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**Chairman: Mr. Luciano JOUBLANC RIVAS
(Mexico).**

Requests for hearings (*continued*)

1. The CHAIRMAN announced that a letter requesting a hearing had been received from Mr. Abdirazak Haji Hussien, representative of the Somali Youth League. He suggested that, in accordance with the usual practice, the request should be circulated to the members of the Committee.

There being no objection, it was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 35

The Togoland unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration: report of the Trusteeship Council (A/3046, A/C.4/L.428/Rev.1, A/C.4/L.429/Rev.1, T/1206 and Add. 1, T/1214, T/1215) (*continued*)

GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY INDIA (A/C.4/L.428/Rev.1) (*continued*)

2. Mr. OSMAN (Egypt) withdrew his proposal made at the previous meeting and proposed instead that the Secretariat should be requested to prepare a document containing an enumeration of the suggestions and recommendations of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French Administration, 1955, with regard to the plebiscite arrangements for Togoland under British administration (T/1206, chap. IV).

There being no objection, it was so decided.

3. Mr. HOPKINSON (United Kingdom) said that, in view of the emphasis the United Kingdom delegation had placed on the need for speed in carrying out the plebiscite, delegations would naturally wish to know when the Gold Coast would achieve independence. At the 536th meeting, Mr. Gbedemah, Finance Minister of the Gold Coast, had clearly expressed the Gold Coast Government's views on the point. The United Kingdom Government did not wish in any way to lag behind. Nevertheless, as the Indian representative had said, the introduction of independence in a colonial

territory was not a simple matter even from the purely parliamentary point of view. It had been made clear that the independence of the Gold Coast—meaning its full independence as a sovereign State—was imminent, but certain steps still had to be taken. The United Kingdom Government intended that the Gold Coast should become independent as soon as there was general agreement in the Gold Coast on the nature of the constitution it was to have. As soon as agreement had been reached and the constitutional documents had been drawn up, the necessary bill would be introduced in the United Kingdom Parliament. It was impossible to say exactly when that would be, but if general agreement on the nature of the constitution was reached, the time-table outlined by Mr. Gbedemah accorded with that the United Kingdom Government had in mind.

4. While he sympathized with the reasons which had prompted the proposal for a United Nations commission of three members instead of a single United Nations plebiscite commissioner, his Government was strongly opposed to it on purely practical grounds. As members of the Committee were aware, a United Kingdom commissioner would be in charge of those arrangements which were the responsibility of the Administering Authority. He would be called upon to deal with many matters requiring decisions at short notice but on which it might be necessary for him to consult whoever was representing the General Assembly in supervising the plebiscite. The only satisfactory and efficient way of dealing with the situation would be to have one single United Nations representative with full power and responsibility. If the proposal in the Indian draft resolution (A/C.4/L.428/Rev.1) that the Trusteeship Council should be in a position to be called together at any time to consider any matter arising in respect of the Trust Territory were adopted, the United Nations commissioner would have every opportunity of seeking and obtaining the Council's advice and support in any problem which might arise.

5. The appointment of three representatives would make the problems of cost, administration, accommodation and transport much more difficult. There was, too, the question of the selection of representatives. The choice of even one man might not prove easy and there would be far greater difficulties in choosing three.

6. A further point that should be considered was the possibility of disagreements arising between three commissioners. In the day-to-day task of preparing for and carrying out a plebiscite the Administering Authority's plebiscite commissioner could hardly be expected to take into account the views of a minority on a commission. In the event of any disagreement between him and a single United Nations plebiscite commissioner the matter could of course be referred to the Trusteeship Council, as provided in the Indian draft resolution.

7. For all those reasons the United Kingdom delegation hoped that the Fourth Committee would endorse

the Visiting Mission's proposal for a single United Nations plebiscite commissioner and that the General Assembly would select an outstanding personality for that important appointment.

8. Mr. MARTIN (Canada), referring to the recommendations made in the Visiting Mission's report (T/1206 and Add.1), remarked that in considering a matter of such great importance it would have been well if, in addition to the Mission's valuable and carefully thought out report, the Committee had had the benefit of the Trusteeship Council's experienced views. His delegation did not, however, object to the course of action that had been adopted in respect of the item.

9. As a result of forty years of enlightened and progressive administration, Togoland under British administration was on the threshold of independence—a development which involved the fulfilment of the ends of the Trusteeship System. Consequently the General Assembly was now called on to take early action in that respect. In view of that situation, his delegation was satisfied that the procedure that had been followed was not in any way to be regarded as a precedent which would preclude a more exhaustive examination by the Trusteeship Council of similar problems in the future.

10. The Canadian delegation agreed with the Visiting Mission's fundamental recommendation, given in paragraph 103 of its report, that the wishes of the populations of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration should be ascertained by means of a plebiscite.

11. The Canadian delegation also agreed with the recommendation in paragraph 111 that a United Nations plebiscite commissioner should be appointed, assisted by observers drawn from the Secretariat, to supervise the arrangements to be made by the Administering Authority for the popular consultation. Indeed, having regard to the approximate date suggested by the Visiting Mission for the holding of the plebiscite and the consequent necessity for the commissioner to co-ordinate his activities and those of his staff with the Administering Authority as soon as possible in the coming year, the Canadian delegation would favour his appointment without delay from among representatives in the Fourth Committee, or from members of the International Court of Justice or of the United Nations Secretariat.

12. Lastly, his delegation subscribed whole-heartedly to the majority view of the Visiting Mission with regard to the setting up, prior to the plebiscite, of separate deliberative institutions for Togoland under British administration. The arguments against that proposal had been so clearly set out (536th meeting) by one of the members of the Visiting Mission, Mr. Robbins of the United States delegation, that there was no need to comment on it further.

13. His delegation felt some difficulty, however, with regard to the subsequent recommendations of the Visiting Mission and, in particular, to the proposal for the division of the Territory into four separate areas for the purpose of assessing the result of the plebiscite. In spite of the arguments adduced in favour of the proposal, the Canadian delegation considered that in view of the size and population of the Territory it would have been possible to follow the majority principle, with the minority abiding by the result, in accordance with usual democratic processes. In his

delegation's view the proposal showed perhaps undue concern for popular feeling in the different areas listed; if the approach was considerate of the views expressed by certain groups or districts, it might well be regarded as discriminatory by others. In that sense it might prejudice the result of the plebiscite and, if adopted, would result in a fragmentation which would be felt down to the level of local councils and divisions. Both the Visiting Mission and the Administering Authority had stated that the administration of the whole of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration was impracticable as a separate and independent entity; that would undoubtedly be still more true with regard to local councils and divisions.

14. He did not wish to belittle the considerations which had prompted the Visiting Mission to make that recommendation or object to a proposal which the Administering Authority itself would be prepared to accept *faute de mieux* and in the light of the particular circumstances of the Territory. The Canadian delegation's acceptance, however, should not be regarded as a precedent but rather, as had already been pointed out, as related to conditions particular to the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration.

15. With regard to the questions to be put at the plebiscite, his delegation urged that the issue should be put to the people in simple and clear terms. That being so, it would have thought it possible to place only the first of the two questions proposed (T/1206, para. 105), which was simple, straightforward and practical. In itself the question implied its alternative, and a negative majority reply would certainly provide a clear indication that the majority of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory would elect to terminate their association with the Gold Coast on the day independence was achieved by the latter.

16. Moreover, the addition of the second question, addressed to peoples who had only recently been introduced to the intricacies of democracy, would invite difficulties, create doubts and uncertainties in their minds and generally bring about the same kind of situation which his delegation feared when considering the Visiting Mission's proposal as to the assessment of the results of the plebiscite. In the light of the Administering Authority's statement that it would lay down its trusteeship when the Gold Coast became independent, the Canadian delegation noted its genuine concern regarding the serious dislocation in any part of Togoland under British administration which might, as the result of the putting of a second question, elect against integration with the Gold Coast. Hence it would be more appropriate to agree that the peoples of the Trust Territory should be asked to pronounce themselves on only one issue. If a substantial part of the population were to decide against union with an independent Gold Coast, then a new situation would arise which, of course, would have to be considered both by the Administering Authority and by the United Nations.

17. The doubts which he had expressed, reflecting as they did the legitimate concern of the United Kingdom in its capacity of Administering Authority, should commend themselves to the most serious scrutiny by the members of the Committee. The sole concern of the Canadian delegation was to ensure that when a final decision was taken by the General Assembly, its implementation would work in the best interest of the inhabitants themselves.

18. Section A of the Indian draft resolution (A/C.4/L.428/Rev.1) should achieve the very aims which the Canadian delegation had in mind. He thought it should commend itself generally to the members of the Committee.

19. His delegation would reach its decisions on the various amendments placed before the Committee (A/C.4/L.429/Rev.1) in the light of the considerations he had just outlined. He did not propose for the time being to express his views on each of them, but he regretted that they should have been introduced at so late a stage. He was persuaded that their sponsor would not wish to be a party to any action, no matter how well-intended, that might have the result of delaying the exercise of the right to independence by the peoples of the Trust Territory. His delegation felt that if the amendments were adopted, the United Nations would not be keeping faith with the peoples concerned. The Canadian delegation could not associate itself with any action which would have such a result.

20. He could not see any advantage in the suggestion that a commission rather than a United Nations plebiscite commissioner should be appointed by the General Assembly. In view of the size and population of the Trust Territory and the opinion of the Visiting Mission itself that, if approved, the plebiscite should be carried out forthwith, the appointment of a commission might well lead to the submission of a minority report and thus involve delays which all were anxious to avoid. For that reason the Canadian delegation strongly favoured the course recommended by the Visiting Mission.

21. Mr. AZIZ (Afghanistan) said that the two problems of the unification of Togoland and the future of Togoland under British administration were closely linked. It was difficult to solve one and ignore the other without sacrificing the interests of the indigenous population. That was why General Assembly resolution 860 (IX) had called for a special visiting mission to be sent to both Togolands.

22. He congratulated the members of the Visiting Mission on the way in which they had performed their task. On the basis of their report and the petitioners' statements the General Assembly had to take a very important decision that would have grave repercussions on the future of the two Trust Territories and the International Trusteeship System.

23. The purpose of trusteeship was to prepare the peoples of the Trust Territories for independence or self-government at the earliest possible date. The arbitrary division of Togoland into two Territories had hardly contributed to the attainment of that objective. Past action was the cause of the Assembly's present trouble. It was to be hoped that the action the Assembly was about to take would not store up trouble for the people of Togoland in the future.

24. He was glad the Visiting Mission favoured a plebiscite in Togoland under British administration and that the United Kingdom Government had decided in favour of a plebiscite. His delegation supported the principle of popular consultation to decide the future of all dependent territories, since that was one application of the right of self-determination which it had consistently supported and which it had insisted should be included in the covenants on human rights. A plebiscite should be held simultaneously in Togoland under French administration. That would solve all the dif-

ficulties, since he was convinced that an independent Gold Coast and two independent Togolands would be able to solve their problems fairly and in their own best interests.

25. With regard to the procedures for conducting the plebiscite, his delegation attached great importance to two points. First, the United Nations must carry out the plebiscite in an absolutely impartial manner in order to ensure that no foreign influence or pressure was brought to bear on the indigenous inhabitants. Secondly, the questions put to the voters must cover all the possibilities, including independence. He agreed with the Egyptian representative's statement at the 536th meeting that the role of the United Nations should be to adopt a general plan for the plebiscite, in consultation with the Administering Authorities, and to control the plebiscite effectively.

26. It was encouraging to hear that the United Kingdom had already committed itself to the principle of a plebiscite under United Nations supervision in its Trust Territory and that the French Government had informed the Visiting Mission that it wished to undertake a popular consultation in Togoland under French administration at some future date. If the consultations could be achieved at the same time and in the same conditions in both Togolands, that would ensure the utmost impartiality in the solution of the problem.

27. His delegation's attitude to any draft resolutions and amendments would be dictated by the considerations he had just outlined.

28. Mr. TARAZI (Syria) said that a very important decision lay ahead of the United Nations and one which would affect the future not only of Togoland but of many other Trust Territories. It might seem easy to the Committee sitting in New York to come to a decision and set the machinery in motion. In Africa, however, the people were impatiently awaiting the outcome of the debate and it was important that the General Assembly should not disappoint them or betray their confidence. Any error in judgment by the Committee might have serious repercussions on a people who were seeking to achieve their national aspirations by peaceful means and might worsen rather than solve the crisis in Togoland.

29. The Visiting Mission's report contained a clear account of all developments in the political, constitutional, economic and social fields in both Trust Territories. The Mission had omitted nothing and had tried to delve to the bottom of every controversy. That it had sometimes been brought to a halt was due to circumstances outside its control.

30. The Mission's terms of reference had been very clear: it was to go to both Togolands to ascertain the aspirations of the various sectors of the population on their political future. General Assembly resolution 860 (IX), setting out those terms of reference, had been adopted only because the United Kingdom had expressed its desire to end trusteeship over its part of Togoland for reasons which were well known. The resolution had been very careful not to prejudge the final solution. It had recognized that there were three possibilities: first, Togoland under British administration could become independent; secondly, it could integrate with the Gold Coast; thirdly, it could unite with an independent Togoland under French administration. Those three possibilities should form the context of the Committee's discussion.

31. The Visiting Mission's report and the petitioners' statements showed that there were two trends of opinion in Togoland under British administration, one for integration with the Gold Coast and the other for unification with the French Trust Territory. It would be incorrect, however, to deduce from that that no one in Togoland under British administration favoured independence. On the contrary, both those in favour of unification and those in favour of integration were agreed on one point, that there should be an end to trusteeship. That could be achieved only in the light of the provisions of Article 76 b of the Charter, which specifically mentioned the particular circumstances of each Territory and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. Consequently, if the peoples of the two Territories wished to be united, their will must be respected.

32. In Togoland under British administration the official stress was entirely on integration, unification being left in the shade in the hopes that it would die a natural death. It was obviously easier to integrate the United Kingdom Trust Territory with the Gold Coast, as both Territories were administered by the United Kingdom, than to unite it to the rest of Togoland under a different, i.e. French, administration.

33. The aspirations of those people in the two Territories who desired unification were as legitimate as the aspirations of those in Togoland under British administration who wanted association with the Gold Coast. It was essential that the United Nations should maintain a strictly neutral attitude and give each faction absolute freedom to express its views. So long as the United Nations remained neutral it should be easy to attain the objectives of the International Trusteeship System, but if the United Nations deviated, however slightly, from an objective position, the peoples' confidence would be destroyed. The General Assembly must not be persuaded to accept a ready-made solution.

34. A number of points emerged clearly from an analysis of the Visiting Mission's conclusions and the petitioners' statements. First, the majority of the Visiting Mission recommended that a plebiscite should be held immediately in Togoland under British administration but that the results should be evaluated in four separate units. Secondly, one member of the Visiting Mission—the speaker—had called for the constitutional separation of the Trust Territory from the Gold Coast prior to the plebiscite. As matters stood the Trust Territory had no separate identity, for its links with the Gold Coast went far beyond the bounds of a normal administrative union. So long as there was no separate territorial assembly in the Trust Territory the results of the plebiscite might be influenced by organizations having their headquarters in the Gold Coast. Thirdly, public opinion in Togoland under French administration was divided between unification and independence with Togoland under British administration on the one hand and internal autonomy within the French Union on the other. Those favouring the latter alternative did not entirely exclude the possibility of any link with the United Kingdom Trust Territory; they were prepared to agree to unification provided the unified Togoland remained in the French Union. Lastly, the advocates of unification in both Togolands also favoured increased association with the Gold Coast but only after unification had been achieved. It should be noted that

those favouring association with the French Union had so far remained silent on the question of any future links with the Gold Coast.

35. The following consequences could be drawn from the ideas he had just outlined. First, the plebiscite should be held simultaneously in both Togolands for, if one alternative was unification, the inhabitants of Togoland under French administration were obviously concerned and should have their say. That argument had been contested on the grounds that the people of the Gold Coast were not being consulted on the question of integration. The analogy was false, since integration would merely attach the Trust Territory to an existing legal entity whose political structure would not be modified unless its people so decided, whereas unification involved the merger of two territories and could be achieved only by mutual consent. Secondly, the people of Togoland under British administration must not be consulted on the question of unification without simultaneous consultation of their neighbours in the French Trust Territory. Any other procedure would entirely fail to take the people's wishes into account. Thirdly, as Togoland under British administration was an integral part of the Gold Coast, its constitutional separation from the Gold Coast was a prerequisite for the plebiscite: if the people of the Trust Territory were asked immediately whether they wanted integration, they would in fact have no choice as they were *de facto* integrated already. The contrary question must therefore be put. As the petitioners favouring unification had complained, the existing situation placed the Territory at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* the Gold Coast. The prior establishment of separate institutions would not prejudice the aspirations of any group; it would indeed make it possible for them to express their aspirations more freely. In the absence of separate institutions, some people would always accuse the United Nations of having failed to take their interests into account. Lastly, he was in general agreement with the Visiting Mission that the results of the plebiscite should be evaluated in separate units. If the majority in the South favoured unification they should not be obliged to accept the views of the northern peoples, who might well decide for integration. The General Assembly must be guided by the peoples' wishes.

36. His delegation would vote in the light of those considerations.

37. Miss ROESAD (Indonesia) recalled that at the ninth session of the General Assembly, her delegation had abstained from voting on General Assembly resolution 860 (IX) on the grounds that it had always been in favour of the unification of the two Togolands and that it could not agree to the idea of allowing a Trust Territory to be integrated with a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The Indonesian delegation would have been obliged to vote against the resolution if the integration of Togoland with the Gold Coast had been taken as a certainty and if operative paragraph 3 of the resolution had not contained the assurance that a special visiting mission would visit both Trust Territories in order to carry out a special study of the problem involved. It had, therefore, studied the special report of the Visiting Mission in the light of those considerations, and with special emphasis on operative paragraphs 1 and 3 of General Assembly resolution 860 (IX). It had been impressed by the able way in which the Visiting Mission had carried out its task and by the excellence of the report. Her

comments would be based on that report and on the supplementary statements of Mr. Robbins and Mr. Tarazi, who had been members of the Mission.

38. Chapter I of the report contained a clear description of the problems to be solved and the way in which they had previously been approached by the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly on the basis of the reports of the 1949 and 1952 United Nations Visiting Missions to Trust Territories in West Africa.¹ It was stated in paragraph 35 of the report of the 1955 Mission that the 1949 Visiting Mission had recommended the unification and co-ordination of legislative and administrative practices in both Territories in contemplation of the eventual reconstitution of the former German Togoland as an autonomous unit. In paragraph 42 there was a statement to the effect that the 1952 Visiting Mission had noted that, with the exception of the northern part of Togoland under British administration, there was increased support for the concept of unification, although neither form of unification had sufficient support to justify recommending any modification of the existing administrative arrangements. Thus, chapter I of the report showed that both the 1949 and 1952 Visiting Missions had reported the existence of a desire for unification and had stressed the need for the development of co-ordinated action. In 1952 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 652 (VII) recommending the re-establishment of the Joint Council for Togoland Affairs in the light of those findings.

39. She had therefore listened with great interest to Mr. Robbins when he had said that the 1955 Visiting Mission had been mindful that neither the General Assembly nor the Trusteeship Council had asked that any change should be made in the existing administrative union between the Gold Coast and Togoland under British administration. It was precisely because of the dangers which had been foreseen in that administrative union that the General Assembly had recommended that the French and British Administrations should be co-ordinated in the interest of both Territories and had accordingly recommended the re-establishment of the Joint Council. It might perhaps have been better if the General Assembly had recommended changes in the administrative union; but the General Assembly was often unwilling to suggest drastic changes, and the Trusteeship Council even more so. She recalled that during the ninth session of the General Assembly, at the Committee's 462nd meeting, she had noted that both the United Kingdom and France could have done more on behalf of unification by re-establishing the Joint Council and giving it real executive powers in both Territories.

40. Chapter II of the report contained the findings of the Visiting Mission, and paragraphs 69 to 75 of that chapter were devoted to the manner in which Togoland under British administration was administered as an integral part of the Gold Coast. The administrative arrangements for Togoland under British administration were not altogether easy to understand. According to paragraph 61 of the report, under the Gold Coast (Constitution) Orders in Council of 1950 and 1952, both Territories had been provided with a single legislative assembly and executive council. However, the representative members of the Legislative Assembly had been selected by various methods, with the result that Togoland under British

administration was not represented as a separate entity in the Legislative Assembly. The same situation seemed to prevail under the new Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council of 1954, which provided for elections to the Legislative Assembly directly from constituencies, some of which were in the Trust Territory. It would therefore appear that Togoland under British administration as a separate unit lacked authority in legislative matters. In any event, the Indonesian delegation was unable to evaluate clearly the extent of the influence of Togoland under British administration as a separate unit in matters of legislation affecting both Territories.

41. With regard to the administration of the Trust Territory, paragraph 69 indicated that the Governor of the Gold Coast, in his capacity as the representative of the Administering Authority, was responsible for all aspects of the administration of the Territory. She wondered if the administration of the Trust Territory had always been in the hands of the Governor. If that was so, it might be correct to assume that the Gold Coast Executive Council or Cabinet had never been fully entrusted with the administration of the Territory. If that was the case, it might mean that the Gold Coast Cabinet had never had any part in some aspects at least of the administration of the Trust Territory. She would like to understand more clearly the degree of experience gained by the central Government or the Cabinet of the Gold Coast in matters of administration in the Trust Territory. If the opportunity to participate in the administration of the Trust Territory had indeed been given to the Cabinet, that degree of experience should have been considerable. However, paragraph 69 indicated the contrary. Thus, the Cabinet of the Gold Coast was probably still a stranger to the actual administration of the Trust Territory. If that was the case, she would like to know whether the idea of giving Togoland under British administration autonomy, if integration were decided upon, had ever been considered by the Cabinet of the Gold Coast.

42. The experience of the statutory regional councils of Togoland under British administration, which had been consulted by the Governor on important questions of policy, might be regarded as representing some progress towards autonomy, but on the whole, the Indonesian delegation could not conclude that the peoples of Togoland under British administration had been given an opportunity to participate in the actual administration of their country. That impression had been reinforced by the belief expressed by Mr. Tarazi that Togoland under British administration was being administered as a province of the Gold Coast. She had tried in vain to ascertain the views of those petitioners in favour of integration on the administrative machinery. She had also tried by questioning the petitioners to discover what sort of administration they had in mind if integration took place. She was not convinced that the petitioners in favour of integration fully understood its effects, or knew how they wanted to take part in a central government.

43. In regard to that part of chapter II which dealt with Togoland under French administration, she noted that legislative authority over the Territory rested with the central organs of the French Union. The degree of the Trust Territory's participation in legislation as described in paragraph 87 was, in the view of the Indonesian delegation, insufficient. Nevertheless, she noted that participation was greater than in the

¹ See T/798, pp. 72 to 85, and T/1105.

case of Togoland under British administration. Moreover, there was also a Government Council which assisted the Commissioner of the Republic in the administration of the Territory. Togoland under French administration would thus appear to have developed further towards autonomy than Togoland under British administration. She noted with regret that there was less political freedom in Togoland under French administration. However, in paragraph 119, the Visiting Mission had pointed out that, in its opinion, economic, educational and social progress had been greater in Togoland under French administration than in Togoland under British administration. The Indonesian delegation believed that once the inhabitants of a Territory had been given an opportunity of participating in the government of their country, they would make greater efforts towards achieving better educational and social conditions in general. She was pleased to note the French administration's intention of holding consultations with the people of Togoland under French administration in due course in order to ascertain their wishes for their future.

44. In her view, the findings of the report showed, first, the existence of a desire for unification in Togoland under British administration and in Togoland under French administration; secondly, the absence of any elements which might have led Togoland under British administration as a separate entity towards autonomy and self-government; and thirdly, the appearance of elements which would eventually lead Togoland under French administration as a separate entity towards autonomy and self-government. Those points should be borne in mind in seeking a solution for the problem under discussion.

45. She noted with regret that the Visiting Mission had failed to recommend that the wishes of the peoples of both Trust Territories should be ascertained simultaneously. She shared the view of the Egyptian delegation on that point. Mr. Robbins, the United States member of the Visiting Mission, had said that the majority of the Mission had been unwilling to depart from the aim of practical solutions and to indulge in theoretical speculations about unification. She agreed that the General Assembly should aim at practical solutions. On the other hand, the Visiting Mission itself had urged that the wishes of the peoples concerned should be taken into consideration. In paragraph 103, the Mission agreed that a plebiscite would be the most democratic and direct method of ascertaining those wishes. The people themselves would decide and it could not be determined in advance whether their decision would be a practical one. She again stressed the need of holding a plebiscite simultaneously in both Togolands. Such a procedure alone could ensure the expression of the true wishes of the people in both Trust Territories. The Visiting Mission had discovered that a desire for unification existed in both Togolands, together with a tendency to integration with the Gold Coast in some parts of Togoland under British administration and a tendency to integration with the French Union in some parts of Togoland under French administration. She therefore agreed that until the results of the plebiscite were known, the issue of unification was theoretical.

46. Chapter III of the report contained the conclusions and recommendations of the Visiting Mission. She could not agree with the suggestion in paragraph 104 that the people of Togoland under British administration should be called upon to decide their future

first, without considering the conduct of a plebiscite in Togoland under French administration at the same time. However, she commended the Mission's attitude with regard to the questions to be put to the people in the plebiscite. The Mission had sought to be fair to both sides. She agreed in principle that it would not be fair to put only one question. However, she would prefer the population of Togoland under British administration to be given an opportunity of choosing between several alternatives, as indicated in operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 860 (IX), if the General Assembly should decide that a plebiscite should be held first in that Trust Territory. She also supported the Liberian representative's proposal that a United Nations commission should be appointed to supervise the conduct of the plebiscite instead of a United Nations commissioner (A/C.4/L.429/Rev.1, para. 10).

47. With regard to the timing of the plebiscite, she was not in favour of holding it in the immediate future. Some delegations had suggested that since the Gold Coast was to become self-governing very soon, Togoland under British administration should be called upon to decide as soon as possible whether it intended to join the Gold Coast. However, as long as the Gold Coast was considered to be a Non-Self-Governing Territory by the administering Power, there was no legal justification for holding a plebiscite in the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration with a view to the integration of the Trust Territory with a Non-Self-Governing Territory. She had listened with pleasure to the declaration of the United Kingdom delegation that the Gold Coast would achieve independent status as soon as a constitution was agreed upon. Nevertheless, she was not convinced that a plebiscite should be held as soon as possible.

48. The Indonesian's delegation's vote on the Indian draft resolution and the Liberian amendments would be guided by the considerations she had advanced.

49. Mr. CALLE Y CALLE (Peru) asked the Indian representative to explain two points in section A of the Indian draft resolution. In operative paragraph 2 it was stated that steps should be taken to organize a plebiscite in respect of the Trust Territory "in order to ascertain the wishes of a majority of its inhabitants in regard to the union of their Territory with an independent Gold Coast". However, operative paragraph 4 recommended that the plebiscite should be organized "on the basis of the arrangements proposed in chapter IV of the special report of the Visiting Mission", which did not recommend that only one question regarding integration should be put to the people of Togoland under British administration. In view of that fact, it might be better for operative paragraph 2 to use some wording such as "in regard to the future of that Territory in view of the attainment of independence by the Gold Coast".

50. Operative paragraph 5 of the Indian draft resolution contained the words "the further action to be taken on the attainment of independence by the Gold Coast". Since neither the Trusteeship Council nor the General Assembly was entitled to take any action in respect of the independence of the Gold Coast, he imagined that the phrase meant rather "in view of the attainment of independence" or "as a consequence of the attainment of independence". The paragraph went on to say "in the light of all the circumstances", and the attainment of independence was of course one of

those circumstances. In order to be correct, it might be better for the phrase to which he had drawn attention to be deleted altogether.

51. Mr. JAIPAL (India) said that, in operative paragraph 5, the meaning of the phrase "on the attainment" was "as a consequence of the attainment". Since the attainment of independence was the main circumstance which had led to the present situation, his delegation would like to retain the phrase, but it would accept the suggestion that the word "on" should be replaced by "as a consequence of".

52. The Peruvian representative had drawn attention to an apparent conflict which would arise between the terms of operative paragraph 2 and operative paragraph 4, unless the Committee decided that only one question should be put to the people of Togoland under British administration. If it was so decided, the plebiscite commissioner, in consultation with the Ad-

ministering Authority and the Trusteeship Council, would be able to modify the detailed arrangements accordingly. He did not think that the Committee's decision should be anticipated by acting on the Peruvian suggestion.

53. Mr. CALLE Y CALLE (Peru) still thought that the phrase used in operative paragraph 2 was appropriate only if it were decided to ask a single question. It would not be suitable if the Liberian amendment (A/C.4/L.429/Rev.1, para. 5) was adopted and a question also put regarding the continuation of trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of the political future of the Trust Territory. He felt that since there was no need to refer to integration, it would be better to use a general phrase simply covering the political future of the Territory.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.