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**Chairman:** Mr. Hermod LANNUNG (Denmark).

**AGENDA ITEM 30**

**Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (A/3123/Rev.1, A/3123/Add.1 and 2, A/3154, chap. VI, section IV, A/C.3/L.508, L.509, L.510, L.512) (*continued*)**

GENERAL DEBATE (*concluded*)

1. Mr. DE SEYNES (Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs) assured the Third Committee that in his task of providing relief to the Hungarian refugees, the Secretary-General had no intention of setting up a parallel organization which would compete with the Office of the High Commissioner. The duties laid upon him by the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 587th plenary meeting on 21 November 1956, would be carried out by a few members of the existing staff, working in close contact with the High Commissioner.

2. He was sure that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510) did not wish their text either to cancel or to supersede any of the provisions of the General Assembly resolution, or to alter any of the responsibilities already assigned to the Secretary-General in connexion with the Hungarian refugees.

3. Mrs. NOVIKOVA (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) regretted that the problem of refugees and displaced persons, which had been before the United Nations for ten years, was still far from being settled, as was clearly shown by the High Commissioner's report (A/3123/Rev.1). The reason for that unsatisfactory situation was that reactionary circles in Western countries found it advantageous to use refugees partly as a reservoir of cheap manpower, and partly as spies and fifth columnists in their countries of origin. It was to be deplored that the High Commissioner had bowed to those plans and had been concentrating on the resettlement and integration of refugees, rather than on their repatriation.

4. The results of the High Commissioner's efforts spoke eloquently of the mistakenness of that policy. He could adequately discharge his mandate only by helping the refugees who wished to do so to return to their countries of origin. In that he would have the support of many countries, including her own, which were anxious to welcome back their long-suffering

nationals. The Byelorussian Government had set up a special repatriation committee, representatives of which were stationed in many cities. Byelorussian nationals wishing to return were assisted in obtaining suitable work and living quarters, while a recent amnesty decree guaranteed freedom from all punishment to those who had collaborated with the Nazi occupying forces.

5. Byelorussians who had returned to their country had testified in their letters to the great help they had received from the Byelorussian authorities, and had described the scandalous stories they had been told in the camps of the reprisals which awaited them. However, such hostile propaganda was losing its force, and more and more of the refugees were turning their thoughts homeward; if the High Commissioner had encouraged them in their choice of repatriation, the entire problem would have been solved long since.

6. Many of the recent Hungarian refugees had fled in sheer panic, while others had been utterly confused by an admittedly confusing situation. They should not be rushed out of Austria, but should be given time to think and to decide calmly what they wished to do next; many of them would certainly choose to go back to their homes and families. The High Commissioner, who was in the best position to know the sorry fate that awaited them if they stayed abroad, should help them to return to Hungary.

7. So far as the earlier groups of refugees were concerned, it was the duty of the High Commissioner to change his attitude and to place a new emphasis on their repatriation; and to counteract hostile propaganda he should inform them of the laws and other measures that had been adopted in their countries of origin to facilitate their return. She therefore supported the Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508) and the Albanian amendment (A/C.3/L.511), which pursued those objectives.

8. Mr. MARRIOTT (Australia) said that the work of the High Commissioner's Office had to be considered in the light of the tragic events in Hungary, which had resulted in the appearance of thousands of new refugees and had created additional responsibilities for the High Commissioner. He could not agree that the number of genuine political refugees was a comparatively small fraction of the total number under the mandate of the High Commissioner. The refugees were human beings; like the rest of mankind they included good and bad elements, but it was indefensible to say that they included a substantial proportion of adventurers who were merely seeking to gain entrance to countries otherwise closed to them, and equally inadmissible to say that they were criminals. Such terms could not apply to persons who preferred to live in misery rather than return to their homelands, or who had fled from brutal repression.

9. The High Commissioner's report and the addenda (A/3123/Rev.1 and A/3123/Add.1 and 2) to it were

not reassuring. The shortfall in contributions amounted to approximately one-third of the estimated requirements, and less than half of the Members of the United Nations had made even a token contribution. The sufferings of the refugees were being prolonged for want of human charity.

10. The Committee, which would shortly be dealing with the draft International Covenants on Human Rights, should consider to what extent those human rights were enjoyed by the refugees. They had suffered so greatly that what they were now seeking was no so much the restitution *in toto* of their human rights as the mere assurance of a livelihood for themselves and their children. The least the United Nations could do was to provide such an assurance and promote wider support for their relief.

11. Australia had admitted more refugees than any other country except the United States of America. Furthermore, during the year ended 31 July 1956 it had contributed £A50,000 to the United Nations Refugee Fund (UNREF).

12. The representative of the Soviet Union had said that it would be a waste of time and a farce to discuss the question of the Hungarian refugees. The debate had shown that the question was, on the contrary, one of great significance for the whole United Nations refugee programme. If any delegation had attempted to turn the debate into a farce, it had been the Soviet delegation, in its statement at the previous meeting.

13. Australia had contributed to the relief of the Hungarian refugees by offering permanent asylum to 3,000 of them in the period up to 31 July 1957, and by relaxing its normal selection standards for that purpose. It had also contributed £A20,000 to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and £A10,000 to the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration, for Hungarian refugee relief.

14. It had been alleged that until propaganda was eliminated, refugees would continue to flow out of their native lands; but the effects of propaganda should not be confused with the conditions which forced refugees to leave their homes. The whole world was rife with propaganda, but the stream of refugees flowed in only one direction.

15. Repatriation was being held up as a kind of magic formula which would eliminate the refugee problem. His delegation entirely supported voluntary repatriation, but the refugees must have complete freedom of choice between that solution and those of integration or resettlement. Any pressure in favour of any one solution would seriously impair that freedom. His delegation had complete confidence in the integrity of the High Commissioner and his staff in that regard. The Australian delegation felt that the work of the High Commissioner's Office deserved full support, and was confident that all countries would respond generously to his appeal for assistance.

16. Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) said that the people and Government of his country were keenly interested in a rapid settlement of the problem of refugees and displaced persons. Nearly twelve years after the end of the Second World War, many thousands of persons who had been brutally torn from their homes by the Nazis were still leading a hand-to-mouth existence abroad. Furthermore, the problem

itself was larger than was apparent from the High Commissioner's report, for thousands of refugees who had been resettled overseas and were no longer within his mandate now found themselves in countries whose language and culture were alien to them, and which at best could be a refuge but not a home. Theirs was a new problem—the problem of the uprooted.

17. Of late, the Office of the High Commissioner rarely used the term "displaced persons" in its documents; it preferred to speak of "refugees", implying that all those under its care had deliberately left their countries for political reasons. Yet the main reason they had not been repatriated was that certain Governments had failed to abide by the Yalta Agreement and the recommendations of the General Assembly. The High Commissioner himself had failed to avail himself in equal measure of the three solutions proposed by the General Assembly; he had promoted resettlement and integration, but had taken an entirely passive attitude as regards the best and most humane method open to him—repatriation. Such a policy had not been recommended in any resolution of the United Nations; nor was there any reason to think that the majority of the persons within the High Commissioner's mandate were political refugees. Furthermore, many of those who were genuinely within that category had had time to reconsider their views, and had expressed a desire to return to their countries and to help in building them up. Many letters expressing such a desire had been received from persons resettled overseas.

18. The Romanian Government had taken a number of measures to facilitate the return of its nationals abroad, including a general amnesty for all offences short of homicide; and as a result some 5,000 Romanian nationals had recently returned to their fatherland, despite the obstacles set in their path by the authorities of certain countries. Lodgings and work in their trade or profession had been found for them, the aged and disabled had been granted pensions, and peasants had been given either their own land or a comparable tract from the State lands. The possibilities of repatriation were far from exhausted, and should be further explored by the High Commissioner.

19. The Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508) rightly laid stress on repatriation, and asked the Governments of the host countries to co-operate with those of the countries of origin in settling the problem of displaced persons and refugees, particularly by voluntary repatriation. Such co-operation was essential, for in some countries the authorities exerted pressure on refugees and displaced persons who expressed a desire to go home. In particular, several governmental and voluntary organizations in the United States of America, including a Senate sub-committee, were seeking to discourage and intimidate such people, a fact clearly reflected in the United States Press. The United States authorities also apparently censored the correspondence of persons resettled in the United States, with a view to preventing them from learning the truth about conditions at home. The Romanian Government was convinced that the decision whether or not to return to his country of origin had to be taken by the individual, with full knowledge of the facts and free from outside pressure; yet such pressure was daily exerted by United States authorities.

20. Refugees and displaced persons had presumably been sent to the United States of America so that they

could establish permanent homes there; it was therefore surprising, to say the least, to learn from official sources that some of them were serving in special forces of the United States Army. Surely that indicated that they were being used for ends which had nothing in common with the allegedly philanthropic purposes of resettlement.

21. The history of the refugees was one of suffering and privation; yet some countries were hindering a humane solution of the refugee problem purely in order to maintain international tension, to win what they considered to be a battle in the "cold war", and to have at their disposal a convenient reserve of spies and shock-troops to be used against their own countries. The recent events in Hungary had amply demonstrated how useful such tools could be.

22. Such an attitude was utterly contrary to the spirit of justice and humanity in which the problem should be approached. It was intolerable that the sufferings of thousands should be prolonged so that they might serve as an argument against conditions in their countries. If the High Commissioner and the Governments directly concerned were to concentrate on voluntary repatriation and eliminate the obstacles to repatriation which he had described, the problem would soon be solved. He therefore warmly supported the Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508) and the Albanian amendment (A/C.3/L.511) to it.

23. Mr. TABIBI (Afghanistan) said that, although Afghanistan was unfortunately unable to make any financial contribution on behalf of the refugees, it gave full moral support to all efforts to alleviate their sufferings. He welcomed the reduction that had taken place in the number of refugees in camps, and stressed that repatriation should only be envisaged if the refugee chose that solution of his own free will.

24. The Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508) with the Albanian amendment (A/C.3/L.511) to it, and the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510) were so closely related that the delegation concerned might be able to agree on a combined text. He supported the Dominican draft resolution (A/C.3/L.509) in principle, but felt that operative paragraph 1 would be improved by the amendment he suggested (A/C.3/L.516).

25. Mrs. BILAI (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said it was deplorable that more than ten years after the end of the Second World War there were 200,000 refugees in Europe, 57,000 of whom were still living in camps. Her country was anxious for a rapid solution of that tragic human problem, particularly as the refugees included a number of Ukrainians who had not fled their country of their own free will. They were not political refugees in any sense; they had been driven from their homeland by the Nazi armies, and at the end of the war had found themselves in territories occupied by the Western Powers, from which they had been unable to return.

26. The refugee problem would by now have ceased to exist if General Assembly resolution 8 (I) of 12 February 1946, which specified that the main task concerning displaced persons was to encourage and assist their early return to their countries of origin had been implemented. Unfortunately, integration and resettlement had been stressed at the expense of repatriation, as was clear from the High Commissioner's report (A/3123/Rev.1). Although some delegations had

maintained that the refugees were unwilling to return to their homelands even when they had the opportunity to do so, the facts showed that the contrary was true: many of them longed to return but were prevented from doing so.

27. During the past year, 2,500 Ukrainian citizens had returned to their native land, some of them from Western Europe. Before they had been able to exercise their right to repatriation, they had had to overcome considerable opposition from hostile *émigré* organizations in the pay of foreign Governments. Many displaced persons who had returned to the Ukraine had told of the threats and obstruction they had met with when they had announced their determination to return. The Ukrainian Government, anxious to welcome them back, had declared an amnesty for crimes committed during and after the war, and was ready to provide work, housing and financial assistance for those who returned. The High Commissioner should take effective steps to inform the refugees of the legislation that had been enacted in their favour. He had not only not done so, but had allowed *émigré* organizations to disseminate propaganda against the Ukrainian SSR, thus interfering with the implementation of General Assembly resolution 8 (I). It was essential that the refugees should be allowed to make their decision on repatriation in full knowledge of conditions in their homeland and in complete freedom. Many Ukrainians had already disregarded the slanders that were being circulated about their country, and had returned home, to be welcomed with open arms and reinstated in all their rights as citizens.

28. She supported the Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508) and the Albanian amendment (A/C.3/L.511) to it. She could not support the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510), as it failed to lay sufficient weight on repatriation.

29. Miss MAÑAS (Cuba) paid a tribute to the work done by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Referring to paragraph 9 of the report on the situation of refugees in Latin American countries (A/3123/Add.2), she said that although Cuba was not a party to the Convention relating to the status of refugees, it had agreed to accept the refugee travel documents issued under that Convention for immigration into Cuba. Her Government regretted that owing to the cost of its economic development programme, it was not able to make any regular contribution to UNREF. Because of its deep sympathy with the Hungarian refugees, however, it would as an exception make a contribution to the Secretary-General's fund.

30. The CHAIRMAN declared the general debate closed.

31. Mr. MICHELET (France), exercising his right of reply under rule 116 of the rules of procedure, said, first of all, that it was unfortunate that a debate on the situation of the refugees, which should have been conducted on a purely humanitarian plane, had been given a political twist. In particular, it was deplorable that the Hungarian refugees should have been called fascists. France had already given refuge to 2,000 of those refugees, and 2,000 more were expected. He himself, who was unfortunately only too well acquainted with the Nazi or fascist attitude and vocabulary, had seen some of the Hungarian refugees on their arrival in Paris; they had nothing in common with fascists. More-

over, it was surprising, if they were criminals and fascists, that the Hungarian Government was so anxious for them to return to Hungary.

32. The representative of the Soviet Union had tried to give the impression that the spontaneous movement of sympathy and support for the Hungarian refugees in Europe had an ulterior motive: to divert attention from the situation in the Middle East. There was no parallel between the Middle East and Hungary. In the Middle East, every effort had been made to restrict operations to military targets and to spare civilian lives, and Port Said had been little damaged. In Hungary, the picture was very different; Budapest was in ruins. Finally, a United Nations mission would soon be able to report on the situation in Port Said; the same could not be said for Budapest.

33. The Bulgarian representative had been mistaken in supposing that France wished to impose its own idea of liberty. There could be no doubt that if all peoples adopted it, there would be no refugee problem; but the important thing was that no idea should ever be imposed at the point of a bayonet.

34. Mr. KNOWLAND (United States of America) said that although he did not wish to engage in polemics, he could not allow the misrepresentations of the Soviet bloc to go unchallenged.

35. It was somewhat surprising to note the eagerness with which the Soviet Union and its associates were extending a welcome to elements which the Soviet representative had stigmatized as criminal and undesirable. Such an attitude was self-contradictory. The Soviet charges were obviously groundless, and unjust both to the refugees and to the High Commissioner; a few words with a refugee from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, or a visit to a refugee camp, gave sufficient proof of that. Each refugee had complete freedom of choice between repatriation or resettlement. The refugees were neither criminals nor fascists; they were human beings seeking a freedom they could not find at home.

36. The Albanian representative had alleged that the "Voice of America" was instigating the overthrow of the Albanian Government. One of the principal purposes of the "Voice of America" was to present to the world the statements of those who were foes of tyranny. In a free country, with a free Press and free speech, such testimony could not be silenced. It was not true, as the Albanian representative had tried to insinuate, that the facts given by the "Voice of America" were distorted. The statement he himself was now making, which would be transmitted over that programme, could not be interpreted as an incitement to revolt, without distortion of its purpose. The Albanian representative could check the accuracy of the transmitted version for himself if he wished.

37. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said that the United Kingdom and Australian representatives had misunderstood his reference to the proportion of genuine political cases among the Hungarian refugees. He had meant that their number was small compared with the vast number of those who had left their country because of fear or intimidation. There was a difference between a refugee who had left his country because he was in danger of being persecuted for political reasons and one who preferred to leave because he was dissatisfied with his country's form of government.

38. One category of refugees was unfortunately being created by propaganda. Countries with highly developed media of information were undoubtedly using them for psychological warfare; and peaceful citizens who, if left to themselves, would quietly stay at home, were being influenced to become refugees. The countries of the Middle East had long had to face a barrage of such propaganda, but every attempt to discuss the situation had been blocked. They had deep sympathy with the Hungarian refugees, who were now exposed to a similar onslaught.

39. Mr. ARKADEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), exercising the right of reply under rule 116 of the rules of procedure, said that while it was natural for the United States representative to try to defend his country's position, it was an irrefutable fact that certain groups in the United States of America, and the agents and organizations sponsored by those groups, were sparing no effort to keep the refugee problem on the agenda of the General Assembly and to turn it into a political question. Those groups were directly responsible for some refugees' mistrust and hostility towards their own countries. With regard to the United States representative's defense of the "Voice of America" Mr. Arkadev said that he had never heard anything so virulently provocative as the broadcasts directed against the USSR and the peoples' democracies by that agency, which did not redound to the credit of the United States of America.

40. The French representative had misrepresented the statement of a certain representative by alleging that the latter had declared all the Hungarian refugees to be fascists. What had in fact been said was that there was a fascist element among the refugees. The French representative must be aware, moreover, that the presence of a United Nations mission in Port Said could not conceal the loss of life and property in Egypt. Finally, there was no reason to believe that French bayonets had brought freedom to the Egyptian people.

#### CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.3/L.508, L.509, L.510, L.512)

41. Mr. KNOWLAND (United States of America) observed that the Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508) was merely a restatement of the old thesis that the High Commissioner's Office should urge repatriation as the only solution of the refugee problem and that Member States should aid and abet efforts to return unfortunate people to the countries from which, because of oppression, they had fled. The purpose of paragraph 4 of the draft resolution seemed to be to enable the countries of origin of the refugees to exercise pressure and to refine their efforts at forcible repatriation. Such proposals had been made before, and had been rejected by large majorities of Member States. United Nations efforts to solve the refugee problem had not been as successful as some might have wished, but it was to be hoped that the Organization would never deliberately do anything to encourage the repatriation of refugees against their will.

42. The only new element was contained in the third paragraph of the preamble, which would extend the solution of repatriation to the Hungarian refugees, over 80,000 of whom had chosen freedom abroad rather than



tyranny at home. The Czechoslovak representative was wrong if he thought that the majority of the United Nations would be willing to allow the Hungarian refugees to be sent back to the terror they had escaped, or that the world had forgotten how many promises had been broken in Hungary. The Yugoslav Government would bear witness to the latest example of disregard for promises, in connexion with the treatment of Mr. Imre Nagy. The United Nations could not be party to such a policy without violating its own Charter and undoing the work already done by the High Commissioner's Office.

43. His delegation would vote against the Czechoslovak draft resolution, and hoped that that text would be defeated by a large majority.

44. Miss BOWLBY (Canada) said it was understandable that the Committee's attention should have been diverted from the detailed consideration of the High Commissioner's report by the urgent problems that had arisen as a result of the influx of Hungarian refugees into Austria; however, the United Nations must not forget the problems of the earlier refugees or, by giving the impression of forgetting them and thus increasing their disillusionment, make it more difficult for the High Commissioner's Office to find permanent solutions.

45. The Canadian delegation to the twenty-second session of the Economic and Social Council had been among those which had supported the decision of the UNREF Executive Committee that the General Assembly should be informed of the progress of the UNREF programme and of the effect on that programme of the shortfall in governmental contributions.<sup>1</sup> As it was obvious that larger contributions were needed from States which were already helping, the Canadian Government intended to increase its contribution to \$200,000 in 1957. However, if the objectives of the programme were to be carried out, financial support for UNREF must be provided by more Member States. States which had shown concern for the urgent needs of the Hungarian refugees would surely not wish the Committee to lose sight of the need for wide and generous support of UNREF, which had been set up in implementation of General Assembly resolution 832 (IX).

46. Her delegation had co-sponsored the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510) because that text dealt with both problems. Its purpose was to stress the urgency and importance both of finding permanent solutions for the earlier refugees and of dealing with the new problems, which could not yet be accurately assessed. The impact of the new situation on the UNREF programme must be weighed carefully, and efforts to deal with the emergency must be made to interfere as little as possible with that programme. The draft resolution covered most of the problems which the High Commissioner's Office would have to face, and her delegation considered that the other resolutions submitted were unnecessary. That did not apply to the Dominican draft resolution (A/C.3/L.509); she was sure the Committee would support unanimously a proposal to commemorate the late High Commissioner, whose untimely death had been a blow to the refugees and to the whole of mankind.

47. Mr. MUFTI (Syria), introducing his delegation's draft resolution (A/C.3/L.512), pointed out that its purpose was simply to fill a gap in the information regularly submitted to the General Assembly, which was incomplete in the absence of figures and other data on migratory movements. The Deputy High Commissioner had provided additional information on request, but it would be preferable if such data were included in the report as a matter of course.

48. He was prepared to support the Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508), as Syria considered that repatriation should be regarded as one of the main solutions for refugee problems. Nevertheless, the emphasis laid on voluntary repatriation in the fifth paragraph of the preamble and in operative paragraph 3 was not in line with the High Commissioner's Statute (General Assembly resolution 428 (V), annex) or with the General Assembly resolutions on the subject. He suggested that those explicit references should be deleted; if the Czechoslovak representative was not prepared to delete them, he would be obliged to ask for a separate vote on the phrases concerned.

49. He would also support the Albanian amendment (A/C.3/L.511), which usefully supplemented the Czechoslovak draft resolution. If the provisions of the amendment were applied in good faith, they would help to clear the international atmosphere and to place the refugee problem in its proper humanitarian context.

50. His delegation was in favour of the Dominican draft resolution (A/C.3/L.509), but wished to point out that paragraph 1 in effect embodied a directive to Governments to work along the lines laid down by the late High Commissioner. Although the Syrian delegation did not wish to criticize the High Commissioner or to minimize the value of his work, it considered that it would be unsuitable to urge Governments to support the work on behalf of refugees on the basis of one man's view of it. If the Dominican representative would amend her draft resolution accordingly, the proposal might be adopted unanimously, as a mark of general esteem for the late High Commissioner.

51. The purpose of the Syrian amendments (A/C.3/L.514) to the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510) was to rid that proposal of its political implications and its somewhat exaggerated and imperative provisions. It was unwise to refer in a purely humanitarian resolution to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1006 (ES-II) of 9 November 1956, which laid the responsibility for events in Hungary on the Soviet Union. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 587th plenary meeting on 21 November 1956 contained all the necessary elements for humanitarian action on behalf of the refugees; a reference to that resolution would be adequate and appropriate.

52. Mr. READ (Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) said that the High Commissioner's Office was always interested in obtaining more information about the refugees, and had means of finding out all the pertinent data on possibilities of repatriation, resettlement and integration. However, its resources were limited, and its small staff would hardly be able to obtain all the statistics called for in the Syrian draft resolution. Extra funds would certainly be required to provide the supplementary information.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Twenty-second Session, 932nd meeting, para. 44.*

53. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) pointed out that the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510) had considerably greater financial implications than his own. Moreover, the necessary information could be obtained from data already available to the High Commissioner's Office. If a report was prepared on the financial implications of the Syrian draft resolution, he hoped that a similar report would be submitted in respect of the joint proposal.

54. Mr. MASSOUD-ANSARI (Iran) pointed out that in his statement in the general debate (689th meeting), he had referred to voluntary repatriation as one solution of the refugee problem, but had drawn attention to the lack of enthusiasm for that solution among the refugees, who had lived outside their countries for so long that they had become accustomed to conditions in other countries. That situation had to be faced, and the question was whether the High Commissioner's Office should continue unsuccessfully to urge repatriation or whether other solutions should be sought. The Iranian delegation believed that the second course was correct, and had therefore expressed its satisfaction with the results achieved through resettlement and integration. The fact that the number of refugees whose fate had not been settled had been substantially reduced since January 1955 should be taken into account in any directive to the High Commissioner's Office.

55. The Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508) and the Albanian amendment (A/C.3/L.511) were one-sided in that they stressed only repatriation and made no reference to the other two possibilities. If the only solution applied was repatriation, the High Commissioner's Office would become a permanent institution for providing assistance to refugees who were unwilling to return to their countries. The aim of the United Nations was not to perpetuate the problem, but to eliminate it; that was the purpose of the four-year programme undertaken by UNREF.

56. He thought that the policy of resettlement should be used with caution, lest it should come to be regarded as an opportunity for emigration free of the usual formalities, and result in new waves of refugees. However, the task of making the best choice for the refugees could safely be entrusted to the High Commissioner's Office, which had given proof of its good judgement and efficiency.

57. His delegation could not support the Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508), but would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510), which was more balanced, and in favour of the Dominican draft resolution (A/C.3/L.509).

58. Miss BRUUN (Denmark) said that her delegation had co-sponsored the joint draft resolution because it covered all the main points of the work of the High

Commissioner's Office. The Office must be given sufficient resources to deal with the difficult problems before it, and Member States of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies were therefore urged to contribute as much as they could at the earliest possible date. Co-ordination through the High Commissioner's Office and the UNREF Executive Committee was also necessary.

59. The provisions in paragraph 4 of the Czechoslovak draft resolution (A/C.3/L.508) and in the Syrian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.512) concerning statistical data seemed to be unsuitable, since those data were closely connected with individual placement, which was a matter for the High Commissioner's Office.

60. The joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510) did not duplicate or supersede previous General Assembly resolutions on the Hungarian refugees. The Danish delegation did not regard as criminals those refugees who had fled their country and it appreciated the efforts of the High Commissioner's Office to come to their aid. It hoped that the joint draft resolution would be adopted unanimously.

61. Mr. SAMY (Egypt) regretted that the French representative, in his attempt at self-justification, had denied the factual evidence of the violent assault which had been carried out against Egypt and had tried to minimize the amount of the damage and the number of civilian casualties in Port Said. The Egyptian delegation had photographs of the extensive damage that had been caused in that city by acts which were contrary to the elementary principles of humanity.

62. Miss BERNARDINO (Dominican Republic) said that in order to comply with the Afghan and Syrian representatives' suggestions she would be prepared to amend paragraph 1 of her draft resolution (A/C.3/L.509) in such a way that Governments would be called upon actively to support the work on behalf of the refugees in the spirit of the Charter, by which the late High Commissioner had been motivated. It was important to retain the reference to the late High Commissioner, as the purpose of the draft resolution was to honour his memory.

63. Mr. CHENG (China) asked for clarification of three points in connexion with operative paragraph 3 of the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.510). First, it was not clear how work for the Hungarian refugees was to be co-ordinated; secondly, the draft did not state whether the General Assembly would approve the High Commissioner's assessment; and finally, in connexion with the phrase "at the earliest possible date", he wished to know whether the UNREF Executive Committee would be convened before 4 January 1957, when its next regular meeting was to be held.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.