences of article 7. Under that article, if any State objected to a reservation, the Convention would not enter into force as between that State and the State making the reservation. Reservations to multilateral conventions did not usually relate to the substantive provisions. It would accordingly be better to decide that, with the exception of those parts to which the reservation related, the Convention should have effect as between the State making the reservation and the other Parties. The right to make reservations was an inalienable prerogative of sovereign States, but the other signatory States were entitled to take a stand with regard to such reservations. If they did not intend to consider themselves bound by the Convention in respect of a State making a reservation, they must give express notice to that effect. The amendment proposed by the USSR delegation (A/C.3/L.519) was based on those considerations.

20. The United Kingdom amendment (A/C.6/L.373, point 2) would weaken the Convention, the purpose of which was precisely to encourage Governments to amend legislation which was not in keeping with its provisions. The United Kingdom amendment would enable Governments to keep such legislation on the statute books even after their accession to the Convention, which would thus lose all its practical value. The Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520) was based on an erroneous principle. It might be asked why, since it excluded articles 1 and 2, it did not also exclude article 3, which likewise contained substantive provi-

sions. The two amendments were accordingly not acceptable. A formula must be found which, without weakening the text of the Convention, would take into account both the principles of the United Nations Charter and those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

21. Mr. VLAHOV (Yugoslavia) said that in principle his delegation was opposed to reservations, because they might have the effect of rendering the Convention meaningless. However, if it was felt by the majority of the delegations that a reservations clause was absolutely essential, reservations should be restricted to a minimum by specifying the articles to which they could be made. The Yugoslav delegation could not agree to reservations to the first three articles, for they constituted the substance of the Convention.

22. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) pointed out that article 7 of the draft Convention consisted of two paragraphs, one concerning the making of reservations and the other concerning their withdrawal. He would like to know whether the amendment submitted by the USSR (A/C.3/L.519) was intended to replace paragraph 1 of the article or to replace the article as a whole. The elimination of paragraph 2 would be unfortunate, because its provisions were useful and should be retained. Moreover, the Syrian delegation would have preferred that the articles of the Convention should not be subject to reservations. In point of fact, the scope of the Convention was very limited; it covered only a few aspects of the problems involved. Differences between the laws of the signatory States would be few and comparatively unimportant, and they would probably not necessitate reservations.

23. A reservations clause would have the advantage of permitting a larger number of States to accede to the Convention. However, reservations should be restricted to certain articles and should not in any event relate to the substantive articles. For that reason, the Syrian delegation supported the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520), which precluded reservations to articles 1 and 2. The USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.519) also was satisfactory, because it provided that certain provisions of the Convention would continue to have effect as between the State making the reservations and the State or States refusing to accept those reservations. It was in the interest of the international community that the Convention should remain in force despite any reservations which might be made to some provisions. But the USSR amendment did not specify which articles would be subject to reservations, as did the Cuban text. The two amendments were, therefore, complementary and should be adopted together.

24. Mrs. MIRONOVA (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that her delegation had not incorporated paragraph 2 of article 7 in its amendment (A/C.3/L.519), because it was understood that States could always withdraw their reservations. If the Committee thought it useful to be specific on that point, the USSR delegation would have no objection to retaining the paragraph.

25. Mrs. MURPHY (Ireland) said that her Government could accept without reservation the substantive articles the Committee had so far adopted (A/3059, para. 21). The laws in force in Ireland were in line with the provisions of articles 1 and 2 and went even further than those of article 3. In that connexion, she gave a brief account of her country's legislation on

the nationality of married women. Her delegation would have preferred no reservations clause in the Convention, but if there had to be one, she would support the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520).

26. Mr. GOMEZ ROBLEDI (Mexico) thought that the USSR amendment provided a useful amplification of article 7 of the draft Convention, because it specified the legal effect of reservations. Its provisions were in conformity with Pan-American legislation and with the principle of the freedom of States in international law. Moreover, they established the principle of reciprocity, thus precluding a State that made reservations from enjoying a privileged position with respect to other States. Accordingly, the Mexican delegation supported the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.519), which did not at first sight appear to be incompatible with the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520).

27. Mrs. ELLIOT (United Kingdom) said that article 7 should be so drafted as not to impair the effectiveness and unity of the Convention. Every State party to the Convention should be bound by the Convention towards every other party.

28. No reservations should be allowed to articles 1 and 2, which were the most important articles of the Convention; the United Kingdom delegation would therefore support the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520). The USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.519), on the other hand, was open to objection for a number of reasons. It would permit States to participate in the Convention without accepting any substantial obligations under it. Any State would have the right to make as many reservations as it liked to as many provisions of the Convention as it liked. Those reservations could amount to a complete derogation from all the obligations of the Convention. Nevertheless, the State concerned would be able to claim that it was a party to the Convention, provided only that one other State, possibly through feelings of friendship, or because it was in a similar position, or through inadvertence, did not notify the Secretary-General of its non-acceptance of the reservations made. Furthermore, the USSR amendment would destroy the unity of the Convention; if it were adopted, the Convention would be in force between some parties to it, but not between others. In practice, that system would lead to great complications.

29. The United Kingdom amendment (A/C.6/L.373, point 2) would, on the contrary, keep reservations within reasonable limits and preserve the unity of the Convention. Under the article proposed by the United Kingdom, a State could only make a reservation to the extent that its existing law required it, and a reservation, to be valid, had to be accepted by two-thirds of the States which had signed or acceded to the Convention or deposited their instruments of ratification. If the reservation was accepted, the State making it would become a party to the Convention and the Convention would be in force as between that State and all the other parties, subject to the reservation. Moreover, the United Kingdom amendment provided that States making reservations should bring their laws into conformity with the provisions of the Convention, thus enabling them in due course to withdraw their reservations.

30. The United Kingdom delegation would vote in favour of the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520), but if it was rejected, it would press for a vote on its

own amendment (A/C.6/L.373, point 2) which, in its view, safeguarded the effectiveness of the Convention more than the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.519).

31. Mr. EUSTATHIADES (Greece) pointed out that the first sentence of the French text of the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.519) did not seem to be a correct translation of the original. If the Russian text were compared with the French text, it would be seen that the French might give the impression that States could make reservations to only one article of the Convention, whereas the Russian text said, not "to an article" but "to any article of this Convention".

32. Two important considerations should be borne in mind with regard to the reservations clause: first, the unity of the Convention; secondly, its ratification by the greatest possible number of States. The greater the uniformity of application of the Convention—which would be obtained by excluding reservations—the smaller the number of Contracting States would be likely to be. That risk would not be so great if the Soviet amendment were accepted, greater with the United Kingdom amendment (A/C.6/L.373, point 2) and greater still with the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520). The USSR amendment was therefore preferable. If, however, the Soviet delegation intended to retain the provision in article 7, paragraph 2, of the draft Convention, he would draw its attention to the fact that paragraph 4 of the United Kingdom amendment was more flexible, since it allowed for the partial withdrawal of reservations. The USSR amendment could also be amplified by a reference to the legislation of different countries and by mentioning, as was done in paragraph 1 of the United Kingdom amendment, that any reservation made should be accompanied by a statement of the law or laws to which it related.

33. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) supported the Greek representative's suggestion regarding the withdrawal of reservations. He wished to make it clear, however, that his support for one of the paragraphs of the United Kingdom amendment was without prejudice to his delegation's position on the amendment as a whole.

34. Mr. THIERRY (France) said that the Committee was dealing with one of the most difficult and complex problems of international law, because reservations involved the problem of international legislation.

35. Laws, whether international or domestic, should be generally applicable and uniform. By eliminating the territorial clause, the Committee had already jeopardized the principle of universality, because it had thus prevented certain States from ratifying the Convention. The reservations clause must not impair that principle still further or undermine the uniformity of the Convention. A balance had to be struck between universality and uniformity; in other words, reservations should be allowed, but they should be restricted. In line with the opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice with respect to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,¹ the French delegation considered that reservations should not relate to what constituted the substance of the Convention; they should be in accordance with the aim and objective of the Convention.

¹ *Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion*: I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15.

Consequently, it would support the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520), because it precluded any reservations to article 1 and 2, which were the fundamental provisions of the Convention.

36. To provide, as did the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.519), that States should be bound with respect to the other Parties not by the whole Convention, but by certain provisions only, would result in an unfortunate distortion of the Convention and would lead to extremely complicated situations. The French Government had always held that the legal validity of reservations was dependent on their explicit or tacit acceptance by the original Contracting Parties. Consequently, the principle underlying the USSR amendment should be rejected, and the Committee should adhere to the principle stated in the United Kingdom amendment (A/C.6/L.373, point 2).

37. Mr. TSAO (China) noted that while reservations undermined the effectiveness of international conventions in general, they had particularly serious effects when they related to a text as brief as the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women. If States were allowed to make reservations to the first two articles, which embodied the basic principles underlying the whole Convention, the latter would be virtually robbed of its substance, and would probably be reduced to article 3, which dealt only with special circumstances. In order to avoid seriously impairing the effectiveness of the Convention, the Chinese delegation would vote in favour of the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520) and against the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.519).

38. Mrs. KRASSOWSKA (Poland) said that as reservations were wholly admissible in international law, the only problem concerned the effect they were to be recognized as having. Her delegation considered that, with the exception of the provisions which were the subject of reservations, the Convention should have effect as between the State making the reservations and the other parties. That, incidentally, was the inter-American practice. The Soviet amendment (A/C.3/L.519) corresponded to the views of Poland and it would further enable a large number of States to become parties to the Convention. She would therefore vote in its favour.

39. Mrs. SHOHAM-SHARON (Israel) said that her country was among those which had signed and ratified the Convention on the Political Rights of Women and that it also intended to sign and ratify the Convention under consideration. Her delegation had abstained from voting on the first three articles at the tenth session of the General Assembly because the Ministry of Justice had not yet completed its study of the draft Convention. As the Israel delegation had explained at the time, it had abstained for a technical reason and not for reasons of principle. The Israel delegation had in the meantime been authorized to vote for the three substantive articles. The draft Convention was wholly in accord with Israel law practice.

40. Her delegation thought it undesirable for the essential provisions of the Convention to be the subject of reservations; if they were, the advantages the Convention offered and its effectiveness would be seriously impaired and its unity destroyed. In her delegation's view, it would therefore be preferable for the three substantive articles not to be subject to reservations and for States to ratify the Convention only

after they had amended their own legislation to conform to its requirements. Since the first two articles were the *raison d'être* of the Convention, the Israel delegation would support the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520); her delegation suggested that if article 7 were listed among those to which reservations could not be made, the Cuban amendment would be rendered more effective.

41. Miss MAÑAS (Cuba) pointed out that if States were given the right to make reservations to the basic provisions of the Convention, that instrument might be deprived of all value. To eliminate that danger, the Cuban delegation had submitted a text proposing that all reservations to articles 1 and 2, the fundamental articles of the Convention, should be prohibited. It had not mentioned article 3 because it wished to take into account the requirements of public policy in the signatory States. It nevertheless agreed that it was desirable that there should be no reservations to the three substantive articles; accordingly, if such were the wish of the majority, she could amend her draft to apply to article 3 as well. In that case, however, she would ask the Committee to vote separately on the original amendment (A/C.3/L.520) concerning articles 1 and 2 and on the same amendment including article 3.

42. She would be unable to support the Soviet amendment (A/C.3/L.519), which would permit all reservations without limitation.

43. Miss BRUUN (Denmark) said that while she wanted as many States as possible to be able to ratify the Convention, she felt that its fundamental principles could not be sacrificed merely to ensure its universal application. If there were too many reservations, the Convention might very well become a dead letter. For that reason her delegation could not accept the Soviet amendment (A/C.3/L.519), which placed no restriction whatever on the right of States to make reservations. It preferred the Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520), which prohibited any reservation to articles 1 and 2. That was the least that could be done and it might perhaps even be desirable to prohibit reservations to article 3.

44. Mr. BRATANOV (Bulgaria) considered that, in line with the practice adopted with respect to multilateral treaties, the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women should contain an article on reservations. The Soviet Union delegation had presented a wholly acceptable draft on the subject which clarified the matter considerably.

45. The Bulgarian delegation did not consider the United Kingdom amendment (A/C.6/L.373, point 2) satisfactory. Paragraph 2 of the text proposed by the United Kingdom was particularly debatable, as it would tend to limit the number of countries acceding to the Convention; that was undesirable since an instrument of a humanitarian nature was involved.

46. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) pointed out a contradiction in the French representative's statement. The French representative believed that the Convention should have the widest possible application but nevertheless criticized the Soviet amendment which provided that all the provisions of the Convention, with the exception of those which were the subject of reservations, should have effect as between the State making the reservations and the other parties. It could hardly be denied,

however, that the purpose of that draft was plainly to ensure the universal application of the Convention. Moreover, it was not incompatible with the Cuban proposal (A/C.3/L.520), since the expression "any article" in the Soviet amendment (A/C.3/L.519) was to be understood as meaning only those articles to which reservations could be made. The Syrian delegation believed that the fundamental articles of the Convention should not be subject to reservations and accordingly supported the Cuban amendment. It also endorsed the Soviet amendment, which satisfactorily detailed the effect of reservations on the application of the Convention.

47. He proposed two amendments to article 7, paragraph 2. The first was the insertion of the words "in whole or in part after it has been accepted" after the words "withdraw the reservation". The second was the addition of the following sentence at the end of the paragraph: "Such communication shall take effect on the date on which it is received".

48. He would vote against the United Kingdom amendment, paragraph 4 of which, incidentally, had been embodied substantially in the amendments he had just presented.

49. Mr. BRENA (Uruguay) stressed the practical importance of the provisions of article 7, on which the fate of the Convention largely depended. In an age when States still differed widely in their nationality laws, an article on reservations seemed inevitable, since it was the only means of reconciling the diversity of national juridical systems and the supranational principles established by treaty. It should be noted, however, that if all the provisions of a convention could be the subject of reservations, the instrument would consist solely of optional clauses and would then be a convention only in name. To avoid that danger, it was necessary to specify the articles to which reservations could or could not be made. Moreover, article 7 of the draft Convention left it open to the Committee to indicate which articles it considered absolutely imperative. The Cuban delegation had proposed that articles 1 and 2 should be so considered. That seemed to be the most logical solution, for those two articles embodied the fundamental principles underlying the Convention.

50. It could be asked whether the States should not be denied the possibility of making reservations to article 3. The question was a serious one because some States, including Uruguay, distinguished between naturalization and citizenship, and that distinction was in many cases confirmed by constitutional provisions that were difficult to amend. Nor should the fact be overlooked that the provisions of article 3 themselves constituted reservations. In any event, a draft which did not specify the articles to which reservations were inadmissible would be inadequate. In that respect the Soviet Union amendment (A/C.3/L.519), which permitted unlimited reservations, was unsatisfactory to the Uruguayan delegation. It would be acceptable only if it were so drafted as to prohibit States from making reservations to articles 1 and 2.

51. It was the Committee's duty to adopt a constructive text, which would in practice improve the lot of women. The Cuban amendment (A/C.3/L.520) would prevent States from ever again challenging the essential principles of the Convention and for that reason seemed to be entirely appropriate.

52. Mr. PUDLAK (Czechoslovakia) emphasized the right of sovereign States to make reservations to the articles of a convention. He would vote for the Soviet amendment (A/C.3/L.519) which, in conformity with international practice, unequivocally embodied that right. He proposed that, in any event, the vote on article 7 and the relevant amendments should be deferred until the next meeting.

53. Mr. EUSTATHIADES (Greece), referring to the French representative's statement, pointed out that the question of reservations was perhaps not quite the same in the case of the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women as in that of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In the latter Convention the prohibition of acts of genocide related to public international law and the other provisions concerned implementation. Moreover, for the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women no reservations clause had yet been adopted and the Committee was therefore quite free to draft the clause as it saw fit.

54. The Committee had a choice between two approaches: either to admit reservations or to disallow them. If it admitted reservations, they would be bound to relate to articles 1, 2 and 3, since the other articles were too unimportant for States to wish to make reservations concerning them, with the exception of article 9, where all that would be necessary would be to insert a provision concerning reservations. Whichever approach were adopted, extremely complicated problems of private international law would have to be solved.

55. Elaborating some earlier remarks, he said it would doubtless be possible to insert parts of the United Kingdom amendments (A/C.6/L.373, point 2), in the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.519); he would like to hear the comments of the sponsors of those amendments on that subject.

56. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) said that the United Kingdom draft could not be amalgamated with that of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, article 7, paragraph 2, of the draft Convention could be reconciled with paragraph 4 of the United Kingdom amendment. The Syrian amendments took account of that possibility.

57. Mr. MARMOL (Venezuela) said that though reservations to multilateral conventions were not unusual in international law, reservations should not be made to articles constituting the essence of conventions. That was particularly true in the case of the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women. The delegation of Venezuela would therefore vote for the Cuban proposal (A/C.3/L.520).

58. Mr. BRENA (Uruguay) believed that a majority of the Committee might be prepared to agree on a compromise formula for article 7. Perhaps a sub-committee might be appointed under rule 104 of the rules of procedure to prepare a compromise text before the next meeting.

59. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) moved the adjournment of the meeting.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.