

FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SECOND PLENARY MEETING.

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 26 March 1985, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. A.R. Taylhardat

(Venezuela)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. BELAID

Mr. H. RABEHI

Argentina:

Mr. J. CARASALES

Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia:

Mr. R. BUTLER

Mr. R. ROWE

Ms. J. COURTNEY

Mr. S. FREEMAN

Belgium:

Mr. M. DEPASSE

Mr. Ph. NIEUWENHUYS

Miss M. de BECKER

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV

Mr. V. BOJILOV

Mr. H. HALATCHEV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Mr. N. MIKHAILOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

U HLA MYINT

Canada:

Mr. A. BEESLEY

Mr. A. DESPRES

Mr. M.C. HAMBLIN

China:

Mr. QIAN JIADONG
Ms. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIU ZHONGREN
Mr. SHI JICHENG
Mr. SHI JINKUN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. YU ZHONGZHOU
Mr. LI BENSUNG

Cuba:

Mr. C. LECHUGA HEVIA
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. M. BADR
Mr. F. MONIB

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. G. MONTASSIER
Mr. H. RENIE
Mr. GESBERT

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. H. ROSE
Mr. W. KRUTZSCH
Mr. T. SAYATZ
Mr. M. SCHNEIDER

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. F. ELBE
Mr. W-E. VON DEM HAGEN
Mr. M. GERDTS
Mr. M-N. GERMANN

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. M. DUBEY
Mr. S. KANT SHARMA

Indonesia:

Mr. S. SUTOWARDOYO
Mr. HARYO MATARAM
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Ms. R. TANZIL

Islamic Republic of Iran:

Mr. F. SHAHABI SIRJANI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. F. PIAGGESI
Mr. M. PAVESE
Mr. R. DI CARLO

Japan:

Mr. R. IMAI
Mr. M. KONISHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. T. ISHIGURI
Mr. I. AKIYAMA

Kenya:

Mr. P.N. MWAURA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Ms. S. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
Mr. P. MACEDO RIBA .

Mongolia:

Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. O. HILALE
Mr. M. SBIHI

Netherlands:

Mr. J. RAMAKER
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Mr. J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE
Mr. C.V. UDEDIBIA

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. K. NIAZ

Peru:

Mr. J. GONZALES-TERRONES

Poland:

Mr. S. TURBANSKI

Mr. J. RYCHLAK

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. I. DATCU

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. A. POPESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. J. DHANAPALA

Mr. P. KARIYAWASAM

Sweden:

Mr. L-E. WINGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. A.M. SHMATOV

Mr. A.A. GORGILADZE

Mr. V.I. USTINOV

Mr. G. ANTSIFEROV

United Kingdom:

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

Mr. R.J.S. EDIS

Mr. D.A. SLINN

United States of America:

Mr. D. LOWITZ

Mr. T. BARTHELEMY

Mr. H.W. DAVIDSON

Mr. D. DORN

Mr. B. MORTON

Mr. R. SCOTT

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. P. GARDNER

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. O. GARCIA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. K. VIDAS

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. MONSHEMVULA

Secretary-General of the Conference
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. M. KOMATINA

Deputy Secretary-General of the
Conference on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 302nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today begins the consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, States Members wishing to do so may raise any other matter related to the work of the Conference.

The list of speakers for today includes the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of China. I now give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The discussion on agenda item 5 of the Conference on Disarmament, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", has substantiated the assessment, expressed by the Soviet delegation on 7 March, that this is a priority matter which should be resolved without delay.

The very fact that this item has been spoken on by most members of the Conference points to the urgency of the issue and to the international community's concern for preserving space as an area of peaceful activity of mankind, as well as to the global nature of this problem which affects the interests of all States, big and small.

A number of interesting points deserving a close examination have been made by the representatives of socialist countries as well as by many representatives of non-aligned States.

An analysis of these statements, and of developments in the last few days which have a bearing on this problem, leads to the following preliminary conclusions.

Firstly, virtually all delegations have emphasized the importance of the existing international agreements limiting military uses of outer space and have called for preserving and strengthening those treaties and agreements.

Secondly, there is a broad recognition of the need for additional international legal measures to safeguard space against penetration by the arms race, as well as of the role to be played in this respect by the Conference on Disarmament.

Thirdly, virtually all delegations have no doubt as to the need to work out within an ad hoc committee of the Conference effective measures to prevent the arms race from spreading into outer space. In this connection the overwhelming majority of member countries attach great significance to the United Nations decisions, in particular General Assembly resolution 39/59, containing specific recommendations to the Conference on this score.

Fourthly, unanimous satisfaction has been expressed at the beginning of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on nuclear and space armaments.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Fifthly, participants in the discussion have voiced serious concern at the attempts by the United States to make use of outer space for upsetting the parity which exists in the world correlation of forces and achieving military superiority. In this connection well-substantiated criticism was offered of the United States plans for space militarization, the most sinister reflection of which is the "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI). In fact no delegations, apart from some of the United States' closest allies, expressed approval or even understanding of these plans which are a threat to peace.

The Soviet delegation fully supports the assessment of such plans made here by the representatives of States which signed the well-known Delhi Declaration which has been circulated as Conference document CD/549.

We also share the concern of the delegation of Sri Lanka in connection with "the undiminished desire to continue with space weapons programmes, indeed to accelerate them". A similar concern was expressed by the Swedish delegation. Its statement reflects a just and well-founded anxiety about the future of the most important arms limitation agreement, the 1972 ABM Treaty, and points to the dangerous possibility of dual-purpose weapons being developed which would have both anti-satellite and anti-missile capabilities. We agree with the Swedish conclusion that "development, testing and deployment of all space weapons must be banned".

Finally, we fully associate ourselves with the ideas contained in the striking and detailed statement delivered on this subject by Ambassador Turbanski of the Polish People's Republic.

In this unanimous assessment of the situation, the statement made by the distinguished United States representative Ambassador Lowitz sounded a false note. Ambassador Lowitz reiterated the assertion that the implementation of the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) would enhance international security and render nuclear weapons obsolete and useless. At the same time Ambassador Lowitz claimed that the United States did not intend to go beyond the research and development stage, and would leave the actual deployment of space weapons to be negotiated with the USSR.

However, these two assertions are contradictory. Altogether, the statement of the representative of the United States raised a large number of questions and comments for the Soviet delegation which we would like to share with our colleagues. I have recalled one of these, which is the contradiction which we have pointed out.

It seems to us that the question of whether the "Strategic Defence Initiative" would strengthen peace, stability and international security has already been answered by most of the speakers in our discussion, and in a quite unambiguous manner at that. Quite obviously not, since the advent of space attack systems would sharply destabilize the strategic situation, act as a catalyst to an arms race in every direction, dramatically increase the risk of nuclear catastrophe and completely disorganize the arms limitation process.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

An equally unanimous doubt was expressed by the overwhelming majority of delegations with regard to the assertion that the development of space weapons would lead to the elimination of nuclear arms. This is blatantly disproved by the aggressive actions of the United States itself, which is continuously stepping up nuclear programmes in spite of public assurances of its desire to eliminate nuclear weapons. Indeed, on the one hand we are told that "reductions in the levels of offensive nuclear weapons on both sides" are being sought, while on the other new programmes are adopted to deploy the even more advanced and powerful MX missiles. Here again there is a clear contradiction. The thesis recently put into circulation is that nuclear weapons are in fact not going to be eliminated until the end of the so-called "transition period" of several decades during which the United States intends to develop the new exotic systems for space warfare. One cannot help recalling once again in this connection President Reagan's address on 23 March 1983 in which he stated that the deployment of ABM systems in space, "if paired with offensive systems ... can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy".

The distinguished representative of the United States was trying to persuade us here that his country's "Star Wars" plans are purely defensive and will not "create a situation in which the United States or the West would somehow achieve superiority". But is this really the case? None other than the United States Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger stated explicitly on an NBC television programme on 27 March 1983, that the United States Administration's only motive was "fear of a retaliatory strike". This means the United States needs an anti-missile shield not for defensive purposes but to enable it to deliver a nuclear first strike from behind the shield. What is this if not a quest for military superiority? I wish to point out yet another contradiction or inconsistency in the United States position. We are told that the Strategic Defence Initiative will have a stabilizing effect. Then, according to the logic of the advocates of the SDI, it would seem that in order to obtain this desirable effect, both of the opposing sides, the United States and the Soviet Union, should possess comprehensive ABM systems. However, Washington statesmen unabashedly claim that the situation will only be stable if the system is possessed by the United States alone, and the sooner the better. Should the Russians be the first to acquire such a system, then according to United States Secretary of Defence Weinberger, "the world would be a very dangerous place indeed ... it would strongly resemble a world in which the Russians had nuclear weapons and the United States did not".

So much for the "stabilizing" role of defensive weapons hypocritically discussed in Washington. It is perfectly obvious that the advantages of a comprehensive ABM system if developed by one of the sides are well understood there, and it is precisely for this reason that such a system is so persistently sought for the United States. This also exposes the purpose of the efforts to ascribe, without adducing any proof, to the Soviet Union their own dangerous intentions in this area, to camouflage their actions aimed at eroding the balance and obtaining strategic superiority over the USSR.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We are told, inter alia, by the United States representative to this Conference, that the United States is engaged in pure scientific research and that "any deployment of weapons related to the Strategic Defence Initiative would in view of United States obligations under existing treaties, particularly the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, have to be a matter for negotiations". Here again, however, there are many contradictions. For example, while the United States envoys to foreign capitals, as well as the United States representative to this Conference, claim that their country's space programmes will not go beyond the stage of research, the President of that country states that "this is a historic programme for our national defence ... and we intend to carry it through". One would like to believe, of course, that the \$26 billion programme was drawn up purely for the love of science and that the true United States position in this regard is articulated by Ambassador Lowitz rather than by other high officials in Washington who have repeatedly asserted, and continue to assert, that the United States intends to implement the "Star Wars" programme.

The facts, however, suggest that we are actually witnessing the first steps towards the acquisition of a new class of weapons, towards an arms race of truly cosmic dimensions.

Recently the United States President expressed his wholehearted enthusiasm about the progress of the so-called "research" on the development of space attack weapons. It is also not concealed that the ultimate aim of this so-called "scientific research" is to tear down the ABM Treaty and to violate the international commitments of the United States. It is odd that the United States representative tries to portray such a policy as serving the interests of the international community of nations. In fact the interests it serves are those of the United States military-industrial complex which is already reaping considerable profits from the SDI. The interests of the world community are something quite apart.

The SDI is being advertised to us as designed to enhance deterrence of war. I would like to quote in this connection an excellent assessment of the deterrence concept provided by our distinguished colleague Ambassador Dubey in an article which appeared in the February 1985 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. He wrote: "Deterrence is the biggest conceptual deception devised in all history. It feeds on fear and suspicion and has the effect of eroding trust and confidence. It condemns people to co-exist with the means of their own destruction. In fact, nuclear deterrence is not even a doctrine of security. It is a doctrine used for maintaining dominance, hegemony and the status quo. Security is invoked only as a camouflage in order to mobilize and maintain popular support for deterrence and for its direct outcome, the nuclear arms race."

These are the questions which occurred to us, and to many other delegations, in connection with the statement of the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Lowitz. While reserving the right to go back to this subject if necessary, we would like to offer today certain considerations on another issue which we frankly did not intend to reopen were it not for certain statements made in this hall.

Some delegations have urged us in their statements to avoid polemics. Meanwhile they not only came out with gross distortions of historical facts and of the Soviet position on the prevention of arms race but also circulated as documents of this Conference materials which cannot be called anything other than downright falsification. We have already had an occasion to comment in sufficient detail on the document CD/561 and will not reiterate all of the points we made on that score.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Let me therefore address only some of them.

The first is one to which we have always responded and which naturally cannot go unanswered this time either. It concerns the assertion that the Soviet Union is responsible for ever new spirals in the arms race. Again we are obliged to turn to the facts, and we shall employ only the facts.

Above all, we must point out that in order to lay the blame for the arms race on the Soviet Union, the United States has resorted throughout the post-war period to the same, and I would say elementary, tactic aimed at the forgetful. Today we see it applied once again. The pattern is primitively simple: a non-existent "gap" is "discovered" in those categories of weapons where the United States is about to thrust forward, references are made to apocryphal Soviet systems, to mysteriously emerging "windows of vulnerability" and, accompanied by this theoretical uproar, new broadscale military programmes of their own are adopted. After a while, once the programmes are under way, it is declared with a straight face that all the "Soviet threats" had been plainly invented just to stir up public opinion.

Thus, in the 1950s, on the pretext of having "fallen behind in bombers", the Pentagon obtained large allocations from Congress and set in motion a crash programme for the construction of strategic bombers. After an armada of these aircraft had been built, however, it was "discovered" that the number of Soviet bombers had been deliberately exaggerated three to four times over.

In the early 1960s, a howl was raised about a "United States missile gap", and the United States initiated a massive deployment of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Then, after more than a thousand of these had been deployed, it turned out that the Soviet "missile threat" had been exaggerated 15 to 20 times over.

Simultaneously, an American programme was launched to build 41 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). At the time, no one in the world had them. And already in the mid 1960s, the Pentagon began fitting submarine-launched ballistic missiles with multiple re-entry vehicle warheads.

At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the United States was the first to begin arming strategic ballistic missiles with highly accurate multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), thus starting a new spiral of the nuclear arms race. This sharply increased the total of nuclear warheads. Yet now Washington alleges that in the 1970s the United States was "inactive" and showed "restraint". The "restraint", apparently, manifested itself in adding an average of three nuclear warheads per day to the United States strategic delivery vehicles. Whereas in 1970 United States strategic delivery vehicles could carry just over 5,000 nuclear warheads, at present this figure exceeds 12,000.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It was also in the 1970s that the United States took the initiative in launching a crash programme for the development of a new type of strategic weapon -- the long-range cruise missile. Now it is implementing plans for the deployment of many thousands of air-, sea-, and ground-launched missiles of this type. In 1981 the United States President ordered the full-scale manufacture of neutron munitions.

And today, the United States has embarked on a programme for a comprehensive strategic arms build-up until 1990. The programme extends to all the components of the strategic offensive forces, and includes deployment of new MX and Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missiles and new strategic bombers, construction of Trident nuclear-powered missile submarines, and escalated production of various types of cruise missiles. The United States plans to bring its strategic capability up to 20,000 nuclear warheads by 1990.

Who, then, is throwing down the gauntlet? Who has saddled the world with the arms race?

The United States is playing the same sort of dishonest game with regard to the militarization of space. For instance, it is now trying to represent matters as if it had never worked on anti-satellite weapons itself, but is only trying to close the gap now, after some kind of Soviet "edge" has been discovered. All the facts that do not fit this pattern are naturally being dismissed. But they are there, and nothing can be done about them: it was in fact the United States that first initiated the militarization of outer space. The development of anti-satellite systems under the Spacetrack programme began in the United States as early as 1958. Only a year later, in 1959, a United States Bold Orion missile launched from a B-47 bomber intercepted an artificial Earth satellite. Ever since that time the work on United States military space programmes has virtually never been interrupted. Over 60 billion dollars have been spent on them since the end of the 1950s. Major research has been conducted since into the development of interceptor satellites (The BAMBI and SAINT projects), anti-satellite systems have been deployed on Kwajalein and Johnston Islands in the Pacific and at the Vandenberg Air Force base in California, and missiles to intercept target satellites have been launched repeatedly.

In this connection, I would also like to raise another subject involving a distortion of the facts. To our complete surprise we learned recently that the Soviet Union had never before raised the question of preventing an arms race in space but, in fact, rushed to do it as soon as the United States adopted its new "Star Wars" programme.

Even if this assertion betrays a mere lack of background knowledge, it certainly does little credit to its author. Still worse, however, would be a deliberate distortion of facts by someone possessing such knowledge. May I recall that as early as 1958 the Soviet Union put forward a proposal to prohibit the use of outer space for military purposes. In the same year 1958, at the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union proposed to set up an international committee for co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space. We have since repeatedly raised this question both in the United Nations and elsewhere. For example, at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1963 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, stated: "The peoples have the right to expect that the new sphere entered by man, the boundless ocean of space, will never become another staging area for warfare, destruction, and death. Their eyes turned on the interstellar depths, are full of hope that the conquest of space will serve peaceful purposes only."

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union has invariably taken the initiative and participated in the most active fashion in the elaboration of all the existing treaties which closed off certain avenues of an arms race in outer space.

Our position of principle regarding this issue remains as consistent as before. Lest anyone still have any doubts on this score, we are ready to set it forth in a clear and coherent form once again. Seeking to avert an arms race in outer space and thus to lessen the danger to mankind of the threat of nuclear war, as well as to contribute towards attainment of the goal whereby the exploration and utilization of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, would be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes, the Soviet Union specifically proposes:

First, to prohibit the use or threat of force in outer space and the atmosphere and on Earth through the utilization, as instruments of destruction, of space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in space in any other manner.

Second, to prohibit the use or threat of force against space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner.

Third, not to test or deploy by placing in orbit around the Earth or stationing on celestial bodies or in any other manner any space-based weapons for the destruction of objects on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

Fourth, not to utilize space objects in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner as means to destroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outer space.

Fifth, not to destroy, damage, or disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States.

Sixth, not to test or create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems that may already exist; not to test or use manned spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes.

To this end we are ready to engage in concrete negotiations. Wishing to create a favourable atmosphere for such negotiations, the Soviet Union has declared a unilateral moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite weapons into outer space for as long as other States act in kind.

This is the constructive programme for solving the problem of the prevention of arms race in space put forward by the Soviet Union. We are prepared to negotiate on it within an ad hoc body of this Conference, just as we are prepared to consider any other concrete proposals aimed at that goal. At the same time the Soviet delegation strongly disagrees that the role of this forum be confined to a mere examination and consideration of the existing agreements which in some way or another affect outer space. We shall not allow a subsidiary body of the Conference to be turned into a smokescreen for carrying out a space militarization programme, for preparing for "star wars".

Comparison between the two lines of approach to the prevention of arms race in space reveals that one of them -- namely ours -- aims to prevent space from being militarized and turned into a new sphere of arms race, at reducing nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated. The other one, that of the United States, aims at the broadest possible utilization of space for military purposes, at starting a new round of the arms race, including the race in nuclear arms. Whatever tactics are used by the advocates of the "Strategic Defence Initiative" in their attempts to make black pass for white, the stubborn logic of facts must point to a single conclusion: the space militarization plans or so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" dramatically increase the risk of nuclear war.

Mr. QIAN JIADONG (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President the month of March is about to end, and I have not yet had an opportunity to congratulate you. Please allow me now to extend my congratulations to you both on your assumption of the Presidency for the month of March and on the successful task you will soon have accomplished with your experience, ability and sense of dedication. Your duties in March seem to be no less heavy than the work in the previous month. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador Lowitz for the contributions he made during the month of February.

In my statement today, I would like to set forth some ideas of the Chinese delegation on item 5 of our agenda, namely, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". As our colleagues may have already noted, the Chinese delegation has submitted a Working Paper (CD/579) on this item.

This is the fourth year since "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" was included in the Conference's agenda as a priority item. However, despite repeated appeals of many delegations, the situation in actuality remains the same as from the very beginning. No subsidiary body has ever been established, not to mention any substantive negotiations. While one shadow -- the shadow of the nuclear threat -- is still hanging over the heads of the people of the world, yet another is rising on the horizon and looming larger with each passing day. The pace of an arms race in outer space, far from slowing down, is on the contrary being intensified and accelerated.

The two States with the greatest space capabilities, not content with the thousands of military satellites already launched and the space weapons systems they each possess, are still pouring huge amounts of human, financial and material resources into research and development for new and more sophisticated types of space weapons. One openly proclaims that it is determined to go on with its research on strategic defensive weapons, and according to news reports, also intends to increase funds for a so-called Advanced Strategic Missile Systems programme. The other, while upgrading its offensive strategic weapons, has also, for years, been engaged in developing defensive space weapons. If this arms race in outer space between the two super-Powers is to continue unchecked, people cannot help asking: What kind of end will it lead to?

The history of the development of weaponry tells us that an arms race by itself knows no limit. In his statement on 5 March, Mr. Dhanapala, the distinguished Ambassador of Sri Lanka, rightly pointed out: "There is no such a thing as the ultimate weapons system." On 23 October 1984, in the First Committee of the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the Chinese representative also said with great anxiety that "The arms race now going on between the super-Powers in outer space is in fact an extension and development of their nuclear arms race. It is bound to lead to an even more complicated situation of alternate escalation in which each side would try to outdo the other in the race between offensive weapons systems and between defensive weapons systems, as well as between the two kinds of weapons systems."

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Scientific and strategic studies have increasingly proved that it is impossible to eliminate weapons by developing a new type of weaponry, or to terminate an arms race by starting a new arms race. An arms race in outer space can only bring greater instability to our world, further aggravate the present international relations and increase the danger of war. If such a race cannot be halted, then before long, there will emerge in the world a new type of armed service, the Space Force, to match the existing Ground, Naval and Air Forces, and in the eventuality of a war, there will be, apart from land, sea and sky, a new battlefield, namely, outer space. As is pointed out in the book "Countdown to Space War", published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "If the two super-Powers go to war anytime after, say, 1990, it is very likely that the war would start in space.". What a horrible picture this is!

This is exactly why the people of the world are so much concerned about the arms race in outer space and so urgently demanding the prevention of such a race. It is by no means accidental that the thirty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted by as many as 150 votes in favour and only one abstention the resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (A/39/59). It fully reflects the profound anxieties and misgivings of the peoples of the world, including the Chinese people. China played a part in the elaboration of the above-mentioned resolution. It is in the spirit of this resolution that we have submitted the Working Paper now before you. We hope it will contribute to the work of the Conference. Allow me now to briefly introduce it.

Our Working Paper sets forth first of all our basic position on the issue of outer space: China is opposed to any arms race, and hence also to an arms race in outer space; China holds that the exploration and use of outer space should, in the interest of mankind, serve to promote the economic, scientific and cultural development of all countries. Outer space is universally recognized as the common heritage of mankind. The principles of "non-militarization of outer space" and "the exclusive use of outer space for peaceful purposes" are not only embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, but also expressly stipulated in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Proceeding from its consistent policy for peace, China fully endorses these principles.

The militarization of outer space involves not only space weapons but also the satellite systems which have been established over the years for military purposes. It follows, therefore, that in principle space weapons with actual lethal or destructive power and military satellites of all types should be limited and prohibited to achieve the "non-militarization of outer space". Our Working Paper underscores this point, and we consider that this should be our ultimate objective in preventing an arms race in outer space.

Of course, in the same way as the complete prohibition and total destruction of all nuclear weapons cannot be achieved at one stroke, we cannot expect to realize "non-militarization of outer space" overnight. We all know the complexities of military satellites and the divergence of views as to their limitation. We have, therefore, out of practical considerations, proposed in our Working Paper to leave aside the issue of military satellites to be considered and resolved at an appropriate time in future; and to make the

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

"deweaponization of outer space" our primary objective at the present stage in our efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. This includes the prohibition of developing, testing, producing, deploying and using any space weapons and the destruction of all existing space weapons. In our view, such an objective is not excessive and should be attainable.

In order to facilitate negotiations on the prohibition of space weapons, it is necessary to clearly define what space weapons are. We had tried to do so before and our Working Paper does so again. We do not consider our idea perfect. We only hope it can be of interest to all delegates for further discussions. If consensus could be reached on this key issue, it might serve as a good beginning.

Our Working Paper reaffirms the importance of the major existing international legal instruments concerning outer space, especially the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which contains clearcut provisions prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the Earth. However, it must be admitted that all these international legal instruments have their limitations, and are therefore far from being adequate to fundamentally prevent an arms race in outer space. This is why the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament specifically states in paragraph 80 that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.". With the development of space technology and the acceleration of **arms race in outer space, it is necessary to analyse and examine the** relevant existing international instruments, and to formulate new provisions and conclude new agreements. This has become the general desire of the international community, to which we fully subscribe.

Our paper reiterates that the United States and the Soviet Union should bear special responsibilities for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This is self-evident, as they alone have the greatest capacity for outer space activities and are right now intensifying their efforts in the development and testing of space weapons. What we stress in particular is that they should demonstrate genuine political will and conduct negotiations in earnest to yield results conducive to international peace and security. Like many other delegations, we too are of the view that they should keep the Conference on Disarmament appropriately informed of the progress of their bilateral negotiations.

Multilateral negotiations and bilateral negotiations are mutually complementary. Our Conference should also speedily get into action without any further delay. The relevant resolution adopted at the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly requested the Conference on Disarmament to establish as soon as possible an ad hoc committee to engage in negotiations. It is regrettable that the spring part of our session is already more than half-way through, yet the establishment of an ad hoc committee on outer space remains elusive. We should do all we can to break the present deadlock on the question of mandate. In this connection, China always takes a flexible approach. We share the view expressed by the Sri Lankan and other delegations that the mandate of the ad hoc committee should contain a clear objective, namely to conclude an

(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

agreement or agreements, and at the same time may include an exploratory stage to identify issues. We sincerely hope that all delegations will display the same spirit of compromise and co-operation prevalent at the adoption of General Assembly resolution 39/59, so that an early agreement can be reached on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On the question of disarmament, to this day disarmament negotiations are invariably outpaced by arms races. This should not be allowed to happen to outer space issues. We should try our best to prevent the current situation from deteriorating any further before an agreement is reached. To this end, the Chinese delegation has proposed in the concluding part of its Working Paper that all States having space capabilities refrain from developing, testing or deploying outer space weapons in order to create conditions and an atmosphere propitious to negotiations. It is our hope that our proposal will receive a positive response from all sides.

These, then, are the main contents and the underlying considerations of the Working Paper submitted by China. Any comments will be welcome, and we are ready to explore the issue jointly with all parties.

Time is pressing, but it is not yet too late. On the whole, space weapons are still in the stage of research and testing, and no huge outer space arsenal is in existence. The existing treaties, agreements and other relevant accords concerning outer space, in spite of the many loopholes and inadequacies inherent therein, **have none the less** provided a certain legal basis for our work. The various proposals put forward by Sweden, France and many other countries have also provided us with material for careful study. Let us seize the opportunity and work together to ensure that outer space -- the common heritage of mankind -- be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not one day be destroyed.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

There are no more speakers on the list for this morning. Does any delegation wish to take the floor? I see none.

We have quite a long list of speakers for the plenary meeting on Thursday. As you know, I also intend to report to the Conference on the results of the consultations I have been holding on the various agenda items, and on the same occasion I shall make my closing statement as President, as it will be the last plenary meeting of the month of March. I therefore hope that at Thursday morning's plenary meeting we will be able to complete all the business envisaged for that meeting so as not to disrupt the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Consequently, I would propose that, as we have done on other occasions, we begin the plenary meeting on Thursday at 10 a.m.

(The President)

precisely so that we can finish our work during the morning. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference agrees that we should begin Thursday's plenary meeting at 10 a.m. sharp.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): As we have no further business, I propose to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 28 March, at 10 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.