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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 22

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/3366, A/3470, A/C.1/783, A/C.1/784, A/C.1/L.160 to A/C.1/L.164) (*continued*)

1. Mr. WALKER (Australia) stated that, if it was impossible to achieve political settlements in present conditions, it was right to think that the prospect of achieving such settlements might be enhanced by initial steps in the disarmament field which could create an atmosphere of greater confidence between the great nations of the world. His Government welcomed the proposals submitted by the United States in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission in 1956 concerning initial steps for demonstration of inspection methods (DC/83, annex 4), for joint technical study (DC/83, annex 3) and for first levels of reduced armaments (DC/83, annex 6).

2. The revised comprehensive programme which had been put forward by France and the United Kingdom in the Sub-Committee (DC/83, annex 2) outlined a comprehensive disarmament agreement to be achieved in three stages. The final stage, which included the prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, was to be carried out after certain outstanding political questions had been settled. The Franco-British paper, in his view, represented a magnificent achievement in terms of welding together, in a fair way, the main measures which would be required in working out a full-scale disarmament programme. Australia supported the proposed synthesis as the ideal towards which the United Nations must strive.

3. The Committee was now faced with a new situation in which it was being asked to consider primarily not a comprehensive programme, but various projects bearing upon disarmament which could be adopted in some cases singly, and in other cases as part of a small series of related proposals. The seven Soviet Union proposals of 17 November 1956 (A/3366) were offered

separately, and implementation of no single one was explicitly tied in with the implementation of any other. While the United States proposals (A/C.1/783) were mainly individual ones, the proposals concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons tests were quite closely linked together.

4. The first proposal in the Soviet proposals of 17 November 1956 (A/3366, para. 26), dealt with the reduction of armed forces. While reduction was a good thing in principle, he had considerable doubt as to the real effect of mere reductions of manpower in relation to modern weapons development. His own feeling was that in view of the present state of tension in the world, announced reductions would not create a real feeling of confidence unless such reductions were policed by direct observation carried out under proper conditions by an effective international control organ. It was also essential that any acceptable disarmament formula for fixing the size of armed forces must take into account essential strategical considerations, in addition to economic, political and demographic factors, as well as the effect of any reductions on the balance of forces in Asia, where Chinese manpower might easily become an overwhelming factor in a vast area where no other great Power maintained large standing forces. He did not think that the Committee need be too impressed by unilateral Soviet manpower reductions in its armed services if they were not subject to international verification and control, essentially because the relationship between numerical strength and modern weapons had by no means been worked out on any secure and authoritative basis. He suggested that all such problems needed further study in the Sub-Committee and the Disarmament Commission.

5. The second Soviet proposal was concerned with the prohibition of nuclear weapons and, as a first step, the ending of tests. He pointed out that it should be perfectly clear that, if that proposal were implemented, Communist military manpower would be predominant both in Europe and in Asia, without non-communist countries having at their disposal the atomic and hydrogen weapons which they regarded in present circumstances as essential to their security. Unless the proposal for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons were accompanied by proposals for simultaneous and major reductions of conventional weapons and armed forces to agreed levels under effective international control and verification, agreement would be beyond reach.

6. The third Soviet proposal related to the reduction by one-third of foreign troops stationed in Germany. Such reduction of forces should be a part of the programme regarding the future settlement of the German problem, as well as the future position of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. He considered that the proposal had wide political implications and doubted that it could be effectively dealt with in the Sub-Committee.

7. The fourth proposal dealt with the reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territory of the countries participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the armed forces of the Soviet Union stationed in the territory of the Warsaw Treaty countries. Such reduction, in his opinion, could only be undertaken in the context of an agreement on European security and under conditions of effective international verification and control, which made the proposal unrealistic at the present time.

8. Regarding the fifth proposal, that foreign military, naval and air bases in the territory of other States should be liquidated within two years, he made a distinction between the forces stationed in NATO countries and the Soviet forces stationed in Warsaw Treaty countries, the former being there with the full consent of the countries concerned, while, in the case of the latter, the Government of the countries concerned had no control over those forces.

9. The sixth Soviet proposal recommended reduction of military budgets as a corollary to the other measures. He did not consider that the Soviet Union was prepared to embrace either the necessary control measures, or to reach the essential political settlement which would make the Soviet proposals practicable.

10. Concerning the seventh Soviet proposal, relating to international control of disarmament, it seemed to him to be such an over-simplification as to be almost incredible. He felt that, if the proposal were probed, it would be found that the Soviet Union maintained its position that the control organ must be subject to the Security Council, which would mean that the control organ could be completely frustrated by the Soviet veto.

11. He felt that the question of employing aerial photography in the area of Europe proposed by the Soviet Union was one which could and must receive thorough technical examination in the Sub-Committee and might later be considered in its political aspects.

12. It seemed to him that the Soviet proposal for holding a special session of the General Assembly on matters of disarmament (A/C.1/L.161) was rather premature, in view of the present stage of negotiations among the great Powers and the fact that the Assembly would reconvene in eight months and would reconsider the problem of disarmament in the light of the work accomplished during that time by the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

13. Regarding the Soviet Union draft resolution on the banning of the atomic and hydrogen weapons tests (A/C.1/L.160), he believed that, in view of the present condition of the world, some tests must be continued for a time if the security of the free world was to be safeguarded.

14. He felt that the draft resolution submitted by Canada, Japan and Norway (A/C.1/L.162), calling for registration of test explosions with the United Nations, was based on a correct approach. He believed, however, that it required further study and elaboration among the Powers most directly concerned.

15. Since his Government had not had sufficient time to consider the United States proposals (A/C.1/783), he wished to express his personal reactions to them. The first proposal, to the effect that all future production of fissionable materials would be earmarked for non-weapons purposes under effective international inspection and supervision, would be a highly significant step and could lead to the next phase, in which transfers

would be made from past production to internationally supervised non-weapons use of such nuclear materials.

16. The second United States proposal, relating to nuclear test explosions, seemed to him realistic in its approach.

17. The third United States proposal concerned a first-stage reduction, under adequate inspection, of conventional armaments and armed forces; he believed that his country would agree with such an approach, and particularly with the emphasis on inspection and verification.

18. The fourth United States proposal concerned control of the propulsion of objects through outer space and similar programmes; he thought that his country's attitude towards the subject would be a positive one.

19. The fifth and last United States proposal, regarding guarantees against a major surprise attack, might prove the most fruitful in its approach. He shared the concern expressed by the representative of the United States on the subject (821st meeting), and thought the problem should be most seriously studied.

20. It seemed to him that the Soviet proposals were "loaded" and had been contrived either for propaganda advantage or as traps in which to catch the Governments of the free world. However, despite the lack of trust in Soviet motives, he did not think that talks with the Soviet Union on disarmament should be abandoned. He declared his country's readiness to bend all its efforts towards discovering ways by which agreement might be reached. However, the lead must come from the great Powers.

21. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the basic conclusion which could be drawn from the exchange of views in the First Committee was that the problem of disarmament remained a central international problem which was of the greatest significance for reducing international tension and strengthening universal peace. The Soviet Union had constantly called for an end to the arms race and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. It was prepared to co-operate towards fulfilling those aims.

22. General Assembly resolution 808 A (IX) had a special importance since the draft had been submitted by Canada, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/752/Rev.2), and it had been unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. The adoption of the resolution constituted recognition of the fact that, for the effective solution of the problem of disarmament, it was necessary to proceed along the course leading to a considerable reduction of armaments, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of effective international control.

23. He considered that the United States proposals (A/C.1/783) circumvented the important question of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States. He pointed out that the United States proposals placed stress, not on reaching agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, but on the establishment of a cumbersome system of inspection and observance of the future production of fissionable materials. Agreement on disarmament had become even more urgent, and he feared that further delay would not reduce, but would increase, the threat of a destructive atomic war. He recalled that as early as 1954, the Indian Government had submitted a proposal to the Disarmament Commission (DC/44 and Corr.1)

for ending tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The proposal to discontinue atomic and hydrogen weapons tests was receiving increased support from a number of countries. His delegation had submitted a draft resolution providing for the immediate cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons (A/C.1/L.160). He considered that the proposals made by some Western countries as well as the draft resolution submitted by Canada, Japan and Norway (A/C.1/L.162) did not testify to an attempt on the part of those countries to put an end to the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The complete solution of the problem would be to stop such tests, thus eliminating one of the sources of existing apprehension among the peoples. The necessary conditions and prerequisites for such a solution existed, and it would be harmful to international co-operation if the opportunities were not utilized.

24. The development of intercontinental missiles and various long-range guided missiles referred to in the United States proposals increased the threat of atomic war. The threat was caused not by the missiles themselves, but by the warheads — the atomic and hydrogen weapons — with which they might be equipped. He noted that the proposals for establishing control over the development of such missiles were silent on such questions as the military bases from which it would be possible to launch rockets with similarly effective range and planes which could carry nuclear weapons. The only correct course by which to save mankind from the threat of atomic war was to decide to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons completely.

25. His country attached great importance to the questions of international control over the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prevention of surprise attack by one State on another. He considered that the Soviet proposal concerning aerial photography in a certain zone in Europe was an important step in bringing the views of different states closer together on disarmament. It was quite natural that international control could not be considered in isolation from real disarmament measures. Without agreement on the reduction of armaments, the control organ could do exactly nothing, for it was the States which must disarm, and not the control organ.

26. Dealing with the question of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, he pointed out that the Western Powers and the Soviet Union had made similar proposals with regard to the levels of the armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council, and accordingly, there was every reason to agree on that particular question. With regard to a further reduction of conventional armaments, he noted that several delegations had rightly stated that no settlement could be reached on the problem if the major political questions had to be settled beforehand. It was not difficult to see that the United States proposals could not lead to a reduction of the armed forces and armaments of the Western Powers, as required by United Nations decisions. He reminded the members of the Committee that the Soviet Union was prepared to reach agreement on all aspects of the disarmament problem simultaneously and to conclude an appropriate agreement. At the same time, his country considered it appropriate to reach agreement on certain partial measures independently of a general or comprehensive agreement and without waiting for the conclusion of such an agreement. In that connexion, he recalled the Soviet proposals for reducing the armed forces of the United States, the

USSR, the United Kingdom and France stationed in Europe.

27. On the question of enlarging the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, he considered that the present one-sided composition of the Sub-Committee made it difficult for it to fulfil the important tasks entrusted to it. For that reason, his delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.164) calling for the enlargement of the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee for the purpose of making those organs more objective and more inclusive. The draft proposed that India and Poland should be added to the membership of the Sub-Committee, and that those two countries, plus Egypt and one of the Latin-American countries, should be added to the membership of the Disarmament Commission.

28. Referring to the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.163), among the sponsors of which were the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, he considered it a favourable and positive development. Its submission had been made possible because of the good will and a desire for co-operation that had been demonstrated in the course of the negotiations. The Soviet Union would exert all its efforts for a most rapid solution of the problem of disarmament.

29. Mr. MOCH (France) recalled that other members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission had already given an account of the work of the Sub-Committee during 1956. Since the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee could be summarized by the words "to give an account and to take into account", it was his duty to take into consideration what had been said in the First Committee and to try to adapt the Sub-Committee's future work to those ideas.

30. The current debate had begun in an atmosphere less favourable than that of 1954 or even that of 1955. Nevertheless, it was the duty of the members of the Committee to bring it to a successful issue and it was their right to remain optimistic. The French attitude was guided by two considerations: first, each technical agreement, however limited, might ease political tension somewhat, while each failure might result in increasing international difficulties. Secondly, a *rapprochement* of various points of view was gradually taking place, although still too slowly. Those two considerations justified the consistent attitude of the French delegation in sparing no effort towards reaching mutual understanding and in constantly seeking a compromise.

31. Reviewing France's efforts toward conciliation, especially since 1951, he emphasized the indispensability of unanimity of opinion regarding any disarmament plan. He recalled that the 1951 agreement which had led to the establishment of the present Disarmament Commission had come about under very disturbing circumstances and in a period of division and tension. Subsequently, on 24 June 1952 the French delegation had submitted to the Disarmament Commission a preliminary plan (DC/5) comprising three stages and setting forth principles still applicable. In his view, any disarmament plan must, in order to meet with unanimous approval, fulfil at least one condition: it must, during each of its stages, increase the security of all parties concerned and not that of one party at the expense of the other. That condition, however, had not been as obvious in 1952 as it was today. In 1952, French efforts to reach a synthesis had encountered differences in points of view, resulting from the opposite military

positions of those who had advocated postponing nuclear disarmament until the end of operations in the field of conventional weapons, and the Soviet Union delegation, which had placed nuclear disarmament in the forefront.

32. In November 1953, the General Assembly had adopted a proposal originally submitted in the First Committee (A/C.1/L.72/Rev.1) which had suggested, *inter alia*, that the Disarmament Commission should set up a limited committee which would meet in closed session. That committee had been established by the Commission in April 1954, and the French delegation, in close co-operation with the United Kingdom delegation, had continued its efforts to reach a synthesis during the Sub-Committee's first session (April-June 1954). After having been initially rejected by the USSR delegation, the Franco-British proposals of 11 June 1954 (DC/53, annex 9) became the basis for discussion as a result of their acceptance as such by the Soviet Union delegation in the General Assembly on 30 September 1954 (484th plenary meeting). The unanimous adoption by the First Committee and later by the General Assembly of a draft resolution sponsored by the five members of the Sub-Committee (A/C.1/752/Rev.2) had raised the hopes of everyone.

33. The Sub-Committee, meeting again in February 1955, had examined a Franco-British plan of 8 March 1955,¹ a Soviet counter-plan of 18 March (DC/71, annex 8), and a Franco-British compromise text of 19 April (DC/71, annex 13). On 10 May, the Soviet delegation, replying to the compromise suggestions, had submitted an extremely important document (DC/71, annex 15) which had showed progress on the technical aspect of disarmament but had introduced various political conditions and certain new concepts with regard to control. Meeting again in August 1955 after the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers at Geneva had failed to make any progress, the Sub-Committee found itself in a stalemate. The technical reason for it stemmed from the impossibility of verifying closely enough the quantity of nuclear materials produced prior to the institution of controls. In that connexion, he recalled his warning of 4 April 1952 before a committee of the Disarmament Commission² that as time went on the risks of concealment and the danger of not being able to detect traces of production would be terribly increased.

34. Taking up and developing that concept, the Soviet delegation had in 1955 derived from it conclusions of a political nature based not so much on inspection as on the means calculated in its opinion to restore confidence. The United States delegation had countered by adhering only to the "Eisenhower plan". During the tenth session of the General Assembly, the French delegation had made a new effort toward a synthesis based on the formula: "No control without disarmament, no disarmament without control, but progressively all disarmament that could currently be controlled".

35. General Assembly resolution 914 (X) of 16 December 1955 started a new stage during which the emphasis had been wholly pragmatic. While the preference of the French delegation was still for an over-all plan of the Franco-British type, it proposed to the Sub-Committee on 9 April 1956³ that all general plans should be abandoned and that a specific agreement on each of the component parts should be sought; the

combination of those separate parts could form a reasonable whole acceptable to all. He stressed that that concession by the French delegation, confirmed in July in the Disarmament Commission, remained valid, and he emphasized that France was prepared to study limited solutions if general agreements remained out of reach.

36. Of the three plans that had been laid before the Sub-Committee in 1956, the Franco-British plan of 19 March 1956 (DC/83, annex 2) was general both in its nature and in its time-table. The USSR plan of 27 March (DC/83, annex 5) was partial in its nature since it dealt primarily with conventional disarmament, but it included isolated measures with regard to nuclear weapons, as well as other measures meant as possible substitutes. Lastly, the United States plan (DC/83, annex 6) was partial in its time-table, but general in its scope. No reconciliation of views had been reached at the spring session of the Sub-Committee, and the new method suggested by the French delegation had not been explored. The last attempt made by the French delegation at conciliation also failed. That concerned a procedural suggestion made to the Disarmament Commission in July 1956.

37. Since that time, three new attempts had been made: Prime Minister Bulganin's message of 11 September 1956 to President Eisenhower, mentioning the possibility of separating the prohibition of nuclear weapons from the problems of disarmament taken as a whole; the Soviet proposals of 17 November 1956 (A/3366), as supplemented by the USSR representative's speech of 14 January 1957 (821st meeting); and finally, a group of measures — some of them new — proposed by the representative of the United States on 14 January 1957 (821st meeting).

38. Observing that the number and complexity of the documents submitted for the General Assembly's consideration made it impossible to analyse them thoroughly in an eighty-nation Committee, he earnestly hoped that the First Committee would unanimously decide to refer the whole question to the Sub-Committee for study.

39. Turning to an examination of the points on which complete or partial agreement had been reached and those still disputed, Mr. Moch, applying the method which he had suggested in vain to the Sub-Committee in April 1956 — namely, to take up separately each component part of the previous generous plans — divided the problems into five groups: general questions, questions relating to the conventional field, those concerning the nuclear field, those relating to control, and, miscellaneous questions.

40. Among the general questions, three principles demanded close examination. First, should the United Nations seek an over-all plan encompassing all the fields and the whole time-table of operations, or should it define a first stage, or even limit itself still further to giving first priority to isolated measures? Recalling various limited proposals and statements by representatives favouring various forms of partial solutions, he concluded that it appeared that the disagreement could be resolved in view of the general preference for what could be called "something now", rather than "everything later or perhaps never".

41. The second general difficulty could be defined as follows: in the case of a more or less general plan, was the transition from one stage to the next, or from one operation to the next, automatic or not? On that point,

¹ See document DC/SC.1/PV.26.

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Committee I*, 1st meeting, para. 26.

³ See document DC/SC.1/PV.78.

three ideas had been expressed. The Soviet Union delegation had almost always favoured transition of a completely automatic character. The Franco-British plans had been based on the idea that transition would be semi-automatic: it would be subject to two certified statements by the head of the international control organ, namely, that the preceding stage had been correctly carried out by all parties and that the control organ was in a position to verify the next operations. He observed that details of the procedure proposed by the French delegation could be found in annex 22 to the second report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (DC/71). The third position was that of the United States, which had entered a reservation on that point, since its delegation had proposed plans confined to the first stage. He emphasized that, obviously, the question of automatic transition from one stage to the next had merit only if the Organization did not give up the idea of establishing a general plan.

42. The third question of a general nature, was the following: was it advisable to interrelate measures concerning conventional armaments and those relating to nuclear weapons, or should they be considered separately? Observing that the difficulty of reaching a general agreement had resulted in a certain tendency to consider measures separately, Mr. Moch agreed with the representative of the United Kingdom that a limitation of nuclear weapons did not provide complete security unless it was coupled with the limitation and control of conventional weapons. However, he emphasized that France had agreed to discuss partial or even isolated measures provided that those measures, separated from their initial context, should not, as a result of their isolation, assume a value different from the one they had when originally placed in an over-all plan.

43. Dealing with the problems concerning the conventional field, he declared that it had been agreed that the level to which the armed forces would be reduced at the end of the first stage should be 2,500,000 men for China, the United States and the USSR and 750,000 men for France and the United Kingdom. However, no agreement had been reached with regard to ceiling levels for the other Powers, and the question of determining the level of the armed forces of each State below a common ceiling had not yet been taken up.

44. With regard to the final levels, agreement had been reached between France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union regarding the permanent members of the Security Council. No suggestions had been made by the United States since its projects had been confined to the first stage only. And nothing had been said regarding other Powers.

45. As to determining final levels, quite a number of subsidiary questions had been left unanswered. What should those totals consist of and how should the effectives be apportioned among the various branches of the armed forces? When a State had trained reserves, there was a risk of rapid remobilization. The French delegation was of the opinion that the levels should comprise only the active forces of the army, the navy and the air force, as well as police forces organized on a military basis. He emphasized the complexity of those problems and the fact that they had not been settled.

46. He observed that there appeared to be a tacit understanding that the real significance of the levels of armed forces was that they provided the means by which to calculate a parallel limitation of armaments. But that tacit understanding concealed numerous difficulties, for

it would be necessary to determine the quantities of the principal weapons, aircraft units, and naval tonnages corresponding to the manpower of each country. Fundamental agreement had also been reached to the effect that the limitation of manpower and armaments involved a reduction in military credits. The problem of what would actually be involved in such a reduction, however, had not yet been examined.

47. Turning to the nuclear field, he pointed out that there were at least four types of conceivable prohibitions: prohibition of test explosions, prohibition of manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes, prohibition of use of weapons of mass destruction, and prohibition of maintaining stockpiles of fissionable materials for military purposes.

48. With regard to test explosions, Mr. Moch stated that there was agreement on principle, but not on implementation. The Soviet Union proposed immediate and complete prohibition, but made no mention of controls. France agreed to such prohibition with controls, provided it was linked eventually with prohibition of manufacture, because if other countries continued to produce bombs, France would regretfully have to set aside its own fissionable materials for that purpose and would have to make a few tests. The United Kingdom contemplated limitation rather than prohibition and was ready to discuss it even apart from any disarmament plan. France did not make the same reservation with regard to limitation as it did with regard to prohibition; it would accept limitation even without linking it to prohibition. The United States contemplated a period of declaration and partial international control, which could be very soon, before stages of limitation and prohibition, both of which would be controlled.

49. The problem of test explosions was not simple since, contrary to the statements of the representative of India in the Disarmament Commission⁴ and by the representative of the Soviet Union at the present meeting, all explosions could not be detected. Very small explosions, or powerful ones set off in deep water, might escape detection. Moreover, he agreed with those who were of the opinion that it should be permissible to set off explosions for scientific purposes under international control. The very minimum that must be achieved without delay as a first step was contained in the draft resolution submitted by Canada, Japan, and Norway (A/C.1/L.162), which France accepted.

50. The French delegation would study the suggestion of the representative of Sweden for a moratorium on tests of nuclear weapons (824th meeting), which would necessitate the setting up of an international scientific control organ, as well as the suggestion of the representative of the Philippines on localizing test explosions (824th meeting).

51. As to the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear materials for military purposes, he asserted that such a measure would be controllable. On that point there was agreement on principle. But if France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had been able to reach an understanding on the timing of that prohibition for purposes of a general plan of disarmament, agreement had not been unanimous on the date, and the problem would be revived when considering a partial plan. Furthermore, a new United States proposal bearing on that subject had been submitted.

⁴ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission*, 58th meeting.

52. The problem of the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction had a character all its own. It constituted an act of faith, for it could not be controlled. On that point there was a disagreement on principle: the Soviet Union demanded moral prohibition and wanted it to be absolute; France and the United Kingdom had accepted that, at least during the first period, with the proviso that the prohibition would not be effective in the case of defence against aggression. In the eyes of the Soviet Union that condition had the two-fold defect of raising the problem of defining aggression and of legalizing the use of those weapons.

53. Furthermore, there was also disagreement in regard to the maintenance of stocks of fissionable materials for military purposes. The Soviet Union wanted immediate transformation of those stocks to peaceful uses, while the United States agreed to that only as an ultimate goal to be reached by stages to be determined. The problem was still further complicated by the impossibility of detecting existing stockpiles with sufficient precision.

54. Turning to questions relating to control, he noted that, though many difficulties remained, the situation had gradually improved. There seemed to be agreement on the four following points: the gradual setting up of a control organ and its extension on the basis of the operation to be verified; the setting up of the control organ at the latest before the operation to be verified was begun; the adaptation of the powers of the control organ to its various functions; the setting up of fixed and mobile teams of international composition under international direction. As to the last point, the French delegation would find it rather difficult to subscribe to a view according to which a State could act as a delegate of the international organization.

55. Recalling the detailed studies on control submitted by the Western Powers, he observed that the USSR had never disclosed its opinion on them, but had limited itself to general proposals which had been gradually coming closer to those of the Western Powers. He also called attention to the agreement on the principle of fixed control points, but not on their number and distribution, or on the control of military blueprints.

56. He emphasized the importance of mobile teams in a control system, a question which had given rise to much controversy. The international organ must have access to installations other than those mentioned in an agreement, because infractions and evasions would probably take place elsewhere than in the declared establishments.

57. He agreed with the representative of the Ukrainian SSR, who had raised the question at the 827th meeting, that financial control must bear not only on the budget voted by the legislative bodies, but also on its effective implementation and use by the Governments. He also agreed that it was necessary to give the control organ the sole task of proving the existence of infractions, and perhaps of taking certain strictly conservatory measures, leaving the decisions to a different organ. While differences with regard to the interpretation of the powers of the control organ were important, he felt that technical formulas of agreement on those problems would be found.

58. With regard to nuclear control, in principle the Powers were in complete agreement that nuclear control would necessarily be permanent and would be essential — whether or not the Powers succeeded in disarming — because of the increasing number of reactors. But the

various methods of applying it in practice had not yet been worked out, and the work of the Disarmament Commission would have to be coupled with that of the International Atomic Energy Agency and various other institutions. Calling for further explanation by the Soviet Union delegation with respect to the relationship between its acceptance of the principle of effective control and the principles of absolute automatism and moral prohibition, he emphasized that either disarmament would be controlled or there would be no true disarmament.

59. Reviewing the positions with respect to aerial inspection, he concluded that the situation had considerably changed since the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers at Geneva in 1955, at which the "Eisenhower plan" had been presented. Recalling his efforts in the Disarmament Commission in July 1956 to seek a compromise solution between the views held by the USSR and the United States and his private talks in Moscow later that year, he observed that in their proposals of 17 November 1956, the Soviet Government had agreed "to consider the question" of aerial inspection in a limited area of Europe. He added that he would like to consider that formula as an acceptance in principle. Terming the Soviet proposal on aerial inspection technically inadequate, he emphasized that the problem was not to draw two lines equidistant from a dividing line, but rather to include within the zone of control all the territories in which secret concentrations of land or air forces might be dangerous. It was for that purpose that he had suggested that the preliminary demarcation of the sectors should be entrusted to military experts. But temporary distortions mattered little, since a certain advance was none the less being made with regard to the principle of aerial inspection. Similarly, in so far as the United States proposals submitted on 14 January (A/C.1/783) spoke of the progressive installation of inspection systems, hopes had been raised that a way out of the deadlock was beginning to appear.

60. Finally, with regard to miscellaneous questions, in particular the United States proposal regarding missiles travelling through outerspace, Mr. Moch declared that France, which had carried out studies on such matters and also had its long-range proving ground, was fully prepared to channel the research in which it was engaged in the direction of scientific purposes only and to agree to give up utilizing the stratosphere for military purposes, provided that an adequate system of control could be established. France likewise accepted the proposal made by the representative of the United Kingdom at the 822nd meeting, according to which "offensive submarines" would be included among the weapons covered by the disarmament plan.

61. With regard to proposals regarding the geographic limitation of manpower and the abandoning of bases on foreign territories, it was the opinion of the French delegation that those problems were beyond the competence of the Committee. A disarmament treaty, he added, could fix the total of the armed forces but not their geographical apportionment, which could be determined only by agreements between the parties directly concerned. While not minimizing such political problems, he contended that the General Assembly was only fully qualified to draw up the general rules of universal disarmament.

62. Surveying some of the new ideas put forward during the present session, he warned the First Committee against the innovations which would enlarge the

Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee and thought it was premature to convene a special session of the General Assembly. Neither did he think it advisable to request, as had been suggested by the representative of the Philippines (824th meeting), that an objective, methodical account should be drawn up summarizing the various proposals which had been presented. Nor did he think it necessary to select a neutral chairman for the Disarmament Commission.

63. With regard to the United States and Soviet Union technical proposals, he thought that the former marked a great step forward toward a *rapprochement* and the latter made it appear that something was becoming possible. He fully agreed with the practical suggestions made by the representative of the United Kingdom, including that with regard to the limitation of test explosions.

64. In summarizing his considerations, he had come to three conclusions: first, that a number of new ideas had been advanced which the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission would have to study attentively, while returning also to many older ones; secondly, that it was inconceivable that any Government should wish to become engaged in a total war or contribute toward its provocation; thirdly, that to avoid such a perspective disarmament, and concurrent disarmament, was needed.

65. The French delegation, would redouble its efforts in the Sub-Committee where, once the First Committee's work had been placed before it, he was confident that, a draft agreement would at long last be evolved.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.