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Chairman: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 13

Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/3822, A/C.4/387, A/C.4/388) (continued)

THE FUTURE OF THE CAMEROONS UNDER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION AND THE CAMEROONS UNDER FRENCH ADMINISTRATION (continued)

1. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) said that his statement would be confined to constitutional and political issues. His delegation had warmly welcomed the French representative's statement at the 774th meeting, later elaborated in his memorandum (A/C.4/388), concerning the attainment of independence by the Cameroons under French administration on 1 January 1960. That was a statement in keeping with French liberal traditions and his delegation was proud to be associated with France in the momentous process of helping peoples in West Africa to achieve nationhood. He also welcomed the statement made at the 794th meeting by Mr. Ahidjo, Prime Minister of the Cameroons under French administration, who had expressed the hope that the people of the Cameroons under British administration, too, would be consulted regarding their future and had said that his Government would warmly welcome them if they decided on unification.

2. His task was partly to express the views of the United Kingdom Government but also to give the views of the leaders of opinion in the Cameroons under British administration, and of the Nigerian leaders. The necessity of hearing the views of the inhabitants of the Cameroons under British administration had not been met by the statement made by the one petitioner from that Territory, who had spoken for himself and for his party, One Kamerun.^{1/} That party had not been in existence when the most recent election had taken place but the party most closely allied to it had polled less than 3 per cent, or under 2,000, of the votes.

3. The Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference held in London in September and October 1958 on the subject of Nigerian independence had been the culmination of a series of remarkable consultations between ministers in the United Kingdom Government and lead-

ers of all sections of opinion in Nigeria and in the Cameroons under British administration. All the parties in the Southern Cameroons which had won seats at the last election—the Kamerun National Congress, the Kamerun Peoples' Party and the opposition Kamerun National Democratic Party—had been represented at the Conference; the Northern Cameroons had been represented by two Northern Cameroonians and by representatives of the political parties which operated throughout Northern Nigeria and the northern part of the Trust Territory.

4. The Fourth Committee was concerned with events in Nigeria only in so far as they affected the future of the Cameroons under British administration. Some of the conclusions reached at the Conference were of great importance to that Trust Territory, in particular the agreement on the date for Nigerian independence. The official report issued at the conclusion of the Conference^{2/} referred to a statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on behalf of the United Kingdom Government that, if a resolution was passed by the new Federal Parliament of Nigeria early in 1960 asking for independence, the United Kingdom Government would agree to that request and would introduce a bill into Parliament to enable Nigeria to become a fully independent country on 1 October 1960. The Federal Prime Minister of Nigeria and the Premiers of the Nigerian Regions had accepted that statement and had expressed their desire that, on independence, Nigeria should become a full member of the Commonwealth and that there should continue to be close co-operation between the United Kingdom and Nigeria.

5. That decision vitally affected the Cameroons under British administration, for under the Trusteeship Agreement it was administered as an integral part of Nigeria. At the Nigeria Constitutional Conference held in London in May and June 1957, the Secretary of State had pointed out that when Nigeria became independent, it would no longer be possible for the United Kingdom to discharge its obligation under the Trusteeship Agreement to administer the Trust Territory as an integral part of Nigeria and that it would be necessary to review the Trusteeship Agreement at that stage.

6. For all practical purposes, the Southern Cameroons had been given by the 1957 Conference the full status of a Region within the Nigerian Federation. Its Premier was the person who, in the opinion of the Governor-General, was best able to command a majority in the Assembly, and the other ministers were appointed on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. The Cameroonian ministers formed a majority on the Executive Council. It was agreed that the House of Assembly should be enlarged and should henceforth be elected in single-member constituencies by secret ballot and by universal male and female suffrage. The elections

^{1/} See 775th, 779th and 780th meetings.

^{2/} Report by the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference, Cmnd. 569 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

under those new arrangements and enlargement of the Assembly would take place in January 1959.

7. The report on the 1957 Conference^{3/} had stated that the delegate from the Northern Cameroons wished to reaffirm the decision taken by the Northern Cameroons in 1953 to remain part of the Northern Region of Nigeria. That Region had, by its own wish, not attained self-government as early as the other Regions but had since expressed a desire for self-government early in 1959. Meanwhile, the northern area of the Trust Territory participated in the regional legislature of Northern Nigeria and there was a Minister for Northern Cameroons Affairs, who was himself a Northern Cameroonian. Certain reserve powers had been retained by the Governor of the Region in order to enable the United Kingdom Government to carry out its responsibilities under the Trusteeship Agreement.

8. The report on the 1958 Conference referred to preliminary discussions held between the Secretary of State and all the delegates and advisers of the Southern Cameroons during which the representatives of the Kamerun National Congress and the Kamerun Peoples' Party had stated that the major political objective of their parties was the attainment by the Southern Cameroons of the status of a Region equal in all respects with the other Regions in an independent Nigeria and that they were accordingly anxious to achieve rapid constitutional progress to prepare themselves to take that place in an independent Nigeria. The representatives of the Kamerun National Democratic Party had stated that their party did not wish the Southern Cameroons to become a permanent part of an independent Nigeria: their objective for both the northern and southern sections of the Cameroons under British administration was secession from the Federation of Nigeria. They were therefore opposed to any further constitutional advance for the Southern Cameroons which had as its objective closer association with Nigeria. The Secretary of State had taken note of the difference of opinion expressed; he had said that he was prepared to accept in principle that the Southern Cameroons should become, at the appropriate time, a Region fully equal in status to the other Regions of Nigeria. Such a development, he had said, by preparing the people for full self-government, would be in fulfilment of one of the basic objectives of the Trusteeship Agreement while it would in no way commit the Southern Cameroons to permanent association with Nigeria, about which it would be for the people of the Territory to express their wishes at the right time.

9. There had thus been a difference of opinion between the two parties supporting the Government of the Southern Cameroons and the official opposition. The Government of the Southern Cameroons had previously asked for full regional status but the United Kingdom Government had not immediately granted that status, no doubt because of the opposition of the Kamerun National Democratic Party. The report went on to say that it had been accordingly agreed with the Southern Cameroons representatives, and subsequently approved by the Conference, that no immediate constitutional changes should be made but that it should be open to the Southern Cameroons Government, which would be formed after the elections to be held in January 1959, to request the United Kingdom to bring all

or any of certain changes into effect. The Secretary of State had undertaken that the United Kingdom Government would thus give effect to those changes forthwith in so far as they could be made without constitutional amendment, and that the necessary legal instruments should be prepared as soon as possible. In other words, the matter had been deferred until the electors had, under universal suffrage, determined what they wanted. The Government constituted as a result of those elections would then be able to make its request to the United Kingdom Government. Among the changes referred to were the elimination of two of the official members from the Southern Cameroons Executive Council; the Legal Secretary, however, would continue to be a member of the Executive Council. A very important change was that there should be a separate public service for the Southern Cameroons, to which all Southern Cameroonians serving in the Territory would automatically be transferred. Finally, the 1958 Conference, noting that the 1957 Conference had given implicit approval to the attainment by the Southern Cameroons of full regional status, and that the endorsement of the Fiscal Commission's proposals and the helpful waiver by the Federal Government of interest on the advances made to the Southern Cameroons would result in a considerable improvement in the financial condition of the Territory, had confirmed that, if that proved to be the wish of the people of the Territory, Nigeria would welcome the Southern Cameroons as part of the Federation with the status of a fully self-governing Region equal in all respects with the other Regions in an independent Nigeria.

10. With regard to the Northern Cameroons, the Conference had recommended that constitutional provision should be made for the Northern Region to become self-governing on 15 March 1959. The Governor, however, would retain general reserve powers in relation to the Northern Cameroons to enable the United Kingdom Government to discharge its obligations under the Trusteeship Agreement. The Conference had taken note of the fact that the question of a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the people of the Northern and Southern Cameroons as to the future status of the Territory was covered by the terms of reference of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1958.

11. Turning to the question of the action to be taken in the United Nations with regard to the Trusteeship Agreement, he said that it was essential that such action should be taken in co-operation between the United Nations and the Administering Authority before Nigeria became independent. If the Cameroons under British administration obtained independence under whatever arrangements, it was clear that the Trusteeship Agreement would have to be terminated. If the Trusteeship Agreement was to continue for a short time, it was equally clear that it would have to be modified; his Government could not continue to administer the Territory as an integral part of Nigeria once the United Kingdom had ceased to exercise any powers in Nigeria. Accordingly, in July 1958 his Government had asked the Trusteeship Council to give special terms of reference to the Visiting Mission to advise on the method of the consultation of the inhabitants when the time came.^{4/} He hoped that the Visiting Mission would report also on the choice to be put before the voters, on resi-

^{3/} Report by the Nigeria Constitutional Conference, Cmd. 207 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

^{4/} See T/1393.

dential qualifications and similar matters. The report of the Visiting Mission was expected in January 1959; it would be considered by the Trusteeship Council in February or March and, according to the intention of his Government, would be placed, together with the conclusions of the Trusteeship Council, before the General Assembly at the fourteenth session. His delegation would ask that the agenda for that session should include a special item on the future of the Cameroons under British administration, on the precedent of Togoland under British administration, and that that item should be taken up first. Subject to the views of the Visiting Mission and of the Trusteeship Council, his delegation's intention was to ask the General Assembly to agree that the consultation of the people, once authorized, should be held at the earliest possible date. There would be full opportunity for the General Assembly, at its next session, to discuss all the issues involved. He hoped that a resolution authorizing the United Kingdom Government to proceed with the task would be adopted early in October 1959, after which the consultation should be rapidly organized. The organization of the consultation was a matter for the Visiting Mission to advise upon and for the Trusteeship Council to consider; his Government felt that it should take the form of a plebiscite supervised by the United Nations, as in the case of Togoland under British administration. The result of the plebiscite would be reported to the Trusteeship Council. Once the Trusteeship Council had considered the question, it was the intention of his delegation to ask for a brief special session of the General Assembly at the appropriate stage in 1960, to decide on the action to be taken in the light of the results of the plebiscite. It would be necessary for the decision to be taken some considerable time before the date of Nigerian independence, to enable the many practical and legal arrangements to be made in the Trust Territory.

12. The whole programme had been carefully thought out so as to ensure that the people of the Cameroons under British administration would have a free and fair choice regarding their future. It had been reviewed in the context of recent developments in the Trust Territory, in Nigeria and in the Cameroons under French administration, and his delegation was confirmed in its opinion that it was the right programme and the right timing.

13. He had three comments to make on the programme. Firstly, it might well be asked why, foreseeing the possibility of Nigerian independence, his delegation had not asked for a visiting mission at an earlier date, thus enabling a decision to be taken at the current session on the holding of a plebiscite in 1959. His reply would be that his delegation could not properly embark on the process outlined until the date of the independence of Nigeria was known. His delegation could not have been sure that the London Conference of September 1958 would solve all the formidable problems with which it had been faced. Had the Visiting Mission gone to the Territory earlier than the end of October 1958, it would have gone with an incomplete picture; the results of the London Conference and the developments in the Cameroons under French administration would not have been known.

14. His second comment, which was related to the first, concerned the possibility that it might be asked why a plebiscite could not be held in 1959, particularly

in view of Mr. Ahidjo's statements, and the resolution of 24 October 1958 of the Legislative Assembly of the Cameroons under French administration, with regard to unification. While his Government fully recognized the desire of the Cameroons under French administration that the people of the neighbouring Territory should be consulted as soon as possible, there were three reasons why the plebiscite could not be held earlier. For one thing, it would be impossible to hold a plebiscite during the wet season, which lasted from April until early October; hence if a plebiscite were to be scheduled for 1959 it would have to be held during either the first or the last three months of the year. To hold it during the first three months would not be practical politics because of the elections to be held in the Southern Cameroons in January 1959. It was important that those elections, which had already been postponed once, should take place without further delay so that the parliamentary opposition, which favoured secession, should be given its chance at the polls. After the elections, the Southern Cameroons should be given a chance to settle down. Furthermore, previous United Nations experience had shown that it would take at least three months to organize a plebiscite, and there would be no time to do that after the elections and before the rains. There would be no point in holding it during the last three months of 1959 because the report on its outcome could not be prepared in time to be considered before the close of the General Assembly's fourteenth session and the need for a special session in 1960 would not, therefore, be avoided. Finally, to hold a plebiscite early in 1959 would prevent an orderly examination of the complicated problems involved by the Trusteeship Council, and subsequently by the General Assembly, on the basis of the Visiting Mission's report. His delegation attached the greatest importance to that, for it felt that the General Assembly should be in possession of full information before it made its decision regarding the organization of a plebiscite.

15. His third comment concerned the suggestion that plebiscites should be held simultaneously in both the Trust Territories. Such an arrangement would be understandable only if the votes cast in both Territories were intended to be counted together, whereas it was clear that the people of the Cameroons under British administration, a small Territory situated between two large ones, must in fairness be given an opportunity to express their own wishes regarding their future. To hold the plebiscites simultaneously might indeed be disadvantageous from the standpoint of those favouring unification, for while the terms under which the Territory would form part of an independent Nigeria had been clearly established, it was not yet so clear exactly on what terms it would join with the Cameroons under French administration if that were eventually to be the choice of the people. The plebiscite must be held some months before Nigeria acceded to independence but, subject to that, it would be advantageous to all concerned to have it as late as possible so that the people of the Cameroons under British administration, in deciding whether to join Nigeria, would also know as clearly as possible what their position would be if they eventually chose unification. He assured the Committee that the procedure he had proposed, while it clearly must give the people the opportunity for choosing integration with Nigeria, did not in any way rule out the possibility of unification.

16. Some of the petitioners the Committee had heard had made statements attacking the good faith of the Administering Authority. As those unworthy and unjustified imputations had been intended to influence the Committee in its consideration of the important and delicate issue before it he felt obliged to deal with them briefly. Mr. Ntumazah had said at the 775th meeting that integration was no doubt a new name for imperialism. The fact was that integration, if it took place, would be integration with an independent Nigeria. That being so, Mr. Ntumazah's statement could only be objectively interpreted to mean that he was opposed to integration. His statement that there was no reference to integration in the Charter had clearly been intended to rule out that choice. The United Kingdom delegation had therefore been glad to hear the petitioner state at the 780th meeting, when pressed by the representative of Iraq, that he did not entirely rule out integration. Two of the petitioners had sought to cast doubt on the Administering Authority's impartiality: Mr. Ntumazah had said at the 775th meeting that the only party which had spoken loudly in favour of integration was the United Kingdom, and Mr. Moumié had told the Committee at the 792nd meeting that the United Kingdom was stubbornly persisting in its integrationist efforts. Mr. Moumié had referred to a remark of the Secretary of State for the Colonies that if the Territory chose to continue under the trust administration of the United Kingdom it would not thereby be given the golden key of the Bank of England; in doing so the petitioner had attempted to suggest that the Administering Authority was trying to blackmail the inhabitants by saying that if the people chose continued trusteeship aid would be cut off by the United Kingdom Government, whereas it was perfectly clear from the full text of the statement quoted that it simply meant that the Territory would not receive unlimited assistance from the United Kingdom if it chose to remain under trusteeship any more than it had such aid now. That seemed to be an eminently reasonable statement. Mr. Moumié had further suggested that the Secretary of State had said at the 1958 Constitutional Conference that the interests of the Cameroons would be best served by its integration with Nigeria. He felt that that remark in fact referred to the statement made by the Secretary of State at the 1957 Constitutional Conference that many of the best friends of the Cameroons did not foresee a destiny more likely to promote its happiness and prosperity than in its continued association with Nigeria; the terms of that statement showed that that was not necessarily an expression of the Secretary of State's opinion. Finally, Mr. Moumié had quoted a passage from an article in the publication *West Africa* which stated that, if the votes in the Northern and Southern Cameroons were counted together, there could be no doubt about the result since the people of the North would vote almost unanimously for staying with Nigeria. Mr. Moumié had then said that, for that reason, it was probable that the Administering Authority would ask for the votes to be counted together. That was directly contrary to fact, for while the Administering Authority would leave it to the Visiting Mission to advise on the matter its own view was that the fairest arrangement would be to count the votes separately.

17. He would refrain from commenting on Mr. Moumié's remarks at the 792nd meeting concerning the frontier and the tribes, not because he agreed with them but because it was for the people of the Terri-

tory to make their own choice. The Administering Authority's interest was to ensure that they were given a fair opportunity to make that choice and he was confident that the same could be said of the Nigerian leaders, as was indicated by the statement in the report of the 1958 Constitutional Conference that Nigeria would welcome the Southern Cameroons as part of the Federation if that proved to be the wish of the people of the Trust Territory.

18. The proper conduct of the consultation on the future of the Trust Territory was a complex issue the outcome of which would affect the peoples of the Cameroons under both British and French administration, and also the people of Nigeria. It was of the greatest importance to the future of that part of Africa, indeed perhaps of even wider importance, that the consultation should be handled in a calm and careful manner. It would not be assisted by such misrepresentation of motives as had been heard from the petitioners. He had every confidence that the Committee would support the Administering Authority's desire that the Visiting Mission, the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly should carefully study the procedure to be applied before a decision was taken.

19. In conclusion, he said that he thought the proposal put forward by the French delegation in its memorandum (A/C.4/388) deserved the support of all members of the Committee. It fell to be considered now, because the proposed date of independence for the Cameroons under French administration was 1 January 1960, whereas that for Nigeria was 1 October 1960.

20. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines) asked whether the Northern and Southern Cameroons would be consulted simultaneously and whether in the event of one part opting for integration and the other for reunification the Administering Authority would abide by those choices.

21. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) said he did not think his Government would be opposed to simultaneous consultations in the North and South, subject always to the advice of the Visiting Mission. While he was not at present in a position to discuss the second question further, he would like to reiterate his statement that the Administering Authority felt that the votes in the North and South should be counted separately; the implications of that statement were obvious.

22. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines) asked if it was the position of the Administering Authority that in such a plebiscite the choice should be restricted to two alternatives: namely, integration and unification.

23. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) replied that that too was a question which could not be decided until the views of the Visiting Mission had been fully considered.

24. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines), noting that the United Kingdom representative had referred repeatedly to the complex nature of the problem, asked whether the Administering Authority would have any objection to the General Assembly's setting up an *ad hoc* committee for the consideration of the legal, political, moral and other aspects involved.

25. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) replied that he thought there was a grave danger that the problem would become only more confusing if an attempt were made to go beyond the normal channels of examination.

The composition of the Visiting Mission was carefully balanced and its members had had long experience of trusteeship affairs. He therefore thought that there could be no question of setting up another body before the Visiting Mission submitted its report.

26. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines) said that inasmuch as the Visiting Mission was composed of only four members and the Trusteeship Council of fourteen, half of them representing the Administering Authorities, he felt it was logical that the General Assembly with its eighty-one Members, most of whom had no political or other special interest in the future of the Territory, should share in studying the question.

27. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) said that she had understood the United Kingdom representative to say that the results of the proposed plebiscite in the Cameroons under British administration would not be available to the United Nations until some time after 1 January 1960, the date upon which, in accordance with the proposal put forward by the French delegation, the Cameroons under French administration would obtain independence. She would like to know how the views of the people of the Cameroons under British administration would be met should they subsequently decide in favour of unification with the Cameroons under French administration.

28. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) pointed out that in his statement he had dealt at some length with the question whether the plebiscite could be held earlier and had explained why his Government felt that to do so would be impossible and indeed undesirable. He could not see why the attainment of independence by the Cameroons under French administration should in any way interfere with what might happen in the Cameroons under British administration.

29. Mr. BOZOVIC (Yugoslavia) asked whether, if the elections in the Cameroons under British administration in January 1959 were won by the Kamerun National Democratic Party, which, according to the report of the Trusteeship Council (A/3822) stood for the severance of political ties with the Federation of Nigeria, the administration of the Territory as a separate dependency under the Colonial Office and ultimate unification with the Cameroons under French administration on a federal basis, the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to reconsider its plan.

30. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) said he had no doubt that the Visiting Mission would take full account of that possibility in its report. He did not think it would affect the timing he had described.

31. Mr. BOZOVIC (Yugoslavia) felt that the timing might be affected if the Kamerun National Democratic Party were to win the election. The situation now appeared more complex than it had been before the terms of the Visiting Mission had been amended by the Trusteeship Council in its resolution 1924 (S-IX).

32. In his view the memorandum submitted by the French delegation (A/C.4/388) suggested that the Trusteeship Council should be empowered to decide on a question which had hitherto always been regarded as within the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Assembly. He felt that the matter should be decided either during the present session or during a special session of the General Assembly to be held early in 1959.

33. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) said that full explanations would naturally be given by his dele-

gation in the course of the general debate. He would, however, say at once that the question whether a decision on the matter should be taken by the General Assembly or the Trusteeship Council would naturally be settled by the General Assembly itself.

34. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) observed that it was apparently the view of the United Kingdom delegation that the best interests of the Cameroons under British administration would be served by integration with Nigeria. He would like to hear the United Kingdom delegation's reasons for that belief.

35. He asked whether it would not be possible to hold a plebiscite at the same time as the election in the Trust Territory.

36. The United Kingdom representative had said that his Government would be unable to consider certain questions, including some asked by the Philippine representative, until it knew the views of the Visiting Mission. He wondered why it was possible for the United Kingdom Government to come to a decision on certain matters prior to the Visiting Mission's report and not on others.

37. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) emphasized that, as he had stated in his speech, the United Kingdom Government was impartial in the matter; it wished the people to be consulted and to express their views.

38. Secondly, in the opinion of the Administering Authority to hold a plebiscite at the same time as the election would be most confusing. Moreover, at the time of the election the report of the Visiting Mission would not be available.

39. Thirdly, he observed that there was little point in asking a body such as the Visiting Mission to give advice and then stating in advance what the answers would be. He was not sure whether the Visiting Mission would advise about the timing of the plebiscite, but it could be expected to give its views on all the other questions that had been raised.

40. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) was not satisfied with the United Kingdom representative's reply to his first question. The United Kingdom representative had expressed the view that the Prime Minister of the Cameroons under French administration had been perfectly entitled to say that he wished for the unification of the two Trust Territories. He would like to know how in the opinion of the Administering Authority the interests of the people of the Cameroons under British administration would best be served; by integration with Nigeria or by unification with the Cameroons under French administration.

41. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) repeated that his Government was impartial; he was unable to say more than that.

42. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia) said he was not satisfied with that reply.

43. Mr. MUFTI (United Arab Republic) asked whether the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to consider the possibility of United Nations supervision of the elections to be held in the Cameroons under British administration in January 1959.

44. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) replied that it would not, since the election in question was entirely an internal affair and there would be no reason or justification for such supervision. His Government would

naturally report to the Trusteeship Council on the results of the election.

45. Mr. BOZOVIC (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation could not agree with the interpretation given by the United Kingdom representative, since it felt that the United Nations was entitled not only to register a fait accompli but on occasion to take action in advance to protect the interests of peoples concerned.

46. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) said that in general he would adhere to what he had said in reply to the representative of the United Arab Republic.

47. Mr. LOIZIDES (Greece) asked the United Kingdom representative to comment on the petitioners' allegation that conditions in the Cameroons under British administration did not allow of objective consultation of the population and that before any consultation took place freedom of speech and of assembly should be restored.

48. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) replied that as far as the Cameroons under British administration was concerned there was complete freedom of speech and of assembly, subject naturally to the requirements of the law.

49. Mr. ZIKRIA (Afghanistan) asked exactly what the United Kingdom delegation understood by a plebiscite.

50. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) said that in his delegation's view a plebiscite was a consultation of

the people of an area in accordance with the practices usually employed in such consultation.

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (A/C.4/L.547, A/C.4/L.549/REV.1) (continued)

Draft resolution on economic aid to Somalia (A/C.4/L.549/Rev.1) (concluded)

51. The CHAIRMAN invited representatives to explain the votes they had cast at the previous meeting.

52. Mr. JOURY (Jordan) said that his delegation had not been represented at the time of the voting. He wished to place on record that it would have voted in favour of the draft resolution on economic aid for Somalia (A/C.4/L.549/Rev.1).

53. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) stated that he had voted against the amendment to that draft resolution proposed orally at the previous meeting because it appeared to his delegation that the existing United Nations agencies were fully covered by the text of the original draft. His vote should not be regarded as a vote against multilateral aid as a supplement to bilateral aid; it had been against a particular form of multilateral aid which his delegation did not consider would be in the interests either of Somalia or of the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.