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SEVENTH SESSION



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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2127, A/2226, A/C.1/L.30 and A/C.1/L.31) (*continued*)

[Item 17]*

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that the list of speakers would be closed on 19 March 1953, at 5 p.m.

2. Mr. VON BALLUSECK (Netherlands) recalled that his country had been a member of the Disarmament Commission throughout the period of its existence and therefore accepted the responsibilities resulting from its participation in the Commission's work. The Commission had been directed to prepare proposals, as stated in paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI), and not to make final decisions. It had therefore been a sort of technical agency. In the resolution the General Assembly had directed the Commission primarily to prepare a plan for the progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments. That was logical, as such a plan represented the indispensable prerequisite for effective and controllable disarmament.

3. The Commission's work had been hampered from the outset by the divergence of opinion between the Soviet Union and the majority. The majority had believed in beginning at the beginning, namely, by preparing proposals for a verified inventory of all armaments, armed forces and atomic energy resources, whereas the Soviet Union had wanted to start from the end and insisted that final decisions should immediately be taken on the following points: first, unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and establishment of strict international control over the observance of that prohibition, on the understanding that prohibition and control would be put into effect simultaneously; secondly, reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five major Powers within one year, and the convening of a world conference; thirdly,

mandatory provisions requiring all States to supply full official information on their armaments and armed forces. The proposal had proceeded to deal with the problem of bacterial warfare, the preparation of draft conventions relating to the prohibition of atomic and bacterial weapons and the establishment of a control organ for that purpose. Such premature decisions, lacking technical precision and groundwork and lacking safeguards for implementation, would obviously be of no value, except perhaps as propaganda for the peoples of countries where free criticism no longer existed.

4. The peoples of the free world expected more than empty phrases; they wanted security in a world where they knew it must rest on a system of checks and balances. In those countries, an act was not declared criminal until the police force required to check it had been organized first. Steps towards disarmament should proceed in progressive stages, the first of which should be an inventory of existing armaments to be followed by a verification of the information supplied. Not till then could those armaments be reduced, the reduction to apply first, perhaps, to the less important and to extend to the more dangerous by successive stages, each of which would require broader control than the preceding stage. It would be a crime to give the world a false sense of security by means of "side-door" solutions which would expose those who had weakened their protective power to possible aggression by those who, in the absence of any controls, might have preserved or increased their military predominance. The USSR proposals had not changed since the beginning of the debate. They were represented as a kind of short-cut, whereas actually the road to peace and security could only be built on a methodical and realistic basis. The Disarmament Commission should deal with each component part of the problem separately, proceeding from the particular to the general. That was the only way in which it could reach over-all conclusions. The principles by which it was to be guided were stated in resolution 502 (VI), and as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission did not have to take fresh decisions on matters which had been settled.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

5. Although as yet the Commission had achieved only meagre results, it had done some very useful spade-work. The proposals submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States concerning certain aspects of the disarmament question had been extremely constructive, for instance the proposals for fixing the numerical limitation of all armed forces or the supplementary proposals regarding the types and quantities of armaments to support such limited forces. They could have served as an approach to one of the particular component problems and led to a provisional partial solution to be incorporated later in the over-all solution. The Commission should proceed along those lines. The road was long and difficult, but the Commission should not be discouraged or lose sight of the important final goal. For that reason, the Netherlands delegation had associated itself with others in submitting the fourteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.30).

6. Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) said that a positive reply from the USSR representative to the questions asked by the United States representative at the 577th meeting would enable the First Committee to find encouragement in the statement made by Mr. Malenkov, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, in the Supreme Soviet on 15 March 1953. Mr. Malenkov had said that the Government of the USSR would unchangingly carry out the tested policy of preserving and strengthening peace, and had added that at the current time, there was not one undecided question which could not be decided by peaceful means through negotiations between the countries concerned.

7. Progress in the matter of disarmament was closely related to the prospects of an improvement in international relations and could not be brought about by any magic. It must be the corollary of a maturing sense of security, and it was in that respect that there were fundamental differences in approach between the Soviet and the non-Soviet world. That very morning, the Press had reported that a leading Soviet philosopher, Mr. Chesnokov, writing in *Pravda*, had said that so long as capitalist encirclement continued, all measures would have to be taken to strengthen Soviet power, and particularly, the power of its armed forces. Such views were a depressing commentary on the statements of Mr. Malenkov.

8. The three-Power proposals represented considerable progress towards the formulation of a concrete plan for disarmament and an advance over the broad outline prepared by the General Assembly at the sixth session. The history of disarmament—first the peace conferences of 1899 and 1907, then the experience of the League of Nations and the events since the Second World War—was not encouraging. Nevertheless, the New Zealand delegation felt that the efforts towards progress in that very complex matter should be continued in view of the importance of the task and the hopes of mankind. Accordingly, his delegation would vote for the fourteen-Power draft resolution.

9. The whole world awaited the decision of the Government of the Soviet Union because, unless that Government was prepared to reduce its military power, no country dared disarm, and so long as no concrete reply had been made to the questions put by the United States representative, the discussion on disarmament was likely to prove sterile.

10. Mr. WEI (China) said the circumstances which had led to the dead-lock in the Disarmament Commission should be analysed because the USSR plan for disarmament, though repeatedly rejected by the General Assembly, was once again on the agenda in the form of a Polish proposal (A/2229). The issue was not part of the East-West conflict; it was a choice between right or wrong, security or suicide. The basic prerequisite for disarmament was an open world, because so long as secrecy was maintained concerning armed forces and armaments, international confidence, and hence disarmament, was impossible. The necessary condition for an open world was the acceptance by all governments of verification by international inspectors to ensure that the terms of the disarmament agreements were observed. At the moment, the "iron curtain" was the most serious obstacle to world disarmament, because behind it there was complete secrecy. All that was known was that behind it there were large armies some of which were used against United Nations forces. Atomic bombs were being manufactured there. Generalissimo Stalin himself had acknowledged that atomic explosions had taken place there.

11. With respect to atomic energy, what the USSR plan called strict international control would amount to international inspection only of declared mines, plants and stockpiles, in other words, only of those which the USSR Government chose to report to the international control organ. The Soviet Union would not permit general inspection of its territory except if there were definite suspicion, which was very unlikely to arise in a country where there was no freedom of information and no freedom of movement.

12. With regard to general disarmament, the USSR plan called for a single, non-recurring disclosure of data relating to the armed forces in all States, the disclosure to be made at the time when the General Assembly adopted decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments. Both disclosure and verification would be made only on the basis of official information provided by States, and inspection on a continuing basis would be allowed only to the extent that it did not interfere in the domestic affairs of States. The USSR plan offered no assurance that the official data would be complete or that secret activities were not carried on in violation of the agreement. The purpose of all the USSR proposals concerning the control of atomic energy and disarmament was clearly to disarm the free world in exchange for promises with no guarantee that they would be carried out by the Soviet Union. If the USSR genuinely desired disarmament, it should accept a general system of international inspection. In view of the existence of the "iron curtain", of the great industrial potential of the USSR and of its aggressive policy, the free world could not and should not disarm unilaterally.

13. One of the main purposes of the Disarmament Commission should be to secure agreement on the principle of international inspection and on the principle of disclosure and verification by stages. After such agreement had been reached, the number of stages and the elements to be included in each stage could be worked out in the light of political and technical considerations. The United States had proposed a plan of five stages including armed forces and atomic and non-atomic armaments, while France, in

an attempted compromise, had proposed that the number of stages should be reduced to three. For the time being the Chinese delegation had an open mind with regard to the number of stages and the elements to be included in each stage.

14. Agreement on a system of international inspection could not by itself ensure the elimination of atomic weapons. As the Atomic Energy Commission had pointed out, such weapons could be manufactured illegally by any of the three following methods. The first was the secret operation of mines and plants; it was possible to avoid that by authorizing the inspectors to move freely in every country. The second method would be the diversion of atomic raw materials from supervised plants and mines. By using nuclear fuel diverted from isotope separation plants and reactors, it was easy to produce atomic weapons quickly in very small plants. As early as 1947 a Soviet expert had already conceded, in the Atomic Energy Commission, that direct management rather than inspection of atomic installations would be necessary to prevent the diversion of nuclear fuels. As the USSR representative accused the United Nations of wishing, through the plan adopted in 1948, to dominate the world for the benefit of the United States ruling classes, it should be stressed that the problem of effective control of atomic energy could only be solved by experts working dispassionately. There were experts on both sides of the "iron curtain" and it should be easier to work out a system of control than it had been in 1947. The third method of unlawfully producing atomic weapons would be the seizure of atomic installations and their conversion to military ends. That danger would persist irrespective of the control system in force, but it might be reduced to a minimum by the international co-operative development of atomic energy with proper distribution of the installations in the different countries of the world. To be effective any system of control would have to guard against the three methods of manufacturing atomic weapons illegally.

15. The Chinese delegation would return to the question of the bacterial weapon when the Committee took up the relevant agenda item. For the moment he would merely say that his delegation was in favour of the elimination of bacterial weapons but that the Geneva Protocol was not effective enough to prevent their use. Although it was technically difficult to detect the production of bacterial weapons, it would be possible to eliminate them in an open world, and there was reason for believing that a satisfactory solution of the atomic energy question would provide a key to the control and elimination of other weapons of mass destruction.

16. The USSR proposal for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments should be rejected for well-known reasons. He believed that regulation of armed forces by numerical limitation was an excellent starting-point. Yet any concrete proposal for numerical limitation seemed to be of secondary importance, for, without agreement on a system of disclosure, verification and general international inspection, it would be without practical value and would have the same intrinsic shortcomings as the USSR proposal.

17. The most important point, which common sense and technology demanded as a condition prior to

atomic control and disarmament, was the existence of a really free world. The "iron curtain" was the common enemy of all mankind. It could be removed under the pressure of well-informed public opinion and by the establishment of an effective system of collective security. The world would then be ready to proceed with genuine disarmament. In that spirit he requested the Committee to adopt the fourteen-Power draft resolution, of which his delegation was a co-sponsor.

18. In conclusion, he referred to the international bibliography on atomic energy compiled by the Secretariat, which considerably facilitated the international exchange of information on the subject. The Secretariat should be congratulated on that undertaking.

19. Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) said that all delegations were in agreement in their desire for a substantial measure of disarmament, but disagreed on the methods by which the objective should be reached. The existing level of armaments imposed a very heavy burden on all countries, including the USSR. That alone would be a sound reason for the United Kingdom to wish for results; yet it was constantly being accused of insincerity by the USSR representatives. Accordingly, it should be made clear where the responsibility lay. The USSR position regarding the problem as a whole had not changed materially since 1948. It was that the General Assembly should immediately make a declaration prohibiting the atomic weapon, which should be followed at some uncertain future date by agreement on a method of control. The agreement should in turn be followed at a still more distant date by agreement on the international control agency. Finally, the agency must be in a position to undertake its functions on the spot. The USSR representatives had frequently accused the majority of embodying the conception of stages in the United Nations plan for atomic energy control. Actually, however, the USSR proposals provided for too many stages, each more remote than the other.

20. The USSR position with regard to armed forces and conventional armaments was even less defensible, as mere mathematical reduction would only perpetuate and even exaggerate the existing disparity between the armed forces of the various countries. That had in fact been admitted by Mr. Vyshinsky, when he stated at the sixth session of the General Assembly that the objection did not really matter since, after the first reduction, others would follow and a balance between the military forces could thus be achieved. All those arguments seemed unconvincing and unsatisfactory from the point of view of the security of any country. The USSR plan in any case provided for a series of stages as in the case of atomic energy.

21. The inevitable conclusion was that the USSR was requesting commitments from others without being prepared to commit itself. The exact intention seemed to be to deprive the West of the atomic weapons which were, at the moment, its bulwark and main safeguard against Soviet preponderance in armed forces and conventional armaments.

22. The Disarmament Commission had carefully examined the two so-called concessions made by the USSR representative at the sixth session of the General Assembly (A/C.1/698). The first had consisted

in the addition of the following phrase to the standard USSR formula: "it being understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control shall be put into effect simultaneously". The second was the statement that the international control agency should undertake inspection on a continuing basis but without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

23. With regard to the first point, if the USSR had genuinely desired the prohibition of the atomic weapon to be immediate, it was obvious that that could not come into force simultaneously with the institution of international control, since no agreement had been reached on methods of control. The discussions had clearly shown that the USSR representatives had hoped to have it both ways. First, they wanted a declaration prohibiting the atomic weapon, the result of which would be to deprive the Western Powers of the defence which those weapons constituted; then they pretended to meet the point of view of the Western Powers by admitting that prohibition would come into effect only when a system of international control had been established. But the declaration on prohibition would have no immediate value because control would not be established until all the stages of the USSR plan had been completed.

24. With respect to the second so-called concession, the USSR representative had given an even less satisfactory reply when asked for the exact meaning of the words "inspection on a continuing basis" and of the phrase concerning interference in the domestic affairs of States. The reply had been that those words meant what they said and nothing else. On being pressed, he had finally stated that he would explain the exact meaning of those words only if the United States representative renounced the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy. That had been tantamount to demanding the abandonment of a plan endorsed repeatedly by the General Assembly, before the USSR would deign to explain its own proposals.

25. The USSR representative had, admittedly, introduced one new element: a clause providing for an immediate ban on the use of the bacterial weapon and for calling to account all those who violated the prohibition. Unfortunately, he had only included that paragraph in his plan of work in order to raise the question of the alleged use of the bacterial weapon in Korea.

26. Sir Gladwyn then referred to a number of proposals—none of them in the nature of an ultimatum—which had been intended, rather, to facilitate the discussion. For example, the working paper submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, containing proposals for the numerical limitation of all armed forces—reproduced in part IV, section B, of the second report of the Disarmament Commission (DC/20) addressed to the Secretary-General under the symbol A/2226—had been based on the idea that the number of men employed in the armed forces was a vital element in any plan for disarmament. There had been no intention of establishing any kind of immediate mathematical rule but it had been hoped that the work would be judged on its merits, and that the members of the Commission would discuss it seriously and possibly submit helpful amendments. However, the USSR representative had objected that

the paper did not mention atomic weapons; but then the document had not been meant to deal with them. The USSR delegation had also complained that it was not made clear that naval and air as well as land forces would be covered by the proposals. After full explanations had been given on that point, the USSR had stated that the draft did not call for a reduction of existing armed forces, although in reality it would have produced a reduction of 50 and 40 per cent respectively in the United States and USSR armed forces, on the basis of the figure of 3,500,000 men given for the United States forces by the USSR representative himself, and also the figures which Mr. Malik had implied for the armed forces of the Soviet Union. In other words, the reduction under the scheme proposed by France, the United Kingdom and the United States would have been larger than the one-third reduction proposed in the Soviet plan. It was a pity that the Soviet Union had never followed up its peaceable professions by co-operating in the work of the Disarmament Commission. It was therefore high time that the Soviet Union, whose Prime Minister, Mr. Malenkov, had proclaimed his country's desire for a peaceful settlement of all international problems, passed from slogans to action.

27. The United Kingdom delegation had joined with most of the members of the Disarmament Commission in submitting the fourteen-Power draft resolution, which should be received with almost unanimous approval. Despite the disappointments of the previous year, it was impossible to abandon every hope of some day obtaining the co-operation of the Soviet Union and thereby overcoming many obstacles.

28. Mr. KYROU (Greece) said that, as a result of the Disarmament Commission's work, the situation was at least clear: disarmament could not be unilateral, and unless it was controlled and based on principles of disclosure and verification, it might even do harm by exposing peaceful States to aggression and thereby starting wars instead of preventing them. Real disarmament could only be brought about by international agreement and certainly not by propaganda and polemics.

29. After the adoption of resolution 502 (VI), eleven of the twelve members of the Commission had endeavoured to comply with its terms of reference. The three great Western Powers in particular had made every effort; but despite the co-operation of the eight other members of the Commission, they had been unable to persuade Mr. Malik either to discuss their proposals seriously or to submit constructive suggestions. As the representative of Belgium had so aptly said, Mr. Malik had refused to explain or to elaborate on his "phantom" proposals, which had been rejected so many times by a crushing majority in the United Nations; instead, he had merely made propaganda and slanderous speeches. If the rulers of the USSR were anxious to prove their sincerity, they had it in their power to lead the Disarmament Commission out of the dead-lock caused by the obstructive tactics of the USSR delegation.

30. The Commission's work, however, had at least made it clear where the responsibility lay, and its work should be continued with patience and determination. In that spirit Greece was joining with other delegations in sponsoring the fourteen-Power draft

resolution, and it was to be hoped that the USSR would decide to recommend its adoption.

31. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that at the 577th meeting the United States representative had described the work of the Disarmament Commission in terms wholly at variance with the facts; the facts proved that the Soviet Union had in reality submitted constructive proposals for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. It was the United States which, far from supporting disarmament, was working to bring about the failure of the Commission.

32. As usual, the United States delegation had slandered the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies. Actually, the whole history of recent sessions showed that the Soviet Union had always clearly affirmed the principles of the regulation and reduction of armaments, and the prohibition of atomic weapons under international control, and that it had repeatedly made proposals to that effect both in the General Assembly and its Committees and also in the Security Council. The Soviet Union had always been moved by a desire for peace, which was its constant aim. On 9 March 1953, Mr. Malenkov had said that his country was above all desirous of avoiding a further war and of living at peace with all other countries. On 15 March, addressing the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. Malenkov had said that all States interested in the maintenance of peace might rest assured, both then and in the future, of the consistently peaceful policies of the Soviet Union. That will to prevent a further world war was shared by the entire Soviet people, and by all peoples everywhere, including the American people. The policy of the United States Government, by contrast, the policy of the armaments race and situations of strength, was in flat contradiction with the statement made by Mr. Gross that disarmament was the best safeguard against aggression.

33. The questions raised by Mr. Gross (577th meeting) were merely a trick, since the concrete proposals of the Soviet Union had actually been submitted and examined in the United Nations. Unfortunately they had always met with the opposition of the United States and certain other delegations. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union would continue in the various organs of the United Nations, the Disarmament Commission in particular, to seek a solution to the problem by the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

34. The United States representative had also commented on the work of the Disarmament Commission and on the attitude of its members. To correct any misconceptions, Mr. Zorin pointed out that two methods had been advocated in the Disarmament Commission: the Soviet Union had, as always, continued to call for the adoption of a decision on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and all other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, and on the establishment of strict international control, and for a one-third reduction, within one year, of the armaments and armed forces of the five major Powers. The Soviet Union had then agreed that the prohibition of atomic weapons and institution of international control should be put into effect simultaneously and that all States should, not later than one month after the adoption of the said decisions, submit complete official data on

the situation of their armaments and armed forces, including information relating to atomic weapons and military bases established on foreign territory. The proposals put forward by the Soviet Union and transmitted by the General Assembly to the Disarmament Commission had also stipulated that a draft convention should be presented to the Security Council providing for measures to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons, cessation of their production and the establishment of international control. As indicated in part II, section A, of the second report of the Commission, they had also recommended the establishment, within the framework of the Security Council, of an international control organ with the right to carry out inspection on a continuing basis, "without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States". The Soviet Union had further proposed the convening of an international conference to study practical measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for international control to secure observance of the prohibition.

35. At the sixth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union had urged the adoption of its clear and concrete proposals, which were in conformity with the wishes of all peoples anxious to avert war. The three Western Powers, however, had opposed a detailed study of the Soviet Union's plan, insisting that it should be transmitted to the Disarmament Commission, while at the same time they had put forward a proposal for the collection of information on the situation of armaments. Already at the sixth session, the Soviet Union had pointed out that the three-Power plan was not conducive to a positive solution for the problem of the reduction of armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons but was in effect meant only to conceal the current situation of armaments among the Western Powers and to promote the armaments race.

36. Contrary to the statements made at the sixth session by the United States and the United Kingdom regarding a possible solution of the problem on the lines of their plan, the Disarmament Commission's second report revealed that the three Powers, particularly the United States, had sabotaged the Commission's work and dashed the hopes of the advocates of peace. The object of the plan of work proposed by the United States and set forth in part II, section A, of the report was merely to divert the Commission from its true task by concentrating on the question of disclosure and verification instead of presenting a plan for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments.

37. The USSR representative on the Disarmament Commission had thereupon submitted a working plan following the scheme outlined earlier. The plan, set forth in the same section of the report, contained, in addition, proposals for consideration by the Commission of the impermissibility of the use of bacterial weapons. It had also raised the question of preparing a draft convention for submission to the Security Council and the preparation of provisions relating to the establishment of an international control organ within the framework of the Security Council.

38. The three Western Powers had opposed the Soviet Union's plan in order to divert the Commission from its real task and the French representative had

put forward the earlier United States plan for the disclosure and verification of all armaments, as if it was a French plan. That plan, which was also set forth in part II, section A, of the report, had avoided all reference to the prohibition of atomic weapons and provided only for a "balanced" reduction of all other armaments. In short, it did not provide a basis for practical action and merely revealed an obvious desire to divert a body directed to study the prohibition of atomic weapons and effective disarmament, subject to international control, from its terms of reference. Events had proved that the Commission had had no intention of considering definite proposals on those three matters.

39. With reference to the international control of the prohibition of atomic weapons, Mr. Gross had once again, at the 577th meeting, been guilty of misrepresentation in asserting that the Soviet Union had declined to elaborate on its proposals. That was untrue, since as early as June 1947 the USSR representative on the Atomic Energy Commission had submitted a proposal¹, the first point of which dealt with the strict international control of all enterprises engaged in the production or conversion of atomic raw materials. That very detailed plan had provided for the establishment of an international commission, which would have had its own inspectors and which would have verified the accounts and operations of the enterprises in question. Very strict rules for technical control have been contemplated. The commission would also have taken part in drafting rules governing atomic production, would have collected information and was to have conducted special inspections in the event of any suspicion. Such were the measures proposed by the Soviet Union, which had appeared in the third report of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC/31/Rev.1). Lastly, at the sixth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union had submitted further proposals for the international control of atomic energy (A/C.1/698). It had agreed that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control should take effect simultaneously. It had also proposed that the control organ should have the right of continuous inspection, though not the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

40. Accordingly, it was surprising that Mr. Gross could have claimed that the USSR proposals were vague and that the Soviet Union had declined to elucidate them. Mr. Gross had also referred to a Soviet Union veto in the matter of inspection, even though the Soviet Union had stated earlier that the question of the veto did not arise in connexion with the functioning of the control organ, since the latter would be separate from the Security Council. Such a statement was a distortion of the facts and intended to blind public opinion to the responsibility of the United States for the Disarmament Commission's failure.

41. After adopting the unsatisfactory plan of work proposed by the United States and redrafted by France in an attempt to disguise its real identity, the Commission, despite a semblance of activity, had made no effort to study practical proposals of any sort, but had preferred to engage in futile discussions of general issues or of the disclosure and verification of informa-

tion. The working paper submitted by the United States on 5 April 1952 had referred to progressive disclosure, "by stages", subject to the requirement that each stage should have been "satisfactorily completed" before the next could begin. The question was who would have the final decision as to whether a stage had been satisfactorily completed. The intention behind the proposal had in fact been to obtain information concerning the armaments of certain countries, the disclosure of information relating to atomic weapons being postponed to the final stage; in other words, it might never take place at all, if it was maintained that the preceding stage had not been completed. That was the plan with which the Netherlands representative had associated himself.

42. Obviously, such plans had been unacceptable to the USSR representative, who, in contrast, had submitted practical proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments. In reply to questions from the USSR regarding the duration of the five stages, the United States representative had first said that he could not forecast their duration and had added later that any one stage might last two years. That was tantamount to admitting that the United States needed time to carry out its rearmament programme and that it had evolved the system of stages so as to be able to build up situations of strength, in the language employed by the United States representative at the preceding meeting. The USSR representative had therefore told the Commission that the United States meant to obtain information about the armaments of certain countries while keeping its own atomic weapons secret, and that the Soviet Union was obliged to oppose a plan which was not based on the prohibition of atomic weapons or on the reduction of armaments and which, in keeping with the wishes of the United States, was calculated to hamper any real progress.

43. After the USSR had criticized the plan on those lines, the French representative had resorted to the manoeuvre of reducing the number of stages from five to three, whereupon the United States had submitted a proposal, set forth in part III, section C, of the Commission's report, on "essential principles for a disarmament programme". All that those principles had contained, apart from the provisions set forth in the earlier General Assembly resolution (41 (I)) of 1946, was a reference to the need for the conclusion of international agreements with a view to attaining fixed maximum levels. It had mentioned a number of "effective safeguards" as well as an "effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification". In other words, it had revived the idea of a system which would conceal a firm intention of taking no action in regard to the prohibition of atomic weapons and the effective reduction of armaments. Moreover, to judge by the United States representative's reply to some inquiries made by the Soviet Union, the United States had clearly meant to give priority to the question of disclosure and verification. In other words, the United States position had remained unchanged and its attempt to put forward "essential principles" as the basis for a new programme had been doomed to failure, since the intention had once again been merely to substitute vague declarations without binding force for the practical decisions required by the Commission's actual terms of reference. The United States had itself

¹ See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, No. 2.*

emphasized that a decision on those "essential principles" could not establish a moral and juridical obligation for States to disarm, unless they were protected by effective guarantees against violations or possible subterfuges.

44. Sir Gladwyn Jebb had referred to the proposal made on 28 May 1952 by the three Western Powers (DC/10) for fixing numerical limitations on all armed forces on the basis of a number of factors—geographical, political and economic—and in keeping with the responsibilities of States under the United Nations Charter. The United Kingdom representative had no doubt been trying to give the impression that that formula would make it possible to reach a practical solution through numerical limitations on the armed forces of other States in the form of ceilings established by the five major Powers, since he had attempted to lead the Commission to believe that it at last had before it the plan for the reduction of armaments which the peoples were awaiting and which would end the armaments race in which the countries of the North Atlantic bloc were engaged. When, however, the USSR representative had asked whether the plan provided for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armed forces and armaments, the United Kingdom representative had replied that the Commission was only competent to make recommendations and not to take decisions on matters which had allegedly not been studied. The three Powers had later admitted, and Sir Gladwyn had confirmed, that their proposals related only to the numerical limitation of armed forces and did not deal with the prohibition of atomic weapons. At the Commission's 12th meeting the United States representative had said that that was only a part of the problem, thus tacitly admitting that the proposal did not cover the prohibition of atomic weapons. Furthermore, he had been unable to answer satisfactorily the USSR representative's question why the reduction of naval or air forces—the most substantial of the United States and United Kingdom armed forces—had not been mentioned. Finally, the three-Power proposals had made no provision for a reduction in armed forces and indeed would have allowed the United States, the United Kingdom and France to maintain their forces at their current level or even to increase them.

45. The representative of the Soviet Union had stated that if the Western Powers would agree to some definite decisions on a reduction of armed forces, if only by one-third, and on the prohibition and control of atomic weapons, he would have no objection to an agreement on numerical ceilings. That statement had gone unanswered. Thus the intention had in fact been to maintain the existing armed forces, and particularly the naval and air forces.

46. Since that plan had been shown to be manifestly inadequate, the three Powers had submitted on 12 August 1952 a supplementary proposal reproduced in part IV, section C, of the report, relating to the provisions which any agreement for the numerical limitation of armed forces would necessarily comprehend. It provided *inter alia* for the development of certain programmes under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission and for the convening of a conference of the five major Powers, to be followed by regional conferences to be attended by all governments having

substantial military forces. The proposal provided for the co-ordination of reductions and eliminations and for the continuation of the production of atomic weapons until the reductions in armed forces and armaments had been completed. In reply to the Chilean representative, the French representative had explained that the Disarmament Commission would co-ordinate the decisions of the regional conferences and the conference of the five Powers, after which the whole plan would be referred to a world conference which would not, however, deal with the prohibition of atomic weapons. Hence the object of the plan had been to divert attention from that question and from the question of the reduction of armaments.

47. As the United States had bases and armed forces all over the world, the conclusions reached by the regional conferences would obviously have been dictated by that country and would have led to an intensification of the armaments race. Moreover, only the representatives of the major Powers had stated their views on the plan; the Canadian representative had later made a brief statement in support of it. That was the truth about the Commission's so-called positive and constructive efforts.

48. The attitude of the United States had been further exemplified in the debate on the prohibition of bacterial weapons, when, in March 1952, at the 3rd meeting of the Commission, a proposal had been made for barring those weapons. The United States, reluctant to deprive itself of weapons of mass destruction, had opposed the proposal, which would have prevented it from using such weapons, especially in Korea and China. Similarly, the other two Western Powers had argued that the Commission was not competent to consider the USSR proposal on bacterial warfare, and with the support of some other governments which were willing to condone violations of the Geneva Convention of 1925, had wrung from the Commission a decision enjoining its members not to make accusations concerning bacterial warfare and not to discuss documents on the subject.

49. World public opinion had, however, been outraged by American methods in Korea and on 18 June 1952 the Soviet Union representative had raised the question of the ratification of the Geneva Convention by all States. The United States, feeling itself isolated, had taken refuge in a stratagem and suggested that the USSR proposal should be referred to the Disarmament Commission, although in March the United States delegation had barred the question from discussion in that body. The fact was that an impartial commission on Korea had gathered conclusive evidence of the use of bacterial weapons, and on 15 August 1952 the United States had felt compelled to attempt to reply to those accusations. The International Red Cross Conference had also adopted a resolution concerning the signature or ratification of the Convention by all States.

50. The United States had, however, argued that in the absence of certain safeguards it could not pledge itself not to use certain weapons. What, then, became of the United States Government's declared intention to abide by its obligations under the Charter and to refrain from using force for purposes contrary to the Charter? On 15 August² the United States representa-

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 19th meeting.

tive had said that when men were fighting it was not easy to regulate the methods of war. Thus the United States representative had betrayed his true intentions by opposing the USSR proposal that the Commission should take up the question of bacterial warfare.

51. To sum up, the United States had prevented the Commission from coming to any definite decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and, with the help of the countries which followed its example, had led the Commission to waste time in discussions on the disclosure and verification of information, with the sole object of concealing its own rearmament.

52. The representatives of the Western Powers had, of course, made a number of hypocritical declarations in order to evade responsibility. Early in the session Mr. Acheson had said that the United States wanted disarmament and that negotiations could lead to a reduction of armed forces. Mr. Eden had stated, at the 393rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 11 November 1952, that his Government would give the Commission its full support. Unfortunately, Mr. Acheson had made a number of stipulations concerning effective safeguards; in order to avoid disproportion between the various countries, the Western Powers were to continue to rearm for the time being. Those arguments had been put forward earlier in the Commission for Conventional Armaments. In truth, however, were not the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons the best guarantees of peace?

53. Actually, the United States representative on the Disarmament Commission had said that the free world would have to increase its military strength. In a report to the President of the United States, Mr. Lovett had stated that in two years the United States had increased its armed forces by over two million men and had expanded its war industries. The document showed that since the beginning of the war in Korea the Department of Defense had received funds amounting to \$US156,600 million, to say nothing of the troops engaged in the criminal war in Korea. Mr. Lovett had admitted that that war had laid a heavy burden on the American people: additional taxation, a rise in the cost of living, loss of human lives, all for a war so far from the United States.

54. Despite public protests, the new Administration was continuing the armaments race. In the United Kingdom, however, Mr. Churchill had been obliged to admit, on 5 December 1952, that the slowing down of the country's rearmament programme was due to economic difficulties, but he had added that rearmament was still the crux of the policy of the North Atlantic bloc.

55. At the time of Mr. Dulles' visit to the United Kingdom, the British newspapers had protested against the pressure exerted by the United States. Nevertheless the budget of the United Kingdom for 1953 was \$US400 million higher than that for the previous year. The French Government had adopted a military budget of over \$US4,000 million, and the French people were becoming more and more hostile to such large military budgets. Military appropriations in Norway and Denmark amounted to 40 per cent and 30 per cent of the budget respectively and there was growing discontent, as had been witnessed by Mrs. St. George, who had informed Congress that many Europeans regarded

the Americans as war-mongers or, at best, as children playing with fire.

56. The United States representative on the Disarmament Commission had claimed that his country wished to abolish atomic weapons. Actually, however, General Collins, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, had recently stated that with the help of the atomic weapon fewer soldiers would be needed. General Bradley had said earlier, in 1950, that the atomic weapon would become the standard weapon.

57. There was growing opposition to that policy, not only among the people but in intellectual circles also. Mr. Halpern, writing in the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, had said that no illusions of security should be based on the hydrogen bomb, and that genuine security could only be achieved through a gradual but positive approach to peace. As public opinion was coming to realize, the armaments race being carried on by the North Atlantic bloc was a threat to peace. The three Western Powers claimed, of course, that it was forced on them by the communist danger. But what country was building bases thousands of miles from the United States and sending troops to parts of the world where there was no threat to the security of the United States?

58. American visitors had been obliged to recognize that in several European countries there was no fear of the supposed threat on which the United States policy was based. In 1952, Mr. Jonas had informed the House of Representatives that General Gruenther did not believe that the Soviet Union would begin a war either then or in the future. Was not that an admission that the so-called threat from the Soviet Union was a mere pretext for the armaments race?

59. If in fact, as was claimed, the armaments race was forced on the United States, why did that Government reject the proposals made by the Soviet Union and other peace-loving States concerning the prohibition of atomic weapons, the reduction of the armed forces of the major Powers by one-third and strict control of atomic energy? Why did they persecute the real advocates of peace? Both the statements of the United States representative and the fourteen-Power draft resolution showed that the United States and a number of other countries continued to oppose measures which ought to be supported by any true friend of peace.

60. At the sixth session the Soviet Union delegation had submitted proposals along those lines. Unfortunately the Disarmament Commission, to which they had been referred, had failed in its task. It could and should, however, shoulder its responsibilities in the interests of the peace and security of all the peoples.

61. He read out the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.31), and in conclusion expressed the hope that the First Committee would satisfy the aspirations of the peoples, who were anxious that peace should be maintained, that an armistice should be concluded in Korea, that the armaments race should cease and that the threat of a new war should be banished.

62. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) pointed out that it had always been the custom for the Security Council not to meet at the same time as the Political Committee and the General Assembly. Furthermore, the representa-

tives on the Security Council also represented their countries on the Disarmament Commission and were therefore interested in the current debate in the First Committee. Accordingly, he proposed that, as the Security Council was meeting in the afternoon, the First Committee should hold its next meeting on 20 March at 10.30 a.m.

63. The CHAIRMAN observed that if the First Committee wanted to complete its agenda during the first week in April, it should, as far as possible, avoid

cancelling meetings. There were still five speakers on the list on the question of disarmament.

64. Nevertheless he would put to the vote the French proposal that the next meeting of the First Committee should be held on 20 March at 10.30 a.m.

The proposal was adopted by 28 votes to 17, with 11 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.