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Chairman: Mr. Djalal ABDOH (Iran).

AGENDA ITEM 23

The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/3672, A/C.1/795, A/C.1/L.192) (continued)

1. Mr. TSYBA (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that there had been no progress towards a settlement because the General Assembly had adopted as a basis a plan which disregarded the need for agreement by both sides on the conditions of unification, and sought to impose the régime of one part of the country on the other. Instead of discussing the reports of the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and seeking to prolong its activities, the United Nations should work for a rapprochement between the two parts of Korea and the establishment of political, economic and cultural bonds between the two groups of the population as a precondition for a settlement by the Koreans themselves.
2. For its part, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea continued to prove itself a peace-loving State and to work intensively towards such a rapprochement. It had reduced its armed forces by 80,000 men and had made a corresponding reduction in its armaments; it had proposed a joint declaration of intention to renounce the use of force and to undertake negotiations for a reduction of arms and military budgets of both parts of Korea. But those overtures had been rejected by South Korea, whose extremist militarist groups, supported by the United States, still assumed that the Korean question could be settled only by force.
3. Despite the difficulties arising from the continued division of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic had achieved great progress in the economic and cultural fields, which had resulted in a sharp rise in the standard of living. The people of the North would not willingly agree to forgo those advantages.
4. In preparation for Korea's unification and for the time when the existing truce would be transformed into a lasting peace, it was essential to strengthen the Armistice Agreement (S/3079, appendix A) and ensure strict observance of its provisions. Yet the United States was attempting to subvert the very

basis of that Agreement. It had tried to obstruct the functioning of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), which was an integral part of the Agreement, by demanding the departure of its inspection teams from areas under United Nations control. It was evident that the expulsion of the inspection teams had been planned long in advance, for those teams had been responsible for preventing the military build-up of South Korea, which the United Nations Command was determined to continue. Violations by the South Korean authorities of the Armistice Agreement by importing arms, training new military units and fostering a war psychosis, had been cited repeatedly in the NNSC reports. Recently, the situation had been further complicated by the declaration of the United States that it would not abide by the provisions of sub-paragraph 13 (d) of the Agreement, and by the announcement made by the United States Department of Defense that it was sending to South Korea modern United States arms including aircraft capable of delivering atomic weapons.

5. He cited numerous instances of crimes and brutalities inflicted on the population of South Korea by United States servicemen. The United Nations could not remain indifferent to those excesses because they had been done under the aegis of the United Nations.

6. The key to a peaceful solution of the Korean question was the gradual rapprochement, economically, politically and culturally, between the peoples of the two parts of Korea. Acceptance of the proposal made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 26 June 1957 and by the People's Republic of China on 27 June 1957 for a political conference of the countries concerned would pave the way towards such a solution.

7. Mr. SCHURMANN (Netherlands) noted that the aims for which fifteen countries had fought side by side with the Republic of Korea had been only partly achieved. The United Nations could not passively accept the illegal situation created by the North Korean authorities and their supporters. The duty of its Member States was to uphold the principle of self-determination through free elections under proper supervision; the suggestion that they should urge the Republic of Korea to come to a settlement with the invaders was contrary to the principles of the Charter. It was therefore gratifying to note that the Government of the Republic of Korea was equally determined to pursue the course of honour and justice.

8. The Armistice Agreement could not be unilaterally set aside; non-compliance by the Communists deprived them of the right to demand that the United Nations Command should continue to observe the rules they had broken. However, the Agreement remained in force and infringement of it by the Communists was illegal.

9. The Netherlands delegation would support any draft resolution reaffirming the principles for unification set forth in the Declaration by the Sixteen (A/2786, annex) made at the Korean Political Conference, held at Geneva in 1954, and calling upon the Communist authorities to accept those objectives.

10. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that the United States was attempting to exploit the explosive situation it had created in Korea in order to maintain tension in the relations between the countries of the Far East which would enable it to continue its policy of force. The statement of the United States representative (899th meeting) had provided further proof that his Government was unwilling to allow the people of Korea to settle their differences between themselves; despite the acknowledged warmongering attitude of the South Korean authorities and, in particular, of Syngman Rhee, the United States had insisted that the Rhee government was the only legal government of Korea and that its representative alone should be heard. The United Nations had neither the power nor the right to say which of the two régimes in Korea was the legal one; recognition of a government by other States did not make it legal; only the fundamental laws of a country determined the legality of its government. It was a dangerous practice for the United Nations to make arbitrary decisions in such matters and it clearly obstructed the unification of Korea by peaceful means.

11. Instead of allowing the passage of time to dull the memory of United States intervention in Korea, the United States representative had repeated the false charges against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China which had served to justify the military occupation of South Korea and Taiwan. In disregard of the Soviet proposals for the withdrawal of troops from both parts of the country and of the proposals of organizations in the North for direct contacts between responsible representatives of the two parts of the country to discuss unification by appropriate procedures, the United States had decided to hold separate elections in South Korea and thus to perpetuate the division of the country. It was evident that the Syngman Rhee clique, supported by United States imperialists, wanted unification by force. Syngman Rhee had never consented to a truce; as late as 1956 he had called for a march into the North, and he continued to call for denunciation of the Armistice Agreement. Clearly, the South Korean leaders, at the instigation of foreign groups, sought to perpetuate the "cold war" and to spread propaganda for a third world war. Their position was especially dangerous as there could be no certainty that a new war could be localized.

12. The charges of violations of the Armistice Agreement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were wholly unfounded and had been invoked as a pretext for acknowledged United States violations, such as the equipment of United States troops with modern weapons, including atomic weapons, and the reorganization and re-equipment of the South Korean Army. In order to give a semblance of truth to such false charges, the United States had seen to it that no representative of the Democratic People's Republic was present to refute them in the Committee.

13. The United Nations could not assist the peaceful unification of Korea and safeguard peace in the Far East unless it exerted every effort to restrain the

South Korean Government from continuing the arms race undertaken with the help of the United States, and encouraged direct contacts at all levels between representatives of the two States in Korea.

14. Mr. ESIN (Turkey) said it was evident from UNCURK's report (A/3672) that there had been no change in the prospects for realizing the fundamental objective of the United Nations in Korea, which was to achieve an equitable and satisfactory solution of the problem by the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government for the whole Korean peninsula. Although the efforts of the United Nations to achieve such a solution had so far been unsuccessful because of the obstruction of the North Korean and Chinese Communist authorities, it must continue to seek the fulfilment of those objectives. There was no doubt that the most appropriate way to do so was on the basis laid down at the Korean Political Conference and overwhelmingly endorsed by the General Assembly, that is, through genuinely free elections held under United Nations supervision.

15. As the report emphasized, the Armistice Agreement had been only a step towards the ultimate ends which should be sought in a peace settlement. However, although such a settlement had not been achieved, there was no doubt that the Armistice Agreement contributed to the tranquillity which should naturally precede such a settlement and the meticulous implementation of that agreement was therefore an important factor in the efforts directed towards a settlement. It was consequently regrettable that the side which had frustrated the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a settlement should also have disregarded the most important provisions of the Armistice Agreement and thus have created a tense and delicate situation. His delegation had referred to those violations at earlier sessions of the General Assembly; a recent account of them and of the protective action which had been taken by the United Nations Command was to be found in the report of the Unified Command (A/3631). It should be emphasized that the measures taken by the Command were purely defensive in character.

16. Although it regretted that peaceful unification had not yet been achieved, his delegation noted with satisfaction that, in spite of difficulties common to the less-developed countries and the problems resulting from the division of the country, the Republic of Korea continued to make progress in the economic, social and political fields. It believed that a country with such a distinguished record was entitled to membership in the United Nations and hoped that the Republic of Korea would soon take its rightful place there.

17. His Government wished to express once again its concern over the fate of the 166 Turkish soldiers missing in action in Korea and so far unaccounted for by the Chinese and North Korean authorities. As the United States representative had said, the North Korean authorities, who had recently accepted the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed on 12 August 1949, had an opportunity to demonstrate their goodwill by satisfactorily accounting for the fate of those members of the United Nations Command.

18. Mr. ASTROM (Sweden) recalled that the NNSC, of which Sweden was a member, had been intended

to carry out certain functions of control, inspection and investigation until the political conference envisaged in the Armistice Agreement had reached a final settlement of the Korean question. Sweden had agreed to become a member of the NNSC on the understanding that it would function only for a limited period of time. It had also made it clear at the outset that in its view the powers of the NNSC were not sufficient to assure effective control and verification.

19. The NNSC had had to discharge its responsibilities without the physical means necessary to do so in a proper and responsible manner. At present, its work was at a virtual standstill, for its only task was to receive, analyse and forward to the Military Armistice Commission the reports it received from the two parties on the entry and exit of military personnel in North and South Korea.

20. In the circumstances, it was natural for his Government to reconsider the question of its continued participation in the NNSC. It did not wish to create difficulties for the Military Armistice Commission or the parties to the Armistice Agreement by an abrupt withdrawal, and would take no action to cease its membership without giving ample notice to the parties. It was also aware that none of the parties to the Armistice Agreement had taken any initiative to dissolve the NNSC, a fact which might indicate a belief on their part that its continued existence had a stabilizing influence on the situation. If that was so, the NNSC should of course continue to exist and Sweden had no wish to see it dissolved or dismembered. It should be pointed out, however, that if one member of the NNSC should signify its intention of terminating its term of duty, there was nothing to prevent the parties from agreeing on the appointment of a new member to replace it.

21. His remarks were intended only to give the Committee a fuller picture of certain aspects of the working of the Armistice Agreement. His Government knew that the continuance of that Agreement was of vital importance and was one of the prerequisites for a peaceful, equitable and democratic settlement of the Korean question.

22. Mr. NASE (Albania) said that, because of the attitude and behaviour of the United States up to the present, the United Nations had adopted an unjustified procedure in the consideration of the Korean question, which had been debated in the absence of one of the parties, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That approach not only failed to contribute to a solution of the problem, but made progress towards such a solution even more difficult. Any decision taken on the matter would remain a dead letter unless it was based on an agreement between the two parts of Korea which was approved by the whole Korean people. Moreover, experience had shown that the method of discussion adopted in the United Nations served only to camouflage the aggressive policy of the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China, a policy which endangered peace in the Far East and in the whole world.

23. In his speech on the subject, the United States representative had attempted to distort the facts regarding the responsibility for the aggression in Korea and the identity of those preventing the peaceful unification of the country, and it had ignored the

role assigned to South Korea by the United States, which was that of serving as a base against the People's Republic of China and other Asian countries. In fact it was the United States that had been directly responsible for the aggression in Korea.

24. Although the end of hostilities in Korea had contributed towards a relaxation of tension throughout the world, the United States, together with the puppet government of Syngman Rhee, had learned no lesson from its failure, but had attempted to sabotage the Armistice Agreement in order to have a free hand to aggravate the situation in the region and to make preparations for another military adventure. It had violated the Armistice Agreement by illegally introducing combat equipment for the South Korean army, which was being trained by American officers. When the inspection teams stationed in ports in the South had denounced those activities, the American Command had done everything possible to hinder their work and had finally expelled them from South Korea. The United States had crowned those violations of the Armistice Agreement by its action of 21 June 1957, when it had announced that it considered itself relieved of its obligations under sub-paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement, and had introduced modern armaments, including aircraft capable of carrying atomic devices, into South Korea. Although it attempted to justify its illegal action by claiming that the Armistice Agreement had been violated by the other side, the facts refuted those allegations. The Korean-Chinese side had strictly observed its obligations and had reduced its armed forces. At the same time, the South Korean army had been increased from sixteen to thirty-one combat divisions and South Korean and American forces systematically engaged in acts of armed provocation against North Korea. It was not the conduct of the other side which had led the United States to violate the Armistice Agreement, but its own aggressive intentions.

25. The Korean and Chinese Governments, supported by the Soviet Union, had proposed an international conference of all the States concerned in order to establish a lasting peace in Korea and to bring about a peaceful settlement of the question. Moreover, the North Korean Government had repeatedly and officially expressed its sincere desire for the peaceful unification of Korea and has proposed specific measures for the gradual elimination of the obstacles to such unification, such as the restoration of postal and telegraphic communications on a normal basis and the authorization of fishermen from South Korea to fish in the waters of the North. But the United States and the puppet Syngman Rhee régime had committed themselves to a solution of the Korean problem by force.

26. The North Korean Government and people had outlined a policy of peaceful reunification the fundamental principles of which were the following: (1) reunification must be carried out on a democratic basis and the central government of Korea chosen by free elections; (2) the armistice must be transformed into a lasting peace and all foreign troops must be withdrawn from the country; (3) the people of South Korea must be assured of democratic rights and freedoms; (4) in order to foster peaceful unification, the barriers to broad contact between North and South Korea must be eliminated; (5) representatives of the Governments, parliaments, political

organizations and social organizations of both parts of the country should be set up to work together for reconciliation and unification; and (6) in order to reach a peaceful settlement, an international conference of the States concerned should be convened.

27. The United States representative had ignored those principles, which were equitable and realistic

and expressed the will of the Korean people. But the United Nations could and should contribute to a solution of the problem, and it was its duty to support the Korean people in their ardent desire for unification within an independent and democratic State.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.