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**CONTENTS**

	Page
<i>Agenda item 70:</i>	
<i>General and complete disarmament (con-</i>	
<i>tinued)</i>	
<i>General debate (continued) . . . . .</i>	43

Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

**AGENDA ITEM 70**

**General and complete disarmament (A/4218, A/4219, A/C.1/818, A/C.1/820, A/C.1/821) (continued)**

**GENERAL DEBATE (continued)**

1. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) said that, as a small State, his country was aware that a solution of the disarmament problem depended primarily on agreement between the great Powers, but that did not prevent it from being vitally interested in a solution, which would have a direct bearing on world peace and security.

2. Although Afghanistan had certain doubts regarding the prospects for agreement on disarmament, it welcomed the improvement in the general atmosphere in which the question was being considered and the spirit in which the various proposals had been put forward. The goal of all negotiations should remain total disarmament, and the practical steps which could be taken, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons, should not be delayed.

3. Though the question of disarmament was primarily the responsibility of the United Nations, Afghanistan would support any efforts made outside the Organization, provided they were in conformity with the Charter. Afghanistan was interested in what the position of the small countries would be in a disarmed world and in what would then be understood by might. The small countries could place their hopes only in the United Nations.

4. As a small and under-developed country, Afghanistan recognized the economic benefits which would result from the diversion of armaments expenditure to economic assistance, but its supreme concern was the maintenance of peace and security and the observance of human rights in a peaceful world. In particular, the abolition of arms should be accompanied by guarantees to the small nations against all forms of foreign domination.

5. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) said that the priority given by the First Committee to the item on general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union reflected the unanimous opinion that the destructive power of atomic and hydrogen weapons developed by modern science and technology, and the speed and efficiency of carriers of such weapons, had created

a situation where war could no longer be used as an instrument of national policy. As a result of that awareness, major political and strategic changes had taken place and many values had had to be reappraised. The theories invoked to justify the arms race had been invalidated; military rivalry between nations had proved self-defeating. Peoples had arrived at the only logical conclusion: they could survive only if the means of waging war were abolished and nations lived in conditions of peaceful coexistence.

6. As a result of the pressure of public opinion and of the visit of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, to the United States, a favourable atmosphere had been created for progress towards disarmament. The plan placed before the General Assembly by Mr. Khrushchev (799th plenary meeting) was the boldest, the most comprehensive and the most realistic programme for the abolition of war. It had been hailed in all parts of the world; nobody had dared to reject it in principle. Bulgaria had stated its attitude to the plan in a declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on 24 September 1959 (A/C.1/818). However, certain groups in Western countries, unable to rid themselves of reactionary attitudes of distrust, continued to view all disarmament proposals in the context of the continuing arms race and the cold war, and were attempting to block any progress towards disarmament. Other groups, while adopting a constructive attitude to the plan, were unable to shake off entirely their former ways of thinking, based on an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.

7. It was not true to say that the present Soviet proposal (A/4219) merely reproduced the USSR disarmament plan placed before the League of Nations.<sup>1/</sup> It was a new plan which was being put forward at a time when conditions had changed radically, when science and technology had literally transformed the world. It was being sponsored by a nation which had become one of the two most powerful on earth and which now had loyal allies. The fact that it reproduced some of the points of the plan laid before the League merely demonstrated the continuity of the Soviet Union's policy of peace, a policy aimed at protecting the vital interests of all countries and not just those with socialist systems of government.

8. The objections to the Soviet plan raised by those who considered that total disarmament within a four-year period was impractical were unfounded. If the parties showed good will and the urgency of the problem remained their primary concern, there was no doubt that complete disarmament could be achieved in that time. In the fourteen years during which no progress had been made towards that goal, such large stocks of increasingly powerful weapons had been accumulated, such efficient methods of carrying them

<sup>1/</sup> See League of Nations publications, IX, Disarmament, 1932.IX.63 (documents Conf. D. 82 and 87), pp. 124-137.

had been developed that there was a real danger that a war of annihilation could be unleashed, by inadvertence or by error, by a handful of technicians. Instead of accusing the authors of the Soviet proposal of undue haste, all efforts should be bent towards ending the arms race, protests should be voiced against the establishment of new atomic bases within reach of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, against the authorization given by NATO to West Germany to produce atomic weapons, and against the enormous investments of capital in the armaments industry in West Germany.

9. To those who regarded the question of control as the principal stumbling block in the Soviet proposal, he would say that while control in itself should not be urged to the exclusion of all else, adequate control to implement disarmament measures at every stage was essential and the Soviet Union had not only recognized that fact, but had called for sufficient controls. The provisions for control in the Soviet plan should not be read out of context; it was not true, for example, that the USSR would institute full control only in the third stage. On the contrary, as soon as agreement in principle was reached on any specific aspect of disarmament and a start was made in implementing that agreement, control measures would immediately be applied. To institute control before any disarmament measures had been taken would be tantamount to carrying out intelligence operations against other States. Indeed, the course of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests demonstrated the wisdom of applying control measures to effective disarmament: although the details of a control and inspection system for testing had not been worked out, there was full confidence that none of the parties had resorted to testing during the agreed period. Confidence was essential in all disarmament negotiations. Bulgaria would welcome assurances from the Western Powers to match the Soviet pledge that it would not carry out any tests of nuclear weapons so long as they did not do so.

10. Fears had been expressed that, if total disarmament was achieved and nations had nothing but internal police forces to protect them, the larger and more economically powerful States might commit aggression against the smaller States. There was reason to believe that those fears were unfounded. To wage a successful war in a disarmed world, a State would have to take more special measures than when States were armed to the teeth, and the control system set up would prevent the re-establishment of armed forces, troop concentrations, and all other means of attack. Socialist countries had no intention of intervening by force in the internal affairs of other States; no groups in those countries desired territorial conquest. In certain capitalist countries, on the other hand, those groups which continued to seek domination of other nations would be prevented from achieving their ends. The system of control under the Soviet proposal would eliminate the danger of a rebuilding of armed strength. Moreover, as the United Kingdom representative had rightly pointed out at the 1029th meeting, with each forward step towards disarmament, more and more confidence between nations would be generated, more and more tensions would be eased. Indeed, the conclusion of an international treaty on disarmament would create an atmosphere designed to eliminate tension and help to solve outstanding political problems; the diversion of

armaments expenditure to the economic assistance of under-developed and other nations would create a new climate of co-operation and confidence consolidating friendly relations between States. The argument that the prevailing political and social order should be maintained within States in a totally disarmed world was untenable. In particular, it was inadmissible that guarantees should be given that capitalist societies would remain capitalist societies, but that the internal systems of the socialist countries would be altered. The peoples of all countries should be free to determine their own social and political structure, and there could be no valid pretext for infringing that freedom.

11. It was not true that the Soviet Union had insisted on general and complete disarmament or nothing. That distortion had been given currency by those who, arguing that security was indivisible, had attempted to justify an acceleration of the arms race. In fact, the Soviet Union had consistently held that partial disarmament measures should be adopted with a view to immediate solutions if no agreement was found possible on total disarmament.

12. Bulgaria unreservedly supported general and complete disarmament. In line with its policy of peaceful co-operation, it had proposed a non-intervention pact with its neighbours. It did not wish the Balkans to become a zone of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, at a time when a summit conference was being prepared to remove outstanding causes of tension, an agreement had been negotiated for the installation of atomic launching bases in Turkey. Bulgaria viewed such moves as diametrically opposed to the creation of a proper climate for disarmament. Indeed, the establishment of atomic bases and suggestions for bringing outside pressure to change the régimes in socialist countries prompted Bulgaria to doubt the sincerity of the motives of the Western Powers.

13. The General Assembly should adopt a resolution reflecting the fact that the merits of the Soviet plan and the need to give it careful study in subsequent negotiations had not been questioned by any representative and expressing the hopes of all peoples for progress towards disarmament. The resolution should be forwarded to the ten-Power disarmament committee. The debate in the Committee should serve as a basis for a General Assembly recommendation to the ten-Power committee to guide it in its work.

14. The opposition to disarmament in certain quarters must be resolutely resisted and negotiations should be started with the firm determination to make progress. There should be no intimidation of nations on the grounds that they would ultimately become defenceless in an unarmed world. Instead, efforts should be focused on demonstrating the real and present dangers of atomic war. Control should not be said to have been accepted by one side only; that was patently untrue; the socialist countries were as much concerned with effective control as any other States.

15. Mr. QUAISON-SACKKEY (Ghana) said that his delegation considered the Soviet disarmament plan as one of the greatest issues before the General Assembly and expressed the hope that the First Committee would continue to conduct the present debate in a spirit of harmony and restraint and that it would adopt constructive proposals that would facilitate the work of the ten-Power disarmament committee and

the United Nations Disarmament Commission. As a young country which was striving to raise its people's standard of living, Ghana had a particular stake in the maintenance of peace; the diversion of the resources now being devoted to armaments into constructive fields would make a decisive difference for the under-developed countries.

16. The Soviet proposal, the United Kingdom plan (A/C.1/820) and the observations made by the representatives of the United States (1027th meeting) and France (1030th meeting) all seemed directed towards the ultimate goal of complete disarmament with accompanying control and inspection. The principal disagreements concerned the degree of inspection and control to be exercised and the manner in which they should operate. However, those were technical questions which could be left to experts. The essential point was that, given the existing lack of confidence between States, control and inspection were necessary; there seemed to be general agreement that complete disarmament could be achieved only by stages, and his delegation felt that each stage in the disarmament process must be accompanied by corresponding arrangements for effective inspection and control.

17. Inasmuch as the Disarmament Commission had assigned the task of working out a disarmament agreement to the ten-Power committee, it would be unrealistic for the First Committee to adopt a detailed plan for disarmament. Its rôle should be that of offering encouragement to the Powers that were to deal with the problem in the ten-Power committee. However, a representative of the Disarmament Commission should be permanently associated with the work of the ten-Power committee, and he hoped that all States accepted the principle that a disarmament agreement must ultimately be the responsibility of the United Nations.

18. Noting that the area of disagreement in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, which had just been resumed, had apparently narrowed to purely technical issues, he said that agreement in that field would provide evidence of the sincerity of the nuclear Powers' pronouncements on the need for general disarmament.

19. Nevertheless, disarmament alone would not automatically abolish war, for the fundamental causes of war lay in the attitudes of nations—in their desires for territorial aggrandizement, their racial prejudices

and their political ideologies. In a world in which the advances of science and technology had done away with hunger, disease and ignorance, it should be possible for nations to renounce territorial ambitions, to avoid fomenting race hatred as an instrument of national policy and to refrain from imposing their ideologies on other peoples. Only in that way could progress be made towards the permanent abolition of war.

20. Mr. GARIN (Portugal) said that the problem of disarmament vitally affected all nations, including smaller ones like his own; he urged the major Powers not to permit the many difficulties involved to deter them from seeking an equitable solution.

21. The Soviet proposal on general and complete disarmament seemed to offer hope that agreement could be reached on practical and mutually acceptable measures of disarmament, since it reflected the Soviet Union's recognition that another war would bring disaster for all, the weak and the strong alike. However, it left unanswered the question of how international security would be maintained in a disarmed world; he hoped that the points raised in that connexion by the United States representative would receive the attention of all concerned, including the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal was also somewhat ambiguous in its acceptance of the principle of control; it appeared to call for a large measure of purely self-imposed control and perhaps even the right of veto, which would render the entire system of control meaningless. The United Kingdom proposal, while not in conflict with the fundamental aims of the Soviet plan, represented a more balanced approach to the various issues involved in the problem of disarmament.

22. The First Committee should refer the Soviet and the United Kingdom plans, together with the suggestions presented by the French representative (A/C.1/821) and any other proposals that might be made to the ten-Power disarmament committee without indicating a preference for any one of the various proposals. It was logical that the ten-Power committee should be assigned the task of defining the specific basis for agreement on balanced disarmament, which must be carried out in stages and accompanied by self-enforcing measures of inspection; the committee should report its final conclusions to the Disarmament Commission.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.