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Chairman : Mr. Finn MOE (Norway).

Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891, A/C.1/676/Rev.1 and A/C.1/688) (continued)

[Item 18]*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that examination of the report of the Collective Measures Committee (A/1891) revealed that it was nothing but another step in the preparation for the unleashing of a new world war. No other result could have been expected from the illegal resolution of the General Assembly entitled "Uniting for peace". The intention was to enable the United States of America to avail itself of the armed forces of other Members of the United Nations in pursuit of its aggressive purposes. The correctness of that view was confirmed by the report of the Committee and it was not difficult to see what the Committee and the Secretary-General had had in mind in recommending that a sufficient armed force to stop any aggression should be placed at the disposal of the United Nations.

2. In that connexion, Mr. Baranovsky cited a statement made by General Bradley which made it clear that contrary to Article 47 of the Charter, the functions of the Military Staff Committee were to be transferred to one of the "aggressive blocs", or directly to the United States General Staff which would direct all "enforcement action" under the name and flag of the United Nations. The proposed so-called collective measures were intended to carry out on a broader basis the fundamental notions underlying the North Atlantic Treaty. Even the representative of Peru had considered it unreasonable to vest the control of military power in one State alone. The ultimate aim was to create a single system directed against the USSR and the countries of the peoples' democracies, the aggressive measures of which were to be covered up like the aggression in Korea, by the United Nations.

3. The committee in its report could not conceal the fact that the majority of nations had avoided participating

in the carrying out of the so-called collective measures. Though General Assembly resolution 377 (V) had gathered 52 votes at the fifth session, it was apparently one thing to vote under pressure, of the United States of America, and quite another to participate in the military venture in Korea, to which the people of the world had taken a negative attitude. According to the report, the so-called majority appeared to be limited, apart from the United States and one or two others, to Norway, Denmark, Greece and Colombia. Even countries such as Canada, New Zealand and the Netherlands had been reluctant to provide forces, in spite of the pressure brought to bear upon them. The indications were that the majority of States were quite unwilling to participate in any new aggressive ventures of the United States of America.

4. Citing various statements and reports by American business leaders, Mr. Baranovsky said that the peoples knew that the United States, and not the USSR, was responsible for the existing situation. He also cited a Press report to the effect that increased United States strength was designed for aggression against the USSR and that the aggressiveness of the United States would increase with its armaments.

5. In view of assertions as to the legitimacy of the North Atlantic Treaty, he wished to recall certain facts which had already been brought out. It was clear that the conclusion of that treaty represented a reversion to the old policy of isolating the USSR followed up to the Second World War. The fact that the North Atlantic Treaty was designed against the USSR had been made clear by the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Acheson, who had stated in 1949 that it had been conceived with the struggle against the USSR in mind.

6. There could be no comparison between the North Atlantic Treaty and the treaties concluded between the USSR and other countries. All the latter were bilateral treaties which guaranteed the sovereignty of the countries involved and which were directed against aggression. The USSR had such treaties not only with the peoples' democracies, but also with countries such as the United Kingdom and France, whereas the North Atlantic Treaty was consolidated into one aggressive unit under the leadership of the United States and was directed against the USSR. The regional arrangements contemplated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter had a geographical basis

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

and consisted of countries usually contiguous and sharing common interests. That was not true of the North Atlantic Treaty which, with the inclusion of Greece and Turkey, embraced a huge area stretching from the Arctic to the tropics.

7. The so-called Collective Measures Committee had gone even further than the "Uniting for peace" resolution in seeking to legitimize the transfer to the General Assembly of powers which the Charter had entrusted exclusively to the Security Council. In that connexion, the representative of Peru and merely repeated old ideas as to the utopian nature of the principle of the unanimity of the great Powers, without considering the dangers to peace involved in discarding that principle. The USSR had always attached great importance to that principle, which had been designed to safeguard the interests of the small Powers.

8. Thus, during the discussion of the problem of disarmament, several delegations had pointed out that only if the great Powers could reach agreement on international problems, could disarmament become really effective. The absence of agreement between the great Powers in itself represented a threat to peace. According to the report, the General Assembly was to name an organ to replace the Military Staff Committee on the grounds of the latter's alleged inaction. Was it not a fact, however, that the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Collective Measures Committee had done everything in their power to hold up the conclusion of agreements with the Security Council pursuant to Article 43? That proposal was completely contrary to the Charter and must be opposed. The same was true of the provision for agreements to be concluded with participating States, which would be in flagrant violation of Article 43.

9. The question of sanctions was placed in the foreground in the report of the Collective Measures Committee in the event a threat to peace should arise. As had been pointed out, however, the application of force under the Charter was the ultimate measure, before the application of which the Security Council was to call for measures of peaceful settlement. In the same way, Article 106 provided for consultation among the permanent members of the Security Council, pending the coming into force of special agreements under Article 43, with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as might be necessary to maintain international peace and security.

10. In conclusion, Mr. Baranovsky stated that his delegation would oppose the eleven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/676) based on the report of the Collective Measures Committee and would support the draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/688).

11. Mr. TRUCCO (Chile) said that the search for new methods to maintain international peace and security had been rendered the most urgent concern by the events of the previous five years.

12. Based on the experience of the League of Nations, the Security Council had been set up by the nations meeting at the San Francisco Conference as an organ which would be able to contain aggression and prevent wars by means of the armed forces and assistance which were to be made available to it under certain conditions by Article 43 of the Charter. At the San Francisco Conference the inseparable nature of peace and the maintenance and strengthening of certain principles within the territory of Member States had also been affirmed. Unfortunately, certain nations, as was well known, had systematically violated their duty and had sealed off the rest of the world. They

had also engaged in one-sided interference in the internal affairs of certain countries and had engaged in physical aggression, contrary to the Charter objective that force should be used only in the common interest. Reckless use of the veto in the Security Council had paralyzed the setting up of an effective system to avoid war and collective action to contain and to suppress armed aggression wherever it might break out.

13. In the circumstances, certain Member States had had to conclude agreements among themselves to safeguard their physical integrity. Thus, the treaties of Rio de Janeiro and the North Atlantic Treaty had been concluded.

14. The later aggression against Korea had led to a reaction which had produced General Assembly resolution 377 (V) and had given rise to the studies on which was based the report of the Collective Measures Committee.

15. His delegation had supported that resolution and the United Nations action to repel the aggression in Korea, but did not ignore the primary responsibility of the Security Council or desire to weaken its authority to act in the case of aggression. On the contrary, his Government maintained that the collective security system should be used by the Security Council, and should be used by the General Assembly if the Council found it impossible to fulfil its commitments.

16. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR was but another attempt to prevent in the Security Council the establishment of a collective security system, which the United Nations could not allow. The USSR could not be allowed immunity in its swallowing up of new victims.

17. In that connexion, Mr. Trucco said that the USSR representative's contention that it was the United Nations which had launched the aggression in Korea was astounding. If that had been the case, it was a unique event, since the forces alleged to have undertaken the aggression on 25 June 1950 had not succeeded in obtaining the slightest foothold on the territory of the supposed victim.

18. The attempt of the USSR representative to represent the United Nations action in Korea as not supported by the Members of the Organization, on the grounds that only eight countries were taking a direct part in the military operation, was belied by the votes which had taken place in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

19. Dealing with the amendment to the joint draft resolution proposed by his delegation together with the delegations of Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689), Mr. Trucco stated that it was designed to avoid the apparent contradiction among a number of paragraphs in the joint draft resolution and was drafted so as to avoid impairing undertakings already subscribed to by certain Member States.

20. It would be illogical to approve the conclusions of the Collective Measures Committee's report in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution, while directing the Committee, in paragraph 9, to continue its studies for another year. The other modifications resulted from the undertaking subscribed to by the American republics by the Inter-American Mutual Defence Pact of Rio de Janeiro and the declaration made at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Washington on 7 April 1951. Those undertakings obliged the American republics to devote their attention in the first place to the defence of the American continent.

21. The delegation of Chile, jointly with the Colombian delegation, was submitting an amendment (A/C.1/692) to paragraph 6 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution to take into account that fact. The countries in the

American continent, less developed than those which had been strengthened economically in Europe to stand up to aggression, had undertaken to develop the defensive system of the Americas and, subsequently, to co-operate in a collective security system which would guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of all the nations of the world.

22. Mr. Trucco would support the joint draft resolution together with the amendments which his delegation had joined in sponsoring.

23. Mr. ARDALAN (Iran), dealing with resolution 377 (V), entitled "Uniting for peace", pointed out that the General Assembly could discuss or be seized of all questions coming within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and could make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or the Security Council. Since the co-operation of States for the maintenance of international peace and security constituted the basis of the United Nations, it was inconceivable that measures taken to achieve that objective should be in contradiction with the Charter. Resolution 377 (V) was designed to prevent aggression and to place the great Powers on an equal footing with the small in relation to a strong United Nations capable of fulfilling the tasks with which it had been entrusted.

24. Analysing the report of the Collective Measures Committee, he stressed the importance of the principle that the burden resulting from economic measures should be shared equitably, avoiding the grave economic difficulties which could be caused to individual countries. In that connexion, he recalled that section E of General Assembly resolution 377 (V) declared that "a genuine and lasting peace" depended upon "the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-being in all countries". That was particularly necessary in the case of the inhabitants of under-developed areas, who constituted the majority of the inhabitants of the world. The great Powers must respect the aspirations of such small countries and the measures which the latter adopted in order to ensure their welfare. Mr. Ardalan stressed the benefits that would result in that connexion from the establishment of collective security.

25. The representative of Iran indicated that he supported the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/676) and the amendment submitted by Chile, Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689). He reminded the Committee that his delegation, together with seven other delegations, had submitted an amendment (A/C.1/690) which he hoped would be accepted by the sponsors of the joint draft resolution.

26. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that study of the report of the Collective Measures Committee and of the joint draft resolution showed that once again hypocritical language was being used to camouflage the intention to discard the principle of unanimity of the great Powers and to transform the United Nations into the tool of the aggressive policy of the "Anglo-American bloc".

27. In the process, the functions vested in the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee by the Charter, were to be entrusted to the so-called Collective Measures Committee. That deliberate violation of the Charter was to enable the United States of America to secure armed forces to prosecute its aggression in Korea and to perpetrate new aggressive acts under the banner of the United Nations. Contrary to assertions that the measures proposed by the committee in its report were not intended to circumvent the Security Council, the Press in western countries admitted that the Collective Measures Committee had become a little "Security Council" subordinate to the

western nations and designed to paralyse the veto by destroying the Security Council.

28. A number of countries, as revealed by the report, had gone so far as to question the very legality of the recommendation in regard to armed forces of the United Nations. In that connexion, Mr. Kiselyov cited the replies made by the Governments of India and Pakistan, refusing to assign any such armed forces. In the same way, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chile had denied reports to the effect that Chile would be prepared to place forces at the disposal of the United Nations, declaring that Chile would never send forces abroad.

29. The reply of the United States itself made no commitment to earmark forces but only to reconsider the question after the Korean affair had been settled. However, the United States maintained that its forces in Korea and in Europe amounted to fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 377 (V). The United Kingdom and France made similar replies referring also to Malaya and Indo-China. Resolution 377 (V) had proved very convenient for those Powers.

30. The purpose behind the panel of military experts had been revealed in the Press as the establishment of a supreme military co-ordination. The United States policy was to militarize the United Nations and convert it into a tool of the "Atlantic bloc".

31. The Chairman of the Collective Measures Committee had stated at the 462nd meeting on 3 December that the committee's task was to discover a system by which the General Assembly could take responsibility for international peace and security. The committee's proposals were in contravention of the Charter and were dictated solely by United States policy.

32. The measures listed in the report amounted to a programme of sanctions to be applied to the victims of United States aggression. Such sanctions were reserved under the Charter for the Security Council but the United States wished to gain control of economic and financial measures in order to be able to dominate the economies of other nations.

33. The Committee in its report proposed that all States should survey their legal and constitutional framework in order to see whether they ought to make any changes with a view to facilitating action against an aggressor. That recommendation would lead to still further interventions by the United States in the affairs of other nations.

34. The terms of paragraph 195 of the report made it clear that the United States intended to supersede the Military Staff Committee with an executive military authority which would be under its control. Moreover the provision in sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 260 that the authority could be a State or a group of States was clearly intended to refer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which was under United States control. Sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 253 envisaged the appointment of some new Eisenhower for all the United Nations forces.

35. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution reflected the United States desire to circumvent the Charter and drag its allies into aggressive adventures under the banner of the United Nations. The aim was to legitimize United States aggression not only in Korea but also for the future. The procedure to be followed was to undermine the Security Council which was the corner-stone of the United Nations.

36. The effect of the report and of the draft resolution would be to violate the Charter and turn the United Nations

into a tool for aggressive war. The amendment proposed by Chile, Colombia and Mexico (A/C.1/689) would not remedy the situation and was also unacceptable.

37. The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union (A/C.1/688), offered the only means of removing the tension from international relations and of keeping world peace and security. The Byelorussian delegation would vote in favour of that draft resolution.

38. Mr. COATON (Union of South Africa) said that his delegation had supported the "Uniting for peace" resolution at the fifth session on certain understandings, namely, that its provisions would only be invoked if aggression had taken place and the Security Council had been unable to act, that a "breach of the peace" would only be interpreted to mean a conflict between States and that a "threat to the peace" could only mean that danger of aggression was imminent or unavoidable. The delegation of the Union of South Africa had the same attitude towards the report of the Committee and the eleven-Power draft resolution.

39. The Government of the Union of South Africa regarded the committee's conclusions as satisfactory as general principles although some of them had implications that seemed to require further study. South Africa was not prepared to undertake specific commitments in addition to those already assumed in Korea, in Africa and the Middle East. The Government did not contemplate taking any steps of a legislative character since their constitution required parliamentary sanction for participation in hostilities.

40. The South African delegation welcomed the proposal for the continuation of the work of the Collective Measures Committee. It also agreed with the contention that governments would not be undertaking any advanced commitments.

41. It would support the draft resolution and any useful amendments which could be accepted by the sponsors.

42. Mr. KURAL (Turkey) thought that the draft resolution represented a further development of the "Uniting for peace" resolution which had given the General Assembly an effective role in cases of aggression. The object was to avoid the need for hasty improvisation and to discourage aggression by the establishment of suitable machinery. States had been called upon to earmark forces for the United Nations and the joint draft resolution was based upon the manifest willingness of many governments to do so.

43. The Turkish delegation believed that the implementation of that draft resolution would contribute considerably to the maintenance of peace.

44. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said that although the United States in the past had put forward many proposals to foster its aggressive policies, its desire to turn the United Nations into an instrument of its policy had never been so cynically clear as it was in the report of the Collective Measures Committee.

45. The work of that Committee had put in jeopardy provisions of the Charter relating to the maintenance of peace and security. The representative of Australia had tried to pretend that it contained only a catalogue of possible measures and not a plan of action. Such phrases could only be intended to delude public opinion. The true state of affairs was revealed by paragraph 21 of the committee's report which dealt with advance measures and co-ordination.

46. The committee had produced a plan which would present the United Nations to the United States as a tool for aggression. Previously the desire of the United States to control the United Nations had been blocked by the

principle of unanimity in the Security Council. But the Collective Measures Committee had elaborated methods which would enable the General Assembly to deal with matters concerning the maintenance of peace and security.

47. The fact that the proposals were illegal and in violation of the Charter was recognized in the United States. In a book which he had recently published Senator Taft had admitted the illegality of the Acheson plan. The views given by Mr. Stettinius in 1945 had already been quoted. The expert evidence given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1945 was to the effect that the activities of the General Assembly in connexion with peace and security were limited by the primary responsibility of the Security Council. It was therefore rash to claim that the United States had been guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter.

48. The true purposes of the United States were exposed by the references to Korea. The aggression against Korea had established a pattern for the Collective Measures Committee and had demonstrated to the United States the value of the United Nations flag as a disguise for its aggressions. The fact that the only connexion between the United Nations and the armies in Korea was in name had been revealed by General MacArthur at the Congressional hearing on 3 May 1951.

49. The Collective Measures Committee proposed in its report to replace the Military Staff Committee by an illegal authority to control military operations. It was pretended that that procedure was to be provisional and was needed until agreements had been concluded under Article 43. However, there was no need for any such interim arrangements since provision had been made in the Charter in Article 106. The real reason for the attempt to establish a fraudulent military staff committee was the desire to avoid co-operation. The United States attitude had been illustrated by the exchange between Senator Kefauver and Admiral Sherman at a Congressional hearing on 31 May regarding the difficulty of securing a military staff committee that would serve the United States. The United States desired neither the Military Staff Committee provided by the Charter, nor the interim arrangements of Article 106. It therefore sought to establish military experts under the control of the General Assembly which could be used as instruments for aggression.

50. Any attempt to allocate to other organs of the United Nations matters which were within the competence of the Security Council was an illegal attempt to change the Charter. The report of the Collective Measures Committee would discard a basic principle of the United Nations, namely, the need for the co-operation of the great Powers. The Committee therefore should be abolished.

51. It would be fitting for the Assembly to recommend to the Security Council that it should take measures to eliminate international tension. Article 28 offered the possibility for an appropriate recommendation and the Polish delegation would support the initiative taken by the Soviet Union. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union also contained an important provision concerning the conflict in Korea. If that problem could be solved a great contribution to peace and security would be made.

52. The Polish delegation believed that all who wished for the abatement of tension should follow the path pointed out by the USSR draft resolution.

53. Mr. RAFAEL (Israel) said that the report of the Collective Measures Committee was a useful attempt to deal with one aspect of resolution 377 (V), entitled "Uniting for peace".

54. In lending support to the report the delegation of Israel was guided by the belief that the lack of unanimity required to establish a system of collective security provided in the Charter had made it necessary to seek alternate measures. However, it believed that those measures should be invoked only in a serious emergency and only after the Security Council had had an opportunity to act.

55. The report presented neither a programme nor a system and involved no commitments. It presented rather a catalogue of possible measures. The Security Council had tried to establish a system under the terms of Article 43 of the Charter and Israel would welcome a further attempt. But the other Members of the United Nations did not have to give up merely because the five permanent members of the Security Council failed to agree.

56. Owing to its situation in the midst of hostile neighbours, Israel recognized the importance of a system of collective security and was particularly interested in those passages of the report and the draft resolution relating to regional arrangements. Nevertheless, such arrangements directed against a State in the same region, or based on racial or religious criteria, or failing to contribute to universal security were dangerous and contrary to the Charter.

57. The Israel Government was keeping under constant review the request that units should be earmarked for service with the United Nations. It was for the time being prevented from making definite arrangements in that respect by the necessity of maintaining large forces in a state of constant readiness in view of the refusal of the Arab States to reach a peace settlement.

58. Israel agreed with Egypt that United Nations resolutions should be implemented. Yet the Arab governments had for three years disregarded the Security Council's recommendations for the restoration of peaceful relations with Israel. Egypt had been one of the first countries to employ force to reverse a General Assembly resolution. It still maintained substantial military forces on foreign territory and continued to enforce an economic blockade and wage political warfare against Israel in violation of Council resolutions. In the light of its experience, the United Nations should draw up a guide to possible methods of peaceful settlement. Force should not be regarded as the only means of settling a dispute.

59. It had been generally agreed that the Security Council bore primary responsibility for peace and security and every effort should be made to restore it to effective operation. Israel supported that part of the Soviet resolution calling for a periodic meeting, but doubted the advisability of allocating specific items to such a meeting. The considerable progress in the Korean armistice talks might be interrupted if the question were brought to the Security Council. Such a meeting would be more fruitful if it were held after a cease-fire had been agreed upon. Israel hoped that all those who could influence the situation would exert every effort toward a speedy and successful termination of the armistice negotiations. Israel supported the rule of law and peaceful co-operation through collective action for peace.

The meeting rose at 2.5 p.m.