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Chairman: Mr. Miguel Rafael URQUIA (El Salvador).

AGENDA ITEM 68

Question of Cyprus (A/3874 and Add.1, A/C.1/811, A/C.1/814, A/C.1/L.221-223, A/C.1/L.225, A/C.1/L.226/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.228 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.229) (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

1. Mr. ARAUJO (Colombia) thought that, despite the considerations put forward by some speakers, the question of Cyprus should be settled within the United Nations. It would be a serious blow to the prestige of the United Nations to say, after it had examined the question at three sessions, that that question was not within the competence of the Organization or could not appropriately be discussed by it. In any case, each of the three Powers directly concerned had submitted a draft resolution which to some degree or other called for a decision by the General Assembly. It had been maintained that the United Nations, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), did not provide a sufficiently relaxed atmosphere to study the question of Cyprus. But it was precisely on account of the failure of negotiations within the framework of NATO that the question had been brought before the United Nations, and there could be no doubt whatever that questions were debated in that body in an entirely appropriate atmosphere of calm and reflection.

2. His delegation's draft resolution (A/C.1/L.225) pointed out that the solution to the question should be peaceful, in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and should be adopted by common agreement. Moreover, it was against all violence and pressure, whether exercised on the negotiators or on the inhabitants of the island.

3. But the main point of the draft was that it suggested the establishment of an observation group. If the United Nations had made a mistake in connexion with Cyprus, that mistake lay precisely in the fact that it had not sent its own observers to the island in order that they might, with complete impartiality, form an exact idea of conditions there.

4. The observation group could also assume the functions of a good offices committee at the request of all the parties. Obviously, a solution reached by negotiation was bound to be unpopular in the three countries concerned, for extremist demands could never be satisfied by a compromise solution. It was permissible, perhaps, to think that the parties would more easily

accept a somewhat disappointing solution if it was presented to them by the United Nations. Direct intervention by the United Nations would be of the utmost importance. Moreover, if the Secretary-General was made responsible for appointing the observers, the Committee would be paying a tribute to the qualities Mr. Hammarskjöld had already revealed by his execution of other equally delicate missions.

5. His delegation had stated (1000th meeting) that it would be prepared to withdraw its draft resolution if the parties reached agreement on another text, and to amend it if any amendments likely to facilitate its adoption were proposed. As none of those conditions had been fulfilled, it was maintaining its proposal. It would be a pity if the United Nations was to shirk the problem and adopt a resolution providing for no really constructive measures.

6. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) was emphatically opposed to the Iranian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.226/Rev.1), which was impartial in appearance only: in fact, it would promote the partition of Cyprus. The text referred to the "three Governments concerned", which meant that the parties "concerned" would comprise the Greek, Turkish and United Kingdom Governments rather than the people of Cyprus, whose representatives would be admitted to the negotiations only to hear the verdict of the three Governments.

7. It then went on to refer to a solution which, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, would meet the legitimate aspirations of the inhabitants of Cyprus. But that formula might very well be interpreted as reserving the right of partition to the Turkish minority. The word "legitimate" meant something different in the United Nations, in London, in Ankara or in Athens and ambiguous formulae could be interpreted by everyone in his own way. In case of doubt, one could refer to the source of the resolution, i.e., to the statements of the representative of Iran, and the suggestion for partition would then appear at the conference table through the United Nations.

8. The draft resolution would lay upon those who supported it a responsibility considerably beyond that of mere procedure. Moreover, no purpose would be served by recommending a conference in which neither the Cypriots nor Greece took part because they did not wish to have the suggestion for partition imposed on them. Furthermore, Greece would take part in no more conferences where it would be confronted only by those who had dared to insinuate that there might be a war if a certain decision proposed by the ten Powers in their draft resolution were adopted. Any delegations which were not intending to vote for a text which did not secure the approval of all three parties should know that Greece was opposed to the Iranian text.

9. His delegation would urge the Committee to support the ten-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.228 and Add.1).

10. The Colombian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.225), while it proposed constructive action, had one weak point. It gave no instructions. It was true that the observation group would ask the General Assembly to give instructions at the next session. But was it wise to waste a whole year when blood was being shed in Cyprus? Moreover, the text recommended the resumption of negotiations. The United Kingdom Government had done nothing to initiate negotiations with the principal party concerned, the Cypriot people.

11. The draft resolution proposed by Belgium (A/C.1/L.229) was designed to state in very dignified terms that the Organization was not competent to deal with the question. But the United Nations could not evade its responsibilities.

12. There remained the Mexican proposal (1006th meeting) on the establishment of a working group which would try to reach agreement on a compromise text. His delegation would not oppose that step, but did not think that it could achieve any successful result.

13. The General Assembly could not merely offer the people of Cyprus, in their fight for freedom, a series of compromises which would only prolong their sufferings. The British Cyprus Conciliation Committee, whose members included prominent political leaders of all parties, was asking the United Nations to sponsor a solution leading to independence, and safeguards for minority rights under United Nations guarantee. The Cypriot people were awaiting such a solution. Outstanding figures in British public life were advocating it. The peoples of the world were also waiting for the United Nations to act. Was the General Assembly going to say "No"? The founders of the United Nations had not intended to set up a body whose resolutions either said nothing or said too much.

14. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) believed that the time had come for the various delegations which had submitted draft resolutions to make a last effort to reconcile their views. It was necessary to produce a psychological shock which would restore calm and renew hope in Cyprus. Moreover, the General Assembly ought to try to bring about the greatest possible degree of harmony between the three Powers directly concerned.

15. He then analysed the various draft resolutions before the Committee, and found it perfectly natural that the United Kingdom should wish the General Assembly to recognize the efforts it had made to establish a system of self-government in Cyprus and to condemn violence. But it was clear that if the General Assembly were to adopt the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.221), it could not count on the consent of the other parties.

16. The Greek delegation in its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.222) used the happy expression "Cypriots" instead of "the inhabitants" or "the population" of Cyprus. It was natural that it should want a resolution to be adopted which contained the magic word independence, but the General Assembly could not pronounce a word of such significance without knowing the wishes of the Cypriots themselves on that point. Furthermore, the delegations of Greece and the United Kingdom appeared to have indicated during the debate that they agreed that a provisional solution must be adopted at the present stage. With regard to the good offices committee referred to in the Greek draft resolution, he observed

that the General Assembly could not set up such a committee because good offices could not be imposed. To be successful, good offices must be exercised and accepted voluntarily.

17. The Turkish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.223) expressed the very legitimate preoccupation of Turkey with the fate of Cypriots linked with it by ties of religion, language and culture. As he had already said on an earlier occasion, the Peruvian delegation could not accept the solution proposed in that draft.

18. The Peruvian delegation appreciated the value of certain elements in each of the three draft resolutions to which he had referred, but would be compelled to abstain if they were put to the vote.

19. The revised text of the Iranian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.226/Rev.1) revealed an admirable effort at compromise, but he considered that the most important parts of a resolution should be in the operative part and not in the preamble.

20. He understood the anxiety of the Colombian delegation, in its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.225), to affirm the authority of the General Assembly, but unfortunately could not approve all the means proposed to that end, for the General Assembly ought to try to bring about a settlement between the parties concerned—the Cypriots among them—before deciding to undertake what might be called foreign intervention. Such intervention could be envisaged, but in a different manner. It would be preferable, for instance, that a conference such as the one contemplated in the Iranian draft resolution should of its own accord call upon the good offices of a specified Power or person and that that conference should, if it considered it necessary, appoint a committee of enquiry.

21. The ten-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.228 and Add.1) contained a number of interesting points: it affirmed the authority of the General Assembly; it recalled resolution 1013 (XI); and it stressed the need to restore peaceful conditions. But it was not customary to include in a resolution opinions expressed during the debate and that was likely to arouse a certain amount of opposition. Moreover, the quotation of a phrase out of context could give rise to misinterpretations. Furthermore, operative paragraph 2 spoke of "effective provisions for the protection of all legitimate minority interests". He opposed the notion of a minority and its implications of segregation. He saw Cyprus as a territorial unity having a common destiny in which the Turkish community should have something more than the status of a minority. Indeed, that had been conceded by the representative of Greece. It was undesirable in a resolution to reduce the possibilities which had appeared in the course of the debate.

22. With regard to the Belgian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.229), it contained a number of important elements, but he would prefer it to be drafted differently.

23. To sum up, there were in the different draft resolutions before the Committee all the requirements for a single resolution. That was why, at the 1005th meeting, he had appealed to their authors to make an effort to come together and reach a compromise.

24. He would not himself present a draft resolution but, summarizing the ideas he had put forward during the debate, he would like to suggest that a compromise draft resolution might be drawn up somewhat as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the question of Cyprus,

"Deeply concerned over the situation existing in Cyprus,

"Convinced that self-government and free institutions must be established in Cyprus, taking into account the interests and aspirations of the Cypriots,

"1. Reaffirms the desire expressed in its resolution 1013 (XI) that a peaceful, democratic and just solution should be found in accord with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

"2. Urges the parties concerned to make every effort to re-establish in Cyprus an atmosphere of peace, harmony and co-operation;

"3. Recommends the calling of a conference of the parties concerned with a view to finding a speedy and amicable solution of the problem, with the assistance or the collaboration, where necessary, of Governments and personalities acceptable to the three Governments and to the representatives of the Cypriots;

"4. Invites these Governments to report to the General Assembly at its next session."

25. He would be glad to co-operate with the authors of the various draft resolutions in drawing up a single text which would offer a solution acceptable to all members of the Committee.

26. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) said that his delegation's point of view was by no means partisan, unless it was partisan to say that the Cypriot people were the party chiefly concerned. The other party was the United Kingdom, but that did not preclude in any way the participation of other Member States or individuals with the consent of the United Kingdom, and of all the other parties involved, provided that the co-operation of the people of Cyprus could be obtained. Any democratic solution conforming with General Assembly resolution 1013 (XI) required the consent of the majority of the population.

27. In introducing the ten-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.228 and Add.1), his delegation had no wish to impose a particular solution; it simply wished to set forth the kind of method which could be resorted to in attempts to provide a solution for the problem. He agreed with the Peruvian representative that, if a resolution carried with it the moral authority of the Assembly, it would make a large contribution to the cessation of violence in Cyprus by convincing the Cypriots that self-government was the aim which had been set for their country and that it would be gradually attained. His own country knew from experience that violence hindered progress towards freedom. Hence the ten-Power draft resolution urged all concerned to use their best endeavours to establish conditions for the ending of violence on Cyprus.

28. For the sake of agreement, the Indian delegation was willing to accept the deletion of the paragraphs containing references to statements made by Governments. Moreover, it was ready to accept any amendment which did not involve changing the fundamental purpose of the draft resolution, which was to seek a peaceful, democratic and just solution.

29. The word "independence" did not appear in the text because the situation in Cyprus did not make it

possible for the territory to attain independence in one stage. On the other hand, it was natural to wish to promote self-government for Cyprus in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. In order to avoid partitioning the island, however, it was essential to adopt effective provisions for the protection of minority interests. That was the point of the operative paragraph 2, which left the parties concerned free to decide what form those provisions should take. His delegation did not feel that the unity and integrity of Cyprus made a unitary form of Government imperative. All solutions were possible provided that the interests of the island's communities were properly protected. Neither did his delegation rule out the possibility of seeking a solution in co-operation with the Greek and the Turkish Governments, but it felt that those Governments were not entitled to share in the sovereignty or sovereign rights of Cyprus. The immediate objective to be attained was the integrity and self-government of the island, which was indeed what Member States were called upon to respect in operative paragraph 4. The last-mentioned provision therefore made annexation impossible since that would be tantamount to violation of an international treaty, if it occurred after self-government had been attained.

30. In the Potomac Declaration,^{1/} the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had undertaken to defend the principle of the right of non-self-governing territories to govern themselves and to promote the unification of divided peoples. Moreover, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies had made it clear in a statement of 20 July 1954 that the Declaration applied to Cyprus. He hoped that the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom would take those declarations into account.

31. He noted with satisfaction that the New Zealand representative appeared to share the basic opinions of the Indian delegation with regard to self-government for Cyprus. He hoped that the Committee would do the same and adopt the ten-Power draft resolution unanimously.

32. Mr. SON SANN (Cambodia) noted that the discussions did not appear to have furthered a settlement of the Cyprus question. Most of the delegations had asked the parties concerned to continue negotiating and to seek agreement. Although that was the wisest proposal, it was not sufficient, since the Greek representative had at the previous meeting asked the United Nations to draw up directives for the solution of the Cyprus question in order to facilitate negotiations between the parties concerned.

33. The efforts of delegations which had submitted draft resolutions were praiseworthy, but their drafts either failed to meet the requirements of the Greek representative or did not correspond to the Turkish point of view. All the texts nevertheless had something in common, namely that the problem could only be settled in a just and democratic way, in keeping with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, by means of negotiations between the three parties concerned conducted in a peaceful atmosphere and in the absence of violence. But violence

^{1/} Joint Declaration of Principles, issued in Washington on 29 June 1954.

persisted. In view of the dissension between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, it might be worth considering a formal promise that independence would be granted, if such were the desire of all inhabitants of Cyprus, after a general consultation which would take place within a suitable period of time.

34. The right of both the majority and the minority to independence and self-determination should be recognized. Whatever might be said to the contrary, the fact remained that the people of Cyprus were not united and the Greek and Turkish groups were no longer living in harmony. Hence the first step must be to restore peace and then the two groups should be consulted on whether or not they wished to continue living together as before.

35. His delegation had refrained from taking part in the general debate in order not to complicate the issue. It would also abstain from voting unless the sponsors of the draft resolutions agreed upon a text acceptable to the three parties concerned, as he hoped would be the case.

36. Mr. NISOT (Belgium) regretted that he could not take part in the working group proposed by the Mexican representative at the previous meeting. The Belgian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.229) was expressed in very general terms so that it could be adopted by the

General Assembly if the other drafts failed, but it would no longer be useful if merged with other drafts.

37. The CHAIRMAN proposed that the Committee should examine the suggestion made by the representative of Mexico at the previous meeting that a working group should be asked to draw up a compromise draft resolution.

38. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) pointed out that the working group could be set up quite informally. He was sure that it would be possible to draw up a text which could be accepted by a large majority of the Committee with possibly the abstention of three Powers directly concerned, but he did not wish his proposal to be put to the vote unless those three Powers consented.

39. Mr. NOBLE (United Kingdom) agreed with the Greek representative that there was no need to alter the procedure followed by the Committee in view of the various discussions going on at that time.

40. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) felt that in the circumstances it would be better to wait until the discussions referred to by the United Kingdom representative were over.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.