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Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

The question of Morocco (A/2175 and Add. 1 and 2, A/C.1/737, A/C.1/738 and A/C.1/L.17) (*concluded*)

[Item 65]*

1. Mr. ARZE QUIROGA (Bolivia), explaining his delegation's vote, observed that the debate had demonstrated that there were two opposing tendencies. One, maintained by those nations which still enjoyed the benefits of the colonial system, had entrenched itself behind the principle of the non-competence of the United Nations to deal with the problem of Morocco. On the other hand, there was a larger group of nations, almost all of them ex-colonies of European powers, which maintained the principle that the United Nations was competent to deal with cases such as those of Morocco and Tunisia, which were closely linked with the general well-being of nations.

2. The delegations which had defended the principle of the competence of the United Nations had set a course of action based on sound judgment and regard for the well-being and progress of peoples.

3. The delegation of Bolivia had been in a position to vote for either of the two draft resolutions, but it had favoured the Arab-Asian draft resolution in the first vote in recognition of the spirit of conciliation which had been demonstrated by the Arab-Asian delegations. On the other hand, after the Arab-Asian draft resolution had been rejected Bolivia had supported the Latin-American draft resolution. Mr. Arze Quiroga wished to emphasize that his delegation's votes on the Moroccan question had not signified any divergence from the point of view of the Latin-American nations, which had approached the problem with the highest principles.

4. His delegation had no doubt that France also would understand the meaning of Bolivia's attitude. In conclusion, he stated that his delegation was convinced that in the near future its position would be

even more justified. It was a position which attempted to conciliate the anti-colonialist tendencies which existed in North America, Latin America, Asia and Africa in promise of a better world.

Question of an appeal to the Powers signatories to the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, for an early fulfilment of their pledges toward Austria (A/2160, A/2166 and Add. 1, A/C.1/L.15 and A/C.1/L.16)

[Item 63]*

5. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that his delegation had objected, at the 79th meeting of the General Committee and at the 380th plenary meeting, to the inclusion of the question of the Austrian Peace Treaty in the agenda for the following reasons.

6. Firstly, his delegation had pointed out that according to Article 107 of the Charter the question of a peace treaty with Austria was not subject to consideration by the United Nations.

7. Secondly, the question was within the competence of the four Powers, namely the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which had concluded an agreement on the subject and had occupied Austria. His delegation had drawn attention to the Potsdam Agreement of 1945, which had determined the principles of the general policy of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom with regard to Austria, principles which had been subsequently accepted by France by its adherence to that Agreement. It had also drawn attention to the four-Power decision of June 1946 concerning the institution of control machinery for Austria.

8. Both those agreements had been adopted as a result of the Moscow Declaration of 1943 by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, a declaration in which it had been stated that the Governments of the three Powers wished to see the restoration of an independent

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

Austria. France had also subsequently adhered to that declaration.

9. In accordance with the decision of the four Powers in New York in 1946, it had been decided to prepare the draft of an Austrian peace treaty, and subsequently, in June 1949, important decisions had been adopted on political and economic questions relating to Austria.

10. On the basis of those decisions, the representatives of the four Powers had done substantial work in drafting an Austrian peace treaty. Only a few articles remained to be agreed upon. The Soviet Union Government had repeatedly called upon the other governments concerned to discuss those outstanding articles, and it had drawn their attention to the need for a quadripartite verification in Austria of the fulfilment by the Austrian Government of the four-Power decision on demilitarization and denazification.

11. The fulfilment by the Austrian Government of the obligations concerning demilitarization and denazification would create the conviction among Austria's neighbours that Austria would no longer be used by any Power for aggressive purposes as it had been used by Hitlerite Germany in preparing for and carrying on the Second World War.

12. The Soviet Union Government had also drawn the attention of the Governments of the three Powers to the fact that no consideration of an Austrian Peace Treaty could ignore the non-observance of other international agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, the United Kingdom and France. In that connexion the Soviet Union Government had pointed to the non-observance by the three Powers of the provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty concerning Trieste. Under those provisions, as well as under other existing international agreements, Trieste should long ago have become a free city governed on the basis of a special statute. It had, however, been transformed illegally into an Anglo-American base. The Soviet Union Government had pointed out that so long as the three Powers failed to abide by their obligations with respect to Trieste there could be no guarantee that a treaty with Austria would not suffer the same treatment.

13. Mr. Gromyko stated that he had said that in order to stress his Government's position to the effect that the United Nations was not competent to deal with the Austrian question.

14. The Governments of the three Powers had refused to consider or discuss further the remaining points of an Austrian Peace Treaty. They had also refused to carry out the quadripartite verification and, in general, to fulfil their obligations with regard to Trieste. Instead, in March of 1952, they had proposed an abbreviated peace treaty. That proposal had been made in contradiction to the previous agreements reached among the four Powers on the establishment of an independent Austria. The Soviet Union Government, in its note of 14 August 1952 to the Governments of the three Powers, had declared that the draft abbreviated peace treaty was unacceptable and that it was necessary for them to declare their readiness to complete the consideration of the outstanding points of an Austrian peace treaty. Further, it inquired whether the three Powers would be prepared to withdraw their proposal for an abbreviated peace treaty.

15. In their Note of 5 September 1952 to the Soviet Union Government, the three Powers had replied that they would not relinquish their position with regard to a treaty with Austria. But neither in that Note nor in their subsequent communications had they declared their willingness to withdraw the proposal for an abbreviated peace treaty. Their subsequent actions had made it clear that their attitude had been no accident, and it had become known that they had decided to bring the question before the United Nations.

16. The position of the three Powers on the Austrian question was designed to hamper the conclusion of an Austrian peace treaty. The bulk of the basic draft peace treaty with Austria had been agreed upon by the four Powers, but the completion of the few outstanding articles—six out of fifty-one, and not the most important—the discussion of which had been proposed by the Soviet Union, had been virtually repudiated by the three Powers.

17. The decision of the Governments of the three Powers to raise the question of an Austrian peace treaty in the General Assembly could be interpreted only as a manoeuvre on their part to divert public attention from proposals and acute international problems, such as the Polish proposals for the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control over that prohibition, bacterial weapons, the North Atlantic Treaty, the proposals for ending the aggressive war against the Korean people and the conclusion of a peace pact among the five great Powers, all of which had been included in the agenda of the General Assembly. But that manoeuvre, Mr. Gromyko believed, was doomed to failure.

18. Because of those points, and because the General Assembly was not empowered to discuss the Austrian peace treaty, his delegation would not participate in a consideration of that question. Nor would it take part in the voting on any proposals submitted on the subject. Consequently, his delegation would not recognize the validity of any resolution which might emerge from the General Assembly's consideration of the question.

19. Mr. QUINTANILLA (Mexico) said that his delegation had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.15) to the effect that the Committee invite His Excellency Mr. Karl D. Gruber, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to participate in the debate without the right to vote.

20. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said, on a point of order, that on the grounds of what he had said before his delegation could not accept a proposal to invite the representative of the Austrian Government to participate in a debate of the question of the Austrian Peace Treaty. Consequently, it would object to the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Mexico.

21. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) seconded the draft resolution of the representative of Mexico.

22. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) stated that her delegation considered discussion of the question of the Austrian Peace Treaty by the United Nations as illegal and contrary to the

provisions of the Charter and of international law. Consequently, it would oppose the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Mexico.

23. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), in associating himself with the views expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union, stated that the question of an Austrian peace treaty was beyond the powers of the General Assembly under Article 107 of the Charter. His delegation also objected to the proposal of the representative of Mexico to invite the Austrian Foreign Minister to take part in the debate.

24. For the same reasons advanced by the representative of the Soviet Union his delegation would not participate in the consideration of the question by the General Assembly, or in the voting on any proposals thereon. Nor would it consider itself bound by any resolutions that might emerge from the Assembly's consideration of the item which had been illegally included in the agenda.

25. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia) declared the wholehearted support of his delegation for the proposal to invite the Austrian Foreign Minister to assist the Committee in the discussion of the important question before it.

26. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic), in supporting the position taken by the representative of the Soviet Union, stated that his delegation would not participate in the consideration of the question or in the voting on the various proposals arising from the Austrian question. His delegation categorically objected to the Mexican draft resolution, which in its opinion was illegal. Moreover, it would not regard as binding any resolutions which might emerge from the consideration of the item.

27. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution of the representative of Mexico (A/C.1/L.15).

The draft resolution was adopted by 47 votes to 5.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Grüber, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, took a place at the Committee table.

28. Mr. DE SOUZA GOMES (Brazil) stated that his delegation had asked for the inclusion of the Austrian question in the agenda (A/2166 and Add.1) because it had been persuaded that the United Nations could not remain indifferent to the subjection and partition of Austria.

29. In submitting the question to the General Assembly, his delegation did not wish to accuse anyone nor did it intend to intervene in a matter which fell within the immediate responsibility of the great Powers. However, his delegation felt that it was the duty and the right of the United Nations to address itself to the governments directly responsible with a request that they produce an immediate solution of a problem with which everyone was concerned.

30. It had been stated that the United Nations was not competent to deal with the Austrian question. Mr. de Souza Gomes could not agree with that view for the following reasons.

31. In the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet

Union had recognized that Austria had been the first of the free countries to fall victim to the Hitlerite aggression. They had declared further that they did not consider themselves bound in any way by the *Anschluss* imposed on Austria by Germany on 13 March 1938, an act of annexation which they had declared to be null and void. The three Powers had further affirmed their determination to restore Austria as a free and independent State. On 16 November 1943, the French Government had declared its adherence to the Moscow Declaration.

32. The determination of the four Powers to re-establish an independent Austria had been reaffirmed by the agreement signed in Vienna on 28 June 1946 and concerning a control machinery which was to operate until it was liquidated by common agreement among the four Powers. The occupation, was to be regarded as only a provisional stage in the accomplishment of the mission of the four-Power Governments in assisting the people of Austria to regain their independence.

33. On 25 November 1945, even before the signature of the Vienna Accord, Austria had conducted free elections and had set up a democratic government which had been recognized by the occupying Powers. Nevertheless, seven years after its liberation from the Hitlerite yoke, Austria was still occupied, although it had never been an enemy State.

34. The negotiations undertaken by the four Powers with a view to concluding an Austrian peace treaty had been fruitless. They had run into an impasse which only prolonged the duration of the occupation. That situation had become a cause of concern to all nations and had been a profound disappointment to the Austrian people.

35. Mr. de Souza Gomes believed that the disastrous consequences of the impasse in the negotiations for concluding a peace treaty with Austria must be brought to the attention of the United Nations. Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter stated that one of the purposes of the United Nations was to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. It was in that spirit that the Assembly at its third session had adopted resolution 190 (III) in which it had appealed to the great Powers to redouble their efforts with a view to compromising their differences and establishing a lasting peace.

36. Cognizant of the serious situation of Austria and of the responsibility of the four great Powers for a solution of that problem, and cognizant also of the obligation of the United Nations to seek agreement among all peoples and all governments, the Brazilian delegation had associated itself with the delegations of Lebanon, Mexico and the Netherlands in proposing a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.16) under the terms of which the General Assembly would make an urgent appeal to the Powers signatories to the Moscow Declaration to make a new and serious effort to conclude a treaty with Austria, so that they might without delay carry out their obligations in respect of the Austrian people.

37. The text of that draft resolution brought out clearly the fact that a solution of the Austrian problem would greatly facilitate elimination of other points of

disagreement and the creation of conditions favourable to the establishment of world peace. That did not mean that its co-sponsors were seeking to establish any relationship between the question under discussion and the other important political problems which had remained unsettled since the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. Mr. de Souza Gomes was convinced, however, that solution of the question of an Austrian State Treaty would represent a decisive contribution to a healthier international atmosphere.

38. The joint draft resolution was quite in conformity with the attitude adopted previously by the General Assembly with regard to that special category of questions, and in particular with resolution 190 (III) of 3 November 1948. The motives underlying the submission of the question to the General Assembly and the submission of the joint draft resolution were the same as those which had inspired that appeal to the great Powers to renew their efforts to resolve their differences. As on the past occasion, there was no intention of dealing with the substance of the matter and that was why the second, third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble merely recalled the solemn decisions of the four great Powers. Reference to the Declaration of Moscow was natural since, by that Declaration, the four Powers had accepted the responsibility for restoring a free and independent Austria. The authors of the joint draft resolution were convinced that the four Powers still were sincerely resolved to accomplish that aim and that they would not, therefore, raise any objection to the attempt by the General Assembly to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security and of friendly relations among nations in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. It was necessary, therefore, that the joint proposal should express the deep concern of the medium and small Powers at the deadlock in which the negotiations had remained since 1947. The General Assembly could not ignore a situation that involved great disappointment to the Austrian people which from the outset of the occupation, had co-operated whole-heartedly with the great Powers and had, on its own initiative, taken measures for the reconstruction and restoration of a democratic Austria. As the seventh paragraph of the preamble stressed, the efforts of the Austrian people could achieve full success only with the removal of the heavy burden of occupation which, as was noted in the eighth paragraph, prevented Austria from exercising its sovereign powers freely and from participating in normal and peaceful international relations.

39. The last paragraph of the joint draft resolution merely repeated the terms used in the title of the question on the agenda. The only objective of the sponsors was to have the General Assembly address a solemn appeal to the four Powers to make a new and urgent effort to reach agreement on a treaty which would lead to an early end to the occupation of Austria and to the free exercising by Austria of the Powers inherent in its sovereignty. There was no question of having the General Assembly deal with the Austrian question as such, still less of having it take up the substance of the matter. Should the great Powers choose to deal with those questions in the course of the discussion, his delegation would certainly listen but would, nevertheless, not comment on the position of any of them. The joint proposal would express no

condemnation of anyone, and there was thus no reason why the unanimity necessary to the launching of such an appeal could not be achieved by the General Assembly. In conclusion, Mr. de Souza Gomes quoted a passage from a speech made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil at the 394th plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 11 November 1952 to the effect that the restoration of full sovereignty to Austria, which had been one of the first victims of nazi slavery, was being deferred and hindered in flagrant contempt of the ideals of the Charter. The Brazilian Foreign Minister had appealed to all countries, and particularly to the Powers directly responsible, to restore Austria's independent position in the modern world.

40. The CHAIRMAN called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria.

41. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) asked the Chairman for permission to make a statement of principle prior to the debate on the substance of the question.

42. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the rules of procedure made no provision for priority for statements on matters of principle and said that the representative of Poland should have spoken prior to the vote on the Mexican draft resolution.

43. Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) thought that there was a misunderstanding. The representative of Poland had clearly indicated a desire to speak before the Committee considered the substance of the question. It was not too late to correct the situation.

44. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) pointed out that she also had requested permission to speak before the vote on the Mexican draft resolution. She had been told that she had been included in the list and had waited as a matter of courtesy.

45. After further discussion in which Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia), Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland), Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and Mr. KISELOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) and the CHAIRMAN took part, Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran), agreeing with the ruling of the Chairman, expressed the view that there had been a misunderstanding. He said that it was reasonable that delegations should speak on the question of participation in the debate at the outset, and therefore appealed to the Chairman to allow such statements to be made by the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

46. The CHAIRMAN said that if there were no objections, he would recognize the representative of Poland as a matter of courtesy.

47. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) emphasized that consideration in the United Nations of the question of a treaty with Austria was a violation of the Charter. As Article 107 made clear beyond any doubt, the Organization could not intervene with regard to any action taken in relation to any State involved in the Second World War as an enemy of any signatory to the Charter. The question of a treaty with Austria was closely related to the recent war and concerned a

Power which had been involved in that war on the side of the Axis. The problem must, therefore, be solved on the basis of the relevant international agreements. The procedure for the drawing up of a treaty with Austria had been delineated in the Moscow and Potsdam decisions and in the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. He recalled that in Moscow in 1943 the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom had declared that the Austrian problem was to be resolved with due account being taken of the fact of the Hitlerite aggression against Austria, and of the fact that Austria had participated in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany. The question of the peace treaties had been handed over to the Council of Foreign Ministers created by the Potsdam Conference, and that Council had dealt with the question since 1945. Neither the United Nations as a whole, nor its organs individually, could deal in any way with a question so entirely removed from their competence. The Charter was specific on the point and the General Assembly would therefore be acting *ultra vires* if it did deal with the question.

48. The current attempt was not the first of its kind. A similar attempt had been made in connexion with the German question at the sixth session of the General Assembly, with the purpose of hampering the unification of Germany and of preventing free elections in that country. The current attempt was due to the desire of certain Powers to embark upon a course incompatible with the interests of peace and of the Austrian people. By that attempt the United States, which had inspired it, and the countries of the United States bloc, were showing their contempt for the Charter and for the obligations they had undertaken at Moscow and at Potsdam and in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The attempt constituted further proof of the fact that the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France sought to delay the conclusion of the treaty as long as possible and to complicate the solution of the question as a whole. The entire responsibility for the deadlock which existed with regard to the question of the treaty with Austria lay with the three Western Powers which had sought from the outset to use the problem in order to foster a campaign of hatred against the USSR. World public opinion was fully conscious of the hypocritical nature of the position of those Powers. The USSR, on the other hand, desired that Austria should become independent in accordance with the procedures set forth at Potsdam. At the meetings of the Foreign Ministers and Deputy Foreign Ministers the USSR had consistently displayed its sincere desire to reach agreement. The three Western Powers, for their part, had revealed that they did not want such an agreement and that instead they wanted the occupation to continue in order that they might transform Austria into a military base. They had thus produced the so-called "abbreviated treaty" which was contrary to existing international agreements and incompatible with the interests of the Austrian people since it would impair the peaceful development of their national economy and culture. Poland, which had endured great sacrifices as the result of the Hitlerite aggression, sympathized with the Austrians' refusal to have their country exploited as a military base.

49. What had been happening in Austria? Despite the continual protests of the USSR in the Control Com-

mission for Austria, war criminals had gone unpunished and those who had been imprisoned had been released before the expiration of their terms. The Austrian Government had refused to return war criminals to Poland. Hitlerite officers were again being given a place of honour. Moreover, the plans for exploitation of Austria as a military base were linked with the development of Trieste for similar purposes. Mr. Skrzyszewski stressed the connexion between the sabotage of a treaty with Austria and the non-implementation of the peace treaty with Italy as it affected Trieste.

50. The three Western Powers had refused to conclude a treaty. The question had been submitted to the General Assembly in order to cloak the political *fait accompli* and the plans of those Powers. The submission of the question to the Assembly constituted a flagrant violation of the Moscow and Potsdam decisions, of the Charter and of the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Moreover, it violated the provisions of the draft treaty with Austria, thus rendering nugatory the obligations incurred thereunder.

51. The one way to solve the question of a treaty with Austria was to carry out the international agreements on the subject. Since consideration of the question by the United Nations was illegal, and was designed to increase tension in international relations and to further the aggressive plans of the United States, the Polish delegation would not participate in the discussion of the substance of the question or in the voting on proposals submitted thereon, and would not consider itself bound by any decision that the General Assembly might take.

52. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) noted that her delegation had already stated its position both at the 79th meeting of the General Committee and at the 380th plenary meeting of the General Assembly. Discussion of the question of a treaty with Austria by the General Assembly was illegal and contrary to the clear provisions of the Charter, as well as to various international agreements. It was clear from Article 107 of the Charter, in particular, that the Assembly was not competent to deal with the question, which the Moscow and Potsdam decisions had made the responsibility of the four Powers.

53. Czechoslovakia had followed the development of the negotiations for a treaty with great interest since their inception in 1946 and welcomed the fact that, thanks to the efforts of the USSR, agreement had been reached on a draft treaty with the exception of certain articles. The three Western Powers had constantly frustrated the conclusion of the treaty. Stating that the so-called "abbreviated treaty", which was contrary to the Moscow and Potsdam decisions, was intended to thwart the establishment of a free, independent and democratic Austrian State, Mrs. Sekaninova-Cakartova pointed out that Czechoslovakia was particularly interested in the denazification and democratization of Austria, since it was a neighbouring State. Reiterating that discussion of the question was illegal, she stated that her delegation would not participate in the debate or in the vote and would not consider as binding any decisions that might be adopted.

54. Mr. GRUBER (Austria) stated that the history of the past three decades had formed for the Austrian people an almost uninterrupted chain of crises and political upheavals, which had included the world eco-

conomic crisis, with its mass unemployment, and the assaults of National Socialism which Austria had defied for years. In March 1938 Austria, abandoned by the entire world, had become the first victim of Hitlerite aggression.

55. After the beginning of the Second World War, Allied statesmen had solemnly proclaimed that Austria would be restored as a sovereign State. In fact, the Moscow Declaration had expressed the common intention of the Allied Powers to liberate Austria from the German annexation. At the end of the war the Austrian people had greeted the Allied armies as friends and liberators. They had even regarded the Allied occupation with understanding and accepted it as a necessity pending the restoration of public order and life.

56. It had been a disappointment for the population not to have Austria treated as other liberated countries, including even those whose governments had taken part in the war on Hitler's side. Despite the fact that the conditions for the withdrawal of Allied troops, namely, free elections, formation of a constitutional government, and re-establishment of public order, had been fulfilled soon after 1945, the Austrian people had had to suffer up to the present, eight more years of bondage—eight more years not of token, but of oppressive occupation.

57. The country had been divided by the occupying Powers into four zones. Despite the promises contained in the control agreement of 28 June 1946, the removal of restrictions on the movement of persons and goods had not been effected. The right of the Austrian Government to maintain law and order throughout the federal territory had been subject to limitations.

58. Many Austrians had been abducted or tried by Allied military tribunals, and seizure and dismantlements of property had been carried out. Austrian oil deposits were being exploited by a foreign occupying power. A large amount of Austrian land was still confiscated. The cost of the occupation borne by the Austrian people, coupled with the heavy losses suffered by Austria's economy, created a considerable burden for the country.

59. Austrian students still used obsolete textbooks in their history classes because the occupying Powers could not yet agree on a common interpretation of history. Moreover, freedom of the Press and inviolability of correspondence, although guaranteed by Austria's democratic constitution, were being repeatedly violated. But what oppressed and disheartened the Austrian people most was the fact that the end of this humiliating situation was not in sight. The unfortunate occupation policy had indeed done everything to hurt Austrian patriotism and national feeling.

60. The generous aid of friendly nations, particularly that of the United States of America, had saved Austria from becoming an economic wreck. Nevertheless, it was the domestic forces of Austria—parliament, parties, the government—which had co-operated to preserve Austrian patriotism, a fact which, in the final analysis, the great Powers should appreciate. For the loss of Austria would not affect merely the Austrian people; it would also create conditions in world policy which even the most extensive contractual settlement could never remove.

61. The history of the negotiations for an Austrian treaty, Mr. Grüber asserted, was a typical example of

the tactics of procrastination, despite efforts of the Austrian Government to facilitate and expedite those negotiations. After endless deliberations, the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers had met in Paris in 1949, at which time the Soviet Union, in exchange for far-reaching concessions on the question of German assets, had finally agreed to finalize the treaty draft with the least possible delay, and in any case not later than 1 September 1949. The Austrian Government had, in fact, been assured by all the great Powers that the State Treaty would be concluded as soon as the Soviet claims on German assets had been satisfied. Admittedly, the State Treaty was actually completed save for a few secondary clauses.

62. Nevertheless, after it had become evident that the Western Powers were ready to compromise on the remaining five articles, the Soviet authorities had suddenly brought up the question of Trieste. The negotiations, which had become deadlocked temporarily, had been resumed on the initiative of the Austrian Government and a meeting of the Deputies in London had been called for 21 January 1952. The Soviet Union, however, asking for assurances concerning settlement of the Trieste question and for the institution of a new commission of investigation in Austria, had refused to take any part in the negotiations.

63. In that connexion, Mr. Grüber wished to assert that the charges of the remilitarization of Austria were entirely unfounded, as had been established by the investigation of a four-Power commission in February 1947. There was not another country in the world so completely disarmed as Austria, and Austria's efforts were limited to protecting its domestic institutions which, in fact, had been threatened. On the other hand, whoever objected to military installations of the great Powers on Austrian soil must realize that the only remedy was the simultaneous withdrawal of all occupation forces, leaving Austria in full sovereign control of its political and economic destiny.

64. It was equally illogical and unfounded to subordinate the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty to a settlement of the Trieste question, since the Austrian Government had not the slightest influence on such a settlement.

65. It had been only the blunt rejection of negotiations by the Soviet Union that had induced the Western Powers to propose in their note of 13 March 1952 a protocol of evacuation, also called an "abbreviated treaty". The Western Powers had met Soviet objections by agreeing to incorporate in the text of the abbreviated treaty all the provisions of the old treaty draft, as requested by the Soviet Union Government. However, a new invitation to the Soviet Union Government by the Western Powers to a Deputies' conference in London on 29 September 1952 had been also rejected.

66. It was necessary to assert at that point that the deadlocked situation would not be accepted passively by the Austrian people, which did not care about the technical aspect of such a treaty but rather about its contents and timing. The Austrian people wanted a prompt treaty, the burdens of which would be commensurate with their ability to pay, and, above all, a treaty which would be implemented most rapidly. The Austrian people had proved its sense of responsibility toward the international community by imposing upon itself great

restraint in the manifestation of its discontent, in view of the acute international situation. Mr. Grüber did not hesitate to declare that the risks inherent in the presence of foreign armed occupation troops in the midst of an increasingly angered population should be recognized.

67. In conclusion, thanking the Brazilian Government and the co-sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.16) for having drawn the attention of the United Nations and of world public opinion to those dangers, Mr. Grüber asserted that the Austrian people put its trust in the United Nations to face the situation squarely and to restore confidence and hope to his countrymen. Such action would be of historic significance not only to Austria but also to the cause of international peace.

68. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) wished above all to express his appreciation to the Brazilian delegation, which had proposed the item in a spirit of concern for the early restitution to Austria of the full rights inherent in its sovereignty. It was the spirit in which the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France had laboured for six years for the re-establishment of a free and independent Austria, as expressed in the Moscow Declaration by the four Powers. The United Kingdom wished also to assure the Committee of its willingness to participate in the discussions on this item with the sole desire that the four Powers agree to the early conclusion of a treaty which would relieve the Austrian people of the burdens of an occupation no longer justifiable.

69. In welcoming Mr. Grüber whole-heartedly he regretted that the former could not join the discussions in his own right as the representative of a Member State, especially since Austria had applied for admission to the United Nations over five years ago. Mr. Grüber's speech had set out clearly the hopes and aspirations of the Austrian people and proved the valuable addition to the forces of peace and stability which would result from the restoration of Austria to the position in world affairs which she had enjoyed before 1938.

70. Setting out to present a clear historical picture of the disagreements between the Soviet Union and the other occupying Powers, Mr. Lloyd declared that the Western Powers had given of their utmost in their efforts to carry out not only the terms of the Moscow Declaration but also those of resolution 190 (III) of the General Assembly. He pointed out that this resolution had urged the great Powers "to redouble their efforts . . . to secure in the briefest possible time the final settlement of the war and the conclusion of all the peace settlements".

71. The democratically elected government which had been established in April 1945 had been recognized by all four occupying Powers in January 1946. Shortly thereafter the Western Powers had begun their attempts to open negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to conclude an Austrian Peace Treaty for the purpose of re-establishing Austria as an independent and democratic country, in accordance with the terms of the Moscow Declaration. Not until December 1946 had the Soviet Union agreed to hold a conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers which would draft the treaty.

72. The progress had been slow, but by June 1949, at the end of 163 meetings, the main points of a draft treaty had been agreed upon. Certain points of dis-

agreement had been referred to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which, in its turn, had agreed on a number of important points, including Yugoslav territorial claims on Austria and Soviet claims on German assets in Austria. While the Soviet Union Government had abandoned its support of the Yugoslav claims, which had been contested by the Western Powers, the Western Powers, although they had themselves waived their rights to take over German assets in their zones, had agreed to the retention by the Soviet Government of the oil and shipping assets in eastern Austria, and to the payment by Austria to the Soviet Government of 150 million dollars in respect of other German assets relinquished to Austria.

73. With agreement on the question of assets, all the major issues facing the four Powers had seemed to have been settled. The four Deputy Foreign Ministers had been instructed to complete the State Treaty by 1 September 1949. All hopes, however, had soon been dashed.

74. The first difficulty had arisen in connexion with the wording of the agreement on the question of assets, but it had been resolved as the result of a compromise by the Western Powers, which had accepted the Soviet Union's text. Thereupon, the Soviet representative had flatly declined to discuss a few remaining articles of the draft treaty until his Government had obtained satisfaction with regard to its claim against the Austrian Government for supplies furnished to Austria after the war.

75. The principle of that claim had been embodied in article 48-bis of the draft treaty, and had previously been accepted by the Western Powers despite the fact that they had themselves renounced their claims in respect of such supplies. The actual text of that article, however, had remained to be settled, and it had been assumed that the question was one for the four Powers. But the Soviet Union had declined to work on that article or on any of the other unagreed articles until it had obtained satisfaction in direct negotiations on the subject which, it had announced, it was undertaking with the Austrian Government.

76. Those negotiations, unfortunately, had been more fiction than fact. The Austrian Government had made repeated efforts to discuss the Soviet claims with the Soviet Union Government but the latter had failed to reply to the Austrian Government's notes on the subject while at the same time continuing to obstruct the Treaty negotiations themselves for the very reason that the Soviet Union was unable to reach a settlement with the Austrian Government on the question of its claim, and that question was still unsettled.

77. Although it had been assumed that the text of the article pertaining to that question was one for the Four Powers to decide upon, the Soviet Union Government had insisted on negotiating it directly with the Austrian Government and had declined to work on any other unagreed articles in the meantime. Since no progress had been made because of the failure of the Soviet Union Government to reply to the Austrian Government's notes on the subject, the four-Power negotiations had been resumed in May 1950. At that time the Soviet Union Deputy had introduced a new issue by accusing the Austrian Government and the Western Powers of encouraging the revival of nazism and of remilitarizing western Austria. He had used that accusation as a

ground for reopening article 9 of the treaty, which had dealt with the suppression of nazi organizations and which had already been agreed between the four Powers. Considering that any signs of remilitarization or renazification would be the subject of grave concern to all, the Western Powers had been only too willing to investigate Soviet allegations in that connexion. The Soviet Union representatives in the Allied Council in Vienna, however, had failed without exception to substantiate those allegations in any way or even to introduce any concrete proposals for investigating them. So long as the Soviet Union Government was unable to establish the truth of its allegations in the Allied Council, its fears could not properly be cited as reasons for holding up the treaty negotiations to which they had no direct relevance. It had been for that reason that the Western Powers had declined to reopen negotiations on the wording of article 9.

78. At about the same time, the Soviet Union had also introduced the question of the Italian Peace Treaty in so far as it concerned Trieste. The Soviet Union Deputy, on 4 May 1950, had accused the Western Powers of violating the terms of the Italian Peace Treaty by the continued Anglo-American occupation of Zone A in Trieste. He had maintained that the Western Powers were, by their action, throwing doubts on the sincerity of their intention to put the Austrian Treaty into effect upon its conclusion, and he had declined further discussion of the State Treaty until a Soviet note of 20 April 1950 on that subject had been answered.

79. In the opinion of the Western Powers, the irrelevance of that allegation had been clear. Nevertheless, the negotiations had broken down on that issue. Although the Western Powers had done their best to dispel Soviet concern over that matter in a reply dated 16 June 1950 to the Soviet note of 20 April 1950, the Soviet Union Government had found the reply unsatisfactory and the negotiations had been abandoned in December 1950.

80. Another effort made by the Western Powers in December 1951 to have the treaty negotiations reopened in London on 21 January 1952 had been thwarted by the Soviet Deputy, who had refused to attend unless given a prior assurance that the meeting would discuss the question of Trieste together with the charges of remilitarization and renazification in Austria. The Western Powers had thereupon conceived a new approach to the question, and had presented to the Soviet Union Government on 13 March 1952 an abbreviated draft treaty which had contained only a minimum of articles required to end the occupation of Austria and to restore its independence. The Soviet reply in August, however, had merely reaffirmed the Soviet Union Government's willingness to conclude negotiations on the original long draft of the Austrian treaty, provided that its demands concerning the issues of remilitarization, renazification and the status of Trieste were met. The Soviet Union, at the same time, had rejected the abbreviated treaty on the grounds that it failed to make any provision for the maintenance in Austria of human rights and democratic government or for the suppression of nazi activities; the Soviet Union had also maintained that the abbreviated treaty

gave Austria no right to maintain armed forces for national defence.

81. In reply, the Western Powers had offered to meet the Soviet objections by adding to the abbreviated treaty articles 7, 8 and 9 of the original long draft.

82. Those articles had referred respectively to human rights, democratic institutions and the dissolution of nazi organizations. Regarding Austria's right to armed forces, the Western Powers had pointed out that the abbreviated treaty in fact had been intended to remove the restrictions imposed on Austria in this respect by article 17 of the long draft. They were ready, however, to include article 17 in the abbreviated treaty if the Soviet Union, so desired. The Western Powers, still hopeful for a settlement, had convened a meeting of the Foreign Ministers for 29 September 1952.

83. Nevertheless, a Soviet note of 28 September had maintained that the offer of the Western Powers had answered only one objection to the abbreviated treaty and had passed over in silence the remaining articles of the State Treaty which had been agreed between the Four Powers but omitted from the abbreviated treaty, as well as the questions of Trieste and the remilitarization and renazification of Austria. Thus, the meeting scheduled for 29 September had never taken place.

84. Mr. Lloyd went on to say that he hoped he had given an objective account of the position taken by the Western Powers during the negotiations and of their attempts, by continuous compromise to meet the Soviet point of view, to achieve the State Treaty with Austria. The Western Powers, anxious to restore Austrian independence, had negotiated throughout in good faith. They had made important concessions. The Soviet Union Government, nevertheless, had followed every concession by a demand for further concessions or the introduction of further objections.

85. The Western Powers, Mr. Lloyd declared, remained convinced that no point of substance was preventing the conclusion of the Austrian treaty; Russian assent alone was lacking. The Western Powers were ready now, as always, to meet the Soviet representatives at any time and to discuss any relevant points in connexion with the Austrian treaty intended to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty.

86. The United Kingdom delegation, therefore, unhesitatingly supported the joint draft resolution initiated by Brazil. The Austrian people had indeed waited seven years, and should not be kept waiting any longer.

87. In conclusion, Mr. Lloyd agreed that, as the joint draft resolution pointed out, the solution of the Austrian problem would be an important contribution to the general relaxation of international political tension. He hoped that the Soviet Union Government would respond to the joint draft resolution in the same sense and spirit as his own Government. The solution of just one of the outstanding controversies between East and West would bring new hope to the whole world, which was deeply disturbed by present trends, and which longed for lasting peace.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.