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Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

AGENDA ITEM 70

**General and complete disarmament (A/4218, A/4219,
A/C.1/818) (continued)**

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. SHTYLLA (Albania) said that the decision to give absolute priority to the question of general and complete disarmament showed the capital importance which the First Committee attached to it. He trusted that every Member State would support the Soviet Government's disarmament programme (A/4219), which had restored hope to mankind and which alone could prevent the catastrophe of a third world war. The time had come to resume the disarmament negotiations in an entirely new spirit. The Soviet Union's efforts in the field of disarmament — made in the form of many different proposals, "démarches" and even unilateral measures — had always been warmly welcomed by peace-loving countries and world opinion. Unfortunately the United States and its associates, far from displaying good will, had surrounded the socialist countries with a network of military bases. Those bases were a cause of friction in the countries where they had been set up and were a threat to peace. The "positions-of-strength" policy had created centres of tension in various parts of the world, while the armaments race was engulfing huge resources — some 100 million men, and over \$US 100,000 million spent annually, to the detriment of the various countries' economic development. The armaments programme of the United States had, for instance, been defined as "a step towards death".

2. The peoples of the globe, who had not forgotten the horrors of the last two wars, was gravely concerned about that situation, in which a single spark might cause the worst conflagration that the world had ever known. According to German statisticians, 55 million persons had lost their lives in the Second World War, while American economists estimated at \$925,000 million the direct military expenditures of the belligerent States, not including those of the Soviet Union (\$357,000 million) and China.

3. The consequence of a third world war would be even more calamitous for mankind. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had demonstrated the destructive power of modern weapons; but that of a single hydrogen bomb was greater than the power of all the explosions which had occurred throughout the world

during the last four years of the Second World War. It should be borne in mind that, with the invention of intercontinental ballistic missiles, no point on earth was immune from the effects of a new war.

4. The only solution open to the world was the elimination of every means of waging war. The concept of a limitation of armaments, or of balanced disarmament, was obsolete, and local wars had become inconceivable, because of the technological advances made in recent years. The Soviet programme, based on a realistic assessment of the international situation, the balance of power in the world and the prospects facing the peoples, was remarkable not only because of the generous policy which inspired it, but also because it offered, at the right moment, the proper solution for the gravest problem of the present time — that of peace or war. As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, had said on more than one occasion, war was not inevitable; no effort should therefore be spared to ensure peace.

5. The marvellous achievements of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in every field had caused many statesmen of the Western Powers to reconsider some of the positions they had adopted, and to take account of the facts. Relations between States should be governed, not by the reactionary concept of the "cold war" or the fatal race in armaments, but by the idea of peaceful coexistence. The international atmosphere had materially improved as a result of Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States, his conversations with the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, and the programme of general and complete disarmament which he had submitted to the General Assembly (799th plenary meeting). Even in the West, the clearest thinkers among the statesmen recognized that an end must be put to the armaments race, which could only lead to a world holocaust. In those circumstances, it was not surprising that the Soviet Union's disarmament programme had been so favourably received in the Assembly, as in every country in the world. It was in line with the vital interests of mankind.

6. There was nothing Utopian about that programme. Although a bold one, it was based on realities and was perfectly feasible within the period planned, each stage preparing for the next and being accompanied by the corresponding measures of control. For that reason the Government of the People's Republic of Albania, in its statement of 29 September 1959, had unreservedly supported the Soviet proposal and had expressed the hope that all other States, in accordance with their peoples' wishes, would likewise support it. The United Nations should study it with all the care that it deserved.

7. The programme proposed by the Soviet Union could be carried out in four years if all the countries of the world, including the great Powers, showed good will. The People's Republic of Albania had always worked for

a peaceful solution of the disarmament problem. It had twice reduced its armed forces substantially and had continually decreased its military expenditures. Albanian experts had taken part in the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack. Moreover, the Albanian Government had made every effort to prevent the establishment of bases for atomic weapons and rockets on the territories of its neighbours, Italy and Greece. Albania remained ready to take the necessary steps for the conversion of the Balkans and the Adriatic into a zone of peace. Lastly, war propaganda was, in Albania, punishable by law.

8. No country had anything to lose from general and complete disarmament; quite the contrary. The resources saved could be used to improve the material and cultural life of all the peoples, particularly those of the under-developed countries. Competition between the two systems would be directed solely towards raising standards of living and promoting science and technology in the interests of mankind. If the General Assembly were to adopt the Soviet proposals in principle, that would represent a milestone in the history of the United Nations. It would open the way to the drafting of an agreement on the practical measures needed for the implementation of the proposed programme of general and complete disarmament, including a detailed plan of control and international inspection.

9. Unfortunately, the agreement recently concluded between the United States and Turkey for the establishment of a nuclear-rocket base on Turkish soil constituted a deliberate "cold war" act which public opinion could not reconcile with the statements of peaceful intentions made by the United States Government.

10. Peace depended upon general and complete disarmament. The programme proposed by the Soviet Union offered the desired solution, and should be fully, immediately and unanimously supported.

11. Mr. AMADEO (Argentina) said that since, in his view, the question of disarmament should be discussed in accordance with the plan adopted by the Committee, he would for the time being confine his remarks to the Soviet proposal.

12. That very important proposal should be taken seriously, and not rejected from the outset as a mere propaganda move. It raised two questions: first, whether disarmament, in the form contemplated, was expedient; secondly, whether it was feasible.

13. The reply to the first question would appear, at first sight, to be categorically in the affirmative. General disarmament and the elimination of all means of mass destruction was one of the highest ideals of mankind. However, the matter had to be considered realistically. General and complete disarmament should be directed towards two objectives — the first being to avoid mankind's annihilation by the immense destructive power of modern weapons, and the second to eliminate the danger of aggression leading to domination of the weaker by the stronger.

14. Undoubtedly, if over a period of four years all weapons were completely destroyed, the first of those objectives would be attained. As for the second, the answer could not, it seemed, be so categorical. Two factors contributed to aggression with a view to domination: on the one hand, the will to power, combined with aggressive intent; on the other, disparity of

strength between aggressor and victim. The Argentine delegation did not believe that the destruction of weapons would eliminate those two factors. The spirit of aggression and conquest did not derive from refinement or multiplicity in armament — it was as old as mankind itself.

15. The proposal of the Soviet Union provided for the maintenance, in each country, of the smallest possible forces, for purposes of internal security. That provision was justifiable, but it did not do away with inequalities of power in international life. It would be logical for a country with a population of 250 millions and an area of 10 million sq. km. to have a police force or militia a hundred times larger than that of a neighbouring country populated by only 2 million persons and covering an area of 50,000 sq. km. But that disparity of forces might lead, just as before disarmament, to an attempt at conquest on the part of the stronger country if it harboured aggressive designs. The wars waged by mankind throughout history, even with the most primitive weapons, abundantly proved that general and complete disarmament, while delivering man from the nightmare of mass destruction by nuclear weapons — which would certainly be a considerable advance — would not eliminate or diminish the danger of aggression and domination, which would, in fact, be increased by certain ideologies. In any part of the world, the triumph of a self-styled liberating doctrine inevitably led to the subjugation of those who were "liberated".

16. Furthermore, the desire to universalize a particular social system could be fulfilled by means other than armed force. Subversive propaganda, social disintegration, and internal rebellion instigated from outside were indirect and subtle methods which had all been recently employed in a number of countries. So long as that danger remained, it would be impossible to speak, as the Soviet representative had spoken, of the consolidation of peace and friendship between the peoples.

17. As for the second question raised by the Soviet proposal — namely, its feasibility — attention should be drawn to the psychological revolution in each country which the abolition, in four years, of all armies, navies and air forces would require. The army was not merely an instrument of destruction; it was also a school for courage, honour and discipline, in which the noblest human virtues were developed. It was the defender of order and, in many cases, a civilizing factor as well.

18. Revolutionary reforms in the social sphere had always been brought about gradually, and the reform now proposed could be no exception to that rule.

19. Moreover, no disarmament programme on so vast a scale could be implemented without the system of control, which was its necessary corollary, being specified. The many questions to be solved would include the precise definition of the functions of the international control commission, the value of information which experts might furnish on the detection of underground explosions, the agreement of countries not represented in the United Nations to inspection, and the impossibility of converting war industries into peace industries within a short space of time.

20. A programme for general disarmament should also be linked to the organization of the international community itself. The great Powers would therefore

first have to reach an understanding in fields where lack of agreement between them was at present preventing the United Nations from functioning properly—for example, and more particularly, the establishment of an international force capable of ensuring the observance of treaties. A true relaxation of international tension could come about only after the conclusion of an agreement of principle concerning the main points of friction between East and West. Only then would the way to disarmament be clear.

21. Hence, while the significance of the Soviet proposal should not be underestimated, it was necessary to avoid the policy of "all or nothing".

22. In that connexion, it seemed that the suggestions made by the United Kingdom representative in the General Assembly (798th plenary meeting) might have a practical value for the purpose of halting the arms race—which was the scourge of the present era—and gradually moving towards the objective proposed by the USSR.

23. When the ten-member Disarmament Committee, which was shortly to meet at Geneva, had communicated its conclusions to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Members of the United Nations would state their opinions. In the meantime, the General Assembly could hardly do more, at the present session, than hear the statements of the principal countries concerned, and exchange impressions.

24. The Argentine delegation therefore thought it better that the First Committee should not for the moment adopt any resolution on the substance of the question and on the Soviet proposal; but it earnestly hoped that, between the fourteenth and fifteenth sessions of the General Assembly, negotiations would have progressed sufficiently for a disarmament programme which was neither disappointing nor Utopian to be contemplated.

25. Mr. SON SANN (Cambodia) said he was glad that the Assembly had unanimously decided to place the question of general and complete disarmament on the agenda of its current session. A country like Cambodia, which practised a policy of neutrality and peaceful coexistence, could not but desire an agreement on disarmament, so that, instead of being compelled to maintain a small army which cost a great deal, it might devote itself more effectively to the economic and social recovery of its people.

26. The Cambodian delegation had continually drawn attention to the dangers of the arms race and the cold war, and had always placed its full confidence in the work for peace done by the United Nations. It thought that the United Nations should profit from the present relaxation of tension in order, finally, to formulate general but precise directives which would guide the experts in their work for a speedy settlement of the disarmament problem. The key to that problem was the establishment of an effective international control of disarmament measures and, since the principal Powers concerned were now agreed on that point, all efforts should now be directed towards rapid removal of the obstacles to the establishment of an effective control body. Any disarmament agreement naturally presupposed an atmosphere of trust; but the United Nations could materially help in creating that atmosphere. The statements made by the representatives of the United States of America (1027th meeting), the United Kingdom (798th plenary meeting) and the Soviet Union

(1026th meeting), as well as the resolution adopted on 10 September 1959 by the Disarmament Commission (A/4209), were already a source of substantial encouragement.

27. Possibly for the first time in mankind's search for a way in which to achieve enduring peace, a ray of hope could be discerned as a result of the Geneva negotiations. The forces of peace were gaining ground, and the hitherto conflicting standpoints of the great Powers had at last been reconciled on several basic issues. Pending an agreement on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union and the United States had already reached agreement on various points concerning the prevention of surprise attacks and the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons testing; they had agreed, in particular, that a treaty should remain in effect so long as the obligations which it entailed were fully observed. Furthermore, the great Powers agreed that general and controlled disarmament should not be contingent on the settlement of other outstanding international questions; that was a decisive step towards a relaxation of tension and the establishment of mutual confidence. Finally, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States now unanimously recognized the principle and the need for effective international control suited to each stage of disarmament. With that principle granted, it only remained to refer the technical aspects of the problem to the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee for consideration.

28. The Cambodian delegation wished to join with all other representatives in expressing full confidence in the possibility of general and complete disarmament and warmly welcomed the prospect of economic and social development which would open up for the underdeveloped countries from a judicious use of the vast resources which the world's disarmament and demilitarization would release. For that reason it urgently appealed to all States to give a favourable response to the concrete proposals made by the great Powers with a view to safeguarding the future of mankind and of civilization.

29. Mr. SCHMIDT (Brazil) observed that not even the most cogent arguments put forward by the Powers whose armaments did not comprise nuclear weapons could ever alter the position of the two parties which, at the present juncture, seemed prepared to come to a direct understanding. However, the risk of an atomic war capable of destroying all life on earth was diminishing in proportion as further progress in the military application of nuclear energy was made. That might perhaps account for the unanimity with which the Soviet proposal for the inclusion of the question of general and complete disarmament in the agenda had been approved (803rd plenary meeting).

30. There had been some scepticism as to the true motives of the Soviet initiative; but a country which had given astonishing proof of its ability to assimilate and perfect the most modern techniques could not wish to involve the whole world in the most tragic of disasters. Moreover, the Soviet Union was engaged in a different kind of war, for it was attempting to demonstrate that the systems of liberal democracy and free enterprise were no longer capable of winning the battle against economic backwardness and poverty. If that thesis were eventually vindicated, and if the non-communist countries maintained a purely critical attitude and failed to act constructively, the socialist

countries would not need to resort to destructive attacks: it would suffice for the revolt to continue to spread in those areas which had been left to shift for themselves. In the present ideological war, victory would go to the side which could prove, not only that its concept of life was superior, but that it possessed the necessary technical skills and the ability to communicate its dynamism to others, for the finding of solutions in line with its ideals.

31. Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States, and President Eisenhower's forthcoming journey to the Soviet Union, warranted the hope that it was possible to take a fundamental step forward — the step towards the disarming of minds. Everything depended on the sincerity with which the nations desired peace and, therefore, disarmament. The allocation of vast resources to the production of instruments of war the use of which would create unforeseeable devastation was certainly not worthy of humanity at its present state of development. Apart from the physical dangers, it was necessary to invoke moral considerations, such as the dignity of man, if an atmosphere preventing recourse to weapons of mass destruction was to be created. The savings resulting from reductions in military expenditure would certainly facilitate economic assistance to under-developed countries; but the main point was that man could not prove his creative intelligence and his moral superiority except by finding a rational solution for a conflict which was, by definition, an ideological one. In that respect, it was to be hoped that under the pressure of world opinion, common sense would prevail.

32. The Disarmament Commission had been concerned to explain that the Disarmament Committee recently set up had been established outside the United Nations, because the so-called parity principle derogated from the basic principle of the sovereign equality of the Organization's Members proclaimed in Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter. Nevertheless, it was a matter for satisfaction that the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had decided to resume direct negotiations. The Disarmament Commission had unanimously expressed the hope that the results achieved by the Disarmament Committee would constitute a useful basis for the study of disarmament in the United Nations. It had thus explicitly recognized the usefulness of new negotiations in a small committee before the United Nations took up final consideration of the question. The results of the Geneva conversations were anxiously awaited in all countries; those conversations would certainly be facilitated by the atmosphere in the direct relations between the great Powers. It was in the light of those new prospects

that Brazil had voted for the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission.

33. The two proposals concerning general disarmament, submitted by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom and by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union respectively, were important contributions to a solution of the disarmament problem as a whole. The United States representative had said that his Government was prepared, at the meetings of the Disarmament Committee, to give the Soviet proposals the most serious scrutiny, and that it looked forward with great interest to discussing the proposals of the United Kingdom Government (1027th meeting). There was therefore no reason to doubt either the good will with which the great Powers were approaching their task, or their acceptance in principle of the idea of general disarmament. It would be premature, however, to enter at all deeply into the technical details of the two proposals at the current session. Several aspects of the Soviet proposal would require very close study, together with a certain measure of clarification, particularly with regard to the establishment of an effective system of inspection and control. That proposal seemed, in fact, to be concerned rather with grandiose political objectives, reflecting universal aspirations in the field of disarmament; whereas the United Kingdom proposal, less radical and less optimistic so far as objectives were concerned, certainly appeared much more interesting from the practical standpoint, since it contemplated a thorough analysis and a gradual introduction of the systems of control essential to its implementation.

34. Despite its fourteen years of existence, the United Nations had not been in a position to adopt a disarmament plan. It would therefore be miraculous if decisions of substance could be reached in the short time available to the current session. Although it did not wish to make a formal proposal, the Brazilian delegation thought that the General Assembly might perhaps express its great hopes concerning the two new disarmament proposals, and a desire that the United Kingdom and Soviet plans should, in all their aspects, be subjected to the most careful scrutiny by the ten-Power Committee which was to meet at Geneva early in 1960. Despite any scepticism that might be engendered by the picture of a happy, well-fed and peaceful world which the Head of the Government of the Soviet Union had painted, it should be recognized that the situation had changed, and the United Nations should make it a point of honour not to lag behind others on the path of hope.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.