

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY

SIXTH SESSION

Official Records




FIRST COMMITTEE 302nd

MEETING

Saturday, 26 January 1952, at 10.30 a.m.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris



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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

**Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August 1945 and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations (A/C.1/711)**

[Item 23]\*

## GENERAL DEBATE

1. Mr. TSIANG (China) recalled that on 14 August 1945 a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance had been signed at Moscow between his Government and the USSR Government. The Treaty had been ratified on 24 August 1945 and had been registered and published by the United Nations at the same time as the notes and annexes and agreements attached thereto, signed also on 14 August 1945.
2. The Treaty had provided for joint prosecution of the war against Japan by the two Governments until final victory was achieved. Article 5 had provided for collaboration between the two parties on the basis of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for non-intervention in each other's internal affairs. Article 6 had provided for reciprocal economic assistance to facilitate the rehabilitation of the two countries. Those two articles had been particularly wise and, had they been implemented, could have made a great contribution to the maintenance of peace in the Far East.
3. Four notes, exchanged between Mr. Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Republic, and Mr. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, had been annexed to the treaty.
4. In note no. 1, he had assured the Chinese Government of moral support and material assistance. Secondly, with regard to the questions raised by the agreements in connexion with Dairen, Port Arthur and the Manchurian railways, the USSR had declared that it regarded the three eastern provinces (Manchuria) as part of China. Lastly, with regard to recent events in Sinkiang, the USSR had reaffirmed that it had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China.

5. Note no. 2 annexed to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was related to the confirmation by the Chinese Government of the assurances given by the USSR Government in note no. 1.

6. In note no. 3, the Chinese Government had stated that after the defeat of Japan it would recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, provided that the desire for independence was confirmed by a plebiscite.

7. Note no. 4, was related to the acceptance of note no. 3 by the USSR. The USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs had affirmed in his turn that his Government would also respect the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.

8. In addition to those notes, there had also been annexed to the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship an agreement on the Manchurian railways, an agreement on the port of Dairen, an agreement on Port Arthur and an agreement on the relations between the Soviet command in Manchuria and the Chinese civil authorities.

9. The agreement on the Manchurian railways had provided that the two principal railway lines in that area should become the joint property of China and the USSR and be operated jointly by those two governments, with a USSR representative acting as manager and a Chinese representative as deputy manager. That agreement, which was in accordance with Tsarist traditions, had established an appearance of equality between the two partners. The USSR, however, was to play a dominant part, owing to the fact that the chief executive officer was a USSR representative. Control of the Manchurian railways was of undeniable strategic and economic importance. Since, therefore, the reason given by the USSR for the conclusion of the agreement had been based on historical considerations, the imperialist nature of that country's policy could not but be observed.

10. The agreement on the port of Dairen had imposed on China the obligation to declare that the port should be free and to give the USSR a thirty years' lease on half the port installations. Moreover, the harbour-master was to be a USSR citizen. It must be noted that Dairen was the chief Manchurian port and that its installations had already been inadequate for the country's needs even before the war. There again, therefore, the imperialist

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

designs of the USSR were to be observed in its exaction of exorbitant privileges in connexion with the use of the port.

11. The third agreement had provided that Port Arthur should be a naval base reserved exclusively for the vessels of China and the USSR. A Chinese was to be in charge of the port's civil administration, but its defence was entrusted to the Soviet Union, which was empowered to maintain military, naval and air forces there. That agreement also showed how the USSR's statements on imperialism differed from the attitude which it concurrently adopted.

12. Finally, the agreement on relations between the USSR military command in Manchuria and the Chinese authorities had provided that the USSR command would have supreme authority in the military zones, while civil administration would be carried out by the Chinese authorities in the non-military zone. It should be noted that the fighting against Japan in Manchuria had stopped immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the USSR. Supreme authority in Manchuria should therefore have been transferred forthwith to the Chinese administration.

13. To the last agreement there were annexed extracts from the record of the meeting of 11 July 1945 between Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Soong, President of the Executive Yuan, in which it was stated that the head of the Government of the Soviet Union had refused to include in the agreement on the entry of USSR forces into Manchuria provisions concerning the evacuation of those troops. But he had remarked that a period of three months after the end of hostilities would certainly be enough to complete the evacuation.

14. Mr. Tsiang stated that the agreements of 14 August 1945 had been signed by China with a view to implementing the Yalta Agreement of 11 February 1945. It would be remembered that at Yalta President Roosevelt had sought the participation of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan. As its price for such participation, Mr. Stalin had demanded not only territorial concessions from Japan but also a number of privileges in Manchuria. The official communiqué of the Yalta Conference had stated that the rights of Russia, unjustly abolished by the attack of Japan in 1904, should be restored.

15. Certain questions should be asked about USSR claims in Manchuria. First, Lenin himself had shown the imperialistic nature of the privileges acquired by the Tsars in Manchuria when he had stated that the Russian defeat of 1904 had brought nearer the date for setting up a free régime in Russia. It was strange that the USSR, self-appointed champion of anti-imperialism, was at the moment reviving Tsarist claims. Secondly, it was obvious that the United Nations should assist in liquidating the remnants of imperialism and not try to re-establish it. Finally, it must be remembered that the concessions which China had made to Russia had been limited to a period of twenty-five years from 1898. Moreover, Russian interests in the Manchurian railways had been transferred by the USSR to Japan in spite of the protests of the Chinese Government. In 1945 Russia therefore no longer had any historical right in Manchuria.

16. Although President Roosevelt's friendship for China was universally appreciated by the Chinese, the part he had played at Yalta was still difficult to justify. The President of the United States had feared at the time that, without the participation of the Soviet Union, the war against Japan might be long and painful. He had also hoped that co-operation with the USSR in the United Nations might lead to an age of world prosperity. Finally, he had thought that the Soviet Union would support the

Chinese Government in the unification of China. In fact, like Lenin and Stalin, President Roosevelt had been one of the few western statesmen to understand the importance of China.

17. At the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the USSR, a large number of Chinese had shared the hopes of the United States President and had believed that the unification and economic development of China depended on the good will of the USSR. The more sceptical Chinese had felt that the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance would at least bring to an end the hostile policy of the Soviet Union towards China. The Chinese Government, under United States pressure, had therefore given its *de facto* consent to the Yalta Agreement. The world now knew that that agreement, without which current events in China and Korea would not have taken place, had been a disastrous mistake.

18. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the USSR had declared war on Japan on 9 August 1945. That very day its troops had entered Manchuria and on 14 August Japan had capitulated.

19. The USSR troops had remained in Manchuria until May 1946, when they had withdrawn from the country with the exception of the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. The Chinese delegation had in 1949 already submitted the list of atrocities committed by USSR troops in Manchuria<sup>1</sup>. There had been no fighting because the Japanese had offered no opposition. Nevertheless, the USSR had extended its control over the whole country and had taken advantage of the opportunity to organize the systematic plundering of industrial equipment. The Chinese Government estimated that the equipment thus destroyed or removed by the USSR Government in Manchuria amounted to 2,000 million dollars. That fact should be compared with the provisions of article 6 of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which said that the USSR and China had agreed to afford each other economic assistance. For China the result of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union had been not economic assistance, but pillage.

20. In order to re-establish Chinese authority in Manchuria, the Government had been obliged to transport troops there. On 1 October 1945 the Chinese Government had therefore notified the Ambassador of the USSR that it was about to despatch an army to Manchuria which would land at Dairen. The USSR had objected to the landing on the pretext that Dairen was a commercial port and later because a state of war still existed with Japan. Shortly after, the USSR command had allowed the Chinese communists to occupy the town of Yingkow before the proposed landing of the government troops. It had also objected to the transporting of Chinese troops by air or by rail. The Chinese Government had then been obliged to recruit local units to maintain order. The USSR military command had not objected to that action, but the USSR troops had disarmed the newly constituted units on the pretext that the Chinese Government had been secretly organizing underground forces.

21. The Chinese Government had hoped, when the USSR troops had been evacuating Manchuria, that there would be a minimum of co-operation in order to co-ordinate the departure of the USSR troops with the establishment of the Chinese authorities. But the USSR command had refused to inform the Chinese Government on the pretext that its plans were secret. It had therefore been impossible

<sup>1</sup> See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, First Committee, 338th meeting.

for the Chinese Government to take the necessary action, whereas the Chinese communists had been informed by the command of the date when the USSR troops would withdraw from each town or area and had thus been able to occupy the towns before the arrival of Chinese Government troops.

22. In Mukden, for example, the USSR troops had withdrawn, without prior notice, had proceeded to destroy the railway lines which terminated in the city and had assisted the Chinese communists in blocking the entry of Chinese troops.

23. On 1 April 1946, an agreement had nevertheless been signed which had specified the procedure and time-table for the withdrawal of the USSR troops from the areas still occupied. That had not prevented the USSR command from transferring control of evacuated areas to "whatever existing military forces" there were, in other words, in many cases, to the Chinese communists.

24. The evacuation of Manchuria by the USSR troops had thus been devised and executed according to a Machiavellian plan designed to transfer power to the Chinese communists.

25. Vast quantities of arms and equipment had shortly afterwards been issued by the USSR authorities to the Chinese communists, who had thus been able to provide 200,000 men with full equipment. Moreover, Soviet military authorities had helped the Chinese communists by providing them with German, Japanese or Russian experts who had worked in various arsenals and munitions factories.

26. The communists had claimed that their troops had been equipped with material furnished by the United States to the Chinese Government and taken from the nationalist troops they had captured. That statement did not bear examination, for the United States Government had furnished the army of the Chinese Nationalist Government with equipment for 400,000 men, while from 1945 to 1949 the losses of the Chinese communists had been more than 1,400,000 men.

27. Since Yalta, the Soviet Union had been practising a policy of progressive absorption of North China.

28. The territory of Tannu Tuva which had been part of China since 1727, had been detached by the USSR, then after the Bolshevik revolution made a people's republic, and finally, in March 1948, incorporated as an autonomous region of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. There had been no reply to the protest of the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow on the subject.

29. Tannu Tuva was an example of the methods used by the USSR to detach and take over a region. The USSR was applying the same procedure to Outer Mongolia, which officially had achieved the status of a people's republic but was already under the domination of the Soviet administration.

30. The USSR also had designs on Manchuria. The three eastern provinces had been made autonomous, although the railways and the two chief ports were under the direct control of the USSR. Manchuria had become a Soviet colony. A report from a Chinese businessman who had travelled in Manchuria a few months previously also indicated that the railways and customs were in the hands of Soviet officials. He added that the headquarters of the Siberian third army was at Dairen.

31. The USSR also coveted Sinkiang. It was a region with natural resources which had been only partly explored, but which was rich in coal, iron, tin, oil, sulphur, gold and uranium.

32. The Soviet Union was concealing its designs on Sinkiang by putting forward the rights of Outer Mongolia. It maintained that the Mongolian claim was justified. It must consequently be noted that the aggression by Mongol troops in 1947 was a violation of the Soviet Union's undertaking on 14 August 1945 not to intervene in the domestic affairs of China in connexion with events in Sinkiang. In fact, Sinkiang had become a Soviet colony.

33. In an important statement on 12 January 1950, Mr. Acheson had said that the attitude of the USSR towards North China followed the traditional policy of the Tsars, although Soviet imperialism had adopted more modern methods. The USSR had already taken over Outer Mongolia and was on the way to taking over Manchuria and Sinkiang. That fact, the United States Secretary of State had concluded, must be considered the most important one in the relations of any foreign Power with Asia.

34. It should be remembered that on 8 December 1949, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution [292 (IV)] submitted by the delegations of Australia, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and the United States. That resolution had called upon all States to refrain from seeking to acquire spheres of influence or to create foreign-controlled régimes within the territory of China and to refrain from seeking to obtain special rights or privileges within the territory of China. The Soviet Union had deliberately violated that clause of the General Assembly resolution.

35. The representative of China recalled that the Chinese communist party had been organized in July 1921 by Gregory Voitinsky, who had been sent for that purpose by the Comintern. By the end of the Second World War the organization had become a powerful instrument in the hands of the USSR.

36. Two features of the Chinese communist party were of importance: first, an outstanding part was played by agents of the Comintern; and, secondly, its internal struggles were intense. Four chiefs had been successively overthrown before Mao Tse-tung, a military and political leader imbued with communist doctrines, had taken over power.

37. The support of a large staff sent by Moscow had reinforced the Communist Party in the work of sovietizing China. The number of these USSR agents was about 60,000—stationed mainly in South China.

38. The sovietization of China had been put into practice on the plane of intellectual culture. In the schools, the Chinese classics had been replaced by Soviet textbooks. Teaching had to deal above all with the natural sciences, and awaken in the students mistrust of the conception of the world presented by the capitalist countries in their "outmoded doctrines".

39. Concurrently with that programme of indoctrination, a régime of terror had been established against what were called the "counter-revolutionaries". The Chinese delegation had already had occasion to explain in plenary meeting the manner in which that reign of terror functioned. The world Press, for its part, had given descriptions of the horrible tragedy inflicted on the Chinese people by the communist régime.

40. The Press had also begun to report on religious persecution.

41. One of the elements of the terrorist policy was the extortion of funds from the emigrant relatives of inhabitants of China. If the Chinese overseas did not send the sums of money demanded, their relatives were threatened with the most serious penalties, and even with assassination. Such threats had too often been executed for it to be



possible for a single moment to doubt the cruelty of the régime.

42. An intensification of the terror and the extortion of money from Chinese overseas had been rendered necessary by the communist military campaign in Korea. While Members of the United Nations might in general terms consider that the Korean problem represented a real danger, they did not perhaps realize the meaning of such a war for the Chinese people. The losses in human life were terrible and the fact that the Chinese population was large in no way lessened the affliction of each family at the announcement of a new death. Economic difficulties, which constituted a permanent anxiety for China in normal times, had grown in terrifying proportions. The Korean war had increased the poverty and famine from which the Chinese people were suffering. In spite of all the communist propaganda with regard to the so-called American aggression in Korea, the Chinese people could not agree to the maintenance of an army of one million men on a territory where it had no national interests.

43. In accordance with Chinese policy as it had been for fifty years, the Chinese Government had given all the assistance possible to the establishment of an independent and united Korea under the auspices of the United Nations. That effort had been hindered by the North Korean communists. The fact nevertheless remained that, in spite of a diabolically cunning propaganda, the Chinese people had not changed its opinion and was hopefully following the attempts of the United Nations to reach a peaceful and democratic solution.

44. It was noteworthy that, if the war in Korea had been a disaster to the Chinese people, the Moscow Government, for its part, considered that a common military adventure would strengthen solidarity among its satellites. There could be no doubt that the war in Korea had greatly facilitated the sovietization of the mainland of China. China had been turned into the "Russia of Asia".

45. Those who worked for peace and freedom in the United Nations Organization should organize all their efforts with the basic fact in mind that the world was faced at the present time with two communist totalitarian Russias, with Moscow as their common political centre.

46. The sovietization of China had been promoted by Moscow not only for the sake of the resources of China itself, but also for Soviet expansion beyond China's southern and south western borders. Moscow's present policy was in keeping with the statements made by the USSR Government since the time of Lenin. Many observers had already drawn world attention to that fact.

47. At the end of 1949 when the first international conference organized by the Chinese communists was held in Peking journalists had been able to obtain news on events in China. That was no longer the case. Nevertheless, the communist march on Tibet was a well-known fact and proof that the plans had reached the stage of realization. All along the Tibetan frontier as far as the south-east, political and military preparations were being made for further expansion. Strategic roads and airports had been constructed, aeroplanes had been sent, armed forces had been massed and training centres, where Vietnamese and Burmese youth were being trained for revolutionary struggle, had been established.

48. On 4 October 1951, in Peking a conference had opened attended by seventy delegates from the communist parties of China, Viet-Nam, Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Malaya and the Philippines. The conference had been called by a so-called Asian revolutionary co-ordination committee, under the chairmanship

of none other than Mao Tse-tung. Three important decisions had been taken at the conference. First, it had been decided to invite representatives of the communist parties in the northeastern regions to join the Asian revolutionary co-ordination committee. Secondly, Viet-Nam and Burma had been designated as centres for military struggle in the immediate future. Lastly, Malaya and Indonesia had been designated as the centres of economic struggle.

49. For the present, the propaganda theme in all South-East Asia was based on the idea of "liberation". Such a way of presenting the situation was reminiscent of the first proclamations of the Bolshevik régime addressed to the Chinese people by Moscow agents. In the spring of 1920, Karakhan, in his proposals to the Chinese people, had spoken of nothing else.

50. At the present time, the Chinese communists were sending similar messages of sympathy and promises of support to the peoples of South-East Asia. As it had seemed to the Chinese people thirty years previously, the peoples of South-East Asia were inclined to believe that such an attitude represented the beginning of a new era.

51. In China, the people were beginning to question the sincerity of the USSR's promises. Some had come to understand that Moscow only championed the cause of freedom in order to promote world domination by the USSR. Nevertheless, the people of China were being reminded by propaganda of the exploits of past emperors and a programme of conquest was supported by revised historical facts. In Russia, the same method had been followed in connexion with the memory of Peter the Great. Mao Tse-tung himself, at times a poet, sang of his dreams of conquest.

52. Just as Stalin had preferred to forget the promises he had made in the twenties and had claimed the so-called historical rights of Russia in Manchuria, at Yalta in 1945, so Mao Tse-tung would in due time forget his promises and press China's "historical rights" in south-east Asia.

53. Such a development would be a great tragedy for China and its neighbours since, after a brief moment of triumph, the régime would collapse, leaving behind it chaos and ruin for the people. There was yet time to check that mad adventure. Action should be taken not along the fringe of China, but on the mainland itself.

54. Lastly, as Mr. W. Averell Harriman had concluded on 23 October 1950, the Soviet Union which, according to the Yalta Agreement, should have served as a link between Europe and China, had violated its commitments and dangerously complicated the international situation by the attitude it had adopted.

55. In its relations with China after the surrender of Japan, the Soviet Union had violated articles 5 and 6 of the treaty of friendship it had signed with China.

56. The Soviet Union had violated all three pledges contained in the first note addressed by Mr. Molotov to Mr. Wang on 14 August 1945.

57. The Soviet Union had violated the pledge contained in the fourth note addressed by Mr. Molotov to Mr. Wang, affirming the respect of the Soviet Union for the political independence and territorial integrity of the Mongolian People's Republic.

58. The progressive absorption of North China by the Soviet Union and the sovietization of China as a whole were flagrant acts of aggression. They constituted as such not only a violation of the treaty of 14 August 1945, but also a violation of the United Nations Charter.

59. In conclusion, the Chinese representative read the text of the draft resolution submitted by his delegation (A/C.1/711).

60. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) deplored the fact that the General Assembly should for the third time find itself compelled to consider the same slanders by the Kuomintang. The falsity of those assertions had already been proved at the two previous sessions.

61. Clearly, the aim of statements so far removed from the truth was, in the mind of the Kuomintang slanderers and their American protectors, to establish that the political upheaval of China had been caused by foreign interference. In point of fact, the Kuomintang régime had aroused the indignation and wrath of the Chinese people and had gone into complete bankruptcy. Mr. Acheson himself had officially stated that such a régime was not worthy of confidence and he had added in a statement at San Francisco on 15 March 1950, that the Nationalist Government in China had been overthrown not through force of arms but due to its inherent weaknesses and to the people's loss of confidence in it. That view had recently been confirmed by the former United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Marshall.

62. The Kuomintang representative asserted that the Soviet Union had violated the treaty of 14 August 1945. There was no truth in that, since the treaty had been rescinded by the Chinese people when it set up the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic. That Government had, on 14 February 1950, concluded an agreement of friendship, alliance and mutual aid with the USSR Government. All previous agreements had been rescinded. In any case, it was impossible to accept such a protest when it came from a delegation no longer representing any government and which usurped the legitimate place of China in the United Nations.

63. Without wishing to enter into a discussion on the subject, the USSR delegation felt compelled to protest also against the slanders spread by the Kuomintang with regard to the participation of the USSR in the war against Japan.

64. It was in any case sufficient to recall that Mr. Acheson had stated recently to a committee of the United States Senate that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan and its participation in the struggle against Japanese imperialism had been responsible for saving the United States a million lives. When confronted by such a statement by the United States Secretary of State, anyone with any common sense would realize that the agent of the Kuomintang was nothing more than a slanderer.

65. The Kuomintang clique was also attempting to show that the Soviet Union was seeking to expand in China. The falsity of such assertions was proved by the fact that the USSR Government, whose policy had consistently been based on respect for the independence and the sovereignty of other nations, had established friendly relations with the Chinese People's Republic, such relations having been further strengthened by the signature on 14 February 1950 of a treaty of alliance and mutual aid. Under that treaty, agreements had been concluded whereby the Soviet Union had, without compensation, transferred to the Chinese Government all rights connected with the mutual exploitation of the Changchung railways, as well as those connected with the property of that railway company and the rights in the bases of Dairen and Port Arthur. Similarly, the Soviet Union had transferred to China the

entire property of USSR land organizations in Manchuria, as well as all buildings which had previously belonged to Chinese organizations. Very favourable credits had been given with a view to developing the economy of the Chinese People's Republic.

66. Such facts showed the absurdity of the statements invented by the Kuomintang when it asserted that the Soviet Union was threatening the territorial integrity and political independence of China.

67. Such a threat did in fact exist, but it came from the United States and not from the Soviet Union. It was notorious that for more than half a century the United States had consistently intervened in China's internal struggles with the aim of transforming China into an American colony and base. United States armed forces and officers had directly participated in the Kuomintang's struggle against the Chinese army of liberation. After the forces of the Kuomintang and its allies had been crushed, leading circles in the United States had not abandoned their plans to enslave China. While leading the fight in Korea, the United States had occupied the island of Taiwan (Formosa), which it had transformed into a military base. Almost every day, American aeroplanes were violating Chinese air space and bombing peaceful Chinese villages. One could read, in the papers of that very day, of an agreement between Mr. Truman and Mr. Churchill concerning the bombing of Chinese territory. Such was the true situation, which the slanderers of the Kuomintang sought to conceal.

68. The United States authorities were organizing a network of espionage in China. That had been confirmed during the trial in Peking in August 1951 in connexion with the spies of the American Colonel Barrett.

69. It was obvious that an attempt at diversion had been made. It was hoped to divert public opinion from United States aggressive plans in the Far East. It was hoped also that the 100 million dollars which had been voted in the United States under the Mutual Security Act in 1951 in support of the struggle against the countries of the peoples' democracies would be forgotten. Consideration of that question had shown that the United States Government was violating international agreements, among them the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on non-intervention in domestic affairs, an agreement signed by President Roosevelt.

70. In considering such slanderous complaints, submitted by an agent who did not represent China and consequently did not have any right to have a seat in the United Nations, the General Assembly and the First Committee were becoming the accomplices of adventurers. That would inevitably undermine the Organization's prestige. For those reasons, the USSR delegation requested that an end should be put to the consideration of such lies.

#### **Tribute to the memory the President of the Republic of Iceland**

71. The CHAIRMAN paid a tribute to the memory of Mr. Björnsson, President of the Republic of Iceland, whose death had been announced during the meeting.

72. He asked Mr. Thors to convey to the Icelandic Government his condolences and those of the members of the First Committee.

73. Mr. THORS (Iceland) thanked the Chairman.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.