

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

FOURTEENTH SESSION
Official Records



**FIRST COMMITTEE, 1040th
MEETING**

*Friday, 30 October 1959,
at 3.15 p.m.*

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Agenda item 70:</i>	
<i>General and complete disarmament (continued)</i>	
<i>General debate and consideration of the draft</i>	
<i>resolution (continued)</i>	<i>71</i>

Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

AGENDA ITEM 70

**General and complete disarmament (A/4218, A/4219,
A/C.1/818, A/C.1/820, A/C.1/821, A/C.1/L.234)
(continued)**

**GENERAL DEBATE AND CONSIDERATION OF THE
DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/C.1/L.234) (continued)**

1. Mr. DE LEQUERICA (Spain) said that it was wise to refer the detailed examination of the various disarmament proposals to the ten-Power disarmament committee. In doing so, the United Nations enhanced its political dignity and its moral authority. The committee would, of course, have before it the full record of the debate and would submit its conclusions to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, on which all Member States were represented. The United Nations should be represented in the committee, and he would welcome the choice of Mr. Padilla Nervo as its representative. In matters of disarmament, however, only nations with powerful military establishments could put forward proposals that would command the respect of other States. Moreover, in dealing with so difficult a question, the smaller the deliberating body, the more effective would be the results. For its part, the United Nations would continue to represent the force of world public opinion, giving authority to the agreements reached.

2. Like all other nations, Spain looked forward to a reduction in armaments and was prepared to consider the proposals for total disarmament, Utopian though they might be. However, the dream of a peaceful world should not weaken political vigilance; nations should be careful not to accept vague proposals without carefully assessing the safeguard they provided. As a member of one of the two great power blocs in the world, Spain's primary concern was that a reduction of armaments should not upset the balance of forces or weaken what Spain regarded as major guarantees of peace and of the orderly development of human civilization. Even if the instruments of war were abolished, there would still be great dangers. Consequently, the nations negotiating with the Soviet bloc should proceed with great caution, and insist on guarantees and controls at every stage in order to preserve a balance of forces. Mistrust on both sides was the point of departure, but it did not preclude agreement on basic principles. Indeed, the political and institutional development of

the most highly developed countries had largely been the product of the mistrust of power and its arbitrary uses. Similarly, through the painstaking solution of technical problems, international mistrust might bring about balance and mutual restraint.

3. It was not necessary to believe that only an ambitious plan for general and complete disarmament could lead to a reduction in arms and armaments; that result could be obtained by a more modest plan for progressive and rapid disarmament. The cold war could be made less costly, and what might be called a "guarded peace" could be achieved. The prevailing mistrust could become a constructive factor if it encouraged the institution of the effective controls which should go hand in hand with every measure of disarmament so that no party could gain an advantage at any stage. For example, nations with large armies stationed at strategic points bordering on weaker nations could not be allowed to eliminate nuclear weapons while retaining their strength in conventional armaments. The problem was so complex that special precautions should be taken in all sensitive areas such as central Europe and the Middle East.

4. There was nothing in the United States statements and the United Kingdom proposal (A/C.1/820) with which any peace-loving nation could quarrel. Certain technical aspects of the Soviet proposal (A/4219) might also serve as a basis for negotiation. Nevertheless, he had strong reservations regarding the Soviet proposal for the abolition of all armies and their replacement by internal militias, with which the Communist countries had had long experience. Armies and armed forces had not only been the means of protecting nations against aggression from without; they had proved essential for the maintenance of internal order and as a factor in social discipline. Military establishments had been schools of valour and an instrument in the education of the masses. It should be recognized, moreover, that the socialist countries, which were advocating the liquidation of Western military establishments, far from having destroyed the military spirit within their own borders, had converted their own military forces into effective instruments of their national policy.

5. It was difficult to answer the United States representative's question (1027th meeting) concerning the type and size of the international police force which would be responsible for safeguarding peace in a disarmed world. There was danger that such a force, placed at the service of the United Nations, might convert the world Organization into a world government. In a world without armies or with only token national forces, the existence of a powerful world security force would provoke a jockeying for power and would pervert the spirit of the United Nations. Moreover, pending total disarmament, the great Powers would always have larger armies than the smaller nations, and it was doubtful that the United Nations permanent army could take successful punitive action against

them if they failed to act in accordance with the principles of justice. It was therefore premature to decide what principle of international law should govern the use of such an international security force. To ask more of the United Nations than that it should safeguard peace, denounce aggression and, where possible, help to put down rebellion was to compromise its very existence. The Organization should be kept within its present limitations, taking enforcement action only when it had decisive world support. The establishment of an international security force would require a revision of the United Nations Charter, particularly with regard to the powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The cases in which United Nations forces could intervene would have to be specified. It would have to guard against using its international force to intervene in the internal affairs of States on the decision of a majority which might well be partial. The right of veto would have to be abolished because no country should have to defer to any other in matters of self-defence. The internal security forces of every State would have to be fixed on a basis of equity, taking into account the particular circumstances of each State. Nations were jealous of their independence—in particular, the newly independent nations which would not tolerate a neo-colonial paternalism—and while they might accept limitations and compromises, they would not yield to orders. Consequently, procedures for the maintenance of internal order should not be prematurely put to the test.

6. Reviewing the development of the debates on disarmament, he pointed out that the settlement of outstanding political questions was no longer being made a pre-condition for negotiation by the one side and the immediate prohibition of nuclear weapons by the other. As the United States representative had said (1027th meeting), the progress of the current conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests would serve as a good indication of the course of future disarmament negotiations. Spain hoped that those talks would be successful and would result in the conclusion of an agreement placing nuclear tests under international control. The question of nuclear tests was a key to the treatment of the whole question of control. It was also satisfying to note that agreement had been reached regarding tests for peaceful purposes under international inspection and that experts were examining the problem of detecting explosions at great heights and in outer space. He hoped that the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack had not been futile and that the ten-Power disarmament committee would take up the question. The concession made by the Western Powers, under which the experts would be authorized to discuss the political aspects of the problem, should expedite the negotiations. The Soviet Union had also made a concession with regard to the liquidation of military bases: it had agreed that they should be liquidated as conventional armaments were progressively reduced.

7. Thus, Spain recognized that progress had been made, but it urged caution. The West should guard against agreeing to broad principles which the socialist countries could accept at no sacrifice but which, in the absence of adequate safeguards, could render the Western world physically and morally defenceless.

8. U THANT (Burma) said that, while the adoption of the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.234) which had been presented jointly by the great Powers and endorsed

by all Member States, did not signify the end of the cold war, it would give great hope to a world yearning for peace. It would corroborate an important fact which had emerged from fourteen years of United Nations experience, namely, that the Organization could take action on vital problems only if the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were in agreement. Achievement of the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control within the shortest possible time would require a basic reappraisal of the entire security problem and a willingness on the part of all concerned to refrain from attributing prior failures to one side or the other. Since the end of the Second World War, neither the Soviet Union nor the West had assumed a really responsible position on the question of disarmament owing to fear and suspicion on both sides.

9. He was gratified that the declarations made in the General Assembly by both the Soviet Union (799th plenary meeting) and the United Kingdom (798th plenary meeting) had recognized that the basic problems were human ones and were chiefly political and economic, rather than military. The declarations gave promise of a new era of mutual confidence. Moreover, the spokesmen for the Soviet Union had given assurances indicating a willingness on the part of the USSR to give new emphasis to the problem of control and inspection. Those assurances would facilitate the task of the ten-Power disarmament committee.

10. The credit for the present heartening development in international relations should go not only to Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and to Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, but to Mr. Eisenhower, President of the United States, for his courageous act of statesmanship in inviting Mr. Khrushchev to the United States in the prevailing state of Western opinion. The three statesmen were preparing for a meeting at the summit in the belief that the best approach to ending the cold war was to revive the wartime system of conferences. The success of the ten-Power disarmament committee would depend on whether they could advance further and initiate the difficult constructive process of reaching agreements on how to keep international peace.

11. His delegation believed that the division of the world between rich and poor nations was more lasting and ultimately more dangerous than the division between Communist and non-Communist countries. As an under-developed country, Burma welcomed the prospect that, as a result of disarmament, a substantial proportion of the wealth of the highly developed nations would be diverted to the less fortunate areas. Unless the wealthy countries participated in the efforts of two-thirds of the world's peoples to raise their perilously low standards of living, they would fail to meet the challenge of the second half of the twentieth century. It was essential to find some way of creating a world community with a proper division of all resources and without wasting them in a sterile arms race.

12. No genuine and enduring system of disarmament could be achieved unless the China issue was settled. The People's Republic of China had the largest army in the world, and no disarmament agreement would have any value unless it was a signatory to it. Burma hoped that the ten-Power disarmament committee would take note of that very important fact.

13. Mr. FERNANDEZ (Ecuador) said that civilization would have to undergo drastic change if the world was

to attain the ideal of general and complete disarmament. Law would have to become the supreme guide of life, and the balance of power between nations would have to be based on a constitutional régime, in which the nationalist aggressiveness that had characterized international life for centuries would play no part. Viewed in that light, disarmament appeared virtually alien to human conduct and therefore impracticable. However, there were new factors which made the objective of a disarmed world a less visionary undertaking.

14. From the statements heard in the Committee, and particularly those of the four great Powers, it was clear that everyone sincerely sought an end to the arms race. The proposal for total disarmament had had an overwhelming emotional impact on all peoples. Their fear of destruction, which they had previously evaded by appealing for protection to forces outside themselves, was now being turned to constructive use: the knowledge that they held the key to their survival or annihilation led them to clamour for disarmament.

15. The present debate on disarmament was of historic significance: all the Powers primarily concerned had endorsed the objective of comprehensive disarmament. Ecuador believed that both nuclear and conventional arms should be abolished. Having achieved a temporary cessation of nuclear test explosions, the next steps should be the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, and the progressive elimination of armed forces and of the armaments industry. An essential corollary of those efforts was the creation of a climate of confidence: so long as confidence did not prevail, States would have to continue to depend on force for their national security.

16. The disarmament process should be gradual, balanced and controlled; arms and armaments should be eliminated by stages subject to simultaneous control. Like all small countries, Ecuador could make no major contribution to that process; it could only express the hope that the world would ultimately attain the ideal of peaceful coexistence. Nobody stood to gain by another war; everybody would benefit by a consolidation of peace; nobody could be indifferent or neutral when faced with the prospect of annihilation.

17. The establishment of the ten-Power disarmament committee was significant because it meant a resumption of negotiations on disarmament by the Powers primarily concerned. While those Powers alone were in a position to settle matters of strategy and technology, the United Nations should retain responsibility for the political application of their decisions. Only the United Nations could help nations to make the internal adjustments which would become necessary as a result of disarmament. Confidence, born of conviction, provided the framework within which disputes could be settled peacefully and the United Nations should strengthen that confidence to the point where it would have the moral authority effectively to guarantee collective security based on the rights of States and on justice.

18. Two essential elements of controlled disarmament were, as the Peruvian representative had said (1033rd meeting), the possibility of collective action against aggression and of collective action to punish aggression. The third vital factor was the war against poverty, backwardness and inadequate standards of living. However, people should guard against the illusion that, once the process of disarmament had been initi-

ated, there would be an immediate diversion of resources for purposes of economic development. The abolition of arms would not alter human nature, but it would alter men's views about the future.

19. Nothing should be permitted to interfere with, postpone or hamper the negotiations in the ten-Power committee. Ecuador had accordingly co-sponsored the joint draft resolution; it reflected agreement between the USSR and the United States and the hopes of all peoples.

20. Mr. NASH (New Zealand) recalled that the Soviet Union had advocated total disarmament on several earlier occasions. While not new, however, the proposals put forward in the General Assembly by Mr. Khrushchev (799th plenary meeting) had been accorded more wide-spread attention than any similar statement made in the past.

21. The authors of the United Nations Charter had sought to lay the foundations of a world free from want and secure from the threat of war. However, where nations were dominated by fear, little progress could be made. In order to achieve the freedom necessary for human survival, and above all that freedom from fear which all human beings should enjoy, the world had to be rid of poverty and hunger. Regrettably, since 1945, a large part of the world's resources had been devoted, not to human welfare, but to the preservation of a precarious security based on the accumulation of destructive weapons.

22. Although comprehensive disarmament had constantly been the goal of most Members of the United Nations, necessity had compelled them to concentrate for many years on more limited objectives. The recent reaffirmation of that goal was accordingly to be welcomed, particularly as it had been prompted by proposals submitted by two great Powers at a time when negotiations on the broad range of disarmament were to be resumed.

23. There was reason to hope that study of the specific question of measures against surprise attack could be successfully resumed, without prejudice to the discussion of broader issues of general disarmament. It was also a source of satisfaction that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed to pursue their negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests for, if agreement could not be secured on that limited issue, comprehensive measures of disarmament would remain a distant prospect. The reasons stated by the New Zealand Government at the thirteenth session of the Assembly (770th plenary meeting) for urging a separate agreement on the discontinuance of tests had lost none of their validity. Such an agreement would end the problem of radioactive fall-out, prevent nuclear weapons from being developed by an ever-increasing number of countries, provide experience in establishing controls and increase confidence among States. New Zealand welcomed the fact that no tests had been held during 1959; but it was his Government's hope that the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests would result in an agreement upon their permanent cessation, to which all States would subscribe. One of the most important benefits of such an agreement would be the experience to be gained in the operation of an effective system of inspection and control which might be applied to measures of comprehensive disarmament. Control was not an end in itself but a means of establishing lasting security. Measures of

verification should accompany each stage of disarmament and, in the event of either partial or comprehensive disarmament, should be universal in application.

24. While the two plans submitted for comprehensive disarmament had a number of elements in common, they also had many points of difference. But it was above all significant that such bold proposals could now be submitted without evoking merely doubt and scepticism. It showed that progress in disarmament largely depended upon the reduction of the suspicions which had so long beset relations between the great Powers.

25. International peace and security would continue to be precarious unless progress was made towards the solution of outstanding political problems. It was accordingly to be hoped that the recent improvement in international relations would be reflected in progress on such questions. The United Kingdom disarmament plan took full account of the need to establish international confidence and, in providing for disarmament by carefully balanced stages, with adequate controls, represented a realistic approach to the goal of total security. The Soviet plan sought an ideal solution, which New Zealand would unhesitatingly support in principle, but it must be acknowledged that earlier experience in disarmament negotiations raised doubts whether the objective could be attained so rapidly. Although the Soviet plan had been presented in very general terms, his delegation welcomed Mr. Khrushchev's statement on the question of control, which indicated that differences might now have been reduced to a point where further negotiations could yield positive results. It was to be hoped that further clarifications would be provided at the appropriate time.

26. Both proposals were open to, and called for, further discussion. They should, together with any proposals from other States, be referred to the ten-Power disarmament committee which, it was hoped, would also consider suggestions for partial disarmament measures. Despite some sense of regret that disarmament negotiations were largely to be pursued outside the United Nations, New Zealand had welcomed the establishment of that committee, in the realization that progress in disarmament must ultimately depend on agreement between the four major Powers, and that only small bodies were conducive to the conduct of practical negotiations. It hoped, however, that in order to maintain the ultimate responsibility of the United Nations in disarmament, the ten-Power committee would submit full reports to the Disarmament Commission and that the United Nations might be effectively represented at the committee's meetings. One of the Disarmament Commission's most important tasks would be to formulate measures for the wider application of agreements reached by the ten-Power committee.

27. The New Zealand Government hoped that the Disarmament Commission would not attend exclusively to the problems which lay beyond the immediate purview of the ten-Power committee, as it might well provide the latter with useful guidance as its work proceeded. Moreover, it was a necessary corollary to the establishment of the committee outside the United Nations that the full membership of the United Nations should be informed and, where appropriate, consulted at all stages.

28. A number of useful proposals had been submitted by various delegations for study by the Disarmament

Commission. The Netherlands representative had properly emphasized (1031st meeting) that disarmament was not necessarily a panacea for the world's ills, as both the opportunity and the capacity for domination could persist even when armaments and armed forces were reduced to the level required for purposes of internal security. Nor would the existence of an international police force prevent power politics from being exercised in economic and commercial relations. Careful consideration would have to be given at the appropriate time to such problems.

29. It had been stated that the smaller Powers depended for their existence on their own defensive arrangements or on collective defence agreements. It was perhaps not sufficiently realized that the major agency that defended the smaller powers was the United Nations, which could have a far greater influence on world affairs than any great Power, however strong. In spite of its limitations, the United Nations was still the most powerful agency for peace in the world. It was indeed heartening to think that much had been done since the founding of the United Nations to give that body even more power than had originally been envisaged.

30. Mr. Khrushchev had made a telling statement in predicting that peaceful competition between the Powers in building up social services and material welfare in place of destructive weapons would be universally welcomed. The New Zealand Government whole-heartedly endorsed the statement in the joint communiqué issued on 27 September 1959 by President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev that the question of general disarmament was the most important one facing the world today. Nuclear weapons had been perfected to such a point that it was doubtful if the world could survive a nuclear war.

31. It was to be hoped that the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests would culminate in an agreement. The most difficult problems still outstanding were the composition of control posts and the Soviet Union's insistence that certain decisions associated with the functioning of the control system should be unanimous. However, new proposals had been submitted on the subject and, while agreement had not yet been reached, negotiations would continue. The three Powers had suspended tests. It was to be hoped that suspension would soon be made permanent and that other countries capable of producing nuclear weapons would recognize the climate of world opinion and refrain from initiating tests.

32. Within the context of those developments, the General Assembly was now considering three main disarmament proposals. His delegation viewed with sympathy the objectives of the Irish proposal concerning the prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.1), but was uncertain how it could be translated into effective measures with adequate controls.

33. Mr. Khrushchev had submitted a proposal for complete and, virtually, immediate world disarmament and, as an alternative, a partial disarmament plan based on measures previously advocated by the Soviet Union. He had, however, favoured complete disarmament because of the difficulties involved in negotiating a step-by-step agreement. His statement was to be welcomed because it reflected his concern with such a vital question. Moreover, there was reason to believe that the Soviet Union was more fearful than any other

nation of witnessing the destruction of everything it had built up. It was encouraging that Mr. Khrushchev had deliberately chosen to force the pace on disarmament, having realistically concluded that nuclear war would not lead to a military victory or the final triumph of any one political system. The Soviet Union was thus committed to making a further effort to reach agreement on disarmament. Its specific proposal, however, appeared to be less a plan for disarmament than a statement of objectives for such a plan, and the obstacles to agreement in the past had been related not to objectives, but to measures of implementation. It would have been helpful if Mr. Khrushchev had discussed some of the points of disagreement concerning the vital question of inspection and control. Substantial progress might be made if it were agreed that representatives of the various nations should have free access to all areas for inspection purposes. It would also have been interesting to hear Mr. Khrushchev's views on possible machinery for maintaining peace and settling international disputes after disarmament was achieved.

34. The United Kingdom proposal was probably the most practical approach that had been suggested. However, the Soviet and United Kingdom proposals were by no means incompatible and, if the Soviet Union indeed was prepared to enter fully into the spirit of complete disarmament, it would undoubtedly find the Western Powers responsive.

35. Although a number of major problems still confronted the world, there were no grounds for undue pessimism. Real progress could be discerned in economic and social conditions in many parts of the world. Progress was, however, subject to certain qualifications. First, the changes that must take place in the under-developed countries were by no means predictable and might be accompanied by turbulence. Second, there was the spread of communism—which in his view was to be feared, not as a political or an economic theory, but as a means of impeding free thought. Lastly, there were problems to be faced in connexion with China, the Middle East, and certain troubled areas and divided countries. It had been stated that discussions on disarmament would be useless while one quarter of the world's population remained outside the United Nations.

36. However, a number of recent developments, such as the encouraging statement on Algeria made on 16 September 1959 by the President of France, General de Gaulle, and the improvements recently witnessed with regard to Cyprus, all gave hope that solutions to the world's present grave problems might eventually be found.

37. The existence of nuclear weapons made the present situation unique. The cry for disarmament came not only from idealists but from realists and persons with vision. With patience and integrity the political problems of the world could be settled on a basis that would enable scientific resources to be utilized fully to give all human beings the freedom and material benefits to which they were entitled.

38. Mr. KESTLER (Guatemala) said that disarmament, important though it was, could not of itself ensure conditions of security in which every State could conduct its affairs in accordance with its own political principles. So long as inequality existed among States, the large States would be in a position to impose their will on the small ones. Other speakers had stressed

the need for States to give up their desire to dominate others and the dangers inherent in economic and ideological aggression. Since disarmament was therefore not an end in itself but a means of ensuring international security, it must be implemented gradually and in conjunction with other measures directed towards the same objective.

39. Once complete disarmament was achieved, the international community, rather than individual States, would be responsible for maintaining peace and the rule of law. An international police force would have to be set up, and a decision would have to be made as to the domestic security forces to be retained by the individual States. The international control organization, whose supervisory functions would necessarily extend into the political, administrative and industrial spheres as well as the military, must function without undermining the sovereign equality of States. As the representative of a small country, he questioned whether that end would be fully attained under the Soviet plan for a control body composed of all States with an international staff chosen on the basis of equitable geographical distribution.

40. It was the complexity of the problem of general and complete disarmament and its vast political and legal ramifications that had prompted his delegation to join in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.234. Although the ten-Power disarmament committee had been set up outside the United Nations, a small body of that type was the logical forum for discussion of a problem like disarmament which could be solved only through agreement among the great Powers. At the same time, the basic responsibility for maintaining international peace and security lay with the United Nations; the link established between the ten-Power Committee, on the one hand, and the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the First Committee, on the other, helped to uphold that principle.

41. His delegation welcomed the agreement of the great Powers to work towards a solution of the disarmament problem based on the principle of gradual arms reduction with accompanying measures of control; it hoped that the efforts of the ten-Power committee and, ultimately of the United Nations Disarmament Commission would be crowned with success.

42. Dato' KAMIL (Federation of Malaya) said that, while fully conscious that any workable programme of disarmament must necessarily ensue from an agreement among the great Powers, the Federation of Malaya, as one of the smaller nations, believed that all countries should have equal responsibility in supporting efforts to find a solution to such a pressing problem. The smaller nations also realized that without peace there could be no progress and that, at a time when all their energies needed to be concentrated on achieving economic and social development, expenditure on armaments was unprofitable.

43. It was gratifying that the difficult question of disarmament was being discussed in a spirit of understanding and harmony. His country was extremely anxious that the question of disarmament should be settled definitively and, realizing that the initiative lay with the nuclear Powers, would welcome any proposal made by them to settle that crucial problem. In spite of differences in approach, it was encouraging that the proposals submitted by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were both directed to a common objective, namely, complete disarmament. The state-

ments made by the representatives of the United States (1027th meeting) and France (1030th meeting) provided further evidence that the great Powers had agreed on that common objective and were prepared to negotiate an acceptable agreement.

44. The ten-Power disarmament committee would have an opportunity to discuss the technical aspects of the proposal and to reconcile differences in approach. The existing disagreements on the question of inspection and control should not prove an insurmountable obstacle to progress and could best be discussed by the ten-Power committee.

45. Certain observations, however, might be borne in mind by the committee during its discussions. The question of security was of paramount importance. As the Minister of External Affairs of the Federation of Malaya had pointed out (821st plenary meeting), disarmament should be the fruit of an effective system of international security rather than its basis.

46. His delegation believed that no progress could be made towards disarmament if the countries concerned were not given adequate assurance that other countries were also engaged in disarmament. Such an assurance could only be forthcoming if an effective system of inspection and control existed. Only thus could the balance of power be maintained, preserving international security, at each planned stage of disarmament. It would be unrealistic to discuss disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons outside the context of over-all disarmament, and there should be a close interrelation between disarmament in nuclear weapons and disarmament in conventional weapons, so that advantage could not be gained by one country through a superiority in conventional weapons.

47. In welcoming the establishment of the ten-Power committee and supporting any proposal for referring current disarmament plans to that body, the Federation of Malaya did not depart from its position that the United Nations should remain the ultimate authority on the question of disarmament. It was satisfactory to note that the ten-Power committee would submit reports on its work to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and that the great Powers proposed to adhere to that principle.

48. It was to be hoped that the unanimous support given to proposals for general disarmament and for their transmission to the ten-Power committee would serve as an encouragement to the latter and also as a reminder of the great responsibility entrusted to its members by those Members of the United Nations which were not represented on it. It was the earnest hope of the Federation of Malaya that the forthcoming negotiations would not suffer the same fate as past negotiations on the subject. The world could no longer afford to continue the pattern of failure. The good faith already shown in the debate encouraged the hope that a solution might be found.

49. Mr. GUTIERRIEZ (Chile) said that, before resorting to the use of the devastating new weapons now at its disposal, mankind should remember that the seemingly vital issues of today often appeared unimportant tomorrow and that man's very instability tended, with the passage of time, to correct conditions which needed to be corrected. The immediate causes of most past wars appeared trivial when viewed in the perspective of history. Of the three most recent major wars, only the Second World War, which had been

unleashed by one man, could not have been avoided. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and the First World War had been precipitated by trivial incidents—in the first case, by an alleged affront to the dignity of the French Ambassador to Prussia and, in the second, by the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne—and none of the leaders at the time had wanted war.

50. Wars could be set off by minor incidents of that kind or even by miscalculation only when the prevailing atmosphere was one of fear and suspicion rather than confidence. World tension was at least as great at the present time as it had been in 1914, and it was aggravated by the greater destructiveness of the weapons now available and the danger that a war could be set off through an error. If peace was to be achieved, States must cease to feel that they were threatened and must know that they were free to shape their own destinies without having the political systems of others imposed upon them. Given the wide differences in political outlook in the world, it would be a long time before men were willing to submit to the judgement of an international body charged with enforcing justice and law; for the present, it would be sufficient if they could be taught tolerance and made to realize that the desire to install a given economic or social system did not justify resort to the use of force between nations.

51. The peoples of the world would watch closely the course of the forthcoming disarmament negotiations at Geneva and would judge the sincerity and good faith of the States participating in them. Nevertheless, the free world must not permit its fear of a nuclear war to be used by others as a means of inducing it to surrender its principles.

52. Mr. CHRISTIANSEN (Denmark) expressed satisfaction at the unanimous sponsorship of draft resolution A/C.1/L.234. He quoted from the statement made in the General Assembly on 25 September by the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs (809th plenary meeting), in which the latter had pointed out that, while the United Kingdom disarmament proposal appeared more realistic than the Soviet plan in that it stressed phased, balanced disarmament subject to effective international control at each stage, the two plans agreed in looking to complete disarmament as the ultimate goal.

53. It was gratifying that nuclear weapons tests had been halted for some time past; the conclusion of a final agreement on that matter at the recently resumed Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests would serve to encourage efforts in the field of disarmament as a whole. If action on disarmament was not taken soon, it might be too late to stem the tide of events leading towards nuclear war. It was essential to ban nuclear weapons while they were still the monopoly of only three Powers; at the same time, the terrible destructiveness of modern conventional weapons must not be lost sight of.

54. Disarmament could prevent war only if it was accompanied by a system of control which inspired confidence. If States were unable to satisfy themselves that a disarmament agreement was not being violated, the resulting distrust and suspicion might create an even more dangerous situation than if disarmament had never been undertaken. In a disarmed world, an international police force would be required to provide protection against aggression; it would also be necessary to determine the nature and strength of the police forces to be retained by individual States.

55. His delegation hoped that the ten-Power committee would be able to overcome the difficulties besetting the road to disarmament and that the United Nations would be able to carry out its responsibilities in that field.

56. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) said his delegation was pleased that the ten-Power disarmament committee would shortly begin its work and that it was to remain in close contact with the United Nations Disarmament Commission, so that ultimate responsibility in the field of disarmament would remain with the United Nations.

57. Despite the differences in emphasis in the various disarmament proposals and suggestions advanced by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and France, all had the same end in view. While his delegation supported the Soviet plan's objective of general and complete disarmament, it questioned the feasibility of achieving that aim in the brief period of four years. The viewpoint of the United States, the United Kingdom and France was more realistic in that they placed less emphasis on a definite time-table for disarmament and stressed the desirability of achieving agreement on specific aspects of the problem and instituting appropriate control measures simultaneously with each measure of disarmament.

58. Yet, disarmament could not of itself ensure lasting peace. That could be accomplished only by banishing from the world the idea that war was a means of settling differences and, at the same time, by removing the differences which caused war. Progress towards disarmament must therefore be coupled with efforts to improve the political, economic and social fabric of international society.

59. Since the advent of nuclear weapons had removed any incentive to make war for purposes of territorial or economic gain, war could be precipitated only by an accident; the possibility of such an accident must therefore be eliminated by abolishing all nuclear weapons. It was equally imperative to do away with conventional weapons, lest the idea should once again suggest itself that war could be made a profitable endeavour. His delegation therefore endorsed the idea of general and complete disarmament, provided that it was carried out by stages, in a balanced manner and with permanent and effective controls, so that the security of States and the existing balance of power was not undermined in the process of disarmament.

60. In conclusion, he observed that one of the chief causes of tension and hatred in the world was the economic and social inequality which enabled some peoples to enjoy increasing prosperity while others lived in poverty and ignorance. Peace could not be ensured until the money now spent on armaments was invested in projects for economic and social assistance to the under-developed countries.

61. Mr. ARTHAYUKTI (Thailand) wished, as the representative of a neighbouring country, to express his delegation's sympathy to the delegation of Laos on the death of King Sisavang-Vong.

62. His delegation whole-heartedly supported the draft resolution and hoped that the unanimous sponsorship of that resolution betokened a spirit of confidence which would promote the success of the forthcoming ten-Power disarmament talks.

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.