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Report of the Fifth Committee

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Fifth Committee considered agenda item 87 at its 1617th and 1619th to 1622nd meetings, held from 4 to 10 December 1973. The Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General containing a draft statute for the International Civil Service Commission and the proposed budget of the Commission for 1974-1975 (A/9147 and Corr.1) and the related interim report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/9370). 1/
2. The report of the Secretary-General had been prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3042 (XXVII) of 19 December 1972, in which the Assembly had decided to establish in principle, as of 1 January 1974, an International Civil Service Commission and had requested the Secretary-General,

"together with his colleagues in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination and after such consultations as he or they may deem necessary, to submit, through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session detailed proposals for an International Civil Service Commission, together with a draft statute covering its terms of reference and procedures, including conditions and periods of service for the commissioners, methods of selection of the supporting staff of the commission, methods of consultation with representatives of the administration and staff, and other necessary administrative, budgetary and financial provisions".
3. In reaching agreement on the draft statute, the Secretary-General and his colleagues had drawn upon the advice of the International Civil Service Advisory Board (ICSAB) to help resolve some of the more complex or debatable issues relating to the proposed terms of reference for the Commission which had arisen in the course of extended interagency discussions and consultations with staff representatives. The report of the Board, which had devoted its entire session in 1973 to an examination of the draft statute, was annexed to the Secretary-General's report (A/9147 and Corr.1, annex I).

1/ At the 1621st meeting a note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/1584) was distributed to members of the Fifth Committee concerning the inclusion of the full-time members of the International Civil Service Commission, the Inspectors serving in the Joint Inspection Unit and the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in the categories of officials to which the provisions of articles V and VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 22 A (I)) should apply. In light of the decision it had taken at its previous meeting (see paragraph 33 below), the Fifth Committee decided that the document should be revised and reissued for consideration under agenda item 86 (b): Other personnel questions.

4. In its interim report on the item (A/9370), the Advisory Committee sought the views of the Member States on what it considered to be the crucial question before the General Assembly as an essential preliminary step to producing a final report on the draft statute. The question was "whether the full-time Commissioners (whatever their number) should, as proposed by ACC, be accorded under the terms of the statute powers different from those of their colleagues". Specifically, the Member States were asked to indicate whether:

"(a) They favour the approach envisaged by ACC, which involves the statutory allocation of certain functions to the full-time members; or

"(b) They prefer statutory equality for all members of the Commission."

5. The Advisory Committee stated that it was prepared to accept the conclusion of ACC that the Commission should have a membership of 13 so as to make it sufficiently representative to command general confidence. However, its position on the number of full-time commissioners, on the frequency of meetings of the Commission and on other aspects of the draft statute would depend upon the answer to the basic question it had posed.

6. The Advisory Committee recalled that, in its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session, it had stated that it was not convinced of the need for more than one full-time commissioner, who would be the Chairman of the Commission (A/8914, para. 16). It would continue to question the need for more than one full-time member (the Chairman) if the Commission's powers were to be indivisible, except in so far as the Commission as a whole saw fit to delegate authority to individual members. However, if Member States were to favour the ACC provision that the full-time commissioners should act as an executive nucleus and exercise specific powers conferred upon them by the statute, the Advisory Committee was prepared to concede the proposal for three full-time members.

7. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee, in an oral statement introducing the report of its Committee 2/ at the 1617th meeting of the Fifth Committee, on 4 December, observed that most articles of the draft statute referred to the Commission - a term which could apply either to the Commission as a whole or to its full-time members. The key article was article 18, which defined the powers to be reserved to the full Commission. By a process of exclusion, one could then deduce which functions would be exercised by the full-time members. In the annex to its report, the Advisory Committee had attempted to give a summary list of the powers which would be entrusted to the Commission under the draft statute proposed by ACC, broken down as between those powers which were to be referred to the Commission as a whole and those which were to be allocated to the three full-time members. The Advisory Committee felt that it was essential to have the views of Member States on the proposed statutory relationship between the full-time members of the Commission and the Commission as a whole before it proceeded to produce a final report.

2/ A/C.5/SR.1617, p. 9.

II. DEBATE

8. In the course of the discussion, the alternatives posed by the Advisory Committee, as well as other aspects of the draft statute, were commented upon. All of the delegations participating in the discussion reiterated their support for the establishment of an International Civil Service Commission and indicated that they were prepared to accept, as had the Advisory Committee, the ACC proposal that the Commission should be composed of 13 members so as to make it sufficiently representative to command general confidence. Several delegations questioned, however, whether the composition of the Commission should follow the pattern of geographical distribution reflected in the composition of the Advisory Committee, since such a distribution would not result in equitable representation for the developing countries. In order to correct the basic imbalance in favour of the developed countries in the proposed structure of the Commission, some delegations suggested that the chairman of the Commission should be from a developing country.

9. On the question posed by the Advisory Committee, no consensus emerged in the course of the discussion. Several delegations expressed the view that the approach envisaged by ACC would establish a statutory inequality between the full-time and part-time members of the Commission and would thus have the effect of creating a super-commission within a commission. They believed that this would become a source of strain and dissension within the Commission which would impede its work. Other delegations maintained that ACC had not intended that the full-time members of the Commission should assume independent powers, but rather sought to provide for a division of work according to the nature of the functions being entrusted to the Commission as a whole so as to ensure that the day-to-day business of the Commission would be carried out efficiently and with dispatch. In support of this position, they cited paragraph 10 of the Secretary-General's report (A/9147 and Corr.1), paragraph 20 of the ICSAB report (A/9147 and Corr.1, annex II) and articles 17, 18 and 19 of the draft statute (A/9147 and Corr.1, annex I). The latter, especially, made it clear that the competence and control of the Commission as a whole would extend to all the activities of the Commission.

10. Several delegations suggested that the fears that the full-time members might dominate the Commission could be mitigated if the Commission as a whole had statutory authority to amend the functions and powers allocated to the full-time members. This could be done by amending the draft statute to provide that the Commission as a whole retained the residual powers in respect of all functions entrusted to the Commission. The full-time members could be empowered to carry out certain functions and to deal with the day-to-day business of the Commission in accordance with general policy directives formulated by the Commission as a whole and their actions could be subject to review by the Commission as a whole.

11. A number of delegations expressed the view that statutory equality for all members of the Commission could best be realized if the Commission had only one full-time member, who would be the chairman. Other delegations argued that it was not inconsistent to favour three full-time members as well as statutory equality for all members of the Commission.

12. Among the arguments advanced in favour of a single full-time member, the chairman of the Commission, and against three full-time members were the following:

(a) The establishment of two categories of members was likely to create difficulties and could lead to dissension within the Commission because of the unequal apportionment of functions and powers. If the Commission were composed of 13 members with equal statutory powers, and had only its chairman as a full-time member, the Commission as a whole could determine its own modus operandi. The statute should not establish a division of functions and powers among the members of the Commission. Rather the Commission as a whole should delegate certain functions to its chairman or other members. In this way the type of statutory inequality which was explicit in the proposed draft statute would be avoided.

(b) A single full-time member, who would be the chairman, would give the Commission unity of command and would promote both efficiency and harmonious relations within the Commission. On the other hand, the existence of two categories of members would necessitate a rather complex system for co-ordinating the activities of the two types of members, a situation which is not conducive to efficient day-to-day administration and to the establishment of a satisfactory decision-making process.

(c) More than one full-time member posed the danger of their controlling the Commission, through the creation of a super-commission within the Commission. It was more democratic and fair that an important body such as the Commission should have 13 rather than three members on an equal footing.

(d) Three full-time commissioners would mean higher costs without convincing justification that more than a full-time Chairman was needed to carry out efficiently the day-to-day administration of the decisions of the Commission, especially in view of the fact that the Commission would have at its disposal a relatively large secretariat. The Advisory Committee was cited as a body which had functioned efficiently and effectively with only one full-time member, its Chairman.

13. Those delegations favouring three full-time members made the following arguments:

(a) The importance and multiplicity of tasks to be entrusted to the Commission, particularly in the early years of its operation, made it necessary to provide for some division of labour between the members of the Commission. A single full-time member would not be able to carry out the day-to-day administrative duties of the Commission without becoming dependent on, and being influenced by, the Secretariat.

(b) The collective wisdom of three full-time members was preferable to the judgement of a single person, however knowledgeable. A single full-time member, who would be the chairman of the Commission, would lead to the concentration of too much authority in one person, who would become the focal point of all requests for reviews of the salary system. With three full-time members, the central authority would be diffused. Moreover, the focal point of the Commission would be more representative of the whole Commission.

(c) In terms of structural and organizational needs, the Commission should not be compared to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, since the latter's functions were advisory, whereas those of the Commission would be administrative and policymaking. Many of the functions and powers being entrusted to the Commission were presently carried out by the executive heads of the various agencies.

(d) Having three members of the Commission available on a full-time basis would facilitate consultation with all interested parties on matters arising from the decisions of the Commission as a whole.

14. Some delegations favoured having the Chairman of the Commission elected by its members, while others agreed with the procedure proposed by ACC in article 2 of the draft statute. Of the former, all but one felt that the Chairman should be elected for a one-year term and be eligible for re-election, the divergent opinion being that the Chairman should be elected for a relatively long term in the interest of continuity.

15. Several delegations attached great importance to making the Commission operational at as early a date as possible. Because they were concerned that substantial changes in the draft statute might oblige the executive heads of the specialized agencies and of IAEA to refer the changes to their governing body and hence delay the establishment of the Commission, these delegations favoured accepting the draft statute on an experimental basis. Once the Commission had become operational, the Secretary-General, his colleagues in ACC, the Advisory Committee and the Commission itself could evaluate the results of the implementation of the draft statute and recommend amendments to it.

16. In response, several delegations said that they could not accept the view that the Member States should refrain from making significant amendments to the draft statute approved by ACC, because that could lead to a further round of consultations among the organizations in the United Nations common system and thus complicate the process of arriving at a statute acceptable to all the parties concerned. In their view, the Member States should not be faced with a fait accompli. They noted that, under article I of the draft statute, the Commission was to be established by the General Assembly; the specialized agencies and other organizations in the United Nations common system were then to be asked to notify the Secretary-General in writing of their acceptance of the statute.

17. A number of delegations suggested that the absence of a consensus on the basic questions raised by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions militated in favour of deferring consideration of the question of the draft statute of the Commission until the twenty-ninth session. In their view, the differences of opinion in the Fifth Committee could not be resolved within the few remaining days of the session.

18. Some delegations felt that to defer the item to the next session of the General Assembly could undermine the morale of the staff in that it would mean that the long overdue review of the salaries for staff in the Professional and higher categories

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would not take place in 1974. They noted that there had been no salary increases since July 1971 and that the system of post adjustment did not fully compensate for losses in purchasing power resulting from currency fluctuations and inflation.

19. In response to a question as to whether a provisional list of candidates for the Commission would be made available to the members of the Fifth Committee, the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management recalled the provisions of paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 3042 (XXVII), in which the Secretary-General and his colleagues in ACC were asked to compile, after appropriate consultations, a roster of candidates for appointment to the Commission. Such a roster has been compiled and would be submitted to the Advisory Committee as required by the resolution as soon as a final decision had been made regarding the composition of the Commission. The list would be made available to the Fifth Committee after consultations had taken place with the Advisory Committee. In no case had a prospective candidate been consulted and therefore it could not be said that any candidates were being regarded as firm candidates for the Commission.

20. The Under-Secretary-General also commented on some of the observations made in the course of the discussion. He recalled that the structure for the Commission proposed by ACC was similar to the one recommended to the General Assembly last year by the Special Committee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System. It was in that Committee that the idea of having full-time members originated. The Special Committee had also recommended that the members of the Commission should be appointed for a four-year term of office and that the geographical composition of the Commission should be along the lines of the composition of the Advisory Committee. Furthermore, ICSAB had taken the position (A/9147 and Corr.1, para. 22) that, second only to a compact body, the one choice open was to draw a distinction between the types of authority to be exercised within the Commission, especially in view of the fact that the nature of the Commission would differ from that of the Advisory Committee in that the Commission would have administrative and policy-making functions. It had been in the minds of the members of ACC that the combined effects of article 30 of the draft statute, which provided that the Commission as a whole would be responsible for establishing its rules of procedure, and the last sentence of article 18, would ensure that the Commission as a whole would be fully responsible for carrying out administrative functions, while the implementation of the policy decisions of the Commission would have to be dealt with by one or more members on a day-to-day basis.

21. In the view of the Under-Secretary-General, there was no reason why the Fifth Committee should not decide to transfer some of the powers allocated to the three full-time members to the Commission as a whole. It was clear in the statute that the powers to be entrusted to the three full-time members were to be exercised within general policy lines established by the Commission as a whole. It was never intended that the three full-time members should have independent status or be superior to the other members of the Commission.

III. PROPOSALS

22. At the 1619th meeting, on 6 December, the representative of Ghana, on behalf of Ghana and Trinidad and Tobago, proposed (A/C.5/L.1149) the following paragraph for inclusion in the report of the Fifth Committee:

"The Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly that it should designate, as Chairman of the International Civil Service Commission, when constituted, a member from a developing country."

23. At the 1620th meeting, on 6 December, the representative of Algeria formally submitted the following proposal for the consideration and decision of the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/L.1150):

"The Fifth Committee, aware of the importance to the United Nations system of the establishment of an international civil service commission, considers that it is necessary to give the Governments of Member States more time in order that they may study this matter thoroughly and adopt a position on it. Consequently, the Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly that it defer the consideration of this question until its twenty-ninth session and that it request the Secretary-General in the meantime to communicate the text of the commission's draft statute to Governments for comment and to report on this subject to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session."

In calling for a postponement of the consideration of the draft statute of the Commission until the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the representative of Algeria stated that it was evident that the Fifth Committee would not be able to resolve at the current session the impasse which had arisen in respect of the draft statute. In the view of his delegation it was important that the Governments be given time to comment on the draft statute. Since ICSAB would continue in being, the proposal would not be injurious to the staff.

24. The representative of Sierra Leone proposed (A/C.5/L.1151), at the same meeting, on behalf of Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Trinidad and Tobago, that the following paragraph be included in the report of the Fifth Committee:

"The Fifth Committee interprets article 18 in the draft statute to mean that the functions and powers enumerated in chapter 3 of the draft statute are vested in the Commission as a whole. This arises out of the provision in article 18, that empowers the Commission to establish general policies; article 17, under which the Commission as a whole will adopt its annual report; and article 30, under which the Commission will adopt its own rules of procedure. Under article 30, the Commission as a whole will be able to set out in detail the functions to be delegated to its three full-time members, and in preparing its annual report the Commission will have the opportunity to review the manner in which the functions assigned to its full-time members have been carried out during the year."

In the view of the sponsors, the proposed paragraph provided a compromise between the two alternatives advanced by the Advisory Committee in its report.

25. In response to a point of order, the Chairman said that, as the draft paragraph (A/C.5/L.1151) represented a compromise between the two alternatives set forth in subparagraphs 8 (a) and 8 (b) of the interim report of the Advisory Committee (A/9370), it could be acted upon in advance of the receipt of a final report of the Advisory Committee on the draft statute. However, in accordance with rule 122 of the rules of procedure, a vote would have to be taken at the next meeting. In the case of the paragraph proposed by Ghana and Trinidad and Tobago (A/C.5/L.1149), the Chairman indicated that it would be considered at a later date when the basic question posed by the Advisory Committee in its interim report had been resolved.

26. The representative of Algeria argued that rule 122 did not apply to his proposal, which was a proposal to postpone consideration of an item. Accordingly, he insisted that a vote be taken on the proposal at that meeting.

27. After a procedural discussion, the Chairman put to the vote the question of whether the Algerian proposal should be voted upon at the current meeting.

28. The Fifth Committee decided, by a vote of 44 to 24, with 12 abstentions, to put the Algerian proposal to an immediate vote.

29. In reply to a question posed by several delegations as to whether the position of the staff would be affected by a decision to defer the establishment of the Commission, and, in particular, whether ICSAB would be in a position to deal with the question of the salaries of the staff, the Under-Secretary-General stated that it was clear from the last paragraph of resolution 3042 (XXVII) that ICSAB would continue in existence until the Commission became operational. Whether ICSAB could undertake a salary review without an authorization from the General Assembly to do so was not clear, since the General Assembly had taken the decision, in its resolution 2742 (XXV), that there should be no further adjustment in the base salary scales for staff in the Professional and higher categories until such time as the General Assembly had acted upon the recommendations of the Special Committee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System and, in its resolution 3042 (XXVII), had decided that the report of the Special Committee should be referred to the International Civil Service Commission for its consideration when it became operational.

30. In light of the information provided by the Under-Secretary-General, the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic suggested that the Algerian proposal be amended to include the words "bearing in mind the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2742 (XXV)" after the words "Fifth Committee" in the second sentence of the paragraph.

31. At the same meeting, the representative of Argentina proposed the addition of the following paragraph (A/C.5/L.1153) to the Algerian proposal:

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"The Fifth Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the International Civil Service Advisory Board to submit urgently to the General Assembly, at its twenty-ninth session, a report designed to solve the salary problems of staff in the United Nations system."

The representative of Argentina stated that the paragraph he proposed, if adopted, would allay the fears expressed in the Committee that a deferral of consideration of the draft statute would prejudice the interests of the staff of the United Nations.

32. A number of delegations continued, however, to urge that a decision on the Algerian proposal not be taken at that meeting. They noted that consultations aimed at finding a compromise to resolve the impasse that had arisen were in progress and should be given more time, at least 24 hours. Several delegations argued that the Fifth Committee, even if it would eventually have to defer a decision on the draft statute as a whole, should at least endeavour at the present session to arrive at a consensus on some of the fundamental aspects of the draft statute.

33. On a point of order, one delegation moved to adjourn the meeting under rule 121 (b) of the rules of procedure. Another delegation drew attention to rule 120 and argued that rule 121 (b) could not be invoked at the current stage of the deliberations on the Algerian proposal.

34. On another point of order, one delegation stated that the decision the Fifth Committee had taken to vote on the Algerian proposal at the current meeting did not cover any amendments to the proposal, which would have to be voted on separately.

35. The Chairman pointed out that the Committee had decided to vote on the Algerian proposal at the current meeting, but, in making that decision, the Committee did not exclude amendments being made to the proposal before it was voted upon. He ruled that any proposal to reconsider that decision would have to be adopted by a two-thirds majority, in accordance with rule 125 of the rules of procedure.

36. In response to a question as to whether the purpose of the oral amendment made by the representative of Argentina could be met by a simple statement to the effect that the Fifth Committee was of the opinion that the General Assembly might not wish to invoke paragraph 2 of resolution 2742 (XXV), the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management noted that the amendments submitted by the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and by the representative of Argentina contradicted each other. The contradiction would become even more apparent if the proposal of the representative of Argentina were amended along the lines suggested. Unless the General Assembly decided to reconsider the decision it had taken in paragraph 2 of its resolution 2742 (XXV) to freeze the base salary scales for the staff in the Professional and higher categories, it was very doubtful that ICSAB could undertake a review of salaries. He pointed out that one of the two amendments submitted proposed implicitly that paragraph 2 of resolution 2742 (XXV) be invoked, while the other implicitly proposed that the paragraph in question not be invoked.

37. Several delegations suggested that, since the proposal of Algeria would not defer discussion of the agenda item, but only consideration of the draft statutes, the proposed amendments should be considered as separate proposals after a decision had been taken on the proposal of Algeria as it stood. The representatives of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Argentina agreed to that procedure.

38. The proposal of Algeria (A/C.5/L.1150) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 42 to 16, with 32 abstentions (see paragraph 46 (a) below). The voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Dahomey, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Greece, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Guyana, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago.

Abstaining: Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela.

39. At the 1621st meeting, on 7 December, the representative of Ghana proposed that the words "designed to solve the salary problems" in the paragraph proposed by Argentina (A/C.5/L.1153), should be replaced by the words "a report on the salary and allowances".

40. At the same meeting, the representative of Iran proposed the following alternative text to the paragraph submitted by Argentina:

"The Fifth Committee recommends that:

(a) The General Assembly should decide not to invoke the provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 2742 (XXV);

(b) The International Civil Service Advisory Board should be requested to submit, as a matter of priority, to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session a report with recommendations concerning the salaries and allowances of the staff of the United Nations common system from 1 January 1975."

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41. The representative of Argentina agreed to withdraw his proposal and to support the proposal of Iran.

42. On the proposal of the representative of the USSR, invoking rule 122 of the rules of procedure, a vote was postponed on the proposal of Iran until the following meeting.

43. At the 1622nd meeting, on 10 December, the representative of Iran submitted the following revised proposal (A/C.5/L.1154):

"The Fifth Committee recommends that the General Assembly should decide not to invoke the provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 2742 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, and to request the International Civil Service Advisory Board to submit, as a matter of priority, to the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session a report with recommendations concerning the salaries of staff in the Professional and higher categories and staff allowances of the United Nations common system, to be effective from 1 January 1975."

44. Several delegations spoke in favour of the proposal of Iran. Others expressed opposition to the proposal, because they felt it went beyond the normal procedures of the Fifth Committee in that it sought to annul General Assembly resolutions 2742 (XXV) and 3042 (XXVII). In their view, there were no urgent circumstances which required such a decision. The Fifth Committee had already decided at the present session to recommend to the General Assembly the consolidation of five classes of post adjustments into the base salaries of staff in the Professional and higher categories. In addition, the system of post adjustments compensated for increases in cost of living. Therefore there was no urgent need to take up a review of the salaries of staff before the establishment of the International Civil Service Commission.

45. The proposal of Iran (A/C.5/L.1154) was adopted by 71 votes to 9, with 3 abstentions (see paragraph 46 (b) below).

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE

46. The Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following proposals:

(a) The General Assembly, aware of the importance to the United Nations system of the establishment of an international civil service commission, considers that it is necessary to give the Governments of Member States more time in order that they may study this matter thoroughly and adopt a position on it. Consequently, the General Assembly decides to defer the consideration of this question until its twenty-ninth session and requests the Secretary-General in the meantime to communicate the text of the commission's draft statute to Governments for comment and to report on this subject to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth session.

(b) The General Assembly decides not to invoke the provisions of paragraph 2 of its resolution 2742 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, and to request the International Civil Service Advisory Board to submit, as a matter of priority, to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth session a report with recommendations concerning the salaries of staff in the Professional and higher categories and staff allowances of the United Nations common system, to be effective from 1 January 1975.
