

fore 1 July 1950, but 292,000 would remain, including the so-called hard core of 150,000 persons, who could not be resettled for reasons of age, health or failure to meet professional requirements. In other words, the principal countries in IRO, having selected only those persons qualified for heavy labour or the intelligence services, were intending to refuse further responsibility for a situation which they themselves had created. Such was the real objective of the proposals for the establishment of a High Commissioner's Office.

32. The displaced persons had, however, been the victims of involuntary deportation by the Nazis. They were nationals of certain countries and they had never been deprived of their nationality. Obviously, therefore, it was the duty of their Governments, not of a High Commissioner, to bear the responsibility for their protection; it was, moreover, to their own interest to do so. The creation of a High Commissioner's Office would violate both the right of States to protect their own nationals and Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, as well as previous resolutions of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the adoption of the French resolution might well lay an additional burden on the United Nations budget, as some delegations had feared.

33. The sole valid solution to that, as to so many problems examined by the United Nations, would be for Member States to fulfil their obligations. The USSR delegation would therefore vote against the French draft resolution and in favour of that submitted by the Byelorussian SSR.

34. With regard to the observations made by the Chilean representative at the previous meeting, about the children of Spanish Republicans living in the USSR, the fact that they were not suffering or living in wretched circumstances was shown by a letter from a large group of them published by *Pravda* on 16 August 1949 and by

an illustrated article published by *Ogonek* in September 1949. In the letter to *Pravda*, a group of 114 young Spanish Republicans who had just graduated from technical colleges expressed the warmest appreciation of the opportunities afforded to them in the Soviet Union to obtain advanced professional and technical training unavailable to the children of workers in capitalist countries, especially in Franco Spain. More than 300 Spanish Republican youths had received such training. The letter showed clearly, in his opinion, that the Chilean representative's charges were unfounded.

35. Mr. DEDIJER (Yugoslavia) deprecated the tone of the USSR representative's comments and reserved his right to reply in detail to their substance.

36. Mr. VALENZUELA (Chile) explained that he had not advocated the repatriation of the Spanish youths from the Soviet Union to Franco Spain, but to their parents currently living in Latin America. He was unable to square his personal observations in Moscow with the letter published in *Pravda*, and therefore suggested that the USSR Government might imitate the Governments of France and the United Kingdom in inviting ocular investigation, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the living conditions of the displaced persons in their countries.

37. With regard to the body of international law relating to repatriation, the only agreement on such forcible repatriation as that of the inhabitants of Memel and of parts of Poland from 1939 to 1941 was, to the best of his knowledge, the agreement concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union for that particular case. That had not been fully explained by the USSR representative, whose method of argument, furthermore, was not, in his opinion, wholly appropriate to the high level at which a discussion of great humanitarian import should be conducted.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTIETH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 11 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Carlos E. STOLK (Venezuela).

Refugees and stateless persons (A/971 and A/C.3/527) (*continued*)

1. Mrs. ROOSEVELT (United States of America) said she wished to reply to four questions raised by the representative of Pakistan at the 258th meeting.

2. First, he had asked why protection should not be continued under the International Refugee Organization. She wished to point out that only eighteen Governments had become members of that organization, while the great majority of Governments had not felt able to join, primarily for financial reasons. The provision of protection should be the concern of all Members of the United Nations. Indeed, that protection could only gain substance if it were given by all the Members of the United Nations. Its cost was not great and, if shared by all Member States in the regular budget of the United Nations, it would not fall as a heavy burden upon any one

Government. Furthermore, the eighteen Government Members of IRO, which had joined an admittedly temporary organization, had decided that they were not prepared to continue IRO for the sole purpose of providing protection which would need to be extended for a continuing period of time to be determined by the General Assembly.

3. Secondly, the representative of Pakistan had asked for what period it was proposed to provide protection under the auspices of the United Nations. No categorical answer could be given to that question. The time required would depend on the rate of progress made by the refugees in achieving a normal life, exemplified by the acquisition of citizenship in a country of final residence. For the immediate purposes of the United Nations, it would be desirable to establish the office of High Commissioner for a period of three years in order to provide the possibility of reviewing, at a later stage, the need for con-

tinuing the service of protection under the United Nations.

4. Thirdly, the Pakistan representative had pointed out that paragraph 41 of the Secretary-General's report referred to a statement by IRO that 20,000 refugees would require institutional care of an indefinite duration, and had said that such a statement was inconsistent with that made by the United States representative that the period of mass care and maintenance of refugees would come to an end upon the termination of IRO on 1 January 1951. She wished to emphasize that IRO had attempted to make provision for the continuing care of cases requiring institutional treatment; 10 million dollars had been allocated for that purpose in the budget for 1949, and a further 12 million dollars for the period after 30 June 1950. It was hoped that before ceasing to function, IRO would be able to allocate additional residual funds for the 20,000 refugees mentioned in the Secretary-General's report. No appeal to the General Assembly for funds for the continuing maintenance of dependent refugees was envisaged in the proposal under discussion by the Committee.

5. Lastly, the Pakistan representative had expressed the view that if the General Assembly was to assume responsibility for refugees, it should do so on a global basis, and he had in that connexion mentioned the 6 or 7 million refugees in his own country. That raised a very great problem indeed. The Pakistan representative had in fact suggested that the General Assembly accept responsibility for all categories of refugees existing in any part of the world, and also for such other categories as might develop in the future. The matter required very careful consideration, and she wondered whether the General Assembly would be prepared at that juncture to assume responsibility for other groups of refugees than those defined in the IRO Constitution. It should be borne in mind, however, that at its ninth session the Economic and Social Council had set up an *Ad Hoc* Committee to review existing conventions providing protection for refugees and to consider the desirability of drafting a single convention to be submitted to the General Assembly for approval. In accomplishing that task, the *Ad Hoc* Committee would have to deal first with the categories of refugees who were to be covered by the draft convention. Thus, the question raised by the Pakistan representative would in any case be examined, objectively and judiciously, by a formal body of the United Nations. She thought that was the best procedure for determining what responsibilities with respect to what groups of refugees the General Assembly should undertake.

6. At the previous meeting of the Committee, the Byelorussian representative had agreed with her statement that the people of the United States did not want war, but had then gone on to allege that the Government of the United States, on the other hand, was bent on a war policy. She wished to emphasize that in a democracy the Government was controlled by the people, to whom it was responsible.

7. Regarding the Byelorussian representative's assertions that displaced camps were controlled by fascists and war criminals, she wanted to remind him that under the Yalta Agreement USSR nationals had been put in charge of the adminis-

tration of camps containing Soviet citizens. That provision of the Yalta Agreement had been carried out throughout 1945, with the result that many people had been forcibly repatriated to the USSR, and that riots had broken out in various camps against such forcible repatriation. After 2 million people had been so repatriated, UNRRA had taken over the administration of the camps in question, and in December 1945 the United States Government had advised the Soviet Union that it would repatriate by force only former war criminals or deserters. The United States regretted that it had to some extent abetted the forcible repatriation which had been carried out by USSR officials before that date.

8. Mr. DEMCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said he was not surprised that his statements should prove so unpalatable to the representatives of the United Kingdom and of the United States. Indeed, they contained facts which could not be and, indeed, had never been denied—not even partially. The United States representative had recently accused him of making statements which could only cause friction and misunderstanding. In his opinion, friction and misunderstanding were not caused by speeches made in the Committee, but rather by the activities of the United States occupation authorities in Germany and Austria, which refused to hand over Ukrainian war criminals, formed military organizations from among displaced persons and gave them military training, or else simply expelled USSR repatriation missions, as had been the case in Austria. Indeed, there would have been no need for any speeches had there been no such activities.

9. Secondly, the United States representative had accused him of having said that the people of the United States were preparing for war. He had always been most careful to draw a clear-cut distinction between the people of the United States and their Government. The people undoubtedly did not want war. The same, however, could not be said of the monopolists, who, having derived huge profits from the human misery and world tragedy of the late war, were bent on unleashing a third world war. Of course, the people of the United States were not interested in keeping Ukrainian war criminals, or giving military training to displaced persons, or, indeed, hindering repatriation. Yet that was being done by their authorities in Germany. Like all other nations, the people of the United States wanted peace. Yet their Government was increasing its military budget from year to year, acquiring strategic bases thousands of miles away from its own territory and encircling the USSR, while the Press of the United States was brazenly brandishing the threat of the atom bomb and gloating in anticipation over the devastation and casualties it would wreak in Kiev or Leningrad. Nor could the people of the United States be blamed for the creation of aggressive blocs, such as the Western European bloc and the Atlantic bloc.

10. The United States representative had also said (258th meeting) that some people were motivated by a feeling of fear. He could assure her that the people of his country were not frightened in any way, and that they would continue to fight for peace as they had done in the past, in the knowledge that right and justice were on their side.

11. At the previous meeting, Mr. Corley Smith, the representative of the United Kingdom, had complained that he was weary. At one of the preceding meetings he had said that he was bored. Indeed, he always seemed to be either weary or bored whenever the question of refugees came up for discussion and he was unable to deny the accusations made against his country.

12. Mr. Demchenko had always said that repatriation was the only possible solution to the problem of refugees and stateless persons. He had, however, never advocated repatriation by force. Indeed, the main mass of refugees and displaced persons had been forcibly deported from their countries for slave labour in Germany, and he was sure that, given the opportunity, they would be only too happy to return home and be reunited with the families they had been forced to leave behind. Only a small minority of criminals would not wish to return.

13. In conclusion, he expressed full support for the Byelorussian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.25), which appealed to all Governments to implement General Assembly resolution 8 (I) of 12 February 1946 concerning repatriation, and also to supply full information on the numbers and living conditions of the displaced persons under their jurisdiction.

14. Mr. CONTOUMAS (Greece) said that the United States representative had mentioned in her speech that an *ad hoc* committee of the Economic and Social Council might possibly add other categories of refugees to those which were to come under the protection of the United Nations. In that connexion she had specifically referred to the 7 million refugees mentioned by the representative of Pakistan at the 258th meeting. He hoped that, if the Committee in question examined the possible extension of protection to other categories of refugees, it would also consider the case of the 700,000 Greek refugees who had lost their homes in the civil war. That was the formal desire of his Government.

15. Mr. DEDIJER (Yugoslavia) believed that his delegation's action in pointing out that certain States were making use of refugees in order to promote their own political aims had called attention to a new category of refugees, who should enjoy the same treatment as those defined in IRO's Constitution. The only sound basis for dealing with the problems of both categories would be the adoption and application by the General Assembly—the only body competent to make them internationally mandatory—of the six rules which he had stated at the 257th meeting. All Members of the United Nations should assume the obligations deriving from a convention based upon such rules and strictly adhere to them.

16. The USSR Government had contributed to the problem by its breach of the rule which laid down that no State should refuse repatriation to its nationals who were on the territory of a State which refused to continue to grant them hospitality. On 4 June 1946, that Government had granted citizenship to former White Russians, of whom approximately 6,000 were at that time resident in Yugoslavia. Despite a proposal by the Yugoslav Government that they should be repatriated by bilateral agreement and on the most favourable terms, the Soviet Union Government had, however, refused to accept them. At

the previous meeting, the USSR representative had reiterated that refusal.

17. Those persons had emigrated owing to their political views in 1920 and 1921 and had apparently continued to hold views hostile to the Soviet régime. They had been living in Yugoslavia either as *émigrés* or as Yugoslav citizens and had not been molested on account of their political beliefs. Nevertheless, in 1946 the Yugoslav Government had welcomed the opportunity to repatriate them.

18. The Government of the Soviet Union had acknowledged that those persons had become USSR citizens and had sent a large repatriation commission to Yugoslavia, which had established intimate contact with them and had explained to them personally the error of their ways. After three years of such activity, however, only three persons had been repatriated. All the remainder—even including some who had collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces—had received USSR passports after signing a declaration of their loyalty to the Soviet Union. They had not, however, been repatriated but had been assigned special tasks inside Yugoslavia. The situation had been complicated by the fact that some 3,000 of them were working in the Yugoslav civil service.

19. When the USSR had opened its campaign against the Yugoslav Government, the Soviet citizens had been organized in groups, some of which had been instructed to carry on subversive and even criminal activities. The Yugoslav delegation had in its possession documents which it regarded as conclusive proof of that charge.

20. No sovereign State could have remained indifferent to such activities. Thirty former White Russians had been arrested and had been tried on criminal charges. A widespread network of subversive activity had been uncovered. Thereupon, the USSR Government had sent a threatening note to the Yugoslav Government, which had replied with a proposal to set the conspirators free, provided that the USSR Government agreed to repatriate them or that they left the country in some other manner. No reply to that proposal had been received. At the previous meeting, however, the representative of the Soviet Union had demanded that the prisoners should be freed immediately, but should be permitted to remain in Yugoslavia. That demand implied juridically that the USSR Government did not recognize the territorial jurisdiction of the Yugoslav Government over Yugoslav territory and, in fact, that it regarded any arrest of any USSR citizen as illegal. The Yugoslav offer had been stigmatized as an attempt at illegal deportation, which implied that a sovereign State had no right to withdraw its hospitality from undesirable foreigners.

21. It was true that such stipulations had been imposed by the Powers under international law in the past under the name of "Capitulations". The last remaining example of such Capitulations had disappeared in 1943, when the Allies had renounced their extra-territorial rights in China. That the USSR itself had always been hostile to such provisions as the exemption of foreigners from the jurisdiction of local courts by Capitulations was shown by the relevant passages in the article on Capitulations in the second edition of the Soviet Encyclopedia. Yugoslavia itself had never been subject to Capitulations.

22. The USSR demand, moreover, was akin to the imperialist policy known as that of the "open door", which provided exceptional privileges for certain foreigners. Such a policy was not applied in Yugoslavia. Foreigners might settle freely in Yugoslavia, but the Government reserved its sovereign right to exclude or expel undesirables. From the political point of view, the attitude of the USSR Government in that connexion showed, in his opinion, that it did not recognize equality of rights among socialist States.

23. The attitude of the Soviet Union Government was inconsistent with its own statements at all international conferences on the refugee problem in the preceding four years. The USSR delegation had always advocated that the problem should be solved by the Governments concerned by a policy of unhampered repatriation, particularly with regard to their own nationals. Yet, in an instance in which such repatriation would have been particularly easy, it had flatly refused to consider it. The Yugoslav delegation felt that the United Nations was particularly qualified to examine that dispute because the creation of a new category of refugees might be likely to endanger international peace and security.

24. In its note of 18 August 1949, the Government of the Soviet Union had asserted that the White Russians concerned had been ill-treated in prison, and had gone on to impugn the character of the Yugoslav Government. Statements by the prisoners themselves and a subsequent medical examination had shown that that charge was not true. But the strongest proof of its untruth had been the readiness of the Yugoslav Government to hand them over to the USSR Government immediately.

25. In the case of the Yugoslav children at USSR military schools, the USSR Government had violated another rule, which was stated at the 257th meeting, to the effect that no State had the right to detain citizens of another State on its territory when they requested to be repatriated. The representative of Poland, the Byelorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR had stated correctly with regard to Polish children in Canada that children were not competent to decide their own status or choose their domicile. The USSR representative's statement that the children should not be repatriated, simply because they had not formally requested repatriation, appeared to conflict with the view expressed by those representatives. Moreover, both in USSR and in Yugoslav law the parents not only decided the domicile of their children, but also had the right to demand their return if they were in the hands of others. Furthermore, the First Committee had set a precedent by deciding that the Greek refugee children should be returned to their parents.¹ The USSR Government was, therefore, disregarding both its own and international basic legal principles.

26. When the representative of the Soviet Union had referred with approval to a letter written by one of the children to his mother stating that he would not return home so long as existing political conditions continued, he appeared to be associating himself with the approval of subversive activities.

27. The artificial creation of a new category of refugees by such hampering of repatriation was peculiarly a problem for international action by the United Nations. The solution could only be international in scope and must embrace both voluntary refugees and those who had become refugees under duress.

28. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) said that, although IRO had made a great and historical achievement, it had also made one very serious error. At a time when it should have been concentrating on repatriation, it had sent countless refugees to resettle in Palestine, thereby contravening some of the general principles set forth in its Constitution. It was indeed specified in annex I to the Constitution that the organization should make sure that its assistance was not exploited in order to encourage subversive or hostile activities directed against the government of any State Member of the United Nations. It was also laid down that the organization should avoid disturbing friendly relations between nations and that special care should be exercised when the resettlement of refugees in non-self-governing countries was contemplated. In such cases, it was stated, due weight should be given to any evidence of genuine apprehension felt in regard to such plans by the indigenous population of the non-self-governing country in question.

29. In its policy of resettling refugees in Palestine, IRO had consistently violated both those provisions. It could not even be argued that the organization had acted unwittingly. Ever since 1923, the Arab countries had made their position quite clear with regard to immigration into Palestine, and the inhabitants of that non-self-governing country had shown their apprehension not only by words but by deeds. Some might say that IRO had allowed humanitarian ideals to outweigh the strict provisions of its Constitution. It was sufficient to consider the results of the immigration into Palestine to see that humanitarian ideals would have militated against it. For each refugee sent to Palestine ten new ones had been created, and IRO was directly responsible for the tragic plight of a million Arab refugees.

30. Turning to the other aspects of the work of IRO, he noted that, by the time it ceased its activities, it hoped to have provided for the repatriation or resettlement of the vast majority of refugees and displaced persons who still remained in the camps. The chief problem would then be to provide legal protection for the stateless. That was a very important problem, for the development of the modern sovereign State had brought most of man's activities and needs under the direct authority of the State. Thus the position of the stateless in the modern world was extremely difficult. Fortunately, the recognition of the need for closer international relations had increased at the same time; international action could therefore be taken to protect the rights of those who did not come under the special protection of any State. IRO had already concluded agreements with certain Governments for the legal protection of stateless persons and some new organization would have to be established, when IRO ceased its activities, in order to assume the responsibilities under those agreements as well as to conclude further agreements where desirable.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, First Committee, 310th meeting.

31. The new organization would concentrate on providing legal protection for the stateless. Its structure could therefore be very simple and it should have the minimum staff. The future would show whether any other work should be required of the organization and arrangements could be made if and when the need arose.

32. It had been suggested that either a special section within the United Nations Secretariat, or a High Commissioner's Office, should be established to deal with the problem. He preferred the latter alternative because the protection of refugees might well involve bitter political controversies in which the United Nations Secretariat should not become implicated. Moreover, a High Commissioner would have a greater degree of autonomy and would thus be able to take action more speedily than the Secretariat. He would have more authority to conclude agreements with Governments and it would be easier for him to enter into negotiations with non-member States. The High Commissioner's Office would have to continue work for as long as the necessity for legal protection of refugees continued and a tentative initial period of four or five years could be tentatively fixed. He fully agreed with the remarks made by the United States representative in so far as the refugees who had come under the Constitution of IRO were concerned.

33. In the French draft resolution, however, the problem was treated on a more general basis. Conditions had indeed altered in the two years since the establishment of IRO. There were new categories of refugees who did not come under the protection of IRO; for example those in Greece, Pakistan, India and China. The refugees in Palestine were a distinct category on their own, for their plight was the direct responsibility of the United Nations. Assistance to refugees was, moreover, no longer simply a humanitarian ideal; it had become a definite duty of the United Nations since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 15, paragraph 1 of that declaration—a paragraph that had been inserted at the instigation of his delegation—stated: "Everyone has the right to a nationality". Until a formula was found for eliminating statelessness, the United Nations should afford legal protection aimed at removing the disabilities arising therefrom. He felt that any resolution the Committee adopted should establish the High Commissioner as the protector of all refugees. For the first few years he could be asked to concentrate on providing legal protection for the special class of refugees covered by IRO, but it should be possible for the United Nations to extend his services to cover all refugees at a later stage.

34. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan) thanked the United States representative for replying to the questions he had raised.

35. He had intended to concentrate on the task to be done in the future rather than dwell on any of the mistakes made by IRO in the past. Many complaints had, however, been made about the activities of IRO and he could not but support all that had been said by the representative of Lebanon on the subject of the refugees resettled in Palestine. That action had led to untold misery for countless human beings and had created the very problems which IRO had set out to solve.

36. With regard to the work of the proposed new organization, it had been stated that it would provide for the legal protection of an unspecified number of stateless persons. It had been suggested that a tentative period of three years should at first be fixed for the duration of the organization, but that in all probability a much longer period of time would be required. The process of obtaining naturalization was often extremely lengthy and consequently the work of the new organization might well continue indefinitely. It was unfortunate that IRO had decided to conclude its activities before completing the task it had set out to accomplish, all the more as the most expensive part of the work had already been done and what remained would only require a small staff and a far lower level of expenditure. IRO had already done some work towards providing legal protection for the stateless and the only argument against its continuing that work appeared to be that the co-operation of all the States Members of the United Nations was needed.

37. There was of course no serious objection to the proposal that the United Nations should take over the work hitherto accomplished by IRO. All Member States would naturally approve of the humanitarian task envisaged. His country was, however, faced with a far larger refugee problem of its own. There were between 6 and 7 million refugees in Pakistan in a far worse plight than those covered by IRO. Although statelessness was a great privation, it was after all the least of the misfortunes to deal with which the IRO had been set up. If the proposal before the Committee were adopted, Pakistan would have to share in financing the legal protection of an undefined number of refugees in Europe, while obtaining no benefits for the millions of refugees in its own country. He was glad to hear from the United States representative that an *ad hoc* committee of the Economic and Social Council was to consider the various categories of refugees to be covered by a new draft convention. It would, however, take some time to prepare that draft convention and those suffering from disease and starvation might not live to see its completion.

38. There was no mention in any formal proposal to extend the protection of the new organization to all categories of refugees and he hoped that some concrete amendments would be submitted in order to allay his anxiety.

39. Mr. ROCHEFORT (France) thought that the comments of the Ukrainian representative had shown the need for the widest possible legal protection of the refugees, administered in accordance with the impartial standards characteristic of IRO. It had been argued that nothing more than consular protection would be required. While that was normally true, there had been cases in which no consulates existed, as, for example, for future Israel citizens before the creation of the State of Israel.

40. The example of Israel threw light on another aspect of the problem—that raised by the Lebanese representative. He must assure that representative that it had never been the intention of France or of the United Nations to take any action prejudicial to the interests or sentiments of the Arab States. The urgent problem of the plight of the future Israel citizens, however, had aroused such profound humanitarian feelings

that it had been permitted to take precedence over all political considerations. That the United Nations had had only humanitarian intentions had been demonstrated by its subsequent anxiety to assume responsibility for the care of the Arab refugees.

41. It was unthinkable that an organization which had demonstrated such a depth of humanitarian sentiment could possibly have committed the cal-

lousness implicit in placing refugee camps under nazi or fascist administrators, as some representatives had asserted.

42. Moreover, in the case of certain categories of refugees, such as the Spanish Republicans, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR would surely not advise approaching the consuls of their countries.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Saturday, 12 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mrs. Ulla LINDSTRÖM (Sweden).

Refugees and stateless persons (A/971 and A/C.3/527) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN drew attention to the fact that the French delegation had withdrawn its original draft resolution (A/C.3/529) and had submitted two resolutions in substitution for it (A/C.3/L.26, A/C.3/L.27). Also before the Committee were draft resolutions submitted by the Byelorussian delegation (A/C.3/L.25) and by the United States delegation (A/C.3/L.28).

2. Mr. PANYUSHKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) felt it unnecessary to reply to the observations made by the representative of Yugoslavia at the previous meeting, since they had, in his opinion, been intended only to provoke a political controversy into which he refused to be drawn.

3. Mr. VRBA (Czechoslovakia) was surprised that representatives who had had considerable experience of the problem of refugees and stateless persons should quite uncritically propose the continuance of the International Refugee Organization in some form or other. That implied that IRO had satisfactorily implemented all the provisions of General Assembly resolution 8 (I) of 12 February 1946, or was on the point of doing so. The statements of the representatives of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR and Poland had demonstrated that IRO had not fulfilled its obligations. The Ukrainian representative had shown that the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons had been hampered rather than encouraged, in direct contravention of annex I, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the IRO Constitution. The fact that many displaced persons had been repatriated, in no way altered the fact that a great many had not been so treated. Furthermore, IRO had failed to implement fully the stipulations of annex I, paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (c), (d) and (g) of its Constitution. Traitors, quislings and war criminals had not been surrendered, but had actually been placed in charge of camps and had terrorized genuine displaced persons. Such persons had secretly entered Czechoslovakia after having been incited in the camps to commit murder and sabotage. The very numerous examples which had been cited made it seem incredible that representatives should have failed to realize what undesirable practices were being carried on under the guise of humanitarian activities. A High Commissioner would merely continue the un-

desirable activities initiated by officials of IRO. His delegation would therefore oppose the French draft resolution or any similar proposal. It would vote for the Byelorussian draft resolution, because it emphasized the need for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution of 12 February 1946 and for the submission of the relevant information by the countries concerned.

4. At the 257th meeting, the representative of the existing Yugoslav Government had laid down as one of the rules which should govern the international treatment of refugees the stipulation that no State should make use of refugees present on its territory in order to jeopardize the independence of the countries from which those refugees originated. He had adduced the example of Mr. Lazar Brankov, a former Counsellor of the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, who had recently been sentenced by the Hungarian People's Court in connexion with a conspiracy headed by Mr. Laszlo Rajk and aimed at the overthrowing of the people's democratic Government in Hungary. Mr. Brankov had remained in Hungary after the open breach between Yugoslavia and the peoples' democracies, posing as a political refugee on instructions from the existing Yugoslav Government. That fact had been brought out in Mr. Brankov's own confession in open court, at a trial watched by representatives of the world Press.

5. The representative of Yugoslavia argued that Mr. Brankov had acted out of fear, although the other Yugoslav diplomats had left Hungary unhampered. That was tantamount to saying that Mr. Brankov had co-operated with the Hungarian court in order to incur a heavy sentence merely out of fear—a patent absurdity. Thus mentioning the Rajk trial in Budapest, the representative of the current Yugoslav Government acted like a thief trying to confuse his pursuers by crying, "Stop thief!"

6. Furthermore, the Yugoslav representative had deemed fit to attack a Polish draft resolution on discriminations practised by certain States against labour recruited from the ranks of refugees (A/C.3/524), which had been discussed by the Third Committee. He had attempted to create the impression that that draft resolution could be used to provide protection for war criminals and quislings. Paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (d), of that resolution, however, had stated explicitly that immigrant labour should be recruited exclusively on the basis of bilateral conventions concluded