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FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 340 (1973)

Report of the Fifth Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Ernesto C. GARRIDO (Philippines)

1. At its 2161st plenary meeting, on 31 October 1973, the General Assembly decided to allocate to the Fifth Committee agenda item 109, entitled "Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force established pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973)". The Fifth Committee considered this question at its 1603rd to 1610th meetings during the period from 19 to 26 November 1973.

2. For its consideration of this item, the Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General (A/9285) in which he submitted to the General Assembly for approval budget estimates totalling \$30 million for the organization, operation and maintenance of a United Nations Emergency Force of 7,000, all ranks, for a period of six months, beginning on 25 October 1973. The Secretary-General also requested General Assembly authority to enter into commitments for the Force at a rate not to exceed \$5 million a month for the period from 25 April to 31 October 1974 should it be necessary to continue the Force beyond the initial period of six months. In paragraph 2 of his report, the Secretary-General recalled, inter alia, that, by resolution 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, the Security Council approved a report (S/11052/Rev.1), in paragraph 7 of which he stated, with respect to the method of financing the Force, that:

"The costs of the Force should be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter."

3. At the 1603rd meeting on 19 November, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions introduced its report (A/9314) containing the observations and recommendations of that Committee on the report of the Secretary-General (A/9285). In paragraph 3 of its report, the Advisory Committee expressed the view that the establishment of a special account

for these expenditures would have several distinct advantages, one of these being that a special account would in any case be necessary if the General Assembly decided to invite voluntary contributions towards the expenses of the Force. In paragraph 4 of its report, the Advisory Committee suggested that voluntary contributions could be in cash or in kind and that, moreover, Governments providing contingents could voluntarily waive in whole or in part any reimbursement of extra and extraordinary expenses that the General Assembly might allow. In paragraph 23 of its report, the Advisory Committee stated that, independently of such voluntary action by Governments and bearing in mind the lack of a uniform definition of extra and extraordinary costs, the General Assembly might wish to review the question with a view to formulating and introducing standardized cost factors. As far as the cost estimates outlined by the Secretary-General were concerned, the Advisory Committee believed that savings could be expected under certain sections of the estimates, but that under other sections the Secretary-General had taken a very conservative view. Subject to such decision that the General Assembly would take in regard to the matter of reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs to Governments providing contingents, the Advisory Committee recommended acceptance of the Secretary-General's estimate of \$30 million for the six-month period from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974. The Advisory Committee also recommended that the General Assembly authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments at a rate not to exceed \$5 million per month during the period from 25 April to 31 October 1974, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the initial period of six months.

4. At the same meeting, the representative of Brazil introduced a draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1) on behalf of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. In so doing, the representative of Brazil announced that Chad, Cyprus, Guinea, Japan, Panama, Peru and Rwanda had been added to the list of sponsors. The draft resolution read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the report 1/ of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the United Nations Emergency Force established pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973) for the period from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974 and the report 2/ of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions thereon,

"Reaffirming its previous decisions regarding the fact that in order to meet the expenditures caused by such operations a different procedure is required from that applied to meet expenditures of the regular budget of the United Nations,

1/ A/9285.

2/ A/9314.

"Taking into account the fact that the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions and that the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute towards peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures,

"Bearing also in mind the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council in the financing of such operations, as indicated in resolution 1874 (S-IV) and other resolutions of the General Assembly,

"1. Decides to appropriate an amount of \$30,000,000 for the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974 inclusive and requests the Secretary-General to establish a special account for this Force;

"2. Decides, as an ad hoc arrangement, without prejudice to the positions of principle that may be taken by Member States in any consideration by the General Assembly of arrangements for the financing of peace-keeping operations:

"(a) To apportion an amount of \$18,945,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the permanent members of the Security Council in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976;

"(b) To apportion an amount of \$10,434,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the economically developed Member States which are not permanent members of the Security Council in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976;

"(c) To apportion an amount of \$606,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among economically less developed Member States in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976;

"(d) To apportion an amount of \$15,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period to the following countries among the economically less developed Member States, in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Yemen;

"3. Decides that, for the purpose of the present resolution, the term 'economically less developed Member States' in paragraph 2 (c) above shall mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Member States referred to in paragraphs 2 (a) and (d) above;

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"4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the United Nations Emergency Force at a rate not to exceed \$5,000,000 per month for the period 25 April 1974 to 31 October 1974 inclusive, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the initial period of six months, said amount to be apportioned among Member States in accordance with the scheme set out in this resolution;

"5. Invites voluntary contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force both in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General."

5. In introducing the 35-Power draft resolution, the representative of Brazil stated, inter alia, that it was based on the principle of collective responsibility of Member States in sharing the costs of the Force (General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV)) and that it complied fully with the decision of the Security Council, when it decided to establish the Force, that the costs of the Force should be considered as expenses of the United Nations to be borne by the Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. The proposal was inspired also by past decisions of the General Assembly to the effect that any peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures should be financed through a procedure different from that applied to meet expenditures of the regular budget of the United Nations, and it followed the guidelines embodied in stands previously taken by the Assembly on the question of financing peace-keeping operations. In this respect, the draft proposal took account of the fact that the permanent members of the Security Council had a special responsibility in financing such peace-keeping operations, that economically more developed countries were in a position to make relatively larger contributions and that economically less developed countries had relatively limited capacity to contribute towards such operations. In selecting the four categories of countries and in calculating the amounts to be shared by them, the co-sponsors had borne in mind past experience of the General Assembly in dealing with similar issues, the criteria involved in the preamble of the draft proposal and elements of judgement derived from political and economic considerations. The scale of assessment for 1974-1976 was chosen to determine the amounts to be contributed because, to a very large extent, it was lower than the present scale and a vast majority of Member States would receive a more favourable treatment with regard to their share in the financing of the Force. The representative of Brazil stated that the proposed scheme for apportionment of the expenditure appearing in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was subject to the proviso that it was an ad hoc arrangement and that it did not prejudice positions of principle of Member States on the matter of financing peace-keeping operations. The co-sponsors, motivated mainly by the hope of achieving a consensus on their draft proposal, held many consultations with the representatives of Member States of a wide geographical and political area, in order to reach a solution to the problem which would meet, if not the unanimous view, at least the view of a large majority of Member States and would provide the General Assembly with a reasonable and speedy solution to the financing of the Force so as to enable it to perform expeditiously its important peace-keeping mission.

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6. At the same meeting, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in his general statement on the question of financing the Force, introduced an amendment to the 35-Power draft resolution, which was subsequently sponsored also by Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/C.5/L.1137). The amendment would replace operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution by the following:

"2. Decides, as an ad hoc arrangement, without prejudice to the positions of principle that may be taken by Member States in any consideration by the General Assembly of arrangements for the financing of peace-keeping operations, to apportion an amount of \$30,000,000 on the basis of the following principles:

"(a) Each of the permanent members of the Security Council shall contribute an amount equal to approximately 15 per cent more than its contribution according to the United Nations scale of assessments for 1974-1976, i.e. a total of 63.15 per cent;

"(b) The most developed countries with an annual per capita income of \$2,501 or more (Australia, Denmark, Germany (Federal Republic of), Norway, Canada, Sweden) shall contribute an amount equal to 10 per cent more than their contribution according to the United Nations scale of assessments for 1974-1976, i.e. a total of 15.49 per cent;

"(c) The developed countries with an annual per capita income of \$1,501 to \$2,500 (Austria, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Israel, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand) and also the Republic of South Africa and Portugal shall contribute an amount equal to their contribution according to the United Nations scale of assessments for 1974-1976, i.e. a total of 16.44 per cent;

"(d) Countries with an annual per capita income of \$1,001 to \$1,500 (Argentina, Greece, Poland, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, Ireland) shall contribute an amount equal to approximately 40 per cent less than their contribution according to the United Nations scale of assessments for 1974-1976, i.e. a total of 3.37 per cent;

"(e) Brazil, Mexico and Spain shall contribute an amount equal to 70 per cent less than their contribution according to the United Nations scale of assessments for 1974-1976, i.e. a total of 0.79 per cent;

"(f) Algeria, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Republic, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia shall contribute an amount equal to 87 per cent less than their contribution according to the United Nations scale of assessments for 1974-1976, i.e. a total of 0.48 per cent;

"(g) All developing countries making the minimum contribution to the United Nations budget, and countries with an annual per capita income of less than \$100 (India, Indonesia, Burma) shall contribute an amount equal to 90 per cent less than their contribution according to the United Nations scale of assessments for 1974-1976, i.e. a total of 0.28 per cent."

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7. In introducing the amendment, the representative of the USSR stated that his delegation fully concurred in the principle of collective responsibility upon which the 35-Power draft resolution was based, but could not accept certain anomalies in the apportionment of the expenses among Member States which it considered to be unjustified. His delegation believed that Israel's contribution to the expenses of the Force should be increased. Moreover, in the opinion of his delegation, the apportionment made in the draft resolution was unfair to some Member States and contrary to the accepted principle of capacity to pay. The method used for apportioning the expenses of the Force in the amendment proposed by his delegation was fairer both to the economically developed countries as well as to the large group of developing countries and those with a medium per capita income.

8. As regards the amount of \$30 million which was being requested by the Secretary-General for the first six months of the existence of the Force, the representative of the USSR, as well as other delegations, considered it to be a highly hypothetical and very excessive estimate. These delegations agreed with the Advisory Committee that savings could be achieved in some of the sections of the Secretary-General's estimates and he drew attention particularly to the estimate in respect of the reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs to Governments providing contingents, which was included under section 7 of the estimates and which accounted for two thirds of the total requested allocation. Referring to the observations made by the Advisory Committee in paragraph 20 of its report (A/9314) to the effect that there was no uniform criterion for determining what constituted extra and extraordinary costs, and to the possible consequential uneven reimbursement of such costs to Governments, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed the following draft paragraph (A/C.5/L.1136) for inclusion in the report of the Fifth Committee:

"The Fifth Committee recommends that the General Assembly should propose to the Secretary-General that in his discussions with the Governments of countries providing military contingents for the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, he should try to effect the maximum possible reduction in the divergencies between reimbursements made to Governments for extra and extraordinary costs. The maximum amount of reimbursement to Governments for such costs should not exceed \$250 monthly per capita."

9. At the same meeting, the representative of Portugal introduced the following amendment (A/C.5/L.1134) to the 35-Power draft resolution:

"In operative paragraph 3, line 6, delete the word 'Portugal'."

10. In so doing, the representative of Portugal stated that his delegation, although maintaining its expressed reservations concerning peace-keeping operations in other regions of the world, was willing to join other Member States in devising an ad hoc arrangement for the financing of the Force on the understanding that such an arrangement would not serve as a precedent for the future. His delegation, however willing to support the 35-Power draft resolution, had definite reservations in regard to paragraph 3, in which Portugal, with an annual per capita income below \$1,500, had been arbitrarily grouped among the economically developed countries. His delegation, therefore, felt constrained to introduce the amendment (A/C.5/L.1134).

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11. Subsequently, the delegation of Portugal submitted the following subamendment (A/C.5/L.1139) to the amendment introduced by the USSR (A/C.5/L.1137):

"1. In paragraph 2, subparagraph (c), remove the words 'and Portugal'.

"2. Add 'Portugal' to the list of countries appearing in paragraph 2, subparagraph (f).

"3. Make consequential changes in the percentages shown as payable by the countries shown in the said subparagraphs (c) and (f)."

12. At the same meeting, the representative of Yemen introduced an amendment (A/C.5/L.1135) to the 35-Power draft resolution on behalf of the delegations of Cuba and Yemen, which read as follows:

"After paragraph 3, insert the following paragraphs:

"4. Decides that, for the purpose of the present resolution, the Member States whose economy suffers certain strains because of the military aggression and occupation of their territories should be exempted from contributing to the financing of the Emergency Force.

"5. Decides further that the above-mentioned apportionments in paragraph 2 (a), (b), (c) and (d) should be adjusted proportionately to absorb the balance resulting from the implementation of paragraph 4 above.

"Renumber the remaining paragraphs accordingly."

13. In introducing the amendment (A/C.5/L.1135), the representative of Yemen stated that it was the intention of the sponsors to apply to the 35-Power draft resolution the principle affirmed in paragraph 1 (e) of General Assembly resolution 1874 (S-IV) by virtue of which, where circumstances warranted, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which were victims of events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation.

14. At the request of some delegations, in the course of the discussion at the 1604th meeting, on 20 November, a note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/L.1138) was prepared indicating the apportionment of the total appropriation of \$30 million for the Force on the basis of the United Nations scale of assessments for 1974-1976, on the basis of the ad hoc arrangement proposed in document A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1 and on the latter ad hoc arrangement as amended by each of the proposals contained in documents A/C.5/L.1137 and A/C.5/L.1135, respectively.

15. At the same meeting, one delegation, making specific reference to the draft paragraph proposed by the USSR (A/C.5/L.1136) requested information regarding the average amount per man-month, by contingent, reimbursed to Governments which had provided contingents for past United Nations peace-keeping operations. The note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/L.1140), prepared in response to this request, provided such information in respect of the United Nations Emergency Force for the period from 1956 to 1967 based on claims made by the Governments for the years 1966 to 1967.

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16. At the same meeting, the representative of the Secretary-General, replying to a question raised by one delegation at the 1603rd meeting as to whether the Secretary-General had included provision in his estimate for a service allowance to be paid to members of the Force, stated that the Secretary-General would not take a final decision on the amount to be paid until he had received all the figures he required to make an accurate estimate. Since the amount of \$30 million was only an initial estimate and there were still many relevant unknown factors involved, the Secretary-General would very likely have to submit a revised estimate, which could include a provision for the service allowance in the amount decided upon.

17. At the 1608th meeting, on 22 November, Costa Rica and Zaire joined the list of sponsors of the 35-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1).

18. In the course of the discussion, a number of delegations supporting the 37-Power draft resolution stated that they did so because it maintained the principle of collective responsibility as affirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 1874 (S-IV). They stated also that they considered the arrangement outlined in the proposal to be an ad hoc one which would not constitute a precedent for the financing of future peace-keeping operations, and that it in no way prejudiced any position they might adopt with regard to similar operations in the future. Many of these delegations stated that they would have preferred that the funds required for the financing of the Force be apportioned in accordance with the scale of assessment established for the regular budget, but accepted the ad hoc arrangement outlined in the draft resolution as a compromise solution to the varying points of view held by the total membership. One delegation stated that it did not object to the reference in the preambular part of the 37-Power draft resolution to the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council in the financing of such peace-keeping operations, but wished to point out that the permanent members should be able to exercise those responsibilities at all other levels without discrimination. The view was expressed that any amendments to the draft resolution would destroy the delicate balance of the compromise solution. Some of these delegations also expressed the view that they would have preferred a more specific reference to the concept of collective responsibility in the text of the draft resolution. One delegation, although supporting the 37-Power draft resolution and concurring in the view that countries with very low per capita incomes or with serious problems in connexion with payments in convertible currencies should make only a nominal contribution to the costs of the Force, believed that the more economically developed countries, which had in many cases received considerable reductions in the regular scale of assessment established for 1974-1976, should forgo at least part of the deduction they were receiving by virtue of the grouping in the draft resolution.

19. Certain other delegations emphasized that they fully supported the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force under discussion because, contrary to some past peace-keeping operations which, in their opinion, had been carried out in contravention to the Charter, this operation was a result of decisions taken by the Security Council and was in accordance with the provisions of the Charter; their present position, however, in no way altered their position of principle in regard to certain of the past peace-keeping operations. These delegations, although in full

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agreement with the principle of collective responsibility upon which the 37-Power draft resolution was based, could not agree with the grouping of Member States for the apportionment of the costs as set out in that draft resolution. It was pointed out by some of these delegations that, in their view, the draft resolution failed to take fully into account the relative capacity to pay of Member States and that it had departed from the principle of the low per capita allowance formula applied by the Committee on Contributions in arriving at the scale of assessment for the regular budget. These delegations expressed their support for the four-Power amendment (A/C.5/1137) to the 37-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1) and believed that the grouping of countries in the amendment was more consistent with the principles contained in the preambular part of the 37-Power draft resolution, wherein it took into account that participation of a Member State in the financing of the Force should be conditioned by its level of economic development.

20. The delegations of Albania and the Libyan Arab Republic declared their strong objections to the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and stated that they would in no way participate in the financing of the Force.

21. Those delegations supporting the amendment submitted by Cuba and Yemen (A/C.5/L.1135) maintained that it would serve to restore the proper balance in the ad hoc arrangement appearing in the 37-Power draft resolution and that it was in accordance with the principle laid down in paragraph 1 (e) of resolution 1874 (S-IV), wherein the General Assembly stated that, where circumstances warrant, special consideration should be given to the situation of Member States which are victims of the events or actions leading to a peace-keeping operation. In this connexion, the representative of Egypt expressed the objection of his delegation to the arrangement in the 37-Power draft resolution wherein the parties directly involved in the issue under discussion were placed in the same category of assessment, irrespective of the political and economic factors involved. It was the view of his delegation that Israel should be classified as a developed country rather than as a developing country. One delegation, expressing its strong opposition to the proposed amendment (A/C.5/L.1135), stated that the amendment raised political questions and that it was not for the Fifth Committee to make political judgements which the Security Council itself had not made in this instance.

22. The Advisory Committee, commenting in its report (A/9314) on the question of reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs to Governments providing contingents for the Force, observed that considerable savings could be achieved in this area and suggested that the General Assembly might wish to review the question of reimbursement with a view to formulating and introducing standardized cost factors which would obviate wide discrepancies between the payments made to participating Governments. In this connexion, some delegations expressed their support for the draft paragraph (A/C.5/L.1136) introduced by the Soviet Union on this question. The Advisory Committee also suggested that Governments providing contingents might voluntarily waive in whole or in part reimbursement of these expenses. Some of the Member States expressed their strong objections to the suggestions of the Advisory Committee and stated that those suggestions, as well as the draft proposal in document A/C.5/L.1136, were in complete contradiction to the understanding on which their Government's participation in the Force was founded and that, although such action might result in considerable savings, it would place a heavy burden on those Governments which had responded quickly to the Security Council's request for assistance.

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23. In reply to queries raised with regard to the reimbursement of extra and extraordinary costs to Governments providing troops to the Force, the representative of the Secretary-General stated, inter alia, that the Security Council had taken a decision on the selection of troops on the basis of geographical distribution and political considerations. The standard procedure for the reimbursement of such costs, which had evolved out of past peace-keeping operations and which had been used thus far in the present operation, was based on the amount of extra and extraordinary costs specified by domestic law of each country. Experience had shown that the national legislation of the countries involved determined the amount charged for troops from those countries. If the General Assembly could reach agreement on a fixed and reasonable standardized reimbursement which would not make it impossible to secure troops from the countries authorized by the Security Council, a standardized cost factor might work. In any case, a delicate balance would need to be kept between geographical and political considerations and cost, without contravening the decision of the Security Council. Regarding the question raised by one delegation as to whether the \$30 million estimate would be adequate, the representative of the Secretary-General explained that it had been based on the assumption that there would be 7,000 troops in the field for the full six-month period. However, no provision had been made for such expenditure as the repatriation of troops and liquidation expenses, rotation of troops and service allowance. Moreover the amount required for equipment had been grossly underestimated in the hope that contributions of equipment would be made or that it could be rented. If the amount of \$30 million proved inadequate, it would not be possible to secure additional funds before the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. Moreover, no cash was being requested for the period from 25 April to 31 October 1974. Additional estimates would have to be submitted in any event to the General Assembly at its next session if the Force were continued and should there be any under-expenditures they could be credited at that time.

24. At the 1609th meeting, on 23 November, the representative of Ghana introduced a draft paragraph (A/C.5/L.1141) for inclusion in the report of the Committee on behalf of Ghana, Kenya, Indonesia and Senegal. The delegation of Nepal subsequently joined the list of sponsors. The draft paragraph read as follows:

"The Fifth Committee takes note of the observations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in document A/9314 and, with regard to reimbursement made to Governments for extra and extraordinary expenses, requests the Secretary-General to study the possibility of standardizing costs and determining a ceiling after appropriate consultations with the aim of reducing the wide discrepancies. The Fifth Committee also requests the Secretary-General to report to the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly on this matter."

25. In introducing the draft paragraph, the representative of Ghana stated that there was no broadly acceptable definition for extra and extraordinary expenses and that the wide discrepancies which existed in reimbursing such costs to Governments was unacceptable inasmuch as the troops from different countries served in the same area under similar conditions. Since the sponsors of the draft paragraph believed

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that the limit of \$250 per man-month proposed by the USSR (A/C.5/L.1136) was not enough and since, as a result of various consultations, it had not been possible to arrive at a suitable figure, it was agreed to leave this sensitive matter to the Secretary-General for study.

26. At the same meeting, the representative of the USSR, on behalf of the sponsors, agreed to withdraw the four-Power amendment (A/C.5/L.1137). In so doing, he stated that, although the sponsors still believed that the method of apportionment in the amendment had been based on the principle of collective responsibility and ensured a more equitable apportionment of costs among Member States taking into account the different economic situations of various groups of countries, the sponsors agreed to withdraw their amendment in response to the wishes expressed by the Group of Seventy-Seven and in order to enable the Committee to take a decision on this question which would enjoy the widest possible support. The sponsors would vote instead for the 37-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1).

27. The representative of Yemen, on behalf of the delegations of Cuba and Yemen, then agreed to withdraw the amendment which they had proposed (A/C.5/L.1135). In so doing, he stated that the sponsors still believed that the 37-Power draft resolution should have taken into consideration the situation of countries which were victims of aggression, but that they were withdrawing their amendment in a gesture of conciliation in order to facilitate an early decision by the Committee. He also stated that the sponsors had been prepared to vote for the four-Power amendment (A/C.5/L.1137), but, since it had been withdrawn, they would now vote for the 37-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1).

28. In explaining his vote, the representative of Poland reiterated his delegation's regret that its contribution to the costs of financing the Force had not been assessed on the basis of economically justified criteria. His delegation was prepared to accept the present ad hoc arrangement strictly on the understanding that in any future peace-keeping operations its participation in the scale of assessment for their financing would be readjusted on a "legitimate" basis. Furthermore, he stressed that his delegation's participation in the arrangement under discussion was applicable exclusively to the present peace-keeping undertaking and was not to constitute a precedent for future undertakings.

29. The delegation of China stated that its position with regard to the financing of the Force had been stated at the Security Council's 1752nd meeting on 27 October 1973; China was fundamentally opposed to the dispatching of the United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East and could, therefore, not bear any of the expenses of the Force. Based on these considerations, the delegation of China decided not to participate in the voting on the draft proposals before the Committee under this item.

30. The representative of the Secretary-General stated that the Secretariat would interpret the acceptance by the General Assembly of the provisions of paragraph 4 of the 37-Power draft resolution to mean that the Assembly would decide to apportion the amount in question among Member States, but that the actual appropriation of funds would have to be made by the Assembly later, fairly early in the course of its twenty-ninth session.

31. At the 1609th meeting, on 23 November, the Fifth Committee took the following decisions.

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32. The amendment submitted by Portugal (A/C.5/L.1134) was rejected by a recorded vote of 97 to 2, with 10 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour: Portugal, South Africa

Against: Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Abstaining: Bolivia, Brazil, Greece, Honduras, Israel, Khmer Republic, Paraguay, Spain, Swaziland, United States of America.

33. The 37-Power draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1) was adopted by a recorded vote of 105 to 2, with 4 abstentions (see paragraph 44 below). The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against: Albania, Libyan Arab Republic.

Abstaining: Algeria, Portugal, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic.

34. The delegations of the Congo and Mali stated that, if they had been present during the vote, they would have voted in favour of the 37-Power draft resolution.

35. The representatives of Democratic Yemen and Iraq asked that the present report reflect that their delegations had not participated in the voting.

36. The representative of Brazil stated that the draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1130/Rev.1) adopted by the Committee represented a compromise text based on a delicate political balance and that his delegation had not been in a position to support amendments which would have altered that balance. His delegation's abstention in respect of the Portuguese amendment (A/C.5/L.1134) did not imply any judgement as to its merits, either from a financial standpoint or in respect of the political considerations raised in connexion with the matter.

37. The representative of Portugal stated that his delegation did not consider itself bound by the decision which had just been taken and reserved its right not to contribute to the financing of the Force.

38. At the 1610th meeting, on 26 November, the representative of the USSR stated that his delegation had proposed the draft paragraph (A/C.5/L.1136) out of concern regarding the lack of clearly defined criteria for the reimbursement of extra and extraordinary expenses to Governments providing contingents, a major aspect of the whole question of financing the Force. However, in a spirit of solidarity with the expressed wishes of the Group of 77, his delegation was not pressing for a vote on its proposal and would instead support the four-Power draft paragraph introduced by the delegation of Ghana (A/C.5/L.1141).

39. The representative of Brazil stated that his delegation had serious misgivings about the appropriateness of the four-Power draft paragraph introduced by the delegation of Ghana. The question of the standardization of reimbursements was, in the opinion of his delegation, much more than just an administrative issue. The formation of an international peace-keeping force depended mainly on the political and geographical balance of its composition, and complete flexibility was therefore required for the selection of participating Governments and in order to secure their agreement. In so doing, account had to be taken of the undisputed right of States to see that the remuneration of their personnel conformed to their respective national standards as applied to service away from home. The imposition of limitations on levels of reimbursement might result in limiting the choice of countries providing contingents which, from a political point of view, would not be in the interest of the United Nations. Furthermore, approaching peace-keeping operations with the restrictive view of limiting the remuneration of troops and reimbursable costs tended to obscure the true nature of the participation of Governments which had so generously consented to co-operate in the maintenance of international peace. The representative of Brazil expressed the hope that the sponsors of the draft paragraph (A/C.5/L.1141) would not press for a vote, considering the broader substantive issues involved. On the strength of those issues, his delegation would be compelled to vote against the draft paragraph, as it would have had to vote against the draft paragraph proposed by the USSR (A/C.5/L.1136).

40. The representative of Ghana, speaking for the sponsors of the draft paragraph (A/C.5/L.1136), stated that they were not asking the Fifth Committee to take a decision on the matter at this time, but were rather asking the Secretary-General to study the question in the light of the views expressed by Brazil and other

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delegations. They had held many consultations and all countries providing contingents for the Force had been consulted in order that the draft proposal might be adopted by consensus.

41. Other comments made by delegations in the course of the discussion on this item appear in the summary records of the 1603rd to 1610th meetings of the Committee.

DECISION OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE

42. At the 1610th meeting, the Committee decided, without objection, to include the following paragraph (A/C.5/L.1141) in the present report (see paragraph 24 above):

"The Fifth Committee takes note of the observations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/9314) and, in regard to reimbursement made to Governments for extra and extraordinary expenses, requests the Secretary-General to study the possibility of standardizing costs and determining a ceiling after appropriate consultations with the aim of reducing the wide discrepancies. The Fifth Committee also requests the Secretary-General to report on this matter to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session."

43. The representative of Poland stated that he reserved the right of his Government to submit to the Secretary-General claims for reimbursement of extra and extraordinary expenses incurred by it in connexion with the sending of its troops to the Force in the Middle East.

RECOMMENDATION OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE

44. The Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the cost estimates of the United Nations Emergency Force established pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973 for the period from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974 3/ and the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions thereon, 4/

Reaffirming its previous decisions regarding the fact that, in order to meet the expenditures caused by such operations, a different procedure is required from that applied to meet expenditures of the regular budget of the United Nations,

Taking into account the fact that the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions and that the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute towards peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures,

3/ A/9285.

4/ A/9314.

Also bearing in mind the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council in the financing of such operations, as indicated in resolution 1874 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963 and other resolutions of the General Assembly,

1. Decides to appropriate an amount of \$30 million for the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force from 25 October 1973 to 24 April 1974 inclusive and requests the Secretary-General to establish a special account for the Force;

2. Decides, as an ad hoc arrangement, without prejudice to the positions of principle that may be taken by Member States in any consideration by the General Assembly of arrangements for the financing of peace-keeping operations:

(a) To apportion an amount of \$18,945,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the permanent members of the Security Council in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976;

(b) To apportion an amount of \$10,434,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among the economically developed Member States which are not permanent members of the Security Council in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976;

(c) To apportion an amount of \$606,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period among economically less developed Member States in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976;

(d) To apportion an amount of \$15,000 for the above-mentioned six-month period to the following countries among the economically less developed Member States, in the proportions determined by the scale of assessments for 1974-1976: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta and Yemen;

3. Decides that, for the purpose of the present resolution, the term "economically less developed Member States" in paragraph 2 (c) above shall mean all Member States except Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Member States referred to in paragraphs 2 (a) and (d) above;

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the United Nations Emergency Force at a rate not to exceed \$5 million per month for the period 25 April to 31 October 1974 inclusive, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the initial period of six months, the said amount to be apportioned among Member States in accordance with the scheme set out in the present resolution;

5. Invites voluntary contributions to the United Nations Emergency Force both in cash and in the form of services and supplies acceptable to the Secretary-General.