

cumstances of the moment when the organization was set up. The definition of the term refugees in its Constitution also corresponded to the circumstances of the moment when the organization was set up. The definition would cease to be valid at the same time as the IRO Constitution, that is, at the moment when that body's competence ended. Even if the General Assembly decided to adopt the same definition for the High

Commissioner's use, it would be a text independent of that incorporated in the IRO Constitution, which would automatically have ceased to be part of positive law. It would, however, be only logical to take advantage of the opportunity to adopt a fairer definition and one better adapted to the permanent realities of the problem of statelessness.

The meeting rose at 12.55 a.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 15 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Carlos E. STOLK (Venezuela).

Refugees and stateless persons (A/971 and A/C.3/527) (continued)

1. The CHAIRMAN called attention to the amendments submitted by Lebanon (A/C.3/L.30), Australia (A/C.3/L.31), the United Kingdom (A/C.3/L.32) and Israel (A/C.3/L.33), to the joint French and United States draft resolution (A/C.3/L.29).

2. Mr. JOCKEL (Australia) suggested that the French-sponsored paragraph 4 (e) of the annex to the joint draft resolution should be made a separate paragraph 5, beginning with the words "The High Commissioner should distribute . . ."

3. If that suggestion were adopted, the text he had suggested as a further sub-paragraph (263rd meeting, paragraph 33) would become paragraph 6, beginning with the words "The High Commissioner should engage in . . ."

4. Mr. ROCHEFORT (France) agreed to the Australian representative's suggestion.

5. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan) said that the debate so far could be divided into two clearly distinct parts. The first had taken a very long time and had mainly consisted of charges and replies regarding the conduct of IRO and even of its constituent members. For his part, he had nothing to say on that subject because he did not have all the necessary information and also because his Government had not been a member of the organization. From that part of the debate, however, he had gathered the unfortunate impression that some delegations entertained serious doubts as to the purely humanitarian aspect of the problem of refugees and also that politics had perhaps made an unwelcome intrusion into the question. Furthermore, he deplored a situation in which refugees might find themselves mere pawns on the international chess-board. Such considerations could not fail to influence the approach of some delegations to the problem under discussion.

6. The second part of the debate had finally found its concrete expression in the joint French and United States draft resolution before the Committee. Not unnaturally that part of the debate had been taken up mainly by the statements of the French and the United States representatives. No vigorous support had been expressed for the joint proposal which seemed to have met with lukewarm acquiescence only because of the humanitarian considerations which it involved. The only firm stands taken had been those of the Indian delegation, which had opposed the draft

resolution, and the Mexican and Brazilian delegations, which had expressed grave misgivings about its ultimate implications. Although many had asked very pertinent and relevant questions, no definite answer had been received and the situation was extremely confused. Indeed, never before had the Committee been faced with a proposal which was so vague both in its text and in its implications.

7. It had been asked during the debate whether the future definition of refugees would include people whose plight was much worse than that of the refugees defined in the IRO Constitution. The answer had been both "yes" and "no". It had been said that the High Commissioner would first be concerned with the refugees covered by the IRO Constitution, but that other categories might be added at some later stage. What the other categories were, or when and how they might so be added had never been made clear. Statements as to whether IRO had completed its task had also been contradictory in the extreme. Nor had it ever been clearly stated whether IRO could continue; apparently it could, although it required a higher international status than that conferred by a membership of only eighteen States. It had also been asked whether the High Commissioner would be concerned with legal protection only or whether he might also provide some form of material assistance to refugees. Again the answer had been both "yes" and "no". He would at first provide only legal protection, but that would not exclude material assistance in the future. As to the financial implications of the proposal, the Secretariat itself had been unable to provide estimates for the whole scheme. The general impression was one of utter confusion.

8. The position, as he saw it, was that the United Nations had received a memorandum from (A/C.3/528) which made it clear that IRO proposed to bring its operations to an end on 30 June 1950. The same paragraph of the memorandum, however, also stated that the problem facing the organization "may never be completely resolved". Indeed, it was stated that about 292,000 refugees would still be in need of assistance after IRO had ceased operation and that, in addition, there would be a very large number of refugees requiring legal protection. Clearly, the proposal under discussion would saddle the United Nations with all the unfinished tasks of IRO because the organization had apparently come to the conclusion that it was time its work was taken over by another body. Yet, although paragraph 8

of the memorandum had itself stressed "the need to avoid any break in continuity" in that field, it was alleged that the problem was not one of continuing the work of IRO. If that was not the problem, what was it?

9. As far as he could see, the tasks which had confronted IRO in the past could only increase in the future, for paragraph 13 of the memorandum clearly stated that allowance should be made for a "continuous flow of refugees". At the same time, however, it was proposed that the High Commissioner should be concerned only with the refugees covered by the IRO Constitution, namely, the statutory refugees dating from the First World War and those who had been brought into existence by the fascist and nazi aggression in the Second World War. As far as he knew, the fascist and nazi régimes no longer existed, and he was somewhat at a loss, therefore, to grasp the full purport of the mysterious reference to a "continuous flow of refugees". The only other refugees in the world were the Asian refugees. Yet it was not proposed to bring them under the competence of the High Commissioner. Who then were the unknown refugees for whom the Committee was being asked to make provision without even knowing whether they would require legal protection or material assistance or both?

10. The draft resolution contained a very large number of hopes, aspirations and theoretical possibilities which might or might not materialize; if they did materialize, they might do so in some totally unexpected form. Only three clear results would be achieved by the adoption of the draft resolution; a High Commissioner's Office would be established, its main task would be to provide legal protection to refugees, and, at the beginning, it would abide by the definitions of the IRO Constitution. Its competence might extend to some other categories of refugees, but no one knew which. Indeed, the Committee was being asked to make provisions for an unknown number of refugees, over an unknown period of time and at an unknown cost to the United Nations.

11. It was clear from the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution that the main function of the High Commissioner would be to provide the necessary legal protection for refugees. It was true that as a result of certain political upheavals various categories of people had become either refugees or exiles and had thus lost their nationality *de facto* or *de jure*. The disabilities by statelessness could only be removed if the people in question acquired a new nationality in their country of residence; until that time their situation obviously raised certain legal problems. In his opinion, it was for the countries in which the refugees and exiles resided to grant them naturalization and in the meantime to provide the necessary protection. Yet the Governments concerned seemed to imply that the protection of refugees was the responsibility of the United Nations as a whole, and apparently suggested the appointment of the High Commissioner for the mere purpose of being reminded themselves of their own duty to grant protection and eventually naturalization. That was an utterly unnecessary expense, especially when it was remembered that other countries had much graver problems of their own to consider. As the coun-

tries involved were all members of IRO, he did not see why the organization should not continue as in the past.

12. Regarding the definition of the term "refugee", it was proposed that the matter should be left to the discretion of the General Assembly, which might make appropriate decisions from time to time. It was difficult to vote for hypothetical possibilities. It was true that the General Assembly might one day decide to include the 7 million refugees in Pakistan within the High Commissioner's terms of reference. But Mr. Bokhari could not, on that mere assumption, ask the refugees in his own country, who sadly lacked food and shelter though not legal protection, to forego part of the already inadequate help they received, for unspecified categories of refugees, over an unspecified period, to be administered by a High Commissioner whose relationship with them also remained unspecified. When he asked that IRO should continue looking after its own refugees and not burden the whole of the United Nations with that task, he was doing no more than the member States of IRO themselves when they told Pakistan to look after its own refugees without any help from the United Nations in the guise of a High Commissioner.

13. In view of the above considerations, his delegation would vote against the joint draft resolution before the Committee.

14. Mrs. AFNAN (Iraq) expressed full support for the views outlined by the representative of Pakistan. In her opinion, the Australian amendments carried dangerous political implications and she would have to vote against them. She could only partially support the Byelorussian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.25).

15. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) said that, small though his country was, it could not overlook the fact that a certain number of refugees would require legal protection, even if the provision of such protection entailed additional financial burdens. In his opinion, there was nothing vague about the draft resolution; indeed, the duties of the High Commissioner were clearly outlined in paragraph 4 of the annex. As to material assistance, that problem arose for particular categories in particular circumstances and for particular reasons. It could not be dealt with in a resolution of a general character and should be left to the discretion of the General Assembly whenever the need arose. That consideration determined his attitude to the amendment which suggested that the Economic and Social Council should at that stage make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the problem of material assistance.

16. He agreed with the amendments proposed by the United Kingdom delegation. Indeed, he did not feel that the Economic and Social Council should have the authority to give directives to the High Commissioner on questions which might have political implications.

17. The Australian amendments introduced an element of great uncertainty regarding the functions and activities of the High Commissioner. He was not prepared to grant him such wide and undefined powers and would, therefore, vote against the amendments.

18. In his opinion, there was no real incompatibility between the joint draft resolution and

the Byelorussian draft. He was in full agreement with the preamble to the Byelorussian proposal and would vote in its favour, while abstaining on the operative part, which he felt concerned other countries than his own.

19. Mr. ROCHEFORT (France) would not vote for the Byelorussian draft resolution, because, by laying stress exclusively on repatriation, it failed to cover all aspects of the problem: that of the Spanish refugees, for example, in the case of whom repatriation was not a solution at the moment. Moreover, provision for repatriation was included not only in the recital introducing the joint French and United States draft resolution but also in the annex to it.

20. Replying to the representative of Pakistan, he regretted that a confusion between refugees and stateless persons continued, despite the exhaustive discussions on that point in the Economic and Social Council. Stateless persons would not be entitled to the benefit of the protection of the High Commissioner except in so far as they were themselves refugees: the same was true of IRO. The French variants in the joint draft resolution went further than resolution 248A (IX) of the Economic and Social Council, because it made the legal protection of the refugees an international concern, instead of leaving it to the Governments to deliver the requisite documents through their courts.

21. The French delegation could not acquiesce in the proposal that no provision should be made for material assistance. The Norwegian representative had inquired (263rd meeting) what funds would be forthcoming for that purpose. The General Assembly was not apparently intending to grant any. Nevertheless, there were the best possible grounds for assuming that the European Governments—and perhaps some others—would respond generously to any appeals the High Commissioner might make on behalf of the aged, infirm and sick, victims of Germany, who would presumably be left in Germany after the termination of IRO. France bordered on Germany and was, understandably enough, concerned about their future fate. In anticipation of such a problem, the French delegation had submitted a second draft resolution (A/C.3/L.27).

22. It was not a matter of finding a successor for IRO. The situation demanded a new organization corresponding to the facts. That was why the French delegation had proposed that the High Commissioner should only retain the IRO definitions provisionally and the General Assembly should review them.

23. The Pakistan representative had objected to the resolution on the grounds that it gave no decisive answer to the questions posed by the refugee problem. It was obvious, however, that the Committee was divided about the possible solutions; the joint draft resolution had provided for that by including variants, affecting a number of particulars, so as to enable the Committee members to express their opinions.

24. The problem had not been caused or kept alive by the European receiving countries. They had applied as broad a policy of assimilation and naturalization as had been possible. France in 1947, for example, had granted 100,000 naturalizations. But still, even if everybody were received without discrimination, not everybody could be naturalized; France was making naturalization

dependent on the same conditions which immigration countries imposed for entry to their territory. Moreover, not all refugees wished to be, and not all should be, naturalized.

25. France was not seeking the creation of a High Commissioner's Office for selfish reasons, but because it was, as always, deeply concerned with the problem as one international in character, and had therefore taken the lead in proposing a solution.

26. Of the amendments to the joint draft resolution he could accept the Australian, and would accept the Lebanese amendment to the effect that the High Commissioner should be elected by the General Assembly rather than by the Economic and Social Council. He could also accept the United Kingdom amendments. He could not, however, accept the first Israeli amendment (263rd meeting, paragraph 41), because it was obviously merely the United States variant of paragraph 3 (b) in another guise.

27. Mrs. ROOSEVELT (United States of America) said that the proposal that a High Commissioner's Office should be set up had been made a full year before the date when IRO was to terminate its operations because it was essential that there should be no transition period during which a certain number of refugees would be without protection. IRO did not expect to leave any substantial problems behind it. Its achievements would have been considerable; it would have spent 400 million dollars and resettled or repatriated nearly one million persons. In addition, it was attempting to resettle or repatriate all those eligible for such treatment and had allocated 22 million dollars for the care of the so-called hard core. The gloomy prospect depicted by the French representative might never become a reality. It was agreed, however, that a number of refugees and stateless persons would remain; such persons had always been a problem, ever since the end of the First World War. Such cases would have to be continually reviewed by the General Assembly.

28. The United States delegation had been unable to reach a compromise with the French delegation on three principal issues—the question of definitions, that of the method of the High Commissioner's appointment and that of the problem of material assistance.

29. She felt very strongly that the definitions in the IRO Constitution should be retained, because they had been carefully thought out, because experience had shown their practical effectiveness and because they had been accepted by the General Assembly. Further consideration might be given to other categories of refugees at a later stage; but they must be accepted by the General Assembly. The number of persons who might be affected was irrelevant; the essential point was that the General Assembly must be fully cognizant of the situation in which such new categories should be accepted. The decision on the situation should remain in the hands of the General Assembly.

30. The election of a High Commissioner would be an innovation and might set an undesirable precedent. Admittedly, it had very recently been decided¹ that the proposed High Commissioner

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 250th plenary meeting.

for Libya should be elected; that was the first instance in the history of the United Nations. The procedure of setting up small High Commissioner's Offices outside the framework of the United Nations administration might, however, be most unwise, because it would increase administrative difficulties. The High Commissioner must, of course, enjoy a certain freedom of action—which was accorded him, indeed, in the joint draft resolution—but it was even more important that he should be intimately linked with the overriding authority of the Secretary-General.

31. Furthermore, legal protection might be of far greater value to the refugee than material assistance. He might not need such assistance if his papers were in order, so that he could obtain the requisite work or travel permits. Any situation in which a refugee had his papers in order but was faced with starvation would be most painful. An even more distressing situation, however, would be one in which the refugee was faced with inevitable starvation owing to his lack of proper papers.

32. The granting of legal protection had the additional advantage that it would require only a small administrative staff. The Secretary-General had made an estimate; the United States delegation believed that even less would be needed. It would, in any case, add little to the general budget of the United Nations, so that the considerable results obtained would more than justify the expense involved. Legal protection, therefore, should be the first consideration. The refugee should feel that he had in the High Commissioner a friend in need and in his office a place to which he could apply for the kind of assistance which would enable him to support himself. She felt most strongly that whenever, as might occasionally happen, the High Commissioner found it necessary to raise the question of material assistance, the General Assembly should approve such requests. The Assembly should not assume obligations without being fully aware what those obligations involved. Even requests for material aid for the "hard core" should be presented to the General Assembly by the High Commissioner only as occasion arose.

33. It had been suggested that IRO might continue its operations. That would involve the granting of further material assistance on a large scale. The eighteen countries which comprised IRO might be unwilling to remain the only countries to bear such a burden and therefore any such proposal would have to be very carefully considered. The advisability of such a suggestion at that juncture was open to the gravest doubt. She had, however, every sympathy with the situation in which the Indian and Pakistan representatives found themselves.

34. Turning to the amendments to the joint draft resolution, she could not accept those submitted by the Australian delegation; the General Assembly could always authorize the High Commissioner to discharge additional functions, but it would be inopportune to provide for that at that stage. She could not accept the United Kingdom amendments, because it would be more in accordance with regular procedure to continue to employ the channels of the Economic and Social Council. She would accept the first and second Israeli amendments (263rd meeting, paragraphs 41 and 43), but not the third (263rd meeting,

paragraph 44), and the first and third Lebanese amendments (262nd meeting, paragraphs 31 and 35), but not the second (262nd meeting, paragraph 33). As for the Byelorussian draft resolution, it was merely a cloak for the same proposal which had been presented over and over again. It disregarded the facts that a large number of refugees did not wish to be repatriated and that the number of those who were going to be repatriated was becoming smaller and smaller. She would therefore vote against it.

35. Mr. AQUINO (Philippines) said that he would have been prepared to support the original United States draft resolution (A/C.3/L.28), but thought the new joint draft resolution had some undesirable features. In some respects it was too broad and in others too narrow. He supported the view held by the United States delegation that, for the time being, the activities of the High Commissioner should be restricted to providing legal protection and that the question of granting material assistance should be left to future decisions of the General Assembly. As the representative of a country which had not belonged to IRO, he thought it would be unwise for the United Nations to assume responsibility for all the tasks which that organization might leave unfinished when it terminated its activities. The financial implications should be given due consideration before any decision was taken regarding material assistance.

36. Referring to the French representative's remarks concerning statelessness, he said that the question was extremely delicate. Persons who were not actually refugees might still wish to leave their country because its political atmosphere was uncongenial, and they would need legal protection in the same way as actual refugees. He emphasized that the whole question was fraught with difficulties and stated that his country would not accept any interference in its domestic laws governing naturalization.

37. Mrs. CASTLE (United Kingdom) explained that her amendments were intended to postpone any final decision on the question whether the High Commissioner should hold his authority direct from the General Assembly or through the intermediary of the Economic and Social Council. That was a question of detail which did not affect the fundamental issues, so there was no need to settle it immediately. She hoped, therefore, that her amendments under the letter A would be adopted. In case they should be rejected, she had submitted further amendments under the letter B providing that the High Commissioner should be directly responsible to the General Assembly. It was her delegation's opinion, at that stage of the discussion, that the High Commissioner should be directly responsible to the highest organ of the United Nations in order to maintain the high personal prestige and authority necessary for the exercise of his functions. Thus, if the amendments under the letter A were rejected, she would be obliged to press for the adoption of those under the letter B.

38. Finally, she reiterated her delegation's firm support of the French variant of paragraph 3 of the annex to the joint draft resolution, regarding the definition of the refugees who were to come under the competence of the High Commissioner. The French variant provided that a single definition of the term "refugee" should be adopted, and

all persons who fulfilled the requirements of that definition would automatically be eligible to receive the services provided by the High Commissioner's Office. The United States variant on that point provided that the Assembly should decide in each specific case whether or not it wished to accept responsibility for a certain category of refugees and the adoption of that text might well lead to unjust discrimination.

39. The CHAIRMAN announced the closure of the discussion and proceeded to put the various draft resolutions to the vote. He first called for a vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR (A/C.3/L.25).

40. Mr. STEPANENKO (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) requested that his draft resolution should be put to the vote paragraph by paragraph.

The first paragraph of the draft resolution was rejected by 21 votes to 9, with 15 abstentions.

The second paragraph was rejected by 20 votes to 9, with 16 abstentions.

The third paragraph was rejected by 16 votes to 7, with 22 abstentions.

The fourth paragraph was rejected by 15 votes to 7, with 22 abstentions.

41. Mr. DEDIJER (Yugoslavia) explained that he had voted in favour of the Byelorussian draft resolution, which laid special emphasis on repatriation, in the hope that the USSR would repatriate its citizens who had lost the right to hospitality in Yugoslavia.

42. The CHAIRMAN opened the voting on the joint French and United States draft resolution (A/C.3/L.29), together with the variants and amendments.

43. Mr. KATZNELSON (Israel) said that, as his third amendment (263rd meeting, paragraph 44) had not proved a successful compromise solution, he would withdraw it in favour of the French variant for paragraph 3(b) of the joint draft resolution.

44. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first Lebanese amendment (262nd meeting, paragraph 31) for the insertion of a new paragraph between the first and second paragraphs of the preamble, reading as follows:

"Recognizing the responsibility of the United Nations for the international protection of refugees".

That amendment was adopted by 18 votes to 8, with 16 abstentions.

45. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first Australian amendment (263rd meeting, paragraph 32) for the addition of the following words at the end of the first paragraph:

"to discharge the functions contained therein and such other functions as the General Assembly may from time to time confer upon it".

That amendment was adopted by 18 votes to 9, with 19 abstentions.

46. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Israeli amendment (263rd meeting, paragraph 43) proposing that the word "establishment" should be replaced by the word "functioning" in paragraph 3(a) of the draft resolution.

That amendment was adopted by 17 votes to 1, with 26 abstentions.

47. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Israeli amendment (263rd meeting, paragraph 41) proposing that the final part of the French variant for paragraph 3 (b), after the word "regarding", should be altered to read:

"the extension of categories of refugees entitled to protection to persons not covered by the Constitution of IRO".

That amendment was rejected by 22 votes to 4, with 17 abstentions.

48. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the French variant for paragraph 3 (b) (A/C.3/L.29).

That text was adopted by 19 votes to 10, with 15 abstentions.

49. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the first United Kingdom amendment (A/C.3/L.32) which proposed that paragraph 1 (c) of the annex to the joint draft resolution should be replaced by the following text:

"(c) Receive policy directions from the United Nations according to methods to be determined by the General Assembly."

That amendment was adopted by 22 votes to 6, with 18 abstentions.

50. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the French variant for paragraph 3 of the annex.

That text was adopted by 18 votes to 14, with 11 abstentions.

51. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the additional paragraph 5 submitted by the French delegation (A/C.3/L.29), as amended by the Australian suggestion (paragraph 2). The text read as follows:

"The High Commissioner should distribute among private and, as appropriate, official agencies which he deems best qualified to administer such assistance any funds, public or private, which he may receive for this purpose. The accounts relating to these funds should be periodically verified by the auditors of the United Nations. For the information of the General Assembly, the High Commissioner should include in his annual report a statement of his activities in this field."

52. Mrs. ROOSEVELT (United States) requested that the vote be taken by roll-call.

The vote was taken by roll-call, as follows:

Syria, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, France, Greece, Guatemala, Israel, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden.

Against: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, India, Iraq, Liberia, Philippines, Poland.

Abstaining: Syria, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia.

That text was adopted by 17 votes to 14, with 16 abstentions.

53. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the new paragraph 6 submitted by the Australian delegation (A/C.3/L.31):

"The High Commissioner should engage in such additional activities, including repatriation and resettlement activities, as the General Assembly may determine."

That text was adopted by 14 votes to 6, with 26 abstentions.

54. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the second United Kingdom amendment (A/C.3/L.32), which proposed that paragraph 7 of the annex (formerly paragraph 5) should be replaced by the following text:

"7. The High Commissioner should report to the United Nations periodically as determined by the General Assembly."

That amendment was adopted by 18 votes to 5, with 22 abstentions.

55. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the French variant for paragraph 9 (formerly paragraph 7) of the annex (A/C.3/L.29), as amended by the representative of Lebanon (262nd meeting, paragraph 33). The text read:

"9. The High Commissioner should be elected by the General Assembly on the nomination of the Secretary-General . . ."

That text was adopted by 19 votes to 6, with 21 abstentions.

56. The CHAIRMAN put the whole of paragraph 9 (formerly paragraph 7), as amended, to the vote.

Paragraph 9, as amended, was adopted by 19 votes to 10, with 15 abstentions.

57. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the joint draft resolution as a whole, as amended by the preceding votes.

58. Mr. DEMCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) explained that he would vote against the joint draft resolution because, in his opinion, it had been expressly prepared by the representatives of France, the United States and the United Kingdom in order to carry out their policy of undermining repatriation and recruiting cheap labour from among the refugees. He reiterated his opinion that the only proper solution to the problem would be to create favourable conditions for repatriation and said it was for that reason that he had supported the Byelorussian draft resolution.

59. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan) said that he would be obliged to vote against the joint draft resolution for the simple reason that his country, faced

as it was with a vast refugee problem of its own, could ill afford to contribute towards an organization from which it seemed unlikely to benefit.

60. Mr. PENTEADO (Brazil), Mr. DEDIJER (Yugoslavia) and Mrs. KRIPALANI (India) said that they would vote against the joint draft resolution for the reasons they had given in earlier statements.

61. Mrs. AFNAN (Iraq) explained that she would vote against the joint draft resolution because its provisions were not wide enough to include all refugees and because she thought that the definition of the term "refugee" should be settled before the Assembly decided on the principle of establishing a High Commissioner's Office.

62. Mr. ALAMAHEYOU (Ethiopia) said that, although his country wished to co-operate in assistance to refugees, he would be obliged to abstain from voting on the joint draft resolution because it did not explain the financial implications or give a clear definition of the field of action of the High Commissioner.

63. Mr. BOKHARI (Pakistan) requested that the vote be taken by roll-call.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Lebanon, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Israel.

Against: Pakistan, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, India, Iraq.

Abstaining: Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran.

The joint draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 24 votes to 12, with 10 abstentions.

64. The CHAIRMAN called for a vote on the additional draft resolution submitted by the French delegation (A/C.3/L.27).

The draft resolution was adopted by 18 votes to 8, with 18 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Friday, 18 November 1949, at 11 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Carlos E. STOLK (Venezuela).

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund: (a) report of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund—(b) United Nations Appeal for Children (A/1006 and E/1406¹)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the members of the Committee to begin the discussion of item 31

¹ See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Fourth Year, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 16.*

of the agenda of the General Assembly regarding the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and the United Nations Appeal for Children (A/1006 and E/1406).

2. Mr. RAJCHMAN (Chairman of the Executive Board of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund) introduced two reports on the work carried out by the Fund from the time it was set up. The first, which was submitted to the ninth session of the Economic and Social Council, referred to the period from 11 December 1946 to 1 July 1949 (E/1046); the