

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SEVENTH SESSION

Official Records



FOURTH COMMITTEE, 267th

MEETING

Saturday, 8 November 1952, at 10.30 a.m.

Headquarters, New York

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Chairman: Mr. Rodolfo MUNOZ (Argentina).

Question of the renewal of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories (A/2219 and Corr.1, A/C.4/212, A/C.4/L.223/Rev.1, A/C.4/L.225) (*continued*)

[Item 34]*

1. Mr. PAVLIK (Czechoslovakia) said that even though the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories was not always critical of the information submitted by the Administering Members, it was a useful subsidiary organ to assist the General Assembly and the Fourth Committee in fulfilling their obligations under Chapter XI of the Charter. Those obligations applied not only to the Administering Members, who had undertaken to promote the welfare and advancement of the non-self-governing peoples and to submit information thereon, but to all Members of the United Nations, who must study that information and make such recommendations as might be necessary. The United Nations would not be fulfilling its obligations if it considered the information submitted by the Administering Members at plenary meetings only, without proper preparation and study; some subsidiary organ was necessary.

2. The discussion in the Fourth Committee had shown that an overwhelming majority favoured continuing the Committee on Information. The opposition of certain administering Powers was based on their desire to be responsible only to themselves and not to report on their colonial administration to any international body. The Fourth Committee must adopt a decision fully in accordance with Chapter XI. In his view, the only point at issue was the form the new committee should take. Chapter XI would be fully implemented only when all the Non-Self-Governing Territories had achieved complete independence; until that time, the obligations under Chapter XI were continuing obligations. The Committee should therefore not be set up as a temporary organ but on a permanent basis, and provision should be made for representatives of the territories concerned to participate in its work. It would

be absurd if the whole debate on the Committee's future were to be renewed at future sessions of the General Assembly.

3. His delegation had always advocated the establishment of a permanent committee and would vote in favour of the twenty-one-Power amendment (A/C.4/212) to draft resolution C (A/2219 and Corr.1, part one, annex II).

4. Mr. Shiva RAO (India) thought that the discussion might be expedited and the area of disagreement narrowed if the sponsors of the United States-Venezuelan amendment (A/C.4/L.223/Rev.1) would clarify the reference to "additional three-year periods". He would like to know whether the General Assembly would have to adopt another resolution in 1955, and every three years thereafter, in order to extend the life of the Committee or whether it would automatically continue in existence unless some delegation submitted a proposal to dissolve it and that proposal was adopted by a two-thirds majority. Secondly, did the inclusion of the phrase "for additional three-year periods" imply that the General Assembly tacitly agreed not to raise the issue of the Committee's continued existence except at intervals of three years?

5. His understanding was, first, that the Committee would in the first instance be continued for another three years; secondly, that unless its dissolution was proposed and adopted in 1955, it would automatically continue in existence; thirdly, that no further positive resolution would be necessary to validate the Committee; and lastly, that proposals regarding the Committee would be brought up only at intervals of three years.

6. His delegation would prefer the Committee to be renewed on a permanent basis because it was convinced that the General Assembly could not do without it. Nevertheless, it wanted the administering Powers to participate in the work of the Committee because it valued their willing co-operation, which was essential for the success of the Committee. His delegation would go far to ensure that co-operation and the answers to the questions he had just raised might

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

well reassure his delegation and help it to reach a quick decision.

7. Mr. RIVAS (Venezuela) pointed out that, as matters stood, positive action by the General Assembly was necessary every three years for the Committee to continue. The same situation would prevail if draft resolution C were approved. On the other hand, if the amendment submitted by the United States and Venezuela were adopted, the Committee would automatically continue unless the General Assembly adopted a proposal for its dissolution. Such proposals could be submitted only at intervals of three years.

8. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) objected that the General Assembly was quite powerless to decide that a question could not be raised for three years. It could decide on the automatic renewal of the Committee every three years, but if any delegation raised the question of dissolution at the next session of the General Assembly, that question would figure on the agenda and if the majority decided in favour of dissolution, the Committee would cease to exist.

9. Mr. PEREZ CISNEROS (Cuba) wondered whether the Belgian representative would agree that, were the United States-Venezuelan amendment adopted, any future discussion of the Committee's continued existence would depend on the initiative of those who wished to curtail or discontinue the Committee.

10. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) agreed. As the representative of Israel had said, the twenty-one-Power amendment and the United States-Venezuelan amendment were the same in essence. The Belgian delegation would be compelled to vote against both of them.

11. Mr. FOURIE (Union of South Africa) said that his delegation's approach was based on the fundamental distinction in the Charter between Trust Territories and Non-Self-Governing Territories. In drawing up Chapter XI, the Administering Members had made their declaration of policy, embodied in the opening paragraphs of Article 73, and had undertaken besides, subject to certain limitations, to transmit information on economic, social and educational developments in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. It was quite clear that their declaration of policy had been entirely unilateral and that the Charter had not provided for any accountability or supervision in connexion with that declaration or with their undertaking to transmit information, whereas such provisions were included in the case of Trust Territories. The original idea had been that, through the transmission of information to the United Nations, the Administering Members could benefit from each other's experiences. At a later stage the Administering Members had agreed, as a compromise and in order to show their willingness to co-operate with other Members of the United Nations, to participate in the work of the Committee on Information. Their agreement had been based partly on the fact that the Committee had been set up temporarily for a trial period. Had they known that that decision would be construed as the first step towards establishing a permanent body, it was doubtful whether their co-operation would have been secured.

12. The argument that the establishment of the Committee on a permanent basis would save time by obviating further discussion of the matter was not con-

vincing since the whole question would be reopened—though possibly in a different form—in 1955, in connexion with the possible revision of the Charter. It would therefore be inadvisable to adopt any line of action which, in the opinion of some delegations, was devoid of any legal basis.

13. Opinions varied on the Committee's work so far, but whatever their views, a large number of delegations believed that it was still at a formative stage. It was open to question, therefore, whether it was desirable, at that juncture, to establish it as a permanent body.

14. There was, moreover, nothing in the Charter to sanction such action on the part of the Fourth Committee, and the administering Powers had intimated that they might not be prepared to co-operate in the work of the Committee if it was made permanent. Since it would be virtually impossible for the Committee to continue its work without their co-operation, he felt that it should not be established on a permanent basis without their agreement.

15. He would therefore vote against any proposal to continue the Committee indefinitely. He agreed with the Belgian representative that the twenty-one-Power amendment and the United States-Venezuelan amendment would have the same practical effect, though their approach was different.

16. Mr. CALERO RODRIGUES (Brazil) recalled that in the Committee on Information he had stated that his delegation was in favour of establishing the Committee on a permanent basis, as long as any Non-Self-Governing Territories continued to exist. Nevertheless, in a spirit of compromise, he had voted in favour of draft resolution C.

17. He was glad to note that in the Fourth Committee the administering Powers were now voicing their opposition to the Committee's renewal and their opinion of its past work in more reasonable terms, but he maintained that the arguments against establishing the Committee on a permanent basis had little validity. That was why his delegation had joined in sponsoring the twenty-one-Power amendment.

18. Nevertheless, the Brazilian delegation wished to do everything within its power to ensure an atmosphere of co-operation and it was therefore ready to support the amendment submitted by the United States and Venezuela, which was not inconsistent with the principles of the twenty-one-Power amendment. He preferred the twenty-one-Power amendment as being clearer and more simple but it seemed that acceptance of the United States-Venezuelan amendment would make it easier for the administering Powers to collaborate in the future work of the Committee.

19. Mr. PEREZ CISNEROS (Cuba) pointed out that the Fourth Committee had discussed renewal of the Committee on Information at least five times and that on each occasion the discussion had led to the same arguments and tension in the Committee. It was precisely in order to avoid such arguments that certain delegations were proposing the renewal of the Committee on a permanent basis.

20. It had been said that the Committee was mediocre and its work semi-sterile. As was the case in a number of other United Nations organs, its progress was slow

and difficult; nevertheless it served a useful purpose. The question of domestic jurisdiction did not arise, because the administering Powers had assumed certain obligations to the international community, which was entitled to ask for an accounting on the way in which those obligations were being fulfilled. The "sacred trust" embodied in Chapter XI devolved not only on the Administering Members but on all Members of the United Nations. Chapter XI stated that the interests of the inhabitants of the Non-Self-Governing Territories were paramount. That consideration was not solely humanitarian. Economic justice for the whole world must be guaranteed or else factors might arise which would threaten peace and security. From a practical point of view, therefore, the colonial question was of direct interest to the whole world.

21. His delegation had always advocated the establishment of the Committee on Information as a permanent organ; had its advice been followed in 1946, interminable discussion and, consequently, thousands of dollars would have been saved.

22. The twenty-one-Power amendment, of which Cuba was one of the sponsors, was simple and clear; but, apparently, it might make it difficult for certain administering Powers to participate in the Committee's work. His delegation's position was similar to that of the Indian and Brazilian delegations: it was in favour of a permanent committee, but it sought the co-operation of the administering Powers. Since the question was one of procedure, not of principle, and since the United States-Venezuelan amendment would achieve the same results, he was prepared to vote for that amendment on the understanding that any future modification of the Committee's status would depend on the initiative of those who wished to dissolve it.

23. Certain representatives appeared to be very optimistic about the possible revision of the Charter in 1955. He drew attention to the exact wording of Article 109, paragraph 3, which made it clear that for a conference on the Charter to be convened a majority vote of the General Assembly or of any seven members of the Security Council would be necessary. Furthermore, since any decision by the conference would require unanimity on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council, its work would be overshadowed by the veto. The revision of the Charter was therefore hypothetical and members of the Committee should not be over-optimistic. Assuming, however, that revision were possible, the only way in which Chapter XI could be revised would be to clarify the obligations of the Administering Members and of the international community as a whole. He did not see how the establishment of a permanent Committee on Information could prove detrimental in that case; it might, in fact, encourage the trend towards revision.

24. In conclusion he emphasized that the Committee on Information guaranteed the Administering Members a well-balanced analysis of the information they submitted, which might not always be possible in the General Assembly.

25. Mr. FORTEZA (Uruguay) said that Chapter XI of the Charter, especially Article 73, was one of the greatest contributions that had been made to the development of the United Nations and every attempt to strengthen it would help to strengthen the Charter.

The Uruguayan delegation did not share the fears that had been expressed concerning possible consequences of the debate on the information submitted under Article 73 e, because it had faith in the effective co-operation of the administering Powers. It had therefore joined in sponsoring the twenty-one-Power amendment. He appealed to the administering Powers to recognize the validity of the argument in favour of continuing the Committee Information as long as there were any Non-Self-Governing Territories. The Committee had done valuable work, which had greatly facilitated the work of the Fourth Committee.

26. With regard to the amendment proposed by the United States and Venezuela, he could see no reason why, after the initial three-year period, the Committee should be prolonged for further three-year periods. The proposal contained in document A/C.4/212 appeared to him to be more practicable.

27. He had not had sufficient time to study the amendment proposed by Liberia (A/C.4/L.225) but could see no objection to it.

28. Mr. TRIANTAPHYLAKOS (Greece) considered that the Committee on Information served a useful and indeed a vital purpose, and would support its renewal. The United States-Venezuelan amendment was an attempt to reconcile the various and conflicting opinions that had been expressed on that subject and he would therefore vote for it. In his view it was the best possible solution in the circumstances and moreover it did not in any way prejudice or limit the scope of the Committee's work.

29. Mr. PEON DEL VALLE (Mexico) observed that the twenty-one-Power amendment was a moderate and conciliatory proposal which respected the wishes expressed by the great majority of speakers in the debate.

30. The United States-Venezuelan amendment contained two elements which might possibly lead to confusion: first, the phrase referring to renewal of the Committee for three-year periods, and secondly, the phrase "unless otherwise decided by the General Assembly". The Mexican delegation would be unable to accept the provision for three-year periods unless it were quite clear that it referred only to the structure and composition of the Committee. It might be necessary to revise the Committee's structure at three-yearly intervals, but the provision might be interpreted as implying some doubt whether the Committee should continue its work. He would therefore be obliged to vote against it.

31. The words "unless otherwise decided by the General Assembly" could equally well be inserted in every resolution adopted by the Assembly. It had been said that that phrase made the draft resolution more acceptable to the administering Powers, but no administering Power except the United States had said that the insertion of the words in question would enable it to withdraw its objections to the renewal of the Committee. The inclusion of the phrase would only be justified if it would ensure the full co-operation of the administering Powers. If the States transmitting information considered those words to be important, it could only be because their inclusion would give the impression that the Fourth Committee was not con-

vinced that the Committee on Information should be continued, thereby weakening the authority of the Committee on Information, and would facilitate the reopening of the debate on the subject.

32. In view of the tenor of the debate and the fact that unconciliatory and even unfriendly motives had been attributed to the sponsors of the twenty-one-Power amendment, he felt constrained to point out that it was a conciliatory proposal: it left intact the structure of the Committee on Information in spite of the fact that many delegations, his own for one, felt that its membership should be studied in detail as soon as the opportunity arose because it did not correspond proportionately to the representation in the General Assembly, that being the reason, incidentally, why some of its recommendations did not receive the support of the Fourth Committee. The role of the non-administering Powers seemed to be inverted; it was they who were defending the Committee on Information, which, being a replica, not of the General Assembly but rather of the Trusteeship Council, represented, so to speak, a guarantee to the administering Powers that their voice would be heard and their votes registered from the first stages of the consideration of a subject.

33. If the United States-Venezuelan amendment were voted on first, he would be regretfully obliged to vote against the two phrases to which he had referred and, if they were approved, against the proposal as a whole. He considered the phrase relating to periodic renewals unless the Assembly decided otherwise to be superfluous and even harmful.

34. In a spirit of conciliation, he would accept the Liberian amendment if that would make the twenty-one-Power proposal more acceptable to the administering Powers.

35. Mr. GHASSEMZADEH (Iran) considered that the work of the Committee on Information had been outstandingly useful but that it had not covered all the issues raised by the problem of the status of the Non-Self-Governing Territories; hence its reconstitution was imperative.

36. From the legal point of view there was little difference between the twenty-one-Power amendment and the United States-Venezuelan amendment, since the Committee on Information was set up by the General Assembly, which was therefore free to revise any earlier decision limiting the duration and scope of its terms of reference.

37. From the political point of view, however, the twenty-one-Power amendment was preferable to the United States-Venezuelan amendment, since it recognized more clearly the principle that sooner or later all peoples would become fully self-governing in accordance with the spirit of the Charter.

38. He would abstain in the vote on the United States-Venezuelan amendment and would vote in favour of the twenty-one-Power amendment.

39. Mr. SALAZAR (Peru) said that the question of the Committee's future did not involve merely its structure but also its terms of reference and its functions. There was evidence that each year the Committee on Information had broadened its sphere of activity and had assumed some of the powers of the Fourth

Committee. The Peruvian delegation did not consider it desirable that the Fourth Committee should permanently delegate its responsibilities to a Committee the members of which were not experts, nor was it in favour of setting up permanent organs, because they tended to become submerged in bureaucracy and to lose their effectiveness.

40. He would vote for the United States-Venezuelan amendment, which he understood was acceptable to the administering Powers. Their acceptance was an essential element for the future activities of the Fourth Committee, as it would ensure their co-operation in its work for the emancipation of the non-self-governing peoples.

41. Mr. EL-PHARAONY (Egypt) said that the usefulness and constructiveness of the work performed by the Committee on Information was generally recognized. The main objective should be to ensure the necessary continuity in that work. The establishment of the Committee on a permanent basis, or for as long as there were Non-Self-Governing Territories, would be the best means to that end. His delegation felt that that purpose would be achieved by the United States-Venezuelan amendment and would therefore support it.

42. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen) said that the colonial Powers, now known as the administering Powers, had originally occupied the Non-Self-Governing Territories in order to exploit them. Their aim was now said to be to guide them towards independence. His delegation was confident of the good intentions of the administering Powers, but the role of the United Nations was, nevertheless, to see that those intentions were not frustrated by the old habits of colonialism. The General Assembly had set up the Committee on Information in order to assist it to carry out that work of supervision. Those colonial Powers which were unwilling to adjust themselves to the new conception of colonialism had found the supervision irksome, and hence attacked the Committee on Information. However, unless the United Nations was to be powerless to control the fulfilment by the administering Powers of their obligations towards the Non-Self-Governing Territories, the Committee on Information must be allowed to continue on the same, if not an improved, basis until all the Non-Self-Governing Territories had attained self-government or independence. Any attempt to dissolve the Committee before that stage was reached would not be in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations. It was on those grounds that the Yemeni delegation had participated in sponsoring the twenty-one-Power amendment to draft resolution C. It would vote in favour of that amendment, and any other proposal which would allow the Committee on Information to continue as long as one Non-Self-Governing Territory remained.

43. Mr. PEON DEL VALLE (Mexico) requested that all votes on draft resolution C and the amendments to it should be taken by roll-call.

It was so agreed.

44. The CHAIRMAN called upon the Committee to vote on the phrase "unless otherwise decided by the General Assembly" in the United States-Venezuelan amendment (A/C.4/L.223/Rev.1) to the twenty-one-Power amendment (A/C.4/212) to draft resolution C

submitted by the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

Indonesia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Venezuela, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Greece.

Against: Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras.

Abstaining: Indonesia, Iran, Liberia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Belgium, Burma, China, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India.

The phrase was adopted by 22 votes to 20, with 12 abstentions.

45. The CHAIRMAN called upon the Committee to vote on the phrase "for additional three-year periods" in the United States-Venezuelan amendment (A/C.4/L.223/Rev.1) to the twenty-one-Power amendment.

Colombia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, India, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, Thailand, United States of America, Venezuela, Australia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China.

Against: Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Abstaining: Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Indonesia, Iran, Liberia, Luxembourg, Union of South Africa.

The phrase was rejected by 23 votes to 22 with 9 abstentions.

46. The CHAIRMAN called upon the Committee to vote on the United States-Venezuelan amendment (A/C.4/L.223/Rev.1) to the twenty-one-Power amendment, as amended by the deletion of the phrase "for additional three-year periods".

Honduras, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece.

Against: Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-

land, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France.

Abstaining: Honduras, Iran, Liberia, New Zealand, Norway, Syria, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti.

The amendment, as amended, was adopted by 23 votes to 16, with 15 abstentions.

47. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) withdrew his amendment (A/C.4/L.225) to the twenty-one-Power amendment, in view of the adoption of the amended United States-Venezuelan amendment.

48. The CHAIRMAN called upon the Committee to vote on the twenty-one-Power amendment (A/C.4/212) to draft resolution C, as amended.

Denmark, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia.

Against: Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium.

Abstaining: Dominican Republic, Greece.

The amendment, as amended, was adopted by 40 votes to 12, with 2 abstentions.

49. The CHAIRMAN called upon the Committee to vote on draft resolution C (A/2219 and Corr.1, part one, annex II), as amended.

Liberia, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon.

Against: Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France.

Abstaining: Dominican Republic, Greece.

Draft resolution C, as amended, was adopted by 40 votes to 12, with 2 abstentions.

50. Mr. CARPIO (Philippines) said that his delegation had felt that the United States-Venezuelan amendment held out a hope of unanimity while not surrendering the principle of the twenty-one-Power

amendment, namely, the continuation of the Committee on Information. Approval of the United States-Venezuelan amendment would have implied recognition of the General Assembly's competence to continue the Committee despite the legal objections that had been made to the contrary. On the other hand, by not referring specifically to the permanence of the Committee, that amendment would have given the administering Powers an opportunity to accept that formula without any surrender of principle on their side. The Philippine delegation had therefore voted in favour of the phrase "for additional three-year periods", although it had felt it to be superfluous and without any practical meaning in view of the use of "automatically" earlier in the amendment. However, the United States-Venezuelan amendment had not been adopted unchanged, and the administering Powers had not therefore joined in adopting draft resolution C of the Committee on Information as amended.

51. The Philippine delegation had gone a long way to meet the administering Powers despite its conviction that the General Assembly was entitled to establish any organs which it deemed necessary. It had done so because it believed that the co-operation of the administering Powers was essential for the implementation of Chapter XI of the Charter in the best interests of the inhabitants of the Non-Self-Governing Territories. He hoped that the General Assembly's ratification of draft resolution C as amended in the Fourth Committee would encourage the administering Powers to continue to co-operate with the Committee on Information and not to flout world public opinion.

52. Mr. DE MARCHENA (Dominican Republic) said that his delegation had always been in favour of the continuation of the Committee on Information. However, in view of the fact that in three years' time, under the provisions of Article 109 of the Charter, a special conference would be convened to revise the Charter and matters of policy would have to be decided

then, it had abstained from voting on the various amendments which sought to prejudge the issue. If draft resolution C had been voted on in its original form, the Dominican delegation would have voted in favour of it. The new elements that had been adopted had forced his delegation to reserve all its rights in that connexion.

53. Sir Alan BURNS (United Kingdom) said that in view of the decision taken by the Fourth Committee, he wished to reserve fully the position of the United Kingdom Government with regard to its future relations with the Committee on Information.

54. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) associated his delegation with the declaration made by the United Kingdom.

55. Mr. GERIG (United States of America) said that the United States delegation believed that the United States-Venezuelan amendment was a carefully balanced compromise and offered the best hope for continued co-operation in the Committee on Information. When that compromise was altered by the deletion of one of its principal elements, his delegation, with great regret, felt it necessary to vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

56. Mr. LANNUNG (Denmark) and Mr. MUNRO (New Zealand) said that they had voted against draft resolution C as amended on the grounds explained by the United States delegation.

57. Mr. RIVAS (Venezuela) said that on introducing the amendment of the United States and Venezuela, he had said that he would vote in favour of the twenty-one-Power amendment if the amendment he was proposing was rejected. He expressed his appreciation of the spirit of co-operation shown by the United States in the attempt to elicit the greatest possible support for the draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 2 p.m.