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**Chairman: Mr. Thanat KHOMAN (Thailand).**

**AGENDA ITEM 13**

**Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/3595 and Corr.1,  
 A/3718, A/C.4/372) (continued)**

**HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)**

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Charles Assalé, Mr. Paul Soppo Priso and Mr. Jean Ekwabi, representatives of the Groupe d'action nationale du Cameroun, Mr. Ndeh Ntumazah, representative of One Kamerun, Mr. Félix Roland Moumié, representative of the Union des populations du Cameroun, Mr. Dika Akwa, representative of the Confédération des syndicats indépendants du Cameroun, and Mr. Jacques Ngom, representative of the Confédération générale camerunaise du travail, took places at the Committee table.

1. Mr. SOPPO PRISO (Groupe d'action nationale du Cameroun) said that he wished to supplement the statement he had made at the 714th meeting by summarizing the most important points he had touched upon on that occasion.

2. Firstly, the new Statute which had been granted to the Cameroons under French administration, <sup>1/</sup> apart from its contradictions and inconsistencies, was unsatisfactory in that it failed to provide any guarantees with regard to the aspirations of the Cameroonian people for sovereignty and independence. The fact that it did not formally recognize their right to independence gave rise to the suspicion that, far from being a step in the direction of full sovereignty for the Cameroons, it was intended to lead merely to some form of autonomy within the framework of integration into the French Union. The division of the Cameroons into provinces enjoying a large degree of self-government was in itself a threat to Cameroonian unity and sovereignty.

3. Secondly, his party was convinced that in the present political circumstances the Cameroons fulfilled all the conditions required to warrant its being granted full sovereignty.

4. Thirdly, it would assist the reunification of the Cameroons, which was the widely voiced wish of the population in both the Trust Territories, if both Territories could be granted independence simultaneously.

<sup>1/</sup> For the text of the Statute, see T/1314 and Corr.1.

5. Fourthly, no reforms could be introduced as long as the present atmosphere of tension prevailed and the only way to reduce that tension was to declare an amnesty for political offences.

6. He and his fellow petitioners had followed with great interest the discussion on Togoland and hoped that the Committee, approaching the Cameroonian problem in the same spirit, would submit to the General Assembly a draft resolution or recommendation which would note that, under the terms of the Statute, France had recognized the capacity of the Cameroons under French administration to govern itself; note that the Trusteeship Council at its nineteenth session had concluded that the elected representatives of the Cameroonian people favoured independence (A/3595 and Corr.1, p. 126); call upon the General Assembly to recognize and solemnly proclaim the right of the Cameroons to independence; appoint a commission of inquiry to work out a procedure which would facilitate the transition to independence; and call upon the Administering Authority to transfer its residual powers to the Cameroonian authorities. It was further to be hoped that the Committee's resolution would call for a general political amnesty with a view to easing the present atmosphere of tension and would urge that the two zones should be granted independence simultaneously in order to facilitate their reunification.

7. Mr. DIKA AKWA (Confédération des syndicats indépendants du Cameroun) expressed the gratitude of his party to the anti-colonialist States which had been working for the emancipation of oppressed peoples, and in particular to the Sudan, which had granted asylum to recently exiled Cameroonian nationalist leaders.

8. A brief review of the history of the Cameroons should help to clear up the mistaken impression which had been created on some quarters that the Cameroonian problem was a fabrication of agitators and Communists. It should be remembered that in pre-colonialist times the Cameroons had been a sovereign State. That State had come into existence in the eighth century with the name Biafra and had flourished until the fourteenth century, when it had been divided into the two kingdoms of Adamawa in the north and Biafra in the south. While the former had had relations with Tunisia, Libya and other countries, Biafra had carried on a profitable trade with European nations from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The Convention of January 1666 and the Treaties of 1841, 1842, 1852, 1856, 1859, 1869 and 1872, which could be found in the archives of the British Foreign Office, were among agreements which the Cameroons had concluded with other States during that period. In the nineteenth century, however, the Cameroons had suffered the same fate as the other African countries when the continent had been divided among the European Powers. The

Treaty concluded with Germany on 12 July 1884, setting up the German protectorate, and the raising of the German flag on Cameroonian soil two days later had marked the end of Cameroonian sovereignty and the beginning of the Territory's colonization. In 1901 Germany had conquered northern Biafra and incorporated it into the protectorate. Finally, the Kingdom of Bamoun had likewise been incorporated.

9. Thus, while the Germans had not created the entity known as the Cameroons, by unifying northern and southern Biafra, they had given its diverse peoples a sense of nationhood. When the First World War had broken out, the Cameroons, surrounded as it was by United Kingdom, French and Belgian colonies, had become a battleground and when the Germans had been driven out two years later it had been arbitrarily divided between France and the United Kingdom. France, which had received by far the larger share, had incorporated 250,000 square kilometres into its colonies in Equatorial Africa, leaving 430,000 square kilometres to form the Territory of the Cameroons under French administration. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles the Cameroons, regarded as a colony of the defeated enemy, had been ordered to pay war damages. For nearly twenty years thereafter the two Territories, placed under the Mandates System, had been the victims of the most reactionary form of colonialism. In 1946 the division of the Cameroons into two zones had been confirmed by the two Trusteeship Agreements.

10. The frontiers of the Cameroons had been guaranteed by various international treaties, from the Convention signed by the United Kingdom and Germany on 21 April 1885 to the Convention of 4 November 1911, confirmed on 28 September 1912. The Cameroonian people had never ceased to claim the frontiers existing in 1914, considering that the subsequent division of their country into three parts constituted not only a crime against the tribes thus dismembered but also a violation of international agreements. The question of reunification was becoming ever more urgent, especially since the Northern Cameroons under British administration was already an integral part of the Northern Region of the Federation of Nigeria. Pending the day when a sovereign Cameroonian State could enter into negotiations with Spain for the restoration of the island of Fernando Po and with France for the restoration of the Cameroonian lands which had been incorporated into France's colonies in Equatorial Africa, the United Nations should take immediate action to bring about the reunification of the Cameroons under French administration with the Northern and Southern Cameroons under British administration. For the benefit of those who still doubted whether the Cameroonian people desired to be reunited he would recall that from 1926 to 1935 the League of Nations had been flooded with petitions urging unification. That the problem was a real one and not mere a fabrication of the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), as was maintained in some quarters, was evident from the fact that the party at present in power in the Cameroons under British administration had until recently been called the Kamerun United National Congress. That party, moreover, had been responsible for the meeting held in 1951 by representatives of all the nationalist parties in the two zones to discuss the problem of reunification.

11. As far as the reunification of the Northern and Southern Cameroons under British administration was concerned, to argue that there were affinities between the people of the Northern Cameroons and those of the Northern Region of Nigeria was no more valid than it would be to argue that Geneva should belong to France because there were affinities between its inhabitants and the French. Indeed, the Administering Authority's awareness that the people of the Northern Cameroons considered themselves one with those of the South had obliged it to set up an organ at least superficially distinguishing them from the inhabitants of the Northern Region of Nigeria. Instead of seeking to strengthen the bonds between the peoples of the Territory, the Administering Authority was thus sowing the seeds of distrust, justifying its position by invoking the views of the Consultative Committee for the Northern Cameroons. In that connexion, he pointed out that, according to the Trusteeship Council's report (A/3595 and Corr.1, p.104) the Haitian representative had told the Council that the leaders in the Northern Cameroons who desired integration with the Northern Region of Nigeria were not necessarily representative of the masses. The argument that to alter the existing arrangement would be prejudicial to law and order was disproved by the fact that there was only one authority for both North and South in the Cameroons under French administration and that had never been the cause of any such problem.

12. When the United Kingdom authorities argued that the best way to safeguard the interests of the Trust Territory under their administration was to maintain its close association with Nigeria it might well be asked whether it was the interests of the Cameroons or the interests of the United Kingdom that they had in mind. A glance at the budgets of the three zones would supply the answer. The budget for the 3,500,000 inhabitants of the Cameroons under French administration amounted to £22 million at the official rate of exchange, while the budget for the 750,000 inhabitants of the Southern Cameroons under British administration amounted to £1 million and that for the 17 million inhabitants of the combined Northern Region of Nigeria and Northern Cameroons was £12 million. Hence it was evident that the Cameroons under British administration with a population of 1,500,000, or more than one-third of the total Cameroonian population, would be in a better position reunified with the Cameroons under French administration than it was under the present arrangement, whereby half of its inhabitants were integrated into Nigeria, of whose total population they represented only one-thirtieth. The benefits derived by the British under the present arrangement were further indicated by the fact that the Cameroons Development Corporation had reinvested only £750,000 of the total of £2,618,000 profit which it had realized in 1955, not one penny of which had been handed over to the Cameroonian Government. The same thing could be said of the other commercial enterprises in the Territory.

13. Another consideration was that the arbitrary division of the Cameroons into three parts broke up plantations, villages and families in the neighbourhood of the frontiers and entailed double taxation, duplicated customs formalities and the necessity of obtaining passes in order to travel from one point to another within what was actually a single country.

14. From the foregoing it was evident that the division of the Cameroons into three parts constituted an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of the Trusteeship System. To say that the peoples of the three zones could remedy the situation after they had each attained their independence was to forget the lessons of Germany, Korea and Indo-China. A solution was all the more urgently required inasmuch as the scheduled accession to independence of Nigeria in 1960 intensified the fear that the Cameroons under British administration would eventually be integrated into that State.

15. With regard to the present political situation, the opposition to the Government and the activities of the maquis must be considered against the background of the struggle for their rights which the Cameroonian people had been waging since 1886, when they had tried to enforce respect for the treaty establishing the protectorate. From 1902 to 1911 a delegation of the Ngondo, the traditional movement of the Douala people, had had a seat in the Reichstag and had urged self-government for the Cameroons. Between 1911 and 1914 the struggle had become intensified and appeal had been made to France and the United Kingdom for aid. After France and the United Kingdom had set themselves up in place of the Germans the Cameroonian people had put their case before the League of Nations. In 1940 the Cameroonian people had supported France, hoping that it could at last understand their hatred of foreign occupation and would grant them independence, but after the incidents of September 1945 France had adopted a policy of partial integration. Finally, from 1949 onwards Cameroonian nationalist delegations had been putting the case for reunification and independence before the United Nations, supported by more than 40,000 written petitions. The present critical situation in the Cameroons under French administration was the direct result of the events of May 1955, which had galvanized the hostility of the people into open opposition. The events which had occurred since December 1956 were attributable to the Administering Authority's stubborn insistence on maintaining its integrationist and paternalistic policies.

16. After the Second World War the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA), of which the UPC had constituted an important element, had been organized with a view to liberating the African countries. Leaders of every persuasion had united to bring about the abolition of the indigénat, the establishment of local assemblies and the elimination of all vestiges of the colonial régime. It had been attacked by the French settlers but had successfully resisted all attempts to weaken it until 1952, when its Chairman, Mr. Houphouët-Boigny, had signed the protocol of 9 August with the Indépendants catholiques d'outre-mer, the party of the African Catholics. The purpose of that understanding, as Mr. Saler, a French Senator, had written, was to give the French Government and its allies the assurance that internal security in the African Territories would no longer be disturbed. Another Frenchman, Mr. Robert Buron, a former cabinet minister, had correctly described the position of the RDA parliamentary leaders in Paris when he had said that instead of insisting on independence they were now stressing technical assistance and capital investments with a view to bringing about the modernization of Africa, without which independence

would be meaningless. In doing so, however, they were reversing the logical order of events, for only the attainment of independence could frustrate the intrigues of those who sought to use industrialization for their own selfish ends. In that connexion the recent setbacks suffered by Mr. Houphouët-Boigny were particularly significant. In the elections of March 1957 he had won 13,571 votes out of a total of 15,393 cast, whereas the total registered electorate had been 73,796, meaning that 80 per cent had abstained.

17. In response to a point of order raised by Mr. DE CAMARET (France), the CHAIRMAN asked the speaker to confine his remarks to the item under discussion.

18. Mr. DIKA AKWA (Confédération des syndicats indépendants du Cameroun), continuing his statement, said that after the change of front by Mr. Houphouët-Boigny, Um Nyobé of the Cameroonian branch, Vice-Chairman of the RDA, had realized that a Franco-African community, whether it was termed integration, federation or association, would not lead to the results hoped for by the African masses, since France would continue to dominate and exploit them. Hence the UPC leaders had continued to plead the cause of independence before the United Nations. Their success had alarmed the reactionary elements and had led to the events of May 1955. A political vacuum had been created in the Cameroons following the outlawing of the UPC. That fact illustrated the importance of the UPC; those who used the expression implicitly recognized that it was the main factor of political life in the Cameroons. The outlawing of the UPC and its affiliated bodies, the Union démocratique des femmes camerounaises and the Jeunesse démocratique camerounaise, had revealed the true aims of the administering Authority. The Administration had hoped to reinforce the position of the Indépendants catholiques d'outre-mer and to guide the Cameroonian nationalist movement towards a policy of compliance, the logical conclusion of which would be the integration of the Cameroons into the French Union through the operation of the so-called loi-cadre. The immense majority of the population, however, was opposed to the loi-cadre since it did not satisfy the national aspirations or give any hope of their ever being satisfied. Above all the Administration had wished to prevent the extension of the nationalist movement into the Northern Cameroons and to strengthen the position of the RDA.

19. At one point the purposes of the Administering Authority seemed to have been achieved. There had been the refusal of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of the Cameroons under British Administration and the Cameroons under French Administration, 1955 to receive the UPC representatives; the Visiting Mission's conclusion that Cameroonian nationalism equalled Communism; the exclusion of the UPC from the RDA in order to give the impression that the policy of the Cameroonian branch was repudiated by most of the African movements; and the establishment by Mr. Roland Pré, the Governor, of an association of Foulbé chiefs in the Northern Cameroons apart from the association of all the traditional chiefs. All those were symptoms of a separatism which was later to take concrete form in the organization of the northern region as an autonomous province. The Administering Authority had also encouraged the formation of a number of small parties which had no real support.

20. The success of the Administering Authority had, however, been more apparent than real. The Cameroonian people had been the real victors. That had become clear when, during the elections on 2 January 1956, 71.5 per cent of the registered electors had abstained from voting and 215,000 had voted in favour of the nationalist candidates despite the desperate efforts of Mr. Roland Pré to rally all the supporters of autonomy. The triumph of the nationalists had also been demonstrated by the strengthening of the influence of the UPC and of the traditional anti-colonialist movements, the recall of Mr. Roland Pré, the dispatch by the Administering Authority of emissaries to the maquis to negotiate with the UPC leaders, the rapid development of the UPC in the Cameroons under British administration and the granting of hearings to the UPC by the United Nations since 18 February 1957.<sup>2/</sup> Those successes would, however, have been sterile if the UPC, all-powerful despite the fact that it had been banned, had not taken action on 12 April 1956 with a view to the establishment of a national union in the whole country; negotiations had been opened between the French Government and the authorized representatives of the Cameroonian people. Mr. Soppo Priso, at that time President of the Territorial Assembly of the Cameroons, on the basis of the UPC manifesto, had launched the Union nationale camerounaise on 9 June 1956. That movement, supported by all shades of opinion in the country, had protested vigorously against the provisions of the so-called loi-cadre and had demanded a popular referendum for the establishment of a Cameroonian constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage, together with a total amnesty. That minimum programme had been enthusiastically welcomed by the people; by 4 August seven movements had rallied to the Union nationale camerounaise and by November twenty-two organizations had joined.

21. The awakening of the Cameroonian people had stimulated the various traditional movements. In June 1956 the Ngondo, Traditional Assembly of the Douala People, had endorsed the UPC programme, while the Conseil national des chefs traditionnels du Cameroun had demanded immediate independence and unanimously rejected the so-called loi-cadre. Severe punishment had been inflicted on the traditional chiefs, some of whom had been dethroned and imprisoned.

22. On the eve of the municipal elections of 18 November 1956 the national demand had been summarized as follows: firstly, the rejection of the loi-cadre; secondly, a total amnesty and the re-establishment of all democratic liberties; thirdly, a referendum under United Nations supervision or the establishment of a constituent assembly.

23. The results of the municipal elections spoke for themselves. The strength of the national liberation movement had been demonstrated by abstentions of 92 per cent at Douala, 35 per cent at Nkongsamba and 61 per cent at Yaoundé, where Mr. Mbida, who had not then become Prime Minister, had been conducting a campaign to disrupt the national unity.

24. The Union nationale had defined its position early in November when it had adopted a resolution making

<sup>2/</sup> On that date, a representative of the U.P.C. was heard by the Fourth Committee. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Fourth Committee, 640th and 641st meetings.

its participation in the elections to the Territorial Assembly dependent upon the preliminary granting of an unconditional amnesty for those involved in the events of May 1955 and the fixing of a date for the election at least two months after the promulgation of the amnesty. The French Government had immediately laid an amnesty bill before the Assembly. Its intention had been to grant an amnesty in order to satisfy certain claims and to crystallize the movement in favour of participation in the elections, but to grant it only after the registration of candidates, in order to eliminate some of them, in particular the UPC leaders. The amnesty bill was still pending.

25. Despite the opposition of the Cameroonians to the loi-cadre, the French Government was determined to give the Cameroons an Assembly to France's liking, to discuss the draft Statute. The Administration had thus had to find a way of bringing about a split in the Union nationale. The attempt had been successful and in December the Union nationale had split up into the UPC and its faithful adherents, who refused to participate in the elections, and those who were prepared to serve in a prefabricated Assembly and thus give an appearance of democracy to a completely undemocratic body.

26. The election had proceeded in the classic manner, except for the fact that, in order to induce the Cameroonians to vote, the Administering Authority had decided to admit persons without voting cards or even identity papers. The result of the elections had been so striking that a former French minister had said that the Administration had no reason to rejoice and had pointed out that whereas on the one hand there had been a large number of abstentions at Douala, in the Bassa region, in the Nkam region and even in the north, in other regions there had been a suspiciously high number of voters, which must have been due to strong pressure exercised on the chiefs. The former minister had also stated that certain candidates had been given liquor licences or authorizations to purchase guns in the middle of the electoral campaign and that Administration officials had carried on election propaganda on the orders of the administrator. Moreover, railway lines had been sabotaged, bridges blown up and pro-Administration candidates murdered during the electoral campaign. Such actions, caused by the exasperation of the people, did not justify the extermination of the Bassa and Bamileké tribes which was being carried out.

27. The stalemate was being prolonged by the fact that the Cameroonian crisis was being dealt with in Paris without the participation of authorized spokesmen of the Cameroons. The non-representative character of the present Legislative Assembly was shown by the absence of the UPC leaders, who represented the great majority of public opinion, and by the fact that it was based on fraudulent elections and was the outcome of a Statute imposed by France on the Cameroonians.

28. The constitutional reforms granted by France to the Cameroonian people were a flagrant violation of the spirit of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement and were an insult to the Cameroonian people. They constituted the simple integration of the Cameroons into the French Republic.

29. Article 76 of the Charter laid down that one of the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System was



self-government or independence according to the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. The Charter also enjoined the administering Powers to ensure the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the peoples for whom they were responsible. Since 1949 the United Nations had been aware of the determination of the Cameroonians to achieve immediate independence and the unification of their country. No one could deny that that was the wish of the people, expressed in 40,000 petitions during the past three years. France should therefore have organized either a referendum under international supervision or free and fair elections to the Cameroonian Legislative Assembly. That, however, had not been done. The repression exercised by France had resulted in slaughter, arrests, torture, pillage, rape, police raids, arson, the dethroning and imprisonment of traditional chiefs who supported the national movement and their replacement by others who were known as lackeys, and the suppression of the UPC and its affiliates. Nothing, however, had shaken the resolution of the Cameroonian people. It was the French Government's determination to prevent the Cameroonians from demanding a régime of their own choice that had led to the drawing up of the Statute.

30. Mr. J. Nguenga Kouoto, an eminent lawyer, had recently pointed out various defects in the text of the Statute, including its lack of clarity, its incompleteness, the retention of the French High Commissioner and the wide scope of his powers. Furthermore the immunity granted by article 10 did not protect opposition deputies outside the Assembly and non-parliamentary nationalists were doubly at the mercy of the police.

31. The reference to the United Nations Charter in article 2 of the Statute was obviously a legal trick, since the conditions laid down in the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement had not been fulfilled. To dignify the few constitutional reforms that had been introduced with the name of "Statute" was a mere juggling with legal texts. The Cameroons could not have two Statutes; to grant a new Statute before the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement was a violation of the Charter and was contrary to the wish of almost all Cameroonians. Article 2 confirmed that view since it mortgaged the Cameroons' future. It gave no indication of when and how the Cameroonians would be able to express an opinion, particularly since every precaution had been taken to ensure a long life for the first Government; under article 18 the Prime Minister was to be confirmed in office by a simple majority, whereas a motion of censure required a two-thirds majority.

32. The Statute was not only a mockery; it integrated the Cameroons into the French Republic. Under article 8 Cameroons citizens enjoyed the civil, civic and social rights of French citizens and French citizens enjoyed in the Cameroons all the rights attaching to the status of Cameroons citizen. That provision for double nationality was assimilation of the most reactionary nature: its sole purpose was to prevent Cameroonians from holding civic office.

33. French representatives in the United Nations had frequently confirmed that the objective of the Trusteeship System was self-government or independence and it was therefore difficult to see why the relationship between the Cameroons and the Administering

Authority should be settled before the coming into being of an independent Cameroons which could negotiate on the subject. France clearly considered the present "autonomy" as an end, thus violating the spirit of the Charter. The Statute was an insult to the Cameroonian people, a cynical refusal to recognize the political maturity of the Cameroonians, their unshakable will as expressed for over half a century and their international status.

34. Chapter III of part III of the Statute, which created a separate province of the Northern Cameroons, was undoubtedly a blow to Cameroonian unity. In a debate held in the Council of the French Republic in June 1956, that innovation had been clearly shown up as an attempt to retard the attainment of independence by the Cameroons by creating the problem of partition as in the case of Nigeria. Mr. Plantier, one of the advocates of the measure, had called for the establishment of a separate Territorial Assembly for the Northern Cameroons or, failing that, a system of rotation in the office of president, to be held alternately by representatives of the Northern and Southern Cameroons. It had no doubt also served as a reward to Mr. Ninine, the Chairman of the Overseas Committee of the French National Assembly, who had championed the recent constitutional reforms in the Cameroonian Assembly, enabling him to be elected indefinitely as deputy in the Cameroons as well as in France.

35. Nevertheless, the real purpose had been to split the Northern and Southern Cameroons into two opposing factions in order to crush the nationalist movement. The French had gained the adherence of nearly all the sultans in the north and by instituting provincial councils had endeavoured to foster a regional feeling which would lead the Northern Cameroonians to view with disfavour any attempt at unification between the North and the South. While depriving the traditional chiefs of the South of all authority, on the pretext of democratization, the Administering Authority had consolidated the power of the feudal sultans in the north. If the Administering Authority was really anxious to speed up the evolution of the Northern Cameroons, it should begin by granting it communes de plein exercice instead of provincial councils. It was obvious that while using the North to quell the nationalist aspirations of the South, the Administering Authority would at the same time be in a position to integrate the Northern Cameroons with the Territory of Chad. Finally, that separatist policy paved the way for the holding of separate referendums in the North and South of the Territory, a step which had been facilitated by the United Kingdom's action in dividing the Cameroons under its administration.

36. The Statute was thus a thinly veiled attempt to integrate the Cameroons in the French Republic, as was clear from articles 2 and 4. It maintained the status quo, the only difference being that there were now two types of deputies; a superior type in Paris, and an inferior type at Yaoundé. Article 11 considerably restricted the powers of the Cameroonian Legislative Assembly with regard to legislation, while under article 6 and part IV, chapter I, a French official was retained as head of the "Trust State", with the result that the Cameroonian Government was a mere appendage of the French Government. Article 17 entitled the French Council of Ministers to dissolve the Cameroonian Legislative Assembly. Indeed, the

French had never made any juridical distinction between France and the Cameroons and they had even managed to include a provision to that effect in the Trusteeship Agreement, without the knowledge of the Cameroonians, with the result that the Cameroons was administered as an integral part of the French Republic.

37. There was no denying that, after many recommendations by the Trusteeship Council, France had taken a step towards the constitutional evolution of the Cameroons but it still fell far short of the legitimate aspirations of the people. The real solution lay not in the institution of a Trust State but in granting an amnesty, ending the political vacuum and reviewing the whole problem of the Cameroons.

38. The Territorial Assembly of the Cameroons had ratified the Statute, as was to be expected. The members of the Assembly had had no opportunity for free discussion, let alone a choice in the matter, since the French Conseil d'Etat, by its veto of 29 January 1957, had strictly limited their task to expressing an opinion on the draft. It was not surprising therefore that a draft sponsored by the Groupe d'action nationale and containing counter-proposals whereby the Cameroons would be recognized as a sovereign State had been rejected out of hand.

39. The unrepresentative character of the Territorial Assembly—subsequently the Legislative Assembly—was even more apparent. Mr. Mbida, the Prime Minister of the Cameroons, was fully aware of the inconsistency of his dual role as a Socialist deputy in Paris and Christian Democrat deputy at Yaounde. He appeared to be equally conscious of his Government's unpopularity since he felt it necessary to give his assurance that it was not a "puppet" Government. It was none the less a fact that practically all the cabinet members of the Cameroonian Government were colonial administrators. It was difficult to take stock of the new Government's achievements since it had not yet considered any crucial issue. The fact that the Prime Minister was planning a campaign against the nationalists, whom he already called rebels, proved that the opposition was rapidly gaining ground.

40. A series of repressive measures had been taken against the UPC, which could only have been achieved through close collaboration between the British and French authorities. When the leaders of that party had sought refuge in the Cameroons under British administration, where they had gained wide support, the Kamerun National Congress had called for a measure to preclude foreigners who had not lived in the Territory for ten years on end from exercising the right to vote. Not only had the authorities of the Cameroons under British administration taken police measures against the UPC but they had withdrawn their protection from the party immediately after the elections, thereby enabling the French police to cross the frontier openly and disrupt the meetings of the national movement. Nevertheless, the UPC kept up an active resistance in the maquis, so much so that the Prime Minister had been obliged to issue an ultimatum to them to desist from their clandestine activities and return to their villages. That ultimatum had achieved no result whatsoever and the Government had been led to take harsh security measures.

Those events showed that the economic and political life of the country was virtually paralysed and that the Administering Authority had not respected General Assembly resolution 1067 (XI) of 26 February 1957, calling upon France to restore political activity in the Territory to normal conditions. Not only had the problem of the Cameroons remained undiminished but it had assumed dangerous proportions.

41. In view of the present situation his party would earnestly request the General Assembly to send a special commission of inquiry to the Cameroons. Firstly, such a commission might inquire into the causes and consequences of the general atmosphere of insecurity. In view of the Administering Authority's inability to restore order, the commission should be accompanied by a United Nations police force, which would maintain order jointly with the Administering Authority. It would also protect the commission during its investigation, for it would be recalled that in 1955 the United Kingdom and France had requested the Visiting Mission not to receive representatives of the UPC, under pain of withdrawing their police protection. Moreover, the sending of such a force would be in accordance with Article 81 of the Charter, which stated that the authority to exercise the administration of a Trust Territory might be constituted by one or more States "or the Organization itself". Such a measure would end the political vacuum, necessitating the abrogation of the Decree of 13 July 1955, disbanding of the UPC and the granting of a complete amnesty.

42. In the second place, the commission would study ways and means for the reunification of the Cameroons, which was a necessary condition for the immediate attainment of independence. That was a particularly urgent matter, for while the Cameroons under British administration in its association with Nigeria was evolving economically towards the British Commonwealth, the Cameroons under French administration was threatened with integration in the European Common Market, which was a form of super-colonialism.

43. Thirdly, the commission would study ways and means for achieving immediate independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1064 (XI), calling for the attainment of self-government or independence by the Trust Territories. That the Cameroons was ready for immediate independence was quite evident. An article in *L'Express* of 4 November 1955 had stated that from the point of view of education and standard of living the Cameroons was far more developed than the territories of North Africa. If those countries were capable of governing themselves, then France, in withholding independence from the Cameroons, was acting in bad faith.

44. The establishment of such a commission by the General Assembly would be in accordance with Article 85 of the Charter. It might be argued that since the Trusteeship Council would send a visiting mission to the Cameroons the following year it would not be necessary for the General Assembly to incur the expense of sending a separate commission. The gravity of the situation in the Cameroons, however, necessitated the direct intervention of the General Assembly and the funds allocated for the regular visiting mission might be used for the General Assem-

bly commission. The measure was also justified by Article 87 of the Charter and by the fact that in his report for 1957 the Secretary-General had emphasized the gravity of the situation in the Cameroons.

It would, moreover, respond to the wishes of all the petitioners.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.