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**Chairman: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).**

**AGENDA ITEM 13**

**The future of the Trust Territories of the Cameroons under French administration and the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration: special report of the Trusteeship Council\* (A/4092, A/4093/Rev.1, A/4094, A/C.4/395, A/C.4/L.580, A/C.4/L.581, T/SR.953-963) (*continued*)**

**GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF  
DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (*continued*)**

1. Mr. KENNEDY (Ireland), commenting on the two draft resolutions on the Cameroons under French administration (A/C.4/L.580, A/C.4/L.581), said that the one conclusion common to both was that the Territory was ready for independence on 1 January 1960 and that the Trusteeship Agreement should be terminated on that date. That was yet another proof that Africa was attaining maturity. The people of Ireland were among those who understood the power of nationalism and knew what sacrifices men could make for freedom and independence. He therefore wished to be among the first to congratulate the people of the new State of the Cameroons, as also its leaders, who had pleaded their cause with such ability before the United Nations.

2. As all the members of the Committee were agreed in recognizing that the Cameroons was ready to become a sovereign State, they should beware of doing anything that might imply that the new State would not be capable of shaping its own destiny without external aid and of governing itself with due respect for the rights and liberties of the individual. Those who were in favour of general elections before independence argued that such elections would be freer and more equitable if they were held under United Nations supervision. In other words, they wanted the United Nations to supervise elections in 1959 because they did not consider that it was possible to trust the Government and Assembly of the Cameroons in 1960. That was inconsistent, for it was not possible to recognize that a people was ready for independence and at the same

time to doubt that it was capable of organizing free elections. Moreover, if it was maintained that elections should be held under United Nations supervision in 1959, what guarantee was there that subsequent elections would be free? As the representative of India had pointed out at the 861st meeting, the petitioners from the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) had not stated that they would renounce violence. To cast doubt on the ability of Mr. Ahidjo's Government to organize free elections was to cast similar doubt on the ability of every subsequent Government.

3. To justify the holding of elections before independence, it had been argued that the present Assembly had been elected in December 1956 as a Territorial Assembly for the purpose of considering the draft Statute and was therefore not competent to pronounce on the question of independence. He would point out, however, that the Territorial Assembly had become a Legislative Assembly only four months after its election. As Mr. Ahidjo, the Prime Minister of the Territory, had stated, the Assembly had first adopted the Statute of 16 April 1957 and had then, by virtue of the powers granted under that Statute, asked for, and obtained, full internal autonomy on 1 January 1959. The Assembly had then proclaimed the desire of the Cameroonian people to become independent on 1 January 1960. Having received a general mandate from the Cameroonian people on the basis of universal suffrage, the Assembly had availed itself of the opportunity to choose between the alternatives offered, as part of the normal development of the Trusteeship System. The Irish delegation approved of the procedure that had been followed and it supported the view set forth in the report on the Territory (T/1427 and T/1434<sup>1</sup>) submitted by the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1958, to the effect that there were insufficient grounds for the holding of new general elections as a pre-condition of the attainment of independence.

4. It seemed to him that there were three reasons why the Committee would be wrong to recommend elections before independence. The first, which had been pointed out by the representative of Israel, was that public opinion in the Cameroons would interpret such a recommendation as implying that the United Nations lacked confidence in Mr. Ahidjo's Government, a fact which would handicap that Government in the electoral campaign. The second reason, referred to by the representative of Ethiopia, was that, as the future of the Territory had been determined by the people's choice of independence, the holding of elections for the purpose of enabling Cameroonians to choose between the programmes of different political parties was not a matter for the United Nations and that to recommend such elections would accordingly be tantamount to unjustifiable interference in the in-

\*In accordance with General Assembly resolution 1281 (XIII).

<sup>1</sup>/ Transmitted to Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/4092).

ternal affairs of the Cameroons. The third reason was that elections before independence would not only damage the prestige of the new State but would also endanger its future peace and stability. The principal problem in the Cameroons under French administration had always been the maintenance of law and order; it would hardly contribute to the restoration of harmony to encourage those who opposed the elected Government to proclaim that the United Nations itself had recognized that elections held after independence could not be trusted and that the legislative majorities that would result from them would have no right to speak on behalf of the people.

5. He hoped that the chief concern of all delegations would be to ensure that the Cameroonian people attained the objectives of the Trusteeship System. As Mr. Ahidjo had stated that general elections would in any case be held in 1960, shortly after the attainment of independence, it was to be hoped that the members of the Committee would be able to find a common ground which would enable the United Nations to welcome the new republic within a short time.

6. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) said that the role of the United Nations must be to find a way of organizing the transition of the Cameroons from trusteeship to independence in the best interests of the Cameroonian people. It must be remembered that what was at issue was the fate of an African country and that Africa was a continent which was far behind the others from the point of view of political and economic development and one in which outmoded forms of colonial exploitation, racial and political discrimination and economic backwardness were still entrenched. Millions of Africans who were still struggling for independence were following the deliberations of the United Nations with the closest attention, since those debates would have considerable influence on their future by creating certain precedents and clarifying a number of questions.

7. There were two points on which there was almost unanimous agreement. First, the trusteeship over the Cameroons under French administration would end on 1 January 1960 and the independent and sovereign State of the Cameroons would then be recognized; secondly, the new State would immediately become a Member of the United Nations. The two unresolved problems, which were closely linked, concerned the unification of the two Trust Territories of the Cameroons, and the holding of new elections in the Cameroons under French administration.

8. With regard to unification, the Polish delegation considered that a country that had been divided in the interests of the colonial Powers, without the consent of its people, had the right to be reunified. It accordingly thought there should be a formal consultation of the people of the two zones of the Cameroons under British administration on that question. There would be no point in holding such a consultation in the Cameroons under French administration, since it was obvious that the people of that Territory were unanimously in favour of unification.

9. The Polish delegation therefore disagreed with the opinion expressed by the Visiting Mission in its report on the Cameroons under British administration (T/1426 and Add.12/) that there was no justification for

consulting the population of the Northern Cameroons on the subject of unification. The Mission had clearly exceeded its terms of reference in assuming the responsibility of thus prejudging the future of the Territory. The views expressed to the Committee by the representatives of Cameroonian political groups threw doubt on the validity of the Mission's conclusions.

10. The very Mission that was so bold in reaching conclusions about the Northern Cameroons was very cautious in its conclusions about the Southern Cameroons, despite the fact that in the recent elections that zone had declared itself categorically opposed to union with Nigeria.

11. In both the zones under British administration a plebiscite should be held under the supervision of the United Nations, which had special responsibilities towards the peoples of Trust Territories. As the two zones had long been administered separately, the votes in the north and in the south should be counted separately, so that the wishes of the people in each zone could be determined separately.

12. The Polish delegation also disagreed with the Visiting Mission with regard to the questions to be asked in the plebiscite. The people of both the Northern and the Southern Cameroons should state whether or not they wished to be united with the Cameroons under French administration once that Territory became independent. If they rejected unification there should be further consultation about their future.

13. The plebiscite should take place before 1 January 1960. It was of the utmost importance that the Cameroons should know, during the final stage before independence, what its territory, its population and its resources were to be. That would be most useful in deciding upon the composition of a new common Government and the adoption of a common constitution. Moreover, it would be an advantage for the Fourth Committee at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly to know the results of the plebiscite.

14. With regard to the question of elections in the Cameroons under French administration, the Polish delegation considered it essential for the peace, prosperity and progress of the independent State of the Cameroons that such elections should be held under United Nations supervision before independence. It was also necessary to ensure that all political organizations would be able to take part in those elections without discrimination and in freedom from fear.

15. The last elections had been held in 1956 and the question of independence had not been an important issue in the electoral campaign. The only party that had been asking for independence at that time, through petitioners at the United Nations and in the Territory, had been dissolved by the French Government in 1955. Moreover, those elections had been held on the heels of disturbances, in abnormal conditions and in the presence of French troops sent in by the French Government. Lastly, as public opinion and the Cameroonian political groups seemed to be very much divided, new elections might be instrumental in bringing about the desired reconciliation. It would therefore be a normal procedure, at a time when the Cameroons was about to become an independent State, for the present Legislative Assembly, which had

<sup>2/</sup> Transmitted to Members of the General Assembly by a note of the Secretary-General (A/4093/Rev.1).

been elected as a Territorial Assembly in 1956, to be replaced by a new Assembly.

16. The Polish delegation had not embarked upon the debate with any preconceived ideas. It was not for the United Nations to decide what parties or individuals should be in power in an independent Cameroons; that was for the Cameroons itself to decide. The Cameroonian leaders who had been heard by the Committee had demonstrated their wisdom and political maturity, and their ability did credit both to the Cameroons and to France. It seemed clear that the colonialist methods of oppression and exploitation had been dictated by the policy of certain groups. The genius of the French people, their culture and their ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity had prevailed and had unquestionably helped the Cameroonian people in their struggle for independence. The Cameroonian people would undoubtedly be grateful to France provided that no mistakes were made at the present crucial moment. The essential condition for the "*présence française*" in the Cameroons was the absence of French colonialism.

17. The United Nations was entrusted with heavy responsibilities under the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement. On 1 January 1960 the Cameroonian Government would have to take decisions on a number of matters of the greatest importance: the country's constitution, its relations with other countries, the validity of the existing Franco-Cameroonian Conventions, the presence of foreign troops and foreign nationals, economic relations and so forth. It was essential that at that time the United Nations General Assembly should be certain that those decisions would be taken by leaders who enjoyed the full confidence of the majority of the Cameroonian people. Without passing judgement on the members of the present Cameroonian Government, it must be conceded, in view of what had been said by many leaders representing various parties, that there were sufficient doubts to justify a decision by the General Assembly calculated to allay those doubts.

18. In expressing its views the Polish delegation had been guided by the views of Africans, who must decide their own future. It was following with attention and sympathy the struggle of the African peoples for independence and was convinced that despite all obstacles the African continent would soon be a continent of free and independent nations.

19. Mr. TOURE (Guinea) said that his delegation had a special interest in the Cameroonian problem, which was a specifically African question. In proclaiming its Constitution, the Republic of Guinea had solemnly declared that its attainment of independence would be significant only to the extent that it would thereby be enabled to help other African territories or dependent states to recover their sovereignty. Guinea was indeed the best placed of all African States, for geographical and historical reasons, to have a full understanding of the Cameroonian problem and its various developments, because of the affinities which had linked the peoples of Guinea and the Cameroons in a common destiny. Cameroonians and Guineans had fought, and were still fighting, in the same political and trade-union organizations concerned with the evolution of Africa under French rule. As far back as 1948 the UPC had been established as the Cameroonian branch of the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA), of which the late Um Nyobé, General Secretary of the UPC, and

Mr. Sékou Touré, now the Head of State of Guinea, had both been Vice-Chairmen. The one African trade-union organization whose influence extended to the whole of West Africa included the workers of Ghana, the Cameroons and Guinea, fighting in support of the same programmes under the chairmanship of Mr. Sékou Touré.

20. All the independent countries of Africa were moved by the same considerations as was Guinea and viewed the Cameroonian problem as their own. They realized that as long as any states or territories in Africa remained under foreign rule it would not be possible to attain the level of development and progress that was essential for the establishment of a United States of Africa.

21. It should be remarked that there was no practical difference between the situation of the people of the French colonies and that of the people of the Trust Territories under French administration. "Black" Africa had subscribed to the idea of the French Union in order to escape from its own inferior position and play its part side by side with France, but that idea had not become a reality. The African peoples, having suffered greatly under the yoke of colonialism and having been deeply disappointed by the attitude of successive French Governments, which had always failed to recognize their desire for progress, had turned more and more to specifically nationalist aims. All the African political and trade-union organizations, which had originally been no more than extensions or branches of the corresponding French organizations, had gradually changed their structure and become true instruments of African nationalism. The consciousness of unity, universally felt, had underlined the need to recognize and develop the African personality.

22. The UPC, while recognizing the need to co-ordinate its political activity, within the RDA, with the general movement for the emancipation of "Black" Africa, had always advocated the independence and unification of the Cameroons, and it must be recognized that the events of May 1955 had in no way diminished the admiration that the whole of Africa felt for that movement. The Cameroonian problem thus had a double significance, and in the struggle against the colonial system the UPC and its General Secretary were of unquestionable value to the African consciousness and the future of Africa.

23. The Cameroonian problem was inseparable from the struggle of the peoples of Africa against colonial oppression and exploitation. Whatever the colonial system was, the essential weapon of domination was the same: divide the people and set them against one another by stressing internal conflicts of interest. When that method did not succeed, recourse was had to force. Thus from 1946 to 1957 the whole of Africa had been subjected to a series of repressive measures, sometimes involving bloodshed. As a result of unusually long and widespread strikes the trade unions had become a powerful force in influencing public opinion and conducting the struggle against injustice. Internal crises had sometimes endangered African movements; the RDA itself had narrowly escaped losing its unity. In the face of the irresistible tide of African nationalism, it was not easy to define the line of demarcation between the desire to strive for the desired goals by peaceful and legal means

and the need to respond to the ever more powerful desire of the African masses for freedom.

24. The whole world had followed with interest the proceedings of the congress held by the RDA at Bamako in September 1957, at which the supporters of the Franco-African community and those who favoured a development of Africa that would allow of an assertion of the African personality and of African unity had come face to face. At that time the loi-cadre of 23 June 1956 had just been put into effect and had been regarded as an attempt by the French Government to reconcile its wish to maintain its supremacy in its former colonies with the need to take due account of the wishes of the African peoples. The inconsistencies and inadequacies of the loi-cadre had been shown up at the congress. That had marked the birth of African national feeling, which was now finding increasingly clear expression despite all attempts to create division. General de Gaulle's accession to power had coincided with a striking increase in the pace of political events. The day of the French constitutional referendum, 28 September 1958, had marked the end of the systematic opposition to the colonial peoples' claims to independence, but at the same time had introduced the idea of trying to safeguard the essential aims of the colonial system while appearing to meet the wishes of the peoples of the former colonies. The loi-cadre had been a divisive factor; the referendum might be said to be the most brilliant attempt ever made to rob the people of their sovereignty and their personality with their own consent. The whole of "Black" Africa was still puzzling over that historic aberration which had resulted in its adherence to a foreign community and its apparently voluntary renunciation of independence.

25. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) said that any reference to the French Community constituted an interference in the internal affairs of a country, which was contrary to the Charter. The referendum had enabled Guinea to obtain independence. It was hard to see why the delegation of Guinea should question the results of the referendum in other territories.

26. The CHAIRMAN said that the Fourth Committee was considering the question of the future of the Cameroons under French administration and the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration; comments on the French Community and the referendum, in so far as they did not deal with the Cameroons under French administration, were out of order.

27. Mr. TOURE (Guinea), continuing his statement, said that happily the Community had appeared in its true light after the publication of the decisions reached at the first meeting of its Executive Council. Guinea's negative vote in the referendum had enabled Africa to take up the challenge and to lay the foundations for further steps towards national independence and African unity. The African problem was no longer settled by the word "independence" but by the degree of that independence and the conditions for its attainment. The Parti démocratique in Guinea had made its adherence to the community proposed by France conditional on the establishment of an African community that would respect the federations in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa that had been broken up by the loi-cadre and on the recognition of the African personality in the Franco-African community; it was thus that the party had been led to

choose independence not only on behalf of the people of Guinea but on behalf of all "Black" Africa.

28. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) pointed out that Mr. Sékou Touré had voted in favour of the loi-cadre.

29. The CHAIRMAN said that the delegation of Guinea was free to explain the reasons why Guinea had refused to join the Franco-African community, but that it must avoid making any general observations about that community.

30. Mr. TOURE (Guinea), continuing his statement, said that African unity had been the keynote of the national conference of the Parti démocratique of Guinea which had decided in favour of independence. Africa condemned persons and organizations which, under the pretext of respect for traditions, opposed African efforts and supported oppression. The harmful action of the indigenous chiefs and religious sects was meeting with ever-increasing disapproval, as were the statements of doubtful spontaneity on the benefits derived from the civilizing mission of the colonial Powers.

31. Peaceful means had been considered the most realistic, but the All-African People's Conference held at Accra in December 1958 had stated specifically that a people deprived of its freedom could not be held responsible if its claim for freedom met with systematic opposition, and that in such a case it was the duty of the people to support that claim by every possible means. The history of free nations showed, moreover, that some peoples had had to regain their liberty by force.

32. The United Nations was founded on the recognition of the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination. The principles which had built up the prestige of the United Nations constituted the highest hope of the dependent peoples in their unequal struggle against oppression. The Trusteeship System, which was regarded as a protection against the abuses of the direct colonial régime, was perhaps one of the forces which had promoted the rapid development of colonial peoples. But if the work of the General Assembly were to be confined to approving the request for Cameroonian independence submitted by the Administering Authorities, without general elections under United Nations supervision, "Black" Africa would be sadly disappointed. The recent Conference at Accra had called definitely for a broad popular consultation before the termination of trusteeship in the Cameroons under French administration, and the majority of the independent African States also looked forward to an independence supported by elections held under United Nations supervision.

33. Certainly the independence of the Cameroons under French administration could and should be proclaimed on 1 January 1960. No delegation was opposed to that. It was untrue to say that the rains would prevent elections being held before the date of independence, for the referendum campaign organized by France in twelve African territories had been carried out at the height of the rainy season. The representative character of the present Cameroonian Government was not a sufficient reason to deny a voice, not only to the democratic organizations which had been the first to lay down the principles of independence, but to the Cameroonian people themselves. The petitioners had shown that the UPC retained all its influence in



the Cameroons and that it could not be blamed for all the incidents in the Cameroons while nothing was said about the actions of the French troops. The Cameroonian Prime Minister had appealed for reconciliation on several occasions. It was therefore evident that elections were imperative, for they would give substance to the desire for reconciliation expressed by all the petitioners and by the authorities themselves. The amnesty law of 14 February 1959<sup>3/</sup> would permit a large section of the underground opposition to resume lawful activities, but it related only to individuals and did not settle the problem of national reconciliation, which could not take place without a political amnesty extending to the dissolved organizations.

34. It was curious to see the French Administration citing the representative character of the present Cameroonian Government in order to minimize the importance of elections prior to the termination of the trusteeship. The example of Togoland under French administration should have been instructive, however. Besides, it might well be asked why France, which had had no doubts as to the representative character of the Territorial Assembly of the Ivory Coast, for example, had asked for its renewal only six months after that 100-per-cent homogeneous Assembly had voted the referendum with a crushing majority of 99 per cent.

35. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) regretted having to interrupt the representative of Guinea, who once again was dealing with questions which were outside the Committee's competence. He noted that Guinea had not renewed its Assembly after the referendum.

36. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Committee could only deal with the question of the Cameroons under French administration and the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration.

37. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) reserved the right of the representatives of the Cameroonian Government, who were not present at the moment, to give their views on the internal situation of Guinea.

38. The CHAIRMAN said that that also would be contrary to normal procedure.

39. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) thought that no right of reply could be granted to the representatives of the Cameroonian Government.

40. Mr. TOURE (Guinea), continuing his statement, said that free elections would enable disturbances to be avoided in the Cameroons after 1 January 1960. The presence of French troops in the Cameroons was disquieting in view of the fact that a whole series of conventions still bound the Cameroons to France. The Cameroonian Assembly and Government should be supported by the renewed confidence and approval of the people on whose behalf they would assume the responsibilities of independence. To represent elections under United Nations supervision in the Trust Territory as a violation of Cameroonian sovereignty was equivalent to asking the United Nations to abdicate its responsibilities and stand surety for the determination of the Administering Authority to consider the evolution of the countries in its care only as it affected its own colonial empire, which still existed under new aspects and which could be entered through what was now called the Community.

<sup>3/</sup> See A/C.4/395.

41. The CHAIRMAN again asked the representative of Guinea to refrain from commenting on the French Community per se.

42. Miss BROOKS (Liberia) could not see why the Committee should not deal with the question of the future relations between the Cameroons and the French Community. That question had already been touched on by the Committee and was in fact very important.

43. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the question of future relations between the Cameroons under French administration and the French Community had been covered by questions addressed to the Prime Minister of the Territory and to the representative of France. The Committee had heard their replies at the 849th meeting. It was in no way competent to discuss at that time the French Community per se.

44. Mr. LOBANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that an attempt was being made to prevent the representative of Guinea from speaking about an essential aspect of the Administering Authority's policy as reflected in the loi-cadre and in the French Community. The loi-cadre and the French Community represented a threat to the Trust Territory of the Cameroons. The United Nations was therefore fully competent to examine that question.

45. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that he had not ruled out of order the remarks dealing with the relations between the French Community and the Cameroons under French administration, but those which did not concern the Trust Territory.

46. Mr. PACHACHI (Iraq) recalled that when the Committee had discussed the future of Togoland under British administration and the future of the Gold Coast, now Ghana, it had spoken at length about the British Commonwealth. The United Kingdom delegation had supplied all the necessary information on that subject. France would do well to follow the United Kingdom's example.

47. Sir Andrew COHEN (United Kingdom) pointed out that the question in that case had been entirely different. There were no grounds for such a comparison.

48. Mr. KOSCZIUSKO-MORIZET (France) said that the Iraqi representative's observations could not weaken the ties of friendship between France and the United Kingdom. In any case, France did not need to be told what to do by anyone.

49. The CHAIRMAN said that he hoped the representative of Guinea would make every effort to omit any paragraphs in his statement that concerned the French Community per se.

50. Mr. TOURE (Guinea) said that he would try to meet the Chairman's request but he still felt it was difficult to deal with a problem as typically African as that of the Cameroons without referring to a number of other States which were directly concerned in African questions. When he used the expression "French Community" he was referring to the African States which were members of that Community.

51. Neo-colonialism was more dangerous than the former system of direct rule, which had at least openly opposed the peoples' desire for independence. Nowadays the colonial Powers lost no time in spectacularly fixing the date for the proclamation of independence, having taken every precaution to remain in entire control of the situation and to make sure of the gratitude of the Government to which they offered independence. It was for the Cameroonian people to choose the new Assembly which would be entrusted with the supreme authority exercised by France in the Cameroons, under the Trusteeship System, until 1 January 1960. If all the Cameroonian political parties were permitted to submit themselves to the verdict of universal suffrage, the difficulties caused by the present prohibition of the UPC would be removed, the extent of national reconciliation could be assessed and the political situation in the Cameroons could be truly ascertained.

52. With regard to the question of the reunification of the two Trust Territories, he pointed out that the task would be made much easier if all efforts were directed towards giving the Cameroons under French administration genuine independence, which would put an end to internal dissension. The great driving force in Africa today, after the desire for political freedom, was the unanimous desire for reunification with a view to the establishment of vast African aggregations.

53. In conclusion, he proposed the following measures, which in his opinion were essential to the harmonious solution of the question of the future of the Cameroons under French administration: first, a total and unconditional amnesty as the basis for national reconciliation; secondly, the repeal of all statutory provisions enacted against any of the Territory's political movements; thirdly, reunification on the basis of a popular consultation held under United Nations supervision; fourthly, general elections under United Nations supervision before 1 January 1960; and finally, the proclamation of independence, the termination of the trusteeship and the admission of the Cameroons under French administration to the United Nations on 1 January 1960.

54. Mr. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET (France) said that, although he was anxious to avoid a controversy, he felt bound to take up some of the points in the statement of the representative of Guinea. The latter had said that the Cameroonian question was a specifically African question. Under the Charter, however, the question of the accession of any Trust Territory to independence was the concern of all States Members of the United Nations, without distinction. Mr. Ahidjo himself had told the Committee that the Cameroonian Government did not recognize the right of any country to interfere in the internal affairs of the Cameroons. He would also draw attention to the fact that the RDA had expelled the UPC from membership when the latter had refused to renounce violence.

55. Mr. TOURE (Guinea) said that when he had called the Cameroonian question a specifically African question he had simply meant that the question was part of the present general development of Africa. Moreover, it was the African States which had appealed to the United Nations to help the Cameroons to achieve independence in a spirit of national reconciliation. He

went on to point out that Mr. Houphouët-Boigny, the Chairman of the RDA, was at present a Minister of the French Government and therefore it was not surprising that the UPC had been expelled from that movement.

56. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) stressed the importance of the decision which the Members of the United Nations were called upon to take at the current session. It was their duty, not only to facilitate the accession of the two Cameroonian Trust Territories to independence, but also to ensure, as far as possible, their future stability and peace. His delegation viewed with sympathy the great movement of national and political revival which was now rousing the African continent and it was happy to see the African States playing an increasingly important part in international life, particularly in the United Nations. The presence at the current session of a great many African leaders and petitioners was symbolic of Africa's political awakening and thanks were due to them all for their contribution to the Committee's work.

57. Turning to the Visiting Mission's reports, he said that, while he did not agree with all the conclusions in the reports, he appreciated the valuable work the Mission had accomplished. With regard to the Cameroons under British administration, he fully endorsed the recommendation that the two parts of the Territory should be considered separately. On the other hand, he did not agree with the conclusion that there was no need to hold a plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons. Even if there seemed to be no doubt about the wishes of its people, the United Nations was bound to consult them before terminating the trusteeship. Malam Abdullahi, the Minister for Northern Cameroons Affairs, had also stated that, although he did not think it was necessary, he would agree to the holding of a plebiscite if the United Nations requested it. With regard to the future of the Southern Cameroons, Mr. Shaha thought that the General Assembly should encourage Mr. Foncha, the Premier of the Southern Cameroons, and Mr. Endeley, the Leader of the Opposition to try to reach an agreement on the choice to be offered to the people in the plebiscite. Mr. Foncha should also be allowed time to come to an understanding with the authorities in the Cameroons under French administration on the form in which the two Territories could be reunified.

58. In the case of the Cameroons under French administration, his delegation agreed with the Visiting Mission that there was no need to consult the people on the question of independence, since they were unanimous in calling for the proclamation of independence on 1 January 1960. The only points on which there was disagreement were the question of the political amnesty and the holding of new general elections before independence. On the first point, his delegation was glad that the amnesty law of 14 February 1959 had been adopted but it felt that a true reconciliation could be brought about only by the repeal of the Decree of 13 July 1955 dissolving the parties which had demanded independence and unification. With regard to the second point, his delegation did not dispute the representative character of the present Cameroonian Government or the genuine nature of the independence to be proclaimed on 1 January 1960, but it felt that, in view of the doubts expressed about the legality of transforming the Territory Assembly

elected in 1956 into a constituent assembly and in view of the unsettled atmosphere in which those elections had taken place, elections held under United Nations supervision would strengthen the authority of the

Cameroonian Government both internally and in its future relations with other States.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.