



**Tuesday, 6 December 1955,
 at 10.50 a.m.**

New York

C O N T E N T S

Page

Agenda item 35:

The Togoland unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration: report of the Trusteeship Council (*continued*) 389

**Chairman: Mr. Luciano JOUBLANC RIVAS
 (Mexico).**

AGENDA ITEM 35

The Togoland unification problem and the future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British administration: report of the Trusteeship Council (A/3046, T/1206 and Add.1, T/1214, T/1215) (*continued*)

GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. BELL (United States of America) thought that despite the diversity of the opinions expressed by the petitioners, the hearings had thrown light on the attitude of the various groups in the Territories regarding their future political status and had made the whole complex problem clearer.

2. Now that the Committee had heard the views of the petitioners, it would probably like to examine them in the light of the special report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories of Togoland under British administration and Togoland under French administration, 1955 (T/1206 and Add.1). Several members of the Committee and of the Trusteeship Council had considered that the report set forth clearly and completely the major problems which arose in the two Togolands and the views of all groups of the population regarding them. The Trusteeship Council had said in its resolution 1367 (S-5) that it considered that the report constituted in general a useful basis for determining the plebiscite arrangements. The United States delegation shared that opinion.

3. At the previous meetings, some members of the Committee had asked for explanations of some passages in the report and had expressed the hope that the general debate would throw light on those points. Because of the complexity of the problems dealt with in a very short space in the report, there were perhaps certain points which called for additional details. He therefore asked the Chairman to call upon Mr. Robbins, a member of the United States delegation who had also been a member of the Visiting Mission. With the other members of the Mission, Mr. Robbins had travelled widely in the two Togolands, discussing the problems with the people and observing conditions on the spot. He had participated in all the deliberations of the Visiting Mission and in the drafting of the report

before the Fourth Committee. He was therefore in a position to help clarify some aspects of the report.

4. Mr. ROBBINS (United States of America) wished to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to section C of the introduction to the Visiting Mission's report (T/1206) in which the Mission described the methods it had adopted in order to carry out its complicated task.

5. He also drew attention to annex III, in the addendum to the report (T/1206/Add.1), in which were reproduced the memoranda submitted to the Mission by the principal political groups. The Mission had studied those memoranda carefully and in consultation with the party leaders had tried to clear up any obscure points so as to be able to give the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly an accurate picture of the divergent points of view.

6. In chapter III of the report, the Mission had sought, within its terms of reference, to make recommendations in keeping with the information it had received and in accordance with the practical approach which it had adopted at all stages of its tour in order to find a solution to the problem.

7. As the letter of transmittal to the Secretary-General showed, the report had been unanimously adopted by the four members of the Mission. The Syrian member had suggested that the report should be so described despite the divergent recommendation which he had made, and which was set forth in paragraph 107 of the report, and despite the reservation given in the footnote to paragraph 108.

8. The separate recommendation of the Syrian member was in accordance with the argument of the Togoland Congress, which felt that before a plebiscite was held, Togoland under British administration should be clearly separated from the Gold Coast and the Trust Territory should be given a separate legislative body. Three of the members of the Mission had felt that the establishment of a purely temporary legislative body in Togoland under British administration was unnecessary and would delay the holding of the plebiscite. They also felt that it would hardly be possible to establish a body of that kind before the plebiscite because a large proportion, if not an overwhelming majority, of the population of the Territory would hold aloof from any such proposal. Moreover, the establishment of such a legislative body and of separate institutions would hardly be feasible in the absence of wide-spread popular demand for that step, which would reverse the evolution of the two Territories over the past forty years. Lastly, although the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly had often discussed the extent of the administrative union between the Gold Coast and the Trust Territory under British administration, neither of those two organs had seen fit to institute any such far-reaching changes as the establishment of separate institutions for the Trust Territory. The measure

would be extremely costly and would completely disrupt the organization of life in the Territory.

9. After examining the fundamental differences of opinion among the peoples of the Trust Territory under British administration, the Mission had concluded that the people should be invited, first, to make their views known through a plebiscite. It had been brought out in the Fourth Committee that the Mission had not fixed any time for the implementation of its recommendation and that fact had been used to suggest that the plebiscite could be postponed until a later date.

10. He noted that the Visiting Mission had never undertaken to tell the Trusteeship Council or the General Assembly what to do. The Administering Authority had proposed a method and a time-limit, but it had also quite rightly stated that the General Assembly would undoubtedly wish to formulate its own views, taking into account the views of the Administering Authority and the opinions of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. The action of the General Assembly at the ninth session (resolution 860 (IX)) and of the Trusteeship Council at its fifteenth and sixteenth sessions (resolutions 1084 (XV) and 1252 (XVI)) suggested that prompt action was required, and the Visiting Mission had been under the impression that the plebiscite, if decided upon, would be organized immediately. Moreover, throughout Togoland under British administration, it was obvious that the people were hoping that the plebiscite would be organized early in 1956. That was why the Mission had taken care to stress the seasonal factors which needed to be considered in order to avoid any delay. It was therefore misleading to conclude that by refraining from stating formally that the plebiscite should be organized in the near future, the Mission had considered that it could or should be delayed.

11. The Mission was convinced that the questions to be put to the population in the plebiscite should be clear and simple. The first question should ask the population whether they desired union with the Gold Coast, as urged by the Convention People's Party and the Northern People's Party. They should then be asked whether, if they wanted to be separated from the Gold Coast, they wanted Togoland to remain under the Trusteeship System until a practicable future status had been determined for the Territory, in accordance with the wishes of the Togoland Congress. The purpose of those two questions was to give all parties an opportunity of expressing their views clearly.

12. In view of the declaration of the Togoland Congress party which had announced that it would not take part in the plebiscite unless a separate legislative body was first instituted in Togoland under British administration, the Mission felt that the uncompromising attitude of that minority group made it very difficult if not impossible to find a satisfactory solution. However, the Mission's recommendations were calculated to encourage the members of all parties to take part in the plebiscite by giving them an equal opportunity of expressing their views in favour of the separation of Togoland under British administration from the Gold Coast as a first stage.

13. In proposing to divide Togoland under British administration into four territorial units, the Mission had hoped to give the people in the various parts of the Territory an opportunity of realizing their aspirations. In the tribal areas of the Northern Section,

opinion was almost unanimously in favour of integration with the Gold Coast. Similarly, in the districts of Krachi and Akan, most of the votes would probably be cast in favour of union with the Gold Coast. However, the Mission felt that the voters of those regions should not be allowed to impose their views on those of the lower part of the Southern Section, with whom they had no affinities. Moreover, opinion in that area was divided between integration and unification.

14. As could be seen from paragraph 108 of the report, the Mission had given full consideration to the aspirations of the Togoland Congress and the partisans of Ewe unification and had taken particular care to give them an opportunity of making their views prevail. At the same time the Mission had sought to bring the question of Ewe unification into perspective in relation to the total population of the two Togolands which was about 1.5 million. The note on the sketch map in annex VI, in the addendum to the Mission's report, showed that only about one-fifth of that population was Ewe. Moreover, more than 50 per cent of the Ewes lived in the Gold Coast. The Visiting Mission obviously had to take into account the views and aspirations of the other four-fifths of the population.

15. The Mission's report had been criticized on the grounds that its recommendations, if carried out, would result in fragmentation. That was not what the Mission had wanted. It stated in its report that neither Togoland under British administration nor any part thereof constituted a viable unit. Its proposals could be interpreted correctly only if it was understood that they called for the integration of those parts which wished to join the Gold Coast as soon as that country had attained its independence. That integration would take place simultaneously with the achievement of Gold Coast independence. In that connexion, he referred to paragraph 109 of the report.

16. If any part of the Trust Territory should desire to remain under trusteeship, the resulting arrangements would be for a temporary period only and the ultimate aim would be the early integration of any remaining part of the Trust Territory into a larger polity with freedom of choice. Should a second plebiscite be required in the southern part of Togoland under British administration the people should be asked whether they wished to join the Gold Coast or Togoland under French administration whatever its status might then be.

17. The Mission had considered the administrative problems which would arise if a small part of Togoland under British administration chose to remain temporarily under trusteeship and had concluded that those problems would not be insoluble. The Southern part of the Territory could then continue to be administered under United Kingdom trusteeship, the powers of the Administering Authority being exercised as now through the Governor or Governor-General in the Gold Coast. The Mission thought it unlikely that the United Kingdom Government and the Gold Coast Government would withhold such necessary co-operation for an interim period.

18. Chapter IV of the report set forth the details of the arrangements for the holding of the plebiscite. Its recommendations were intended to provide for all essential safeguards which the United Nations would require and to obviate all possible criticism of the Administering Authority and the Gold Coast Govern-

ment. It was for that reason alone that the Mission, for example, had recommended that the court established to hear plebiscite petitioners should be presided over by a judge appointed from outside the Trust Territory and the Gold Coast. In making its proposals for United Nations supervision and observation the Mission had had in mind not only the need of adequate safeguards at all stages but also the desirability of keeping the arrangements simple enough to permit full co-operation with the Administering Authority responsible for the conduct of the plebiscite.

19. The Visiting Mission recognized that the question of the future of Togoland under British administration, either in whole or in part, in the event of a decision by its people in favour of separating from the Gold Coast was bound up with the political future of Togoland under French administration. It had found in Togoland under French administration distinct differences of opinion on the important question of the political future of the country. As was clear from paragraph 121 of its report, the Mission believed that the Territory would be in a position to express its wishes regarding its political future within a few years after the Administering Authority had carried out certain constitutional measures it was now contemplating. The Mission had been interested to learn that the Administering Authority itself contemplated some form of consultation with the people of Togoland under French administration to ascertain their wishes regarding their future and that it recognized the advantages of a plebiscite for that purpose.

20. For the reasons set forth in paragraph 122, the Mission considered that the future plebiscite in Togoland under French administration should decide whether the people wished for self-government within the French Union, and on what conditions, or whether they wanted to break off all connexion with the French Union.

21. Throughout its report the Mission had stressed two fundamental facts: first, that neither Trust Territory was an ethnic or cultural unit; secondly, that owing to forty years' association with their respective Administering Authorities, their economic, social, educational, political and juridical institutions fell into two divergent patterns. Those divergencies of view were to be seen particularly in connexion with the unification of the two Togolands. In Togoland under British administration there was no objection to union with the neighbouring Territory under French administration provided that the whole Territory was joined with the Gold Coast. In Togoland under French administration, which was about two and a half times the size of Togoland under British administration both in area and population, there was no objection to the union of the two Togolands provided that such a unified Togoland remained in the French Union.

22. Those were the popular conceptions held by the people in the two Territories, and they were not likely to be changed by any political arguments put forward in the Fourth Committee.

23. In conclusion Mr. Robbins stated that the Visiting Mission had been guided by three basic considerations in making the recommendations in its special report: the wishes of the people of the two Territories, the principles of democracy, and the desire to deal fairly with the whole problem and in particular with the Ewe question and to bring about an early settlement of a matter which had been before the General Assembly annually for many years.

24. Mr. GBEDEMAH (United Kingdom) wished to reply to the gratuitous attack made by one of the petitioners on the Gold Coast Government, of which he was a member. Although such attacks were of little importance, Mr. Gbedemah thought that to ignore them completely might lead to misunderstanding.

25. He had already described at the ninth session (459th meeting) the democratic institutions which existed in the Gold Coast at the local, regional and central government levels. He had also tried to give the Committee a picture of the economic situation of the Gold Coast and Togoland under British administration and to explain what the Government had done to stabilize it by introducing a measure designed to eliminate inflation and to earmark the budgetary surplus for development of the social services. A year after enactment of that measure, to which there had been strong opposition, the world price of cocoa had fallen by half. Visitors could bear witness to the rapid progress there had been in every sphere: the building of schools and colleges, good drinking water supplies, roads, housing, etc.

26. Since the ninth session the necessary preparations for the achievement of independence by the country had made great progress. Departments of External Affairs and Defence had been set up and would become Ministries as soon as independence was proclaimed. Both Departments were directed by African officials who had recently been appointed by the Governor. The Governor, as head of Defence and of Foreign Affairs, was advised by a committee of five Cabinet members, all of whom were Africans. Young cadets were now studying abroad to become members of the future diplomatic service.

27. At the beginning of November it had been decided, at the request of the Gold Coast, that on 1 July 1956 the Gold Coast Government would take over full financial responsibility for its armed forces. That decision had been taken at Kaduna, in Northern Nigeria. On 19 September a contract had been signed in London for the issue of Gold Coast bank notes, which were to be put into circulation immediately the country had achieved its independence. All those facts showed that the Gold Coast expected to become independent in 1956 or at the latest at the beginning of 1957.

28. Some of the petitioners had alleged that there was a constitutional crisis in the Gold Coast which might lead to chaos. He thought those statements were greatly exaggerated. There was a difference of opinion on the kind of constitution the Gold Coast should adopt when it became independent, but that was not surprising in a democratic country. The question would undoubtedly be settled in a regular manner, and help was being given by a constitutional adviser who was working in the country at the Government's invitation.

29. There had been allegations of misappropriation of the funds of the Cocoa Marketing Board and of scandals connected with the operations of the Cocoa Purchasing Company in which the Government was involved. The Gold Coast Government had announced on 21 November that it was going to carry out an official inquiry into all those questions.

30. He next turned to the accusation that the Gold Coast Government, in co-operation with the United Kingdom Government, intended to deprive the people of Togoland under British administration of their fair share in the profits from the Volta River project. The project entailed the construction of a dam on the Volta

for the production of electric power with a view to manufacturing aluminium from the bauxite which was found in large quantities in the Gold Coast, but which had not so far been found in Togoland under British administration. The project provided for participation of the Gold Coast and United Kingdom Governments and of large Canadian aluminium manufacturing interests. Investigations had been carried out under the supervision of a Special Commissioner with the advice of a number of internationally known experts, and were almost complete. The reports so far submitted by the Commissioner had been studied by the National Committee for the Volta River Project, of which Mr. Gbedemah was Chairman, and which had been appointed by the Government on the advice of the Legislative Assembly. The Government and the Preparatory Commission carefully examined the Committee's comments and opinions. Two of the seven members of the Committee were from Togoland under British administration, although it had been claimed before the Fourth Committee that the interests of Togoland under British administration were being sacrificed. Only after the report on the investigations had been received would it be possible to decide whether or not the project should be proceeded with. As for the report which had been mentioned at the 528th meeting of the Fourth Committee, it had been based on a previous and less thorough investigation carried out over fifteen years previously by a South African company on its own account; the Gold Coast Government had had nothing to do with it.

31. As Minister of Finance, he was convinced that the project would be very advantageous to the Gold Coast and enable it to diversify its economy, which was now, unfortunately, entirely dependent on the cocoa industry. If the Government decided, after thorough discussion in the Legislative Assembly, in which Togoland under British administration was represented, to carry out the Volta River project, anybody whose land was inundated would be entitled to fair compensation. The number of such people in the Trust Territory would certainly be far below 35,000, a figure that had been mentioned in the Committee, for investigations had shown that the population was not dense in the area to be flooded.

32. With regard to the problem of the plebiscite to be held in Togoland under British administration, he, like Mr. Hopkinson, would prefer the Territory to be considered a single plebiscite unit, for its division into several units might lead to the further fragmentation of a small territory and impede the attainment of independence in the Gold Coast. The procedure suggested by the Visiting Mission was that with which the people were already familiar. The voter would place his ballot in one of two boxes each designated by a symbol; that was the simplest and most practical form of ballot, as most of the voters were illiterate. There were two possibilities before the voters. One was obviously association of integration with an independent Gold Coast. The others, suggested by the Visiting Mission, was the separation of Togoland under British administration from the Gold Coast and its continuance under trusteeship, but there was nothing to indicate whether the separation would be complete or whether the association would merely be less close. Moreover, the voters should not be asked to indicate the period for which trusteeship should continue if they were opposed to association. He felt that the voters should be asked one question only: "Do you

want the integration of Togoland under British administration with an independent Gold Coast, yes or no?"

33. The arrangements for the registration of voters and the voting procedures proposed by the Mission should not present any difficulty for the peoples of the Territory. The qualifications of voters were also acceptable. If the United Nations decided to modify them in any way, the Gold Coast Government would raise no objection, provided that the change did not exclude people who, by virtue of residence or property, had interests in the Territory. The Visiting Mission's recommendation that the judge presiding over the electoral court should be appointed from outside the Gold Coast was acceptable, on the understanding that it implied no criticism of the judiciary in the Gold Coast and cast no slur on its integrity.

34. As far as the Gold Coast was concerned, the most important question was the date on which the plebiscite should be held. The Gold Coast Government believed that it was very important that the plebiscite should be conducted during the dry season early in 1956. Plans were being laid for the Gold Coast to attain independence at the end of 1956. The General Assembly would presumably like to consider the results of the plebiscite before further action was taken on them, in other words in the autumn of 1956. If the United Nations plebiscite commissioner was to report to the General Assembly in 1956 and if the rainy season in the Gold Coast was to be avoided both for the registration of voters and for the actual balloting, the plebiscite must be held during the first five months of 1956. From June to September detailed plans could be prepared for consideration by the General Assembly, in the event of a decision by one region against integration with the Gold Coast. The preparation of the final plans, including legislation, for the ultimate phase leading up to independence would be unnecessarily complicated if the Gold Coast did not know, during the next six months, what areas of the Trust Territory were to become independent with it at the end of 1956.

35. In conclusion, he said that his Government, the peoples of the Gold Coast and the peoples of Togoland under British administration were impatiently awaiting the decisions of the Fourth Committee and of the United Nations, in which they had full confidence; witness the festivities that had taken place throughout the country on the tenth anniversary of the United Nations. They were convinced that the United Nations, one of whose principal purposes was to ensure that the Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories attained independence as soon as possible, would not waver now that its goal was, for the first time, in sight. Togoland under British administration had an opportunity to become independent in 1956: nothing should thwart its hopes or delay their realization.

36. Mr. OSMAN (Egypt) paid a tribute to the members of the Visiting Mission for the efforts they had made to carry out a delicate and complex task. On the basis of the Mission's report the General Assembly was called upon to take a decision which was of the utmost gravity, as it directly involved the fundamental principles of the Charter and the future of the International Trusteeship System and would have serious repercussions not only in the two Trust Territories and West Africa, but throughout the African continent. He would not embark on a detailed study of the various recommendations in the report. His delegation's attitude to those recommendations and to the procedure outlined by the Mission would depend

on the Fourth Committee's stand on certain questions of principle.

37. There were three such questions of principle. The first was the principle of popular consultation. The Visiting Mission had concluded that there must be popular consultation in the two Togolands and that in Togoland under British administration it should take the form of a plebiscite. His delegation fully agreed on the principle of popular consultation as a means of deciding the future of the dependent territories, for it was one way of giving practical expression to the right of peoples to self-determination. Egypt had always defended that right in the United Nations, insisting that it should be included in the covenants on human rights, and it had applied it in practice in the Sudan. His Government therefore congratulated the Administering Authority on its wish to go to the people of Togoland under British administration and ascertain their wishes. It regretted, however, that the Visiting Mission had not recommended a simultaneous plebiscite in Togoland under French administration. A plebiscite in both Togolands would have solved the problems in the area. Once the Gold Coast became independent, the two independent Togolands could, of their own volition and by mutual agreement, have settled their reciprocal relations in the manner best suited to their interests. His delegation therefore reserved its position on the question of the plebiscite in Togoland under French administration.

38. The second question of principle was what would be the legal effects of acceptance of the plebiscite on the International Trusteeship System as it applied to Togoland under British administration. That question must be emphasized if the Committee wished to abide strictly by the provisions of the Charter. At the ninth session, in explaining its views on resolution 860 (IX), his delegation had stated in the Committee (464th meeting) that as far as Chapters XII and XIII were concerned, the matter was still in a preliminary procedural phase during which the International Trusteeship System would continue to apply in full to Togoland under British administration; that any change in the Territory's status should be based on the fundamental principles of the Trusteeship System and that resolution 860 (IX) did not prejudice the substance of the question, on which the United Nations would remain free to act as provided for by the Charter.

39. It was therefore natural that, when making arrangements for the plebiscite, the Assembly should bear in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter and particularly of the Trusteeship System, such as respect for the legal and territorial integrity of Togoland, which was guaranteed by the Charter. It was impossible to over-emphasize the serious responsibility that rested on the United Nations, and more particularly on the General Assembly, in taking any decision involving consultation of the people of a Trust Territory. The Charter promised the peoples of the Trust Territories protection, assistance and independence. Since the result of the popular consultation would be, first, to end the specific legal obligations of the United Nations and, secondly, to deprive the Trust Territories of the rights conferred on them by the Charter, the role of the United Nations in the plebiscite must be commensurate with its responsibilities; it must be carefully defined particularly as it was the first occasion on which the United Nations had been called upon to play that role. The United Nations, acting in agree-

ment with the Administering Authority, should therefore prepare and adopt a general plan for the plebiscite and then exercise effective control over the actual plebiscite itself.

40. For that purpose he felt that it would assist the General Assembly to have at its disposal a comprehensive and co-ordinated draft plan covering the main aspects of the plebiscite and their possible consequences. Such a plan would have two advantages: it would make possible the unequivocal definition of the rights and obligations of the Administering Authority and of the United Nations, the nature and functions of the supervisory body and the rights and duties of the people, and would eliminate friction; secondly, it would afford a means of assessing the validity and correctness of the operations. There was no call to go into detail; the need was to determine the essential principles for the conduct of the plebiscite. If the General Assembly was to be asked to authorize a plebiscite in a Trust Territory, it should be in a position to do so in full knowledge of the circumstances. The Fourth Committee would have had an easier task if the Trusteeship Council had already drafted a comprehensive plan which could be discussed fully and systematically.

41. With regard to the third question of principle, Mr. Osman said that the plan would have to state the general conditions and safeguards needed to enable the Togoland people to express their wishes in complete freedom and in the neutral atmosphere, free of influence or pressure, which was indispensable for any plebiscite. Given the special conditions in the Trust Territory, it would even be necessary to lay down specific rules to assure an atmosphere of neutrality for all political parties. The parties involved claimed that the present situation did not lend itself to the preservation of a neutral atmosphere. The supporters of integration with the Gold Coast complained of infiltration into and interference with their affairs by the inhabitants of Togoland under French administration. The supporters of unification complained that the administrative union, with political and administrative organs common to the Gold Coast and Togoland under British administration, with overlapping electoral areas and a common electorate, made a neutral and impartial plebiscite impossible.

42. The General Assembly should study those criticisms closely in order to create the conditions of impartiality essential to the plebiscite, to eliminate the fears of various sections of the population and, above all, to preserve unity and existing bonds of solidarity, between brother Africans. The Egyptian delegation attached great importance to that third factor, which was essential to the peace and well-being of every people in the region. It took that opportunity of appealing on behalf of its country, which was bound by many ties to the African continent, to all the peoples of the region concerned, and reminded them that the attainment of a goal of paramount importance, namely the creation of a free Africa capable of contributing to the peace and prosperity of humanity side by side with Asia, America and Europe, depended on them, their unity and their co-operation.

43. Mr. RYCKMANS (Belgium) felt that the confusing nature of the discussion was due to the simultaneous consideration by the Fourth Committee of two questions, that of Togoland's unification and that of its integration with the Gold Coast. A choice clearly had to be made between those two solutions, a choice

which appeared the more difficult in that the views of petitioners varied and the Fourth Committee was unable to assess the importance of the different parties they represented.

44. He felt, however, that there was a fairly simple solution to the problem. He reviewed the background and content of the Visiting Mission's recommendations. Belgium, in common with the majority of the Mission, considered it preferable to hold a popular consultation without first endeavouring to give Togoland under British administration separate political institutions. Indeed the operation of such institutions would be doomed to failure, for the northern peoples had already stated that they would not participate in it. Nor would the difficulties involved in organizing a popular consultation be avoided, for elections would have to be held in any case in order to fill the seats in a new assembly. It would be much simpler, therefore, to ask the population to express their wishes as to their status immediately.

45. It should be emphasized that such a popular consultation would not be a plebiscite. The aim would be to ask the Togolandese, not to take a final decision on their future, but merely to make their wishes known. It would then be for the General Assembly to take those wishes into account in making whatever changes were desirable in the Territory's status.

46. The Visiting Mission proposed that two questions should be put at the plebiscite: the population would be asked, first, whether they wanted integration with an independent Gold Coast, and, secondly, whether they wished the Territory to be separated from the Gold Coast and to continue under trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of its future. If the Togolandese returned an affirmative answer to the first question they would acquire the rights and duties of inhabitants of the Gold Coast and would renounce the special protection which the Charter assured the peoples of Trust Territories. That was a serious decision to take, and he was not certain that the people of all the regions of Togoland were really in a position to take it, as so many were illiterate. Nevertheless he saw no objection to the holding of the consultation provided it was held in conditions of complete freedom.

47. If the Togolandese answered the first question in the negative, the second question would be put to them as an alternative; in effect, they would be told: "Do you prefer to take the road to the left or the second road to the right?", when there were several roads to the right. If he were a Togolander, Mr. Ryckmans would be strongly tempted to answer. No to both questions. In his opinion they were not well framed. If the answer to the first question were affirmative, the second was useless. If, on the other hand, the answer to the first were negative, the second was inadequate since it offered only one solution, separation from the Gold Coast, whereas several other solutions were possible. If the answer to the single question: "Do you wish integration with the Gold Coast?" were negative, the majority would have rejected modification of their status and it would remain unchanged, in other words, the Territory would continue to be administered as an integral part of the Gold Coast under the Trusteeship System. In that case, it remained to be seen how the new status of the Territory could be determined, since on the one hand the United Kingdom would no longer be administering the Gold Coast

and on the other it did not wish to be responsible for Togoland under British administration alone. In his view, the simplest course would be to transfer responsibility for Togoland under British administration to the Gold Coast. That would preserve the *status quo* while giving the people a chance of expressing, at a later date, their views on their future.

48. Another problem was to decide whether the plebiscite should be organized on a Territory-wide basis or on the basis of smaller voting areas. Some considered that there was one Togoland people and that the minority should normally bow to the wishes of the majority. Others regarded Togoland as being divided into separate groups, and felt that there was no reason why there should be imposed on the majority of the Ewes, for instance, the wishes of a majority composed of members of other tribes.

49. That difficulty was not insurmountable. As it was merely a matter of determining the freely expressed wishes of the people it seemed logical to organize the vote area by area. If the vast majority of areas voted for integration all that would have to be done would be to adopt that solution. If, on the contrary, the North voted for, and the South against, integration and if there was a small majority in favour of integration in the Territory as a whole, it would be inadvisable to impose on the South the will of the North, for such a course would create in the southern part of the Territory irredentism which would add to the difficulties of the new Gold Coast State. He felt that in the latter event it would be preferable to maintain the *status quo* in the voting areas opposed to integration and to transfer the trusteeship responsibility to the Gold Coast.

50. With regard to the organization of the plebiscite, a detailed plan was not, as the Egyptian representative had suggested, essential. The General Assembly could confine itself to asking the Administering Authority to take the necessary steps to enable all adults to express their views as soon as possible. The only safeguard needed would then be the appointment of a United Nations commissioner who, with the assistance of observers, would help the Administering Authority to prepare for the consultation, and whose presence would reassure all the elements of the population as to the regularity of the proceedings.

51. Lastly, he wished to emphasize that he had been stating the opinion not of an Administering Authority but of a Member of the United Nations which had no other aim in view than to serve the interests of the peoples concerned.

52. Mr. GARCIA (Philippines) asked whether the Visiting Mission had been able to form an exact idea of public opinion in Togoland despite any pressure which might have been exerted on that opinion.

53. Mr. ROBBINS (United States of America) replied that the Mission had endeavoured to do so. It had heard inhabitants who had lodged complaints against certain administrative decisions.

54. Mr. GARCIA (Philippines) pointed out that the Togoland Congress had stated that it would not participate in the plebiscite unless the Territory was first provided with separate political institutions. He wished to learn whether the Visiting Mission had envisaged any measures which might meet that party half way.

55. Mr. ROBBINS (United States of America) said that the members of the Visiting Mission had not all been agreed on that matter; he had explained the

various viewpoints in his statement at the beginning of the meeting.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.